


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


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Malcolm N. Shaw, QC, is a practising barrister at Essex Court Chambers and Senior Fellow at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at Cambridge University. He is Emeritus Sir Robert Jennings Professor of International Law at Leicester University. One of the world's leading international lawyers, he is an Associé of the Institut de Droit International, former Trustee of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law and a founding

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Surya P. Subedi, University of Leeds

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Malcolm N. Shaw

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For my wife Judith. May her memory be a blessing.

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Preface to the Ninth Edition

The chapters in this book have been re-examined, updated and, where necessary, rewritten in order to try and cope with the ever-increasing volume of new materials on international law. I have, in particular, been able to increase the coverage of outer space and international economic law, and to introduce sections on cyber activities, cyber warfare and the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. I have also been able to add somewhat to the chapters on international law and municipal law and on recognition in the light of important case-law. However, to compensate, some trimming has been necessary in other parts to free up the necessary space.

I would especially like to thank the Cambridge University Press team of Caitlin Lisle, Marianne Nield and Amy Mower for their help and encouragement in the production of this edition and to Finola O’Sullivan who has monitored this work through many editions now. She is a friend as well as a guide. I am also grateful to Sophie Rosinke for the thorough and excellent copy-editing of the text and preparation of the tables and to Judy Oliver for so carefully preparing the index. Particular appreciation is owed to Tim Clark for his meticulous research assistance, accomplished with speed and organisation. A lasting debt remains, however, to Sir Elihu Lauterpacht QC, a towering figure in international law, whose encouragement and assistance in the initial development of this book were indispensable. His continuing interest and friendship were always deeply appreciated and are now much missed. I would also like to thank my many colleagues from

around the world for their advice and support, while reassuring them that all responsibility for the end product rests squarely with me.

As ever, the deepest thanks are due to my wife Judith and my children, Talia, Ilan and Daniella and now my grandchildren, Mika, Eden, Zevi and Zak. I am particularly grateful to Ilan for once again producing an imaginative, intriguing and quite remarkable cover painting.

The date of this work is July 2020, but I have been able to insert some additional material during the production process. As this work entered the proofing stage, my beloved wife Judith passed away after a long and brave struggle against a cruel illness. She was the heart and foundation of my life. May she rest in peace.

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Abbreviations

AC

Law Reports, Appeal Cases

ACtHPR

African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights

AD

Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (now International Law Reports)

AFDI

Annuaire Français de Droit International

AJIL

American Journal of International Law

All ER

All England Law Reports

ALR

Argus Law Reports (1895–1959); Australian Argus Law Reports (1960–73); Australian Law Reports (1973–)

AMF

Arab Monetary Fund

AMIS

African Mission in Sudan

AMISOM

African Union Mission to Somalia

ASEAN

Association of South-East Asian Nations

AU

African Union

Australian YIL

Australian Yearbook of International Law

B & C

Barnewall Cresswell (English Reports)

BCLC

Butterworths Company Law Cases

BFSP

British and Foreign State Papers

BIT

bilateral investment treaty

BPIL

British Practice in International Law

Bull.

Bulletin

Burr.

Burrow's Reports

BYIL

British Year Book of International Law

Cal

California Reports

Canadian YIL

Canadian Yearbook of International Law

CARICOM

Caribbean Community

Cass. Crim.

Cour de Cassation, France, Criminal

CCC

Canadian Criminal Cases

Cd, Cmd or Cmnd

UK Command Papers

CETA

Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

CFC

chlorofluorocarbon

Ch.

Law Reports, Chancery Division

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States

CJEU

Court of Justice of the European Union

Cl. Ct.

US Court of Claims Reports

CLJ

Cambridge Law Journal

CLR

Commonwealth Law Reports

CMLR

Common Market Law Reports

CoE

Council of Europe

COMECON

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

Cr App R

Criminal Appeal Reports

Cranch

Cranch Reports, United States Supreme Court

Crim LR

Criminal Law Review

C.Rob.

C. Robinson's Admiralty Reports

CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Dall.

Dallas, Pennsylvania and United States Reports

DLR

Dominion Law Reports

Dod.

Dodson's Admiralty Reports

DUSPIL

Digest of US Practice in International Law

EC

European Communities

ECHR

European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

ECJ

European Court of Justice

ECOMOG

ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group

ECOSOC

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

ECR

European Court Reports

EEC

European Economic Community

EJIL

European Journal of International Law

EU

European Union

EUFOR

European Union force

EURATOM

European Atomic Energy Community

EWCA Civ.

England and Wales, Court of Appeal, Civil

EWHC Admin.

England and Wales, High Court

Ex.D.

Law Reports, Exchequer Division

F.2d

Federal Reporter (Second Series)

Fam.

Law Reports, Family Division

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organization

FCDO

Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office

FCO

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FCR

Federal Court Reports (Australia)

Finnish YIL

F(J)

Faculty of Advocates

FLR

Family Law Reports

FRG

Federal Republic of Germany

F.Supp.

Federal Supplement

GAOR

General Assembly Official Records

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDR

German Democratic Republic

GEF

Global Environmental Facility

German YIL

German Yearbook of International Law

GHG

greenhouse gas

GNP

gross national product

HC Deb.

House of Commons Debates

HCFC

hydrochlorofluorocarbon

HFC

hydrofluorocarbon

HLC

House of Lords Reports (Clark)

HL Deb.

House of Lords Debates

HMSO

Her Majesty's Stationery Office

HR

Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours

HRJ

Human Rights Journal

HRLJ

Human Rights Law Journal

HRQ

IAC

Iraqi Airways Company

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IBRD

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICG

International Crisis Group

ICJ

International Court of Justice

ICLQ

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

ICR

Industrial Cases Reports

ICR

International Civilian Representative

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

ICSID

International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes

ICTR

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

IDA

International Development Association

IFC

International Finance Corporation

IFOR

implementation force

IGAD

Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa

IJIL

Indian Journal of International Law

ILA

International Law Association

ILC

International Law Commission

ILM

International Legal Materials

ILO

International Labour Organization

ILR

International Law Reports (see also Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases)

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IMO

International Maritime Organization

IPPA

investment promotion and protection agreement

Iran–US CTR

Iran–United States Claims Tribunal Reports

ISAF

International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

ISDS

investor–state dispute settlement

ITC

International Tin Council

JCPA

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

KB

Law Reports, King’s Bench Division

KFOR

Kosovo Force

KZW

Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar

L.Ed.

US Supreme Court, Reports, Lawyers' Edition

LL. R

Lloyd's Law Reports

LNOJ

League of Nations Official Journal

LNTS

League of Nations Treaty Series

LQR

Law Quarterly Review

LRA

Lord's Resistance Army

MERCOSUR

Southern Cone Common Market

MINURSO

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSCA

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic

MINUSMA

United Nations mission in Mali

MLR

Modern Law Review

MNF

Multi-National Force

MONUC

Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MONUSCO

Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MPA

Marine Protected Area

NAFO

North Atlantic Fisheries Organization

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NE

Northeastern Reporter

Netherlands YIL

Netherlands Yearbook of International Law

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

NILR

Netherlands International Law Review

NKR

Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

NY

New York Reports

NYS

New York Supplement

NZLR

New Zealand Law Reports

OAS

Organization of American States

OAU

Organisation of African Unity

ODIHR

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OECS

Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States

ONUVEN

Observer for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua

OR

Ontario Reports

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

P.

Law Reports, Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, 1891–

PAIGC

Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde

PASIL

Proceedings of the American Society of International Law

PCA

Permanent Court of Arbitration

PCIJ

Permanent Court of International Justice

PD

Law Reports, Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, 1875–90

Pet.

Peter's United States Supreme Court Reports

PLO

Palestine Liberation Organisation

POW

prisoner of war

QB

Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division

RecChl

Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

RFDA

Revue Française de Droit Administratif

RGDIP

Revue Française de Droit International Public

RIAA

United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards

R (J)

Justiciary cases in vols. of Session Cases, 1873–98

SA

South African Reports

SADC

Southern African Development Community

SADR

Saharan Arab Democratic Republic

SAR

Special Administrative Region

SC

Supreme Court

SCOR

Security Council Official Records

SCR

Supreme Court Reports (Canada)

S.Ct.

Supreme Court Reporter

SFOR

stabilisation force

SFRY

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SR (NSW)

New South Wales, State Reports

Stat.

United States Statutes at Large

TEU

Treaty on European Union

TFSC

Turkish Federated State of Cyprus

TRNC

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UK

United Kingdom

UKHL

United Kingdom, House of Lords

UKMIL

United Kingdom Materials in International Law

UN

United Nations

UNAMIC

United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

UNAMID

United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNAMIR

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNAMIS

United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan

UNAMSIL

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNASOG

United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group

UNAVEM I

United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNCESCR

United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

UNCIO

United Nations Conference on International Organization

UNCITRAL

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNCRO

United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDRO

United Nations Disaster Relief Office

UNEF

United Nations Emergency Force

UNEP

United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICYP

United Nations Force in Cyprus

UNIFIL

United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon

UNIKOM

United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observer Mission

UNITAF

Unified Task Force

UNJYB

United Nations Juridical Yearbook

UNMIH

United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNMIK

United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNMIS

United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNMISET

United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

UNMISS

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

UNMOGIP

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNMOP

United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

UNMOVIC

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNOMIL

United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOSOM

United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNPREDEP

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

UNPROFOR

United Nations Protection Force

UNSCOB

United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans

UNSCOM

United Nations Special Commission

UNSMIH

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

UNTAC

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAES

United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia

UNTAET

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

UNTAG

United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UNTS

United Nations Treaty Series

UNTSO

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

US

United States Reports (Supreme Court)

USC

United States Code

USLW

United States Law Weekly

Va. JIL

Virginia Journal of International Law

Ves. Jun.

Vesey Junior's Chancery Reports

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

VMS

vessel monitoring system

VR

Victoria Reports

WEU

Western European Union

Wheat.

Wheaton, United States Supreme Court Reports

WHO

World Health Organization

WLR

Weekly Law Reports

Yale JIL

Yale Journal of International Law

YBWA

Yearbook of World Affairs

ZACC

South African Constitutional Court

ZaöRV

Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht

1

The Nature and Development of International Law

In the long march of mankind from the cave to the computer a central role has always been played by the idea of law – the idea that order is necessary and chaos inimical to a just and stable existence. Every society, whether it be large or small, powerful or weak, has created for itself a framework of principles within which to develop. What can be done, what cannot be done, permissible acts, forbidden acts, have all been spelt out within the consciousness of that community. Progress, with its inexplicable leaps and bounds, has always been based upon the group as men and women combine to pursue commonly accepted goals, whether these be hunting animals, growing food or simply making money.

Law is that element which binds the members of the community together in their adherence to recognised values and standards. It is both permissive in allowing individuals to establish their own legal relations with rights and duties, as in the creation of contracts, and coercive, as it punishes those who infringe its regulations. Law consists of a series of rules regulating behaviour, and reflecting, to some extent, the ideas and preoccupations of the society within which it functions.

And so it is with what is termed international law, with the important difference that the principal subjects of international law are nation-states, not individual citizens. There are many contrasts between the law within a country (municipal law) and the law that operates outside and between states, international organisations and, in certain cases, individuals.

International law itself is divided into conflict of laws (or private international law as it is sometimes called) and public international law (usually just termed international law).¹ The former deals with those cases, *within* particular legal systems, in which foreign elements obtrude, raising questions as to the application of foreign law or the role of foreign courts.² For example, if two Englishmen make a contract in France to sell goods situated in Paris, an English court would apply French law as regards the validity of that contract. By contrast, public international law is not simply an adjunct of a legal order, but a separate system altogether,³ and it is this field that will be considered in this book.

Public international law covers relations between states in all their myriad forms, from war to satellites and from trade to human rights and now on to cyber issues, and regulates the operations of the many international and regional institutions. It may be universal or general, in which case the stipulated rules bind all the states (or practically all depending upon the nature of the rule), or regional, whereby a group of states linked geographically or ideologically may recognise special rules applying only to them, for example, the practice of diplomatic asylum that has developed to its greatest extent in Latin America.⁴ The rules of international law must be distinguished from what is called international comity, or practices such as

saluting the flags of foreign warships at sea, which are implemented solely through courtesy and are not regarded as legally binding.⁵ Similarly, the mistake of confusing international law with international morality must be avoided. While they may meet at certain points, the former discipline is a legal one as regards both its content and its form, while the concept of international morality is a branch of ethics. This does not mean, however, that international law can be divorced from its values.

In this chapter and the next, the characteristics of the international legal system and the historical and theoretical background necessary to a proper appreciation of the part to be played by the law in international law will be examined.

Law and Politics in the World Community

It is the legal quality of international law that is the first question to be posed. Each side to an international dispute will doubtless claim legal justification for its actions and within the international system there is no independent institution able to determine the issue and give a final decision.

Virtually everybody who starts reading about international law does so having learned or absorbed something about the principal characteristics of ordinary or domestic law. Such identifying marks would include the existence of a recognised body to legislate or create laws, a hierarchy of courts with compulsory jurisdiction to settle disputes over such laws and an accepted system of enforcing those laws. Without a legislature, judiciary and executive, it would seem that one cannot talk about a legal order.⁶ And

international law does not fit this model. International law has no legislature. The General Assembly of the United Nations comprising delegates from all the member states exists, but its resolutions are not legally binding save for certain of the organs of the United Nations for certain purposes.⁷ There is no system of courts. The International Court of Justice does exist at The Hague, but it can only decide cases when both sides agree⁸ and it cannot ensure that its decisions are complied with (although the Security Council of the United Nations is responsible for enforcement). Above all there is no executive or governing entity. The UN Security Council, which was intended to have such a role in a sense, has at times been effectively constrained by the veto power of the five permanent members (the United States, the Soviet Union – now the Russian Federation – China, France and the United Kingdom).⁹ Thus, if there is no identifiable institution either to establish rules, or to clarify them or see that those who break them are punished, how can what is called international law be law?

It will, of course, be realised that the basis for this line of argument is the comparison of domestic law with international law, and the assumption of an analogy between the national system and the international order. And this is at the heart of all discussions about the nature of international law.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, the English philosopher John Austin elaborated a theory of law based upon the notion of a sovereign issuing a command backed by a sanction or punishment. Since international law did not fit within that definition, it was relegated to the category of ‘positive morality’.¹⁰ This concept has been criticised for oversimplifying and even confusing the true nature of law within a society and for overemphasising the

role of the sanction within the system by linking it to every rule.¹¹ This is not the place for a comprehensive summary of Austin's theory, but the idea of coercion as an integral part of any legal order is a vital one that needs to be examined in the context of international law.

The Role of Force

There is no unified system of sanctions¹² in international law in the sense that there is in municipal law, but there are circumstances in which the use of force is regarded as justified and legal. Within the United Nations system, sanctions may be imposed by the Security Council upon the determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.¹³ Such sanctions may be economic, for example those proclaimed in 1966 against Rhodesia,¹⁴ or military as in the Korean War in 1950,¹⁵ or indeed both, as in 1990 against Iraq.¹⁶

Coercive action within the framework of the United Nations is rare because it requires coordination among the five permanent members of the Security Council and this obviously needs an issue not regarded by any of the great powers as a threat to their vital interests.

Korea was an exception and joint action could only be undertaken because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Union from the Council as a protest at the seating of the Nationalist Chinese representatives.¹⁷

Apart from such institutional sanctions, one may note the bundle of rights to take violent action known as self-help.¹⁸ This procedure to resort to force to

defend certain rights is characteristic of primitive systems of law with blood-feuds, but in the domestic legal order such procedures and methods are now within the exclusive control of the established authority. States may use force in self-defence, if the object of aggression, and may take action in response to the illegal acts of other states. In such cases the states themselves decide whether to take action and, if so, the extent of their measures, and there is no supreme body to rule on their legality or otherwise, in the absence of an examination by the International Court of Justice, acceptable to both parties, although international law does lay down relevant rules.¹⁹

Accordingly, those writers who put the element of force to the forefront of their theories face many difficulties in describing the nature, or rather the legal nature, of international law, with its lack of a coherent, recognised and comprehensive framework of sanctions. To see the sanctions of international law in the states' rights of self-defence and reprisals²⁰ is to misunderstand the role of sanctions within a system because they are at the disposal of the states, not the system itself. Neither must it be forgotten that the current trend in international law is to restrict the use of force as far as possible, thus leading to the absurd result that the more force is controlled in international society, the less legal international law becomes.

Since one cannot discover the nature of international law by reference to a definition of law predicated upon sanctions, the character of the international legal order has to be examined in order to seek to discover whether in fact states feel obliged to obey the rules of international law and, if so, why. If, indeed, the answer to the first question is negative, that states do not feel the

necessity to act in accordance with such rules, then there does not exist any system of international law worthy of the name.

The International System²¹

The key to the search lies within the unique attributes of the international system in the sense of the network of relationships existing primarily, if not exclusively, between states recognising certain common principles and ways of doing things.²² While the legal structure within all but the most primitive societies is hierarchical and authority is vertical, the international system is horizontal, consisting of over 190 independent states, all equal in legal theory (in that they all possess the characteristics of sovereignty) and recognising no one in authority over them. The law is above individuals in domestic systems, but international law only exists as between the states. Individuals only have the choice as to whether to obey the law or not. They do not create the law. That is done by specific institutions. In international law, on the other hand, it is the states themselves that create the law and obey or disobey it.²³ This, of course, has profound repercussions as regards the sources of law as well as the means for enforcing accepted legal rules.

International law, as will be shown in succeeding chapters, is primarily formulated by international agreements, which create rules binding upon the signatories, and customary rules, which are basically state practices recognised by the community at large as laying down patterns of conduct that have to be complied with.

However, it may be argued that since states themselves sign treaties and engage in action that they may or may not regard as legally obligatory, international law would appear to consist of a series of rules from which

states may pick and choose. Contrary to popular belief, states do observe international law, and violations are comparatively rare. However, such violations (like armed attacks and racial oppression) are well publicised and strike at the heart of the system, the creation and preservation of international peace and justice. But just as incidents of murder, robbery and rape do occur within national legal orders without destroying the system as such, so analogously assaults upon international legal rules point up the weaknesses of the system without denigrating their validity or their necessity. Thus, despite the occasional gross violation, the vast majority of the provisions of international law are followed.²⁴

In the daily routine of international life, large numbers of agreements and customs are complied with. However, the need is felt in the hectic interplay of world affairs for some kind of regulatory framework or rules network within which the game can be played, and international law fulfils that requirement. States feel this necessity because it imports an element of stability and predictability into the situation.

Where countries are involved in a disagreement or a dispute, it is handy to have recourse to the rules of international law even if there are conflicting interpretations, since at least there is a common frame of reference and one state will be aware of how the other state will develop its argument. They will both be talking a common language and this factor of communication is vital since misunderstandings occur so easily and often with tragic consequences. Where the antagonists dispute the understanding of a particular rule and adopt opposing stands as regards its implementation, they are at least on the same wavelength and communicate by means of the same phrases. That is

something. It is not everything, for it is a mistake as well as inaccurate to claim for international law more than it can possibly deliver. It can constitute a mutually understandable vocabulary book and suggest possible solutions which follow from a study of its principles. What it cannot do is solve every problem no matter how dangerous or complex merely by being there.

International law has not yet been developed, if it ever will, to that particular stage and one should not exaggerate its capabilities while pointing to its positive features. It is, however, a way for states to conduct their business together in a relatively congenial context.

But what is to stop a state from simply ignoring international law when proceeding upon its chosen policy? Can a legal rule against aggression, for example, of itself prevail over political temptations? There is no international police force to prevent such an action, but there are a series of other considerations closely bound up with the character of international law which might well cause a potential aggressor to forbear.

There is the element of reciprocity at work and a powerful weapon it can be. States quite often do not pursue one particular course of action which might bring them short-term gains, because it could disrupt the mesh of reciprocal tolerance which could very well bring long-term disadvantages. For example, states everywhere protect the immunity of foreign diplomats for not to do so would place their own officials abroad at risk.²⁵ This constitutes an inducement to states to act reasonably and moderate demands in the expectation that this will similarly encourage other states to act reasonably and so avoid confrontations. Because the rules can ultimately be changed by states altering their patterns of behaviour and causing one custom to

supersede another, or by mutual agreement, a certain definite reference to political life is retained. But the point must be made that a state, after weighing up all possible alternatives, might very well feel that the only method to protect its vital interests would involve a violation of international law and that responsibility would just have to be taken. Where survival is involved international law may take second place.

Another significant factor is the advantages, or ‘rewards’, that may occur in certain situations from an observance of international law. It may encourage friendly or neutral states to side with one country involved in a conflict rather than its opponent, and even take a more active role than might otherwise have been the case. In many ways, it is an appeal to public opinion for support and all states employ this tactic.

In many ways, it reflects the esteem in which law is held. The Soviet Union made considerable use of legal arguments in its effort to establish its non-liability to contribute towards the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations,²⁶ and the Americans, too, justified their activities with regard to Cuba²⁷ and Vietnam²⁸ by reference to international law. In some cases, it may work and bring considerable support in its wake, in many cases it will not; but in any event the very fact that all states do it is a constructive sign.

A further element worth mentioning in this context is the constant formulation of international business in characteristically legal terms. Points of view and disputes, in particular, are framed legally with references to precedent, international agreements and even the opinions of juristic authors. Claims are pursued with regard to the rules of international law and not in

terms of, for example, morality or ethics.²⁹ This has brought into being a class of officials throughout governmental departments, in addition to those working in international institutions, versed in international law and carrying on the everyday functions of government in a law-oriented way. Many writers have, in fact, emphasised the role of officials in the actual functioning of law and the influence they have upon the legal process. To this one may add more generally the role of those actively working in the field academically and professionally.³⁰

Having come to the conclusion that states do observe international law and will usually only violate it on an issue regarded as vital to their interests, the question arises as to the basis of this sense of obligation.³¹ The nineteenth century, with its business-oriented philosophy, stressed the importance of the contract, as the legal basis of an agreement freely entered into by both (or all) sides, and this influenced the theory of consent in international law.³² States were independent, and free agents, and accordingly they could only be bound with their own consent. There was no authority in existence able theoretically or practically to impose rules upon the various nation-states. This approach found its extreme expression in the theory of auto-limitation, or self-limitation, which declared that states could only be obliged to comply with international legal rules if they had first agreed to be so obliged.³³

Nevertheless, this theory is most unsatisfactory as an account of why international law is regarded as binding or even as an explanation of the international legal system.³⁴ To give one example, there are over 100 states that have come into existence since the end of the Second World War and by no stretch of the imagination can it be said that such states have consented to

all the rules of international law formed prior to their establishment. It could be argued that by ‘accepting independence’, states consent to all existing rules, but to take this view relegates consent to the role of a mere fiction.³⁵

This theory also fails as an adequate explanation of the international legal system, because it does not take into account the tremendous growth in international institutions and the network of rules and regulations that have emerged from them within the last generation.

To accept consent as the basis for obligation in international law³⁶ begs the question as to what happens when consent is withdrawn. The state’s reversal of its agreement to a rule does not render that rule optional or remove from it its aura of legality. It merely places that state in breach of its obligations under international law if that state proceeds to act upon its decision. Indeed, the principle that agreements are binding (*pacta sunt servanda*) upon which all treaty law must be based cannot itself be based upon consent.³⁷

One current approach to this problem is to refer to the doctrine of consensus.³⁸ This reflects the influence of the majority in creating new norms of international law and the acceptance by other states of such new rules. It attempts to put into focus the change of emphasis that is beginning to take place from exclusive concentration upon the nation-state to a consideration of the developing forms of international cooperation where such concepts as consent and sanction are inadequate to explain what is happening.

Of course, one cannot ignore the role of consent in international law. To recognise its limitations is not to neglect its significance. Much of

international law is constituted by states expressly agreeing to specific normative standards, most obviously by entering into treaties. This cannot be minimised. Nevertheless, it is preferable to consider consent as important not only with regard to specific rules specifically accepted (which is not the sum total of international law, of course), but in the light of the approach of states generally to the totality of rules, understandings, patterns of behaviour and structures underpinning and constituting the international system.³⁹ In a broad sense, states accept or consent to the general system of international law, for in reality without that no such system could possibly operate. It is this approach which may be characterised as consensus or the essential framework within which the demand for individual state consent is transmuted into community acceptance.

It is important to note that while states from time to time object to particular rules of international law and seek to change them, no state has sought to maintain that it is free to object to the system as a whole. Each individual state, of course, has the right to seek to influence by word or deed the development of specific rules of international law, but the creation of new customary rules is not dependent upon the express consent of each particular state.

The Function of Politics

It is clear that there can never be a complete separation between law and policy. No matter what theory of law or political philosophy is professed, the inextricable bonds linking law and politics must be recognised.

Within developed societies a distinction is made between the formulation of policy and the method of its enforcement. In the United Kingdom, Parliament legislates while the courts adjudicate and a similar division is maintained in the United States between the Congress and the courts system. The purpose of such divisions, of course, is to prevent a concentration of too much power within one branch of government. Nevertheless, it is the political branch which makes laws and in the first place creates the legal system. Even within the hierarchy of courts, the judges have leeway in interpreting the law and in the last resort make decisions from among a number of alternatives.⁴⁰ This position, however, should not be exaggerated because a number of factors operate to conceal and lessen the impact of politics upon the legal process. Foremost among these is the psychological element of tradition and the development of the so-called 'law-habit'.⁴¹ A particular legal atmosphere has been created, which is buttressed by the political system and recognises the independent existence of law institutions and methods of operation characterised as 'just' or 'legal'. In most countries overt interference with the juridical process would be regarded as an attack upon basic principles and hotly contested. The use of legal language and accepted procedures together with the pride of the legal profession reinforce the system and emphasise the degree of distance maintained between the legislative–executive organs and the judicial structure.⁴²

However, when one looks at the international legal scene the situation changes. The arbiters of the world order are, in the last resort, the states and they both make the rules (ignoring for the moment the secondary, if growing, field of international organisations) and interpret and enforce them.

While it is possible to discern an ‘international legal habit’ among governmental and international officials, the machinery necessary to enshrine this does not exist.

Politics is much closer to the heart of the system than is perceived within national legal orders, and power much more in evidence.⁴³ The interplay of law and politics in world affairs is much more complex and difficult to unravel, and signals a return to the earlier discussion as to why states comply with international rules. Power politics stresses competition, conflict and supremacy and adopts as its core the struggle for survival and influence.⁴⁴ International law aims for harmony and the regulation of disputes. It attempts to create a framework, no matter how rudimentary, which can act as a kind of shock-absorber clarifying and moderating claims and endeavouring to balance interests. In addition, it sets out a series of principles declaring how states should behave. Just as any domestic community must have a background of ideas and hopes to aim at, even if few can be or are ever attained, so the international community, too, must bear in mind its ultimate values.

However, these ultimate values are in a formal sense kept at arm’s length from the legal process. As the International Court noted in the *South West Africa* case:⁴⁵ ‘It is a court of law, and can take account of moral principles only in so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal form. Law exists, it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely for that reason it can do so only through and within the limits of its own discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal service that would be rendered.’⁴⁶

International law cannot be a source of instant solutions to problems of conflict and confrontation because of its own inherent weaknesses in structure and content. To fail to recognise this encourages a utopian approach which, when faced with reality, will fail.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the cynical attitude with its obsession with brute power is equally inaccurate, if more depressing.

It is the medium road, recognising the strength and weakness of international law and pointing out what it can achieve and what it cannot, which offers the best hope. Man seeks order, welfare and justice not only within the state in which he lives, but also within the international system in which he lives.

Historical Development⁴⁸

The foundations of international law (or the law of nations) as it is understood today lie firmly in the development of Western culture and political organisation.

The growth of European notions of sovereignty and the independent nation-state required an acceptable method whereby inter-state relations could be conducted in accordance with commonly accepted standards of behaviour, and international law filled the gap. But although the law of nations took root and flowered with the sophistication of Renaissance Europe, the seeds of this particular hybrid plant are of far older lineage. They reach far back into history.

Early Origins

While the modern international system can be traced back some 400 years, certain of the basic concepts of international law can be discerned in political relationships thousands of years ago.⁴⁹ Around 2100 BC, for instance, a solemn treaty was signed between the rulers of Lagash and Umma, the city-states situated in the area known to historians as Mesopotamia. It was inscribed on a stone block and concerned the establishment of a defined boundary to be respected by both sides under pain of alienating a number of Sumerian gods.⁵⁰ The next major instance known of an important, binding, international treaty is that concluded over 1,000 years later between Rameses II of Egypt and the king of the Hittites for the establishment of eternal peace

and brotherhood.⁵¹ Other points covered in that agreement signed, it would seem, at Kadesh, north of Damascus, included respect for each other's territorial integrity, the termination of a state of aggression and the setting up of a form of defensive alliance.

Since that date many agreements between the rival Middle Eastern powers were concluded, usually aimed at embodying in a ritual form a state of subservience between the parties or attempting to create a political alliance to contain the influence of an over-powerful empire.⁵²

The role of ancient Israel must also be noted. A universal ethical stance coupled with rules relating to warfare were handed down to other peoples and religions and the demand for justice and a fair system of law founded upon strict morality permeated the thought and conduct of subsequent generations.⁵³ For example, the Prophet Isaiah declared that sworn agreements, even where made with the enemy, must be performed.⁵⁴ Peace and social justice were the keys to man's existence, not power.

After much neglect, there is now more consideration of the cultures and standards that evolved, before the birth of Christ, in the Far East, in the Indian⁵⁵ and Chinese⁵⁶ civilisations. Many of the Hindu rules displayed a growing sense of morality and generosity and the Chinese Empire devoted much thought to harmonious relations between its constituent parts. Regulations controlling violence and the behaviour of varying factions with regard to innocent civilians were introduced and ethical values instilled in the education of the ruling classes. In times of Chinese dominance, a regional

tributary-states system operated which fragmented somewhat in times of weakness, but this remained culturally alive for many centuries.

However, the predominant approach of ancient civilisations was geographically and culturally restricted. There was no conception of an international community of states co-existing within a defined framework. The scope for any 'international law' of states was extremely limited and all that one can point to is the existence of certain ideals, such as the sanctity of treaties, which have continued to this day as important elements in society. But the notion of a universal community with its ideal of world order was not in evidence.

The era of classical Greece, from about the sixth century BC and onwards for a couple of hundred years, has, one must note, been of overwhelming significance for European thought. Its critical and rational turn of mind, its constant questioning and analysis of man and nature and its love of argument and debate were spread throughout Europe and the Mediterranean world by the Roman Empire which adopted Hellenic culture wholesale, and penetrated Western consciousness with the Renaissance. However, Greek awareness was limited to their own competitive city-states and colonies. Those of different origin were barbarians not deemed worthy of association.

The value of Greece in a study of international law lies partly in the philosophical, scientific and political analyses bequeathed to mankind and partly in the fascinating state of interrelationship built up within the Hellenistic world.⁵⁷ Numerous treaties linked the city-states together in a network of commercial and political associations. Rights were often granted

to the citizens of the states in one another's territories and rules regarding the sanctity and protection of diplomatic envoys developed. Certain practices were essential before the declaration of war, and the horrors of war were somewhat ameliorated by the exercise, for example, of religious customs regarding sanctuaries. But no overall moral approach similar to those emerging from Jewish and Hindu thought, particularly, evolved. No sense of a world community can be traced to Greek ideology in spite of the growth of Greek colonies throughout the Mediterranean area. This was left to the able administrators of the Roman Empire.⁵⁸

The Romans had a profound respect for organisation and the law.⁵⁹ The law knitted together their empire and constituted a vital source of reference for every inhabitant of the far-flung domain. The early Roman law (the *jus civile*) applied only to Roman citizens. It was formalistic and hard and reflected the status of a small, unsophisticated society rooted in the soil.

It was totally unable to provide a relevant background for an expanding, developing nation. This need was served by the creation and progressive augmentation of the *jus gentium*. This provided simplified rules to govern the relations between foreigners, and between foreigners and citizens. The instrument through which this particular system evolved was the official known as the Praetor Peregrinus, whose function it was to oversee all legal relationships, including bureaucratic and commercial matters, within the empire.

The progressive rules of the *jus gentium* gradually overrode the narrow *jus civile* until the latter system ceased to exist. Thus, the *jus gentium* became the

common law of the Roman Empire and was deemed to be of universal application.

It is this all-embracing factor which so strongly distinguishes the Roman from the Greek experience, although, of course, there was no question of the acceptance of other nations on a basis of equality and the *jus gentium* remained a 'national law' for the Roman Empire.

One of the most influential of Greek concepts taken up by the Romans was the idea of Natural Law.⁶⁰ This was formulated by the Stoic philosophers of the third century BC and their theory was that it constituted a body of rules of universal relevance. Such rules were rational and logical, and because the ideas and precepts of the 'law of nature' were rooted in human intelligence, it followed that such rules could not be restricted to any nation or any group, but were of worldwide relevance. This element of universality is basic to modern doctrines of international law and the Stoic elevation of human powers of logical deduction to the supreme pinnacle of 'discovering' the law foreshadows the rational philosophies of the West. In addition to being a fundamental concept in legal theory, Natural Law is vital to an understanding of international law, as well as being an indispensable precursor to contemporary concern with human rights.

Certain Roman philosophers incorporated those Greek ideas of Natural Law into their own legal theories, often as a kind of ultimate justification of the *jus gentium*, which was deemed to enshrine rational principles common to all civilised nations.

However, the law of nature was held to have an existence over and above that of the *jus gentium*. This led to much confusion over the exact relationship between the two ideas and different Roman lawyers came to different conclusions as to their identity and characteristics. The important factors though that need to be noted are the theories of the universality of law and the rational origins of legal rules that were founded, theoretically at least, not on superior force, but on superior reason.

The classical rules of Roman law were collated in the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, a compilation of legal material by a series of Byzantine philosophers completed in AD 534.⁶¹ Such a collection was to be invaluable when the darkness of the early Middle Ages, following the Roman collapse, began gradually to evaporate. For here was a body of developed laws ready made and awaiting transference to an awakening Europe.

At this stage reference must be made to the growth of Islam.⁶² Its approach to international relations and law was predicated upon a state of hostility towards the non-Moslem world and the concept of unity, Dar al-Islam, as between Moslem countries. Generally speaking, humane rules of warfare were developed and the ‘peoples of the book’ (Jews and Christians) were treated better than non-believers, although in an inferior position to Moslems. Once the period of conquest was over and power was consolidated, norms governing conduct with non-Moslem states began to develop. The law dealing with diplomats was founded upon notions of hospitality and safety (*aman*), while rules governing international agreements grew out of the concept of respecting promises made.⁶³

The Middle Ages and the Renaissance

The Middle Ages were characterised by the authority of the organised Church and the comprehensive structure of power that it commanded.⁶⁴ All Europe was of one religion, and the ecclesiastical law applied to all, notwithstanding tribal or regional affiliations. For much of the period, there were struggles between the religious authorities and the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire.

These conflicts were eventually resolved in favour of the Papacy, but the victory over secularism proved of relatively short duration. Religion and a common legacy derived from the Roman Empire were strongly unifying influences, while political and regional rivalries were not. But before a recognised system of international law could be created, social changes were essential.

Of particular importance during this era were the authority of the Holy Roman Empire and the supranational character of canon law.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, commercial and maritime law developed apace. English law established the *Law Merchant*, a code of rules covering foreign traders, and this was declared to be of universal application.⁶⁶

Throughout Europe, mercantile courts were set up to settle disputes between tradesmen at the various fairs, and while it is not possible to state that a Continental *Law Merchant* came into being, a network of common regulations and practices weaved its way across the commercial fabric of Europe and constituted an embryonic international trade law.⁶⁷

Similarly, maritime customs began to be accepted throughout the Continent. Founded upon the Rhodian Sea Law, a Byzantine work, many of whose rules were enshrined in the Rolls of Oleron in the twelfth century, and other maritime textbooks, a series of commonly applied customs relating to the sea permeated the naval powers of the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts.⁶⁸

Such commercial and maritime codes, while at this stage merely expressions of national legal systems, were among the forerunners of international law because they were created and nurtured against a backcloth of cross-national contacts and reflected the need for rules that would cover international situations.

Such rules, growing out of the early Middle Ages, constituted the seeds of international law, but, before they could flourish, European thought had first to be developed by that intellectual explosion known as the Renaissance.

This complex of ideas changed the face of European society and ushered in the modern era of scientific, humanistic and individualistic thought.⁶⁹

The collapse of the Byzantine Empire centred on Constantinople before the Turkish armies in 1453 drove many Greek scholars to seek sanctuary in Italy and enliven Western Europe's cultural life. The introduction of printing during the fifteenth century provided the means to disseminate knowledge, and the undermining of feudalism in the wake of economic growth and the rise of the merchant classes provided the background to the new inquiring attitudes taking shape.

Europe's developing self-confidence manifested itself in a sustained drive overseas for wealth and luxury items. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Arabs had been ousted from the Iberian Peninsula and the Americas reached.

The rise of the nation-states of England, France and Spain in particular characterised the process of the creation of territorially consolidated independent units, in theory and doctrine, as well as in fact. This led to a higher degree of interaction between sovereign entities and thus the need to regulate such activities in a generally acceptable fashion. The pursuit of political power and supremacy became overt and recognised, as Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1513) demonstrated.

The city-states of Italy struggled for supremacy and the Papacy too became a secular power. From these hectic struggles emerged many of the staples of modern international life: diplomacy, statesmanship, the theory of the balance of power and the idea of a community of states.⁷⁰

Notions such as these are immediately appreciable and one can identify with the various manoeuvres for political supremacy. Alliances, betrayals, manipulations of state institutions and the drive for power are not unknown to us. We recognise the roots of our society.

It was the evolution of the concept of an international community of separate, sovereign, if competing, states, that marks the beginning of what is understood by international law. The Renaissance bequeathed the prerequisites of independent, critical thought and a humanistic, secular approach to life as well as the political framework for the future. But it is the

latter factor which is vital to the subsequent growth of international law. The Reformation and the European religious wars that followed emphasised this, as did the growing power of the nations. In many ways these wars marked the decline of a continental system founded on religion and the birth of a continental system founded on the supremacy of the state.

Throughout these countries the necessity was felt for a new conception of human as well as state relationships. This search was precipitated, as has been intimated, by the decline of the Church and the rise of what might be termed 'free-thinking'. The theory of international law was naturally deeply involved in this reappraisal of political life and it was tremendously influenced by the rediscovery of Greco-Roman ideas. The Renaissance stimulated a rebirth of Hellenic studies and ideas of Natural Law, in particular, became popular.

Thus, a distinct value-system to underpin international relations was brought into being and the law of nations was heralded as part of the universal law of nature.

With the rise of the modern state and the emancipation of international relations, the doctrine of sovereignty emerged. This concept, first analysed systematically in 1576 in the *Six Livres de la République* by Jean Bodin, was intended to deal with the structure of authority within the modern state. Bodin, who based his study upon his perception of the politics of Europe rather than on a theoretical discussion of absolute principles, emphasised the necessity for a sovereign power within the state that would make the laws.

While such a sovereign could not be bound by the laws he himself instituted, he was subject to the laws of God and of nature.⁷¹

The idea of the sovereign as supreme legislator was in the course of time transmuted into the principle which gave the state supreme power vis-à-vis other states. The state was regarded as being above the law. Such notions as these formed the intellectual basis of the line of thought known as positivism, which will be discussed later.⁷²

The early theorists of international law were deeply involved with the ideas of Natural Law and used them as the basis of their philosophies. Included within that complex of Natural Law principles from which they constructed their theories was the significant merging of Christian and Natural Law ideas that occurred in the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas.⁷³ He maintained that Natural Law formed part of the law of God, and was the participation by rational creatures in the Eternal Law. It complemented that part of the Eternal Law which had been divinely revealed. Reason, declared Aquinas, was the essence of man and thus must be involved in the ordering of life according to the divine will. Natural Law was the fount of moral behaviour as well as of social and political institutions, and it led to a theory of conditional acceptance of authority with unjust laws being unacceptable. Aquinas' views of the late thirteenth century can be regarded as basic to an understanding of present Catholic attitudes, but should not be confused with the later interpretation of Natural Law which stressed the concepts of natural rights.

It is with such an intellectual background that Renaissance scholars approached the question of the basis and justification of a system of

international law. Maine, a British historical lawyer, wrote that the birth of modern international law was the grandest function of the law of nature and, while that is arguable, the point must be taken.⁷⁴ International law began to emerge as a separate topic to be studied within itself, although derived from the principles of Natural Law.

The Founders of Modern International Law

The essence of the new approach to international law can be traced back to the Spanish philosophers of that country's Golden Age.⁷⁵ The leading figure of this school was Francisco Vitoria, Professor of Theology at the University of Salamanca (1480–1546). His lectures were preserved by his students and published posthumously. He demonstrated a remarkably progressive attitude for his time towards the Spanish conquest of the South American Indians and, contrary to the views prevalent until then, maintained that the Indian peoples should be regarded as nations with their own legitimate interests. War against them could only be justified on the grounds of a just cause. International law was founded on the universal law of nature and this meant that non-Europeans must be included within its ambit. However, Vitoria by no means advocated the recognition of the Indian nations as equal to the Christian states of Europe. For him, opposing the work of the missionaries in the territories was a just reason for war, and he adopted a rather extensive view as to the rights of the Spaniards in South America. Vitoria was no liberal and indeed acted on behalf of the Spanish Inquisition, but his lectures did mark a step forward in the right direction.⁷⁶

Suárez (1548–1617) was a Jesuit and Professor of Theology who was deeply immersed in medieval culture. He noted that the obligatory character of international law was based upon Natural Law, while its substance derived from the Natural Law rule of carrying out agreements entered into.⁷⁷

From a totally different background, but equally, if not more, influential was Alberico Gentili (1552–1608). He was born in Northern Italy and fled to England to avoid persecution, having converted to Protestantism. In 1598, his *De Jure Belli* was published.⁷⁸ It is a comprehensive discussion of the law of war and contains a valuable section on the law of treaties. Gentili, who became a professor at Oxford, has been called the originator of the secular school of thought in international law and he minimised the hitherto significant theological theses.

It is, however, Hugo Grotius, a Dutch scholar, who towers over this period and has been celebrated, if a little exaggeratedly, as the father of international law. He was born in 1583 and was the supreme Renaissance man. A scholar of tremendous learning, he mastered history, theology, mathematics and the law.⁷⁹ His primary work was the *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, written during 1623 and 1624. It is an extensive work and includes rather more devotion to the exposition of private law notions than would seem appropriate today. He refers both to Vitoria and to Gentili, the latter being of special influence with regard to many matters, particularly organisation of material.

Grotius finally excised theology from international law and emphasised the irrelevance in such a study of any conception of a divine law. He remarked that the law of nature would be valid even if there were no God: a statement

which, although suitably clothed in religious protestation, was extremely daring. The law of nature now reverted to being founded exclusively on reason. Justice was part of man's social make-up and thus not only useful, but essential. Grotius conceived of a comprehensive system of international law and his work rapidly became a university textbook. However, in many spheres he followed well-trodden paths. He retained the theological distinction between a just and an unjust war, a notion that was soon to disappear from treatises on international law, but which in some way underpins modern approaches to aggression, self-defence and liberation.

One of his most enduring opinions consists in his proclamation of the freedom of the seas. The Dutch scholar opposed the 'closed seas' concept of the Portuguese that was later elucidated by the English writer John Selden⁸⁰ and emphasised instead the principle that the nations could not appropriate to themselves the high seas. They belonged to all. It must, of course, be mentioned, parenthetically, that this theory happened to accord rather nicely with prevailing Dutch ideas as to free trade and the needs of an expanding commercial empire.

However, this merely points up what must not be disregarded, namely that concepts of law as of politics and other disciplines are firmly rooted in the world of reality, and reflect contemporary preoccupations. No theory develops in a vacuum, but is conceived and brought to fruition in a definite cultural and social environment. To ignore this is to distort the theory itself.

Positivism and Naturalism

Following Grotius, but by no means divorced from the thought of previous scholars, a split can be detected and two different schools identified. On the one hand there was the ‘naturalist’ school, exemplified by Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94),⁸¹ who attempted to identify international law completely with the law of nature; and on the other hand there were the exponents of ‘positivism’, who distinguished between international law and Natural Law and emphasised practical problems and current state practices. Pufendorf regarded Natural Law as a moralistic system, and misunderstood the direction of modern international law by denying the validity of the rules about custom. He also refused to acknowledge treaties as in any way relevant to a discussion of the basis of international law. Other ‘naturalists’ echoed those sentiments in minimising or ignoring the actual practices of states in favour of a theoretical construction of absolute values that seemed slowly to drift away from the complexities of political reality.

One of the principal initiators of the positivist school was Richard Zouche (1590–1660), who lived at the same time as Pufendorf, but in England.⁸² While completely dismissing Natural Law, he paid scant regard to the traditional doctrines. His concern was with specific situations and his book contains many examples from the recent past. He elevated the law of peace above a systematic consideration of the law of war and eschewed theoretical expositions.

In similar style, Bynkershoek (1673–1743) stressed the importance of modern practice and virtually ignored Natural Law. He made great contributions to the developing theories of the rights and duties of neutrals in

war, and after careful studies of the relevant facts decided in favour of the freedom of the seas.⁸³

The positivist approach, like much of modern thought, was derived from the empirical method adopted by the Renaissance. It was concerned not with an edifice of theory structured upon deductions from absolute principles, but rather with viewing events as they occurred and discussing actual problems that had arisen. Empiricism as formulated by Locke and Hume⁸⁴ denied the existence of innate principles and postulated that ideas were derived from experience. The scientific method of experiment and verification of hypotheses emphasised this approach.

From this philosophical attitude, it was a short step to reinterpreting international law not in terms of concepts derived from reason, but rather in terms of what actually happened between the competing states. What states actually do was the key, not what states ought to do given basic rules of the law of nature. Agreements and customs recognised by the states were the essence of the law of nations.

Positivism developed as the modern nation-state system emerged, after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, from the religious wars.⁸⁵ It coincided, too, with theories of sovereignty such as those propounded by Bodin and Hobbes,⁸⁶ which underlined the supreme power of the sovereign and led to notions of the sovereignty of states.

Elements of both positivism and naturalism appear in the works of Vattel (1714–67), a Swiss lawyer. His *Droit des Gens* was based on Natural Law

principles, yet was practically oriented. He introduced the doctrine of the equality of states into international law, declaring that a small republic was no less a sovereign than the most powerful kingdom, just as a dwarf was as much a man as a giant. By distinguishing between laws of conscience and laws of action and stating that only the latter were of practical concern, he minimised the importance of Natural Law.⁸⁷

Ironically, at the same time that positivist thought appeared to demolish the philosophical basis of the law of nature and relegate that theory to history, it re-emerged in a modern guise replete with significance for the future. Natural Law gave way to the concept of natural rights.⁸⁸

It was an individualistic assertion of political supremacy. The idea of the social contract, that an agreement between individuals pre-dated and justified civil society, emphasised the central role of the individual, and whether such a theory was interpreted pessimistically to demand an absolute sovereign as Hobbes declared, or optimistically to mean a conditional acceptance of authority as Locke maintained, it could not fail to be a revolutionary doctrine. The rights of man constitute the heart of the American⁸⁹ and French Revolutions and the essence of modern democratic society.

Yet, on the other hand, the doctrine of Natural Law has been employed to preserve the absoluteness of sovereignty and the sanctity of private possessions. The theory has a reactionary aspect because it could be argued that what was, ought to be, since it evolved from the social contract or was divinely ordained, depending upon how secular one construed the law of nature to be.

The Nineteenth Century

The eighteenth century was a ferment of intellectual ideas and rationalist philosophies that contributed to the evolution of the doctrine of international law. The nineteenth century by contrast was a practical, expansionist and positivist era. The Congress of Vienna, which marked the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, enshrined the new international order which was to be based upon the European balance of power. International law became Eurocentric, the preserve of the civilised, Christian states, into which overseas and foreign nations could enter only with the consent of and on the conditions laid down by the Western powers. Paradoxically, whilst international law became geographically internationalised through the expansion of the European empires, it became less universalist in conception and more, theoretically as well as practically, a reflection of European values.⁹⁰ This theme, the relationship between universalism and particularism, appears time and again in international law. This century also saw the coming to independence of Latin America and the forging of a distinctive approach to certain elements of international law by the states of that region, especially with regard to, for example, diplomatic asylum and the treatment of foreign enterprises and nationals.⁹¹

There are many other features that mark the nineteenth century. Democracy and nationalism, both spurred on by the wars of the French Revolution and empire, spread throughout the Continent and changed the essence of international relations.⁹² No longer the exclusive concern of aristocratic élites, foreign policy characterised both the positive and the negative faces of nationalism. Self-determination emerged to threaten the multinational

empires of Central and Eastern Europe, while nationalism reached its peak in the unifications of Germany and Italy and began to exhibit features such as expansionism and doctrines of racial superiority. Democracy brought to the individual political influence and a say in government. It also brought home the realities of responsibility, for wars became the concern of all.

Conscription was introduced throughout the Continent and large national armies replaced the small professional forces.⁹³ The Industrial Revolution mechanised Europe, created the economic dichotomy of capital and labour and propelled Western influence throughout the world. All these factors created an enormous increase in the number and variety of both public and private international institutions, and international law grew rapidly to accommodate them.⁹⁴ The development of trade and communications necessitated greater international cooperation as a matter of practical need. In 1815, the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna established the principle of freedom of navigation with regard to international waterways and set up a Central Commission of the Rhine to regulate its use. In 1856, a commission for the Danube was created and a number of other European rivers also became the subject of international agreements and arrangements. In 1865, the International Telegraphic Union was established and in 1874 the Universal Postal Union.⁹⁵

European conferences proliferated and contributed greatly to the development of rules governing the waging of war. The International Committee of the Red Cross, founded in 1863, helped promote the series of Geneva Conventions beginning in 1864 dealing with the 'humanisation' of conflict, and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 established the Permanent Court of Arbitration and dealt with the treatment of prisoners and the control

of warfare.⁹⁶ Numerous other conferences, conventions and congresses emphasised the expansion of the rules of international law and the close network of international relations. In addition, the academic study of international law within higher education developed with the appointment of professors of the subject and the appearance of specialist textbooks emphasising the practice of states.

Positivist theories dominate this century. The proliferation of the powers of states and the increasing sophistication of municipal legislation gave force to the idea that laws were basically commands issuing from a sovereign person or body. Any question of ethics or morality was irrelevant to a discussion of the validity of man-made laws. The approach was transferred onto the international scene and immediately came face to face with the reality of a lack of supreme authority.

Since law was ultimately dependent upon the will of the sovereign in national systems, it seemed to follow that international law depended upon the will of the sovereign states.

This implied a confusion of the supreme legislator within a state with the state itself and thus positivism had to accept the metaphysical identity of the state. The state had a life and will of its own and so was able to dominate international law. This stress on the abstract nature of the state did not appear in all positivist theories and was a late development.⁹⁷

It was the German thinker Hegel who first analysed and proposed the doctrine of the will of the state. The individual was subordinate to the state,

because the latter enshrined the ‘wills’ of all citizens and had evolved into a higher will, and on the external scene the state was sovereign and supreme.⁹⁸ Such philosophies led to disturbing results in the twentieth century and provoked a re-awakening of the law of nature, dormant throughout the nineteenth century.

The growth of international agreements, customs and regulations induced positivist theorists to tackle this problem of international law and the state; and as a result two schools of thought emerged.

The monists claimed that there was one fundamental principle which underpinned both national and international law. This was variously posited as ‘right’ or social solidarity or the rule that agreements must be carried out (*pacta sunt servanda*). The dualists, more numerous and in a more truly positivist frame of mind, emphasised the element of consent.

For Triepel, another German theorist, international law and domestic (or municipal) law existed on separate planes, the former governing international relations, the latter relations between individuals and between the individual and the state. International law was based upon agreements between states (and such agreements included, according to Triepel, both treaties and customs) and because it was dictated by the ‘common will’ of the states it could not be unilaterally altered.⁹⁹

This led to a paradox. Could this common will bind individual states and, if so, why? It would appear to lead to the conclusion that the will of the sovereign state could give birth to a rule over which it had no control. The

state will was not, therefore, supreme, but inferior to a collection of states' wills. Triepel did not discuss these points, but left them open as depending upon legal matters. Thus did positivist theories weaken their own positivist outlook by regarding the essence of law as beyond juridical description. The nineteenth century also saw the publication of numerous works on international law, which emphasised state practice and the importance of the behaviour of countries to the development of rules of international law.¹⁰⁰

The Twentieth Century and Beyond

The First World War marked the close of a dynamic and optimistic century. European empires ruled the world and European ideologies reigned supreme, but the 1914–18 Great War undermined the foundations of European civilisation. Self-confidence faded, if slowly, the edifice weakened and the universally accepted assumptions of progress were increasingly doubted. Self-questioning was the order of the day and law as well as art reflected this.

The most important legacy of the 1919 Peace Treaty from the point of view of international relations was the creation of the League of Nations.¹⁰¹ The old anarchic system had failed and it was felt that new institutions to preserve and secure peace were necessary. The League consisted of an Assembly and an Executive Council, but was crippled from the start by the absence of the United States and the Soviet Union for most of its life and remained a basically European organisation.

While it did have certain minor successes with regard to the maintenance of international order, it failed when confronted with determined aggressors.

Japan invaded China in 1931 and two years later withdrew from the League. Italy attacked Ethiopia, and Germany embarked unhindered upon a series of internal and external aggressions. The Soviet Union, in a final gesture, was expelled from the organisation in 1939 following its invasion of Finland.

Nevertheless, much useful groundwork was achieved by the League in its short existence and this helped to consolidate the United Nations later on.¹⁰²

The Permanent Court of International Justice was set up in 1921 at The Hague and was succeeded in 1946 by the International Court of Justice.¹⁰³

The International Labour Organization was established soon after the end of the First World War and still exists today, and many other international institutions were inaugurated or increased their work during this period.

Other ideas of international law that first appeared between the wars included the system of mandates, by which colonies of the defeated powers were administered by the Allies for the benefit of their inhabitants rather than being annexed outright, and the attempt was made to provide a form of minority protection guaranteed by the League. This latter creation was not a great success, but it paved the way for later concern to secure human rights.¹⁰⁴

After the trauma of the Second World War the League was succeeded in 1946 by the United Nations Organization, which tried to remedy many of the defects of its predecessor. It established its site at New York, reflecting the realities of the shift of power away from Europe, and determined to become a truly universal institution. The advent of decolonisation fulfilled this

expectation and the UN General Assembly currently has 193 member states.¹⁰⁵

Many of the trends which first came to prominence in the nineteenth century have continued to this day. The vast increase in the number of international agreements and customs, the strengthening of the system of arbitration and the development of international organisations have established the essence of international law as it exists today.

Communist Approaches to International Law

Classic Marxist theory described law and politics as the means whereby the ruling classes maintained their domination of society. The essence of economic life was the ownership of the means of production, and all power flowed from this control. Capital and labour were the opposing theses and their mutual antagonism would eventually lead to a revolution out of which a new, non-exploitive form of society would emerge.¹⁰⁶ National states were dominated by the capitalist class and would have to disappear in the re-organising process. Indeed, the theory was that law and the state would wither away once a new basis for society had been established¹⁰⁷ and, because classical international law was founded upon the state, it followed that it too would go.

However, the reality of power and the existence of the Soviet Union surrounded by capitalist nations led to a modification in this approach. The international system of states could not be changed overnight into a socialist

order, so a period of transition was inevitable. Nevertheless, basic changes were seen as having been wrought.

Professor Tunkin, for example, emphasised that the Russian October Revolution produced a new series of international legal ideas. These, it is noted, can be divided into three basic, interconnected groups: (1) principles of socialist internationalism in relations between socialist states; (2) principles of equality and self-determination of nations and peoples, primarily aimed against colonialism; and (3) principles of peaceful co-existence aimed at relations between states with different social systems.¹⁰⁸

We shall briefly look at these concepts in this section, but first a historical overview is necessary.

During the immediate post-revolution period, it was postulated that a transitional phase had commenced. During this time, international law as a method of exploitation would be criticised by the socialist state, but it would still be recognised as a valid system. The two Soviet theorists Korovin and Pashukanis were the dominant influences in this phase. The transitional period demanded compromises in that, until the universal victory of the revolution, some forms of economic and technical cooperation would be required since they were fundamental for the existence of the international social order.¹⁰⁹ Pashukanis expressed the view that international law was an inter-class law within which two antagonistic class systems would seek accommodation until the victory of the socialist system. Socialism and the Soviet Union could still use the legal institutions developed by and reflective of the capitalist system.¹¹⁰ However, with the rise of Stalinism and the

‘socialism in one country’ call, the position hardened. Pashukanis altered his line and recanted. International law was not a form of temporary compromise between capitalist states and the Soviet Union, but rather a means of conducting the class war. The Soviet Union was bound only by those rules of international law which accorded with its purposes.¹¹¹

The new approach in the late 1930s was reflected politically in Russia’s successful attempt to join the League of Nations and its policy of wooing the Western powers, and legally by the ideas of Vyshinsky. He adopted a more legalistic view of international law and emphasised the Soviet acceptance of such principles as national self-determination, state sovereignty and the equality of states, but not others. The role of international law did not constitute a single international legal system binding all states. The Soviet Union would act in pursuance of Leninist–Stalinist foreign policy ideals and would not be bound by the rules to which it had not given express consent.¹¹²

The years that followed the Second World War saw a tightening up of Soviet doctrine as the Cold War gathered pace, but with the death of Stalin and the succession of Khrushchev a thaw set in. In theoretical terms the law of the transitional stage was replaced by the international law of peaceful co-existence. War was no longer regarded as inevitable between capitalist and socialist countries and a period of mutual tolerance and cooperation was inaugurated.¹¹³

Tunkin recognised that there was a single system of international law of universal scope rather than different branches covering socialist and capitalist countries, and that international law was founded upon agreements between

states which are binding upon them. He defined contemporary general international law as:

the aggregate of norms which are created by agreement between states of different social systems, reflect the concordant wills of states and have a generally democratic character, regulate relations between them in the process of struggle and co-operation in the direction of ensuring peace and peaceful co-existence and freedom and independence of peoples, and are secured when necessary by coercion effectuated by states individually or collectively.¹¹⁴

It is interesting to note the basic elements here, such as the stress on state sovereignty, the recognition of different social systems and the aim of peaceful co-existence. The role of sanctions in law is emphasised and reflects much of the positivist influence upon Soviet thought. Such preoccupations were also reflected in the definition of international law contained in the leading Soviet textbook by Professor Kozhevnikov and others, where it was stated that:

international law can be defined as the aggregate of rules governing relations between states in the process of their conflict and co-operation, designed to safeguard their peaceful

co-existence, expressing the will of the ruling classes of these states and defended in case of need by coercion applied by states individually or collectively.¹¹⁵

Originally, treaties alone were regarded as proper sources of international law, but custom became accepted as a kind of tacit or implied agreement, with great stress laid upon *opinio juris* or the legally binding element of custom. While state practice need not be general to create a custom, its recognition as a legal form must be.¹¹⁶

Peaceful co-existence itself rested upon certain basic concepts, for example non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and the sovereignty of states. Any idea of a world authority was condemned as a violation of the latter principle. The doctrine of peaceful co-existence was also held to include such ideas as good neighbourliness, international cooperation and the observance in good faith of international obligations.

The concept was regarded as based on specific trends of laws of societal development and as a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism, one in which armed conflict is precluded.¹¹⁷ It was an attempt, in essence, to reiterate the basic concepts of international law in a way that was taken to reflect an ideological trend. But it must be emphasised that the principles themselves have long been accepted by the international community.

While Tunkin at first attacked the development of regional systems of international law, he later came round to accepting a socialist law which reflected the special relationship between communist countries. The Soviet interventions in eastern Europe, particularly in Czechoslovakia in 1968, played a large part in augmenting such views.¹¹⁸ In the Soviet view relations between socialist (communist) states represented a new, higher type of international relations and a socialist international law. Common socio-economic factors and a political community created an objective basis for lasting friendly relations, whereas, by contrast, international capitalism involved the exploitation of the weak by the strong. The principles of socialist or proletarian internationalism constituted a unified system of international legal principles between countries of the socialist bloc arising by way of custom and treaty. Although the basic principles of respect for state sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and equality of states and peoples existed in general international law, the same principles in socialist international law were made more positive by the lack of economic rivalry and exploitation and by increased cooperation. Accordingly, these principles incorporated not only material obligations not to violate one another's rights, but also the duty to assist one another in enjoying and defending such rights against capitalist threats.¹¹⁹

The Soviet emphasis on territorial integrity and sovereignty, while designed in practice to protect the socialist states in a predominantly capitalist environment, proved of great attraction to the developing nations of the 'Third World', anxious too to establish their own national identities and counteract Western financial and cultural influences.

With the decline of the Cold War and the onset of *perestroika* (restructuring) in the Soviet Union, a process of re-evaluation in the field of international legal theory took place.¹²⁰ The concept of peaceful co-existence was modified and the notion of class warfare eliminated from the Soviet political lexicon. Global interdependence and the necessity for international cooperation were emphasised, as it was accepted that the tension between capitalism and socialism no longer constituted the major conflict in the contemporary world and that beneath the former dogmas lay many common interests.¹²¹ The essence of new Soviet thinking was stated to lie in the priority of universal human values and the resolution of global problems, which is directly linked to the growing importance of international law in the world community. It was also pointed out that international law had to be universal and not artificially divided into capitalist, socialist and Developing Countries' 'international law' systems.¹²²

Soviet writers and political leaders accepted that activities such as the interventions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 were contrary to international law, while the attempt to create a state based on the rule of law was seen as requiring the strengthening of the international legal system and the rule of law in international relations. In particular, a renewed emphasis upon the role of the United Nations became evident in Soviet policy.¹²³

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War and the re-emergence of a system of international relations based upon multiple sources of power untrammelled by ideological determinacy. From that point,¹²⁴ Russia as the continuation of the former Soviet Union (albeit in

different political and territorial terms) entered into the Western political system and defined its actions in terms of its own national interests free from principled hostility. The return to statehood of the Baltic states and the independence of the other former republics of the Soviet Union, coupled with the collapse of Yugoslavia, has constituted a political upheaval of major significance. The Cold War had imposed a dualistic superstructure upon international relations that had had implications for virtually all serious international political disputes and had fettered the operations of the United Nations in particular. Although the Soviet regime had been changing its approach quite significantly, the formal demise both of the communist system and of the state itself altered the nature of the international system and this has inevitably had consequences for international law.¹²⁵ The mitigation of inexorable superpower confrontation (but not its disappearance) has led to an increase in instability in Europe and emphasised paradoxically both the revitalisation and the limitations of the United Nations.

While relatively little has previously been known of Chinese attitudes, a few points can be made. Western concepts are regarded primarily as aimed at preserving the dominance of the bourgeois class on the international scene. Soviet views were partially accepted, but since the late 1950s and the growing estrangement between the two major communist powers, the Chinese concluded that the Russians were interested chiefly in maintaining the status quo and Soviet–American superpower supremacy. The Soviet concept of peaceful co-existence as the mainstay of contemporary international law was treated with some suspicion, although reworked.¹²⁶

The Chinese conception of law was, for historical and cultural reasons, very different from that developed in the West. ‘Law’ never attained the important place in Chinese society that it did in European civilisation.¹²⁷ A sophisticated bureaucracy laboured to attain harmony and equilibrium, and a system of legal rights to protect the individual in the Western sense did not really develop. It was believed that society would be best served by example and established morality, rather than by rules and sanctions. This Confucian philosophy was, however, swept aside after the successful communist revolution, to be replaced by strict Marxism–Leninism, with its emphasis on class warfare.¹²⁸

The Chinese seem to have recognised several systems of international law, for example, Western, socialist and revisionist (Soviet Union), and to have implied that only with the ultimate spread of socialism would a universal system be possible.¹²⁹ International agreements are regarded as the primary source of international law and China has entered into many treaties and conventions and carried them out as well as other nations.¹³⁰ One exception, of course, is China’s disavowal of the so-called ‘unequal treaties’ whereby Chinese territory was annexed by other powers, in particular the Tsarist Empire, in the nineteenth century.¹³¹

On the whole, international law has been treated as part of international politics and subject to considerations of power and expediency, as well as ideology. Where international rules conform with Chinese policies and interests, then they will be observed. Where they do not, they will be ignored.

Now that the isolationist phase of its history is over, relations with other nations established and its entry into the United Nations secured, China has adopted a much more active role in international relations, an approach more in keeping with its rapidly growing economic power. China has now become fully engaged in world politics and this has led to a legalisation of its view of international law, as indeed occurred with the Soviet Union.

However, this does not mean that either Russia or China have adopted the predominantly Western approaches to international law. Both states have maintained their focus upon state sovereignty, sovereign equality and non-intervention in internal affairs as bulwarks of the international system. This was manifested most recently in the Declaration on the Promotion of International Law issued by these states on 25 June 2016 in Beijing, which also underlined the continuing relevance of the Five Principles of Co-existence of 1954,¹³² and consent-based settlement of disputes.¹³³ Such an approach, while not incorrect in law as such, minimises the contemporary emphasis upon globalisation, international human rights and democratic governance.

The ‘Developing Countries’

In the evolution of international affairs since the Second World War, one of the most decisive events has been the disintegration of the colonial empires and the birth of scores of new states in the so-called ‘Developing Countries’ or ‘Third World’. This has thrust onto the scene states which carry with them a legacy of bitterness over their past status as well as a host of problems relating to their social, economic and political development.¹³⁴ In such

circumstances it was only natural that the structure and doctrines of international law would come under attack. The nineteenth-century development of the law of nations founded upon Eurocentrism and imbued with the values of Christian, urbanised and expanding Europe¹³⁵ did not, understandably enough, reflect the needs and interests of the newly independent states of the mid- and late twentieth century. It was felt that such rules had encouraged and then reflected their subjugation, and that changes were required.¹³⁶

It is basically those ideas of international law that came to fruition in the nineteenth century that have been so clearly rejected, that is, those principles that enshrined the power and domination of the West.¹³⁷ The underlying concepts of international law have not been discarded. On the contrary. The new nations have eagerly embraced the ideas of the sovereignty and equality of states and the principles of non-aggression and non-intervention, in their search for security within the bounds of a commonly accepted legal framework.

While this new internationalisation of international law that has occurred in the last sixty years has destroyed its European-based homogeneity, it has emphasised its universalist scope.¹³⁸ The composition of, for example, both the International Court of Justice and the UN Security Council mirrors such developments. Article 9 of the ICJ Statute points out that the main forms of civilisation and the principal legal systems of the world must be represented within the Court, and there is an arrangement that of the ten non-permanent seats in the Security Council five should go to Afro-Asian states and two to Latin American states (the others going to Europe and other states). The

composition of the International Law Commission has also recently been increased and structured upon geographic lines.¹³⁹

The influence of the new states has been felt most of all within the General Assembly, where they constitute a majority of the 193 member states.¹⁴⁰ The content and scope of the various resolutions and declarations emanating from the Assembly are proof of their impact and contain a record of their fears, hopes and concerns.

The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, for example, enshrined the right of colonies to obtain their sovereignty with the least possible delay and called for the recognition of the principle of self-determination. This principle, which is discussed elsewhere in this book,¹⁴¹ is regarded by most authorities as a settled rule of international law, although with undetermined borders. Nevertheless, it symbolises the rise of the post-colonial states and the effect they are having upon the development of international law.

Their concern for the recognition of the sovereignty of states is complemented by their support of the United Nations and its Charter and supplemented by their desire for ‘economic self-determination’ or the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.¹⁴² This expansion of international law into the field of economics was a major development of the twentieth century and is evidenced in myriad ways, for example, by the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

The interests of the new states of the Developing Countries are often in conflict with those of the industrialised nations, witness disputes over nationalisations. But it has to be emphasised that, contrary to many fears expressed in the early years of the decolonisation saga, international law has not been discarded nor altered beyond recognition. Its framework has been retained as the new states, too, wish to obtain the benefits of rules such as those governing diplomatic relations and the controlled use of force, while campaigning against rules which run counter to their perceived interests.

While the new countries share a common history of foreign dominance and underdevelopment, compounded by an awakening of national identity, it has to be recognised that they are not a homogeneous group. Widely differing cultural, social and economic attitudes and stages of development characterise them, and the rubric of the 'Third World' masks diverse political affiliations. On many issues the interests of the new states conflict with one another and this is reflected in the different positions adopted. The states possessing oil and other valuable natural resources are separated from those with few or none and the states bordering on oceans are to be distinguished from landlocked states. The list of diversity is endless and variety governs the make-up of the southern hemisphere to a far greater degree than in the north.

It is possible that in legal terms tangible differences in approach may emerge in the future as the passions of decolonisation die down and the Western supremacy over international law is further eroded. This trend will also permit a greater understanding of, and greater recourse to, historical traditions and conceptions that pre-date colonisation and an increasing awareness of their validity for the future development of international law.¹⁴³

In the medium term, however, it has to be recognised that with the end of the Cold War and the rapid development of Soviet (then Russian)–American cooperation (which may prove to be temporary only), the axis of dispute began to turn from East–West to North–South. This is beginning to manifest itself in a variety of issues ranging from economic law to the law of the sea and human rights, while the impact of modern technology has hardly yet been appreciated.¹⁴⁴ Together with such factors, the development of globalisation has put additional stress upon the traditional tension between universalism and particularism.¹⁴⁵ Globalisation in the sense of interdependence of a high order of individuals, groups and corporations, both public and private, across national boundaries, might be seen as the universalisation of Western civilisation and thus the triumph of one special particularism. On the other hand, particularism (in the guise of cultural relativism) has sometimes been used as a justification for human rights abuses free from international supervision or criticism. In addition, recent years have seen something of a reaction against globalisation for leaving behind many individuals and societies and the consequential rise in communal tension (not least the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union in January 2020).

Suggestions for Further Reading

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Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (ed. A. Orakhelashvili), London, 2011

¹ This term was first used by J. Bentham: see *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, London, 1780.

² See e.g. Cheshire, North and Fawcett, *Private International Law* (ed. P. Torremans et al.), 15th ed., Oxford, 2017.

³ See *Serbian Loans*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 14, pp. 41–2.

⁴ See further below, p. 78.

⁵ *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 44. See also M. Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’, *47 BYIL*, 1974–5, p. 1.

⁶ See generally R. Dias, *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., London, 1985; and H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, Oxford, 1961.

⁷ See article 17(1) of the UN Charter. See also D. Johnson, ‘The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations’, *32 BYIL*, 1955–56, p. 97 and below, [Chapter 21](#).

⁸ See article 36 of the ICJ Statute; and below, [Chapter 18](#).

⁹ See e.g. *The Charter of the United Nations* (ed. B. Simma et al.), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2012, chapter V and below, [Chapter 22](#).

¹⁰ See J. Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined* (ed. H. L. A. Hart), London, 1954, pp. 134–42.

¹¹ See e.g. Hart, *Concept of Law*, chapter 10.

¹² See e.g. W. M. Reisman, ‘Sanctions and Enforcement’, in *The Future of the International Legal Order* (ed. C. Black and R. A. Falk), New York, 1971, p. 273; J. Brierly, ‘Sanctions’, *17 Transactions of the Grotius Society*, 1932, p. 68; Hart, *Concept of*

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¹³ Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See below, [Chapter 21](#).

¹⁴ Security Council resolution 221 (1966). Note also Security Council resolution 418 (1977) imposing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.

¹⁵ Security Council resolutions of 25 June, 27 June and 7 July 1950. See D. W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces*, London, 1964.

¹⁶ Security Council resolutions 661 and 678 (1990). See *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents* (ed. E. Lauterpacht, C. Greenwood, M. Weller and D. Bethlehem), Cambridge, 1991, pp. 88, 98. See also below, [Chapter 21](#).

¹⁷ See E. Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, vol. I: *The Years of Western Domination 1945–55*, London, 1982, pp. 229–74; and below, [Chapter 21](#).

¹⁸ See D. W. Bowett, *Self-Defence in International Law*, Manchester, 1958; and I. Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Oxford, 1963.

¹⁹ See below, [Chapter 18](#). See also M. Barkin, *Law Without Sanctions*, New Haven, 1967.

²⁰ See e.g. H. Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State*, London, 1946, pp. 328 ff.

²¹ See L. Henkin, *How Nations Behave*, 2nd ed., New York, 1979, and L. Henkin, *International Law: Politics and Values*, Dordrecht, 1995; M. A. Kaplan and N. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law*, New York, 1961; C. W. Jenks, *The Common Law of Mankind*, London, 1958; W. Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law*, New York, 1964; A. Sheikh, *International Law and National Behaviour*, New York, 1974; O. Schachter, *International Law in Theory and Practice*, Dordrecht, 1991; T. M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, Oxford, 1990; R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994; E. Tourme-Jouannet, *What is a Fair Society? International Law Between Development and Recognition*, Oxford,

2013; and *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, vol. I, chapter 1.

²² As to the concept of 'international community', see e.g. M. Hakimi, 'Constructing an International Community', **111** *AJIL*, 2017, p. 317; G. Abi-Saab, 'Whither the International Community?', **9** *EJIL*, 1998, p. 248; B. Simma and A. L. Paulus, 'The "International Community": Facing the Challenge of Globalisation', **9** *EJIL*, 1998, p. 266; and G. Gaja, 'The Protection of General Interests in the International Community', **364** *HR*, 2014, p. 13. See also P. Weil, 'Le Droit International en Quête de son Identité', **237** *HR*, 1992 VI, p. 25.

²³ This leads Rosenne to refer to international law as a law of coordination, rather than, as in internal law, a law of subordination, *Practice and Methods of International Law*, Dordrecht, 1984, p. 2.

²⁴ See H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed., New York, 1973, pp. 290–1; Henkin, *How Nations Behave*, pp. 46–9; J. Brierly, *The Outlook for International Law*, Oxford, 1944, p. 5; and P. Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, New York, 1948, pp. 6–8.

²⁵ See *US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran*, ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 3; 61 ILR, p. 502. See also the US Supreme Court decision in *Boos v. Barry* 99 L.Ed.2d 333, 345–6 (1988); 121 ILR, p. 499.

²⁶ See *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151; 34 ILR, p. 281; and R. Higgins, *United Nations Peace-Keeping; Documents and Commentary*, Oxford, 4 vols., 1969–81.

²⁷ See e.g. A. Chayes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, Oxford, 1974; and Henkin, *How Nations Behave*, pp. 279–302.

²⁸ See e.g. *The Vietnam War and International Law* (ed. R. A. Falk), Princeton, 4 vols., 1968–76; J. N. Moore, *Law and the Indo-China War*, Charlottesville, 1972; and Henkin, *How Nations Behave*, pp. 303–12.

²⁹ See Hart, *Concept of Law*, p. 223.

³⁰ See e.g. M. S. McDougal, H. Lasswell and W. M. Reisman, 'The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision', in *International Law Essays* (ed. M. S. McDougal and

W. M. Reisman), New York, 1981, p. 191. See also as to the role of government legal advisers, D. Bethlehem, 'The Secret Life of International Law', **1** *Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 2012, p. 23; M. Windsor, 'The Special Responsibility of Government Lawyers and the Iraq Inquiry', **87** *BYIL*, 2016, p. 159; and T. Aalberts and L. J. M. Boer, 'Entering the Invisible College: Defeating Lawyers on Their Own Turf', *ibid.*, p. 177. As to the role of international lawyers generally, see O. Schachter, 'The Invisible College of International Lawyers', **72** *Northwestern University Law Review*, 1977–78, p. 217; P.-M. Dupuy, 'L'Unité de l'Ordre Juridique Internationale', **297** *HR*, 2002, pp. 480–7; B. Simma, 'Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner', **20** *EJIL*, 2009, p. 265; and S. Villalpando, 'The "Invisible College of International Lawyers" Forty Years Later', ESIL Conference paper No. 5/2013, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363640.

³¹ See e.g. J. Brierly, *The Basis of Obligation in International Law*, Oxford, 1958.

³² See W. Friedmann, *Legal Theory*, 5th ed., London, 1967, pp. 573–6. See also *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, p. 18.

³³ E.g. G. Jellinek, *Allgemeine Rechtslehre*, Berlin, 1905.

³⁴ See also Hart, *Concept of Law*, pp. 219–20. But see P. Weil, 'Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?', **77** *AJIL*, 1983, p. 413 and responses thereto, e.g. R. A. Falk, 'To What Extent are International Law and International Lawyers Ideologically Neutral?', in *Change and Stability in International Law-Making* (ed. A. Cassese and J. Weiler), Leiden, 1989, p. 137, and A. Pellet, 'The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making', **12** *Australian YIL*, 1992, p. 22.

³⁵ See further below, p. 70.

³⁶ See e.g. J. S. Watson, 'State Consent and the Sources of International Obligation', *PASIL*, 1992, p. 108.

³⁷ See below, [Chapter 3](#).

³⁸ See e.g. A. D'Amato, 'On Consensus', **8** *Canadian YIL*, 1970, p. 104. Note also the 'gentleman's agreement on consensus' in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea:

see L. Sohn, 'Voting Procedures in United Nations Conference for the Codification of International Law', **69** *AJIL*, 1975, p. 318, and UN Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.2.

³⁹ See e.g. J. Charney, 'Universal International Law', **87** *AJIL*, 1993, p. 529.

⁴⁰ See e.g. R. Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, London, 1977.

⁴¹ See e.g. K. Llewellyn, *The Common Law Tradition*, Boston, 1960; and generally D. Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, 4th ed., London, 1979.

⁴² See P. Stein and J. Shand, *Legal Values in Western Society*, Edinburgh, 1974.

⁴³ See generally Henkin, *How Nations Behave*; and Schachter, *International Law*, pp. 5–9. See also *Research Handbook on the Politics of International Law* (ed. W. Sandholtz and C. A. Whytock), Cheltenham, 2017; and *Community Interests Across International Law* (ed. E. Benvenisti and G. Nolte), Oxford, 2018.

⁴⁴ See G. Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics*, 3rd ed., London, 1964; G. Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, 3rd ed., London, 1957, vol. I; and Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*.

⁴⁵ ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 6, 34.

⁴⁶ But see Higgins' criticism that such a formulation may be question-begging with regard to the identity of such 'limits of its own discipline', *Problems and Process*, p. 5.

⁴⁷ Note, of course, the important distinction between the existence of an obligation under international law and the question of the enforcement of that obligation. Problems with regard to enforcing a duty cannot affect the legal validity of that duty: see e.g. Judge Weeramantry's Separate Opinion in the Order of 13 September 1993, in *Application of the Genocide Convention*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 374; 95 ILR, pp. 43, 92.

⁴⁸ See in particular A. Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations*, rev. ed., New York, 1954; *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law* (ed. A. Orford and F. Hoffmann), Oxford, 2016, Part I; *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (ed. R. Bernhardt), Amsterdam, 1984, vol. VII, pp. 127–273; J. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, Leiden, 10 vols., 1968–79; and M. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960*, Cambridge,

2001. See also *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law* (ed. B. Fassbender *et al.*), Oxford, 2012; *International Law and Empire* (ed. M. Koskenniemi *et al.*), Oxford, 2017; *Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law* (ed. A. Orakhelashvili), London, 2011; E. Jouannet, *The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law*, Cambridge, 2012; W. Grewe, *The Epochs of International Law* (trans. and rev. M. Byers), New York, 2000; A. Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World*, Oxford, 1986; A. Cassese, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005, chapter 2; H. Thierry, 'L'Evolution du Droit International', **222 HR**, 1990 III, p. 9; P. Guggenheim, 'Contribution à l'Histoire des Sources du Droit des Gens', **94 HR**, 1958 II, p. 5; D. Gaurier, *Histoire du Droit International Public*, Rennes, 2005; D. Korff, 'Introduction à l'Histoire de Droit International Public', **1 HR**, 1923 I, p. 1; P. Le Fur, 'Le Développement Historique de Droit International', **41 HR**, 1932 III, p. 501; O. Yasuaki, 'When Was the Law of International Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilisational Perspective', **2 Journal of the History of International Law**, 2000, p. 1; A. Kemmerer, 'The Turning Aside: On International Law and its History', in *Progress in International Organisation* (ed. R. A. Miller and R. Bratspies), Leiden, 2008, p. 71; and E. Jouannet, *Le droit international libéral-providence. Une histoire du droit international*, Bruylant, 2011 (translated by C. Sutcliffe as *The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law*, Cambridge, 2012). For a general bibliography, see P. Macalister-Smith and J. Schwietzke, 'Literature and Documentary Sources relating to the History of International Law', **1 Journal of the History of International Law**, 1999, p. 136.

⁴⁹ See D. J. Bederman, *International Law in Antiquity*, Cambridge, 2001.

⁵⁰ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 1–2. Note the discovery in the excavated city of Ebla, the capital of a civilisation at least 4,500 years old, of a copy of a political treaty between Ebla and the city of Abarsal: see *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 19 May 1995, p. 20. See also R. Cohen, *On Diplomacy in the Ancient Near East: The Amarna Letters*, Discussion Paper of the Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester, 1995; O. Butkevych, 'History of Ancient International Law: Challenges and Prospects', **5 Journal of the History of International Law**, 2003, p. 189; A. Altman, 'Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law. The Early Dynastic Period in Southern Mesopotamia', **6 Journal of the History of International Law**, 2004, p. 153, and 'Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law. (2) The Old Akkadian and Ur III Periods in Mesopotamia', **7 Journal of the History of International Law**, 2005, p. 115.

⁵¹ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 1–2.

⁵² Preiser emphasises that the era between the seventeenth and fifteenth centuries BC witnessed something of a competing state system involving five independent (at various times) states: Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. VII, pp. 133–4.

⁵³ See P. Weil, ‘Le Judaïsme et le Développement du Droit International’, **151 HR**, 1976, p. 253; S. Rosenne, ‘The Influence of Judaism on International Law’, *Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht*, 1958, p. 119; and C. Leben, ‘Hebrew Sources in the Doctrine of the Law of Nature and Nations in Early Modern Europe’, **27 EJIL**, 2016, p. 79.

⁵⁴ See Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, p. 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* See also C. H. Alexandrowicz, *An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies*, Leiden, 1967; C. H. Alexandrowicz, ‘The Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations (Historical Aspects)’, **123 HR**, 1967, p. 117; L. Chatterjee, *International Law and Inter-State Relations in Ancient India*, Calcutta, 1958; N. Singh, ‘The Distinguishing Characteristics of the Concept of the Law of Nations as it Developed in Ancient India’, in *Liber Amicorum for Lord Wilberforce* (ed. A. Bos and I. Brownlie), Oxford, 1987, p. 91; R. P. Anand, *International Law and the Developing Countries*, The Hague, 1987; *International Law and Practice in Ancient India* (ed. H. S. Bhatia), New Delhi, 1977; N. Singh, *India and International Law*, New Delhi, 1969; and P. Bandyopadhyay, *International Law and Custom in Ancient India*, New Delhi, 1982.

⁵⁶ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, p. 4; Liu Tchoan Pas, *Le Droit des Gens et de la Chine Antique*, Paris, 2 vols., 1926; P. Gong, *The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society*, 1984, pp. 130–63; pp. 164–200 with regard to Japan; pp. 201–37 with regard to Siam; I. C. Y. Hsu, *China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations*, Harvard, 1960; K. Iriye, ‘The Principles of International Law in the Light of Confucian Doctrine’, **120 HR**, 1967, p. 1; and Wang Tieya, ‘International Law in China’, **221 HR**, 1990 II, p. 195. See also C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘South Asian Antecedents of International Law’, in *International Law: Theory and Practice* (ed. K. Wellens), The Hague, 1998, p. 3; and E. Y.-J. Lee, ‘Early Development of Modern International Law in East Asia – with Special Reference to China, Japan and Korea’, **4 Journal of the History of International Law**, 2002, p. 42.

⁵⁷ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 5–9; and A. Lanni, ‘The Laws of War in Ancient Greece’, *Harvard Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 07-24*, 2007. See also G. Ténékidès, ‘Droit International et Communautés Fédérales dans la Grèce des Cités’, **90 HR**, 1956, p. 469; S. L. Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337–90 BC*, Berkeley, 1996; and Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, pp. 154–6.

⁵⁸ Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, pp. 136–9; and Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 10–16.

⁵⁹ See e.g. A. Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction to Roman Law*, 3rd ed., London, 1972. See also A. Watson, *International Law in Archaic Rome*, Baltimore, 1993; A. Watson, *The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire* (ed. B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann), Oxford, 2010; and R. Lesaffer, ‘Roman Law and the Intellectual History of International Law’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 2.

⁶⁰ See e.g. Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, pp. 79–169.

⁶¹ See generally with regard to Byzantium, M. De Taube, ‘L’Apport de Byzance au Développement du Droit International Occidental’, **67 HR**, 1939, p. 233; and S. Verosta, ‘International Law in Europe and Western Asia between 100–650 AD’, **113 HR**, 1964, p. 489.

⁶² See e.g. M. Al Ghunaimi, *The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach*, The Hague, 1968; A. Draz, ‘Le Droit International Public et l’Islam’, **5 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International**, p. 17; C. Stumpf, ‘Christian and Islamic Traditions of Public International Law’, **7 Journal of the History of International Law**, 2005, p. 69; H. Khadduri, ‘Islam and the Modern Law of Nations’, **50 AJIL**, 1956, p. 358; H. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, 2nd ed., Baltimore, 1962; and S. Mahmassani, ‘The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine’, **117 HR**, 1966, p. 205. See also ‘L’Asile et les Refugies dans la Tradition Musulmane’, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, International Law Association, London, 2000, p. 305; and Y. Ben Achour Yadh, ‘La Civilisation Islamique et le Droit International’, *RGDIP*, 2006, p. 19.

⁶³ See Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, pp. 141–2; and Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 51–4.

⁶⁴ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 17–23; and Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, pp. 143–9.

⁶⁵ Note in particular the influence of the Church on the rules governing warfare and the binding nature of agreements: see Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 17–18; and Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, pp. 146–7. See also M. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages*, London, 1965.

⁶⁶ See G. Holdsworth, *A History of English Law*, London, 1924, vol. 5, pp. 60–3.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 63–129.

⁶⁸ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 29–31. Note also the influence of the Consolato del Mare, composed in Barcelona in the mid-fourteenth century, and the Maritime Code of Wisby (c. 1407) followed by the Hanseatic League.

⁶⁹ See e.g. Friedmann, *Changing Structure*, pp. 114–16.

⁷⁰ See e.g. G. Mattingley, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, London, 1955.

⁷¹ See A. Gardot, ‘Jean Bodin – Sa Place Parmi les Fondateurs du Droit International’, **50 HR**, 1934, p. 549. See also, for a discussion of sovereignty and the treaty-making power in the late Middle Ages, T. Meron, ‘The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages’, **89 AJIL**, 1995, p. 1.

⁷² Below, p. 20.

⁷³ *Summa Theologia*, English ed., 1927.

⁷⁴ H. Maine, *Ancient Law*, London, 1861, pp. 56, 64–6.

⁷⁵ Note Preiser’s view that ‘[t]here was hardly a single important problem of international law until the middle of the 17th century which was not principally a problem of Spain and the allied Habsburg countries’: Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, p. 150. See also Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 79–93.

⁷⁶ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 79–84; and Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, pp. 151–2. See also F. Vitoria, *De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectiones*, *Classics of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1917; and J. B. Scott, *The Spanish Origin of International Law, Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations*, Washington, DC, 1934. See also I. de la Rasilla del Moral, ‘Francisco de Vitoria’s Unexpected Transformations and Reinterpretations for International Law’, **15** *International Community Law Review*, 2013, p. 287; and P. Amorosa, *Rewriting the History of the Law of Nations: How James Brown Scott Made Francisco de Vitoria the Founder of International Law*, Oxford, 2019.

⁷⁷ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 84–91. See also *ibid.*, pp. 92–3 regarding the work of Ayala (1548–84).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 94–101. See also A. Van der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1968.

⁷⁹ Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 102–14. See also W. S. M. Knight, *The Life and Works of Hugo Grotius*, London, 1925, and ‘Commemoration of the Fourth Century of the Birth of Grotius’ (various articles), **182** *HR*, 1984, pp. 371–470; and M. J. van Ittersum, ‘Hugo Grotius: The Making of a Founding Father of International Law’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 4.

⁸⁰ In *Mare Clausum Sive de Dominio Maris*, 1635.

⁸¹ *On the Law of Nature and of Nations*, 1672. See also Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 147–50; and M. Koskeniemi, ‘Transformations of Natural Law: Germany 1648–1815’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 3.

⁸² Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 165–7.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 167–72.

⁸⁴ See Friedmann, *Legal Theory*, pp. 253–5.

⁸⁵ See L. Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia 1648–1948’, **42** *AJIL*, 1948, p. 20; *Renegotiating Westphalia* (ed. C. Harding and C. L. Lim), The Hague, 1999, especially

chapter 1; and S. Beaulac, 'The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy – Myth or Reality?', 2 *Journal of the History of International Law*, 2000, p. 148.

⁸⁶ *Leviathan*, 1651.

⁸⁷ See Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 156–64. See also N. Onuf, 'Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism', 88 *AJIL*, 1994, p. 280.

⁸⁸ See e.g. J. Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, Oxford, 1980; and R. Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories*, Cambridge, 1979. See also G. Gordon, 'Natural Law in International Legal Theory: Linear and Dialectical Presentations', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 14.

⁸⁹ See e.g. N. Onuf and O. Onuf, *Federal Unions, Modern World*, Madison, 1994.

⁹⁰ See Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 186–250, and, e.g., C. H. Alexandrowicz, *The European–African Confrontation*, Leiden, 1973. See also B. Bowden, 'The Colonial Origins of International Law. European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civilisation', 7 *Journal of the History of International Law*, 2005, p. 1; and C. Sylvest, 'International Law in Nineteenth-Century Britain', 75 *BYIL*, 2004, p. 9.

⁹¹ See below, [Chapters 3](#) and [13](#) respectively. See also H. Gros Espiell, 'La Doctrine du Droit International en Amérique Latine avant la Première Conférence Panaméricaine', 3 *Journal of the History of International Law*, 2001, p. 1; and A. A. Cançado Trindade, 'The Contribution of Latin American Legal Doctrine to the Progressive Development of International Law', 376 *HR*, 2016, p. 9.

⁹² See especially A. Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*, London, 1969.

⁹³ G. Best, *Humanity in Warfare*, London, 1980; G. Best, *War and Law Since 1945*, Oxford, 1994; and S. Bailey, *Prohibitions and Restraints in War*, Oxford, 1972.

⁹⁴ See e.g. *Bowett's Law of International Institutions* (ed. P. Sands and P. Klein), 5th ed., London, 2001; and *The Evolution of International Organisations* (ed. E. Luard), Oxford, 1966.

⁹⁵ See further below, [Chapter 22](#).

⁹⁶ See further below, [Chapter 20](#).

⁹⁷ See below, [Chapter 2](#).

⁹⁸ See e.g. S. Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, London, 1972; and Friedmann, *Legal Theory*, pp. 164–76.

⁹⁹ Friedmann, *Legal Theory*, pp. 576–7. See also below, [Chapter 4](#).

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. H. Wheaton, *Elements of International Law*, New York, 1836; W. E. Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*, Oxford, 1880; F. Von Martens, *Völkerrecht*, Berlin, 2 vols., 1883–6; P. Pradier-Fodéré, *Traité de Droit International Public*, Paris, 8 vols., 1855–1906; and P. Fiore, *Il Diritto Internazionale Codificato e la Sua Sanzione Giuridica*, 1890.

¹⁰¹ See Nussbaum, *Law of Nations*, pp. 251–90; and below, [Chapter 21](#). See also M. García-Salmones, ‘Early Twentieth Century Positivism Revisited’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 9.

¹⁰² See also G. Scott, *The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations*, London, 1973.

¹⁰³ See below, [Chapter 18](#).

¹⁰⁴ See below, [Chapter 6](#).

¹⁰⁵ Following the admission of South Sudan in 2011.

¹⁰⁶ See Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, chapter 10; and Friedmann, *Legal Theory*, chapter 29.

¹⁰⁷ Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, quoted in Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, pp. 773–4.

¹⁰⁸ *Theory of International Law*, London, 1974, p. 4, and *International Law* (ed. G. I. Tunkin), Moscow, 1986, chapter 3. See also B. S. Chimni, *International Law and World Order*, New Delhi, 2nd ed., 2017, chapter 7; K. Grzybowski, *Soviet Public International*

Law, Leiden, 1970, especially chapter 1; and generally H. Baade, *The Soviet Impact on International Law*, Leiden, 1964; and Friedmann, *Legal Theory*, pp. 327–40. See also R. St J. Macdonald, ‘Rummaging in the Ruins, Soviet International Law and Policy in the Early Years: Is Anything Left?’, in Wellens, *International Law*, p. 61; *International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies* (ed. S. Marks), Cambridge, 2008; and R. Knox, ‘Marxist Approaches to International Law’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 15.

109 Tunkin, *Theory*, p. 5.

110 *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6. See also H. Babb and J. Hazard, *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, Cambridge, MA, 1951.

111 Grzybowski, *Soviet Public International Law*, pp. 6–9.

112 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

113 *Ibid.*, pp. 16–22. See also R. Higgins, *Conflict of Interests*, London, 1965, part III.

114 Tunkin, *Theory*, p. 251. See also G. I. Tunkin, ‘Co-existence and International Law’, **95 HR**, 1958, pp. 1, 51 ff.; and E. McWhinney, ‘Contemporary Soviet General Theory of International Law: Reflections on the Tunkin Era’, **25 Canadian YIL**, 1989, p. 187.

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118 See Grzybowski, *Soviet Public International Law*, pp. 16–22.

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124 See e.g. R. Müllerson, *International Law, Rights and Politics*, London, 1994. See also *The End of the Cold War* (ed. P. Allan and K. Goldmann), Dordrecht, 1992; and W. M. Reisman, ‘International Law after the Cold War’, **84** *AJIL*, 1990, p. 859.

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126 See H. Chiu, ‘Communist China’s Attitude towards International Law’, **60** *AJIL*, 1966, p. 245; J. K. Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, Cambridge, 1968; J. Cohen, *China’s Practice of International Law*, Princeton, 1972; Anglo-Chinese Educational Trust, *China’s World View*, London, 1979; J. Cohen and H. Chiu, *People’s China and International Law*, Princeton, 2 vols., 1974; and C. Kim, ‘The People’s Republic of China and the Charter-based International Legal Order’, **72** *AJIL*, 1978, p. 317. See also [Chapter 5](#), p. 196.

127 See Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, pp. 760–3; S. Van der Sprenkel, *Legal Institutions in Northern China*, New York, 1962; and R. Unger, *Law in Modern Society*, New York, 1976, pp. 86–109.

¹²⁸ Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*; and H. Li, ‘The Role of Law in Communist China’, *China Quarterly*, 1970, p. 66, cited in Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, pp. 801–8. See also T. Ruskola, ‘China in the Age of the World Picture’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 7.

¹²⁹ See e.g. Cohen and Chiu, *People’s China*, pp. 62–4. See also Xue Hanqin, ‘Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture and International Law’, *355 HR*, 2012, p. 41.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 77–82, and part VIII generally.

¹³¹ See e.g. I. Detter, ‘The Problem of Unequal Treaties’, *15 ICLQ*, 1966, p. 1069; F. Nozari, *Unequal Treaties in International Law*, Stockholm, 1971; Chiu, ‘Communist China’s Attitude’, pp. 239–67; and L.-F. Chen, *State Succession Relating to Unequal Treaties*, Hamden, 1974.

¹³² See further on this, [Chapter 5](#), p. 196.

¹³³ See www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698.

¹³⁴ See e.g. R. P. Anand, ‘Attitude of the Afro-Asian States Towards Certain Problems of International Law’, *15 ICLQ*, 1966, p. 35; T. O. Elias, *New Horizons in International Law*, Leiden, 1980; and Higgins, *Conflict of Interests*, part II. See also Hague Academy of International Law, Colloque, *The Future of International Law in a Multicultural World*, especially pp. 117–42; Henkin, *How Nations Behave*, pp. 121–7; A. A. Yusuf, ‘Pan-Africanism and International Law’, *369 HR*, 2014, p. 165; and A. B. Lorca, *Mestizo International Law*, Cambridge, 2015.

¹³⁵ See e.g. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, vol. I, pp. 435–6. See also B. Roling, *International Law in an Expanded World*, Leiden, 1960, p. 10.

¹³⁶ The converse of this has been the view of some writers that the universalisation of international law has led to a dilution of its content: see e.g. Friedmann, *Changing Structure*, p. 6; J. Stone, *Quest for Survival: The Role of Law and Foreign Policy*, Sydney, 1961, p. 88; and J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 6th ed., Oxford, 1963, p. 43.

137 See e.g. Alexandrowicz, *European–African Confrontation*.

138 See F. C. Okoye, *International Law and the New African States*, London, 1972; T. O. Elias, *Africa and the Development of International Law*, Leiden, 1972; and Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, pp. 205–51.

139 By General Assembly resolution 36/39, twenty-one of the thirty-four members are to be nationals of Afro-Asian–Latin American states.

140 See above, **note 105**.

141 See below, [Chapter 5](#), p. 228.

142 See below, [Chapter 13](#), p. 726.

143 See e.g. J. Zollmann, ‘African International Legal Histories – International Law in Africa: Perspectives and Possibilities’, **31** *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 2018, p. 897; H. Sarin, ‘The Asian–African States and the Development of International Law’, in Hague Academy Colloque, p. 117; *The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Asia and the Pacific* (ed. S. Chesterman, H. Owada and B. Saul), Oxford, 2019; Bernhardt, *Encyclopedia*, vol. **VII**, pp. 205–51; O. Yasuaki, ‘A Transcivilization Perspective on International Law’, **342** *HR*, 2010, p. 77; Y. Masaharu, ‘Significance of the History of the Law of Nations in Europe and East Asia’, **371** *HR*, 2014, p. 277; and R. Westbrook, ‘Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate Expressions of World Order’, **33** *Va. JIL*, 1993, p. 819. See also Jenks, *Common Law of Mankind*, p. 169. Note also the references by the Tribunal in the *Eritrea–Yemen* cases to historic title and regional legal traditions: see the judgment in Phase One: Territorial Sovereignty, 1998, 114 ILR, pp. 1, 37 ff. and Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation, 1999, 119 ILR, pp. 417, 448.

144 See e.g. M. Lachs, ‘Thoughts on Science, Technology and World Law’, **86** *AJIL*, 1992, p. 673.

145 See Koskeniemi, *Gentle Civilizer of Nations*. See also A. Roberts, *Is International Law International?*, Oxford, 2017; Koskeniemi *et al.*, *International Law and Empire*; and G. Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*, Cambridge, 2004.

2

International Law Today

The Expanding Legal Scope of International Concern

International law since the middle of the last century has been developing in many directions, as the complexities of life in the modern era have multiplied. For, as already emphasised, law reflects the conditions and cultural traditions of the society within which it operates. The community evolves a certain specific set of values – social, economic and political – and this stamps its mark on the legal framework which orders life in that environment. Similarly, international law is a product of its environment. It has developed in accordance with the prevailing notions of international relations and to survive it must be in harmony with the realities of the age.

Nevertheless, there is a continuing tension between those rules already established and the constantly evolving forces that seek changes within the system. One of the major problems of international law is to determine when and how to incorporate new standards of behaviour and new realities of life into the already existing framework, so that, on the one hand, the law remains relevant and, on the other, the system itself is not too vigorously disrupted.

Changes that occur within the international community can be momentous and reverberate throughout the system. For example, the advent of nuclear arms created a status quo in Europe and a balance of terror throughout the world. It currently constitutes a factor of unease as further states seek to acquire nuclear technology. Another example is the technological capacity to mine the oceans and the consequent questions as to the nature and beneficiaries of exploitation.¹ The rise of international terrorism has posed new challenges to the system as states and international organisations struggle to deal with this phenomenon while retaining respect for the sovereignty of states and for human rights.² The phenomena of non-state actors and of cyber warfare are yet further examples of new developments impacting significantly upon the evolution of the law.³ More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic which started at the end of 2019 has shaken the world.⁴ There are many instances of how modern developments demand a constant reappraisal of the structure of international law and its rules.

The scope of international law today is immense. From the regulation of space expeditions to the question of the division of the ocean floor, and from the protection of human rights to the management of the international financial system and cyber activities, its involvement has spread out from the primary concern with the preservation of peace, to embrace all the interests of contemporary international life.

But the *raison d'être* of international law and the determining factor in its composition remains the needs and characteristics of the international political system. Where more than one entity exists within a system, there has to be some conception as to how to deal with other such entities, whether it

be on the basis of co-existence or hostility. International law as it has developed since the seventeenth century has adopted the same approach and has in general (though with notable exceptions) eschewed the idea of permanent hostility and enmity. Because the state, while internally supreme, wishes to maintain its sovereignty externally and needs to cultivate other states in an increasingly interdependent world, it must acknowledge the rights of others. This acceptance of rights possessed by all states, something unavoidable in a world where none can stand alone, leads inevitably to a system to regulate and define such rights and, of course, obligations.

And so one arrives at some form of international legal order, no matter how unsophisticated and how occasionally positively disorderly.⁵ The current system developed in the context of European civilisation as it progressed, but this has changed. The rise of the United States and the Soviet Union mirrored the decline of Europe, while the process of decolonisation also had a considerable impact. More recently, the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China as major powers and the phenomenon of globalisation (and the reactions to it) are also impacting deeply upon the system. Faced with radical changes in the structure of power, international law needs to come to terms with new ideas and challenges.

The original Eurocentric character of international law has been gravely weakened in the last sixty years or so and the opinions, hopes and needs of other cultures and civilisations are now playing an increasing role in the evolution of world juridical thought.⁶

International law reflects first and foremost the basic state-oriented character of world politics and this essentially is because the state became over time the primary repository of the organised hopes of peoples, whether for protection or for more expansive aims. Units of formal independence benefiting from equal sovereignty in law and equal possession of the basic attributes of statehood⁷ have succeeded in creating a system enshrining such values. Examples that could be noted here include non-intervention in internal affairs, territorial integrity, non-use of force and equality of voting in the UN General Assembly. However, in addition to this, many factors cut across state borders and create a tension in world politics, such as inadequate economic relationships, international concern for human rights, health issues such as the recent coronavirus pandemic and the rise in new technological forces.⁸ State policies and balances of power, both international and regional, are a necessary framework within which international law operates, as indeed are domestic political conditions and tensions. Law mirrors the concern of forces within states and between states.

It is also important to realise that states need law in order to seek and attain certain goals, whether these be economic well-being, survival and security or ideological advancement. The system therefore has to be certain enough for such goals to be ascertainable, and flexible enough to permit change when this becomes necessary due to the confluence of forces demanding it.⁹

International law, however, has not just expanded horizontally to embrace the new states which have been established since the end of the Second World War; it has extended itself to include individuals, groups and international organisations, both private and public, within its scope. It has also moved into

new fields covering such issues as international trade, problems of environmental protection, human rights and outer space exploration.

The growth of positivism in the nineteenth century had the effect of focusing the concerns of international law upon sovereign states. They alone were the ‘subjects’ of international law and were to be contrasted with the status of non-independent states and individuals as ‘objects’ of international law. They alone created the law and restrictions upon their independence could not be presumed.¹⁰ But the gradual sophistication of positivist doctrine, combined with the advent of new approaches to the whole system of international relations, has broken down this exclusive emphasis and extended the roles played by non-state entities, such as individuals, groups, multinational firms and international institutions.¹¹ It was, of course, long recognised that individuals were entitled to the benefits of international law, but it is only recently that they have been able to act directly rather than rely upon their national states.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals set up by the victorious Allies after the close of the Second World War were a vital part of this process. Many of those accused were found guilty of crimes against humanity and against peace and were punished accordingly. It was a recognition of individual responsibility under international law without the usual interposition of the state and has been reinforced with the establishment of the Yugoslav and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunals in the mid-1990s and the International Criminal Court in 1998.¹² Similarly, the 1948 Genocide Convention provided for the punishment of offenders after conviction by national courts or by an international criminal tribunal.¹³ The developing concern with human rights

is another aspect of this move towards increasing the role of the individual in international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948 lists a series of political and social rights, although it is only a guideline and not legally binding as such. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 1950 and the International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 are of a different nature and binding upon the signatories. In an effort to function satisfactorily, various bodies of a supervisory and implementational nature were established. Within the European Union, individuals and corporations have certain rights of direct appeal to the European Court of Justice against decisions of the various Union institutions. In addition, individuals may appear before certain international tribunals. Nevertheless, the whole subject has been highly controversial, with some writers (for example, Soviet theorists prior to *perestroika*) denying that individuals may have rights as distinct from duties under international law, but it is indicative of the trend away from the exclusivity of the state.¹⁴

Together with the evolution of individual human rights, the rise of international organisations marks perhaps the key distinguishing feature of modern international law. In fact, international law cannot in the contemporary era be understood without reference to the growth in number and influence of such intergovernmental institutions, and of these the most important by far is the United Nations.¹⁵ This organisation comprises the vast majority of states (there are currently 193 member states) and that alone constitutes a political factor of high importance in the process of diplomatic relations and negotiations and indeed facilitates international cooperation and norm creation. Further, of course, the existence of the Security Council as an

executive organ with powers to adopt resolutions in certain circumstances that are binding upon all member states is unique in the history of international relations.

International organisations have now been accepted as possessing rights and duties of their own and a distinctive legal personality. The International Court of Justice in 1949 delivered an Advisory Opinion¹⁶ in which it stated that the United Nations was a subject of international law and could enforce its rights by bringing international claims, in this case against Israel following the assassination of Count Bernadotte, a United Nations official. Such a ruling can be applied to embrace other international institutions, like the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization, which each have a judicial character of their own. Thus, while states remain the primary subjects of international law, they are now joined by other non-state entities, whose importance is likely to grow even further in the future.

The growth of regional organisations should also be noted at this stage. Many of these were created for reasons of military security, for example NATO and the opposing Warsaw Pact organisations, others as an expression of regional and cultural identity, such as the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) and the Organization of American States. In a class of its own is the European Union, which has gone far down the road of economic coordination and standardisation and has a range of common institutions serviced by a growing bureaucracy stationed primarily at Brussels.

Such regional organisations have added to the developing sophistication of international law by the insertion of ‘regional–international law sub-systems’ within the universal framework and the consequent evolution of rules that bind only member states.¹⁷

The range of topics covered by international law has expanded hand in hand with the upsurge in difficulties faced and the proliferation in the number of participants within the system. It is no longer exclusively concerned with issues relating to the territory or jurisdiction of states narrowly understood, but is beginning to take into account the specialised problems of contemporary society. Many of these have already been referred to, such as the vital field of human rights, the growth of an international economic law covering financial and development matters, concern with environmental despoliation, the space exploration effort and the exploitation of the resources of the oceans and deep seabed. One can mention also provisions relating to the bureaucracy of international institutions (international administrative law), international labour standards, health regulations and communications controls. Many of these trends may be seen as falling within, or rather reflecting, the phenomenon of globalisation, a term which encompasses the inexorable movement to greater interdependence founded upon economic, communications and cultural bases and operating quite independently of national regulation.¹⁸ This in turn stimulates disputes of an almost ideological nature concerning, for example, the relationship between free trade and environmental protection.¹⁹ To this may be added the pressures of democracy and human rights, both operating to some extent as countervailing influences to the classical emphasis upon the territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction of states.

Modern Theories and Interpretations

At this point some modern theories as to the nature and role of international law will be briefly noted.

Positive Law and Natural Law

Throughout the history of thought there has been a complex relationship between idealism and realism, between the way things ought to be and the way things are, and the debate as to whether legal philosophy should incorporate ethical standards or confine itself to an analysis of the law as it stands is a vital one that continues today.²⁰

The positivist school, which developed so rapidly in the pragmatic, optimistic world of the nineteenth century, declared that law as it exists should be analysed empirically, shorn of all ethical elements. Moral aspirations were all well and good, but had no part in legal science. Man-made law must be examined as such and the metaphysical speculations of Natural Law rejected because what counted were the practical realities, not general principles which were imprecise and vague, not to say ambiguous.²¹

This kind of approach to law in society reached its climax with Kelsen's 'Pure Theory of Law'. Kelsen defined law solely in terms of itself and eschewed any element of justice, which was rather to be considered within the discipline of political science. Politics, sociology and history were all excised from the pure theory which sought to construct a logical unified structure based on a formal appraisal.²²

Law was to be regarded as a normative science, that is, consisting of rules which lay down patterns of behaviour. Such rules, or norms, depend for their legal validity on a prior norm and this process continues until one reaches what is termed the basic norm of the whole system. This basic norm is the foundation of the legal edifice, because rules which can be related back to it therefore become *legal* rules. To give a simple example, a court order empowering an official to enforce a fine is valid if the court had that power which depends upon an Act of Parliament establishing the court. A rule becomes a legal rule if it is in accordance with a previous (and higher) legal rule and so on. Layer builds upon layer and the foundation of it all is the basic norm.²³

The weakness of Kelsen's 'pure' system lies primarily in the concept of the basic norm for it relies for its existence upon non-legal issues. In fact, it is a political concept, and in the United Kingdom it would probably be the principle of the supremacy of Parliament.²⁴

This logical, structured system of validity founded upon an extra-legal concept encounters difficulties when related to international law. For Kelsen international law is a primitive legal order because of its lack of strong legislative, judicial and enforcement organs and its consequent resemblance to a pre-state society. It is accordingly characterised by the use of self-help.²⁵ The principles of international law are valid if they can be traced back to the basic norm of the system, which is hierarchical in the same sense as a national legal system. For Kelsen, the basic norm is the rule that identifies custom as the source of law, or stipulates that 'the states ought to behave as they customarily behaved'.²⁶ One of the prime rules of this category is *pacta*

sunt servanda declaring that agreements must be carried out in good faith and upon that rule is founded the second stage within the international legal order. This second stage consists of the network of norms created by international treaties and conventions and leads on to the third stage which includes those rules established by organs which have been set up by international treaties, for instance, decisions of the International Court of Justice.²⁷

The problem with Kelsen's formulation of the basic norm of international law is that it appears to be tautological: it merely repeats that states which obey rules ought to obey those rules.²⁸ It seems to leave no room for the progressive development of international law by new practices accepted as law for that involves states behaving differently from the way they have been behaving. Above all, it fails to answer the question as to why custom is binding.

Nevertheless, it is a model of great logical consistency which helps explain, particularly with regard to national legal systems, the proliferation of rules and the importance of validity which gives, as it were, a mystical seal of approval to the whole structured process. It helps illustrate how rule leads to rule as stage succeeds stage in a progression of norms forming a legal order.

Another important element in Kelsen's interpretation of law is his extreme 'monist' stance. International law and municipal law are not two separate systems, but one interlocking structure, and the former is supreme. Municipal law finds its ultimate justification in the rules of international law by a process of delegation within one universal normative system.²⁹

Kelsen's pure theory seemed to mark the end of that particular road, and positivism was analysed in more sociological terms by Hart in his book *The Concept of Law* in 1961.

Hart comprehends law as a system of rules, based upon the interaction of primary and secondary rules. The former, basically, specify standards of behaviour, while the latter provide the means for identifying and developing them and thus specify the constitutional procedures for change. Primitive societies would possess only the primary rules and so would be characterised by uncertainty, inefficiency and stagnation, but with increasing sophistication the secondary rules would develop and identify authority and enable the rules to be adapted to changing circumstances in a regular and accepted manner.³⁰

The international legal order is a prime example of a simple form of social structure which consists only of the primary rules, because of its lack of a centralised legislature, network of recognised courts with compulsory jurisdiction and organised means of enforcement. Accordingly, it has no need of, or rather has not yet evolved, a basic norm, or in Hart's terminology a rule of recognition, by reference to which the validity of all the rules may be tested. Following this train of thought, Hart concludes that the rules of international law do not as yet constitute a 'system', but are merely a 'set of rules'. Of course, future developments may see one particular principle, such as *pacta sunt servanda*, elevated to the state of a validating norm, but in the present situation this has not yet occurred.³¹

This approach can be criticised for its over-concentration upon rules to the exclusion of other important elements in a legal system such as principles and

policies,³² and, more especially as regards international law, for failing to recognise the sophistication or vitality of the system. In particular, the distinction between a system and a set of rules in the context of international law is a complex issue and one which is difficult to delineate.

The strength of the positivist movement waned in the last century as the old certainties disintegrated and social unrest grew. Law, as always, began to reflect the dominant pressures of the age, and new theories as to the role of law in society developed. Writers started examining the effects of sociological phenomena upon the legal order and the nature of the legal process itself, with analyses of judicial behaviour and the means whereby rules were applied in actual practice. This was typified by Roscoe Pound's view of the law as a form of social engineering, balancing the various interests within the society in the most efficacious way.³³ Law was regarded as a method of social control and conceptual approaches were rejected in favour of functional analyses. What actually happened within the legal system, what claims were being brought and how they were satisfied: these were the watchwords of the sociological school.³⁴

It was in one sense a move away from the ivory tower and into the courtroom. Empirical investigations proliferated, particularly in the United States, and the sciences of psychology and anthropology as well as sociology became allied to jurisprudence. Such concern with the wider social context led to the theories of Realism, which treated law as an institution functioning within a particular community with a series of jobs to do. A study of legal norms within a closed logical system in the Kelsenite vein was regarded as unable to reveal very much of the actual operation of law in society. For this

an understanding of the behaviour of courts and the various legal officials was required. Historical and ethical factors were relegated to a minor role within the realist–sociological tradition, with its concentration upon field studies and ‘technical’ dissections. Legal rules were no longer to be accepted as the heart of the legal system.³⁵

Before one looks at contemporary developments of this approach and how they have affected interpretations of international law, the revival of Natural Law has first to be considered.

In the search for meaning in life and an ethical basis to law, Natural Law has adopted a variety of different approaches. One of them has been a refurbishment of the principles enumerated by Aquinas and adopted by the Catholic Church, emphasising the dignity of man and the supremacy of reason together with an affirmation of the immorality (though not necessarily the invalidity) of law contrary to right reason and the eternal law of God.³⁶ A more formalistic and logic-oriented trend has been exemplified by writers such as Stammler, who tried to erect a logical structure of law with an inbuilt concept of ‘Natural Law with a changing content’. This involved contrasting the *concept* of law, which was intended to be an abstract, formal definition universally applicable, with the *idea* of law, which embodies the purposes and direction of the system. This latter precept varied, of necessity, in different social and cultural contexts.³⁷

As distinct from this formal idealist school, there has arisen a sociologically inspired approach to the theme of Natural Law represented by Gény and Duguit. This particular trend rejected the emphasis upon form, and

concentrated instead upon the definition of Natural Law in terms of universal factors, physical, psychological, social and historical, which dominate the framework of society within which the law operated.³⁸

The discussion of Natural Law increased and gained in importance following the Nazi experience. It stimulated a German philosopher, Radbruch, to formulate a theory whereby unjust laws had to be opposed by virtue of a higher, Natural Law.³⁹

As far as international law is concerned, the revival of Natural Law came at a time of increasing concern with international justice and the formation of international institutions. Many of the ideas and principles of international law today are rooted in the notion of Natural Law and the relevance of ethical standards to the legal order, such as the principles of non-aggression and human rights.⁴⁰

New Approaches⁴¹

Traditionally, international law has been understood in a historical manner and studied chronologically. This approach was especially marked in the nineteenth century as international relations multiplied and international conferences and agreements came with increasing profusion. Between the world wars, the opening of government archives released a wealth of material and further stimulated a study of diplomatic history, while the creation of such international institutions as the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice encouraged an appreciation of institutional processes.

However, after the Second World War a growing trend appeared intent upon the analysis of power politics and the comprehension of international relations in terms of the capacity to influence and dominate. The approach was a little more sophisticated than might appear at first glance, for it involved a consideration of social and economic as well as political data that had a bearing upon a state's ability to withstand as well as direct pressures.⁴² Nevertheless, it was a pessimistic interpretation because of its centring upon power and its uses as the motive force of inter-state activity.

The next 'wave of advance', as it has been called, witnessed the successes of the behaviouralist movement. This particular train of thought introduced elements of psychology, anthropology and sociology into the study of international relations and paralleled similar developments within the realist school. It reflected the altering emphasis from analyses in terms of idealistic

or cynical (‘realistic’) conceptions of the world political order, to a mechanistic discussion of the system as it operates today, by means of field studies and other tools of the social sciences. Indeed, it is more a method of approach to law and society than a theory in the traditional sense.⁴³

One can trace the roots of this school of thought to the changing conceptions of the role of government in society. The nineteenth-century ethic of individualism and the restriction of state intervention to the very minimum has changed radically. The emphasis is now more upon the responsibility of the government towards its citizens, and the phenomenal growth in welfare legislation illustrates this. Rules and regulations controlling wide fields of human activity, something that would have been unheard of in the mid-nineteenth century, have proliferated throughout the nations of the developed world and theory has had to try and keep up with such re-orientations.

Since the law now plays a much deeper role in society with the increase in governmental intervention, impetus has been given to legal theories that reflect this growing involvement. Law, particularly in the United States, is seen as a tool to effect changes in society and realist doctrine underlines this. It emphasises that it is community values and policy decisions that determine the nature of the law and accordingly the role of the judge is that much more important. He is no longer an interpreter of a body of formal legal rules, but should be seen more as an active element in making decisions of public policy.

This means that to understand the operation of law, one has to consider the character of the particular society, its needs and values. Law thus becomes a

dynamic process and has to be studied in the context of society and not merely as a collection of legal rules capable of being comprehended on their own. The social sciences have led the way in this reinterpretation of society and their influence has been very marked on the behavioural method of looking at the law, not only in terms of general outlook, but also in providing the necessary tools to dissect society and discover the way it operates and the direction in which it is heading. The interdisciplinary nature of the studies in question was emphasised, utilising all the social sciences, including politics, economics and philosophy.⁴⁴ In particular, the use of the scientific method, such as obtaining data and quantitative analysis, has been very much in evidence.

Behaviouralism has divided the field of international relations into basically two studies, the first being a consideration of foreign policy techniques and the reasons whereby one particular course of action is preferred to another, and the second constituting the international systems analysis approach.⁴⁵ This emphasises the interaction of the various players on the international stage and the effects of such mutual pressures upon both the system and the participants. More than that, it examines the various international orders that have existed throughout history in an attempt to show how the dynamics of each particular system have created their own rules and how they can be used as an explanation of both political activity and the nature of international law. In other words, the nature of the international system can be examined by the use of particular variables in order to explain and to predict the role of international law.

For example, the period between 1848 and 1914 can be treated as the era of the 'balance of power' system. This system depended upon a number of factors, such as a minimum number of participants (accepted as five), who would engage in a series of temporary alliances in an attempt to bolster the weak and restrict the strong, for example the coalitions Britain entered into to overawe France. It was basic to this system that no nation wished totally to destroy any other state, but merely to humble and weaken, and this contributed to the stability of the order.⁴⁶

This system nurtured its own concepts of international law, especially that of sovereignty which was basic to the idea of free-floating alliances and the ability of states to leave the side of the strong to strengthen the weak. The balance of power collapsed with the First World War and, after a period of confusion, a discernible, loose 'bipolar' system emerged in the years following the Second World War.

This was predicated upon the polarisation of capitalism and communism and the consequent rigid alliances that were created. It included the existence of a 'Third World' of basically non-aligned states, the objects of rivalry and of competition, while not in themselves powerful enough to upset the bipolar system. This kind of order facilitated 'frontier' conflicts where the two powers collided, such as in Korea, Berlin and Vietnam, as well as modified the nature of sovereignty within the two alliances, thus allowing such organisations as NATO and the European Community (subsequently European Union) on the one hand, and the Warsaw Pact and COMECON on the other, to develop. The other side of this coin has been the freedom felt by the superpowers to control wavering states within their respective spheres of

influence, for example, the Soviet actions in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and those of the United States, particularly within Latin America.⁴⁷

Behaviouralism has been enriched by the use of such techniques as games theory.⁴⁸ This is a mathematical method of studying decision-making in conflict situations where the parties react rationally in the struggle for benefits. It can be contrasted with the fight situation, where the essence is the actual defeat of the opponent, and with the debate situation, which is an effort to convince the participants of the rightness of one's cause. Other factors which are taken into account include communications, integration, environment and capabilities. Thus, the range and complexity of this approach far exceeds that of prior theories.

All this highlights the switch in emphasis that has taken place in the consideration of law in the world community. The traditional view was generally that international law constituted a series of rules restricting the actions of independent states and forming exceptions to state sovereignty. The new theories tend to look at the situation differently, more from the perspective of the international order expanding its horizons than the nation-state agreeing to accept certain defined limitations upon its behaviour.

The rise of quantitative research has facilitated the collation and ordering of vast quantities of data. It is primarily a methodological approach utilising political, economic and social data and statistics, and converting facts and information into a form suitable for scientific investigation. Such methods with their behavioural and quantitative aspects are beginning to impinge upon

the field of international law. They enable a greater depth of knowledge and comprehension to be achieved and a wider appreciation of all the various processes at work.⁴⁹

The behavioural approach to international relations has been translated into international law theory by a number of writers, in particular Professor McDougal, with some important modifications. This 'policy-orientated' movement regards law as a comprehensive process of decision-making rather than as a defined set of rules and obligations. It is an active all-embracing approach, seeing international law as a dynamic system operating within a particular type of world order.⁵⁰ It therefore minimises the role played by rules, for such a traditional conception of international law 'quite obviously offers but the faintest glimpse of the structures, procedures and types of decision that take place in the contemporary world community'.⁵¹ It has been emphasised that the law is a constantly evolving process of decision-making and the way that it evolves will depend on the knowledge and insight of the decision-maker.⁵² In other words, it is the social process of constant human interaction that is seen as critical and, in this process, claims are continually being made in an attempt to maximise values at the disposal of the participants. Eight value-institution categories have been developed to analyse this process: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect and rectitude. This list may be further developed. It is not exhaustive. Law is to be regarded as a product of such social processes.⁵³ International law is the whole process of authoritative decision-making involving crucially the concepts of authority and control. The former is defined in terms of the structure of expectation concerning the identity and

competence of the decision-maker, whilst the latter refers to the actual effectiveness of a decision, whether or not authorised.⁵⁴

McDougal's work and that of his followers emphasises the long list of values, interests and considerations that have to be taken into account within the international system by the persons actually faced with making the decisions. This stress upon the so-called 'authoritative decision-maker', whether he or she be in the United States Department of State, in the British Foreign Office or 'anyone whose choice about an event can have some international significance'⁵⁵ as the person who in effect has to choose between different options respecting international legal principles, emphasises the practical world of power and authority.

Such a decision-maker is subject to a whole series of pressures and influences, such as the values of the community in which that person operates, and the interests of the particular nation-state served. He or she will also have to consider the basic values of the world order, for instance human dignity. This approach involves a complex dissection of a wide-ranging series of factors and firmly fixes international law within the ambit of the social sciences, both with respect to the procedures adopted and the tools of analysis. International law is seen in the following terms, as

a comprehensive process of authoritative decision in which rules are continuously made and remade; that the function of the rules of international law is to communicate the perspectives (demands, identifications and

expectations) of the peoples of the world about this comprehensive process of decision; and that the national application of these rules in particular instances requires their interpretation, like that of any other communication, in terms of who is using them, with respect to whom, for what purposes (major and minor), and in what context.⁵⁶

Legal rules articulate and seek to achieve certain goals and this value factor must not be ignored. The values emphasised by this school are basically those of human dignity, familiar from the concepts of Western democratic society.⁵⁷ Indeed, Reisman has emphasised the Natural Law origins of this approach as well as the need to clarify a jurisprudence for those persons whose activities have led to innovations in such fields of international law as human rights and the protection of the environment.⁵⁸

The policy-oriented movement has been greatly criticised by traditional international lawyers for unduly minimising the legal content of the subject and for ignoring the fact that nations generally accept international law as it is and obey its dictates.⁵⁹ States rarely indulge in a vast behavioural analysis, studiously considering every relevant element in a particular case and having regard to fundamental objectives like human dignity and welfare. Indeed, so to do may weaken international law, it has been argued.⁶⁰ In addition, the insertion of such value-concepts as 'human dignity' raises difficulties of subjectivity that ill fit within a supposedly objective analytical structure.

Koskenniemi, for example, has drawn attention to the predilection of the policy-oriented approach to support the dominant power.⁶¹

Other writers, such as Professor Falk, accept the basic comprehensive approach of the McDougal school, but point to its inconsistencies and over-fulsome cataloguing of innumerable interests. They tend to adopt a global outlook based upon a deep concern for human welfare and morality, but with an emphasis upon the importance of legal rules and structure.⁶²

Professor Franck, however, has sought to refocus the essential question of the existence and operation of the system of international law in terms of inquiring into why states obey international law despite the undeveloped condition of the international legal system's structures, processes and enforcement mechanisms.⁶³ The answer is seen to lie in the concept of legitimacy. States will obey the rules because they see such rules and their institutional framework as possessing a high degree of legitimacy.

Legitimacy itself is defined as 'a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process'.⁶⁴ Legitimacy may be empirically demonstrated, but compliance may be measured not only by observing states acting in accordance with the principle in question, but also by observing the degree to which a violator actually exhibits deference to that principle even while violating it.

Legitimacy will depend upon four specific properties, it is suggested: determinacy (or readily ascertainable normative content or 'transparency');

symbolic validation (or authority approval); coherence (or consistency or general application); and adherence (or falling within an organised hierarchy of rules). In other words, it is proposed that there exist objectively verifiable criteria which help us to ascertain why international rules are obeyed and thus why the system works. This approach is supplemented by the view that legitimacy and justice as morality are two aspects of the concept of fairness, which is seen by Franck as the most important question for international law.⁶⁵ Franck, however, has also drawn attention to the ‘emerging right to individuality’⁶⁶ within the context of a ‘global identity crisis’⁶⁷ in which the growth of supranational institutions and the collapse of a range of states combine to undermine traditional certainties of world order. He notes that persons are increasingly likely to identify themselves as autonomous individuals and that this is both reflected and manifested in the rise and expansion of international human rights law and in the construction of multi-layered and freely selected affinities.⁶⁸ While such personal rights are increasingly protected in both national and international law, the question as to the appropriate balancing of individual, group and state rights is posed in more urgent form.

However, legitimacy may also be understood in a broader way in referring to the relationship with the international political system as a whole and as forming the link between power and the legal system. It imbues the normative order with authority and acceptability, although not as such legality. Legitimacy links law and politics in its widest sense and will depend upon the context out of which it emerges. One writer has concluded that legitimacy ‘is a matter of history and thus is subject to change as new events emerge from the future and new understandings reinterpret the past’.⁶⁹

Legitimacy is important in that it constitutes a standard for the testing in the wider political environment of the relevance and acceptability of legal norms and practices. A rule seen as legitimate will benefit from a double dose of approval. A rule, institution or practice seen as illegal and illegitimate will be doubly disapproved of. A rule, or entity, which is legal but not legitimate will, it is suggested, not be able to sustain its position over the long term. A practice seen as illegal but legitimate is likely to form the nucleus of a new rule.

The recurring themes of the relationship between sovereign states and international society and the search for a convincing explanation for the binding quality of international law in a state-dominated world appear also in very recent approaches to international law theory which fall within the general critical legal studies framework.⁷⁰ Such approaches have drawn attention to the many inconsistencies and incoherences that persist within the international legal system. The search for an all-embracing general theory of international law has been abandoned in mainstream thought as being founded upon unverifiable propositions, whether religiously or sociologically based, and attention has switched to the analysis of particular areas of international law and in particular procedures for the settlement of disputes. The critical legal studies movement notes that the traditional approach to international law has in essence involved the transposition of 'liberal' principles of domestic systems onto the international scene, but that this has led to further problems.⁷¹ Specifically, liberalism tries constantly to balance individual freedom and social order and, it is argued, inevitably ends up siding with either one or other of those propositions.⁷² Additionally, there are only two possibilities with regard to justice itself: it is either simply

subjective or it is imposed. In either case, liberalism is compromised as a system.

The critical legal studies approach (sometimes termed the ‘New Approaches to International Law’ or NAIL) notes the close relationship that exists between law and society, but emphasises that conceptual analysis is also crucial since such concepts are not in themselves independent entities, but reflect particular power relationships. The point is made that the nexus between state power and international legal concepts needs to be taken into consideration as well as the way in which such concepts in themselves reflect political factors. As Koskenniemi writes, ‘a post-realist theory . . . aims to answer questions regarding the relationship of law and society and the legitimacy of constraint in a world of sovereigns as aspects of one single problem: the problem of power in concepts’.⁷³ The problem posed by the growth in the world community and the need to consider the range of different cultures and traditions within that community leads, it is suggested, to the decline of universality as such and the need to focus upon the specific contexts of particular problems.

In a more recent work, Koskenniemi has drawn attention not only to the continuing tension between the universalist and particularist impulses in international law,⁷⁴ but also to the related distinction between formalism and dynamism, or the contrast between rule-oriented and policy-oriented approaches. It is his view in essence that the latter approach might too easily be utilised to support a dominant political position.⁷⁵ It is the typical lawyer’s answer in any event to declare that all depends upon the particular circumstances of the case and this approach is generalised in order to deal

with the question of which of several relevant international rules is to predominate. It is in fact a way of noting that superior operating principles are difficult to find or justify and thus concluding that the search for universal concepts or principles is of little value. In effect, it is proposed that no coherent international system as such actually exists and that one should rather concentrate upon ad hoc legal concepts as reflecting power considerations and within the confines of the specific contexts in which the particular questions or issues have arisen. Like the policy-oriented approach, the critical legal studies view is to accept that international law is more than a set of rules, but it then proceeds to emphasise the indeterminacy as such of law rather than seeing law as a collection of competing norms between which choices must be made.⁷⁶ One particular area of study in recent years has been that concerned with the position of women within international law, both in terms of the structure of the system and the, for example, relative absence of females from the institutions and processes of international law and in terms of substantive law, which has until recently paid little attention to the needs and concerns of women.⁷⁷

The Fragmentation of International Law?⁷⁸

The tremendous expansion of both the rules and the institutions of international law, with the rise of more and more specialist areas, such as trade law, environmental law and human rights law, has led to arguments that international law as a holistic system is in the process of fragmentation. This has led to the fear that the centre will not be able to hold and that international law might dissolve into a series of discrete localised or limited systems with little or no interrelationship. In many ways, it is the explosion of

what is termed ‘globalisation’, with the consequential spread of practices and mechanisms across the world,⁷⁹ that has precipitated this problem of fragmentation, being defined in one view as the ‘emergence of specialised and relatively autonomous spheres of social action and structure’.⁸⁰ This has led to a debate as to the relationship between self-contained regimes in international law and the system as a whole,⁸¹ with the fear being expressed that the rise of specialised rules and mechanisms that have no clear authority relationship might lead to conflicts between local systems and, at the least, inconsistency in the interpretation and development of international law.⁸² While to some extent the former is a real danger,⁸³ there is still a powerful centralising dynamic in international law and indeed a strong presumption against normative conflict:⁸⁴ for example, the principle that special law (*lex specialis*) derogates from general law (*lex generalis*), so that the more detailed and specific rule will have priority.⁸⁵ It is also true that international law, as a decentralised system, has long had to face the problem of relating together a variety of rules derived from general treaties, specific treaties and customary law, while it is indeed the case that even with the increase in specialist areas of international law, there is an increasing tendency to relate hitherto discrete spheres.⁸⁶ Further, while decisions of international courts and tribunals may not always be compatible, there is a hierarchy of authority with the International Court of Justice at the summit.⁸⁷ The International Law Commission’s Report on Fragmentation reached two principal conclusions: first, that ‘the emergence of special treaty-regimes (which should not be called “self-contained”) has not seriously undermined legal security, predictability or the equality of legal subjects’; and, secondly, that ‘increasing attention will have to be given to the collision of norms and regimes and the rules, methods and techniques for dealing with such collisions’.⁸⁸

Conclusion

The range of theories and approaches to international law and not least the emphasis upon the close relationship between international law and international relations⁸⁹ testifies both to the importance of the subject and the inherent difficulties it faces.⁹⁰ International law is clearly much more than a simple set of rules. It is a culture in the broadest sense in that it constitutes a method of communicating claims, counter-claims, expectations and anticipations as well as providing a framework for assessing and prioritising such demands.

International law functions in a particular, concrete world system, involving a range of actors from states to international organisations, companies and individuals, and as such needs to be responsive to the needs and aspirations of such participants. The international system is composed increasingly of cooperative and competing elements participating in cross-boundary activities, but the essential normative and structural nature of international law remains.⁹¹ Law is not the only way in which issues transcending borders are negotiated and settled or indeed fought over. It is one of a number of methods for dealing with an existing complex and shifting system, but it is a way of some prestige and influence for it is of its very nature in the form of mutually accepted obligations.⁹² Law and politics cannot be divorced. They are not identical, but they do interact on several levels. They are engaged in a crucial symbiotic relationship. It does neither discipline a service to minimise the significance of the other.

Suggestions for Further Reading

P. Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, London, 2002

H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, *The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis*, Manchester, 2000

T. M. Franck, *The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism*, Oxford, 1999

T. M. Franck, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*, Oxford, 1995

M. Koskenniemi, *The Politics of International Law*, Oxford, 2011

S. Marks, *The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology*, Cambridge, 2000

R. Müllerson, *Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International Society*, The Hague, 2000

The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (ed. A. Orford and F. Hoffmann), Oxford, 2016

¹ See below, [Chapter 10](#).

² See below, [Chapter 19](#).

³ See below, p. 1027.

⁴ See below, pp. 249 and 736.

⁵ For views as to the precise definition and characteristics of the international order or system or community, see G. Schwarzenberger and E. D. Brown, *A Manual of International Law*, 6th ed., London, 1976, pp. 9–12; H. Yalem, ‘The Concept of World Order’, **29** YBWA, 1975; and I. Pogany, ‘The Legal Foundations of World Order’, **37** YBWA, 1983, p. 277.

⁶ See e.g. L. C. Green, 'Is There a Universal International Law Today?', **23** *Canadian YIL*, 1985, p. 3.

⁷ See below, [Chapter 5](#), p. 192.

⁸ For examples of this in the context of the law relating to territory, see M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 1–11.

⁹ See S. Hoffman, 'International Systems and International Law', **14** *World Politics*, 1961–62, p. 205.

¹⁰ See *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, p. 18.

¹¹ See further below, [Chapter 5](#).

¹² See below, [Chapter 7](#).

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ See further below, [Chapter 6](#).

¹⁵ See further below, [Chapter 21](#).

¹⁶ *Reparation for Injuries Suffered*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174; 16 AD, p. 318.

¹⁷ See generally below, [Chapter 22](#).

¹⁸ See e.g. A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford, 1990; S. Sur, 'The State Between Fragmentation and Globalisation', **8** *EJIL*, 1997, p. 421; B. Simma and A. Paulus, 'The "International Community": Facing the Challenge of Globalisation. General Conclusions', **9** *EJIL*, 1998, p. 266; P. M. Dupuy, 'International Law: Torn Between Coexistence, Co-operation and Globalisation. General Conclusions', **9** *EJIL*, 1998, p. 278; C. Ku, *International Law, International Relations and Global Governance*, London, 2012; and R. Domingo, *The New Global Law*, Cambridge, 2011. See also the Declaration of Judge Bedjaoui in the Advisory Opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 270–1. Note that Philip Bobbitt has described five

developments challenging the nation-state system, and thus in essence characterising the globalisation challenge, as follows: the recognition of human rights as norms requiring adherence within all states regardless of internal laws; the widespread deployment of weapons of mass destruction rendering the defence of state borders ineffectual for the protection of the society within; the proliferation of global and transnational threats transcending state boundaries such as those that damage the environment or threaten states through migration, population expansion, disease or famine; the growth of a world economic regime that ignores borders in the movement of capital investment to a degree that effectively curtails states in the management of their economic affairs; and the creation of a global communications network that penetrates borders electronically and threatens national languages, customs and cultures; *The Shield of Achilles*, London, 2002, p. xxii.

¹⁹ See e.g. *S. D. Myers v. Canada* 121 ILR, pp. 72, 110.

²⁰ See e.g. *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law* (ed. A. Orford and F. Hoffmann), Oxford, 2016; D. Lyons, *Ethics and the Rule of Law*, London, 1984; R. Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, London, 1977; H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, Oxford, 1961; and P. Stein and J. Shand, *Legal Values in Western Society*, Edinburgh, 1974. See also R. Dias, *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., London, 1985; *Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law* (ed. A. Orakhelashvili), London, 2011; *The Philosophy of International Law* (ed. S. Besson and J. Tasioulas), Oxford, 2010; and *International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World* (ed. J. Kammerhofer and J. d'Aspremont), Cambridge, 2014.

²¹ See Hart, *Concept of Law*; and H. L. A. Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals', 71 *Harvard Law Review*, 1958, p. 593. Cf. L. Fuller, 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart', 71 *Harvard Law Review*, 1958, p. 630. See also D. Anzilotti, *Cours de Droit International*, Paris, 1929; and B. Kingsbury, 'Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive International Law', 13 *EJIL*, 2002, p. 401.

²² 'The Pure Theory of Law', 50 *LQR*, 1934, pp. 474, 477–85 and 51 *LQR*, 1935, pp. 517–22. See also the articles collected in 'The European Tradition in International Law: Hans Kelsen', 9 *EJIL*, 1998, pp. 287 ff.; J. Kammerhofer, *Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective*, London, 2010; and J. von Bernstorff, *The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen*, Cambridge, 2010.

²³ Kelsen, ‘Pure Theory’.

²⁴ See J. Stone, ‘Mystery and Mystique in the Basic Norm’, **26** *MLR*, 1963, p. 34; and J. Raz, *Practical Reason and Norms*, Oxford, 1975, pp. 129–31.

²⁵ *General Theory of Law and State*, Cambridge, 1946, pp. 328 ff. See also J. Lador-Lederer, ‘Some Observations on the “Vienna School” in International Law’, **17** *NILR*, 1970, p. 126.

²⁶ Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State*, pp. 369–70.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Hart terms this ‘mere useless reduplication’: *Concept of Law*, p. 230.

²⁹ *General Theory of Law and State*, pp. 366–8. See further below, [Chapter 4](#).

³⁰ *Concept of Law*, chapter 5. See also e.g. Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*; Raz, *Practical Reason*; and N. MacCormick, *Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory*, Oxford, 1978.

³¹ *Concept of Law*, pp. 228–31.

³² See Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*. See also R. Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy of International Law’, **41** *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 2013, p. 2.

³³ See e.g. *Philosophy of Law*, New Haven, 1954, pp. 42–7. See also M. D. A. Freeman, *The Legal Structure*, London, 1974, chapter 4.

³⁴ *Outlines of Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., Cambridge, 1943, pp. 116–19.

³⁵ See e.g. K. Llewellyn, *The Common Law Tradition*, Boston, 1960 and *Jurisprudence*, Chicago, 1962. See also W. Twining, *Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement*, London, 1973; and L. Loevinger, ‘*Jurimetrics* – the Next Step Forward’, **33** *Minnesota Law Review*, 1949, p. 455.

³⁶ See e.g. J. Maritain, *Man and the State*, Paris, 1951; and J. Dabin, *General Theory of Law*, 2nd ed., 1950.

³⁷ See e.g. R. Stammler, *Theory of Justice*, New York, 1925; and G. Del Vecchio, *Formal Bases of Law*, Boston, 1921.

³⁸ See e.g. F. Gény, *Méthode d'Interprétation et Sources en Droit Privé Positif*, Paris, 1899; and L. Duguit, *Law in the Modern State*, New York, 1919, and 'Objective Law', **20** *Columbia Law Review*, 1920, p. 817.

³⁹ *Introduction to Legal Philosophy*, 1947. See also Hart, 'Positivism'; Fuller, 'Positivism'; and Fuller, 'The Legal Philosophy of Gustav Radbruch', **6** *Journal of Legal Education*, 1954, p. 481.

⁴⁰ See H. Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights*, London, 1950 and for a modern review, M. E. O'Connell, *The Art of Law in the International Community*, Cambridge, 2019. Note more generally the approach of J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford, 1971; and A. D'Amato, 'International Law and Rawls' Theory of Justice', **5** *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, 1975, p. 525. See also J. Boyle, 'Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of Language', **26** *Harvard International Law Journal*, 1985, p. 327; A. D'Amato, 'Is International Law Part of Natural Law?', **9** *Vera Lex*, 1989, p. 8; E. Midgley, *The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations*, London, 1975; and C. Dominicé, 'Le Grand Retour du Droit Naturel en Droit des Gens', *Mélanges Grossen*, 1992, p. 399.

⁴¹ See e.g. B. S. Chimni, *International Law and World Order*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2017; A. Cassese, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005, chapter 1; and R. Müllerson, *Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International Society*, The Hague, 2000. See also D. J. Bederman, *The Spirit of International Law*, Athens, 2002; A. Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination*, Oxford, 2004; *International Law and its Others* (ed. A. Orford), Cambridge, 2006; S. Rosenne, *The Perplexities of Modern International Law*, Leiden, 2004; P. M. Dupuy, *L'Unité de l'Ordre Juridique International*, Leiden, 2003; and *The International Legal Order: Current Needs and Possible Responses* (eds. J. Crawford et al.), Leiden, 2017.

⁴² See e.g. H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed., New York, 1967; and K. Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy*, Princeton, 1960. See also A. Slaughter Burley, 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda', *87 AJIL*, 1993, p. 205; A.-M. Slaughter, *A New World Order*, Princeton, 2004; R. Aron, *Paix et Guerre Entre des Nations*, Paris, 1984; M. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960*, Cambridge, 2001, chapter 6.

⁴³ See e.g. *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (ed. K. Knorr and J. Rosenau), Princeton, 1969; and W. Gould and M. Barkun, *International Law and the Social Sciences*, Princeton, 1970.

⁴⁴ Note Barkun's comment that 'the past theoretical approaches of the legal profession have involved logical manipulations of a legal corpus more often than the empirical study of patterns of human behaviour', *Law Without Sanctions*, New Haven, 1968, p. 3. See also R. A. Falk, 'New Approaches to the Study of International Law', in *New Approaches to International Relations* (ed. M. A. Kaplan), New York, 1968, pp. 357–80; and J. Frankel, *Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States*, London, 1973, pp. 21–2. Note also M. Hirsch, *Invitation to the Sociology of International Law*, Oxford, 2015, referring to the influence of the social constructivist perspective.

⁴⁵ See e.g. C. A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System*, New York, 1966; M. A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, New York, 1964; M. A. Kaplan and N. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law*, New York, 1961; and R. A. Falk and C. Black, *The Future of International Legal Order*, Princeton, 1969. See also A. Kiss and D. Shelton, 'Systems Analysis of International Law: A Methodological Inquiry', *17 Netherlands YIL*, 1986, p. 45.

⁴⁶ See J. Frankel, *International Relations in a Changing World*, London, 1979, pp. 152–7; and Kaplan and Katzenbach, *Political Foundations*, pp. 62–70.

⁴⁷ Kaplan and Katzenbach, *Political Foundations*, pp. 50–5. As far as the systems approach is concerned, see also S. Hoffman, 'International Systems and International Law', in *The International System* (ed. K. Knorr and S. Verba), Westport, 1961, p. 205; G. Clark and L. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, 3rd ed., Boston, 1966; and *The Strategy of*

World Order (ed. R. A. Falk and S. Mendlovitz), New York, 4 vols., 1966. See now Bobbitt, *Shield*, book II.

⁴⁸ See e.g. R. Lieber, *Theory and World Politics*, London, 1972, chapter 2; *Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behaviour* (ed. H. Shubik), London, 1964; and W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Politics and Social Sciences*, London, 1967.

⁴⁹ Note also the functionalist approach to international law. This orientation emphasises the practical benefits to states of cooperation in matters of mutual interest: see e.g. W. Friedmann, *An Introduction to World Politics*, 5th ed., London, 1965, p. 57; F. Haas, *Beyond the Nation State*, Stanford, 1964; D. Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, London, 1946; C. W. Jenks, *Law, Freedom and Welfare*, London, 1964; and J. Stone, *Legal Controls of International Conflict*, London, 1959. See also D. Johnston, 'Functionalism in the Theory of International Law', *25 Canadian YIL*, 1988, p. 3.

⁵⁰ See e.g. M. S. McDougal, 'International Law, Power and Policy', *82 HR*, 1952, p. 133; M. S. McDougal, H. Lasswell and W. M. Reisman, 'Theories about International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence', *8 Va. JIL*, 1968, p. 188; M. S. McDougal, 'International Law and the Future', *50 Mississippi Law Journal*, 1979, p. 259; H. Lasswell and M. S. McDougal, *Jurisprudence for a Free Society*, Yale, 1992; Lung-Chu Chen, *An Introduction to Contemporary International Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective*, 3rd ed., 2015, Oxford; and *Critical International Law* (ed. P. Singh and B. Mayer), Oxford, 2014. See also G. Scelle, *Manuel de Droit International*, Paris, 1948; and Chimni, *International Law*, chapter 3.

⁵¹ M. S. McDougal and W. M. Reisman, *International Law in Contemporary Perspective*, New Haven, 1980, p. 5.

⁵² M. S. McDougal, 'The Policy-Oriented Approach to Law', *40 Virginia Quarterly Review*, 1964, p. 626. See also E. Suzuki, 'The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence', *1 Yale Studies in World Public Order*, 1974, p. 1; *Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honour of W. Michael Reisman* (ed. H. D. Betz, M. H. Arsanjani and J. Cogan), The Hague, 2010; and H. Saberi, 'Yale's Policy Science and International Law: Between Legal Formalism and the Policy Conceptualism', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 21.

⁵³ Suzuki, 'Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence', pp. 22–3. See also M. S. McDougal, 'Some Basic Theoretical Concepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry', *4 Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1960, pp. 337–54.

⁵⁴ M. S. McDougal and H. Lasswell, 'The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order', *53 AJIL*, 1959, pp. 1, 9.

⁵⁵ McDougal and Reisman, *International Law*, p. 2.

⁵⁶ M. S. McDougal, 'A Footnote', *57 AJIL*, 1963, p. 383.

⁵⁷ See M. S. McDougal, H. Lasswell and L. C. Chen, *Human Rights and World Public Order*, New Haven, 1980. For a discussion of the tasks required for a realistic inquiry in the light of defined goals, see McDougal, 'International Law and the Future', pp. 259, 267.

⁵⁸ 'The View from the New Haven School of International Law', *PASIL*, 1992, p. 118.

⁵⁹ See in particular P. Allott, 'Language, Method and the Nature of International Law', *45 BYIL*, 1971, p. 79. Higgins has vividly drawn attention to the differences in approach to international law adopted by American and British writers: 'Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process', *17 ICLQ*, 1968, p. 58. See also T. Farer, 'Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War', *85 AJIL*, 1991, p. 117.

⁶⁰ Allott, 'Language', pp. 128 ff.

⁶¹ See *Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, pp. 474 ff.

⁶² See e.g. R. A. Falk, *Human Rights and State Sovereignty*, New York, 1981; and R. A. Falk, *On Human Governance*, Cambridge, 1995. See also *The United Nations and a Just World Order* (ed. R. Falk, S. Kimand and S. Mendlovitz), Boulder, 1991; and Chimni, *International Law*, chapter 4. But note the approach of, e.g., J. S. Watson, 'A Realistic Jurisprudence of International Law', *34 YBWA*, 1980, p. 265; and M. Lane, 'Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order', *6 Hofstra Law Review*, 1978, p. 269. See also Boyle, 'Ideals and Things'.

⁶³ T. M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, Oxford, 1990. See also T. M. Franck, 'Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System', **240 HR**, 1993 III, p. 13, chapter 2; T. M. Franck, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*, Oxford, 1995, chapter 2; and T. M. Franck, 'The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium', **100 AJIL**, 2006, p. 88. Note also E. Tourme-Jouannet, *What is a Fair Society? International Law Between Development and Recognition*, Oxford, 2013.

⁶⁴ Franck, *Power of Legitimacy*, p. 24.

⁶⁵ Franck, 'Fairness', p. 26.

⁶⁶ T. M. Franck, *The Empowered Self*, Oxford, 1999, p. 1.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 278–80.

⁶⁹ Bobbitt, *Shield*, p. 17. See also J. Brunnee and S. J. Troope, *Legitimacy and Legality in International Law*, Cambridge, 2010; *Fault Lines of International Legitimacy* (ed. H. Charlesworth and J.-M. Coicaud), Cambridge, 2012; and M. N. Shaw, 'International Law: A System of Relationships', **3 Collected Courses of the Xiamen Academy of International Law, China**, 2010, pp. 239, 244 ff.

⁷⁰ See e.g. *The Structure and Processes of International Law* (ed. R. St J. Macdonald and D. Johnston), Dordrecht, 1983; Boyle, 'Ideals and Things'; A. Carty, *The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in International Affairs*, Manchester, 1986; D. Kennedy, *International Legal Structure*, Boston, 1987; M. Koskenniemi, *From Apology to Utopia*, Helsinki, 1989; F. V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge, 1989; P. Allott, *Eunomia*, Oxford, 1990; P. Allott, *The Health of Nations*, Cambridge, 2002; *Theory and International Law: An Introduction* (ed. P. Allott), London, 1991; and *International Law* (ed. M. Koskenniemi), Aldershot, 1992. See also I. Scobbie, 'Towards the Elimination of International Law: Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical Radicalism', **61 BYIL**, 1990, p. 339; and S. Marks, *The*

Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology, Cambridge, 2000.

⁷¹ See e.g. Koskenniemi, *International Law*, p. xvi.

⁷² Koskenniemi, *From Apology to Utopia*, p. 52.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. xxi.

⁷⁴ See also M. Eyskens, 'Particularism versus Universalism', in *International Law – Theory and Practice* (ed. K. Wellens), The Hague, 1998, p. 11.

⁷⁵ *Gentle Civilizer of Nations*. See also M. Koskenniemi, *The Politics of International Law*, Oxford, 2011.

⁷⁶ See R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, p. 9. See also J. A. Beckett, 'Countering Uncertainty and Ending Up/Down Arguments: Prolegomena to a Response to NAIL', **16** *EJIL*, 2005, p. 213. Note also the interaction between international law and international political psychology: see A. van Aaken and T. Broude, 'The Psychology of International Law: An Introduction', **30** *EJIL*, 2019, p. 1225.

⁷⁷ See e.g. H. Charlesworth and C. M. Chinkin, *The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis*, Manchester, 2000; G. Heathcote, *Feminist Dialogues on International Law*, Oxford, 2019; *Research Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law* (ed. S. H. Rimmer and K. Ogg), Cheltenham, 2019; H. Charlesworth, C. M. Chinkin and S. Wright, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law', **85** *AJIL*, 1991, p. 613; F. Tesón, 'Feminism and International Law: A Reply', **33** *Va. JIL*, 1993, p. 647; *International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches* (ed. D. Buss and A. Manji), Oxford, 2005; and D. Otto, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, chapter 24. See also the 'Final Report on Women's Equality and Nationality in International Law', in *Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference*, International Law Association, London, 2000, p. 248. Note that article 25(2) of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights requires that the Sections of the Court be 'gender balanced', while article 36(8)(a)(iii) of the ICC Statute 1998 declares that the selection process for judges of the Court should include the need for a 'fair representation of female and male judges'. See also ICC-ASP/1/Res.-2 (2002) on the procedure for nomination of judges which required a minimum number of female and male candidates.

⁷⁸ See e.g. ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (finalised by M. Koskenniemi), A/CN.4/L.682, 2006; M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, **15** *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 2002, p. 553; M. Prost and P. K. Clark, ‘Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law’, **5** *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2006, p. 341; *A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law* (ed. M. Andenas and E. Bjorge), Cambridge, 2015; *Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation* (ed. M. A. Young), Cambridge, 2015; P. Webb, *International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation*, Oxford, 2013; E. Benvenisti and G. W. Downs, *Between Fragmentation and Democracy*, Cambridge, 2017; B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’, **17** *EJIL*, 2006, p. 483; and E. Benvenisti and G. W. Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’, **60** *Stanford Law Review*, 2007, p. 595.

⁷⁹ See e.g. P. S. Berman, *The Globalisation of International Law*, Aldershot, 2005.

⁸⁰ International Law Commission Report on Fragmentation, p. 11.

⁸¹ See, for an early example, B. Simma, ‘Self-Contained Regimes’, **16** *Netherlands YIL*, 1985, p. 111.

⁸² See e.g. *Unity and Diversity in International Law* (ed. A. Zimmermann and R. Hofmann), Berlin, 2006; K. Wellens, ‘Fragmentation of International Law and Establishment of an Accountability Regime for International Organizations’, **25** *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 2004, p. 1159; and *L’Influence des Sources sur l’Unité et la Fragmentation du Droit International* (ed. K. C. Wellens and R. H. Viraxia), Brussels, 2006.

⁸³ See e.g. A. Reinisch, ‘Necessity in International Arbitration – an Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina’, **8** *Journal of World Investment and Trade*, 2007, p. 191.

⁸⁴ International Law Commission Report on Fragmentation, p. 25.

⁸⁵ See further below, Chapter 3, p. 105.

⁸⁶ See e.g. with regard to human rights law and humanitarian law (or the laws of war), A. E. Cassimatis, ‘International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and Fragmentation of International Law’, *56 ICLQ*, 2007, p. 623. See further below, Chapter 20, p. 1044 and as to the discussion of fragmentation and interrelationship of international legal rules as regards the protection of the atmosphere, see S. Murase, ‘The Guiding Principles of Interrelationship’, Fourth Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere, International Law Commission, A/CN.4/705, pp. 5 ff. (2017); and Shaw, ‘International Law’, p. 239.

⁸⁷ See further below, Chapter 18, p. 979.

⁸⁸ At pp. 248–9. Note also P.-M. Dupuy, ‘L’Unité de l’Ordre Juridique Internationale’, *297 HR*, 2002, p. 9; and P.-M. Dupuy, ‘2000–2020: Twenty Years Later, Where are We in Terms of the Unity of International Law?’, *9 Cambridge International Law Journal*, 2020, p. 6, underlining the unity of international law on the basis of accepted procedures for the creation of the primary norms of international law (the formal unity) and the substantive rules of the system including peremptory norms (the material unity) and their conjunctive and competitive relationship. See Chapter 3 below on the sources of international law.

⁸⁹ See e.g. A.-M. Slaughter, A. S. Tulumello and S. Wood, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’, *92 AJIL*, 1998, p. 367; and Slaughter, *A New World Order*. See also Bobbitt, *Shield*, who posits the dying of the nation-state and its replacement by the market-state, with consequential changes with regard to both international law and its institutions, e.g. pp. 353 ff., 667 ff.

⁹⁰ Note relatively recent arguments based on a revived power realism approach, particularly made in the US, that international law is simply a part of a complex of factors which are relevant, and implicitly subservient, to diplomacy and the pursuit of national interests: see e.g. J. L. Goldsmith and E. A. Posner, *The Limits of International Law*, Oxford, 2005; and M. J. Glennon, *Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after Kosovo*, New York, 2001; but cf. Franck, *Power of Legitimacy*; A. Van Aaken, ‘To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to the “Limits of International Law”’, *17*

EJIL, 2006, p. 289; and G. Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*, Cambridge, 2004.

⁹¹ See also A. Roberts, *Is International Law International?*, Oxford, 2017; and J. Crawford, 'The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law', **81** *Modern Law Review*, 2018, p. 1.

⁹² Higgins has noted that 'international law has to be identified by reference to what the actors (most often states), often without benefit of pronouncement by the International Court of Justice, believe normative in their relations with each other', *Problems and Process*, p. 18.

3

Sources

The ascertainment of the sources of international law lies at the heart of the system.¹ The discovery of the law on any given point in domestic legal orders is not usually too difficult a process. In the English legal system, for example, one looks to see whether the matter is covered by an Act of Parliament (or possibly a statutory instrument) and, if it is, the law reports are consulted as to how it has been interpreted by the courts. If the particular point is not specifically referred to in a statute, court cases will be examined to elicit the required information. In other words, there is a definite method of discovering what the law is. In addition to verifying the contents of the rules, this method also demonstrates how the law is created, namely, by parliamentary legislation or judicial case-law. This gives a degree of certainty to the legal process because one is able to tell when a proposition has become law and the necessary mechanism to resolve any disputes about the law is evident. It reflects the hierarchical character of a national legal order with its gradations of authority imparting to the law a large measure of stability and predictability.

The contrast is very striking when one considers the situation in international law. The lack of a legislature, executive and structure of courts within international law has been noted and the effects of this will become clearer as one proceeds. There is no single body able to create laws internationally

binding upon everyone, nor a proper system of courts with comprehensive and compulsory jurisdiction to interpret and extend the law. One is therefore faced with the problem of discovering where the law is to be found and how one can tell whether a particular proposition amounts to a legal rule. This perplexity is reinforced because of the anarchic nature of world affairs and the clash of competing sovereignties. Nevertheless, international law does exist and is ascertainable. There are 'sources' available from which the rules may be extracted and analysed.

By 'sources' one means those provisions operating within the legal system on a technical level, and such ultimate sources as reason or morality are excluded, as are more functional sources such as libraries and journals. What is intended is a survey of the process whereby rules of international law emerge.²

Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute is widely recognised as the most authoritative and complete statement as to the sources of international law.³ It provides that:

the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general

principles of law recognised by civilised nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

Although this formulation is technically limited to the sources of international law which the International Court must apply, in fact since the function of the Court is to decide disputes submitted to it ‘in accordance with international law’ and since all member states of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute by virtue of article 93 of the UN Charter (states that are non-members of the United Nations can specifically become parties to the Statute of the Court: Switzerland was the most obvious example of this until it joined the United Nations in 2002), there is no serious contention that the provision expresses the universal perception as to the enumeration of sources of international law.

Some writers have sought to categorise the distinctions in this provision, so that international conventions, custom and the general principles of law are described as the three exclusive law-creating processes, while judicial decisions and academic writings are regarded as law-determining agencies, dealing with the verification of alleged rules.⁴ But in reality it is not always possible to make hard and fast divisions. The different functions overlap to a great extent so that in many cases treaties (or conventions) merely reiterate accepted rules of customary law, and judgments of the International Court of

Justice may actually create law in the same way that municipal judges formulate new law in the process of interpreting existing law.⁵

A distinction has sometimes been made between formal and material sources.⁶ The former, it is claimed, confer upon the rules an obligatory character, while the latter comprise the actual content of the rules. Thus, the formal sources appear to embody the constitutional mechanism for identifying law, while the material sources incorporate the essence or subject-matter of the regulations. This division has been criticised particularly in view of the peculiar constitutional set-up of international law, and it tends to distract attention from some of the more important problems by its attempt to establish a clear separation of substantive and procedural elements, something difficult to maintain in international law.

Custom⁷

Introduction

In any primitive society certain rules of behaviour emerge and prescribe what is permitted and what is not. Such rules develop almost subconsciously within the group and are maintained by the members of the group by social pressures and with the aid of various other more tangible implements. They are not, at least in the early stages, written down or codified, and survive ultimately because of what can be called an aura of historical legitimacy.⁸ As the community develops it will modernise its code of behaviour by the creation of legal machinery, such as courts and legislature. Custom, for this is how the original process can be described, remains and may also continue to evolve.⁹ It is regarded as an authentic expression of the needs and values of the community at any given time.

Custom within contemporary legal systems, particularly in the developed world, is relatively cumbersome and unimportant and often of only nostalgic value.¹⁰ In international law, on the other hand, it is a dynamic source of law in the light of the nature of the international system and its lack of centralised government organs.

The existence of customary rules can be deduced from the practice and behaviour of states and this is where the problems begin. How can one tell when a particular line of action adopted by a state reflects a legal rule or is merely prompted by, for example, courtesy? Indeed, how can one discover

what precisely a state is doing or why, since there is no living 'state', but rather thousands of officials in scores of departments exercising governmental functions? Other issues concern the speed of creation of new rules and the effect of protests.

There are disagreements as to the value of a customary system in international law. Some writers deny that custom can be significant today as a source of law, noting that it is too clumsy and slow-moving to accommodate the evolution of international law any more,¹¹ while others declare that it is a dynamic process of law creation and more important than treaties since it is of universal application.¹² Another view recognises that custom is of value since it is activated by spontaneous behaviour and thus mirrors the contemporary concerns of society. However, since international law now has to contend with a massive increase in the pace and variety of state activities as well as having to come to terms with many different cultural and political traditions, the role of custom is perceived to be much diminished.¹³

There are elements of truth in each of these approaches. Amid a wide variety of conflicting behaviour, it is not easy to isolate the emergence of a new rule of customary law and there are immense problems involved in collating all the necessary information. It is not always the best instrument available for the regulation of complex issues that arise in world affairs, but in particular situations it may meet the contingencies of modern life. As will be seen, it is possible to point to something called 'instant' customary law in certain circumstances that can prescribe valid rules without having to undergo a long period of gestation, and custom can and often does dovetail neatly within the

complicated mechanisms now operating for the identification and progressive development of the principles of international law.

More than that, custom does mirror the characteristics of the decentralised international system. It is democratic in that all states may share in the formulation of new rules, though the precept that some are more equal than others in this process is not without its grain of truth. If the international community is unhappy with a particular law it can be changed relatively quickly without the necessity of convening and successfully completing a world conference. It reflects the consensus approach to decision-making with the ability of the majority to create new law binding upon all, while the very participation of states encourages their compliance with customary rules. Its imprecision means flexibility as well as ambiguity. Indeed, the creation of the concept of the exclusive economic zone in the law of the sea may be cited as an example of this process. This is discussed further in Chapter 10. The essence of custom according to article 38 is that it should constitute ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. Thus, it is possible to detect two basic elements in the make-up of a custom. These are the material facts, that is, the actual behaviour of states, and the psychological or subjective belief that such behaviour is ‘law’. As the International Court noted in the *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf* case, the substance of customary law must be ‘looked for primarily in the actual practice and *opinio juris* of states’.¹⁴

It is understandable why the first requirement is mentioned, since customary law is founded upon the performance of state activities and the convergence of practices, in other words, what states actually do. It is the psychological factor (*opinio juris*) that needs some explanation. If one left the definition of

custom as state practice, then the problem of how to separate international law from principles of morality or social usage would necessarily arise. This is because states do not restrict their behaviour to what is legally required. They may pursue a line of conduct purely through a feeling of goodwill and in the hope of reciprocal benefits. States do not have to allow tourists in or launch satellites. There is no law imposing upon them the strict duty to distribute economic aid to developing nations. The bare fact that such things are done does not mean that they have to be done.

The issue therefore is how to distinguish behaviour undertaken because of a law from that undertaken because of a whole series of other reasons ranging from goodwill to pique, and from ideological support to political bribery. And if customary law is restricted to the overt acts of states, one cannot solve this problem.

Accordingly, the second element in the definition of custom has been elaborated. This is the psychological factor, the belief by a state that behaved in a certain way that it was under a legal obligation or had a legal right to act that way. It is known in legal terminology as *opinio juris sive necessitatis* and was first formulated by the French writer François Gény as an attempt to differentiate legal custom from mere social usage.¹⁵

However, the relative importance of the two factors, the overt action and the subjective conviction, is disputed by various writers.¹⁶ Positivists, with their emphasis upon state sovereignty, stress the paramount importance of the psychological element. States are only bound by what they have consented to, so therefore the material element is minimised to the greater value of *opinio*

juris. If states believe that a course of action is legal and perform it, even if only once, then it is to be inferred that they have tacitly consented to the rule involved. Following on from this line of analysis, various positivist thinkers have tended to minimise many of the requirements of the overt manifestation, for example, with regard to repetition and duration.¹⁷ Other writers have taken precisely the opposite line and maintain that *opinio juris* is impossible to prove and therefore of no tremendous consequence. Kelsen, for one, has written that it is the courts that have the discretion to decide whether any set of usages is such as to create a custom and that the subjective perception of the particular state or states is not called upon to give the final verdict as to its legality or otherwise.¹⁸

The Material Fact

The actual practice engaged in by states constitutes the initial factor to be brought into account. There are a number of points to be considered concerning the nature of a particular practice by states, including its duration, consistency, repetition and generality. As far as the duration is concerned, most countries specify a recognised timescale for the acceptance of a practice as a customary rule within their municipal systems. This can vary from ‘time immemorial’ in the English common law dating back to 1189, to figures from thirty or forty years on the Continent.

In international law, however, there is no rigid time element and it will depend upon the circumstances of the case and the nature of the usage in question. In certain fields, such as air and space law, the rules have developed quickly; in others, the process is much slower. Duration is thus not the most

important of the components of state practice.¹⁹ The essence of custom is to be sought elsewhere.

The basic rule as regards continuity and repetition was laid down in the *Asylum* case decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1950.²⁰ The Court declared that a customary rule must be ‘in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question’.²¹

The case concerned Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian, who was sought by his government after an unsuccessful revolt. He was granted asylum by Colombia in its embassy in Lima, but Peru refused to issue a safe conduct to permit Torre to leave the country. Colombia brought the matter before the ICJ and requested a decision recognising that it (Colombia) was competent to define Torre’s offence, as to whether it was criminal as Peru maintained, or political, in which case asylum and a safe conduct could be allowed.

The Court, in characterising the nature of a customary rule, held that it had to constitute the expression of a right appertaining to one state (Colombia) and a duty incumbent upon another (Peru). However, the Court felt that in the *Asylum* litigation, state practices had been so uncertain and contradictory as not to amount to a ‘constant and uniform usage’ regarding the unilateral qualification of the offence in question.²² The issue involved here dealt with a regional custom pertaining only to Latin America and it may be argued that the same approach need not necessarily be followed where a general custom is alleged and that in the latter instance a lower standard of proof would be upheld.²³

The ICJ emphasised its view that some degree of uniformity among state practices was essential before a custom could come into existence in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case.²⁴ The United Kingdom, in its arguments against the Norwegian method of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, referred to an alleged rule of custom whereby a straight line may be drawn across bays of less than ten miles from one projection to the other, which could then be regarded as the baseline for the measurement of the territorial sea. The Court dismissed this by pointing out that the actual practice of states did not justify the creation of any such custom. In other words, there had been insufficient uniformity of behaviour.

In the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases,²⁵ which involved a dispute between Germany on the one hand and Holland and Denmark on the other over the delimitation of the continental shelf, the ICJ remarked that state practice, ‘including that of states whose interests are specially affected’, had to be ‘both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked’. This was held to be indispensable to the formation of a new rule of customary international law.²⁶ However, the Court emphasised in *Nicaragua v. United States*²⁷ that it was not necessary that the practice in question had to be ‘in absolutely rigorous conformity’ with the purported customary rule. The Court continued:

In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule

should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.²⁸

The threshold that needs to be attained before a legally binding custom can be created will depend both upon the nature of the alleged rule and the opposition it arouses. This partly relates to the problem of ambiguity where it is not possible to point to the alleged custom with any degree of clarity, as in the *Asylum* case, where a variety of conflicting and contradictory evidence had been brought forward.

On the other hand, an unsubstantiated claim by a state cannot be accepted because it would amount to unilateral law-making and compromise a reasonably impartial system of international law. If a proposition meets with a great deal of opposition, then it would be an undesirable fiction to ignore this and talk of an established rule. Another relevant factor is the strength of the prior rule which is purportedly overthrown.²⁹ For example, the customary law relating to a state's sovereignty over its airspace developed very quickly in the years immediately before and during the First World War. Similarly, the principle of non-sovereignty over the space route followed by artificial satellites came into being soon after the launching of the first sputniks. Bin Cheng has argued that in such circumstances repetition is not at all necessary provided the *opinio juris* could be clearly established. Thus, 'instant' customary law is possible.³⁰

This contention that single acts may create custom has been criticised, particularly in view of the difficulties of proving customary rules any other

way but through a series of usages.³¹ Nevertheless, the conclusion must be that it is the international context which plays the vital part in the creation of custom. In a society constantly faced with new situations because of the dynamics of progress, there is a clear need for a reasonably speedy method of responding to such changes by a system of prompt rule-formation. In new areas of law, customs can be quickly established by state practices by virtue of the newness of the situations involved, the lack of contrary rules to be surmounted and the overwhelming necessity to preserve a sense of regulation in international relations.

One particular analogy that has been used to illustrate the general nature of customary law was considered by de Visscher. He likened the growth of custom to the gradual formation of a road across vacant land. After an initial uncertainty as to direction, the majority of users begin to follow the same line which becomes a single path. Not long elapses before that path is transformed into a road accepted as the only regular way, even though it is not possible to state at which precise moment this latter change occurs. And so it is with the formation of a custom. De Visscher develops this idea by reflecting that just as some make heavier footprints than others due to their greater weight, the more influential states of the world mark the way with more vigour and tend to become the guarantors and defenders of the way forward.³²

The reasons why a particular state acts in a certain way are varied, but are closely allied to how it perceives its interests. This in turn depends upon the power and role of the state and its international standing. Accordingly, custom should to some extent mirror the perceptions of the majority of states, since it is based upon usages which are practised by nations as they express

their power and their hopes and fears. But it is inescapable that some states are more influential and powerful than others and that their activities should be regarded as of greater significance. This is reflected in international law so that custom may be created by a few states, provided those states are intimately connected with the issue at hand, whether because of their wealth and power or because of their special relationship with the subject-matter of the practice, as for example maritime nations and sea law. Law cannot be divorced from politics or power and this is one instance of that proposition.³³

The influence of the United Kingdom, for example, on the development of the law of the sea and prize law in the nineteenth century, when it was at the height of its power, was predominant. A number of propositions later accepted as part of international customary law appeared this way. Among many instances of this, one can point to navigation procedures. Similarly, the impact of the Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States on space law has been paramount.³⁴

One can conclude by stating that for a custom to be accepted and recognised it must have the concurrence of the major powers in that particular field. A regulation regarding the breadth of the territorial sea is unlikely to be treated as law if the great maritime nations do not agree to or acquiesce in it, no matter how many landlocked states demand it. Other countries may propose ideas and institute pressure, but without the concurrence of those most interested, it cannot amount to a rule of customary law. This follows from the nature of the international system where all may participate, but the views of those with greater power carry greater weight.

Accordingly, the duration and generality of a practice may take second place to the relative importance of the states precipitating the formation of a new customary rule in any given field. Universality is not required, but some correlation with power is. Some degree of continuity must be maintained, but this again depends upon the context of operation and the nature of the usage.

Those elements reflect the external manifestations of a practice and establish that it is in existence and exhibited as such. That does not mean that it is law and this factor will be considered in the next subsection. But it does mean that all states who take the trouble can discover its existence. This factor of conspicuousness emphasises both the importance of the context within which the usage operates and the more significant elements of the overt act which affirms the existence of a custom.

The question is raised at this stage of how significant a failure to act is. Failures to act are in themselves just as much evidence of a state's attitudes as are actions. They similarly reflect the way in which a nation approaches its environment. A failure to act can arise from either a legal obligation not to act, or an incapacity or unwillingness in the particular circumstances to act. Indeed, it has been maintained that the continued habit of not taking actions in certain situations may lead to the formation of a legal rule.³⁵

The danger of saying that a failure to act over a long period creates a negative custom, that is a rule actually not to do it, can be shown by remarking on the absurdity of the proposition that a continual failure to act until the late 1950s is evidence of a legal rule not to send artificial satellites or rockets into space. On the other hand, where a particular rule of behaviour is established, it can

be argued that abstention from protest by states may amount to agreement with that rule.

In the particular circumstances of the *Lotus* case,³⁶ the Permanent Court of International Justice, the predecessor of the ICJ, laid down a high standard by declaring that abstention could only give rise to the recognition of a custom if it was based on a conscious duty to abstain. In other words, states had actually to be aware that they were not acting a particular way because they were under a definite obligation not to act that way. The decision has been criticised and would appear to cover categories of non-acts based on legal obligations, but not to refer to instances where, by simply not acting as against a particular rule in existence, states are tacitly accepting the legality and relevance of that rule. However, acquiescence must be based upon full knowledge of the rule invoked. Where a failure to take a course of action is in some way connected or influenced or accompanied by a lack of knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, then it cannot be interpreted as acquiescence.

What is State Practice?

It is how states behave in practice that forms the basis of customary law, but evidence of what a state does can be obtained from numerous sources.

Obvious examples include administrative acts, legislation, decisions of domestic courts³⁷ and activities on the international stage, for example treaty-making.³⁸ A state is not a living entity, but consists of governmental departments and thousands of officials, and state activity is spread throughout a whole range of national organs. There are the state's legal officers, legislative institutions, courts, diplomatic agents and political leaders. Each of

these engages in activity which relates to the international field and therefore one has to examine all such material sources and more in order to discover evidence of what states do.³⁹

The obvious way to find out how countries are behaving is to read the newspapers, consult historical records, listen to what governmental authorities are saying and peruse the many official publications. There are also memoirs of various past leaders, official manuals on legal questions, diplomatic interchanges and the opinions of national legal advisers. All these methods are valuable in seeking to determine actual state practice.

In addition, one may note resolutions in the General Assembly, comments made by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, decisions of the international judicial institutions, decisions of national courts, treaties and the general practice of international organisations.⁴⁰

International organisations in fact may be instrumental in the creation of customary law. For example, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice declaring that the United Nations possessed international personality was partly based on the actual behaviour of the United Nations.⁴¹ The International Law Commission has pointed out that ‘records of the cumulative practice of international organisations may be regarded as evidence of customary international law with reference to states’ relations to the organisations’.⁴² The International Court has also noted that evidence of the existence of rules and principles may be found in resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.⁴³

States' municipal laws may in certain circumstances form the basis of customary rules. In the *Scotia* case decided by the US Supreme Court in 1871,⁴⁴ a British ship had sunk an American vessel on the high seas. The Court held that British navigational procedures established by an Act of Parliament formed the basis of the relevant international custom since other states had legislated in virtually identical terms. Accordingly, the American vessel, in not displaying the correct lights, was at fault. The view has also been expressed that mere claims as distinct from actual physical acts cannot constitute state practice. This is based on the precept that 'until it [a state] takes enforcement action, the claim has little value as a prediction of what the state will actually do'.⁴⁵ But as has been demonstrated, this is decidedly a minority view.⁴⁶ Claims and conventions of states in various contexts have been adduced as evidence of state practice and it is logical that this should be so,⁴⁷ though the weight to be attached to such claims, may, of course, vary according to the circumstances. This approach is clearly the correct one since the process of claims and counter-claims is one recognised method by which states communicate to one another their perceptions of the status of international rules and norms. In this sense they operate in the same way as physical acts. Whether *in abstracto* or with regard to a particular situation, they constitute the raw material out of which may be fashioned rules of international law.⁴⁸ It is suggested that the formulation that 'state practice covers any act or statements by a state from which views about customary law may be inferred',⁴⁹ is substantially correct. However, it should be noted that not all elements of practice are equal in their weight and the value to be given to state conduct will depend upon its nature and provenance.

*Opinio Juris*⁵⁰

Once the existence of a specified usage has been established, it becomes necessary to consider how the state views its own behaviour. The *opinio juris*, or belief that a state activity is legally obligatory, is the factor which turns the usage into a custom and renders it part of the rules of international law. To put it slightly differently, states will behave a certain way because they are convinced it is binding upon them to do so, or, as ILC Conclusion 9(1) puts it, ‘the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation’.⁵¹

The Permanent Court of International Justice expressed this point of view when it dealt with the *Lotus* case.⁵² The issue at hand concerned a collision on the high seas (where international law applies) between the *Lotus*, a French ship, and the *Boz-Kourt*, a Turkish ship. Several people aboard the latter ship were drowned and Turkey alleged negligence by the French officer of the watch. When the *Lotus* reached Istanbul, the French officer was arrested on a charge of manslaughter and the case turned on whether Turkey had jurisdiction to try him. Among the various arguments adduced, the French maintained that there existed a rule of customary law to the effect that the flag state of the accused (France) had exclusive jurisdiction in such cases and that accordingly the national state of the victim (Turkey) was barred from trying him. To justify this, France referred to the absence of previous criminal prosecutions by such states in similar situations and from this deduced tacit consent in the practice which therefore became a legal custom.

The Court rejected this and declared that even if such a practice of abstention from instituting criminal proceedings could be proved in fact, it would not amount to a custom. It held that ‘only if such abstention were based on their

[the states] being conscious of a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom'.⁵³ Thus, the essential ingredient of obligation was lacking and the practice remained a practice, nothing more.

A similar approach occurred in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases.⁵⁴ In the general process of delimiting the continental shelf of the North Sea in pursuance of oil and gas exploration, lines were drawn dividing the whole area into national spheres. However, West Germany could not agree with either Holland or Denmark over the respective boundary lines and the matter came before the International Court of Justice.

Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 provided that where agreement could not be reached, and unless special circumstances justified a different approach, the boundary line was to be determined in accordance with the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured. This would mean a series of lines drawn at the point where Germany met Holland on the one side and Denmark on the other and projected outwards into the North Sea. However, because Germany's coastline is concave, such equidistant lines would converge and enclose a relatively small triangle of the North Sea. The Federal Republic had signed but not ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention and was therefore not bound by its terms. The question thus was whether a case could be made out that the 'equidistance–special circumstances principle' had been absorbed into customary law and was accordingly binding upon Germany.

The Court concluded in the negative and held that the provision in the Geneva Convention did not reflect an already existing custom. It was emphasised that when the International Law Commission had considered this point in the draft treaty which formed the basis of discussion at Geneva, the principle of equidistance had been proposed with considerable hesitation, somewhat on an experimental basis and not at all as an emerging rule of customary international law.⁵⁵ The issue then turned on whether practice subsequent to the Convention had created a customary rule. The Court answered in the negative and declared that although time was not of itself a decisive factor (only three years had elapsed before the proceedings were brought):

an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, state practice, including that of states whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked, and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.⁵⁶

This approach was maintained by the Court in *Nicaragua v. United States*⁵⁷ and express reference was made to the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases. The Court noted that:

for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned ‘amount to a settled practice’, but they must be accompanied by the *opinio juris sive necessitatis*. Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the *opinio juris sive necessitatis*.’⁵⁸

This was reaffirmed by the Court in *Germany v. Italy* (Greece Application to Intervene), where it was further noted that:

Opinio juris in this context is reflected in particular in the assertion by States claiming immunity that international law accords them a right to such immunity from the jurisdiction of other States; in the acknowledgment, by States granting immunity, that international law imposes upon them an obligation to do so; and, conversely, in the assertion by States in other cases of a right to exercise jurisdiction over foreign States. While it may be true that States sometimes decide to accord an immunity more extensive than that required by international

law, for present purposes, the point is that the grant of immunity in such a case is not accompanied by the requisite *opinio juris* and therefore sheds no light upon the issue currently under consideration by the Court.⁵⁹

It is thus clear that the Court has adopted and maintained a high threshold with regard to the overt proving of the subjective constituent of customary law formation. Confluence of practice in itself is not enough. This was reflected in the *Diallo* case, where the International Court held that the fact that various international agreements have established special legal regimes for investment protection or that such provisions are commonly included in contracts between states and foreign investors ‘was insufficient to show that there has been a change in the customary rules of diplomatic protection: it could equally show the contrary’.⁶⁰

The great problem connected with the *opinio juris* is that if it calls for behaviour in accordance with law, how can new customary rules be created, since that obviously requires action different from or contrary to what until then is regarded as law? If a country claims a three-mile territorial sea in the belief that this is legal, how can the rule be changed in customary law to allow claims of, for example, twelve miles, since that cannot also be in accordance with prevailing law?⁶¹ Obviously if one takes a restricted view of the psychological aspects, then logically the law will become stultified and this demonstrably has not happened.

Thus, one has to treat the matter in terms of a process whereby states behave in a certain way in the belief that such behaviour is law or is becoming law. It will then depend upon how other states react as to whether this process of legislation is accepted or rejected. It follows that rigid definitions as to legality have to be modified to see whether the legitimating stamp of state activity can be provided or not. If a state proclaims a twelve-mile limit to its territorial sea in the belief that although the three-mile limit has been accepted law, the circumstances are so altering that a twelve-mile limit might now be treated as becoming law, it is vindicated if other states follow suit and a new rule of customary law is established. If other states reject the proposition, then the projected rule withers away and the original rule stands, reinforced by state practice and common acceptance. As the Court itself noted in *Nicaragua v. United States*,⁶² '[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend towards a modification of customary international law'. The difficulty in this kind of approach is that it is sometimes hard to pinpoint exactly when one rule supersedes another, but that is a complication inherent in the nature of custom. Change is rarely smooth, but rather spasmodic.

This means taking a more flexible view of the *opinio juris* and tying it more firmly with the overt manifestations of a custom into the context of national and international behaviour. This should be done to accommodate the idea of an action which, while contrary to law, contains the germ of a new law and relates to the difficulty of actually proving that a state, in behaving a certain way, does so in the belief that it is in accordance with the law. An extreme expression of this approach is to infer or deduce the *opinio juris* from the

material acts. Judge Tanaka, in his Dissenting Opinion in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases, remarked that there was:

no other way than to ascertain the existence of *opinio juris* from the fact of the external existence of a certain custom and its necessity felt in the international community, rather than to seek evidence as to the subjective motives for each example of State practice.⁶³

However, states must be made aware that when one state takes a course of action, it does so because it regards it as within the confines of international law, and not as, for example, purely a political or moral gesture. There has to be an aspect of legality about the behaviour and the acting state will have to confirm that this is so, so that the international community can easily distinguish legal from non-legal practices. This is essential to the development and presentation of a legal framework among the states. As the Commentary to ILC Conclusion 9 notes: ‘It is thus crucial to establish, in each case, that states have acted in a certain way because they felt or believed themselves legally compelled or entitled to do so by reason of a rule of customary international law.’⁶⁴

Faced with the difficulty in practice of proving the existence of the *opinio juris*,⁶⁵ increasing reference has been made to conduct within international organisations. This is so particularly with regard to the United Nations. The International Court of Justice has in a number of cases utilised General Assembly resolutions as confirming the existence of the *opinio juris*,

focusing on the content of the resolution or resolutions in question and the conditions of their adoption.⁶⁶ The key, however, is the attitude taken by the states concerned, whether as parties to a particular treaty or as participants in the adoption of a UN resolution.⁶⁷ The Court has also referred to major codification conventions for the same purpose,⁶⁸ and to the work of the International Law Commission.⁶⁹

Protest, Acquiescence and Change in Customary Law⁷⁰

Customary law is thus established by virtue of a pattern of claim, absence of protest by states particularly interested in the matter at hand and acquiescence by other states.⁷¹ Together with related notions such as recognition, admissions and estoppel, such conduct or abstinence from conduct forms part of a complex framework within which legal principles are created and deemed applicable to states.⁷²

The Chamber of the International Court in the *Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary* case defined acquiescence as ‘equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent’ and as founded upon the principles of good faith and equity.⁷³ Generally, where states are seen to acquiesce⁷⁴ in the behaviour of other states without protesting against them, the assumption must be that such behaviour is accepted as legitimate.⁷⁵

Some writers have maintained that acquiescence can amount to consent to a customary rule and that the absence of protest implies agreement. In other words, where a state or states take action which they declare to be legal, the silence of other states can be used as an expression of *opinio juris* or concurrence in the new legal rule. This means that actual protests are called for to break the legitimising process.⁷⁶ As ILC Conclusion 10(3) on the Identification of Customary International Law put it: ‘Failure to react over time to a practice may serve as evidence of acceptance as law (*opinio juris*),

provided that States were in a position to react and the circumstances called for some reaction.’⁷⁷

In the *Lotus* case, the Court held that ‘only if such abstention were based on their [the states] being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom’.⁷⁸ Thus, one cannot infer a rule prohibiting certain action merely because states do not indulge in that activity. But the question of not reacting when a state behaves a certain way is a slightly different one. It would seem that where a new rule is created in new fields of international law, for example space law, acquiescence by other states is to be regarded as reinforcing the rule whether it stems from actual agreement or lack of interest, depending always upon the particular circumstances of the case. Acquiescence in a new rule which deviates from an established custom is more problematic.

The decision in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case⁷⁹ may appear to suggest that where a state acts contrary to an established customary rule and other states acquiesce in this, then that state is to be treated as not bound by the original rule. The Court noted that ‘in any event the . . . rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she had always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast’.⁸⁰ In other words, a state opposing the existence of a custom from its inception would not be bound by it. This is known as the persistent objector rule.⁸¹ However, the problem of one or more states seeking to dissent from recognised customs by adverse behaviour coupled with the acquiescence or non-reaction of other states remains unsettled.

States fail to protest for very many reasons. A state might not wish to give offence gratuitously or it might wish to reinforce political ties or other diplomatic and political considerations may be relevant. It could be that to protest over every single act with which a state does not agree would be an excessive requirement. It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect every state to react to every single act of every other state. If one accepted that a failure to protest validated a derogation from an established custom in every case, then scores of special relationships would emerge between different states depending upon acquiescence and protest. In many cases a protest might be purely formal or part of diplomatic manoeuvring designed to exert pressure in a totally different field and thus not intended to alter legal relationships.

Where a new rule which contradicts a prior rule is maintained by a large number of states, the protests of a few states would not overrule it, and the abstention from reaction by other countries would merely reinforce it. Constant protest on the part of a particular state when reinforced by the acquiescence of other states might create a recognised exception to the rule, but it will depend to a great extent on the facts of the situation and the views of the international community. Behaviour contrary to a custom contains within itself the seeds of a new rule and if it is endorsed by other nations, the previous law will disappear and be replaced, or alternatively there could be a period of time during which the two customs co-exist until one of them is generally accepted,⁸² as was the position for many years with regard to the limits of the territorial sea.⁸³ It follows from the above, therefore, that customary rules are binding upon all states except for such states as have dissented from the start of that custom.⁸⁴ This raises the question of new states and custom, for the logic of the traditional approach would be for such

states to be bound by all existing customs as at the date of independence. The opposite view, based upon the consent theory of law, would permit such states to choose which customs to adhere to at that stage, irrespective of the attitude of other states.⁸⁵ However, since such an approach could prove highly disruptive, the proviso is often made that by entering into relations without reservation with other states, new states signify their acceptance of the totality of international law.⁸⁶

Regional and Local Custom⁸⁷

It is possible for rules to develop which will bind only a set group of states, such as those in Latin America,⁸⁸ or indeed just two states.⁸⁹ Such an approach may be seen as part of the need for ‘respect for regional legal traditions’.⁹⁰

In the *Asylum* case,⁹¹ the International Court of Justice discussed the Colombian claim of a regional or local custom peculiar to the Latin American states, which would validate its position over the granting of asylum. The Court declared that the ‘party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other party’.⁹² It found that such a custom could not be proved because of uncertain and contradictory evidence.

In such cases, the standard of proof required, especially as regards the obligation accepted by the party against whom the local custom is maintained, is higher than in cases where an ordinary or general custom is alleged.

In the *Right of Passage over Indian Territory* case,⁹³ Portugal claimed that there existed a right of passage over Indian territory as between the Portuguese enclaves, and this was upheld by the International Court of Justice over India’s objections that no local custom could be established between only two states. The Court declared that it was satisfied that there had in the past existed a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage

and that the ‘practice was accepted as law by the parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative obligation’.⁹⁴ More generally, the Court stated: ‘Where therefore the Court finds a practice clearly established between two States which was accepted by the Parties as governing the relations between them, the Court must attribute decisive effect to that practice for the purpose of determining their specific rights and obligations. Such a particular practice must prevail over any general rules.’⁹⁵

Such local customs therefore depend upon a particular activity by one state being accepted by the other state (or states) as an expression of a legal obligation or right. While in the case of a general customary rule the process of consensus is at work so that a majority or a substantial minority of interested states can be sufficient to create a new custom, a local custom needs the positive acceptance of both (or all) parties to the rule.⁹⁶ This is because local customs are an exception to the general nature of customary law, which involves a fairly flexible approach to law-making by all states, and instead constitutes a reminder of the former theory of consent whereby states are bound only by what they assent to. Exceptions may prove the rule, but they need greater proof than the rule to establish themselves.

Treaties⁹⁷

In contrast with the process of creating law through custom, treaties (or international conventions) are a more modern and more deliberate method.⁹⁸ Article 38 refers to ‘international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contracting states’. Treaties will be considered in more detail in Chapter 15, but in this survey of the sources of international law reference must be made to the role of international conventions.

Treaties are known by a variety of differing names, ranging from Conventions, International Agreements, Pacts, General Acts and Charters, through to Statutes, Declarations and Covenants.⁹⁹ All these terms refer to a similar transaction, the creation of written agreements whereby the states participating bind themselves legally to act in a particular way or to set up particular relations between themselves. A series of conditions and arrangements are laid out which the parties oblige themselves to carry out.¹⁰⁰

The obligatory nature of treaties is founded upon the customary international law principle that agreements are binding (*pacta sunt servanda*). Treaties may be divided into ‘law-making’ treaties, which are intended to have universal or general relevance, and ‘treaty-contracts’, which apply only as between two or a small number of states. Such a distinction is intended to reflect the general or local applicability of a particular treaty and the range of obligations imposed. It cannot be regarded as hard and fast and there are many grey areas of overlap and uncertainty.¹⁰¹

Treaties are express agreements and are a form of substitute legislation undertaken by states. They bear a close resemblance to contracts in a superficial sense in that the parties create binding obligations for themselves, but they have a nature of their own which reflects the character of the international system. The number of treaties entered into has expanded over the last century; witness the growing number of volumes of the United Nations Treaty Series or the United Kingdom Treaty Series. They fulfil a vital role in international relations.

As governmental controls increase and the technological and communications revolutions affect international life, the number of issues which require some form of inter-state regulation multiplies.

For many writers, treaties constitute the most important sources of international law as they require the express consent of the contracting parties. Treaties are thus seen as superior to custom, which is regarded in any event as a form of tacit agreement.¹⁰² As examples of important treaties one may mention the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners and the protection of civilians and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. All kinds of agreements exist, ranging from the regulation of outer space exploration to the control of drugs and the creation of international financial and development institutions. It would be impossible to telephone abroad or post a letter overseas or take an aeroplane to other countries without the various international agreements that have laid down the necessary, recognised conditions of operation.

It follows from the essence of an international treaty that, like a contract, it sets down a series of propositions which are then regarded as binding upon the parties. How then is it possible to treat conventions as sources of international law, over and above the obligations imposed upon the contracting parties? It is in this context that one can understand the term ‘law-making treaties’. They are intended to have an effect *generally*, not restrictively, and they are to be contrasted with those treaties which merely regulate limited issues between a few states. Law-making treaties are those agreements whereby states elaborate their perception of international law upon any given topic or establish new rules which are to guide them for the future in their international conduct. Such law-making treaties, of necessity, require the participation of a large number of states to emphasise this effect, and may produce rules that will bind all.¹⁰³ They constitute normative treaties, agreements that prescribe rules of conduct to be followed. Examples of such treaties may include the Antarctic Treaty 1959 and the Genocide Convention 1948. There are also many agreements which declare the existing law or codify existing customary rules, such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.

Parties that do not sign and ratify the particular treaty in question are not bound by its terms. This is a general rule and was illustrated in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases,¹⁰⁴ where West Germany had not ratified the relevant Convention and was therefore under no obligation to heed its terms.

However, where treaties reflect customary law, then non-parties are bound – not because it is a treaty provision, but because it reaffirms a rule or rules of customary international law. Similarly, non-parties may come to accept that provisions in a particular treaty can generate customary law, depending

always upon the nature of the agreement, the number of participants and other relevant factors.

The possibility that a provision in a treaty may constitute the basis of a rule which, when coupled with the *opinio juris*, can lead to the creation of a binding custom governing all states, not just those party to the original treaty, was considered by the International Court of Justice in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases¹⁰⁵ and regarded as one of the recognised methods of formulating new rules of customary international law. The Court, however, declared that the particular provision had to be ‘of a fundamentally norm-creating character’,¹⁰⁶ that is, capable of forming the basis of a general rule of law. What exactly this amounts to will probably vary according to the time and place, but it does confirm that treaty provisions may lead to custom providing other states, parties and non-parties to the treaty fulfil the necessary conditions of compatible behaviour and *opinio juris*. It has been argued that this possibility may be extended so that generalisable treaty provisions may of themselves, without the requirement to demonstrate the *opinio juris* and with little passage of time, generate *ipso facto* customary rules.¹⁰⁷ This, while recognising the importance of treaties, particularly in the human rights field, containing potential norm-creating provisions, is clearly going too far. The danger would be of a small number of states legislating for all, unless dissenting states actually entered into contrary treaties.¹⁰⁸ This would constitute too radical a departure for the current process of law-formation within the international community.

It is now established that even where a treaty rule comes into being covering the same ground as a customary rule, the latter will not be simply absorbed

within the former, but will maintain its separate existence. The Court in *Nicaragua v. United States*¹⁰⁹ did not accept the argument of the United States that the norms of customary international law concerned with self-defence had been ‘subsumed’ and ‘supervened’ by article 51 of the UN Charter. It was emphasised that ‘even if a treaty norm and a customary norm relevant to the present dispute were to have exactly the same content, this would not be a reason for the Court to hold that the incorporation of the customary norm into treaty law must deprive the customary norm of its applicability as distinct from the treaty norm’.¹¹⁰ The Court concluded that ‘it will therefore be clear that customary international law continues to exist and to apply separately from international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an identical content’.¹¹¹ The effect of this in the instant case was that the Court was able to examine the rule as established under customary law, whereas due to an American reservation, it was unable to analyse the treaty-based obligation.

Of course, two rules with the same content may be subject to different principles with regard to their interpretation and application; thus, the approach of the Court as well as being theoretically correct is of practical value also. In many cases, such dual source of existence of a rule may well suggest that the two versions are not in fact identical, as in the case of self-defence under customary law and article 51 of the Charter, but it will always depend upon the particular circumstances.¹¹²

Certain treaties attempt to establish a ‘regime’ which will, of necessity, also extend to non-parties.¹¹³ The UN Charter, for example, in its creation of a definitive framework for the preservation of international peace and security,

declares in article 2(6) that ‘the organisation shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles [listed in article 2] so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security’. One can also point to the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which set up a common code of conduct in international trade and has had an important effect on non-party states as well, being now transmuted into the World Trade Organization.

On the same theme, treaties may be constitutive in that they create international institutions and act as constitutions for them, outlining their proposed powers and duties.

‘Treaty-contracts’ on the other hand are not law-making instruments in themselves since they are between only small numbers of states and on a limited topic, but may provide evidence of customary rules. For example, a series of bilateral treaties containing a similar rule may be evidence of the existence of that rule in customary law, although this proposition needs to be approached with some caution in view of the fact that bilateral treaties by their very nature often reflect discrete circumstances.¹¹⁴

General Principles of Law¹¹⁵

In any system of law, a situation may very well arise where the court in considering a case before it realises that there is no law covering exactly that point, neither parliamentary statute nor judicial precedent. In such instances the judge will proceed to deduce a rule that will be relevant, by analogy from already existing rules or directly from the general principles that guide the legal system, whether they be referred to as emanating from justice, equity or considerations of public policy. Such a situation is perhaps even more likely to arise in international law because of the relative underdevelopment of the system in relation to the needs with which it is faced.

There are fewer decided cases in international law than in a municipal system and no method of legislating to provide rules to govern new situations.¹¹⁶ It is for such a reason that the provision of ‘the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’¹¹⁷ was inserted into article 38 as a source of law, to close the gap that might be uncovered in international law and solve this problem which is known legally as *non liquet*.¹¹⁸ The question of gaps in the system is an important one. It is important to appreciate that while there may not always be an immediate and obvious rule applicable to every international situation, ‘every international situation is capable of being determined *as a matter of law*’.¹¹⁹

There are various opinions as to what the general principles of law concept is intended to refer. Some writers regard it as an affirmation of Natural Law concepts, which are deemed to underlie the system of international law and

constitute the method for testing the validity of the positive (i.e. man-made) rules.¹²⁰ Other writers, particularly positivists, treat it as a sub-heading under treaty and customary law and incapable of adding anything new to international law unless it reflects the consent of states. Soviet writers like Tunkin subscribed to this approach and regarded the ‘general principles of law’ as reiterating the fundamental precepts of international law, for example, the law of peaceful co-existence, which have already been set out in treaty and custom law.¹²¹

Between these two approaches, most writers are prepared to accept that the general principles do constitute a separate source of law, but of fairly limited scope, and this is reflected in the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice. It is not clear, however, in all cases, whether what is involved is a general principle of law appearing in municipal systems or a general principle of international law or indeed, as it has been expressed, such principles of municipal law as are applicable to the relations between states.¹²²

While the reservoir from which one can draw contains the legal operations of 190 or so states, it does not follow that judges have to be experts in every legal system. There are certain common themes that run through the many different orders. Anglo-American common law has influenced a number of states throughout the world, as have the French and Germanic systems. There are many common elements in the law in Latin America, and most Afro-Asian states have borrowed heavily from the European experience in their efforts to modernise the structure administering the state and westernise economic and other enterprises.¹²³

Reference will now be made to some of the leading cases in this field to illustrate how this problem has been addressed.

In the *Chorzów Factory* case in 1928,¹²⁴ which followed the seizure of a nitrate factory in Upper Silesia by Poland, the Permanent Court of International Justice declared that ‘it is a general conception of law that every violation of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation’. The Court also regarded it as:

a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured state have suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international law.

The most fertile fields, however, for the implementation of municipal law analogies have been those of procedure, evidence and the machinery of the judicial process. In the *German Settlers in Poland* case,¹²⁵ the Court, approaching the matter from the negative point of view,¹²⁶ declared that ‘private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty . . . It can hardly be maintained that, although the law survived, private rights acquired under it perished. Such a contention is based on no principle and would be contrary to an almost universal opinion and practice.’¹²⁷ The International Court of Justice in the *Corfu Channel* case,¹²⁸ when referring to circumstantial evidence, pointed out that ‘this indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law and its use is recognised by

international decisions'. International judicial reference has also been made to the concept of *res judicata*, that is that the decision in the circumstances is final, binding and without appeal.¹²⁹

In the *United Nations Administrative Tribunal* case,¹³⁰ the Court dealt with the problem of the dismissal of members of the United Nations Secretariat staff and whether the General Assembly had the right to refuse to give effect to awards to them made by the relevant Tribunal. In giving its negative reply, the Court emphasised that:

according to a well-established and generally recognised principle of law, a judgment rendered by such a judicial body is *res judicata* and has binding force between the parties to the dispute.¹³¹

The question of *res judicata* was discussed in some detail in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*,¹³² where the issue focused on the meaning of the 1996 decision of the Court rejecting preliminary objections to jurisdiction.¹³³ The Court emphasised that the principle

signifies that the decisions of the Court are not only binding on the parties, but are final, in the sense that they cannot be reopened by the parties as regards the issues that have been determined, save by procedures, of an

exceptional nature, specially laid down for that purpose. That principle signifies that the decisions of the Court are not only binding on the parties, but are final, in the sense that they cannot be reopened by the parties as regards the issues that have been determined, save by procedures, of an exceptional nature, specially laid down for that purpose.¹³⁴

The Court noted that two purposes, one general and one specific, underpinned the principle of *res judicata*, internationally as well as nationally. The first referred to the stability of legal relations that requires that litigation come to an end. The second was that it is in the interest of each party that an issue which has already been adjudicated in favour of that party not be argued again. It was emphasised that depriving a litigant of the benefit of a judgment it had already obtained must in general be seen as a breach of the principles governing the legal settlement of disputes. The Court noted that the principle applied equally to preliminary objections judgments and merits judgments and that, since jurisdiction had been established by virtue of the 1996 judgment, it was not open to a party to assert in current proceedings that, at the date the earlier judgment was given, the Court had no power to give it, because one of the parties could now be seen to have been unable to come before it. This would be to call in question the force as *res judicata* of the operative clause of the judgment.¹³⁵

Further, the Court in the preliminary objections phase of the *Right of Passage over Indian Territory* case¹³⁶ stated that:

it is a rule of law generally accepted, as well as one acted upon in the past by the Court, that, once the Court has been validly seized of a dispute, unilateral action by the respondent state in terminating its Declaration [i.e. accepting the jurisdiction of the Court], in whole or in part, cannot divest the Court of jurisdiction.

The Court has also considered the principle of estoppel which provides that a party that has acquiesced in a particular situation cannot then proceed to challenge it. In the *Temple of Preah Vihear* case,¹³⁷ the International Court of Justice applied the doctrine, but in the *Serbian Loans* case¹³⁸ in 1929, in which French bondholders were demanding payment in gold francs as against paper money upon a series of Serbian loans, the Court declared the principle inapplicable.

As the International Court noted in the *ELSI* case,¹³⁹ there were limitations upon the process of inferring an estoppel in all circumstances, since ‘although it cannot be excluded that an estoppel could in certain circumstances arise from a silence when something ought to have been said, there are obvious difficulties in constructing an estoppel from a mere failure to mention a matter at a particular point in somewhat desultory diplomatic exchanges’.¹⁴⁰ The meaning of estoppel was confirmed in the preliminary objections judgment in *Cameroon v. Nigeria*,¹⁴¹ where the Court emphasised: ‘An estoppel would only arise if by its acts or declarations Cameroon had consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary

dispute submitted to the Court by bilateral avenues alone. It would further be necessary that, by relying on such an attitude, Nigeria had changed position to its own detriment or had suffered some prejudice.’ In *Mauritius v. United Kingdom*, the Tribunal noted that ‘evidence of opportunities foregone in reliance upon a representation constitutes one of the clearest forms of detrimental reliance, although a benefit conveyed on the representing State will also suffice’.¹⁴²

Another example of a general principle was provided by the Arbitral Tribunal in *AMCO v. Indonesia*,¹⁴³ where it was stated that ‘the full compensation of prejudice, by awarding to the injured party the *damnum emergens* and *lucrum cessans* is a principle common to the main systems of municipal law, and therefore, a general principle of law which may be considered as a source of international law’. Another principle would be that of respect for acquired rights,¹⁴⁴ a further one that a party advancing a point of fact in support of its claim must establish that fact,¹⁴⁵ while yet another argued general principle is that of proportionality, which notes that in areas ranging from recourse to self-defence and the actual use of force in the conduct of hostilities to maritime delimitation, counter-measures in WTO (World Trade Organization) and investment law and in human rights, the application of a particular rule may be constrained by relevant factors.¹⁴⁶ One crucial general principle of international law is that of *pacta sunt servanda*, or the idea that international agreements are binding. The law of treaties rests inexorably upon this principle since the whole concept of binding international agreements can only rest upon the presupposition that such instruments are commonly accepted as possessing that quality.¹⁴⁷

Perhaps the most important general principle, underpinning many international legal rules, is that of good faith.¹⁴⁸ This principle is enshrined in the UN Charter, which provides in article 2(2) that ‘all Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter’, and the elaboration of this provision in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970, referred to the obligations upon states to fulfil in good faith their obligations resulting from international law generally, including treaties. It therefore constitutes an indispensable part of the rules of international law generally.¹⁴⁹

The International Court declared in the *Nuclear Tests* cases¹⁵⁰ that:

One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of *pacta sunt servanda* in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral obligation.

Nevertheless, the Court has made the point that good faith as a concept is ‘not in itself a source of obligation where none would otherwise exist’.¹⁵¹ The principle of good faith, therefore, is a background principle informing and shaping the observance of existing rules of international law and in addition constraining the manner in which those rules may legitimately be exercised.¹⁵² As the International Court has noted, the principle of good faith relates ‘only to the fulfilment of existing obligations’.¹⁵³ A further principle to be noted is that of *ex injuria jus non oritur*, which posits that facts flowing from wrongful conduct cannot determine the law.¹⁵⁴

Thus, it follows that it is the Court which has the discretion as to which principles of law to apply in the circumstances of the particular case under consideration, and it will do this upon the basis of the inability of customary and treaty law to provide the required solution. In this context, one must consider the *Barcelona Traction* case¹⁵⁵ between Belgium and Spain. The International Court of Justice relied heavily upon the municipal law concept of the limited liability company and emphasised that if the Court were to decide the case in disregard of the relevant institutions of municipal law it would, without justification, invite serious legal difficulties. It would lose touch with reality, for there are no corresponding institutions of international law to which the Court could resort.¹⁵⁶

However, international law did not refer to the municipal law of a particular state, but rather to the rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems which, in this case, recognise the idea of the limited company.¹⁵⁷

Equity and International Law¹⁵⁸

Apart from the recourse to the procedures and institutions of municipal legal systems to reinforce international law, it is also possible to see in a number of cases references to equity¹⁵⁹ as a set of principles constituting the values of the system. The most famous decision on these lines was that of Judge Hudson in the *Diversion of Water from the River Meuse* case¹⁶⁰ in 1937 regarding a dispute between Holland and Belgium. Hudson pointed out that what are regarded as principles of equity have long been treated as part of international law and applied by the courts. ‘Under article 38 of the Statute’, he declared, ‘if not independently of that article, the Court has some freedom to consider principles of equity as part of the international law which it must apply.’ However, one must be very cautious in interpreting this, although on the broadest level it is possible to see equity (on an analogy with domestic law) as constituting a creative charge in legal development, producing the dynamic changes in the system rendered inflexible by the strict application of rules.¹⁶¹

The concept of equity¹⁶² has been referred to in several cases. In the *Rann of Kutch* arbitration between India and Pakistan in 1968,¹⁶³ the Tribunal agreed that equity formed part of international law and that accordingly the parties could rely on such principles in the presentation of their cases.¹⁶⁴ The International Court of Justice in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases directed a final delimitation between the parties – West Germany, Holland and Denmark – ‘in accordance with equitable principles’¹⁶⁵ and discussed the relevance to equity in its consideration of the *Barcelona Traction* case.¹⁶⁶

Judge Tanaka, however, has argued for a wider interpretation in his Dissenting Opinion in the Second Phase of the *South West Africa* case¹⁶⁷ and has treated the broad concept as a source of human rights ideas.¹⁶⁸

However, what is really in question here is the use of equitable principles in the context of a rule requiring such an approach. The relevant courts are not applying principles of abstract justice to the cases,¹⁶⁹ but rather deriving equitable principles and solutions from the applicable law.¹⁷⁰ The Court declared in the *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf* case¹⁷¹ that ‘the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not an abstract justice but justice according to the rule of law; which is to say that its application should display consistency and a degree of predictability; even though it also looks beyond it to principles of more general application’.

Equity has been used by the courts as a way of mitigating certain inequities, not as a method of refashioning nature to the detriment of legal rules.¹⁷² Its existence, therefore, as a separate and distinct source of law is at best highly controversial. As the International Court noted in the *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf* case,¹⁷³

it is bound to apply equitable principles as part of international law, and to balance up the various considerations which it regards as relevant in order to produce an equitable result. While it is clear that no rigid rules exist as to the exact weight to be attached to each element in the case, this is very far from being an

exercise of discretion or conciliation; nor is it an operation of distributive justice.¹⁷⁴

The use of equitable principles, however, has been particularly marked in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Article 59, for example, provides that conflicts between coastal and other states regarding the exclusive economic zone are to be resolved ‘on the basis of equity’, while by article 74 delimitation of the zone between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is to be effected by agreement on the basis of international law in order to achieve an equitable solution. A similar provision applies by article 83 to the delimitation of the continental shelf.¹⁷⁵ These provisions possess flexibility, which is important, but are also somewhat uncertain. Precisely how any particular dispute may be resolved, and the way in which that is likely to happen and the principles to be used, are far from clear and an element of unpredictability may have been introduced.¹⁷⁶ The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997¹⁷⁷ also lays great emphasis upon the concept of equity. Article 5, for example, provides that watercourse states shall utilise an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner both in their own territories and in participating generally in the use, development and protection of such a watercourse.

Equity may also be used in certain situations in the delimitation of non-maritime boundaries. Where there is no evidence as to where a boundary line lies, an international tribunal may resort to equity. In the case of *Burkina Faso/Mali*,¹⁷⁸ for example, the Court noted with regard to the pool of Soum that ‘it must recognise that Soum is a frontier pool; and that in the absence of

any precise indication in the texts of the position of the frontier line, the line should divide the pool of Soum in an equitable manner'. This would be done by dividing the pool equally. Although equity did not always mean equality, where there are no special circumstances the latter is generally the best expression of the former.¹⁷⁹ The Court also emphasised that 'to resort to the concept of equity in order to modify an established frontier would be quite unjustified'.¹⁸⁰ A further example is provided by the *Diallo* case, where the International Court declared: 'Quantification of compensation for non-material injury necessarily rests on equitable considerations.'¹⁸¹

Although generalised principles or concepts that may be termed community value-judgements inform and pervade the political and therefore the legal orders in the broadest sense, they do not themselves constitute as such binding legal norms. This can only happen if they have been accepted as legal norms by the international community through the mechanisms and techniques of international law creation. Nevertheless, 'elementary principles of humanity' may lie at the base of such norms and help justify their existence in the broadest sense, and may indeed perform a valuable role in endowing such norms with an additional force within the system. The International Court has, for example, emphasised in the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* Advisory Opinion¹⁸² that at the heart of the rules and principles concerning international humanitarian law lies the 'overriding consideration of humanity'.

Judicial Decisions¹⁸³

Although these are, in the words of article 38, to be utilised as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law rather than as an actual source of law, judicial decisions can be of immense importance. While by virtue of article 59 of the ICJ Statute the decisions of the Court have no binding force except as between the parties and in respect of the case under consideration, the Court has striven to follow its previous judgments and insert a measure of certainty within the process. As the Court stated in *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections), '[t]he real question is whether, in this case, there is cause not to follow the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases'¹⁸⁴ and in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Croatia v. Serbia)* (Preliminary Objections), the Court declared that 'it will not depart from its settled jurisprudence unless it finds very particular reasons to do so'.¹⁸⁵

Accordingly, while the doctrine of precedent as it is known in the common law, whereby the rulings of certain courts must be followed by other courts, does not exist in international law, one still finds that states in disputes and textbook writers quote judgments of the Permanent Court and the International Court of Justice as authoritative decisions.

The International Court of Justice itself will closely examine its previous decisions and will carefully distinguish those cases which it feels should not be applied to the problem being studied.¹⁸⁶ But just as English judges, for example, create law in the process of interpreting it, so the judges of the International Court of Justice sometimes do a little more than merely

‘determine’ it. One of the most outstanding instances of this occurred in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case,¹⁸⁷ with its statement of the criteria for the recognition of baselines from which to measure the territorial sea, which was later enshrined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.

Other examples include the *Reparation for Injuries* case,¹⁸⁸ which recognised the legal personality of international institutions in certain cases, the *Reservations to the Genocide Convention* case,¹⁸⁹ which dealt with reservations to treaties, the *Nottebohm* case,¹⁹⁰ which considered the role and characteristics of nationality, and the range of cases concerning maritime delimitation.¹⁹¹

Of course, it does not follow that a decision of the Court will be invariably accepted in later discussions and formulations of the law. One example of this is part of the decision in the *Lotus* case,¹⁹² which was criticised and later abandoned in the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. But this is comparatively unusual and the practice of the Court is to examine its own relevant case-law with considerable attention and to depart from it rarely.¹⁹³ At the very least, it will constitute the starting point of analysis, so that, for example, the Court noted in *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections) that ‘the real question is whether, in this case, there is cause not to follow the reasoning and conclusion of earlier cases’.¹⁹⁴

In addition to the Permanent Court and the International Court of Justice, the phrase ‘judicial decisions’ also encompasses international arbitral awards and the rulings of national courts. There have been many international arbitral

tribunals, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration created by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the various mixed-claims tribunals, including the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, and, although they differ from the international courts in some ways, many of their decisions have been extremely significant in the development of international law. This can be seen in the existence and number of the Reports of International Arbitral Awards published since 1948 by the United Nations.

One leading example is the *Alabama Claims* arbitration,¹⁹⁵ which marked the opening of a new era in the peaceful settlement of international disputes, in which increasing use was made of judicial and arbitration methods in resolving conflicts. This case involved a vessel built on Merseyside to the specifications of the Confederate States, which succeeded in capturing some seventy Federal ships during the American Civil War. The United States sought compensation after the war for the depredations of the *Alabama* and other ships and this was accepted by the Tribunal. Britain had infringed the rules of neutrality and was accordingly obliged to pay damages to the United States. Another illustration of the impact of arbitral awards is the *Island of Palmas* case,¹⁹⁶ which has proved of immense significance to the subject of territorial sovereignty and will be discussed in Chapter 9. In addition, the growing significance of the case-law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda needs to be noted.¹⁹⁷ As a consequence, it is not rare for international courts of one type or another to cite one another's decisions, sometimes as support¹⁹⁸ and sometimes to disagree.¹⁹⁹

As has already been seen, the decisions of municipal courts²⁰⁰ may provide evidence of the existence of a customary rule. They may also constitute evidence of the actual practice of states which, while not a description of the law as it has been held to apply, nevertheless affords examples of how states actually behave, in other words the essence of the material act which is so necessary in establishing a rule of customary law.²⁰¹ British and American writers, in particular, tend to refer fairly extensively to decisions of national courts.

One may, finally, also point to decisions by the highest courts of federal states, like Switzerland and the United States, in their resolution of conflicts between the component units of such countries, as relevant to the development of international law rules in such fields as boundary disputes. A boundary disagreement between two US states which is settled by the Supreme Court is in many ways analogous to the International Court of Justice considering a frontier dispute between two independent states, and as such provides valuable material for international law.²⁰²

Writers²⁰³

Article 38 includes as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, 'the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations'.

Historically, of course, the influence of academic writers on the development of international law has been marked. In the heyday of Natural Law it was analyses and juristic opinions that were crucial, while the role of state

practice and court decisions was of less value. Writers such as Gentili, Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek and Vattel were the supreme authorities of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries and determined the scope, form and content of international law.²⁰⁴

With the rise of positivism and the consequent emphasis upon state sovereignty, treaties and custom assumed the dominant position in the exposition of the rules of the international system, and the importance of legalistic writings began to decline. Thus, one finds that textbooks are used as a method of discovering what the law is on any particular point rather than as the fount or source of actual rules. There are still some writers who have had a formative impact upon the evolution of particular laws, for example Gidel on the law of the sea,²⁰⁵ and others whose general works on international law tend to be referred to virtually as classics, for example Oppenheim and Rousseau, but the general influence of textbook writers has somewhat declined.

Nevertheless, books are important as a way of arranging and putting into focus the structure and form of international law and of elucidating the nature, history and practice of the rules of law. Academic writings also have a useful role to play in stimulating thought about the values and aims of international law as well as pointing out the defects that exist within the system, and making suggestions as to the future.

Because of the lack of supreme authorities and institutions in the international legal order, the responsibility is all the greater upon the publicists of the

various nations to inject an element of coherence and order into the subject as well as to question the direction and purposes of the rules.

States in their presentation of claims, national law officials in their opinions to their governments, the various international judicial and arbitral bodies in considering their decisions, and the judges of municipal courts when the need arises, all consult and quote the writings of the leading juristic authorities.

Of course, the claim can be made, and often is, that textbook writers merely reflect and reinforce national prejudices,²⁰⁶ but it is an allegation which has been exaggerated. It should not lead us to dismiss the value of writers, but rather to assess correctly the writer within his particular environment.

Other Possible Sources of International Law

In the discussion of the various sources of law prescribed by the ICJ Statute, it might have been noted that there is a distinction between, on the one hand, actual sources of rules, that is those devices capable of instituting new rules such as law-making treaties, customary law and many decisions of the International Court of Justice since they cannot be confined to the category of merely determining or elucidating the law, and on the other hand those practices and devices which afford evidence of the existence of rules, such as juristic writings, many treaty-contracts and some judicial decisions both at the international and municipal levels. In fact, each source is capable, to some extent, of both developing new law and identifying existing law. This results partly from the disorganised state of international law and partly from the terms of article 38 itself.

A similar confusion between law-making, law-determining and law-evidencing can be discerned in the discussion of the various other methods of developing law that have emerged since the conclusion of the Second World War. Foremost among the issues that have arisen and one that reflects the growth in the importance of the Developing Countries ('Third World') states and the gradual de-Europeanisation of the world order is the question of the standing of the resolutions and declarations of the UN General Assembly.²⁰⁷

Unlike the UN Security Council, which has the competence to adopt resolutions under articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter binding on all member states of the organisation,²⁰⁸ resolutions of the Assembly are generally not legally binding and are merely recommendatory, putting forward opinions on various issues with varying degrees of majority support.²⁰⁹ This is the classic position and reflects the intention that the Assembly was to be basically a parliamentary advisory body with the binding decisions being taken by the Security Council.

Nowadays, the situation is somewhat more complex. The Assembly has produced a great number of highly important resolutions and declarations and it was inevitable that these should have some impact upon the direction adopted by modern international law. The way states vote in the General Assembly and the explanations given upon such occasions constitute evidence of state practice and state understanding as to the law. Where a particular country has consistently voted in favour of, for example, the abolition of apartheid, it could not afterwards deny the existence of a usage condemning racial discrimination and it may even be that that usage is for that state converted into a binding custom.

The Court in *Nicaragua v. United States* tentatively expressed the view that the *opinio juris* requirement could be derived from the circumstances surrounding the adoption and application of a General Assembly resolution. It noted that the relevant

opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, *inter alia*, the attitude of the Parties [i.e. the US and Nicaragua] and the attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions, and particularly resolution 2625 (XXV) entitled ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’.²¹⁰

The effect of consent to resolutions such as this one ‘may be understood as acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves’.²¹¹ This comment, however, may well have referred solely to the situation where the resolution in question defines or elucidates an existing treaty (i.e. Charter) commitment.

Where the vast majority of states consistently vote for resolutions and declarations on a topic, that amounts to a state practice and a binding rule may very well emerge provided that the requisite *opinio juris* can be proved. For example, the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which was adopted with no opposition and

only nine abstentions and followed a series of resolutions in general and specific terms attacking colonialism and calling for the self-determination of the remaining colonies, marked the transmutation of the concept of self-determination from a political and moral principle to a legal right and consequent obligation, particularly taken in conjunction with the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law.²¹²

Declarations such as that on the Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1963) can also be regarded as examples of state practices which are leading to, or have led to, a binding rule of customary law. As well as constituting state practice, it may be possible to use such resolutions as evidence of the existence of or evolution towards an *opinio juris* without which a custom cannot arise. Apart from that, resolutions can be understood as authoritative interpretations by the Assembly of the various principles of the UN Charter depending on the circumstances.²¹³

Accordingly, such resolutions are able to speed up the process of the legalisation of a state practice and thus enable a speedier adaptation of customary law to the conditions of modern life. The presence of representatives of virtually all of the states of the world in the General Assembly enormously enhances the value of that organ in general political terms and in terms of the generation of state practice that may or may not lead to binding custom. As the International Court noted, for example, in *Nicaragua v. United States*,²¹⁴ ‘the wording of certain General Assembly declarations adopted by states demonstrates their recognition of the principle of the prohibition of force as definitely a matter of customary international

law'. The Court put the issue the following way in the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* Advisory Opinion:²¹⁵

The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an *opinio juris*. To establish whether this is true of a General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an *opinio juris* exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the *opinio juris* required for the establishment of a new rule.

The Court in this case examined a series of General Assembly resolutions concerning the legality of nuclear weapons and noted that several of them had been adopted with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions. It was also pointed out that the focus of such resolutions had not always been constant. The Court therefore concluded that these resolutions fell short of establishing the existence of an *opinio juris* on the illegality of nuclear weapons.²¹⁶

Nevertheless, one must be alive to the dangers in ascribing legal value to everything that emanates from the Assembly. Resolutions are often the results of political compromises and arrangements and, comprehended in that sense, never intended to constitute binding norms. Great care must be taken in moving from a plethora of practice to the identification of legal norms.

As far as the practice of other international organisations is concerned,²¹⁷ the same approach, but necessarily tempered with a little more caution, may be adopted. Resolutions may evidence an existing custom or constitute usage that may lead to the creation of a custom and the *opinio juris* requirement may similarly emerge from the surrounding circumstances, although care must be exercised here.²¹⁸

It is sometimes argued more generally that particular non-binding instruments or documents or non-binding provisions in treaties form a special category that may be termed ‘soft law’. This terminology is meant to indicate that the instrument or provision in question is not of itself ‘law’, but its importance within the general framework of international legal development is such that particular attention requires to be paid to it.²¹⁹ ‘Soft law’ is not as such law. That needs to be emphasised, but a document, for example, does not need to constitute a binding treaty before it can exercise an influence in international politics. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is a prime example of this. This was not a binding agreement, but its influence in Central and Eastern Europe in emphasising the role and importance of international human rights proved incalculable.²²⁰ Certain areas of international law have generated more ‘soft law’, in the sense of the production of important but non-binding instruments, than others. Here one may cite particularly international economic law²²¹ and

international environmental law.²²² The use of such documents, whether termed, for example, recommendations, guidelines, codes of practice or standards, is significant in signalling the evolution and establishment of guidelines, which may ultimately be converted into legally binding rules. This may be accomplished either by formalisation into a binding treaty or by acceptance as a customary rule, provided that the necessary conditions have been fulfilled. The propositions of 'soft law' are important and influential, but do not in themselves constitute legal norms. In many cases, it may be advantageous for states to reach agreements with one another or through international organisations which are not intended to be binding and thus subject to formal legal implementation, but which reflect a political intention to act in a certain way. Such agreements may be more flexible, easier to conclude and easier to adhere to for domestic reasons.

A study by the US State Department concerning non-binding international agreements between states²²³ noted that

it has long been recognised in international practice that governments may agree on joint statements of policy or intention that do not establish legal obligations. In recent decades, this has become a common means of announcing the results of diplomatic exchanges, stating common positions on policy issues, recording their intended course of action on matters of mutual concern, or making political commitments to one another. These

documents are sometimes referred to as non-binding agreements, gentlemen's agreements, joint statements or declarations.

What is determinative as to status in such situations is not the title given to the document in question, but the intention of the parties as inferred from all the relevant circumstances as to whether they intended to create binding legal relationships between themselves on the matter in question.

The International Law Commission

The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly in 1947 with the declared object of promoting the progressive development of international law and its codification.²²⁴ It consists of thirty-four members from Africa, Asia, America and Europe, who remain in office for five years each and who are appointed from lists submitted by national governments. The Commission is aided in its deliberations by consultations with various outside bodies including the Asian–African Legal Consultative Committee, the European Commission on Legal Cooperation and the Inter-American Council of Jurists.²²⁵

Many of the most important international conventions have grown out of the Commission's work. Having decided upon a topic, the International Law Commission will prepare a draft. This is submitted to the various states for their comments and is usually followed by an international conference convened by the United Nations. Eventually a treaty will emerge. This procedure was followed in such international conventions as those on the

Law of the Sea in 1958, Diplomatic Relations in 1961, Consular Relations in 1963, Special Missions in 1969 and the Law of Treaties in 1969. Of course, this smooth operation does not invariably occur: witness the many conferences at Caracas in 1974, and Geneva and New York from 1975 to 1982, necessary to produce a new Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Apart from preparing such drafts, the International Law Commission also issues reports and studies, and has formulated such documents as the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States of 1949 and the Principles of International Law recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal of 1950. The Commission produced a set of draft articles on the problems of jurisdictional immunities in 1991, a draft statute for an international criminal court in 1994 and a set of draft articles on state responsibility in 2001. The drafts of the ILC are often referred to in the judgments of the International Court of Justice. Indeed, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1997, President Schwebel noted in referring to the decision in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case²²⁶ that the judgment:

is notable, moreover, because of the breadth and depth of the importance given in it to the work product of the International Law Commission. The Court's Judgment not only draws on treaties concluded pursuant to the Commission's proceedings: those on the law of treaties, of State succession in respect of treaties, and the law of international watercourses. It gives great weight to some of

the Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, as did both Hungary and Slovakia. This is not wholly exceptional; it rather illustrates the fact that just as the judgments and opinions of the Court have influenced the work of the International Law Commission, so the work of the Commission may influence that of the Court.²²⁷

Thus, one can see that the International Law Commission is involved in at least two of the major sources of law. Its drafts may form the bases of international treaties which bind those states which have signed and ratified them and which may continue to form part of general international law, and its work is part of the whole range of state practice which can lead to new rules of customary law. Further, a view taken by the Commission as to whether a proposition is or is not a rule of customary international law is likely to prove influential. Its drafts, indeed, may constitute evidence of custom, contribute to the corpus of usages which may create new law and evidence the *opinio juris*.²²⁸ In addition, it is not to be overlooked that the International Law Commission is a body composed of eminently qualified publicists, including many governmental legal advisers, whose reports and studies may be used as a method of determining what the law actually is, in much the same way as books.

Other Bodies

Although the International Law Commission is by far the most important of the organs for the study and development of the law, there do exist certain other bodies which are involved in the same mission. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), for example, are actively increasing the range of international law in the fields of economic, financial and development activities, while temporary organs such as the Committee on the Principles of International Law have been engaged in producing various declarations and statements. Nor can one overlook the tremendous work of the many specialised agencies like the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which are constantly developing international law in their respective spheres.

There are also some independent bodies which are actively involved in the field. The International Law Association and the Institut de Droit International are the best known of such organisations which study and stimulate the law of the world community, while the various Harvard Research drafts produced before the Second World War are still of value today.

Unilateral Acts

In certain situations, the unilateral acts of states, including statements made by relevant state officials, may give rise to international legal obligations.²²⁹ Such acts might include recognition and protests, which are intended to have legal consequences. Unilateral acts, while not sources of international law as

understood in article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, may constitute sources of obligation.²³⁰ For this to happen, the intention to be bound of the state making the declaration in question is crucial, as will be the element of publicity or notoriety.²³¹ Such intention may be ascertained by way of interpretation of the act, and the principle of good faith plays a crucial role. The International Court has stressed that where states make statements by which their freedom of action is limited, a restrictive interpretation is required.²³² Recognition will be important here in so far as third states are concerned, in order for such an act or statement to be opposable to them. Beyond this, such unilateral statements may be used as evidence of a particular view taken by the state in question.²³³

Hierarchy of Sources and *Jus Cogens*²³⁴

The question of the hierarchy of sources is more complex than appears at first sight. Although there does exist a presumption against normative conflict,²³⁵ international law is not as clear as domestic law in listing the order of constitutional authority²³⁶ and the situation is complicated by the proliferation of international courts and tribunals existing in a non-hierarchical fashion,²³⁷ as well as the significant expansion of international law, both substantively and procedurally. Judicial decisions and writings clearly have a subordinate function within the hierarchy in view of their description as subsidiary means of law determination in article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, while the role of general principles of law as a way of complementing custom and treaty law places that category fairly firmly in third place.²³⁸ The question of priority as between custom and treaty law is more complex.²³⁹ As a general rule, that which is later in time will have priority (*lex posterior derogate priori*). Treaties are usually formulated to replace or codify existing custom,²⁴⁰ while treaties in turn may themselves fall out of use and be replaced by new customary rules. However, where the same rule appears in both a treaty and a custom, there is no presumption that the latter is subsumed by the former. The two may co-exist.²⁴¹ There is in addition a principle to the effect that a special rule prevails over a general rule (*lex specialis derogat legi generali*), so that, for example, treaty rules between states as *lex specialis* would have priority as against general rules of treaty or customary law between the same states,²⁴² although not if the general rule in question was one of *jus cogens*.²⁴³

The position is complicated by the existence of norms or obligations deemed to be of a different or higher status than others, whether derived from custom or treaty. These may be obligations *erga omnes* or rules of *jus cogens* (peremptory norms).²⁴⁴ While there may be significant overlap between these two in terms of the content of rules to which they relate, there is a difference in nature. The former concept concerns the scope of application of the relevant rule, that is the extent to which states as a generality may be subject to the rule in question and may be seen as having a legal interest in the matter.²⁴⁵ It has, therefore, primarily a procedural focus. Rules of *jus cogens*, on the other hand, are substantive rules recognised to be of a higher status as such. The International Court stated in the *Barcelona Traction* case²⁴⁶ that there existed an essential distinction between the obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole and those arising vis-à-vis another state in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former concerned all states and ‘all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations *erga omnes*’. Examples of such obligations included the outlawing of aggression and of genocide and the protection from slavery and racial discrimination.²⁴⁷ To this one may add the prohibition of torture.²⁴⁸ Further, the International Court in the *East Timor* case stressed that the right of peoples to self-determination ‘has an *erga omnes* character’,²⁴⁹ while reiterating in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* that ‘the rights and obligations enshrined in the Convention are rights and obligations *erga omnes*’.²⁵⁰

This easing of the traditional rules concerning *locus standi* in certain circumstances with regard to the pursuing of a legal remedy against the

alleged offender state may be linked to the separate question of superior principles in international law. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, provides that a treaty will be void ‘if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law’. Further, by article 64, if a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates. This rule (*jus cogens*) will also apply in the context of customary rules so that no derogation would be permitted to such norms by way of local or special custom.

Such a peremptory norm is defined by the Convention as one ‘accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’.²⁵¹ The concept of *jus cogens* is based upon an acceptance of fundamental and superior values within the system and in some respects is akin to the notion of public order or public policy in domestic legal orders.²⁵² It also reflects the influence of Natural Law thinking. Rules of *jus cogens* are not new rules of international law as such. It is a question rather of a particular and superior quality that is recognised as adhering in existing rules of international law. Various examples of rules of *jus cogens* have been provided, particularly during the discussions on the topic in the International Law Commission, such as an unlawful use of force, genocide, slave trading and piracy.²⁵³ The International Court has stated that in its opinion the prohibition of torture had become a peremptory norm.²⁵⁴ However, no clear agreement has been manifested regarding other areas,²⁵⁵ and even the examples given are by no means uncontroverted. Nevertheless, the rise of individual responsibility

directly for international crimes marks a further step in the development of *jus cogens* rules. Of particular importance, however, is the identification of the mechanism by which rules of *jus cogens* may be created, since once created no derogation is permitted.

A two-stage approach is here involved in the light of article 53: first, the establishment of the proposition as a rule of general international law; and, secondly, the acceptance of that rule as a peremptory norm by the international law community of states as a whole.²⁵⁶ It will be seen therefore that a stringent process is involved, and rightly so, for the establishment of a higher level of binding rules has serious implications for the international law community. The situation to be avoided is that of foisting peremptory norms upon a political or ideological minority, for that in the long run would devalue the concept. The appropriate test would thus require virtually universal acceptance of the proposition as a legal rule by states and recognition of it as a rule of *jus cogens* by an overwhelming majority of states, crossing ideological and political divides.²⁵⁷ It is also clear that only rules based on custom or treaties may form the foundation of *jus cogens* norms.²⁵⁸ This is particularly so in view of the hostile attitude of many states to general principles as an independent source of international law and the universality requirement of *jus cogens* formation. As article 53 of the Vienna Convention notes, a treaty that is contrary to an existing rule of *jus cogens* is void *ab initio*,²⁵⁹ whereas by virtue of article 64 an existing treaty that conflicts with an emergent rule of *jus cogens* terminates from the date of the emergence of the rule. It is not void *ab initio*, nor by article 71 is any right, obligation or legal situation created by the treaty prior to its termination affected, provided that its maintenance is not in itself contrary to the new

peremptory norm.²⁶⁰ A reservation to a treaty that reflects a rule of *jus cogens* does not affect the binding nature of that norm, while a reservation cannot exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in a manner contrary to a norm of *jus cogens*.²⁶¹ In so far as customary law is concerned, a new rule cannot be created which conflicts with a norm of *jus cogens*, and a rule of custom which is not one of *jus cogens* ceases to exist if and to the extent that it conflicts with a new norm of *jus cogens*.²⁶²

There are also consequences with regard to state responsibility. Rules of *jus cogens* give rise to obligations owed to the international community as a whole and any state is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another state for a breach of a rule of *jus cogens* in accordance with the rules on the responsibility of states for internationally unlawful acts.²⁶³ No circumstance precluding wrongfulness under the rules of state responsibility may be invoked with regard to any act of a state that is contrary to a norm of *jus cogens*, while no state shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach by a state of an obligation arising under a rule of *jus cogens* nor assist in maintaining that situation. A breach is deemed serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the state responsible to fulfil that obligation²⁶⁴ and ‘it has been suggested that state conduct violating a rule of *jus cogens* may not attract a claim of state immunity’.²⁶⁵ The relationship between the rules of *jus cogens* and article 103 of the United Nations Charter, which states that obligations under the Charter have precedence as against obligations under other international agreements, was discussed by Judge Lauterpacht in his Separate Opinion in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*.²⁶⁶ He noted in particular that ‘the relief which article 103 of the Charter may give

the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obligation cannot – as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms – extend to a conflict between a Security Council resolution and *jus cogens*’.

It is also to be emphasised that the establishment of a rule of *jus cogens* does not as such grant jurisdiction to the International Court (or any other court, of course). The status of a rule, whether or not a rule *erga omnes*, is a separate question from that of consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.²⁶⁷

Suggestions for Further Reading

A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, *The Making of International Law*, Oxford, 2007

B. Cheng, *General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals*, London, 1953

A. Pellet and D. Müller, ‘Article 38’, in *The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary* (ed. A. Zimmermann, C. Tomuschat and K. Oellers-Frahm), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2019, p. 731

H. Thirlway, *The Sources of International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2019

¹ See generally H. Thirlway, *The Sources of International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2019; *The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law* (ed. S. Besson and J. d’Aspremont), Oxford, 2017; J. d’Aspremont, *Formalism and the Sources of International Law*, Oxford, 2011; J. d’Aspremont, ‘Towards a New Theory of Sources in International Law’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law* (ed. A. Orford and F. Hoffmann), Oxford, 2016, chapter 27; C. Parry, *The Sources and Evidences of International Law*, Cambridge, 1965; M. Sørensen, *Les Sources de Droit International*, Paris, 1946; V. D. Degan, *Sources of International Law*, The Hague, 1997; *Oppenheim’s International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, p. 22; *Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, chapter 2; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 124; P.-M.

Dupuy and Y. Kerbrat, *Doit International Public*, 14th ed., Paris, 2018, deuxième partie; A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, *The Making of International Law*, Oxford, 2007; G. M. Danilenko, *Law-Making in the International Community*, The Hague, 1993; G. I. Tunkin, *Theory of International Law*, London, 1974, pp. 89–203; J. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, Leiden, 1968, vol. I, p. 1; H. Lauterpacht, *International Law: Collected Papers*, Cambridge, 1970, vol. I, p. 58; *Change and Stability in International Law-Making* (ed. A. Cassese and J. Weiler), Leiden, 1988; A. Bos, *A Methodology of International Law*, Amsterdam, 1984; A. Cassese, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005, chapters 8–10; A. Pellet and D. Müller, ‘Article 38’, in *The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary* (ed. A. Zimmermann and C. Tomuschat), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2019, p. 819; M. Virally, ‘The Sources of International Law’, in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, p. 116; C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will’, **241 HR**, 1993, p. 195; B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’, **250 HR**, 1994, p. 219; M. Mendelson, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Sources of International Law’, in *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice* (ed. A. V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice), Cambridge, 1996, p. 63; G. Abi-Saab, ‘Les Sources du Droit International – Un Essai de Déconstruction’, in *Le Droit International dans un Monde en Mutation*, Montevideo, 1994, p. 29; and O. Schachter, ‘Recent Trends in International Law-Making’, **12 Australian YIL**, 1992.

² See also, e.g., M. S. McDougal and W. M. Reisman, ‘The Prescribing Function: How International Law is Made’, **6 Yale Studies in World Public Order**, 1980, p. 249. Note J. d’Aspremont, ‘The Idea of “Rules” in the Sources of International Law’, **84 BYIL**, 2013, p. 103, arguing that the sources of international law are better understood as a set of communitarian constraints irreducible to rules.

³ See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 24; and M. O. Hudson, *The Permanent Court of International Justice*, New York, 1934, pp. 601 ff.

⁴ See e.g. G. Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, 3rd ed., London, 1957, vol. I, pp. 26–7.

⁵ There are a number of examples of this: see below, [Chapter 4](#).

⁶ See e.g. Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, pp. 124–5, where it is noted that ‘les sources *formelles* du droit sont les *procédés* d’élaboration du droit, les diverses techniques qui autorisent à considérer qu’une règle appartient au droit positif. Les sources *matérielles*

constituent les fondements sociologiques des normes internationales, leur base politique, morale ou économique plus ou moins explicitée par la doctrine ou les sujets du droit' (emphasis in the original); and Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 864. See also Thirlway, *Sources*, p. 6.

⁷ See generally A. D'Amato, *The Concept of Custom in International Law*, Cornell, 1971; M. Akehurst, 'Custom as a Source of International Law', *47 BYIL*, 1974–75, p. 1; C. A. Bradley, *Custom's Future: International Law in a Changing World*, Cambridge, 2016; Thirlway, *Sources*, chapter III; M. Mendelson, 'The Formation of Customary International Law', *272 HR*, 1999, p. 159; B. Cheng, 'Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World', in *The Structure and Process of International Law* (ed. R. St J. Macdonald and D. Johnston), Dordrecht, 1983, p. 513; A. E. Roberts, 'Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation', *95 AJIL*, 2001, p. 757; H. Thirlway, *International Customary Law and Codification*, Leiden, 1972; Thirlway, *Sources*, chapter 3; B. D. Lepard, *Reexamining Customary International Law*, Cambridge, 2017; *Sources of State Practice in International Law* (ed. R. Gaebler and M. Smolka-Day), Ardley, 2002; K. Wolfke, *Custom in Present International Law*, 2nd ed., Dordrecht, 1993; and K. Wolfke, 'Some Persistent Controversies Regarding Customary International Law', *Netherlands YIL*, 1993, p. 1; L. Kopelmanas, 'Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law', *18 BYIL*, 1937, p. 127; H. Lauterpacht, *The Development of International Law by the International Court*, Cambridge, 1958, pp. 368–93; J. Kunz, 'The Nature of Customary International Law', *47 AJIL*, 1953, p. 662; R. J. Dupuy, 'Coutume Sage et Coutume Sauvage', in *Mélanges Rousseau*, Paris, 1974, p. 75; B. Stern, 'La Coutume au Coeur du Droit International', in *Mélanges Reuter*, Paris, 1981, p. 479; R. Y. Jennings, 'Law-Making and Package Deal', in *Mélanges Reuter*, p. 347; M. Byers, 'Custom, Power and the Power of Rules', *17 Michigan Journal of International Law*, 1995, p. 109; Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 902; J. Kammerhofer, 'The Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems', *15 EJIL*, 2004, p. 523; P. M. Dupuy, 'Théorie des Sources et Coutume en Droit International Contemporain', in *Le Droit International dans un Monde en Mutation*, p. 51; D. P. Fidler, 'Challenging the Classic Conception of Custom', *German YIL*, 1997, p. 198; R. Müllerson, 'On the Nature and Scope of Customary International Law', *Austrian Review of International and European Law*, 1998, p. 1; M. Byers, *Custom, Power and the Power of Rules*, Cambridge, 1999; and A. Carty, *The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in International Affairs*, Manchester, 1986, chapter 3. See also the 'Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law', in *Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference*, International Law Association,

London, 2000, p. 713; *The Nature of Customary Law* (ed. A. Perreau-Saussine and J. B. Murphy), Cambridge, 2007; J. d'Asprement, *Formalism and the Sources of International Law*, Oxford, 2011; M. P. Scharf, *Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change*, Cambridge, 2013; T. Treves, 'Customary International Law', in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*; B. S. Chimni, 'Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective', **112** *AJIL*, 2018, p. 1; and P. Tomka, 'Custom and the International Court of Justice', **12** *Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals*, 2013, p. 195. See also the International Law Commission's study of Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law/Identification of Customary International Law (title changed in 2013), Yearbook of the ILC, 2011, A/66/10, Annex A, p. 302, Yearbook of the ILC, 2012, A/67/10, chapter VIII, p. 108, Reports of the ILC 2012 (A/67/10), 2013 (A/68/10), 2014 (A/69/10) and 2015 (A/70/10), and the five reports of the Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/663 (2013), A/CN.4/672 (2014), A/CN.4/682 (2015), A/CN.4/695 (2016) and A/CN.4/717 and Add. I (2018). A series of Draft Conclusions were adopted by the Commission in 2018, A/73/10 and welcomed by the UN General Assembly in resolution 73/203 on 20 December 2018.

⁸ See e.g. R. Unger, *Law in Modern Society*, New York, 1976, who notes that customary law can be regarded as 'any recurring mode of interaction among individuals and groups, together with the more or less explicit acknowledgement by these groups and individuals that such patterns of interaction produce reciprocal expectations of conduct that ought to be satisfied', p. 49. See also R. Dias, *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., London, 1985, chapter 9; and H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, Oxford, 1961.

⁹ See e.g. D. Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, 4th ed., London, 1979, p. 649; and H. Maine, *Ancient Law*, London, 1861.

¹⁰ See e.g. Dias, *Jurisprudence*.

¹¹ See e.g. W. Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law*, New York, 1964, pp. 121–3. See also I. De Lupis, *The Concept of International Law*, Aldershot, 1987, pp. 112–16.

¹² E.g. D'Amato, *Concept of Custom*, p. 12.

¹³ C. de Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law*, 3rd ed., Princeton, 1960, pp. 161–2.

¹⁴ ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 13, 29; 81 ILR, p. 239. See also the Advisory Opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 253; 110 ILR, p. 163; Pellet and Müller, ‘Article 38’, p. 905; and ILC Conclusion 2, Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p. 124 (‘To determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law (*opinio juris*)’).

¹⁵ F. Génv, *Méthode d’Interprétation et Sources en Droit Privé Positif*, Paris, 1899, para. 110.

¹⁶ See e.g. R. Müllerson, ‘The Interplay of Objective and Subjective Elements in Customary Law’, in *International Law – Theory and Practice* (ed. K. Wellens), The Hague, 1998, p. 161.

¹⁷ See e.g. D. Anzilotti, *Corso di Diritto Internazionale*, 3rd ed., 1928, pp. 73–6; K. Strupp, ‘Les Règles Générales du Droit International de la Paix’, 47 *HR*, 1934, p. 263; Tunkin, *Theory*, pp. 113–33; G. I. Tunkin, ‘Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law’, 49 *California Law Review*, 1961, pp. 419–21; and B. Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?’, 5 *Indian Journal of International Law*, 1965, p. 23.

¹⁸ H. Kelsen, ‘Théorie du Droit International Coutumier’, 1 *Revue Internationale de la Théorie du Droit*, 1939, pp. 253, 264–6. See also P. Guggenheim, *Traité de Droit International Public*, Paris, 1953, pp. 46–8; T. Gihl, ‘The Legal Character of Sources of International Law’, 1 *Scandinavian Studies in Law*, 1957, pp. 53, 84; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 27–31.

¹⁹ See D’Amato, *Concept of Custom*, pp. 56–8; and Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, pp. 15–16. Judge Negulesco in an unfortunate phrase emphasised that custom required immemorial usage: *Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 14, 1927, p. 105; 4 AD, p. 126. See also *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 43; and ILC Conclusion 8(2), Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p. 136, noting that provided that the practice was general, no particular duration was required.

²⁰ ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 266; 17 ILR, p. 280.

²¹ ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 276–7; 17 ILR, p. 284.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ See further below, p. 77.

²⁴ ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 131, 138; 18 ILR, p. 86.

²⁵ ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3.

²⁶ ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 43. Note that the Court was dealing with the creation of a custom on the basis of what had been purely a treaty rule. See Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, p. 21, especially footnote 5. See also *Paquete Habana*, 175 US 677 (1900); and *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 18; 4 AD, p. 153.

²⁷ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14; 76 ILR, p. 349.

²⁸ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 98; 76 ILR, p. 432. See also the discussion by the UK Supreme Court in *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2017] UKSC 62, paras. 31 ff.

²⁹ See D’Amato, *Concept of Custom*, pp. 60–1; and Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, p. 19. See also Judge Alvarez, *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 152; 18 ILR, pp. 86, 105; and Judge Loder, *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, pp. 18, 34.

³⁰ Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions’. See also M. P. Scharf, ‘Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law’, 20 *ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 2014, p. 305.

³¹ See e.g. Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, pp. 325–6.

³² De Visscher, *Theory and Reality*, p. 149. See also Lauterpacht, *Development of International Law*, p. 368; P. Cobbett, *Leading Cases on International Law*, 4th ed., London, 1922, p. 5; and Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, pp. 22–3.

³³ See e.g. *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 42–3. Note also ILC Conclusion 8(1), Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p. 135, stating: ‘The relevant practice must be general, meaning that it must be sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent.’ See *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2017] UKSC 62, para. 31, where the UK Supreme Court referred to ‘a widespread, representative and consistent practice’, citing ILC Conclusions 8 and 9.

³⁴ See e.g. Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions’; C. Christol, *The Modern International Law of Outer Space*, New York, 1982; and C. Christol, *Space Law: Past, Present and Future*, The Hague, 1991. See also K. J. Heller, ‘Specially-Affected States and the Formation of Custom’, **112 AJIL**, 2018, p. 191 and further below, [Chapter 9](#).

³⁵ See e.g. Tunkin, *Theory*, pp. 116–17. But cf. D’Amato, *Concept of Custom*, pp. 61–3, 88–9.

³⁶ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 18; 4 AD, p. 153.

³⁷ See the *Germany v. Italy* (Greece Application to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 99, 123, noting: ‘State practice of particular significance is to be found in the judgments of national courts . . .’.

³⁸ See e.g. Pellet and Müller, ‘Article 38’, p. 939; and *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 23–4; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 78–80. See also Thirlway, *Sources*, p. 71; and M. Wood and O. Sender, ‘State Practice’, in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2017. ILC Conclusion 6, Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p. 133, noted that:

1. Practice may take a wide range of forms. It includes both physical and verbal acts. It may, under certain circumstances, include inaction. 2. Forms of State practice include, but are not limited to: diplomatic acts and correspondence; conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference; conduct in connection with treaties; executive conduct, including operational conduct ‘on the ground’; legislative and administrative acts; and decisions of national courts. 3. There is no predetermined hierarchy among the various forms of practice.

Note that it is proposed to strike out the references to ‘conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental

conference’: see Special Rapporteur’s Fourth Report, A/CN.4/695, Annex (2016).

³⁹ See e.g. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1950, vol. **II**, pp. 368–72, and *Interhandel*, ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 27. Note also Brierly’s comment that not all contentions put forward on behalf of a state represent that state’s settled or impartial opinion: *The Law of Nations*, 6th ed., Oxford, 1963, p. 60. See also Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, p. 2.

⁴⁰ The US has produced an extensive series of publications covering its practice in international law. See the *Digests of International Law* produced by Wharton (1887), Moore (1906) and Whiteman (1963–70). From 1973 to 1980, an annual *Digest of US Practice in International Law* has been produced, while three composite volumes covering the years 1981–88 have appeared. The series resumed with effect from the year 2000. See also H. A. Smith, *Great Britain and the Law of Nations*, London, 2 vols., 1932–35; A. D. McNair, *International Law Opinions*, Cambridge, 3 vols., 1956; C. Parry, *British Digest of International Law*, London, 1965; and E. Lauterpacht, *British Practice in International Law*, London, 1963–67. Several yearbooks now produce sections devoted to national practice, e.g. *British Yearbook of International Law* and *Annuaire Français de Droit International*.

⁴¹ *Reparation for Injuries*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174; 16 AD, p. 318. See also *Reservations to the Genocide Convention*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 15, 25; 18 ILR, p. 364.

⁴² *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1950, vol. **II**, pp. 368–72. See also Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, p. 12; and J. Odermatt, ‘The Development of Customary International Law by International Organisations’, **66 ICLQ**, 2017, p. 491. See also ILC Conclusion 4(2), Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p.130, stating: ‘In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law.’

⁴³ See the Court’s Advisory Opinion in *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 171; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 89–90.

⁴⁴ 14 Wallace 170 (1871). See also *Nottebohm*, ICJ Reports, 1955, pp. 4, 22; 22 ILR, p. 349; and *Paquete Habana*, 175 US 677 (1900).

⁴⁵ D’Amato, *Concept of Custom*, pp. 88, 50–1. See also Judge Read (dissenting), *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 191; 18 ILR, pp. 86, 132.

⁴⁶ Akehurst, 'Custom as a Source', pp. 2–3. See also Thirlway, *International Customary Law*, p. 58.

⁴⁷ E.g. *Asylum*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 266, 277; 17 ILR, p. 280; *Rights of Nationals of the USA in Morocco*, ICJ Reports, 1952, pp. 176, 200, 209; 19 ILR, p. 255; and *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 32–3, 47, 53. See also *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 47, 56–8, 81–8, 119–20, 135, 161; 55 ILR, p. 238.

⁴⁸ But see Thirlway, *International Customary Law*, pp. 58–9.

⁴⁹ Akehurst, 'Custom as a Source', p. 10. This would also include omissions and silence by states: *ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 31–42; and D'Amato, *Concept of Custom*, pp. 66–72. See also Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 909; Thirlway, *Sources*, p. 84; Mendelson, 'Formation', p. 245; Bos, *Methodology*, pp. 236 ff.; P. Haggenmacher, 'Des Deux Éléments du Droit Coutumier dans la Pratique de la Cour Internationale', *91 Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1985, p. 5; O. Elias, 'The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law', *44 ICLQ*, 1995, p. 501; I. M. Lobo de Souza, 'The Role of State Consent in the Customary Process', *44 ICLQ*, 1995, p. 521; and B. Cheng, 'Opinio Juris: A Key Concept in International Law that is Much Misunderstood', in *International Law in the Post-Cold War World* (ed. S. Yee and W. Tieya), London, 2001, p. 56.

⁵¹ A/73/10, p. 138.

⁵² PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 18; 4 AD, p. 153.

⁵³ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 28; 4 AD, p. 159.

⁵⁴ ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3.

⁵⁵ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 32–41.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43. See also e.g. *Asylum*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 266, 277; 17 ILR, p. 280; *Right of Passage over Indian Territory*, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 6, 42–3; 31 ILR, pp. 23, 55; and

Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, para. 149.

⁵⁷ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14; 76 ILR, p. 349.

⁵⁸ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 108–9; 76 ILR, pp. 442–3, citing ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 44.

⁵⁹ ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 99, 122.

⁶⁰ *Guinea v. Congo* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 582, 615. See generally S. Talmon, ‘Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, Deduction and Assertion’, 26 *EJIL*, 2015, p. 417.

⁶¹ See Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, pp. 32–4 for attempts made to deny or minimise the need for *opinio juris*.

⁶² ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 109; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 443.

⁶³ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 176. Lauterpacht wrote that one should regard all uniform conduct of governments as evidencing the *opinio juris*, except where the conduct in question was not accompanied by such intention: *Development of International Law*, p. 580; but cf. Cheng, ‘Custom: The Future’, p. 36; and Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions’, pp. 530–2.

⁶⁴ A/73/10, p. 138. Note D’Amato’s view that to become a custom, a practice has to be preceded or accompanied by the ‘articulation’ of a rule, which will put states on notice that an action etc. will have legal implications: *Concept of Custom*, p. 75. Cf. Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, pp. 35–6, who also puts forward his view that ‘the practice of states needs to be accompanied by *statements* that something is already law before it can become law’: such statements need not be beliefs as to the truths of the given situation, *ibid.*, p. 37 (emphasis in the original). Akehurst also draws a distinction between permissive rules, which do not require express statements as to *opinio juris*, and duty-imposing rules, which do: *ibid.*, pp. 37–8.

⁶⁵ Forms of evidence of acceptance as law may include: public statements made on behalf of states; official publications; government legal opinions; diplomatic correspondence; decisions of national courts; treaty provisions; and conduct in connection with resolutions

adopted by an international organisation or at an intergovernmental conference: see ILC Conclusion 10(2), Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p. 140.

⁶⁶ See e.g. *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 254–5; 110 ILR, p. 163. See also *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 31–3; *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 102; 105 ILR, p. 226; *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 100, 101, 106; 76 ILR, p. 349; and *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 171–2; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 89–90.

⁶⁷ See *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 99–100.

⁶⁸ See e.g. *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 28–32 with regard to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention and e.g. among many cases, *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 429–30 with regard to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.

⁶⁹ See e.g. *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 38–42, 46; 116 ILR, pp. 1, 47–51, 55.

⁷⁰ See H. Lauterpacht, ‘Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas’, 27 *BYIL*, 1950, p. 376; I. MacGibbon, ‘Some Observations on the Part of Protest in International Law’, 29 *BYIL*, 1953, p. 293; and I. MacGibbon, ‘Customary International Law and Acquiescence’, 33 *BYIL*, 1957, p. 115; Wolfke, *Custom*, pp. 157–65; and I. Sinclair, ‘Estoppel and Acquiescence’, in *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice* (ed. A. V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice), Cambridge, 1996, p. 104. See also more generally N. Antunes, *Estoppel, Acquiescence and Recognition in Territorial and Boundary Dispute Settlement*, Durham, 2000.

⁷¹ See, for a good example, the Decision of the International Court in *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 601; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 517, with regard to the joint sovereignty over the historic waters of the Gulf of Fonseca beyond the territorial sea of the three coastal states.

⁷² See e.g. Sinclair, ‘Estoppel and Acquiescence’, p. 104; and below, [Chapter 9](#), pp. 437 ff.

⁷³ ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 305; 71 ILR, p. 74.

⁷⁴ Note that the Court has stated that ‘the idea of acquiescence . . . presupposes freedom of will’, *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 597; 80 ILR, p. 459.

⁷⁵ See e.g. *Luxembourg v. Cie. Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion and Compagnie Luxembourgeoise Assurance ‘Le Foyer’* 91 ILR, pp. 281, 286.

⁷⁶ See e.g. MacGibbon, ‘Customary International Law’, p. 131; and H. S. McDougal *et al.*, *Studies in World Public Order*, New Haven, 1960, pp. 763–72.

⁷⁷ A/73/10, p. 140.

⁷⁸ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 28; 4 ILR, p. 159.

⁷⁹ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86.

⁸⁰ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 131; 18 ILR, p. 93. See also *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 26–7; and *Asylum*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 266, 277–8; 17 ILR, pp. 280, 285. See also P. Dumberry, ‘Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of the Persistent Objector Revisited’, 55 *ICLQ*, 2010, p. 779; and C. Quince, *The Persistent Objector and Customary International Law*, Colorado, 2010.

⁸¹ ILC Conclusion 15, Identification of Customary International Law, states that, leaving aside questions concerning rules of *jus cogens*: ‘1. Where a State has objected to a rule of customary international law while that rule was in the process of formation, the rule is not opposable to the State concerned for so long as it maintains its objection. 2. The objection must be clearly expressed, made known to other States, and maintained persistently.’ A/73/10, p. 152. See also e.g. J. A. Green, *The Persistent Objector in International Law*, Oxford, 2016; and Thirlway, *Sources*, p. 99.

⁸² See also protests generally: Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, pp. 38–42.

⁸³ See below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 486.

⁸⁴ See e.g. *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 38, 130; and *The Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 1987, vol. I, pp. 25–6. See also T. Stein, ‘The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in

International Law’, 26 *Harvard International Law Journal*, 1985, p. 457; and J. Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law’, 56 *BYIL*, 1985, p. 1.

⁸⁵ See e.g. Tunkin, *Theory*, p. 129.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ See Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, pp. 29–31; Thirlway, ‘Supplement’, p. 105; Thirlway, *Sources*, p. 103; D’Amato, *Concept of Custom*, chapter 8; G. Cohen-Jonathan, ‘La Coutume Locale’, *AFDI*, 1961, p. 133; and Wolfke, *Custom*, pp. 88–90. Local custom is sometimes referred to as regional, special or particular custom.

⁸⁸ See e.g. H. Gros Espiell, ‘La Doctrine du Droit International en Amérique Latine avant la Première Conférence Panaméricaine’, 3 *Journal of the History of International Law*, 2001, p. 1.

⁸⁹ Note the claim by Honduras in *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 597; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 513, that a ‘trilateral local custom of the nature of a convention’ could establish a condominium arrangement and the claim by Costa Rica in *Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 232–3 as to rules of international law that apply in the absence of treaty provisions to navigation on ‘international rivers’, a proposition on which the International Court did not consider that it had to take a position.

⁹⁰ See *Eritrea–Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation)* 119 ILR, pp. 417, 448.

⁹¹ ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 266; 17 ILR, p. 280.

⁹² ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 276; 17 ILR, p. 284.

⁹³ ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 6; 31 ILR, p. 23.

⁹⁴ ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 40; 31 ILR, p. 53. See Wolfke, *Custom*, p. 90.

⁹⁵ ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 44.

⁹⁶ See Cohen-Jonathan, ‘La Coutume Locale’.

⁹⁷ See generally A. D. McNair, *The Law of Treaties*, Oxford, 1961; Thirlway, *Sources*, chapter II; Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 888; A. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law and Practice*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2013; and R. Kolb, *The Law of Treaties*, Cheltenham, 2016. See further below, [Chapter 15](#).

⁹⁸ *Oppenheim's International Law* emphasises that 'not only is custom the original source of international law, but treaties are a source the validity and modalities of which themselves derive from custom', p. 31.

⁹⁹ See e.g. UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 404.

¹⁰⁰ See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. Article 2(1)(a) defines a treaty for the purposes of the Convention as 'an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation'. See further below, p. 790, with regard to non-binding international agreements.

¹⁰¹ See Virally, 'Sources', p. 126; Sørensen, *Les Sources*, pp. 58 ff.; and Tunkin, *Theory*, pp. 93–5.

¹⁰² Tunkin, *Theory*, pp. 91–113. See also R. Müllerson, 'Sources of International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking', 83 *AJIL*, 1989, pp. 494, 501–9.

¹⁰³ But this may depend upon the attitude of other states. This does not constitute a form of international legislation: see e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 32; *Reparation for Injuries*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 185; 16 AD, p. 318; and *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 56; 49 ILR, p. 2. See also R. Baxter, 'Treaties and Custom', 129 *HR*, 1970, p. 27; O. Schachter, 'Entangled Treaty and Custom', in *International Law at a Time of Perplexity* (ed. Y. Dinstein), Dordrecht, 1989, p. 717; and Y. Dinstein, 'The Interaction Between Customary International Law and Treaties', 322 *HR*, 2006, p. 247.

¹⁰⁴ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 25.

¹⁰⁵ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 41–2. The Court stressed that this method of creating new customs was not to be lightly regarded as having been attained, *ibid.*

106 But see the minority opinions, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 56, 156–8, 163, 169, 172–80, 197–200, 221–32, 241–7; 41 ILR, p. 85. See also *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 295; 71 ILR, pp. 74, 122; and *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 13, 29–34; 81 ILR, pp. 239, 261–6.

107 See D’Amato, *Concept of Custom*, p. 104; and A. D’Amato, ‘The Concept of Human Rights in International Law’, **82** *Columbia Law Review*, 1982, pp. 1110, 1129–47. See also Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source’, pp. 42–52.

108 D’Amato, ‘Concept of Human Rights’, p. 1146.

109 ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14; 76 ILR, p. 349.

110 ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 94–5; 76 ILR, pp. 428–9. See also W. Czaplinski, ‘Sources of International Law in the Nicaragua Case’, **38** *ICLQ*, 1989, p. 151.

111 ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 96; 76 ILR, p. 430.

112 See further below, [Chapter 19](#), p. 993.

113 See further below, [Chapter 15](#), p. 811.

114 See further below, p. 591, with regard to extradition treaties and below, p. 728, with regard to bilateral investment treaties.

115 See e.g. B. Cheng, *General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals*, London, 1953; A. D. McNair, ‘The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations’, **33** *BYIL*, 1957, p. 1; H. Lauterpacht, *Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law*, London, 1927; G. Herczegh, *General Principles of Law and the International Legal Order*, Budapest, 1969; O. Schachter, *International Law in Theory and Practice*, Dordrecht, 1991, pp. 50–5; C. T. Kotuby Jr and L. A. Sobota, *General Principles of Law and International Due Process*, Oxford, 2017; O. Corten, *L’Utilisation du ‘Raisonnable’ par le Juge International*, Brussels, 1997; B. Vitanyi, ‘Les Positions Doctrinales Concernant le Sens de la Notion de “Principes Généraux de Droit Reconus par les Nations Civilisées”’, **86** *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1982, p. 48; H. Waldock, ‘General Course on Public International Law’, **106** *HR*, 1962, p.

54; Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 922; Thirlway, 'Supplement', p. 108; M. Sørensen, 'Principes de Droit International', **101 HR**, 1960, p. 16; and V. Degan, 'General Principles of Law', **3 Finnish YIL**, 1992, p. 1. See also G. Gaja, 'General Principles of Law', *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*; and Thirlway, *Sources*, chapter IV. The International Law Commission began studying the question of general principles of law in 2018 and the first report was published in 2019, A/CN.4/732; see M. Vázquez-Bermúdez and A. Crosato, 'General Principles of Law: The First Debate within the International Law Commission and the Sixth Committee', **19 Chinese Journal of International Law**, 2020, p. 157.

116 Note that the International Court has regarded the terms 'principles' and 'rules' as essentially the same within international law: *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 288–90. Introducing the adjective 'general', however, shifts the meaning to a broader concept, see e.g. Judge Cançado Trindade's Separate Opinion in *Pulp Mills*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 135 ff. and the Separate Opinions of Judges Donoghue and Dugard in *Certain Activities/Construction of a Road between Costa Rica and Nicaragua*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 782, 846–9.

117 The additional clause relating to recognition by 'civilised nations' is regarded today as redundant: see e.g. Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 927.

118 See e.g. J. Stone, *Of Law and Nations*, London, 1974, chapter 3; H. Lauterpacht, 'Some Observations on the Prohibition of Non Liqueur and the Completeness of the Legal Order', *Symbolae Verzijl*, 1958, p. 196; Pellet, 'Article 38', pp. 851, 882; H. Thirlway, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice (Part Two)', *BYIL*, 1988, p. 76; Thirlway, 'Supplement', p. 44; and P. Weil, 'The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively . . . ? *Non Liqueur* Revisited', **36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law**, 1997, p. 109. See also *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 46; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 135; 76 ILR, p. 349.

119 *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 13, emphasis in the original. See, however, the conclusion of the International Court that it was unable to state whether there was a rule of international law prohibiting or permitting the threat or use of nuclear weapons by a state in self-defence where its very survival was at stake: *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 244; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 194. Cf. the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, *ibid.*; 110 ILR, pp. 532 ff. See also *Eritrea–Yemen* (First Phase), 114 ILR, pp. 1, 119, 121–2.

¹²⁰ See e.g. Lauterpacht, *Private Law Sources*. See also Waldock, ‘General Course’, p. 54; C. W. Jenks, *The Common Law of Mankind*, London, 1958, p. 169; and Judge Tanaka (dissenting), *South West Africa* (Second Phase), ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 6, 294–9; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 455–9.

¹²¹ Tunkin, *Theory*, chapter 7.

¹²² *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 36–7.

¹²³ See generally R. David and J. Brierley, *Major Legal Systems in the World Today*, 2nd ed., London, 1978; and A. Hertogen, ‘The Persuasiveness of Domestic Law Analogies in International Law’, 29 *EJIL*, 2018, p. 1127. Note that the Tribunal in *AMCO v. Indonesia* stated that while a practice or legal provisions common to a number of nations would be an important source of international law, the French concepts of administrative unilateral acts or administrative contracts were not such practices or legal provisions: 89 ILR, pp. 366, 461.

¹²⁴ PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928, p. 29; 4 AD, p. 258. See also the Chile–US Commission decision with regard to the deaths of Letelier and Moffitt: 31 ILM, 1982, pp. 1, 9; 88 ILR, p. 727.

¹²⁵ PCIJ, Series B, No. 6, p. 36.

¹²⁶ See also *South West Africa*, ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 3, 47; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 280–1, for a statement that the notion of *actio popularis* was not part of international law as such nor able to be regarded as imported by the concept of general principles of law.

¹²⁷ See also *Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926, p. 42; and *Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 46, 1932, p. 167.

¹²⁸ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 18; 16 AD, pp. 155, 157.

¹²⁹ *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 248; and *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2018, para. 68.

130 ICJ Reports, 1954, p. 47; 21 ILR, p. 310.

131 ICJ Reports, 1954, p. 53; 21 ILR, p. 314; and the *Argentina/Chile Award (Laguna del Desierto)* 113 ILR, pp. 1, 43, where it was stated: ‘A judgment having the authority of *res judicata* is judicially binding on the Parties to the dispute. This is a fundamental principle of the law of nations repeatedly invoked in the jurisprudence, which regards the authority of *res judicata* as a universal and absolute principle of international law.’ See also *AMCO v. Indonesia* 89 ILR, pp. 366, 558; Cheng, *General Principles*, chapter 17; *Rosenne’s Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920–2015* (ed. M. N. Shaw), 5th ed., Leiden, 2016, pp. 1657 ff.; M. Shahabuddeen, *Precedent in the International Court*, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 30, 168; and I. Scobbie, ‘*Res Judicata*, Precedent and the International Court’, 20 *Australian YIL*, 2000, p. 299.

132 Merits, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 89.

133 ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 595; 115 ILR, p. 110.

134 Merits, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 90. See also *Nicaragua v. Colombia (Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nautical miles)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 100, 125; and *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2018, para. 68.

135 *Ibid.*, at pp. 90–4. See also *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Honduras Application to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 420, 443; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nautical miles) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 100, 125 ff.

136 ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 125, 141–2; 24 ILR, pp. 840, 842–3. See also the *Argentina/Chile Frontier Award (La Palena)* of 21 October 1994, XXII UNRIAA, 2006, pp. 3, 24, 39.

137 ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 6, 23, 31, 32; 33 ILR, pp. 48, 62, 69–70.

138 PCIJ, Series A, No. 20, 1929; 5 AD, p. 466.

139 ICJ Reports, 1989, pp. 15, 44; 84 ILR, pp. 311, 350.

¹⁴⁰ See also *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, pp. 52 ff.; 6 AD, pp. 95, 100–2; the Decision of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission of 13 April 2002, 130 ILR, pp. 1, 35–6; *M/V Saiga (No. 2)* 120 ILR, pp. 143, 230; and H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960–89 (Part One)’, 60 *BYIL*, 1989, pp. 4, 29. See also below, [Chapter 9](#), p. 440.

¹⁴¹ ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 303.

¹⁴² Arbitral Award of 18 March 2015, para. 442.

¹⁴³ 89 ILR, pp. 366, 504.

¹⁴⁴ See e.g. *German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926, p. 22; *Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran* 85 ILR, p. 34; the *Shufeld* claim, 5 AD, p. 179; and *AMCO v. Indonesia* 89 ILR, pp. 366, 496. See further below, p. 870.

¹⁴⁵ *Malaysia v. Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 31; and see also [Chapter 18](#), p. 956.

¹⁴⁶ See e.g. M. Newton and L. May, *Proportionality in International Law*, Oxford, 2014 and the chapters below concerning human rights, [Chapter 6](#); law of the sea, [Chapter 10](#); use of force, [Chapter 19](#); and international humanitarian law, [Chapter 20](#). Note that article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union defines the principle of proportionality as requiring that the ‘content and form’ of EU action ‘shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’.

¹⁴⁷ See McNair, *Law of Treaties*, vol. I, chapter 30. See also article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, and *AMCO v. Indonesia* 89 ILR, pp. 366, 495–7.

¹⁴⁸ *Oppenheim’s International Law* notes that this is ‘of overriding importance’, p. 38. See E. Zoller, *La Bonne Foi en Droit International Public*, Paris, 1977; R. Kolb, *La Bonne Foi en Droit International Public*, Paris, 2000; R. Kolb, *Good Faith in International Law*, Oxford, 2017; Thirlway, ‘Law and Procedure (Part One)’, pp. 3, 7 ff.; Thirlway, ‘Supplement’, p. 7; and G. Fitzmaurice, *The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice*, Cambridge, 1986, vol. I, p. 183 and vol. II, p. 609. See also *Good Faith and International Economic Law* (ed. A. D. Mitchell, M. Sornarajah and T. Voon), Oxford, 2015.

¹⁴⁹ See also *Opel Austria GmbH v. Council of the European Union*, Case No. T-115/94, 113 ILR, p. 295.

¹⁵⁰ ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 268; 57 ILR, pp. 398, 412.

¹⁵¹ *Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1988, p. 105; 84 ILR, p. 218. See also Judge Ajibola's Separate Opinion in *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 71–4; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 69–72; and the statement by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in *Re-introduction of the Death Penalty in the Peruvian Constitution*, 16 HRLJ, 1995, pp. 9, 13.

¹⁵² See also *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 33; 55 ILR, pp. 238, 268; *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 46–7; *Lac Lanoux (France v. Spain)* 24 ILR, p. 119; and *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 264 ff.; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 214–15. Note also Principles 19 and 27 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, 31 ILM, 1992, p. 876.

¹⁵³ *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 304.

¹⁵⁴ See e.g. *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 76; 116 ILR, p. 1; and *Brcko Inter-Entity Boundary* 36 ILM, 1997, pp. 396, 422.

¹⁵⁵ ICJ Reports, 1970, p. 3; 46 ILR, p. 178.

¹⁵⁶ ICJ Reports, 1970, p. 37; 46 ILR, p. 211. See also generally the *Abu Dhabi* arbitration, 1 ICLQ, 1952, p. 247; 18 ILR, p. 44, and *Texaco v. Libya* 53 ILR, p. 389.

¹⁵⁷ See also the *Abyei* Final Award of 22 July 2009, Permanent Court of Arbitration, at paras. 401 ff., 416 ff., discussing the general principle of review of judicial decisions. Note also the general principle that the compatibility of an act with international law can be determined only by reference to the law in force at the time when the act occurred: see *Germany v. Italy (Greece Application to Intervene)*, ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 99, 124. Judge Simma in his Separate Opinion in *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 324, 354 ff., analysed comparative domestic law in order to determine whether a general principle of joint and several responsibility existed. See also article 13 of the International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Wrongful Acts; J. Crawford, *State Responsibility*, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 241 ff.; and see further below, p. 689.

¹⁵⁸ See M. Akehurst, 'Equity and General Principles of Law', 25 *ICLQ*, 1976, p. 801; B. Cheng, 'Justice and Equity in International Law', 8 *Current Legal Problems*, 1955, p. 185; V. Degan, *L'Équité et le Droit International*, Paris, 1970; C. de Visscher, *De l'Équité dans le Règlement Arbitral ou Judiciaire des Litiges de Droit International Public*, Paris, 1972; E. Lauterpacht, 'Equity, Evasion, Equivocation and Evolution in International Law', *Proceedings of the American Branch of the ILA*, 1977–78, p. 33; E. Lauterpacht, *Aspects of the Administration of International Justice*, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 117–52; R. Y. Jennings, 'Equity and Equitable Principles', *Annuaire Suisse de Droit International*, 1986, p. 38; *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 43; R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, chapter 13; M. Miyoshi, *Considerations of Equity in the Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes*, The Hague, 1993; S. Rosenne, 'Equitable Principles and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Tribunals', in *Festschrift für Rudolf Bindschedler*, Berne, 1980, p. 410; S. Rosenne, 'The Position of the International Court of Justice on the Foundations of the Principle of Equity in International Law', in *Forty Years International Court of Justice: Jurisdiction, Equality and Equity* (ed. A. Bloed and P. Van Dijk), Dordrecht, 1988, p. 108; O. Pirotte, 'La Notion d'Équité dans la Jurisprudence Récente de la CIJ', 77 *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1973, p. 131; S. Chattopadhyay, 'Equity in International Law: Its Growth and Development', 5 *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 1975, p. 381; R. Lapidoth, 'Equity in International Law', 22 *Israel Law Review*, 1987, p. 161; Schachter, *International Law*, p. 49; A. V. Lowe, 'The Role of Equity in International Law', 12 *Australian YIL*, 1992, p. 54; P. Weil, 'L'Équité dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice', in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice*, p. 121; Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 874; Thirlway, 'Law and Procedure (Part One)', p. 49; and Thirlway, 'Supplement', p. 26. Note especially Judge Weeramantry's study of equity in *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 38, 211; 99 ILR, pp. 395, 579. See also F. Francioni, 'Equity', in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*; and Thirlway, *Sources*, chapter IV(2).

¹⁵⁹ Equity generally may be understood in the contexts of adapting law to particular areas or choosing between several different interpretations of the law (equity *infra legem*), filling gaps in the law (equity *praeter legem*) and as a reason for not applying unjust laws (equity *contra legem*): see Akehurst, 'Equity'; and Judge Weeramantry in *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 38, 226–34; 99 ILR, pp. 395,

594–602. See also below, [Chapter 16](#), for the extensive use of equity in the context of state succession.

¹⁶⁰ PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 70, 1937, pp. 73, 77; 8 AD, pp. 444, 450.

¹⁶¹ See e.g. Judge Weeramantry in *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 38, 217; 99 ILR, pp. 395, 585. Cf. Judge Schwebel's Separate Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1993, p. 118; 99 ILR, p. 486.

¹⁶² Note that the International Court in *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 60; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 53, declared that 'equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice'. However, see G. Abi-Saab's reference to the International Court's 'flight into equity' in 'The ICJ as a World Court', in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice*, pp. 3, 11.

¹⁶³ 50 ILR, p. 2.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18. In deciding the course of the boundary in two deep inlets, the Tribunal had recourse to the concept of equity: *ibid.*, p. 520.

¹⁶⁵ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 53. Equity was used in the case in order to exclude the use of the equidistance method in the particular circumstances: *ibid.*, pp. 48–50; 41 ILR, pp. 78–80.

¹⁶⁶ ICJ Reports, 1970, p. 3; 46 ILR, p. 178. See also *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 631–3; 80 ILR, pp. 459, 532–5.

¹⁶⁷ ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 6, 294–9; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 455–9. See also *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 22; 16 AD, p. 155.

¹⁶⁸ See also *AMCO v. Indonesia* 89 ILR, pp. 366, 522–3.

¹⁶⁹ The ICJ may under article 38(2) of its Statute decide a case *ex aequo et bono* if the parties agree, but it has never done so: see e.g. Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 882.

¹⁷⁰ See *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 47; and *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 33; 55 ILR, pp. 238, 268. The Court

reaffirmed in *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 13, 40; 81 ILR, pp. 238, 272, ‘the principle that there can be no question of distributive justice’.

¹⁷¹ ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 13, 39; 81 ILR, pp. 238, 271.

¹⁷² See *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 49–50; and *Anglo-French Continental Shelf*, Cmnd 7438, 1978, pp. 116–17; 54 ILR, pp. 6, 123–4. See also *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 60; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 53; and *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 313–14, 325–30; 71 ILR, pp. 74, 140–1, 152–7.

¹⁷³ ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 60; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 53.

¹⁷⁴ See generally R. Y. Jennings, ‘The Principles Governing Marine Boundaries’, in *Festschrift für Karl Doebling*, Berlin, 1989, p. 408; and M. Bedjaoui, ‘“L’enigme” des “principes équitables” dans le Droit des Delimitations Maritimes’, *Revista Español de Derecho Internacional*, 1990, p. 376.

¹⁷⁵ See also article 140 providing for the equitable sharing of financial and other benefits derived from activities in the deep sea-bed area.

¹⁷⁶ However, see *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 443, where the Court declared that its jurisprudence showed that in maritime delimitation disputes, ‘equity is not a method of delimitation, but solely an aim that should be borne in mind in effecting the delimitation’. See further below, [Chapter 10](#), pp. 509 ff.

¹⁷⁷ Based on the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission: see the Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, A/49/10, 1994, pp. 197, 218 ff.

¹⁷⁸ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 633; 80 ILR, pp. 459, 535.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* See also *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 514–15; and *Brcko* 36 ILM, 1997, pp. 396, 427 ff. However, note that in the latter case, the Arbitral Tribunal was expressly authorised to apply ‘relevant legal and equitable principles’: see article V of Annex 2 of the Dayton Accords, 1995, *ibid.*, p. 400. See also J. M. Sorel, ‘L’Arbitrage sur

la Zona de Brcko Tragi-comédie en Trois Actes et un Épilogue à Suivre’, *AFDI*, 1997, p. 253.

181 ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 324, 334.

182 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 257, 262–3; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 207, 212–13. See also *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 22; 16 AD, p. 155. See further below, [Chapter 20](#), p. 1051.

183 See e.g. Lauterpacht, *Development of International Law*; Waldock, ‘General Course’; and Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, pp. 30 ff. See also Thirlway, ‘Law and Procedure of the ICJ (Part Two)’, pp. 3, 127; Thirlway, ‘Supplement’, p. 114; Pellet and Müller, ‘Article 38’, p. 945; and P. Cahier, ‘Le Rôle du Juge dans l’Élaboration du Droit International’, in *Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century* (ed. J. Makarczyk), The Hague, 1996, p. 353. See also Thirlway, *Sources*, chapter V(2); and ILC Conclusion 13, Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p. 149.

184 ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 278, 292.

185 ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 412, 428–9.

186 See further Shahabuddeen, *Precedent*. See also *Le précédent en droit international: Colloque de Strasbourg* (ed. Société française pour le droit international), Paris, 2016.

187 ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86. See further below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 478.

188 ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174; 16 AD, p. 318. See further below, [Chapter 22](#), p. 1156.

189 ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 15; 18 ILR, p. 364.

190 ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 4; 22 ILR, p. 349.

191 See e.g. Thirlway, ‘Supplement’, p. 116; and see below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 506.

192 PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 18; 4 AD, p. 5. See below, p. 194.

193 See e.g. *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 93; *Liechtenstein v. Germany*,

ICJ Reports, 2005, p. 6; and the *Construction of a Wall* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 135, 154–6; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 71–4.

194 ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 292.

195 J. B. Moore, *International Arbitrations*, New York, 1898, vol. I, p. 653.

196 2 RIAA, p. 829 (1928); 4 AD, p. 3. See also the *Beagle Channel* Award, HMSO, 1977; 52 ILR, p. 93; and *Anglo-French Continental Shelf*, Cmnd 7438, 1978; 54 ILR, p. 6. Note the *Abyei* Final Award of 22 July 2009, which concerned the Government of Sudan and its then southern province.

197 See below, [Chapter 7](#).

198 See e.g. the references in *M/V Saiga (No. 2)*, ITLOS, Judgment of 1 July 1999, paras. 133–4; 120 ILR, p. 143, to *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros*, ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 7. See also *Diallo*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 582, 606 ff.

199 For example, the views expressed in the ICTY’s Decision in *Tadić* (Case No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 115 ff.; 124 ILR, p. 61) disapproving of the approach adopted by the ICJ in *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14, with regard to the test for state responsibility in respect of paramilitary units. The International Court indeed reaffirmed its approach in *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 209 ff.

200 See e.g. *Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar, Bentzon v. Boyle* 9 Cranch 191 (1815); *Paquete Habana*, 175 US 677 (1900); and the *Scotia* case, 14 Wallace 170 (1871). See also *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 18; 4 AD, p. 153. For further examples in the fields of state and diplomatic immunities particularly, see below, [Chapter 12](#).

201 See e.g. *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 24; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 80.

202 See e.g. *Vermont v. New Hampshire* 289 US 593 (1933); 7 AD 127; 7 AD 135; and *Iowa v. Illinois* 147 US 1 (1893).

203 See e.g. Parry, *British Digest*, pp. 103–5; and Lauterpacht, *Development of International Law*, pp. 23–5. See also R. Y. Jennings, ‘International Lawyers and the Progressive Development of International Law’, in *Theory of International Law at the*

Threshold of the 21st Century (ed. J. Makarczyk), 1996, p. 325; Pellet and Müller, ‘Article 38’, p. 960; M. Peil, ‘Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law; A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International Court of Justice’, *1 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 2012, p. 136; M. Wood, ‘Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists’, in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*; S. T. Helmersen, ‘Finding “the Most Highly Qualified Publicists”: Lessons from the International Court of Justice’, *30 EJIL*, 2019, p. 509; S. Sivakumaran, ‘The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of International Law’, *66 ICLQ*, 2017, p. 1; Thirlway, *Sources*, p. 143; and d’Aspremont, *Formalism*, p. 209. See also ILC Conclusion 14, Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p. 150.

204 See above, [Chapter 1](#).

205 *Droit International Public de la Mer*, Chateauroux, 3 vols., 1932–34.

206 See e.g. Huber in *Spanish Zone of Morocco*, 2 RIAA, pp. 615, 640 (1925); 2 AD, pp. 157, 164 (note). See also Carty, *Decay of International Law?*, pp. 128–31.

207 See e.g. O. Y. Asamoah, *The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations*, The Hague, 1966; D. Johnson, ‘The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations’, *32 BYIL*, 1955–56, p. 97; J. Castañeda, *Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions*, New York, 1969; and R. A. Falk, ‘On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly’, *60 AJIL*, 1966, p. 782. See also A. Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World*, London, 1986, pp. 192–5; M. Virally, ‘La Valeur Juridique des Recommendations des Organisations Internationales’, *AFDI*, 1956, p. 69; B. Sloan, ‘The Binding Force of a Recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations’, *25 BYIL*, 1948, p. 1; B. Sloan, ‘General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (40 Years After)’, *58 BYIL*, 1987, p. 39; Thirlway, ‘Law and Procedure (Part One)’, p. 6; O. Schachter, ‘United Nations Law’, *88 AJIL*, 1994, p. 1; A. Pellet, ‘La Formation du Droit International dans le Cadre des Nations Unies’, *6 EJIL*, 1995, p. 401; Pellet, ‘Article 38’, p. 771; and S. Schwebel, ‘United Nations Resolutions, Recent Arbitral Awards and Customary International Law’, in *Realism in Law-Making* (ed. M. Bos and H. Siblesz), Dordrecht, 1986, p. 203. See also Judge Weeramantry’s Dissenting Opinion in *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 185; 105 ILR, pp. 226, 326.

208 See e.g. *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 54; 49 ILR, p. 29; and *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992,

pp. 3, 15; 94 ILR, p. 478. See further below, [Chapter 21](#).

209 Some resolutions of a more administrative nature are binding: see e.g. article 17 of the UN Charter.

210 ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 99–100; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 433–4.

211 ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 100; 76 ILR, p. 434.

212 See the *Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019 at paras. 150–3; and below, [Chapter 5](#), p. 195.

213 See e.g. O. Schachter, ‘Interpretation of the Charter in the Political Organs of the United Nations’, in *Law, States and International Order*, Knoxville, 1964, p. 269; R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford, 1963; and M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford, 1986, chapter 2. Note ILC Conclusion 12, Identification of Customary International Law, declared that:

‘1. A resolution adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference cannot, of itself, create a rule of customary international law. 2. A resolution adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference may provide evidence for determining the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or contribute to its development. 3. A provision in a resolution adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference may reflect a rule of customary international law if it is established that the provision corresponds to a general practice that is accepted as law (*opinio juris*)’, A/73/10, p. 147.

214 ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 102; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 436.

215 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 254–5; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 204–5.

216 *Ibid.*, p. 255; 110 ILR, p. 205. See as to other cases, above, p. 70.

217 See generally, as to other international organisations in this context, A. J. P. Tammes, ‘Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International Law’, *94 HR*, 1958, p. 265; Virally, ‘La Valeur Juridique’, p. 66; and H. Thierry, ‘Les Résolutions des Organes

Internationaux dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice’, **167 HR**, 1980, p. 385.

218 See *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 100–2; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 434–6.

219 See e.g. Boyle and Chinkin, *The Making of International Law*, pp. 211 ff.; Pellet, ‘Article 38’, p. 772; H. Hillgenberg, ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’, **10 EJIL**, 1999, p. 499; M. Bothe, ‘Legal and Non-Legal Norms – a Meaningful Distinction in International Relations’, **11 Netherlands YIL**, 1980, p. 65; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, ‘International Economic Soft Law’, **163 HR**, 1980, p. 164; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, *International Economic Law*, 2nd ed., Dordrecht, 1992, p. 42; J. Gold, ‘Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements’, **77 AJIL**, 1983, p. 443; *PASIL*, 1988, p. 371; G. J. H. Van Hoof, *Re-thinking the Sources of International Law*, Deventer, 1983, p. 187; C. M. Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’, **38 ICLQ**, 1989, p. 850; L. Henkin, *International Law, Politics and Values*, Dordrecht, 1995, pp. 94, 192; W. M. Reisman, ‘The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics’, in *Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias* (ed. E. G. Bello and B. Ajibola), Dordrecht, 1992, vol. **I**, p. 135; A. E. Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, **48 ICLQ**, 1999, p. 901; F. Francioni, ‘International “Soft Law”: A Contemporary Assessment’, in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice*, p. 167; *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System* (ed. D. Shelton), Oxford, 2000; and Thirlway, *Sources*, p. 186.

220 See e.g. the reference to it *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 100; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 434.

221 See e.g. Seidl-Hohenveldern, *International Economic Law*, pp. 42 ff.

222 See e.g. P. Birnie and A. Boyle, *International Law and the Environment*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2002, pp. 24 ff.

223 Memorandum of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, US State Department, quoted in **88 AJIL**, 1994, pp. 515 ff. See also A. Aust, ‘The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments’, **35 ICLQ**, 1984, p. 787; O. Schachter, ‘The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’, **71 AJIL**, 1977, p. 296; McNair, *The*

Law of Treaties, p. 6; and A. T. Guzman, 'The Design of International Agreements', **16** *EJIL*, 2005, p. 579.

²²⁴ See, as to the relationship between codification and progressive development, Judge ad hoc Sørensen's Dissenting Opinion in *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 242–3.

²²⁵ See articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ILC Statute. See also e.g. B. Ramcharan, *The International Law Commission*, Leiden, 1977; B. Ramcharan, *The Work of the International Law Commission*, 4th ed., New York, 1988; I. Sinclair, *The International Law Commission*, Cambridge, 1987; *The International Law Commission and the Future of International Law* (ed. M. R. Anderson, A. E. Boyle, A. V. Lowe and C. Wickremasinghe), London, 1998; B. Ramcharan, *International Law on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century: Views from the International Law Commission*, New York, 1997; S. Rosenne, 'The International Law Commission 1949–59', **36** *BYIL*, 1960, p. 104; S. Rosenne, 'Relations Between Governments and the International Law Commission', **19** *YBWA*, 1965, p. 183; B. Graefrath, 'The International Law Commission Tomorrow: Improving its Organisation and Methods of Work', **85** *AJIL*, 1991, p. 597; R. P. Dhokalia, *The Codification of Public International Law*, Manchester, 1970; F. L. Bordin, 'Reflections of Customary International Law: The Authority of Codification Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International Law', **63** *ICLQ*, 2014, p. 535; and G. Gaja, 'Interpreting Articles Adopted by the International Law Commission', **85** *BYIL*, 2014, p. 10.

²²⁶ ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 7; 116 *ILR*, p. 1.

²²⁷ See www.icj-cij.org/files/press-releases/9/3009.pdf. See also the reference to the work of the Commission in *Germany v. Italy* (Greece Application to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 99, 123.

²²⁸ See Commentary to the ILC Conclusion 10, Identification of Customary International Law, A/73/10, p. 142, noting that the output of the International Law Commission 'merits special consideration'.

²²⁹ See Virally, 'Sources', pp. 154–6; W. Fiedler, 'Unilateral Acts in International Law', in *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (ed. R. Bernhardt), Amsterdam, 2000, vol. **IV**, p. 1018; G. Venturini, 'La Portée et les Effets Juridiques des Attitudes et des Actes Unilatéraux des États', **112** *HR*, 1964, p. 363; J. Charpentier, 'Engagements Unilatéraux et

Engagements Conventionnels’, in *Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, p. 367; A. P. Rubin, ‘The International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations’, 71 *AJIL*, 1977, p. 1; K. Zemanek, ‘Unilateral Legal Acts Revisited’, in Wellens, *International Law*, p. 209; E. Suy, *Les Actes Unilatéraux en Droit International Public*, Paris, 1962; Thirlway, *Sources*, p. 51; and J. Garner, ‘The International Binding Force of Unilateral Oral Declarations’, 27 *AJIL*, 1933, p. 493. The International Law Commission studied the question of the Unilateral Acts of States as from 1996, see A/51/10, pp. 230, 328–9, and in 2006 produced Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of states capable of creating legal obligations, A/61/10, pp. 369 ff.

²³⁰ See e.g. the Report of the International Law Commission, A/57/10, 2002, p. 215 and Guiding Principle 1, A/61/10, p. 370.

²³¹ *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 267; 57 ILR, pp. 398, 412. The Court underlined that: ‘Just as the very rule of *pacta sunt servanda* in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral obligation’, *ibid.* See also the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 288, 305; 106 ILR, pp. 1, 27; *Nova Scotia/Newfoundland (First Phase)*, 2001, para. 3.14; 128 ILR, pp. 425, 449; and *Eritrea–Ethiopia*, 2002, para. 4.70; 130 ILR, pp. 1, 69. Such a commitment may arise in oral pleadings before the Court itself: see *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, p. 452. Guiding Principle 4 establishes that such a declaration may bind the state internationally only if made by an authority vested with the power to do so, while Principle 6 states that such declarations may be addressed to the international community as a whole or to one or several states or to other entities and Principle 7 requires that such declaration be stated in clear and specific terms, A/61/10, pp. 372, 376.

²³² *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 267; 57 ILR, pp. 398, 412. See also *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 132; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 466; *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 573–4; 80 ILR, pp. 459, 477–8; and *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 554 ff. The Court in *North Sea Continental Shelf* declared that the unilateral assumption of the obligations of a convention by a state not party to it was ‘not lightly to be presumed’, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 25. The Court in *Malaysia v. Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 22, 88, noted that a denial could not be interpreted as a binding undertaking where not made in response to a claim by the other party or in the context of a dispute between them.

²³³ See e.g. the references to a press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the wording of a communication of the text of an agreement to Parliament by the Norwegian Government in *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 38, 51; 99 ILR, pp. 395, 419. See also Judge Ajibola's Separate Opinion in *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 58; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 56. Note also the Attorney General's Legal Opinion on Joint Instrument and Unilateral Declaration concerning the Withdrawal Agreement of 12 March 2019, noting that '[a] unilateral declaration by one party to a bilateral agreement constitutes an authentic interpretation of the treaty *if* it is accepted by the other party. While it is not an agreed document, it too has legal status as an interpretative document . . . [and will] form part of the context of the treaty in accordance with the principle set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention [on the Law of Treaties]', www.gov.uk/ago, and the judgment of the Colombian Constitutional Court of October 2017, stating that a unilateral act by a state representative could have legal consequences such as the creation of obligations or the loss of rights for that state. For this, there had to be attribution of the act to a state representative; consent to be bound not invalidated by coercion, error, fraud or corruption; independence of the act from any pre-existing obligation under international law; specificity of the act's object; and observance of the rules of *jus cogens*, **113 AJIL**, 2019, p. 122.

²³⁴ See D. Shelton, 'Normative Hierarchy in International Law', **100 AJIL**, 2006, p. 291; M. Koskenniemi, 'Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch', **8 EJIL**, 1997, p. 566; B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law', **17 EJIL**, 2006, p. 483; P. Weil, 'Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?', **77 AJIL**, 1983, p. 413; P. Weil, 'Vers une Normativité Relative en Droit International?', **86 RGDIP**, 1982, p. 5; P.-M. Dupuy, '2000–2020: Twenty Years Later, Where are We in Terms of the Unity of International Law?', **9 Cambridge International Law Journal**, 2020, pp. 6, 8 ff.; M. Akehurst, 'The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law', **47 BYIL**, 1974–75, p. 273; Pellet and Müller, 'Article 38', p. 932; and Virally, 'Sources', pp. 165–6. See also H. Mosler, *The International Society as a Legal Community*, Leiden, 1980, pp. 84–6; Thirlway, 'Law and Procedure (Part One)', p. 143; Thirlway, 'Supplement', p. 52; U. Linderfalk, *Understanding Jus Cogens in International Law and international Legal Discourse*, Cheltenham, 2019; U. Fastenrath, 'Relative Normativity in International Law', **4 EJIL**, 1993, p. 305; and Thirlway, *Sources*, chapter VI(2).

²³⁵ See e.g. ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (finalised by M. Koskeniemi), A/CN.4/L.682, 2006, p. 25.

²³⁶ Pellet and Müller, however, note that while there is no formal hierarchy as between conventions, custom and general principles, the International Court uses them in successive order and ‘has organized a kind of complementarity between them’, ‘Article 38’, pp. 932 ff. The ILC Study on Fragmentation, however, agrees with writers proclaiming that ‘treaties generally enjoy priority over custom and particular treaties over general treaties’, p. 47.

²³⁷ See further below, [Chapter 18](#), p. 979.

²³⁸ Pellet and Müller, ‘Article 38’, p. 934.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 778; and see H. Villager, *Customary International Law and Treaties*, Dordrecht, 1985.

²⁴⁰ See R. Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law’, *BYIL*, 1965–66, p. 275.

²⁴¹ See *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 95.

²⁴² See ILC Report on Fragmentation, pp. 30 ff.; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 1270, 1280. See also *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 76; 116 ILR, pp. 1, 85; *Beagle Channel* 52 ILR, pp. 141–2; *Right of Passage*, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 6, 44; 31 ILR, pp. 23, 56; *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 240; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 190; *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 38; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 31; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 137; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 471.

²⁴³ See e.g. *OSPAR (Ireland v. UK)* 126 ILR, p. 364, para. 84, and further below, p. 106.

²⁴⁴ See e.g. A. Orakhelashvili, *Peremptory Norms in International Law*, Oxford, 2006; T. Weatherall, *Jus Cogens: International Law and Social Contract*, Cambridge, 2015; R. Kolb, *Peremptory International Law – Jus Cogens: A General Inventory*, Oxford, 2015; R.

Kolb, 'La Détermination du Concept de Jus Cogens', **118** *RGDIP*, 2014, p. 5; and Thirlway, *Sources*, chapter VII. The International Law Commission commenced a study on Peremptory Norms in International Law (*jus cogens*) in 2015 and adopted a number of Draft Conclusions on first reading in 2019, see A/74/10, pp. 142 ff.

245 See e.g. Article 48 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility and the commentary thereto, A/56/10, pp. 126 ff. See also the *Furundžija* case before the ICTY, 121 ILR, pp. 213, 260.

246 ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 32; 46 ILR, pp. 178, 206.

247 See also *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 100; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 468; and Judge Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion in *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 172, 204; 105 ILR, pp. 226, 313, 345. See, in addition, Simma, 'Bilateralism', pp. 230 ff.; M. Ragazzi, *The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes*, Oxford, 1997; and J. Crawford, *The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility*, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 242–4.

248 *Belgium v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 422, 449–50. See also e.g. *Furundžija* 121 ILR, pp. 213, 260.

249 ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 102; 105 ILR, p. 226.

250 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 616; 115 ILR, p. 10.

251 See also ILC Draft Conclusion 2, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 142. It was noted in *US v. Matta-Ballesteros* that: 'Jus cogens norms which are nonderogable and peremptory, enjoy the highest status within customary international law, are binding on all nations, and cannot be preempted by treaty', 71 F.3d 754, 764 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995).

252 ILC Draft Conclusion 3, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 142, declares that peremptory norms 'reflect and protect fundamental values of the international community, are hierarchically superior to other rules of international law and are universally applicable'. See e.g. J. Sztucki, *Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, New York, 1974; I. Sinclair, *The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, 2nd ed., Manchester, 1984, p. 203; M. Virally, 'Réflexions sur le Jus Cogens', **12**

AFDI, 1966, p. 1; Shelton, 'Normative Hierarchy', pp. 297 ff.; C. Rozakis, *The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties*, Amsterdam, 1976; Cassese, *International Law*, chapter 11; A. Gomez Robledo, 'Le Jus Cogens International', 172 HR, 1981, p. 17; G. Gaja, 'Jus Cogens beyond the Vienna Conventions', 172 HR, 1981, p. 279; Crawford, *ILC's Articles*, pp. 187–8, 243; J. Verhoeven, 'Jus Cogens and Reservations or "Counter-Reservations" to the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice', in Wellens, *International Law*, p. 195; and L. Hannikainen, *Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law*, Helsinki, 1988. See also article 26 of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility, 2001, and below, [Chapter 15](#), p. 823.

²⁵³ Note that ILC Draft Conclusion 23 and Annex, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, pp. 146–7, provides a non-exhaustive list of norms of *jus cogens* as follows: prohibition of aggression, prohibition of genocide, prohibition of crimes against humanity, basic rules of international humanitarian law, prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid, prohibition of slavery, prohibition of torture and the right of self-determination. See, as regards the prohibition of torture as a rule of *jus cogens*, the Decision of the ICTY in *Furundžija* 121 ILR, pp. 257–8, 260–2; *Siderman de Blake and Others v. Argentina and Others* 965 F.2d 699, 714–18 (1992); 103 ILR, p. 454; *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)* [2000] 1 AC 147, 247 (Lord Hope), 253–4 (Lord Hutton) and 290 (Lord Phillips); 119 ILR, pp. 135, 200, 206–7, 244; and *Al-Adsani*, ECtHR, Judgment of 21 November 2001, para. 61; 123 ILR, pp. 24, 41–2. See also, as regards the prohibition of extrajudicial killing, the Decision of the US District Court in *Alejandro v. Cuba* 121 ILR, pp. 603, 616, and as regards non-discrimination, the Decision of the IACHR in its Advisory Opinion concerning the *Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants*, OC-18/03, IACHR, Series A, No. 18, 2003.

²⁵⁴ *Belgium v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 422, 457. However, Judge Abraham termed this *obiter dictum*, Separate Opinion, pp. 471, 477.

²⁵⁵ See e.g. Lord Slynn in *R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1)*, who stated that '[n]or is there any jus cogens in respect of such breaches of international law [international crimes] which require that a claim of state or head of state immunity . . . should be overridden': [2000] 1 AC 61, 79; 119 ILR, pp. 50, 67.

²⁵⁶ See also ILC Draft Conclusion 4, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 142.

²⁵⁷ Draft Conclusion 7(2) provides that '[a]cceptance and recognition by a very large majority of States is required for the identification of a norm as a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*) is required; acceptance and recognition by all States is not required', A/74/10, p. 143. See also e.g. Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 218–24; and Akehurst, 'Hierarchy'.

²⁵⁸ See ILC Draft Conclusion 5, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 143.

²⁵⁹ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, pp. 91–2. See also ILC Draft Conclusion 10, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 144.

²⁶⁰ See also ILC Draft Conclusions 11 and 12, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 144.

²⁶¹ ILC Draft Conclusion 13, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 144. See also Judges Padilla Nervo, Tanaka and Sørensen in *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 97, 182, 248. See also General Comment No. 24 (52) of the UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6.

²⁶² ILC Draft Conclusion 14, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 145. Similar rules apply to unilateral acts and resolutions of international organisations, Conclusions 15 and 16, *ibid.*

²⁶³ ILC Draft Conclusion 17, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, p. 145.

²⁶⁴ ILC Draft Conclusions 18 and 19, Peremptory Norms of General International Law, A/74/10, pp. 145–6.

²⁶⁵ See e.g. Cassese, *International Law*, pp. 105 ff., citing the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wald in *Princz v. Germany*, a Decision of the US Court of Appeals, 1994, 103 ILR, p. 618; but see *Al-Adsani*, ECtHR, Judgment of 21 November 2001, 123 ILR, p. 24.

²⁶⁶ Order of 13 September 1993, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 440; 95 ILR, pp. 43, 158. See also the Decision of the House of Lords in *Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence*

[2007] UKHL 58 concerning the priority of article 103 obligations (here Security Council resolutions) over article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and M. Lemos, 'Jus Cogens versus the Chapter VII Powers of the Security Council', **19** *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2020, p. 1.

²⁶⁷ *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 31–2; and *Germany v. Italy* (Greece Application to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 99, 141–2.

4

International Law and Municipal Law

The role of the state in the modern world is a complex one. According to legal theory, each state is sovereign and equal.¹ In reality, with the phenomenal growth in communications and consciousness, and with the constant pressure and fluidity of global rivalries, not even the most powerful of states can be entirely sovereign and independent. Interdependence and the close-knit character of contemporary international commercial and political society ensures that virtually any action of a state could well have profound repercussions upon the system as a whole and the decisions under consideration by other states. This has led to an increasing interpenetration of international law and domestic law across a number of fields, such as human rights, environmental and international investment law, where at the least the same topic is subject to regulation at both the domestic and the international levels (and indeed the regional level in the case of the European Union and others). With the rise and extension of international law, questions begin to arise paralleling the role played by the state within the international system and concerned with the relationship between the internal legal order of a particular country and the rules and principles governing the international community as a whole. Municipal law governs the domestic aspects of government and deals with issues between individuals, and between

individuals and the administrative apparatus, while international law focuses primarily upon the relations between states. That is now, however, an overly simplistic assertion. There are many instances where problems can emerge and lead to difficulties between the two systems. In a case before a municipal court a rule of international law may be brought forward as a defence to a charge, as for example in *R v. Jones*, where the defence of seeking to prevent a greater crime (essentially of international law) was claimed with regard to the alleged offence of criminal damage (in English law),² or where a vessel is being prosecuted for being in what, in domestic law, is regarded as territorial waters, but in international law would be treated as part of the high seas. Further, there are cases where the same situation comes before both national and international courts, which may refer to each other's decisions in a complex process of interaction. For example, the failure of the United States to allow imprisoned foreign nationals access to consular assistance in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 was the subject of case-law before the International Court of Justice,³ the Inter-American Court of Human Rights⁴ and US courts,⁵ while there is a growing tendency for domestic courts to be used to address violations of international law.⁶

The Theories⁷

Positivism stresses the overwhelming importance of the state and tends to regard international law as founded upon the consent of states. It is actual practice, illustrated by custom and by treaty, that formulates the role of international law, and not formalistic structures, theoretical deductions or moral stipulations. Accordingly, when positivists such as Triepel⁸ and Strupp⁹ consider the relationship of international law to municipal law, they do so upon the basis of the supremacy of the state, and the existence of wide differences between the two functioning orders. This theory, known as *dualism*, stresses that the rules of the systems of international law and municipal law exist separately and cannot purport to have an effect on, or overrule, the other.

This is because of the fundamentally different nature of inter-state and intra-state relations and the different legal structure employed on the one hand by the state and on the other hand as between states. Where municipal legislation permits the exercise of international law rules, this is on sufferance as it were and is an example of the supreme authority of the state within its own domestic jurisdiction, rather than of any influence maintained by international law within the internal sphere.¹⁰

Those writers who disagree with this theory and who adopt the *monist* approach tend to fall into two distinct categories: those who, like Lauterpacht, uphold a strong ethical position with a deep concern for human rights, and others, like Kelsen, who maintain a monist position on formalistic logical

grounds. The monists are united in accepting a unitary view of law as a whole and are opposed to the strict division posited by the positivists.

The 'naturalist' strand represented in England by Lauterpacht's works sees the primary function of all law as concerned with the well-being of individuals, and advocates the supremacy of international law as the best method available of attaining this. It is an approach characterised by deep suspicion of an international system based upon the sovereignty and absolute independence of states, and illuminated by faith in the capacity of the rules of international law to imbue the international order with a sense of moral purpose and justice founded upon respect for human rights and the welfare of individuals.¹¹

The method by which Kelsen elucidates his theory of monism is markedly different and utilises the philosophy of Kant as its basis. Law is regarded as constituting an order which lays down patterns of behaviour that ought to be followed, coupled with provision for sanctions which are employed once an illegal act or course of conduct has occurred or been embarked upon. Since the same definition appertains within both the internal sphere and the international sphere, a logical unity is forged, and because states owe their legal relationship to one another to the rules of international law, such as the one positing equality, since states cannot be equal before the law without a rule to that effect, it follows that international law is superior to or more basic than municipal law.¹²

Reference has already been made to Kelsen's hierarchical system whereby the legality of a particular rule is affirmed once it conforms to an anterior

rule. This process of referring back to previous or higher rules ends with the so-called basic norm of the legal order. However, this basic norm is basic only in a relative sense, since the legal character of states, such as their jurisdiction, sovereignty and equality, is fixed by international law. Thus, Kelsen emphasises the unity of the entire legal order upon the basis of the predominance of international law by declaring that it is the basic norm of the international legal order which is the ultimate reason of validity of the national legal orders too.¹³

A third approach, being somewhat a modification of the dualist position and formulated by Fitzmaurice and Rousseau among others, attempts to establish a recognised theoretical framework tied to reality. This approach begins by denying that any common field of operation exists as between international law and municipal law by which one system is superior or inferior to the other. Each order is supreme in its own sphere, much as French law and English law are in France and England. And just as one cannot talk in terms of the supremacy of French law over English law, but only of two distinct legal systems each operating within its own field, so it is possible to treat international law and municipal law in the same way. They are both the legal element contained within the domestic and international systems respectively, and they exist within different juridical orders.

What may, and often does, happen is what is termed ‘a conflict of obligations’, that is the state within its own domestic sphere does not act in accordance with its obligations as laid down by international law. In such a case, the domestic position is unaffected (and is not overruled by the contrary rule of international law), but rather the state as it operates internationally has

broken a rule of international law and the remedy will lie in the international field, whether by means of diplomatic protest or judicial action.

This method of solving the problem does not delve deeply into theoretical considerations, but aims at being practical and in accord with the majority of state practice and international judicial decisions.¹⁴ In fact, the increasing scope of international law has prompted most states to accept something of an intermediate position, where the rules of international law are seen as part of a distinct system, but capable of being applied internally depending on circumstance, while domestic courts are increasingly being obliged to interpret rules of international law.¹⁵ As a consequence of this realisation, a number of principles of coordination have arisen. From its perspective, international law underlines that (as noted in the following section) a state cannot evade a rule of international law by pleading a rule of municipal or national law. International instruments, particularly those establishing international or regional courts, seek to permit contracting states a space within which to operate their own rules. For example, the European Court of Human Rights has developed the concept of the margin of appreciation whereby parties to that convention may have rather more freedom of construction and application with regard to some provisions rather than others.¹⁶ Again, under article 5 of the Treaty on European Union 2012, the idea of subsidiarity establishes that decisions are to be taken as closely as possible to the citizen so that action taken at EU level is justified in light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level. Subsidiarity is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas that fall within its exclusive competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. It is closely bound up with the

principle of proportionality, which requires that any action by the Union should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. Similarly, the principle of complementarity, a principle of admissibility in the International Criminal Court, reflected in article 17 of the Statute of that court, seeks to ensure that the court will only exercise jurisdiction where the national legal system cannot or will not investigate or prosecute the crime alleged.¹⁷ More generally, there is a rule that before a state can take up a claim on the international stage of one of its nationals, the latter should have exhausted available and effective local remedies¹⁸ and the same rule appears in international and regional human rights treaties.¹⁹ From the national perspective, principles have emerged that seek to manage the relationship, such as the presumption that legislation should be interpreted in a manner consistent with international law²⁰ and the concept that customary international law forms part of the common law unless there is contrary legislation.²¹ Particular difficulties have arisen of late concerning the relationship between national security and international human rights in an era of increased international terrorism.

The Role of Municipal Rules in International Law²²

The perspective from international law is very clear. The general rule with regard to the position of municipal law within the international sphere is that a state which has broken a stipulation of international law cannot justify itself by referring to its domestic legal situation. It is no defence to a breach of an international obligation to argue that the state acted in such a manner because it was following the dictates of its own municipal laws. The reasons for this inability to put forward internal rules as an excuse to evade international responsibility are obvious. Any other situation would permit international law to be evaded by the simple method of domestic legislation.

Accordingly, state practice and international cases have established this provision and thereby prevented countries involved in international litigation from pleading municipal law as a method of circumventing international law. Article 3 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility declares that: 'The characterization of an act of a state as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.'²³ Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 lays down that in so far as treaties are concerned, a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to carry out an international agreement, while article 46(1) provides that a state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been

expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent.²⁴ This is so unless the violation of its internal law in question was ‘manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance’. Article 46(2) states that such a violation is manifest where it would be objectively evident to any state conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith. The International Court considered this provision in *Cameroon v. Nigeria* in the context of Nigeria’s argument that the Maroua Declaration of 1975 signed by the two heads of state was not valid as it had not been ratified.²⁵ It was noted that article 7(2) of the Vienna Convention provided that heads of state belonged to the group of persons who in virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers are considered as representing their state. The Court also took the view that ‘there is no general legal obligation for States to keep themselves informed of legislative and constitutional developments in other States which are or may become important for the international relations of these States’.²⁶

Such provisions are reflected in the case-law. In the *Alabama Claims* arbitration of 1872, the United States objected strenuously when Britain allowed a Confederate ship to sail from Merseyside to prey upon American shipping. It was held that the absence of British legislation necessary to prevent the construction or departure of the vessel could not be brought forward as a defence, and Britain was accordingly liable to pay damages for the depredations caused by the warship in question.²⁷ In the *Polish Nationals in Danzig* case, the Court declared that ‘a State cannot adduce as against another State its own constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force’.²⁸

The International Court, in the *Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate* case,²⁹ has underlined ‘the fundamental principle of international law that international law prevails over domestic law’, while Judge Shahabuddeen emphasised in the *Lockerbie* case³⁰ that inability under domestic law to act was no defence to non-compliance with an international obligation. This was reinforced in the *LaGrand* case,³¹ where the Court noted that the effect of the US procedural default rule,³² which was to prevent counsel for the LaGrand brothers from raising the violation by the United States of its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 before the US federal courts system, had no impact upon the responsibility of the United States for the breach of the convention.³³ The Court underlined this approach in *Avena (Mexico v. United States)*,³⁴ noting: ‘The rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention are treaty rights which the United States has undertaken to comply with in relation to the individual concerned, irrespective of the due process rights under the United States constitutional law.’ The Court took a step further in that case, which also concerned the failure to allow foreign prisoners access to the consular officials of their state in breach of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, declaring that ‘the remedy to make good these violations should consist in an obligation on the United States to permit review and reconsideration of these nationals’ cases by the United States courts . . . with a view to ascertaining whether in each case the violation of Article 36 committed by the competent authorities caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of criminal justice’.³⁵ By way of contrast, the International Court pointed out in the *Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI)* case³⁶ that the fact that an act of a public authority may have been unlawful in municipal law did not necessarily mean that the act in question was unlawful in international law.

However, such expressions of the supremacy of international law over municipal law in international tribunals do not mean that the provisions of domestic legislation are either irrelevant or unnecessary.³⁷ On the contrary, the role of internal legal rules is vital to the workings of the international legal machine. One of the ways that it is possible to understand and discover a state's legal position on a variety of topics important to international law is by examining municipal laws.³⁸ A country will express its opinion on such vital international matters as the extent of its territorial sea, or the jurisdiction it claims or the conditions for the acquisition of nationality through the medium of its domestic law-making. Thus, it is quite often that in the course of deciding a case before it, an international court will feel the necessity to make a study of relevant pieces of municipal legislation. Indeed, there have been instances, such as the *Serbian Loans* case of 1929,³⁹ when the crucial issues turned upon the interpretation of internal law, and the rules of international law in a strict sense were not at issue. Further, a court may turn to municipal law concepts where this is necessary in the circumstances.⁴⁰ However, it is clear that caution is necessary where an international court or tribunal is considering concepts of national law in the absence of an express or implied requirement so to do and no automatic transposition should occur.⁴¹

In addition to the role of municipal law in revealing the legal position of the state on topics of international importance, the rules of municipal law constitute facts in proceedings before international courts and tribunals, but may also be utilised as evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations and part of any relevant applicable law.⁴² In the

Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, the Permanent Court of International Justice declared that:

From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court, which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures. The Court is certainly not called upon to interpret the Polish law as such; but there is nothing to prevent the Court's giving judgment on the question whether or not, in applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations towards Germany under the Geneva Convention.⁴³

Nevertheless, and despite the many functions that municipal law rules perform within the sphere of international law, the point must be emphasised that the presence or absence of a particular provision within the internal legal structure of a state, including its constitution if there is one, cannot be applied to evade an international obligation. Any other solution would render the operations of international law rather precarious. On the other hand, international law cannot render invalid as such any rule of municipal law⁴⁴ and will rarely interpret a national law in a manner contrary to the domestic authorities.⁴⁵

International Law before Municipal Courts⁴⁶

The problem of the role of international law within the municipal law system as seen from the domestic system is, however, rather more complicated than the position discussed above, and there have been a number of different approaches to it. States are, of course, under a general obligation to act in conformity with the rules of international law and will bear responsibility for breaches of it, whether committed by the legislative, executive or judicial organs and irrespective of domestic law.⁴⁷ Further, international treaties may impose requirements of domestic legislation upon states parties,⁴⁸ while binding Security Council resolutions may similarly require that states take particular action within their jurisdictions.⁴⁹ There is indeed a clear trend towards the increasing penetration of international legal rules within domestic systems coupled with the exercise of an ever-wider jurisdiction with regard to matters having an international dimension by domestic courts. This has led to a blurring of the distinction between the two previously maintained autonomous zones of international and domestic law, a re-evaluation of the role of international legal rules and a greater preparedness by domestic tribunals to analyse the actions of their governments in the light of international law.⁵⁰ Further, domestic courts may often have to determine the meaning of an international rule that is relevant for a case before them⁵¹ or to seek to resolve conflicts between international rules, such as that between state immunity and the prohibition of torture⁵² and that between treaty rules of human rights and binding Security Council resolutions.⁵³ As between the two systems, there will be no *res judicata* (or binding or conclusive effect) at the international level with regard to a national decision in the absence of a specific direction to this effect in the particular case,⁵⁴ while practice is variable with regard to international decisions in the municipal system. Often, domestic courts will ascribe persuasive influence to such decisions and may

grant *res judicata* effect to international and domestic arbitral awards.⁵⁵ At the same time, the constitution of the state in question will be critical in determining precisely how the rules of international law will be treated within the domestic system, so that in the United Kingdom, for example, the key relevant principles will include the separation of powers, the supremacy of Parliament and the independence of the judiciary.⁵⁶

In this section, the approach adopted by municipal courts will be noted. We shall look first at the attitudes adopted by the British courts, and then proceed to note the views taken by the United States and other countries.⁵⁷

The United Kingdom⁵⁸

It is part of the public policy of the United Kingdom that the courts should in principle give effect to clearly established rules of international law.⁵⁹ This does not, however, mean that where a court is exercising a discretionary power, it is obliged to ensure that the government acts compatibly with its international obligations and not in breach of them.⁶⁰

Various theories have been put forward to explain the applicability of international law rules within the jurisdiction. One expression of the positivist–dualist position has been the doctrine of *transformation*. This is based upon the perception of two quite distinct systems of law, operating separately, and maintains that before any rule or principle of international law can have any effect within the domestic jurisdiction, it must be expressly and specifically ‘transformed’ into municipal law by the use of the appropriate constitutional machinery, such as an Act of Parliament. This doctrine grew from the procedure whereby international agreements are rendered operative in municipal law by the device of ratification by the sovereign and the idea has developed from this that any rule of international law must be transformed, or specifically adopted, to be valid within the internal legal order.

Another approach, known as the doctrine of *incorporation*, holds that international law is part of the municipal law automatically without the necessity for the interposition of a constitutional ratification procedure. The

best-known exponent of this theory is the eighteenth-century lawyer Blackstone, who declared in his *Commentaries* that:

the law of nations, wherever any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction, is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and it is held to be a part of the law of the land.⁶¹

This doctrine refers to customary international law and different rules apply to treaties. However, the previously accepted dichotomy between the reception of custom and treaty if now maintained absolutely would distort the many developments currently taking place. As will be seen, English courts have had to deal with the effect of legal decisions emanating from the European Union and its Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights,⁶² as well as the other consequences resulting from membership of the Union and of the Council of Europe; have been concerned with the interpretation of an increasing number of rules of international law incorporated into English law through the ratification of international treaties (particularly the significant number dealing with terrorist issues) and subsequent domestic legislation that they have required;⁶³ have sought to tackle conflicts of international legal rules and have dealt with the changing configuration of the doctrine of non-justiciability of issues raising questions as to the executive's conduct of foreign policy. They have also had to concern themselves with the validity of foreign laws deemed to conflict with international law and the acceptability of evidence obtained abroad in

circumstances that may have violated international law.⁶⁴ English courts take judicial notice of international law,⁶⁵ so that formal proof of a proposition does not need to be demonstrated (unlike propositions of foreign law which need to be proved as fact by evidence) and this itself has been a key factor in determining the relationship between international law and domestic law. Judges are deemed to know international law. In practice, this means that judges and lawyers trained in domestic law have had to grapple with the different sources of international law and the difficulties of this task have percolated through the relationship.

Customary International Law

It is in this sphere that the doctrine of incorporation became the main British approach. It is an old-established theory dating back to the eighteenth century, owing its prominence at that stage to the considerable discussion then taking place as to the precise extent of diplomatic immunity and in the light of the predominance of natural law concepts.

A few of the more important cases will be briefly surveyed. In *Buvot v. Barbuit*,⁶⁶ Lord Talbot declared unambiguously that ‘the law of nations in its full extent was part of the law of England’, so that a Prussian commercial agent could not be rendered liable for failing to perform a decree. This was followed twenty-seven years later by *Triquet v. Bath*,⁶⁷ where Lord Mansfield, discussing the issue as to whether a domestic servant of the Bavarian Minister to Britain could claim diplomatic immunity, upheld the earlier case and specifically referred to Talbot’s statement.

This acceptance of customary international law rules as part and parcel of the common law of England, so vigorously stated in a series of eighteenth-century cases, was subject to the priority granted to Acts of Parliament and tempered by the principle of *stare decisis* or precedent, maintained by the British courts and ensuring that the judgments of the higher courts are binding upon the lower courts of the hierarchical system. Accordingly, a rule of international law would not be implemented if it ran counter to a statute or decision by a higher court.⁶⁸ It is also important to note that during this period the rules of customary international law were relatively few in number so that few conflicts between the systems were to be envisaged in practice.

In the nineteenth century, a series of cases occurred which led many writers to dispute the validity of the hitherto accepted incorporation doctrine and replace it with the theory of transformation, according to which the rules of customary international law only form part of English law if they have been specifically adopted, either by legislation or case-law. This new approach reflected the decline in natural law thinking and the rise of positivism with its emphasis upon state sovereignty and state practice. The turning point in this saga is marked by the case of *R v. Keyn*,⁶⁹ where a German ship, the *Franconia*, collided with and sank a British vessel in the English Channel within three miles of the English coast. The German captain was indicted for manslaughter following the death of a passenger from the British ship, and the question that came before the Court for Crown Cases Reserved was whether an English court did indeed have jurisdiction to try the offence in such circumstances.

The Court came to the conclusion that no British legislation existed which provided for jurisdiction over the three-mile territorial sea around the coasts. It was true that such a rule might be said to exist in international law, but it was one thing to say that the state had the right to legislate over a part of what had previously been the high seas, and quite another to conclude that the state's laws operate at once there, independently of any legislation. One thing did not follow from another, and it was imperative to keep distinct on the one hand the power of Parliament to make laws, and on the other the authority of the courts, without appropriate legislation, to apply the criminal law where it could not have been applied before. The question, as Lord Cockburn emphasised, was whether, acting judicially, the Court could treat the power of Parliament to legislate as making up for the absence of actual legislation. The answer came in the negative and the German captain was released.

This case was seen by some as marking a change to a transformation approach,⁷⁰ but the judgment was in many respects ambiguous, dealing primarily with the existence or not of any right of jurisdiction over the territorial sea.⁷¹ In many respects, the differences between the incorporation and transformation theories have revolved in practice more around evidential questions than any comprehensive theoretical revolution. In any event, any doubts as to the outcome of any further *Franconia* situations were put to rest by the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, which expressed British jurisdiction rights in similar circumstances.

The opinions put forward in the *West Rand Gold Mining Company* case⁷² showed a further blurring of the distinction between the incorporation and transformation theories. Lord Alverstone declared that whatever had received

the common consent of civilised nations must also have received the assent of Great Britain and as such would be applied by the municipal tribunals. However, he went on to modify the impact of this by noting that any proposed rule of international law would have to be proved by satisfactory evidence to have been ‘recognised and acted upon by our own country’ or else be of such a nature that it could hardly be supposed any civilised state would repudiate it. Lord Mansfield’s view in the *Triquet* case could not be so interpreted as to include within the common law rules of international law which appear in the opinions of textbook writers and as to which there is no evidence that Britain ever assented.⁷³ This emphasis on assent, it must be noted, bears a close resemblance to the views put forward by the Court in *R v. Keyn* as to the necessity for conclusive evidence regarding the existence and scope of any particular rule of customary law. Indeed, the problem is often one of the uncertainty of existence and scope of customary law.

Not long after the *West Rand Gold Mining Company* case, another important dispute came before the courts. In *Mortensen v. Peters*,⁷⁴ a Danish captain was convicted by a Scottish court for contravening a fishing by-law regarding the Moray Firth. His ship had been operating within the Moray Firth and was within the area covered by the relevant by-law, but it was beyond the three-mile limit recognised by international law. The issue came to the Scottish High Court of Justiciary, where Lord Dunedin, in discussing the captain’s appeal, concentrated upon the correct construction to be made of the relevant legislation. He noted that an Act of Parliament duly passed and assented to was supreme and the Court had no option but to give effect to its provisions. In other words, statutes had predominance over customary law, and a British court would have to heed the terms of an Act of Parliament even if it

involved the breach of a rule of international law. This is so even though there is a presumption in British law that the legislation is to be so construed as to avoid a conflict with international law. Where such a conflict does occur, the statute has priority and the state itself will have to deal with the problem of the breach of a customary rule.⁷⁵

This modified incorporation doctrine was clearly defined by Lord Atkin in *Chung Chi Cheung v. R.*⁷⁶ He noted that:

international law has no validity except in so far as its principles are accepted and adopted by our own domestic law . . . The courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations accept among themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to ascertain what the relevant rule is, and having found it they will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or finally declared by their tribunals.

It was thus a key requirement that any alleged rule of customary law must be proved to be a valid rule of international law, and not merely an unsupported proposition. This underlined the need to examine what states were actually doing.

In ascertaining the existence and nature of any particular rule, the courts may have recourse to a wider range of authoritative material than would normally be the case, such as ‘international treaties and conventions, authoritative textbooks, practice and judicial decisions’ of the courts of other countries.⁷⁷

The high-water-mark case of *Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria* raised anew many of these issues. The case concerned a claim for sovereign or state immunity by the Central Bank of Nigeria.⁷⁸ In *Trendtex*, all three judges of the Court of Appeal accepted the incorporation doctrine as the correct one. Lord Denning noted that ‘the rules of international law are incorporated into English law automatically and considered to be part of English law unless they are in conflict with an Act of Parliament’ and, reversing his opinion in an earlier case,⁷⁹ stressed that otherwise the courts could not recognise changes in the norms of international law.⁸⁰ Stephenson LJ emphasised, in an important statement, that:

it is the nature of international law and the specific problems of ascertaining it which create the difficulty in the way of adopting or incorporating or recognising as already incorporated a new rule of international law.⁸¹

The issue of *stare decisis*, or precedent, and customary international law was also discussed in this case. It had previously been accepted that the doctrine of *stare decisis* would apply in cases involving customary international law principles as in all other cases before the courts, irrespective of any changes

in the meantime in such law.⁸² This approach was reaffirmed in *Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v. Government of Pakistan*.⁸³ However, in *Trendtex*, Lord Denning and Shaw LJ emphasised that international law did not know a rule of *stare decisis*.⁸⁴ Where international law had changed, the court could implement that change ‘without waiting for the House of Lords to do it’.⁸⁵ The true principle, noted Shaw LJ, was that ‘the English courts must at any given time discover what the prevailing international rule is and apply that rule’.⁸⁶

The incorporationist approach was reaffirmed in principle by the Court of Appeal in *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry*.⁸⁷ This case concerned the consequences of the demise of the International Tin Council and the attempts *inter alia* to render states that were members of the ITC liable for the debts incurred by that unfortunate organisation. Nourse LJ emphasised that the *Trendtex* case had resolved the rivalry between the incorporation and transformation doctrines in favour of the former.⁸⁸ One of the major points at issue in the *Tin Council* litigation was whether a rule existed in international law stipulating that the states members of an international organisation with separate personality could be rendered liable for the latter’s debts.

If such a rule did exist, the question would then arise as to how that would be accepted or manifested in the context of municipal law. This, of course, would depend upon the precise content of such a claimed international rule and, as Kerr LJ noted, no such rule did exist in international law permitting action against member states ‘in any national court’.⁸⁹ It was also not possible for an English court to remedy the gap in international law by itself

creating such a rule.⁹⁰ Nourse LJ, however, took a different position on this point, stating that ‘where it is necessary for an English court to decide such a question [i.e. an uncertain question of international law], and whatever the doubts and difficulties, it can and must do so’.⁹¹ This, with respect, is not and cannot be the case, not least because it strikes at the heart of the community-based system of international law creation.

Lord Oliver in the House of Lords judgment⁹² emphasised:

It is certainly not for a domestic tribunal in effect to legislate a rule into existence for the purposes of domestic law and on the basis of material that is wholly indeterminate.⁹³

Such approaches find support in the *Pinochet* decisions. Lord Lloyd, for example, in *R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 1)*, referred to the ‘well-established principles of customary international law, which principles form part of the common law of England’,⁹⁴ while Lord Slynn took the view that the doctrine of precedent did not apply to the incorporation of rules of customary international law.⁹⁵ Lord Millett in *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)* stressed: ‘Customary international law is part of the common law.’⁹⁶ In *Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 of 2000*, the High Court of Justiciary stated that ‘[a] rule of customary international law is a rule of Scots law’,⁹⁷ and the point was emphasised by the Arbitral Tribunal in *Sandline v. Papua New Guinea* that ‘it is part of the public policy of

England that its courts should give effect to clearly established rules of international law'.⁹⁸

The doctrine that customary international law formed part of the law of England was discussed by the House of Lords in *R v. Jones*,⁹⁹ where the issue focused upon whether the customary international law rule prohibiting aggression had automatically entered into English criminal law. Lord Bingham, while noting that the general principle was not at issue between the parties, commented that he 'would for [his] part hesitate, at any rate without much fuller argument, to accept this proposition in quite the unqualified terms in which it has often been stated'. Preference was expressed for the view maintained by Brierly that international law was not a part, but was rather one of the sources, of English law.¹⁰⁰

More specifically, the House of Lords unanimously accepted that the incorporation doctrine did not apply to the customary international law offence of aggression. While it was accepted that a crime recognised in customary international law 'may' be assimilated into domestic criminal law without statutory provision, this was not automatic.¹⁰¹ The English courts no longer had the power to create new criminal offences, which could only now be done by statute, and in practice when domestic effect was sought for customary international crimes, this was achieved through legislation.¹⁰² Further, a charge of aggression would involve a determination not only of the guilt of the accused, but also of the state itself and possibly of other states, should the state go to war with allies, and this raised constitutional issues as to non-justiciability.¹⁰³

This more nuanced approach was reaffirmed by the UK Supreme Court in *Keyu v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*, where Lord Mance noted that '[c]ommon law judges on any view retain the power and duty to consider how far customary international law on any point fits with domestic constitutional principles and understandings',¹⁰⁴ pointed out that domestic courts face a policy issue in deciding whether to recognise and enforce a rule of international law¹⁰⁵ and concluded that 'the presumption when considering any such policy issue is that CIL [customary international law], once established, can and should shape the common law, whenever it can do so consistently with domestic constitutional principles, statutory law and common law rules which the courts can themselves sensibly adapt without it being, for example, necessary to invite Parliamentary intervention or consideration'.¹⁰⁶ As Lloyd-Jones LJ put it: 'It seems preferable to regard customary international law not as a part but as a source of the common law on which national judges may draw.'¹⁰⁷ In addition, Lord Sumption emphasised:

In principle, judges applying the common law are not at liberty to create, abrogate or modify municipal law rights or obligations in accordance with unincorporated norms derived from international law, whether customary or treaty-based. But, as Lord Bingham pointed out in *R v. Lyons* [2003] 1 AC 976, at para 13, international law may none the less affect the interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions, guide the exercise of judicial or

executive discretions and influence the development of the common law. Although the courts are not bound, even in these contexts, to take account of international law, they are entitled to do so if it is appropriate and relevant.¹⁰⁸

Accordingly, a considerable degree of caution may therefore now be necessary with regard to the traditionally and baldly expressed proposition that customary international law is part of English law.¹⁰⁹ This will be subject not only, as in the past, to the rule that common law (including where incorporating an international customary rule) gives way to statute, but also to considerations of a constitutional nature. Courts will be obliged to determine whether a particular provision indeed constitutes a rule of custom and, additionally, whether there are any constitutional bars to incorporation and indeed whether the custom in question is capable of being applied within the domestic legal system. This is since most of the rules of customary international law actually relate to matters of concern between two or more states and by definition a domestic court is unable to determine the rights and duties of a third state, partly because the domestic court would be unable in such circumstances to enforce its decision against or within the third state and partly because the international rule will often itself provide for implementation and sanctions within the international system upon a state-to-state or multilateral basis.¹¹⁰ Other relevant factors may well include whether the custom is inconsistent with an earlier rule of common law¹¹¹ or with public policy.¹¹² Accordingly, the approach positing automatic incorporation has given way to one proposing presumptive incorporation.

Treaties¹¹³

As far as treaties are concerned, different rules apply as to their application within the domestic jurisdiction for very good historical and political reasons. While customary law develops through the evolution of state practice, international conventions are in the form of contracts binding upon the signatories. For a custom to emerge it is usual, though not always necessary, for several states to act in a certain manner believing it to be in conformity with the law. Therefore, in normal circumstances the influence of one particular state is not usually decisive. In the case of treaties, the states involved may create new law that would be binding upon them irrespective of previous practice or contemporary practice. In other words, the influence of the executive is generally of greater impact where treaty law is concerned than is the case with customary law and this is particularly so where, as in the United Kingdom, ratification of treaties is an executive act.

It follows from this that were treaties to be rendered applicable directly within the state without any intermediate stage after signature and ratification and before domestic operation, the executive would be able to legislate without the legislature. Because of this, any incorporation theory approach to treaty law has been rejected. Indeed, as far as this topic is concerned, it seems to turn more upon the particular relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government than upon any preconceived notions of international law.

One of the principal cases in English law illustrating this dualist situation is *Parlement Belge*,¹¹⁴ which involved a collision between this ship and a British tug, and the claim for damages brought by the latter vessel before the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty division of the High Court. The *Parlement Belge* belonged to the King of the Belgians and was used as a cargo boat. During the case, the Attorney General intervened to state that the Court had no jurisdiction over the vessel as it was the property of the Belgian monarch, and that further, by a political agreement of 1876 between Britain and Belgium, the same immunity from foreign legal process as applied to warships should apply also to this packet boat. In discussing the case, the Court concluded that only public ships of war were entitled to such immunity and that such immunity could not be extended to other categories by a treaty without parliamentary consent. Indeed, it was stated that this would be ‘a use of the treaty-making prerogative of the Crown . . . without precedent, and in principle contrary to the law of the constitution’.¹¹⁵

It is the Crown which in the United Kingdom possesses the constitutional authority to enter into treaties and this prerogative power cannot be impugned by the courts.¹¹⁶ However, this power may be affected by legislation. Section 6 of the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978 provided, for example, that no treaty providing for any increase in the powers of the European Parliament would be ratified by the United Kingdom without being first approved by Parliament.¹¹⁷ Thus it is that treaties cannot operate of themselves within the state, but require the passing of an enabling statute. The Crown in the United Kingdom retains the right to sign and ratify international agreements, but is unable to legislate directly. Before a treaty can become part of English law, an Act of Parliament is essential. This

fundamental proposition was clearly spelt out by Lord Oliver in the House of Lords decision in *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry*.¹¹⁸ He noted:

as a matter of the constitutional law of the United Kingdom, the royal prerogative, whilst it embraces the making of treaties, does not extend to altering the law or conferring rights on individuals or depriving individuals of rights which they enjoy in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament. Treaties, as it is sometimes expressed, are not self-executing. Quite simply, a treaty is not part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated into the law by legislation.¹¹⁹

It therefore followed that as far as individuals were concerned such treaties were *res inter alia acta* from which they could not derive rights and by which they could not be deprived of rights or subjected to obligations.¹²⁰ Lord Templeman emphasised: ‘Except to the extent that a treaty becomes incorporated into the laws of the United Kingdom by statute, the courts of the United Kingdom have no power to enforce treaty rights and obligations at the behest of a sovereign government or at the behest of a private individual.’¹²¹ This was reaffirmed by Lord Bingham in *A (FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department*, noting that ‘a treaty, even if ratified by the United Kingdom, has no binding force in the domestic law of this country unless it is given effect by statute or expresses principles of

customary international law'.¹²² The interpretation of treaties not incorporated by statute into municipal law, and the decision as to whether they have been complied with, are matters exclusively for the Crown as 'the court must speak with the same voice as the Executive'.¹²³ An exception is where reference to a treaty is needed in order to explain the relevant factual background,¹²⁴ for example where the terms of a treaty are incorporated into a contract.¹²⁵ Where the legislation in question refers expressly to a relevant but unincorporated treaty, it is permissible to utilise the latter in order to constrain any discretion provided for in the former.¹²⁶ Further, it has been argued that ratification of an international treaty (where no incorporation has taken place) may give rise to legitimate expectations that the executive, in the absence of statutory or executive indications to the contrary, will act in conformity with the treaty.¹²⁷ The constitutional position was reaffirmed in *Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union*, where the Supreme Court underlined that it was a fundamental principle of the UK constitution that unless primary legislation permits it, the Royal prerogative does not enable ministers to change statute law or common law, nor may ministers prevent the effective operation of a statute by exercising prerogative powers at the international level.¹²⁸ The most significant area in which ministers exercise the Royal prerogative is in the field of foreign affairs, which includes the making of treaties and withdrawal from them and the prerogative power, noted the Supreme Court, rests upon two propositions: first, that treaties between sovereign states have effect in international law and are not governed by the domestic law of any states; and, secondly, that although binding in international law, treaties are not part of UK law and give rise to no legal rights or obligations under domestic law.¹²⁹

However, treaties relating to the conduct of war, cession of territory and the imposition of charges on the public purse¹³⁰ do not need an intervening act of legislation before they can be made binding upon the citizens of the country.¹³¹ A similar situation exists also with regard to relatively unimportant administrative agreements which do not require ratification, providing of course they do not purport to alter municipal law. In certain cases, Parliament will give its approval generically in advance for the conclusion of treaties in certain fields within specified limits, subject to the terms negotiated for particular treaties being promulgated by statutory instrument (secondary legislation).¹³² Such exceptions occur because it is felt that, having in mind the historical compromises upon which the British constitutional structure is founded, no significant legislative powers are being lost by Parliament. In all other cases where the rights and duties of British subjects are affected, an Act of Parliament is necessary to render the provisions of the particular treaty operative within Britain. Parliamentary legislation will be required where a treaty for its application in the United Kingdom requires a modification of, or addition to, existing common law or statute, affects private rights, creates financial obligations for the United Kingdom, provides for an increase in the powers of the European Parliament, involves the cession of British territory or increases the powers of the Crown.¹³³ Accordingly, in *Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union*,¹³⁴ in considering the question of the necessary constitutional processes required upon withdrawal from a treaty which had been incorporated into domestic law, the Supreme Court held that in the light of the terms of the legislation by which the United Kingdom joined the European Union and accepted EU law as part of UK law, it was not open to the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union by virtue of

executive action alone. Section 2 of the European Communities Act had authorised the introduction of EU law as an independent and overriding source of domestic law and it had been accepted that UK domestic law would change as a result of the United Kingdom ceasing to be a party to the EU treaties and that the rights enjoyed by UK residents granted through EU law would be affected. Thus, authorisation by a prior Act of Parliament was required before the exercise by ministers of any power to withdraw from the EU Treaties.

There is no rule specifying the precise legislative method of incorporation of a treaty¹³⁵ and a variety of means are available in practice.¹³⁶ For example, a treaty may be incorporated into domestic law by being given the force of law in a statute with or without being scheduled to the relevant Act; by being referred to in a statute otherwise than in an incorporating statute; by tangential reference in a statute;¹³⁷ and by statutory referral to definitions contained in a treaty.¹³⁸

It had been the practice in the United Kingdom to lay before both Houses of Parliament all treaties which the United Kingdom had either signed or to which it intended to accede.¹³⁹ The text of any agreement requiring ratification, acceptance, approval or accession had to be laid before Parliament at least twenty-one sitting days before any of these actions was taken. This was termed the 'Ponsonby Rule'.¹⁴⁰ All treaties signed after 1 January 1997 and laid before Parliament under this rule are accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum.¹⁴¹ The matter is now regulated by Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. This provides that a treaty may only be ratified if a period of twenty-one days has elapsed from

the placing of the treaty before Parliament by the relevant Minister calling for ratification and the House of Commons has not otherwise resolved.¹⁴²

There is in English law a presumption that legislation is to be so construed as to avoid a conflict with international law.¹⁴³ This operates particularly where the Act of Parliament which is intended to bring the treaty into effect is itself ambiguous. Accordingly, where the provisions of a statute implementing a treaty are capable of more than one meaning, and one interpretation is compatible with the terms of the treaty while others are not, it is the former approach that will be adopted. For, as Lord Diplock pointed out: ‘Parliament does not intend to act in breach of international law, including therein specific treaty obligations.’¹⁴⁴ It is also to be noted that the words of a statute may require consideration of international law by the relevant domestic authorities.¹⁴⁵

Although there is a general presumption that English law accords with international obligations,¹⁴⁶ where the words of a statute are unambiguous the courts have no choice but to apply them irrespective of any conflict with international agreements.¹⁴⁷ Of course, any breach of an international obligation will import the responsibility of the United Kingdom at the international level irrespective of domestic considerations.¹⁴⁸ Attempts have been made in the past to consider treaties in the context of domestic legislation not directly enacting them, or as indications of public policy, particularly with regard to human rights treaties,¹⁴⁹ and it seems that account may be taken of them in seeking to interpret ambiguous provisions.¹⁵⁰ However, ministers are under no obligation to do this in reaching decisions.¹⁵¹

One particular issue has arisen in the case of the implementation of international obligations and that relates to UN sanctions. In the United Kingdom, such sanctions are enforced as a consequence of the United Nations Act 1946, which enables the Crown to adopt Orders in Council so that effect can be given to sanctions.¹⁵² Such secondary legislation tends to be detailed and thus the possibility of differential interpretations arises. It is to be noted that the relevance and application of rules of the European Union may also be in issue.¹⁵³ Further, one may note the obligation contained in article 29 of the ICTY Statute, adopted by binding UN Security Council resolution 827 (1993), for all states to cooperate with the Tribunal and in particular to ‘comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber’, including the arrest and detention of persons and their surrender or transfer to the Tribunal. This was implemented by secondary legislation adopted under the United Nations Act 1946.¹⁵⁴ While Security Council resolutions may create international legal obligations, they do not without domestic legislation become part of the domestic law of the United Kingdom, for example, under the United Nations Act 1946, which allows for such resolutions to be incorporated by way of Orders in Council.¹⁵⁵

There is a rule of statutory interpretation that requires statutes to be construed, if possible, in a way which conforms with existing international treaty obligations.¹⁵⁶ In the interpretation of international treaties incorporated by statute, the English courts have adopted a broader approach than is customary in statutory interpretation, utilising the international rules of treaty interpretation as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 rather than the stricter rules of statutory construction.¹⁵⁷ In

particular, recourse to the relevant *travaux préparatoires* may be possible.¹⁵⁸ However, different approaches have been taken by the British courts as to how to deal with the question of interpretation in such circumstances. In *Sidhu v. British Airways*, Lord Hope, adopting the broad approach signalled in *Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines*, stated that it was ‘well-established that a purposive approach should be taken to the interpretation of international conventions which have the force of law in this country’.¹⁵⁹ Lord Mustill in *Semco Salvage v. Lancer Navigation* took a more traditional approach founded upon the relevant articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969,¹⁶⁰ in particular emphasising the significance of a textual interpretation of the words in question as understood in their ordinary meaning.¹⁶¹ In *Al Attiya v. Al Thani*,¹⁶² it was noted that it was legitimate to construe the terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 that have been incorporated into domestic law by reference to all of its provisions, including those that had not been so incorporated.

In a rather special position is the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 3(1) provides that, ‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights’, although this does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation.¹⁶³ The obligation imposed by section 3 arises crucially in relation to both previous and subsequent enactments.¹⁶⁴ Where legislation cannot be rendered compatible with Convention rights, then a declaration of incompatibility can be made under section 4 and Parliament may then modify the offending provisions under section 10.

The courts have also adopted a broader, purposive approach to interpretation of domestic legislation in order to ensure its compatibility with the Convention.¹⁶⁵ In the process of interpreting domestic legislation so as to render it compatible if possible with the Convention rights, the courts ‘must take into account’¹⁶⁶ any relevant jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, although this is not a provision imposing an obligation to follow such case-law.¹⁶⁷ Reference should also be made to EU law in this context. The case-law of the Communities demonstrates that fundamental rights are an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which the European Court of Justice seeks to ensure. The system provides that Community law prevails over national law and that the decisions of the European Court are to be applied by the domestic courts of the member states. The potential for change through this route was, therefore, significant prior to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the organisation.¹⁶⁸ Further, in interpreting domestic legislation made pursuant to the European Communities Act 1972 where the former appears to conflict with the Treaty of Rome (establishing the European Community), the House of Lords held that a purposive approach should be adopted.¹⁶⁹

The United States¹⁷⁰

As far as the American position on the relationship between municipal law and customary international law is concerned, it appears to be very similar to British practice, apart from the need to take the Constitution into account.

The US Supreme Court in *Boos v. Barry* emphasized: ‘As a general proposition, it is of course correct that the United States has a vital national interest in complying with international law.’ However, the rules of international law were subject to the Constitution.¹⁷¹

An early acceptance of the incorporation doctrine was later modified as in the United Kingdom. It was stated in the *Paquete Habana* case¹⁷² that

international law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.¹⁷³

Similarly, the early pure incorporation cases gave way to a more cautious approach.¹⁷⁴

The current accepted position is that customary international law in the United States is federal law and that its determination by the federal courts is binding on the state courts,¹⁷⁵ although this masks some controversy as to the impact upon such incorporation upon democratic governance.¹⁷⁶ The

similarity of approach with the United Kingdom is not surprising in view of common historical and cultural traditions 3000, and parallel restraints upon the theories are visible. US courts are bound by the doctrine of precedent and the necessity to proceed according to previously decided cases, and they too must apply statute as against any rules of customary international law that do not accord with it.¹⁷⁷ The Court of Appeals reaffirmed this position in the *Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan* case,¹⁷⁸ where it was noted that ‘no enactment of Congress can be challenged on the ground that it violates customary international law’.¹⁷⁹

It has been noted that the political and judicial organs of the United States have the power to ignore international law, where this occurs pursuant to a statute or ‘controlling executive act’. This has occasioned much controversy,¹⁸⁰ as has the general relationship between custom and inconsistent pre-existing statutes.¹⁸¹ However, it is now accepted that statutes supersede earlier treaties or customary rules of international law.¹⁸² It has also been held that it would run counter to the Constitution for a court to decide that a decision of the International Court of Justice overrules a binding decision of the US Supreme Court and thus affords a judicial remedy to an individual for a violation of the Constitution.¹⁸³ However, the question of the impact of a ruling of the International Court upon US courts has been discussed in the light of decisions of the former¹⁸⁴ as to the violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 by the failure to permit access to consular officials by imprisoned foreigners.¹⁸⁵

There does exist, as in English law, a presumption that legislation does not run counter to international law and, as it was stated by the Court in

Schroeder v. Bissell,¹⁸⁶

unless it unmistakably appears that a congressional act was intended to be in disregard of a principle of international comity, the presumption is that it was intended to be in conformity with it.¹⁸⁷

The relationship between US law and customary law has been the subject of re-examination in the context of certain human rights situations. In *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*,¹⁸⁸ the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with an action brought by Paraguayans against a Paraguayan for the torture and death of the son of the plaintiff. The claim was based on the Alien Tort Statute of 1789¹⁸⁹ which provides that '[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations'. The Court of Appeals held that torture constituted a violation of international customary law and was thus actionable. The Court accordingly held against the defendant despite the fact that both parties were alien and all the operative acts occurred in Paraguay. The Court also noted that in ascertaining the content of international law, the contemporary rules and principles of international law were to be interpreted and not those as of the date of the prescribing statute.¹⁹⁰ Other cases came before the courts in which the incorporation of international customary law provisions concerning human rights issues was argued with mixed success.¹⁹¹ An attempt to obtain a judgment in the United States against the Republic of Argentina for torturing its own citizens, however, ultimately foundered upon

the doctrine of sovereign immunity,¹⁹² while it has been held that acts of ‘international terrorism’ are not actionable under the Alien Tort Statute.¹⁹³ In *Kadić v. Karadžić*,¹⁹⁴ the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims based on official torture and summary executions did not exhaust the list of actions that may be covered by the Alien Tort Statute and that allegations of genocide, war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law would also be covered.¹⁹⁵ However, in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*,¹⁹⁶ the Supreme Court held that the Alien Tort Statute was a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action and enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations thought to carry personal liability at the time, being offences against ambassadors, violation of safe conducts and piracy. The federal courts, it was declared, should not recognise claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less ‘definite content and acceptance among civilized nations’ than these particular offences deemed to exist at the date of the adoption of the Act.¹⁹⁷ Accordingly, both ‘a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms’ and a foundation resting upon ‘a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world’ were required in order to form the basis of a claim under the statute.¹⁹⁸

The ambit of the Alien Tort Statute was further limited by the Supreme Court in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company*, where the court in examining whether and under what circumstances the courts may recognise a cause of action under the Act for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States, held that the

presumption against extraterritoriality applied to claims under the Act, and that nothing in the statute rebutted that presumption.¹⁹⁹

The relative convergence of practice between Britain and the United States with regard to the assimilation of customary law is not reflected as regards the treatment of international treaties.²⁰⁰ In the United Kingdom, it is the executive branch which negotiates, signs and ratifies international agreements, with the proviso that parliamentary action is required prior to the provisions of the agreement being accepted as part of English law. In the United States, on the other hand, Article VI Section 2 of the Constitution provides that:

all Treaties made or which shall be made with the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.²⁰¹

There is also a difference in the method of approval of treaties, for Article II of the Constitution notes that while the President has the power to negotiate and make international agreements, he may only ratify them if at least two-thirds of the Senate approve. After that has happened, the President then determines whether to ratify or otherwise make the treaty on behalf of the United States.

There is an exception and this is the institution of the executive agreements. These are usually made by the President on his own authority, but still constitute valid treaties within the framework of international law. As distinct from ordinary treaties, the creation of executive agreements is not expressly covered by the Constitution, but rather implied from its terms and subsequent practice, and they have been extensively used. The Supreme Court, in cases following the 1933 Litvinov Agreement, which established US recognition of the Soviet government and provided for the assignment to the United States of particular debts owing to the Soviet Union, emphasised that such executive agreements possessed the same status and dignity as treaties made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate under Article II of the Constitution.²⁰²

US doctrines as to treaty law and domestic law are founded upon the distinction between ‘self-executing’ and ‘non-self-executing’ treaties.²⁰³ The former are able to operate automatically within the domestic sphere, without the need for any municipal legislation, while the latter require enabling acts before they can function inside the country and bind the US courts. Self-executing treaties apply directly within the United States as part of the supreme law of the land, whereas those conventions deemed not self-executing are obliged to undergo a legislative transformation and, until they do so, they cannot be regarded as legally enforceable against American citizens or institutions.²⁰⁴

But how does one know when an international agreement falls into one category or the other? This matter has absorbed the US courts for many years, and the distinction appeared until recently to have been made upon the

basis of a variety of factors, including political content. In other words, where a treaty involves political questions of definition or exposition, then the issue should be left to the legislative organs of the nation, rather than automatic operation.²⁰⁵ Examples of this would include the acquisition or loss of territory and financial arrangements. The Supreme Court in *Edye v. Robertson*²⁰⁶ declared that treaties which

contain provisions which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country . . . [are] in the same category as other laws of Congress.

This would seem to mean that an international convention would become a law of the land, where its terms determine the rights and duties of private citizens, and contrasts with the position where a political issue is involved and the treaty is thereby treated as non-self-executing.

Of course, such generalisations as these are bound to lead to considerable ambiguity and doubt in the case of very many treaties; and the whole matter was examined again in 1952 before the Supreme Court of California in *Sei Fujii v. California*.²⁰⁷ The plaintiff was a Japanese citizen who had purchased some land in 1948 in California. By legislation enacted in that state, aliens had no right to acquire land. To prevent the property from going to the state, the plaintiff argued that, among other things, such legislation was not consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, an international treaty which called for the promotion of human rights without racial distinction.

The issue raised was whether the UN Charter was a self-executing treaty and, by virtue of such, part of the law of the land, which would supersede inconsistent local statutes. The Court declared that, in making a decision as to whether a treaty was self-executing or not, it would have to consult the treaty itself to try to deduce the intentions of the signatories and examine all relevant circumstances. Following the *Edye* case it would have to see whether the provisions of the treaty laid down rules that were to be enforceable of themselves in the municipal courts.

The Court concluded after a comprehensive survey that the relevant provisions of the UN Charter were not intended to be self-executing. They laid down various principles and objectives of the United Nations organisation, but ‘do not purport to impose legal obligations on the individual member nations or to create rights in private persons’. The Court held that it was obvious that further legislative action by the signatories would be called for to turn the principles of the United Nations into domestic laws binding upon the individual citizens of states.²⁰⁸ Accordingly, they could not be regarded as part of the law of the land and could not operate to deflect the Californian legislation in question. The case was decided in favour of the plaintiff, but on other grounds altogether.²⁰⁹

However, in *Medellín v. Texas*, the US Supreme Court focused heavily upon a textual analysis of the relevant treaty (the UN Charter) rather than upon a wider range of factors and concluded that the Charter (and the ICJ Statute and the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations) were not self-executing and in the absence of incorporation into US law, the international instruments in question would not be given judicial effect.²¹⁰

The Court thus rejected the view that there existed a presumption in favour of self-execution, tending rather to the approach that the matter had to be settled on a treaty-by-treaty basis, depending upon the text, structure and ratification history of the particular treaty in question. However, it was noted that there was a presumption that treaties did not confer privately enforceable rights.²¹¹

As is the case with the UK system, it is possible for the US legislature to take action which not only takes no account of international law rules but may be positively contrary to them, and in such an instance the legislation would be supreme within the American jurisdiction.

In *Diggs v. Schultz*,²¹² for example, the Court had to consider the effect of the Byrd Amendment which legalised the importation into the United States of strategic materials, such as chrome from Rhodesia, a course of action that was expressly forbidden by a UN Security Council resolution which in the circumstances was binding. The Court noted that the Byrd Amendment was ‘in blatant disregard of our treaty undertakings’, but concluded that: ‘under our constitutional scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and there is nothing the other branches of government can do about it’. Although in municipal terms the Amendment was unchallengeable, the United States was, of course, internationally liable for the breach of an international legal rule.²¹³

However, there is a presumption that Congress will not legislate contrary to the international obligations of the state²¹⁴ and a principle of interpretation that where an Act and a treaty deal with the same subject, the courts will seek to construe them so as to give effect to both of them without acting contrary

to the wording of either. Where the two are inconsistent, the general rule has been posited that the later in time will prevail, provided the treaty is self-executing.²¹⁵

The question of a possible conflict between treaty obligations and domestic legislation was raised in *United States v. Palestine Liberation Organisation*.²¹⁶ The Anti-Terrorism Act of the previous year²¹⁷ provided for the closure of all PLO offices in the United States and this was construed by the Attorney-General to include the PLO mission to the United Nations, an action which would have breached the obligations of the United States under the UN Headquarters Agreement. However, the District Court found that it could not be established that the legislation clearly and unequivocally intended that an obligation arising out of the Headquarters Agreement, a valid treaty, was to be violated.²¹⁸

The issue of the relationship between international treaties and municipal law came before the US Supreme Court in *Breard v. Greene*.²¹⁹ The Court noted that ‘respectful consideration’ should be given to the interpretation of an international treaty by a relevant international court;²²⁰ however, ‘it has been recognised in international law that absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State’.²²¹ Accordingly, the effect of resort to a domestic procedural rule might result in preventing the provision of an international treaty from being applied in any given case. The Supreme Court also affirmed that international treaties under the Constitution were recognised as the ‘supreme law of the land’, but so were the provisions of the

Constitution. An Act of Congress was ‘on full parity’ with a treaty, so that a later statute would render an earlier treaty null to the extent of any conflict.²²²

Other Countries

(i) Other Common Law and Related Legal Systems

In other countries where the English common law was adopted, such as the majority of Commonwealth states and, for example, Israel,²²³ it is possible to say that in general the same principles apply. Customary law is regarded on the whole as part of the law of the land.²²⁴ Municipal laws are presumed not to be inconsistent with rules of international law, but in cases of conflict the former have precedence.

The Canadian Supreme Court in the *Re Secession of Quebec* judgment²²⁵ noted that it had been necessary for the Court in a number of cases to look to international law to determine the rights or obligations of some actor within the Canadian legal system.²²⁶ As far as treaties are concerned, Lord Atkin expressed the general position in *Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario*,²²⁷ in a case dealing with the respective legislative competences of the Dominion Parliament and the provincial legislatures. He noted that within the then British Empire it was well enshrined that the making of a treaty was an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they involved alteration of the existing domestic law, required legislative action. ‘The question’, remarked Lord Atkin,

is not how is the obligation formed, that is the function of the executive, but how is the obligation to be performed, and that depends upon the authority of the competent legislature or legislatures.²²⁸

The doctrine that customary international law forms part of the domestic law of Canada has been reaffirmed in a number of cases.²²⁹ This has also been accepted in New Zealand²³⁰ and in Australia.²³¹ In *Horgan v. An Taoiseach*, it was affirmed that ‘established principles of customary international law may be incorporated into Irish domestic law *providing* that they are not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, statute law or common law’.²³² The relationship between treaties and domestic law was examined by the High Court of Australia in *Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh*.²³³ The Court upheld the traditional doctrine to the effect that the provisions of an international treaty to which Australia is a party do not form part of Australian law, and do not give rise to rights, unless those provisions have been validly incorporated into municipal law by statute.²³⁴ It was noted that this was because of the constitutional separation of functions whereby the executive made and ratified treaties, while the legislature made and altered laws.²³⁵ The majority of the Court, however, went on to hold that the fact that a treaty had not been incorporated did not mean that its ratification by the executive held no significance for Australian law. Where a statute or subordinate legislation was ambiguous, the courts should favour that construction which accorded with Australia’s obligations under the particular treaty,²³⁶ while a statute generally had to be interpreted as far as its language permitted so that it was in conformity and not in conflict with the

established rules of international law.²³⁷ Indeed, the Court felt that a narrow conception of ambiguity in this context should be rejected.²³⁸ Referring to *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind*,²³⁹ the Court stated that this principle was no more than a canon of construction and did not import the terms of the treaty into municipal law.²⁴⁰ Moving beyond this approach, which is generally consistent with common law doctrines, the majority of the Court took the view that ratification of a convention itself would constitute an adequate foundation for a legitimate expectation (unless there were statutory or executive indications to the contrary) that administrative decision-makers would act in conformity with the unincorporated but ratified convention.²⁴¹ This particular proposition is controversial in legal doctrine, but is an interesting example of the fact that internal decision-makers may not always be expected to be immune from the influence of obligations undertaken by the state.²⁴²

There are further signs of an increasingly flexible approach. For example, in *Hosking & Hosking v. Runting and Pacific Magazines NZ Ltd*,²⁴³ the New Zealand Court of Appeal referred to the ‘increasing recognition of the need to develop the common law consistently with international treaties to which New Zealand is a party. That is an international trend. The historical approach to the State’s international obligations as having no part in the domestic law unless incorporated by statute is now recognised as too rigid.’ Further, the Canadian Supreme Court, in noting that genocide was a crime in both customary international law and treaty law, declared that international law was therefore called upon to play a crucial role as an aid in interpreting domestic law, particularly as regards the elements of the crime of incitement to genocide, and emphasised the importance of interpreting domestic law in a

manner that accorded with the principles of customary international law and with Canada's treaty obligations.²⁴⁴ This, however, would go further than most common law states would accept.

Although the basic approach adopted by the majority of common law states is clear, complications have arisen where the country in question has a written constitution, whether or not specific reference is made therein to the treatment of international agreements. The use of international law in interpreting the Constitution has occasioned much debate in Australia.²⁴⁵ In *Ahmed Ali Al-Kateb v. Godwin*, for example, two judges of the High Court of Australia came to radically different conclusions. One judge regarded the view that the Constitution should be read consistently with the rules of international law as 'heretical',²⁴⁶ while another declared that 'opinions that seek to cut off contemporary Australian law (including constitutional law) from the persuasive force of international law are doomed to fail'.²⁴⁷ This debate reflects differing approaches to constitutional interpretation.²⁴⁸

The Indian Constitution refers only in the vaguest of terms to the provisions of international law,²⁴⁹ whereas by contrast the Irish Constitution clearly states that the country will not be bound by any treaty involving a charge upon public funds unless the terms of the agreement have been approved by the Dáil.²⁵⁰ Under article 169(3) of the Cyprus Constitution, treaties concluded in accordance with that provision have, as from publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic, 'superior force to any municipal law on condition that such treaties, conventions and agreements are applied by the other party thereto'.²⁵¹ In such cases where there is a written constitution, serious questions of constitutional law may be involved, and one would have

to consider the situation as it arises and within its own political context.²⁵² But in general common law states tend to adopt the British approach.

(ii) Civil Law Systems

The practice of those states which possess the civil law system, based originally on Roman law, manifests certain differences.²⁵³ The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany,²⁵⁴ for example, specifically states in article 25 that ‘the general rules of public international law are an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.’²⁵⁵ This provision, which not only treats international law as part of municipal law, but regards it as superior to municipal legislation, has been the subject of a great deal of controversy as writers and lawyers have tried to establish whether international legal rules would invalidate any inconsistent municipal legislation and, indeed, whether international rules could override the constitution. Similarly, the phrase ‘general rules of public international law’ has led to problems over interpretation as it may refer to all aspects of international law, including customary and treaty rules, or merely general principles common to all, or perhaps only certain nations.²⁵⁶ German courts will seek to interpret domestic law consistently with international law.²⁵⁷

As far as treaties are concerned, the German federal courts will regard these as superior to domestic legislation, though they will not be allowed to operate so as to affect the constitution. Article 59 of the Basic Law declares that treaties which regulate the political relations of the federation or relate to matters of federal legislation shall require the consent or participation, in the

form of a federal law, of the bodies competent in any specific case for such federal legislation. Thereafter such treaties will be treated as incorporated into German law, but with the status (no higher) of a federal law. Such laws may indeed be challenged before the German courts by means of a constitutional complaint if the treaty in question contains provisions directly encroaching upon the legal sphere of the individual.²⁵⁸ In its Decision of 15 December 2015, the German Constitutional Court (second Senate) confirmed that by a process of ‘treaty override’ the German Parliament, in the light of the constitutional principle of democracy, was able to make or amend a law, even if this violated an international treaty ratified by a previous Parliament.²⁵⁹

Article 91(1) of the Netherlands Constitution 1983 requires the prior approval of Parliament before treaties, or their denunciation, become binding, while article 91(3) provides that any provisions of a treaty that conflict with the Constitution or which lead to conflicts with it may be approved by the Chambers of the Parliament, provided that at least two-thirds of the votes cast are in favour. Article 93 states that provisions of treaties and of decisions by international organisations which may be binding by virtue of their contents are to become binding after they have been published, while article 94 provides that statutory regulations in force within the kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or with resolutions by international institutions.²⁶⁰ Customary international law is not referred to in the Constitution. It is deemed to apply internally, although it seems that statute will prevail in cases of conflict.²⁶¹ It is for the courts to establish whether the provisions of a

treaty or decision by an international organisation are binding on all persons within the meaning of articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution.²⁶²

In a provision contained in other constitutions, article 10 of the Italian Constitution of 1947 stipulates that the Italian legal order ‘shall conform with the generally recognised rules of international law’. This is interpreted to indicate that international customary law will override inconsistent ordinary national legislation.²⁶³ In *Judgment No. 238–2014*, the Italian Constitutional Court held that international customary law obligations on state immunity from jurisdiction could be applied automatically within the Italian legal order, but only as long as they were in conformity with the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution.²⁶⁴

Article 8(1) of the Portuguese Constitution provides that the rules and principles of general or customary international law are an integral part of Portuguese law,²⁶⁵ while under article 87 of Poland’s Constitution of 1997, a ratified international treaty, equal to a statute, is one of the sources of law.²⁶⁶ The Supreme Court of Belgium has taken the view that directly effective treaty provisions have superiority over the Constitution,²⁶⁷ as well as over a conflicting legislative act.²⁶⁸

The French Constitution of 1958 declares that treaties duly ratified and published shall operate as laws within the domestic system.²⁶⁹ However, the Constitution provides that, although in principle it is the President of the Republic who negotiates and ratifies ordinary treaties under article 52, with regard to important treaties such as peace treaties, commercial treaties which entail some form of financial outlay, treaties relating to international

organisations, treaties modifying legislation, treaties involving the cession, exchange or acquiring of territory and treaties affecting personal status, ratification must take place by Act of Parliament, thus effectively approximating this to the common law dualist approach (article 53). Once the relevant legislation has been passed, the agreement is promulgated and becomes binding upon the courts. Article 55 of the Constitution provides that duly ratified or approved treaties or agreements shall upon publication override domestic laws, subject only to the application of the treaty or agreement by the other party or parties to the treaty.²⁷⁰ It is also now accepted that the French courts may declare a statute inapplicable for conflicting with an earlier treaty.²⁷¹ However, the Cour de Cassation has held that the supremacy of international agreements in the domestic order does not extend to constitutional provisions.²⁷²

In 1993, South Africa adopted a new (interim) constitution.²⁷³ Whereas the previous constitutions of 1910, 1961 and 1983 had been silent on the question of international law, the 1993 Constitution contained several relevant provisions. These provisions were considered and refined by the Constitutional Assembly, which on 8 May 1996 adopted a new constitution.²⁷⁴

Section 231(1) of this Constitution provides that the negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive, while such an agreement would only bind the Republic after approval by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces.²⁷⁵ Any international agreement becomes domestic law when enacted into law by national legislation, although a self-executing provision

of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.²⁷⁶

Section 232 provides that customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, while section 233 stipulates that when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation which is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. It is also to be particularly noted that section 200(2) of the Constitution states that the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people, ‘in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force’.²⁷⁷ In *Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Others*,²⁷⁸ the High Court of South Africa examined section 231 in the context of the purported withdrawal of South Africa from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The South African Constitution contained no explicit provision on withdrawal from treaties, but since section 231(2) of the Constitution required Parliamentary approval for treaties subject to ratification, the Court found that it could be inferred that this provision required the consent of Parliament to withdraw from such treaties. In these circumstances, the government’s notice of withdrawal was unconstitutional and invalid.²⁷⁹

The Russian Federation adopted a new constitution in 1993.²⁸⁰ Under article 86, the President negotiates and signs treaties and signs the ratification documents, while under article 106 the Federal Council (the upper chamber of the federal parliament) must consider those federal laws adopted by the State Duma (the lower chamber) that concern the ratification and

denunciation of international agreements. The Constitutional Court may review the constitutionality of treaties not yet in force (article 125(2)) and treaties that conflict with the Constitution are not to be given effect (article 125(6)). Article 15(4) of the Constitution provides that ‘the generally recognised principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall constitute part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply’. Thus, both treaty law and customary law²⁸¹ are incorporated into Russian law, while treaty rules have a higher status than domestic laws, but not superior to the Constitution.²⁸² The Constitutional Court takes the view that customary international law and international treaties ratified by Russia are norms incorporated into Russian law.²⁸³ It has also noted that an international decision, in this case a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, deemed explicitly or implicitly contrary to the Constitution cannot be implemented. In such a case, the task of the Court was to find a reasonable balance in order to give effect to the letter and spirit of the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment without conflicting with the Constitution.²⁸⁴

Under article 73(3) of the Japanese Constitution of 1946,²⁸⁵ the Cabinet has authority to conclude treaties with the prior or subsequent approval of the Diet, although executive agreements may be entered into without such approval, usually by simple exchange of notes. Promulgation of a treaty takes place by publication in the Official Gazette under the name of the Emperor once the Diet has approved and the Cabinet ratified the agreement (article 7). Article 98(2) provides that ‘treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed’ and this provision is taken as

incorporating international law, both relevant treaty and customary law, into Japan's legal system.²⁸⁶ Japan has also experienced some difficulty²⁸⁷ in the context of the relative definition of self-governing and non-self-governing treaties.

China's role in international law has been growing significantly.²⁸⁸ It emphasises the five principles of peaceful co-existence (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence) and the concept of 'one country, two systems' by which Hong Kong and Macao returned to Chinese sovereignty, but with a different economic order.²⁸⁹ China has also become increasingly involved in international affairs, from underlining its maritime rights in such areas as the South China and the East China seas to developing the 'belt and road initiative', by which substantial investment is being made in transportation and other facilities across the world.²⁹⁰

China's Constitution (as amended in 2004)²⁹¹ makes no explicit mention of the position of international law in the domestic legal order, although article 67 provides that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has the power to decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states (paragraph 14) and to decide, when the National People's Congress is not in session, on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of an armed attack on the country or in fulfilment of international treaty obligations concerning common defence against aggression (paragraph 18). However, a number of substantive treaty obligations undertaken by China have been incorporated into special national laws and treaties are concluded in accordance with the law on the

Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties 1990. In principle, international treaties to which China is a party have binding force in domestic law, except for those provisions to which China has made reservations. The Legislation Law 2000 provides that the Constitution ranks the highest in domestic law, followed by laws, administrative regulations and local regulations. There is no reference to international law in this legislation. There are over seventy domestic laws which contain specific provisions regarding treaty obligations.²⁹² Further, the principle whereby a domestic provision is to be interpreted consistently with international law also operates.²⁹³

(iii) Conclusion

This survey of the attitudes adopted by various countries of the common law and civil law traditions leads to a few concluding remarks. The first of these is that a strict adherence to either the monist or the dualist position will not suffice. Most countries accept the operation of customary rules within their own jurisdictions, providing there is no conflict with existing laws, and some will allow international law to prevail over municipal provisions in certain circumstances. One can regard this as a significant element in extending the principles and protection of international law, whether or not it is held that the particular provision permitting this, whether by constitutional enactment or by case-law, illustrates the superiority of municipal law in so acting. In noting this, it must be emphasised that an increasing number of states now subject the incorporation of customary international law to the supremacy of constitutional provisions or principles. The concept of the automatic incorporation of customary international law into domestic law is now to be

seen as an insufficient description of what actually happens within municipal legal systems.

The situation as regards treaties is much more complex, as different attitudes are maintained by different states. In some countries, certain treaties will operate internally by themselves (self-executing), while others must undergo a process of domestic legalisation. There are countries where legislation is needed for virtually all international agreements: for example, Belgium.²⁹⁴ It is by no means settled as a general principle whether treaties prevail over domestic rules. Some countries allow treaties to supersede all municipal laws, whether made earlier or later than the agreement. Others, such as Norway, adopt the opposite stance. Where there are written constitutions, an additional complicating factor is introduced and some reasonably stable hierarchy incorporating ordinary laws, constitutional provisions and international law has to be maintained. This is particularly so where a federal system is in operation. It will be up to the individual country to adopt its own list of preferences.²⁹⁵

Of course, such diverse attitudes can lead to confusion, but in the light of the present state of international law, it is inevitable that its enforcement and sphere of activity will become entangled with the ideas and practices of municipal law. Indeed, it is precisely because of the inadequate enforcement facilities that lie at the disposal of international law that one must consider the relationship with municipal law as of more than marginal importance. This is because the extent to which domestic courts apply the rules of international law may well determine the effectiveness of international legislation and judicial decision-making.

However, to declare that international legal rules therefore prevail over all relevant domestic legislation at all times is incorrect in the vast majority of cases and would be to overlook the real in the face of the ideal. States jealously guard their prerogatives, and few are more meaningful than the ability to legislate free from outside control; and, of course, there are democratic implications. The consequent supremacy of municipal legal systems over international law in the domestic sphere is not exclusive, but it does exist as an undeniable general principle.

It is pertinent to refer here briefly to the impact of the European Union.²⁹⁶ Article 3(5) of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that in its relations with the wider world the Union shall uphold and promote its values and shall contribute to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the UN Charter. The European Court of Justice has underlined that the European Union must respect international law, including customary international law. For example, in *Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change*, the Court noted that in the light of article 3(5), when the Union ‘adopts an act, it is bound to observe international law in its entirety, including customary international law, which is binding upon the institutions of the European Union’.²⁹⁷ Further, it was emphasised that the principles of customary international law ‘may be relied upon by an individual for the purpose of the Court’s examination of the validity of an act of the European Union in so far as, first, those principles are capable of calling into question the competence of the European Union to adopt that act . . . and, second, the act in question is liable to affect rights

which the individual derives from European Union law or to create obligations under European Union law in his regard'.²⁹⁸

In terms of the relationship between EU law and national law, the European Court of Justice has held that Community law has supremacy over ordinary national law,²⁹⁹ and indeed over domestic constitutional law.³⁰⁰ In addition to the treaties creating the European Community,³⁰¹ there is a great deal of secondary legislation issuing forth from its institutions, which can apply to the member states. This takes the form of regulations, decisions or directives. Of these, the first two are directly applicable and enforceable within each of the countries concerned without the need for enabling legislation. While it is true that the legislation for this type of activity has been passed – for example, section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972³⁰² in the United Kingdom, which permits in advance this form of indirect law-making, and is thus assimilated into municipal law – the fact remains that the member states have accepted an extraterritorial source of law, binding in certain circumstances upon them. The effect is thus that directly effective Community law has precedence over inconsistent UK legislation. This was confirmed by the House of Lords in *Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport*.³⁰³ It was further noted that one of the consequences of UK entry into the European Communities and the European Communities Act 1972 was that an interim injunction could be granted, the effect of which would be to suspend the operation of a statute on the grounds that the legislation in question allegedly infringed Community law. This is one illustration of the major effect which joining the Community has had in terms of the English legal system and previously accepted legal principles. The mistake, however, should not be made of generalising from this specific relationship to the

sphere of international law as a whole. The United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union on 31 January 2020.³⁰⁴

Non-Justiciability, Act of State and Related Doctrines

An issue is justiciable basically if it can be tried according to law.³⁰⁵ In this context, there must be a presumption of competence for the court to hear a matter brought before it in a manner consistent with the relevant procedural rules. There are, however, a number of principles of constraint, flowing from constitutional law and/or international law, which impact upon this presumption. These include, for example, the rule against the enforcement of foreign penal, revenue or public laws.³⁰⁶

Matters that are accepted constitutionally as falling within the exclusive competence of the executive branch of government are not justiciable before the courts. Accordingly, the test as to whether a matter is or is not justiciable involves an illumination of that grey area where the spheres of executive and judiciary merge and overlap. Recent years have seen a significant reduction in the sphere of exclusive competence of the executive free from judicial oversight and a number of important cases have sought to redraw the boundary, reflecting the increasing transparency of society in a number of states, as well as the vast increase in the availability of relevant information. The rise in the scope of justiciability also reflects the decline in the absolute nature of the sovereignty of foreign states as a concept restricting the competence of domestic courts to hear cases with a foreign element and the switch to concern with the internal constitutional balance with the state. As

part of the latter dynamic is the move to restrain and limit the power of the state to adopt decisions that cannot be reviewed by the courts.

Non-justiciability as a concept is associated but not identical with the doctrine of act of state, which generally concerns the activities of the executive in relations with the sovereign acts of foreign states.³⁰⁷ In the context of international law and municipal courts, non-justiciability refers particularly to the doctrine that no state can exercise jurisdiction over another state.³⁰⁸ As such, it is based upon the principles of the sovereignty and equality of states.³⁰⁹ Non-justiciability acts as an evidential bar, since an issue cannot be raised or proved, in contrast to sovereign immunity, another doctrine of constraint, which provides that the courts cannot exercise the jurisdiction that exists with regard to the matter in question due to the status of the entity or individual concerned, although it is open to the state concerned to waive its immunity and thus remove the jurisdictional bar.³¹⁰ Non-justiciability will usually concern a clear inter-state relationship or situation which is impleaded in a seemingly private action, while immunity issues will invariably arise out of a state–private party relationship not usually relating to inter-state activities as such.³¹¹ Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear whether the consequence of a finding of non-justiciability is that the claim to this effect is struck out with the possibility that a defence relying upon it is deprived of one of its arguments (or indeed the only one) or whether the otherwise justiciable claim is struck out on the ground that it cannot fairly be tried in the absence of the non-justiciable defence. Authority would seem to favour the latter.³¹²

The concept of non-justiciability is essentially a composite doctrine with a number of manifestations. There are primarily two sources. The first is the internal, constitutional aspect, being the prerogative of the executive in the areas of foreign policy and national defence,³¹³ where it is essentially a rule of law principle in a democratic system of government delineating the separation of powers,³¹⁴ to respect for the sovereignty and independence of foreign states.³¹⁵ Accordingly, both domestic and foreign executive acts are covered, but from the perspective of the government and its competence constitutionally.³¹⁶ Thus, the courts will refuse, or at the least be extremely reluctant, to adjudicate upon an exercise of sovereign power, such as making war and peace, making international treaties or ceding territory.³¹⁷ This would include the definition of territories within the United Kingdom,³¹⁸ as well as the conduct of foreign affairs.³¹⁹ Lord Hoffmann held in *R v. Jones* that ‘the making of war and peace and the disposition of the armed forces has always been regarded as a discretionary power of the Crown into the exercise of which the courts will not enquire’.³²⁰ This was cited with approval by Lord Mance in *Keyu v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*.³²¹

The second aspect relates to the acts of foreign states and relies upon the international law principles of sovereignty and legal equality of states. Lord Wilberforce, in the classic statement on the doctrine, declared in *Buttes Gas and Oil Company v. Hammer (No. 3)*:³²²

there exists in English law a general principle
that the courts will not adjudicate upon the
transactions of foreign sovereign states . . . it

seems desirable to consider this principle . . .
not as a variety of 'act of state' but one for
judicial restraint or abstention.³²³

Such a principle was not one of discretion, but inherent in the nature of the judicial process. It flows not from internal constitutional concerns, but from the character of the international system. Although the *Buttes Gas and Oil* case concerned litigation in the areas of libel and conspiracy, the House of Lords felt that a determination of the issue would have involved the court in reviewing the transactions of four sovereign states and having to find that part of those transactions was contrary to international law. Quite apart from the possibility of embarrassment to the foreign relations of the executive, about which one needs to be cautious,³²⁴ there were no judicial or manageable standards by which to judge such issues.³²⁵ This is because such international decisions were taken in the light not just of international law, but also of policy and politics.³²⁶ It has been held, for example, that judicial review would not be appropriate in a matter which would have serious international repercussions and which was more properly the sphere of diplomacy.³²⁷ It has also been held that the courts could not adjudicate upon the claimed international law fishing rights of Mauritius within the waters of the British Indian Ocean Territory in the absence of that state as a party to the case.³²⁸ The acts in question had to be of a sovereign rather than of a commercial nature and performed within the territory of a foreign state. The Court of Appeal has noted that the keeping and disposal of foreign bank notes for commercial purposes in the United Kingdom could not be treated as sovereign acts so as to bring the activity within the protection of the *Buttes*

Gas and Oil non-justiciability doctrine.³²⁹ Legislation can, of course, impinge upon the question as to whether an issue is or is not justiciable,³³⁰ while the State Immunity Act 1978 removed sovereign immunity for commercial transactions, thus rendering the state subject to the jurisdiction of the court.³³¹ One of the questions that the Court of Appeal addressed in *Maclaine Watson v. International Tin Council*³³² was whether in such circumstances the doctrine of non-justiciability survived. It was emphasised that the two concepts of immunity and non-justiciability had to be kept separate and concern was expressed that the *Buttes Gas and Oil* non-justiciability principle could be used to prevent proceedings being brought against states in commercial matters, contrary to the Act.³³³ Further, the English courts are likely to decline to seek to determine an issue where this could be ‘damaging to the public interest in the field of international relations, national security or defence’.³³⁴ Lord Bingham noted in *R v. Jones* that the courts would be ‘very slow to adjudicate upon rights arising out of transactions entered into between sovereign states on the plane of international law’.³³⁵

The issue of justiciability was discussed in *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry* both by the Court of Appeal³³⁶ and by the House of Lords³³⁷ in the context of the creation of the collapsed International Tin Council by a group of states by a treaty which was unincorporated into English law. Kerr LJ emphasised that the doctrine in this context rested upon the principles that unincorporated treaties do not form part of the law of England and that such international agreements were not contracts which the courts could enforce.³³⁸ However, this did not prevent reference to an unincorporated treaty where it was necessary or convenient,

for example in order to assess the legal nature of the International Tin Council.³³⁹ Lord Oliver in the House of Lords decision, in reaffirming the essence of the doctrine of non-justiciability, noted that it was

axiomatic that municipal courts have not and cannot have the competence to adjudicate upon or to enforce the rights arising out of transactions entered into by independent sovereign states between themselves on the plane of international law.³⁴⁰

However, this did not mean that the court must never look at or construe a treaty. A treaty could be examined as a part of the factual background against which a particular issue has arisen.³⁴¹ It was pointed out that the creation of the International Tin Council by a group of states was a sovereign act and that the adjudication of the rights and obligations between the member states of the Council and the Council itself could only be undertaken on the international plane.³⁴² In other words, the situation appeared to involve not only the *Buttes Gas and Oil* form of non-justiciability concerning transactions involving foreign states, but also non-justiciability on the basis of an unincorporated treaty,³⁴³ a question which crosses the distinction between constitutional and international non-justiciability.

Hoffmann LJ in *Littrell v. United States (No. 2)*³⁴⁴ pointed out in the context of a Status of Forces Agreement (providing for the placement of NATO troops in the United Kingdom) that the courts could look at such agreement to ensure that the foreign troops were here by invitation since the conclusion

of a treaty was as much a fact as any other,³⁴⁵ but this could not be taken to mean that the courts would actually enforce the terms of an unincorporated treaty. Additionally, it would not be open to the courts to determine whether a foreign sovereign state had broken a treaty.³⁴⁶ The basic position is that: ‘Ordinarily speaking, English courts will not rule upon the true meaning and effect of international instruments which apply only at the level of international law.’³⁴⁷ However, the rule is not absolute.³⁴⁸ The courts are willing to look at the terms of an unincorporated treaty in specific situations: first, as noted above, in order to ascertain certain facts such as the existence and terms of, and the parties to, a treaty or where the treaty in question is incorporated into a contract or referred to in domestic legislation and is necessary to a particular decision; and, secondly, where the national courts have to adjudicate upon the interpretation of a particular international treaty in order to determine private rights and obligations under domestic law.³⁴⁹ The latter proposition would operate, for example, with regard to extradition and asylum cases where a view has to be taken with regard to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 as a result of domestic legislation, the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996.³⁵⁰ In *Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company*, the Court of Appeal, while affirming this principle, emphasised that context was always important, so that a treaty intended by its signatories to give rise to rights in favour of private investors capable of enforcement under the treaty in consensual arbitration against one or other of its signatory states in domestic proceedings would fall within this exception and thus be justiciable.³⁵¹ The exception to non-justiciability laid down in the *Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* and *Occidental* cases was reaffirmed in *AY Bank Ltd v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Others*,³⁵² where it was held that the right to prove in the liquidation of a

joint venture bank in the United Kingdom (involving the National Bank of Yugoslavia), upon the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its National Bank and consequential apportionment among the successor states, arose in domestic law, so that the existence of the Agreement on Succession Issues, signed by the successor states formally apportioning the assets and debts of the Former Yugoslavia, did not render the question non-justiciable.

Further, a treaty may be rendered justiciable where a government or public official expressly states that he or she has taken such treaty into consideration in reaching a decision or justifies the decision in relation to the terms of the treaty.³⁵³

It will thus be seen that the principle of non-justiciability operates across two planes. In the first, it functions as a constitutional principle based on the separation of powers as between the executive and the judiciary. This is founded upon the norm of democratic governance, but also constitutes a recognition that in certain situations only the executive has access to the special information and expertise relevant to the particular circumstances.³⁵⁴ This would cover the allocation of determining authority in certain limited areas, such as resort to the use of force, as well as the reluctance to permit indirect legislation by virtue of the automatic incorporation of treaties. In this area, it is clear that the scope of the non-justiciable prerogative has been narrowing significantly and this simply reflects political changes within society where the mere invocation of, for example, the Crown Prerogative no longer suffices as such to withdraw the matter from the competence of the court to review decisions.

In the second instance, non-justiciability is a reflection of the sovereignty and equality of states, with the consequential requirement in general principle that the courts of one state cannot sit in judgment upon the sovereign acts of another state. This category is also shrinking as the emphasis in the justification for non-justiciability flows towards constitutional concerns. Further, there may be a distinction between an executive act on the international plane and the consequences of this act in domestic law. For example, in *The Freedom and Justice Party v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*,³⁵⁵ the Court of Appeal noted that while recognition by the Foreign Office of a special mission from abroad was not justiciable, the actual question of the immunity granted was a matter subject to the jurisdiction of the court. This reflects the argument in cases such as the *Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* and *AY Bank* cases discussed above, where the courts will look at questions which it sees as necessary in order to determine private rights or, in other words, where the apparently non-justiciable element has ‘no foothold in domestic law’³⁵⁶ or ‘no domestic foothold’.³⁵⁷

The precise relationship between non-justiciability and act of state is unclear. On the one hand, the view is taken that the two concepts are separate from each other,³⁵⁸ while on the other, the approach has been expressed that the two are part of the same principle.³⁵⁹ The principle of non-justiciability must exist in an international system founded upon sovereign and formally equal states.³⁶⁰ Having said that, there is no doubt that the extent of the doctrine is open to question. While the courts would regard a question concerning the constitutionality of a foreign government as non-justiciable³⁶¹ and would not as a general rule inquire into the validity of acts done in a sovereign capacity,

such as the constitutionality of foreign laws,³⁶² the latter proposition may be subject to limitation.³⁶³ The House of Lords addressed the question in *Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company*.³⁶⁴ Lord Nicholls noted that in appropriate circumstances it was legitimate for an English court to have regard to the content of international law in deciding whether to recognise a foreign law and it did not flow inevitably from the non-justiciability principle that the judiciary must ignore a breach of international law committed by one state against another ‘where the breach is plain and, indeed, acknowledged’.³⁶⁵ In such cases, the difficulty discussed by Lord Wilberforce in *Buttes Gas and Oil* concerning the lack of judicial or manageable standards by which to deal with a sovereignty dispute between two foreign states did not apply.³⁶⁶ The acceptability of a provision of foreign law had to be judged by contemporary standards and the courts had to give effect to clearly established rules of international law.³⁶⁷ Where foreign legislation was adopted consequential upon a fundamental breach of international law (such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and seizure of its assets), enforcement or recognition of such law by the courts would be ‘manifestly contrary to the public policy of English law’. Further, it was emphasised that international law recognised that a national court may decline to give effect to legislative and other acts of foreign states which are in violation of international law.³⁶⁸ Lord Steyn noted that the extension of the public policy exception to recognition of foreign laws from human rights violations to ‘flagrant breaches of international law’ was correct. Reference was made to the UN Charter, binding Security Council resolutions and international opinion in general.³⁶⁹ Lord Hope emphasised that ‘very narrow limits must be placed on any exception to the act of state rule’, but there was no need for restraint on grounds of public policy ‘where it is plain beyond

dispute that a clearly established norm of international law has been violated'.³⁷⁰ He concluded that 'a legislative act by a foreign state which is in flagrant breach of clearly established rules of international law ought not to be recognised by the courts of this country as forming part of the *lex situs* of that state'.³⁷¹

The courts may thus not feel constrained in expressing their views as to foreign sovereign activities where a breach of international law, particularly human rights, is involved³⁷² and may not feel constrained from investigating, in a dispute involving private rights, the legal validity of an act done by a citizen purporting to act on behalf of the sovereign or sovereign state, this being distinct from examining the legal validity of an act of an undisputed sovereign.³⁷³ It is clear that the courts will regard as non-justiciable policy decisions by the government concerning relationships with friendly foreign states, on the basis that foreign policy is pre-eminently an area for the government and not the courts.³⁷⁴ In particular, a number of cases have laid down the proposition that decisions taken by the executive in its dealings with foreign states regarding the protection of British citizens abroad are non-justiciable.³⁷⁵

This approach, however, is subject to some qualification.³⁷⁶ This concerns in particular the evolving law of judicial review³⁷⁷ both with regard to its scope concerning the executive and in terms of 'legitimate expectation',³⁷⁸ or a reasonable expectation that a regular practice will continue. Where diplomatic protection of a national abroad is concerned, the Court of Appeal has noted: 'The Secretary of State must be free to give full weight to foreign policy considerations, which are not justiciable. However, this does not mean

the whole process is immune from judicial scrutiny. The citizen's legitimate expectation is that his request will be "considered", and that in that consideration all relevant factors will be thrown into the balance.'³⁷⁹ Taylor LJ referred, for example, in *Ex parte Everett* to the 'normal expectation of every citizen' that, if he were subjected abroad to a violation of a fundamental right, the British government would not simply wash their hands of the matter and abandon him to his fate.³⁸⁰ The Court in *Abbasi* concluded that judicial review would lie where the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, contrary to its stated policy, refused even to consider whether to make diplomatic representations on behalf of a subject whose fundamental rights were being violated. However, beyond this, no general proposition could be stated, being dependent upon the precise circumstances. In particular, there was no enforceable duty to protect the citizen, only a discretion.³⁸¹ In *R (Al-Rawi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*, the Court of Appeal denied that any such legitimate expectation as to the exercise of discretion would extend to the position of non-nationals.³⁸²

The approach to non-justiciability was further examined by the Supreme Court in *Shergill v. Khaira*.³⁸³ In a judgment by Lords Neuberger, Sumption and Hodge (with which Lords Mance and Clarke agreed), reference was made to the *Buttes Gas and Oil* case,³⁸⁴ where the issue in question was non-justiciable because it was political and it was political for two reasons: first, since it trespassed on the proper province of the executive, as the organ of the state charged with the conduct of foreign relations; and, secondly, because of the absence of judicial or manageable standards. This was because the dispute in question had been resolved by the four states concerned 'by a mixture of diplomacy, political pressure and force' and to deal with the

claimant's argument would involve the Court in 'assessing decisions and acts of sovereign states which had not been governed by law but by power politics'.³⁸⁵ The Supreme Court held that non-justiciable cases generally fell into one of two categories. The first comprised cases where the issue in question was beyond the constitutional competence assigned to the courts under the concept of the separation of powers. Cases in this category were 'rare, and rightly so, for they may result in a denial of justice which could only exceptionally be justified either at common law or under article 6 of the Human Rights Convention'. The paradigm cases would be the non-justiciability of certain transactions of foreign states and of proceedings in Parliament. The distinctive feature of all these cases, it was noted, was that once the 'forbidden area' is identified, the court 'may not adjudicate on the matters within it, even if it was necessary to do so in order to decide some other issue which is itself unquestionably justiciable'.

The second category comprised claims or defences which were based neither on private legal rights or obligations, nor on reviewable matters of public law. Examples here would include: domestic disputes; transactions not intended by the participants to affect their legal relations; and issues of international law which engage no private right of the claimant or reviewable question of public law. Where the court was asked to decide them in the abstract, they might well be non-justiciable. However, they would be justiciable where their resolution was necessary in order to decide some other issue which was in itself justiciable. The best-known examples are in the domain of public law. Where no legal right of the citizen was engaged in public or private law, then the courts would decline to adjudicate, but the court would adjudicate if a justifiable legitimate expectation or European

Human Rights Convention right depended upon it, similarly where a private law liability was asserted which depended on such a matter.³⁸⁶ Also relevant in such issues in particular circumstances might be the question of temporal jurisdiction or time bar questions, where the court may decline to adjudicate on the basis of a procedural time hurdle.³⁸⁷ In addition, while sovereign or state immunity may be waived, the principles of act of state or non-justiciability cannot.³⁸⁸

The issue was thoroughly examined by the Supreme Court in *Belhaj and Rahmatullah (No. 1)*,³⁸⁹ where it was emphasised that whether an issue was or was not non-justiciable had to be considered on a case-by-case basis. It was both fact- and issue-sensitive.³⁹⁰ The key was whether the issue was of a sovereign, international or inter-state nature upon which a domestic court could not or should not appropriately adjudicate; in essence, could a domestic judge deal with the matter or should it be more appropriately dealt with on the international level?³⁹¹ The Court distinguished between private law, ‘traditional’ or ‘municipal’ forms of foreign act of state in respect of legislation, property and other acts within the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the state in question on the one hand, which would be non-justiciable,³⁹² and a different common law doctrine of judicial restraint on the other, which applied to the wider interactions of foreign states on the international stage. The latter doctrine was based both on international comity in the relationships between states and on the domestic constitutional principle of the separation of powers.³⁹³ As Lord Neuberger stated, there are ‘issues which are inappropriate for the courts of the United Kingdom to resolve because they involve a challenge to the lawfulness of the act of a foreign state which is of such a nature that a municipal judge cannot or ought not rule on it. Thus, the

courts of this country will not interpret or question dealings between sovereign states.’³⁹⁴ At the core of such non-justiciability lay the use of armed force by one state against another.³⁹⁵ However, it was agreed that public policy considerations (such as violations of fundamental human rights) were relevant as an exception to non-justiciability or, arguably, as a part of its structure.³⁹⁶ In *Ukraine v. Law Debenture Trust*,³⁹⁷ the Court of Appeal underlined this judgment, noting that Ukraine’s defence of duress in the case constituted acts of high policy by Russia in the sphere of international relations in the exercise of sovereign authority. However, the public policy exception was held to apply for a number of cumulative reasons, including the facts that Russia had chosen to submit to the jurisdiction of the English courts; that this was not a case of the absence of judicial or manageable standards as the English courts were well capable of construing treaty obligations and general obligations of states under international law; that there would be no conflict with the government’s conduct of foreign affairs bearing in mind the UK position with regard to the seizure of Crimea; and, finally, that ‘there is an especially strong public policy in this country that no country should be able to take advantage of its own violation of norms of *ius cogens*’.³⁹⁸

The approach that had been adopted in *Abbasi* was approved in *Kaunda v. President of South Africa* by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which noted: ‘A decision as to whether, and if so, what protection should be given, is an aspect of foreign policy which is essentially the function of the executive.’³⁹⁹ This did not mean that the South African courts had no jurisdiction to deal with issues concerned with diplomatic protection. Since the exercise of all public power was subject to constitutional control, this

would also apply to an allegation that the government has failed to respond appropriately to a request for diplomatic protection. If, for instance, the decision were to be irrational or made in bad faith, the court could intervene to require the government to deal with the matter properly.⁴⁰⁰

Australian courts also have emphasised the importance of separation of powers and the need for courts to exercise considerable caution with regard to foreign policy, expressly citing the *Buttes Gas and Oil* case.⁴⁰¹ The question of justiciability was one for the federal judicial branch.⁴⁰² It has been noted, for example, that any question of a dispute as to the assessment made by the executive and legislative branches of government of the ‘terrorist threat’ to the safety of the public would not be justiciable, but that this situation would change upon the adoption of relevant legislation.⁴⁰³ In *Habib v. Australia*,⁴⁰⁴ the full court of the Federal Court of Australia decided that the doctrine of non-justiciability or act of state did not prevent consideration of a case concerning an Australian citizen, alleging torture in Pakistan, Egypt and Guantanamo Bay by state officials of the respective states, in view of the serious nature of the alleged human rights abuses.

The US courts have similarly recognised the existence of areas of non-justiciability for sensitive political reasons. This is usually referred to as the ‘political question’ doctrine and operates to prevent the courts from considering issues of political delicacy in the field of foreign affairs.⁴⁰⁵ In *Greenham Women against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan*,⁴⁰⁶ for example, the Court held that a suit to prevent the US deployment of cruise missiles at an air force base in the United Kingdom constituted a non-justiciable political question, not appropriate for judicial resolution.⁴⁰⁷ Similarly, issues relating

to rights of succession to the assets of a foreign state were non-justiciable.⁴⁰⁸ Much will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. In *Linder v. Portocarrero*,⁴⁰⁹ for instance, concerning the murder of a US citizen working for the Nicaraguan government by rebel forces (the Contras), the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the political question doctrine was not implicated since the complaint neither challenged the legitimacy of US policy on Nicaragua nor sought to require the Court to decide who was right and who was wrong in the civil war in that country. The complaint was rather narrowly focused on the lawfulness of the conduct of the defendants in a single incident. In *Koochi v. United States*,⁴¹⁰ the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the courts were not precluded from reviewing military decisions, whether taken during war or peacetime, which caused injury to US or enemy civilians. The Court in *Baker v. Carr*,⁴¹¹ the leading case on the political question doctrine, while noting that not every case touching foreign relations was non-justiciable, provided a list of six factors that might render a case non-justiciable.⁴¹² The Court of Appeals underlined in *Kadić v. Karadžić*⁴¹³ that ‘judges should not reflexively invoke these doctrines [political question and act of state doctrines] to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions in the context of human rights’. The fact that judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist would indicate that the issues involved were indeed justiciable.⁴¹⁴ In *Corrie v. Caterpillar*, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the political question doctrine was a jurisdictional issue and that the *Baker v. Carr* factors precluded justiciability, noting in particular that the provision of military assistance by the United States to foreign states constituted such a political question.⁴¹⁵ Further, in *El-Shifa v. United States*, the DC Court of Appeals, adopting a functional approach distinguishing between claims requiring the courts to

decide whether taking military action was wise (being a policy choice) on the one hand and fully justiciable claims presenting purely legal issues such as whether the government had legal authority to act on the other, held that a suit seeking review of ‘the President’s decision to launch an attack on a foreign target’ presented a non-justiciable political question,⁴¹⁶ while in *Re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation*, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the case as presenting a non-justiciable political question because adjudication ‘would express a lack of respect for the Executive Branch because of the Executive Branch’s long-standing foreign policy interest that issues relating to World War II and Nazi-era claims be resolved through intergovernmental negotiation’.⁴¹⁷

However, in *Zivotofsky v. Clinton*,⁴¹⁸ the US Supreme Court appeared to narrow the scope of the doctrine by reframing a question apparently questioning the executive’s right to define foreign policy (with regard to Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem) into one of statutory interpretation and the constitutionality of the statute in question (permitting US citizens born in Jerusalem to have their birthplace inscribed in a US passport as ‘Jerusalem, Israel’).⁴¹⁹ The first two of the *Baker* factors were specifically noted.⁴²⁰ This approach rejecting justiciability challenges where the key issues can be interpreted as ones of the constitutionality and interpretation of statutes has since been followed by the lower courts.⁴²¹

Also relevant in the context of non-justiciability is the doctrine of act of state as it operates in the United States. The *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*⁴²² provides that ‘in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreements regarding controlling legal principles, courts in the

United States will generally refrain from examining the validity of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory, or from sitting in judgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory and applicable there'.⁴²³ In *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino*,⁴²⁴ the US Supreme Court held that the act of state concept was not a rule of public international law, but related instead to internal constitutional balances.⁴²⁵ It was a rule of judicial self-restraint. The Court declared that the judicial branch would not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,⁴²⁶ irrespective of the legality in international law of that action.⁴²⁷ This basic approach was supported in a subsequent case,⁴²⁸ whereas in *Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Cuba*,⁴²⁹ the Supreme Court employed sovereign immunity concepts as the reason for not recognising the repudiation of the commercial obligations of a state instrumentality as an act of state. However, it now appears that there is an exception to the strict act of state doctrine where a relevant treaty provision between the parties specifies the standard of compensation to be payable and thus provides 'controlling legal principles'.⁴³⁰

In an important case in 1990, the Supreme Court examined anew the extent of the act of state doctrine. *Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics*⁴³¹ concerned a claim brought by an unsuccessful bidder on a Nigerian government contract in circumstances where the successful rival had bribed Nigerian officials. The Court unanimously held that the act of state doctrine did not apply since the validity of a foreign sovereign act was not at issue. The Court also made the point that act of state issues only arose when a court 'must decide – that is, when the outcome of the case turns upon – the effect of

official action by a foreign sovereign’.⁴³² While the doctrine clearly meant that a US court had to accept that the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their jurisdictions were to be deemed valid, this did not extend to cases and controversies that might embarrass foreign governments in situations falling outside this. Act of state was not to be extended.⁴³³ The act of state doctrine was not a doctrine of judicial abstention, but a rule of decision which, where applicable, requires the Court to decide cases by deeming acts of a foreign state to be valid.

Executive Certificates

There is an established practice adopted by the British courts of applying to the executive branch of government for the conclusive ascertainment of certain facts. Examples include the status of a foreign state or government, questions as to whether a state of war is in operation as regards a particular country or as between two foreign states, and whether or not a particular person is entitled to diplomatic status. This means that in such matters of state the courts will consult the government and regard the executive certificate (or Foreign Office certificate as it is sometimes called), which is issued following the request, as conclusive, irrespective of any relevant rules of international law.⁴³⁴ This was firmly acknowledged in *Duff Development Company Ltd v. Kelantan*,⁴³⁵ which concerned the status of the state of Kelantan in the Malay Peninsula and whether it was able to claim immunity in the English courts. The government declared that it was regarded as an independent state and the House of Lords noted that ‘where such a statement is forthcoming, no other evidence is admissible or needed’, and that:

it was not the business of the Court to inquire whether the Colonial Office rightly concluded that the Sultan [of Kelantan] was entitled to be recognised as a sovereign by international law.⁴³⁶

This basic position was reaffirmed in *R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Trawnik*,⁴³⁷ in which it was held that certificates under section 40(3) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and section 21 of the State Immunity Act 1978 were reviewable in the courts only if they constituted a nullity in that they were not genuine certificates or if, on their face, they had been issued outside the scope of the relevant statutory power. The contents of such certificates were conclusive of the matters contained therein and, in so far as they related to recognition of foreign states, were matters within the realm of the royal prerogative and not subject to judicial review. In *R v. Mohammed Gul*,⁴³⁸ a Foreign Office certificate was provided declaring that the conflicts in Iraq post-28 June 2004 and Afghanistan post-December 2001 constituted non-international armed conflicts. The appellant accepted this as highly persuasive, but maintained that the decision had to be one for a jury. The point was not taken further and the Court took the ‘provisional view that the Certificate was conclusive’, but that the way in which the case had developed did not require any further inquiry. In *Khurts Bat v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*,⁴³⁹ the Court treated a letter from the Foreign Office that it had not consented to the visit of a Mongolian official (in the context of a German extradition request and the claim that the person in question was on a special mission to the United Kingdom) as binding.⁴⁴⁰

Problems have arisen in the context of the decision of the United Kingdom announced in 1980 not to accord recognition to governments, but rather to treat the question of an unconstitutional change of regimes as one relating to diplomatic relations.⁴⁴¹ In *Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake and Carey (Suisse) SA*,⁴⁴² the Court was faced with a confused situation concerning whether the interim government of Somalia was actually in effective control and the extent to which other factions controlled different areas of the country. The Court noted that in reaching its decision as to whether the interim government was or was not the valid successor to the former legitimate government in the light of the degree of actual control exercised over the country, letters from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office became part of the evidence in the case. In so far as the three letters concerned statements as to what was happening in the country, ‘such letters may not be the best evidence’, but in so far as they dealt with the question as to whether and to what extent the UK government had dealings with the foreign government, such letters ‘will almost certainly be the best and only conclusive evidence of that fact’.⁴⁴³

The US State Department similarly offers ‘suggestions’ on such matters, although they tend to be more extensive than their British counterparts, and include comments upon the issues and occasionally the views of the executive rather than bare facts without legal conclusions.⁴⁴⁴ These are accepted as binding.⁴⁴⁵

Suggestions for Further Reading

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S. Fatima, *Using International Law in Domestic Courts*, Oxford, 2005

D. Feldman, 'Monism, Dualism and Constitutional Legitimacy', **20** *Australian YIL*, 1999, p. 105

International Law and Domestic Legal Systems (ed. D. Shelton), Oxford, 2011

International Law in the US Supreme Court (ed. D. L. Sloss, M. D. Ramsey and W. S. Dodge), Cambridge, 2011

C. McLachlan, *Foreign Relations Law*, Cambridge, 2014

The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (ed. C. A. Bradley), Oxford, 2019

Y. Shany, *Regulating Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts*, Oxford, 2007

¹ See generally *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, vol. I, p. 52; L. Reydam's, *Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives*, Oxford, 2004; Y. Shany, *Regulating Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts*, Oxford, 2007; *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law* (ed. C. A. Bradley), Oxford, 2019; J. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, Leiden, 1968, vol. I, p. 90; R. A. Falk, *The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order*, Princeton, 1964; H. Kelsen, *Principles of International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1966, pp. 290–4, 551–88; *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, chapter 3; H. Lauterpacht, *International Law: Collected Papers*, Cambridge, 1970, vol. I, pp. 151–77; A. Cassese, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005, chapter 12; A. Cassese, 'Modern Constitutions and International Law', **192** *HR*, 1985 **III**, p. 335; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 105; P.-M. Dupuy and Y. Kerbrat, *Droit International Public*, 14th ed., Paris, 2018, troisième partie, chapter 1; R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, chapter 12; K. Marek, 'Les Rapports entre le Droit International et le Droit Interne à la Lumière de la Jurisprudence de la CIJ', *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1962, p. 260; L. Ferrari-Bravo, 'International Law and Municipal Law: The Complementarity of Legal Systems', in *The Structure and Process of International Law* (ed. R. St J. Macdonald and D. Johnston), Dordrecht, 1983, p.

715; F. Morgenstern, 'Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law', *27 BYIL*, 1950, p. 42; B. Conforti, *International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems*, The Hague, 1993; J. G. Starke, 'Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law', *92 HR*, 1957, pp. 5, 70–80; H. Thirlway, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960–89 (Part One)', *60 BYIL*, 1989, pp. 4, 114; Report of the Committee on International Law and Municipal Law, International Law Association: Report of the Sixty-Sixth Conference, 1994, p. 326; V. Erades, *Interactions Between International and Municipal Law – a Comparative Caselaw Study*, Leiden, 1993; and V. Heiskanen, *International Legal Topics*, Helsinki, 1992, chapter 1. See also *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems* (ed. D. Shelton), Oxford, 2011; A. Nollkaemper, *National Courts and the International Rule of Law*, Oxford, 2011; and A. Nollkaemper, *New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law* (ed. J. Nijman and A. Nollkaemper), Oxford, 2007; and *International Law in Domestic Courts: A Casebook* (ed. A. Nollkaemper and A. Reinisch, with R. Janik and F. Simlinger), Oxford, 2018.

² [2006] UKHL 16; 132 ILR, p. 668. See further below, p. 126.

³ See e.g. *LaGrand*, ICJ Reports, 2001, p. 466; 134 ILR, p. 1; and *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 12; 134 ILR, p. 120.

⁴ *Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law*, IACHR, Series A, No. 16, 1999.

⁵ See e.g. *Breard v. Greene* 523 US 371 (1998); and *Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon* 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006). See also *Medillín v. Texas*, Slip Opinion, 522 US (2008).

⁶ See e.g. *R v. Jones* [2006] UKHL 16; 132 ILR, p. 668; *R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2002] EWCA Civ 1598; 126 ILR, p. 685; *R (Gentle) v. Prime Minister* [2008] 1 AC 1356; and *R v. Mohamed Gul* [2012] EWCA Crim 280.

⁷ See above, Chapters 1 and 2. See also above, **note 1**; and J. H. Jackson, 'Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis', *86 AJIL*, 1992, p. 310; N. Valticos, 'Pluralité des Ordres Juridiques et Unité de Droit International Public', in *Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century* (ed. J. Makarczyk), The Hague, 1996, p. 301; and J. Dhommeaux, 'Monismes et Dualismes en Droit International des

Droits de l'Homme', *AFDI*, 1995, p. 447. See also D. T. Bjorgvinsson, *The Intersection of International Law and Domestic Law: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis*, Cheltenham, 2015.

⁸ H. Triepel, *Völkerrecht und Landesrecht*, Berlin, 1899.

⁹ K. Strupp, 'Les Règles Générales du Droit International de la Paix', *47 HR*, 1934, p. 389. See also D. Anzilotti, *Corso di Diritto Internazionale*, 3rd ed., Rome, 1928, vol. I, pp. 43 ff.

¹⁰ See *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 53.

¹¹ Lauterpacht, *International Law*. See also H. Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights*, London, 1950.

¹² Kelsen, *Principles*, pp. 557–9. See also H. Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State*, Cambridge, 1945, pp. 363–80. Note that Scelle, for example, founds international legal monism upon an intersocial monism, essentially a sociological explanation: see Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 108.

¹³ See further above, [Chapter 2](#), p. 42.

¹⁴ G. Fitzmaurice, 'The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law', *92 HR*, 1957 II, pp. 5, 70–80; C. Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, Paris, 1979, pp. 4–16; E. Borchard, 'The Relations Between International Law and Municipal Law', *27 Virginia Law Review*, 1940, p. 137; M. S. McDougal, 'The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Orientated Perspective', in McDougal *et al.*, *Studies in World Public Order*, New Haven, 1960, p. 157; P.-M. Dupuy, 'Relations Between the International Law of Responsibility and Responsibility in Municipal Law', in *The Law of International Responsibility* (ed. J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson), Oxford, 2010, p. 173; and H. Lauterpacht, *The Development of International Law by the International Court*, London, 1958, pp. 262, 314, 332. See also A. Nollkaemper, 'Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law', *65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht*, 2010, p. 65.

¹⁵ See further as to relevant theories, Shany, *Regulating Jurisdictional Relations*, pp. 92 ff.; and Dupuy and Kerbrat, *Droit International*, pp. 462 ff.

¹⁶ See further Chapter 6, p. 302.

¹⁷ See Chapter 7, p. 346.

¹⁸ See Chapter 13, p. 712.

¹⁹ See Chapter 6, p. 247.

²⁰ See below, p. 133.

²¹ See below, p. 122.

²² See e.g. C. W. Jenks, *The Prospects of International Adjudication*, London, 1964, chapter 9; Lauterpacht, *Development of International Law*; and Morgenstern, 'Judicial Practice', pp. 43 ff. See also A. Roberts, 'Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in International Law', **61 ICLQ**, 2011, p. 57.

²³ Appended to General Assembly resolution 56/83, 2001. See further below, Chapter 13.

²⁴ Note also article 13 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States 1949, which provides that every state 'has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty', *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1949, pp. 286, 289.

²⁵ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 430 ff.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 430. But see the view of the Court in *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* that the UK as a coastal state greatly interested in North Sea fishing 'could not have been ignorant' of a relevant Norwegian decree, despite claiming that Norway's delimitation system was not known to it: ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, pp. 86, 101.

²⁷ J. B. Moore, *International Arbitrations*, New York, 1898, vol. I, pp. 495, 653. See also e.g. *Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 46, 1932, p. 167; 6 AD, p. 362; *Greco-Bulgarian Communities*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 17, 1930, p. 32; 5 AD, p. 4; and *Nottebohm*, ICJ Reports, 1955, pp. 4, 20–1; 22 ILR, pp. 349, 357–8.

²⁸ PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 44, 1932, pp. 21, 24; 6 AD, p. 209. See also *Georges Pinson*, 5 RIAA, p. 327; 4 AD, p. 9.

²⁹ ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 12, 34; 82 ILR, pp. 225, 252.

³⁰ ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 32; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 515. See also *Westland Helicopters Ltd v. Arab Organization for Industrialization* 80 ILR, pp. 595, 616.

³¹ ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 497–8; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 35–6.

³² This US federal rule of criminal law essentially prevents a claim from being heard before a federal court if it has not been presented to a state court: see ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 477–8.

³³ See also the Advisory Opinion of the IACHR on the Promulgation and Enforcement of Law in Violation of the Convention, 116 ILR, pp. 320, 332–3.

³⁴ ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 65; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 168.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60. President Bush then issued an order to the state courts to give effect to the Decision of the International Court: see 44 ILM, p. 461 (28 February 2005). The US also withdrew its acceptance of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which had provided for the jurisdiction of the International Court in cases of dispute over the convention. See also the Advisory Opinion of the IACHR, *International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention* 116 ILR, p. 320.

³⁶ ICJ Reports, 1989, pp. 15, 73–4; 84 ILR, pp. 311, 379–80. See also *Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija v. Argentina* 41 ILM, 2002, pp. 1135, 1154.

³⁷ See e.g. Jenks, *Prospects*, pp. 547–603; and K. Marek, *Droit International et Droit Interne*, Paris, 1961.

³⁸ See e.g. *Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.*, ICJ Reports, 1952, p. 93; 19 ILR, p. 507.

³⁹ PCIJ, Series A, No. 20, 1929; 5 AD, p. 466. See also *Brazilian Loans*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 21, 1929.

⁴⁰ See e.g. *Barcelona Traction* concerning the nature of a limited liability company, ICJ Reports, 1970, p. 3; 46 ILR, p. 178.

⁴¹ See e.g. *Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 10, 1925, pp. 19–21; 3 AD, p. 378. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge McNair in *South West Africa*, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 148; 17 ILR, p. 47, noting that private law institutions could not be imported into international law ‘lock, stock and barrel’; the Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice in *Barcelona Traction*, ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 66–7; 46 ILR, pp. 178, 240–1; and the Separate and Dissenting Opinion of President Cassese in *Erdemović*, Case No. IT-96-22-A, 111 ILR, pp. 298, 387 ff.

⁴² See e.g. with regard to *uti possidetis*, below, [Chapter 9](#), p. 448.

⁴³ PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926, p. 19; 3 AD, p. 5. See also *M/V Saiga (No. 2)* before the ITLOS, 120 ILR, pp. 143, 188; and *Benin v. Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 90, 125, 148. For criticism, see e.g. *Brownlie’s Principles*, pp. 52–4.

⁴⁴ See e.g. *Interpretation of the Statute of Memel*, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 49, 1932, pp. 294, 336.

⁴⁵ See e.g. *Diallo*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 639, 665, noting: ‘The Court recalls that it is for each State, in the first instance, to interpret its own domestic law. The Court does not, in principle, have the power to substitute its own interpretation for that of the national authorities, especially when that interpretation is given by the highest national courts (see, for this latter case, *Serbian Loans*, Judgment No. 14, PCIJ, Series A, No. 20, 1929, p. 46; and *Brazilian Loans*, Judgment No. 15, PCIJ, Series A, No. 21, 1929, p. 124). Exceptionally, where a State puts forward a manifestly incorrect interpretation of its domestic law, particularly for the purpose of gaining an advantage in a pending case, it is for the Court to adopt what it finds to be the proper interpretation.’

⁴⁶ See e.g. Morgenstern, ‘Judicial Practice’, pp. 48–66; and Conforti, *International Law*. See also H. Mosler, ‘L’Application du Droit International Public par les Tribunaux Nationaux’, 91 *HR*, 1957 I, p. 619; W. Wenger, ‘Réflexions sur l’Application du Droit

International Public par les Tribunaux Internes’, 72 *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1968, p. 921; E. Benvenisti, ‘Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de Droit International’s Resolution on “The Activities of National Courts and the International Relations of their State”’, 5 *EJIL*, 1994, p. 423. See also *The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts* (ed. H. P. Aust and G. Nolte), Oxford, 2016; S. Weill, *The Role of National Courts in Applying International Humanitarian Law*, Oxford, 2014; P.-H. Verdier and M. Versteeg, ‘International Law in National Legal Systems: An Empirical Investigation’, 109 *AJIL*, 2015, p. 514; A. Nollkaemper, ‘The Duality of Direct Effect of International Law’, 25 *EJIL*, 2014, p. 105; Nollkaemper and Reinisch, *International Law in Domestic Courts: A Casebook*; and International Law Association, Final Report of Study Group on the Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law, 2016.

⁴⁷ See e.g. *Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 10, 1925, p. 20; and *Finnish Ships Arbitration*, 3 RIAA, p. 1484 (1934). See further below, [Chapter 13](#).

⁴⁸ See e.g. as to requirements imposed by anti-terrorist conventions, below, [Chapter 11](#), p. 579. See also the Decision of Trial Chamber II in *Furundžija* 121 ILR, pp. 218, 248–9.

⁴⁹ See as to the effect of counter-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation measures taken by the Security Council, below [Chapter 21](#), p. 1023.

⁵⁰ See e.g. Shany, *Regulating Jurisdictional Relations*; A. Nollkaemper, ‘Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts’, 101 *AJIL*, 2007, p. 760; and Nollkaemper, *New Perspectives*. See also Conforti, *International Law*.

⁵¹ For example, the concept of jurisdiction as laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights: see *Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2007] UKHL 26; 133 ILR, p. 693.

⁵² See e.g. *Jones v. Saudi Arabia* [2006] UKHL 26; 129 ILR, p. 713.

⁵³ See *Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2007] UKHL 58.

⁵⁴ See e.g. *Brownlie’s Principles*, p. 55.

⁵⁵ See Shany, *Regulating Jurisdictional Relations*, pp. 159 ff. See also UK Arbitration Act 1996, sections 58 and 66; 9 USC § 13 and UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Law, 2006, article 17(H)1. Much will, of course, depend upon the parties and subject-matter in question. See as to the precedential effect of decisions and opinions of the ICJ, below, [Chapter 18](#), p. 969.

⁵⁶ See e.g. *R v. Lyons* [2002] UKHL 44, para. 105, per Lord Millett.

⁵⁷ Note the view expressed in *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 54, that 'states show considerable flexibility in the procedures whereby they give effect within their territories to the rules of international law . . . while the procedures vary, the result that effect is given within states to the requirements of international law is by and large achieved by all states'.

⁵⁸ See e.g. Morgenstern, 'Judicial Practice'; H. Lauterpacht, 'Is International Law a Part of the Law of England?', **25** *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, 1939, p. 51; J. E. S. Fawcett, *The British Commonwealth in International Law*, London, 1963, chapter 2; *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 39–41; and W. Holdsworth, *Essays in Law and History*, Oxford, 1946, p. 260. See also J. Collier, 'Is International Law Really Part of the Law of England?', **38** *ICLQ*, 1989, p. 924; Higgins, *Problems and Process*, chapter 12; R. O'Keefe, 'Customary International Crimes in English Courts', **72** *BYIL*, 2001, p. 293; K. Reece Thomas, 'The Changing Status of International Law in English Domestic Law', **53** *NILR*, 2006, p. 371; S. Fatima, *Using International Law in Domestic Courts*, Oxford, 2005; D. Feldman, 'Monism, Dualism and Constitutional Legitimacy', **20** *Australian YIL*, 1999, p. 105; and C. McLachlan, *Foreign Relations Law*, Cambridge, 2014. See also P. Sales and J. Clement, 'International Law in Domestic Courts: The Developing Framework', *LQR*, 2008, p. 388; *Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World* (ed. J. Farrall and K. Rubenstein), Cambridge, 2014; and S. Fatima, 'The Domestic Application of International Law in British Courts', in *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law*, chapter 27.

⁵⁹ See e.g. Upjohn J in *Re Claim by Herbert Wragg & Co. Ltd* [1956] Ch 323, 334; and Lord Cross in *Oppenheimer v. Cattermole* [1976] AC 249, 277; **72** *ILR*, p. 446. See *The Cabinet Manual*, 1st ed., October 2011, p. 26, para. 3.46, which notes: 'Ministers are under an overarching duty to comply with the law, including international law and treaty obligations.' This references the Ministerial Code. However, the October 2015 version of the UK Ministerial Code, setting out standards of conduct expected of ministers, replaced

the previous requirement to ‘comply with the law including international law and treaty obligations’ by the phrase simply to ‘comply with the law’. This occasioned some disquiet. However, the Cabinet Office declared that the new phrase was meant to include international law. See E. Faulkner and M. Everett, House of Commons Briefing Paper, ‘The Ministerial Code and the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, No. 03750, 21 October 2015. See *R (GCHR) v. Prime Minister* [2018] EWCA Civ 1855, paras. 19 ff. The August 2019 version of the Code retains the 2015 wording. However, in September 2020, the government introduced the Internal Market Bill to amend the UK’s Brexit deal with the EU which, it was said, would violate the withdrawal agreement in a ‘specific and limited way’, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-54073836. See also the New Zealand Cabinet Manual, 2017, <https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-06/cabinet-manual-2017.pdf>.

⁶⁰ See *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind* [1991] 1 AC 696, 747–8 (Lord Bridge); and *R (Yam) v. Central Criminal Court* [2016] AC 782–3 (Elias LJ).

⁶¹ *Commentaries*, IV, Oxford, 1765, chapter 5.

⁶² See section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 and section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, incorporating into domestic law respectively the EU treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. See also *Kay v. Lambeth Borough Council* [2006] UKHL 10. Note that the UK left the EU at 11.00 pm (UK time) on 31 January 2020, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32810887.

⁶³ See below, [Chapter 11](#), p. 579.

⁶⁴ See below, p. 168. See also *A (FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2005] UKHL 71.

⁶⁵ F. Bennion, *Statutory Interpretation*, 5th ed., London, 2007, p. 823, citing *Re Queensland Mercantile and Agency Ltd* [1892] 1 Ch 219 at 226. See also *Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 of 2000*, 2001 SLT 507, 512–13; *Chung Chi Cheung v. R* [1939] AC 160; *Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria* [1977] 2 WLR 356 at 379 (per Stephenson LJ); and *Post Office v. Estuary Radio* [1968] 2 QB 740, 756.

⁶⁶ (1737) Cases t. Talbot 281.

⁶⁷ (1764) 3 Burr. 1478.

⁶⁸ But see *Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria* [1977] 2 WLR 356; 64 ILR, p. 111; below, p. 125.

⁶⁹ (1876) 2 Ex.D. 63.

⁷⁰ See e.g. Holdsworth, *Essays*, pp. 263–6; and W. Halsbury, *Laws of England*, 3rd ed., London, 1968, vol. VII, p. 264.

⁷¹ See e.g. Lauterpacht, ‘Is International Law a Part?’, pp. 60–1.

⁷² [1905] 2 KB 391.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 407–8.

⁷⁴ (1906) 8 F(J) 93.

⁷⁵ See also 170 HC Deb., col. 472, 4 March 1907 and the Trawling in Prohibited Areas Prevention Act 1909.

⁷⁶ [1939] AC 160, 168; 9 AD, p. 264. See also *Commercial and Estates Co. of Egypt v. Board of Trade* [1925] 1 KB 271, 295; 2 AD, p. 423.

⁷⁷ Per Lord MacMillan, *Compañía Naviera Vascongado v. Cristina SS* [1938] AC 485, 497; 9 AD, p. 250. See *Re Piracy Jure Gentium* [1934] AC 586, 588; 7 AD, p. 213; and Stephenson LJ, *Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria* [1977] 2 WLR 356, 379; 64 ILR, pp. 111, 135. But see also Lauterpacht, ‘Is International Law a Part?’, p. 87, note m.

⁷⁸ [1977] 2 WLR 356; 64 ILR, p. 111. See further below, [Chapter 12](#).

⁷⁹ *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Thakrar* [1974] 2 WLR 593, 597; 59 ILR, p. 450.

⁸⁰ [1977] 2 WLR 356, 365; 64 ILR, pp. 111, 128. See also Shaw LJ, *ibid.*, 386 and Stephenson LJ, *ibid.*, 378–81.

⁸¹ [1977] 2 WLR 356, 379.

⁸² See e.g. *Chung Chi Cheung v. R* [1939] AC 160, 169; 9 AD, p. 264. But see Morgenstern, ‘Judicial Practice’, pp. 80–2.

⁸³ [1975] 3 All ER 961, 967, 969–70; 64 ILR, p. 81.

⁸⁴ [1977] 2 WLR 356, 365; 64 ILR, pp. 111, 128.

⁸⁵ Per Lord Denning [1977] 2 WLR 356, 366.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 388; 64 ILR, p. 152. But cf. Stephenson LJ, *ibid.*, 381. See also e.g. Goff J, *I° Congreso del Partido* [1977] 3 WLR 778, 795; 64 ILR, p. 154. This approach was supported by Lord Slynn in *R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1)* [2000] 1 AC 61, 77; 119 ILR, pp. 50, 65.

⁸⁷ [1988] 3 WLR 1033; 80 ILR, p. 49.

⁸⁸ [1988] 3 WLR 1116; 80 ILR, p. 132.

⁸⁹ [1988] 3 WLR 1095; 80 ILR, p. 109.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ [1988] 3 WLR 1118; 80 ILR, p. 135.

⁹² [1989] 3 All ER 523; 81 ILR, p. 671.

⁹³ [1989] 3 All ER 554; 81 ILR, p. 715.

⁹⁴ [2000] 1 AC 61, 98 and see also at 90; 119 ILR, pp. 50, 87.

⁹⁵ See [2000] 1 AC 61, 77; 119 ILR, pp. 50, 65.

⁹⁶ [2000] 1 AC 147, 276; 119 ILR, pp. 135, 230. See also *R (European Roma Rights Centre) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and Another* [2004] UKHL 55, paras. 22

ff. (per Lord Bingham); 131 ILR, pp. 652, 671 ff.

⁹⁷ 2001 SLT 507, 512. See also S. Neff, ‘International Law and Nuclear Weapons in Scottish Courts’, 51 *ICLQ*, 2002, p. 171.

⁹⁸ 117 ILR, pp. 552, 560.

⁹⁹ [2006] UKHL 16; 132 ILR, p. 668.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 11; 132 ILR, p. 675; and see J. Brierly, ‘International Law in England’, 51 *LQR*, 1935, pp. 24, 31.

¹⁰¹ *R v. Jones*, para. 23; 132 ILR, p. 680, per Lord Bingham, who noted that ‘customary international law is applicable in the English courts only where the constitution permits’, quoting O’Keefe, ‘Customary International Crimes in English Courts’, p. 335, and that ‘international law could not create a crime triable directly, without the intervention of Parliament, in an English court’, quoting Sir Franklin Berman, ‘Jurisdiction: The State’, in *Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives* (ed. P. Capps, M. Evans and S. Konstadinidis), Oxford, 2003, pp. 3, 11. See also *R (Al-Rabbat) v. Blair and Others* [2017] EWHC 1969, concluding that there was no prospect of the Supreme Court holding that the decision in *Jones* was wrong or the reasoning no longer applicable.

¹⁰² *R v. Jones*, para. 28; 132 ILR, p. 683; and *R (Gentle) v. Prime Minister* [2008] UKHL 20, para. 49 (per Lady Hale). See also *Kneller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v. DPP* [1973] AC 435. Lord Hoffmann in *R v. Jones* noted that ‘new domestic offences should in my opinion be debated in Parliament, defined in a statute and come into force on a prescribed date. They should not creep into existence as a result of an international consensus to which only the executive of this country is a party’, para. 62; 132 ILR, pp. 694–5; and see Lord Mance at paras. 102–3; 132 ILR, pp. 705–6. See also *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain* 159 L.Ed.2d 718, 765 (2004); 127 ILR, pp. 769, 807 (per Scalia J); and the Federal Court of Australia decision in *Nulyarimma v. Thompson* (1999) 165 ALR 621, 630; 120 ILR, pp. 353, 364.

¹⁰³ *R v. Jones*, para. 30; 132 ILR, p. 684, and Lord Hoffmann, paras. 63–7; 132 ILR, pp. 695–6. See further as to non-justiciability, below, p. 159.

104 [2015] UKSC 69, para. 146. Lord Denning’s judgment in *Trendtex* was further discussed and criticised in para. 147.

105 *Ibid.*, para. 149, citing Merkel J in *Nulyarimma v. Thompson* [1999] FCA 1192, para. 109.

106 *Ibid.*, para. 150. See also *R (Akarcay) v. Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police* [2017] EWHC 159 (Admin), para. 23.

107 *The Freedom and Justice Party v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2016] EWCA 2010 (Admin), para. 166.

108 *Belhaj and Rahmatullah (No. 1) v. Ministry of Defence* [2017] UKSC 3, para. 252. See also *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2017] UKSC 62, where Lord Sumption, giving the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court, noted: ‘To identify a rule of customary international law, it is necessary to establish that there is a widespread, representative and consistent practice of states on the point in question which is accepted by them on the footing that it is a legal obligation (*opinio juris*)’, para. 31. Note also *R (Freedom and Justice Party) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2018] EWCA Civ 1719, paras. 15 ff.

109 See R. O’Keefe, ‘The Doctrine of Incorporation Revisited’, **79 BYIL**, p. 7; Sales and Clement, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts’; Collier, ‘Is International Law Really Part?’, p. 890; J. Crawford, ‘International Law in the House of Lords and in the High Court of Australia, 1996–2008: A Comparison’, www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUYrBkIntLaw/2009/1.pdf; M. Kirby, ‘International Law and the Common Law: Conceptualising the New Relationship’, 2009, www.michaelkirby.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=12; and Sir Anthony Mason, ‘International Law as a Source of Domestic Law’, in *International Law and Australian Federalism* (ed. B. R. Opeskin and D. R. Rothwell), 1998, p. 210.

110 See e.g. *West Rand Gold Mining Co. v. R* [1905] 2 KB 391, 408 ff.; and *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Thakrar* [1974] 1 QB 684, 702.

111 See e.g. *Chung Chi Cheung v. R* [1939] AC 160, 167–8 (Lord Atkin); *West Rand Gold Mining Co. v. R* [1905] 2 KB 391, 408 (Lord Alverstone CJ); and *Chagos Islanders v. Attorney General and Others* [2003] EWHC 2222, paras. 374–9 (Ouseley J).

112 See *Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co.* [2002] UKHL 19 (House of Lords), para. 18 (Lord Nicholls). See also *Oppenheimer v. Cattermole* [1976] AC 249, 277–8.

113 See generally A. D. McNair, *The Law of Treaties*, Oxford, 1961, pp. 81–97; A. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law and Practice*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2013, chapter 10; F. A. Mann, ‘The Enforcement of Treaties by English Courts’, **44** *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, 1958–59, p. 29; R. Higgins, ‘United Kingdom’, in *The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law* (ed. F. Jacobs and S. Roberts), London, 1987, p. 123; D. Lasok, ‘Les Traités Internationaux dans la Système Juridique Anglaise’, **70** *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1966, p. 961; I. Sinclair, ‘The Principles of Treaty Interpretation and their Application by the English Courts’, **12** *ICLQ*, 1963, p. 508; I. Sinclair and S. J. Dickson, ‘National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom’, in *National Treaty Law and Practice* (ed. M. Leigh and M. R. Blakeslee), 1995, p. 223; and C. Warbrick, ‘Treaties’, **49** *ICLQ*, 2000, p. 944. See also *The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study* (ed. D. Sloss), Cambridge, 2014.

114 (1879) 4 PD 129.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 154.

116 See e.g. *Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service* [1985] AC 374, 418. See also *Rustomjee v. R* (1876) 2 QBD 69; and *Lonrho Exports v. ECGD* [1996] 4 All ER 673; 108 ILR, pp. 596, 611.

117 See *R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Rees-Mogg* [1994] 2 WLR 115.

118 [1989] 3 All ER 523, 531; 81 ILR, pp. 671, 684. See also *Lonrho Exports v. ECGD* [1996] 4 All ER 673, 687; 108 ILR, pp. 596, 611.

119 [1989] 3 All ER 523, 544–5; 81 ILR, p. 701. See also *Littrell v. US (No. 2)* [1995] 1 WLR 82; and *Thomas v. Baptiste* [2000] 2 AC 1 (PC) at 23 and 31–3. But see R. Y.

Jennings, 'An International Lawyer Takes Stock', **39 ICLQ**, 1990, pp. 513, 523–6.

120 [1989] 3 All ER 523, 544–5; 81 ILR, p. 701. See further as to the non-justiciability of unincorporated treaties, below, p. 163.

121 [1989] 3 All ER 523, 526; 81 ILR, p. 676. See also *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Parte Brind* [1991] 1 AC 696, 747–8; 85 ILR, p. 29; *R v. Lyons* [2002] UKHL 44; 131 ILR, p. 538; and *R (Akarcay) v. Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police* [2017] EWHC 159 (Admin), para. 21.

122 [2005] UKHL 71, para. 27. Lord Bingham in *R v. Asfaw* [2008] UKHL 31, para. 29 stated: 'While, therefore, one would expect any government intending to legislate inconsistently with an obligation binding on the UK to make its intention very clear, there can on well known authority be no ground in domestic law for failing to give effect to an enactment in terms unambiguously inconsistent with such an obligation.'

123 *Lonrho Exports v. ECGD* [1996] 4 All ER 673, 688; 108 ILR, pp. 596, 613. See also *GUR Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa Ltd* [1986] 3 All ER 449, 454, 459 and 466–7; 75 ILR, p. 675; and *Sierra Leone Telecommunications v. Barclays Bank* [1998] 2 All ER 821, 828; 114 ILR, p. 466. See in addition *R v. Lyons* [2003] 1 AC 976, 995 (Lord Hoffmann).

124 Lord Oliver in *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry* emphasised that the conclusion of an international treaty is a question of fact, thus a treaty may be referred to as part of the factual background against which a particular issue arises, [1989] 3 All ER 523, 545; 81 ILR, pp. 671, 702. See further below, p. 164

125 *Lonrho Exports v. ECGD* [1996] 4 All ER 673, 688; 108 ILR, pp. 596, 613.

126 See e.g. *R v. Secretary of State, on the Application of the Channel Tunnel Group* 119 ILR, pp. 398, 407–8.

127 See Lord Woolf MR in *Ex parte Ahmed and Patel* [1998] INLR 570, 584, relying upon the approach of the High Court of Australia in *Minister of Immigration v. Teoh*, as to which see below, p. 147. Hobhouse LJ in *Ex parte Ahmed and Patel* noted that where the Secretary of State had adopted a specific policy, it was not possible to derive a legitimate expectation from the treaty going beyond the scope of the policy: at 592. Note, as to the

special position of human rights treaties as against other multilateral treaties, e.g. *Matthew v. Trinidad and Tobago State* [2004] UKPC 33; 134 ILR, p. 687.

¹²⁸ [2017] UKSC 5, paras. 50, 51. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provided in section 13 that the negotiated withdrawal agreement and the framework for the future relationship would have to be approved by a resolution of the House of Commons on a motion moved by a Minister of the Crown. This was accomplished by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2020.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 54, 55.

¹³⁰ See the evidence presented by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, UKMIL, 70 BYIL, 1999, p. 405.

¹³¹ See e.g. S. de Smith and R. Brazier, *Constitutional and Administrative Law*, 6th ed., London, 1989, pp. 140–2; and W. Wade and O. H. Phillips, *Constitutional and Administrative Law*, 9th ed., London, 1977, pp. 303–6. See also *Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario* [1937] AC 326, 347; 8 AD, p. 41; *Walker v. Baird* [1892] AC 491; *Italy v. Hambro's Bank* [1950] 1 All ER 430; *Cheney v. Conn* [1968] 1 WLR 242; 41 ILR, p. 421; *Porter v. Freudenberg* [1915] 1 KB 857, 874–80; and McNair, *Law of Treaties*, pp. 89–91.

¹³² See the evidence presented by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, UKMIL, 70 BYIL, 1999, p. 405, citing the examples of extradition and double-taxation treaties.

¹³³ Sinclair and Dickson, 'National Treaty Law', p. 230.

¹³⁴ [2017] UKSC 5, paras. 76 ff. The Court underlined the proposition that 'the consequential loss of a source of law is a fundamental legal change which justifies the conclusion that prerogative powers cannot be invoked to withdraw from the EU treaties', *ibid.*, para. 83.

¹³⁵ See *R (European Roma Rights Centre) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and Another* [2004] UKHL 55, para. 42; 131 ILR, p. 683 (per Lord Steyn).

¹³⁶ See e.g. Fatima, *Using International Law*, pp. 57 ff.

¹³⁷ For example, section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 provides that nothing in the immigration rules within the Immigration Act 1971 shall lay down any practice contrary to the Refugee Convention.

¹³⁸ See e.g. the International Criminal Court Act 2001.

¹³⁹ It is also the practice to put before Parliament Orders in Council made under the UN Act 1946 in order, for example, to implement UN sanctions internally: see section 1(4) of the Act; and H. Fox and C. Wickremasinghe, 'UK Implementation of UN Economic Sanctions', 42 *ICLQ*, 1993, pp. 945, 959. See also *R v. HM Treasury and the Bank of England, ex parte Centro-Com*, Decision of the Divisional Court, Times Law Reports, 7 October 1993.

¹⁴⁰ See 171 HC Deb., col. 2001, 1 April 1924.

¹⁴¹ UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 406. See now section 24 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.

¹⁴² Section 20. This section does not apply to a treaty if a Minister is of the opinion that, exceptionally, the treaty should be ratified without the requirements of that section having been met, unless either House of Parliament has resolved that there be no ratification. There are also certain kinds of treaties which are not covered by these provisions: see e.g. section 23 (treaties providing for increase in European Parliament's powers are not to be ratified unless approved by Act of Parliament); and treaties concluded (under authority given by the UK government) by the government of a British overseas territory, of any of the Channel Islands or of the Isle of Man). See also *Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union* [2017] UKSC 5, para. 58.

¹⁴³ See e.g. *Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd* [1983] 2 AC 751; 93 ILR, p. 622; and *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind* [1991] 1 AC 696, 748; 85 ILR, p. 29, where this presumption is referred to as 'a mere canon of construction which involves no importation of international law into the domestic field'. See also *Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes*, 12th ed., London, 1969, p. 183; *A (FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2005] UKHL 71, para. 27; and *Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2007] UKHL 26, para. 45; 133 ILR, pp. 715–16 (per Lord Rodger).

¹⁴⁴ *Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise* [1967] 2 QB 116, 143; *Post Office v. Estuary Radio Ltd* [1968] 2 QB 740; and *Brown v. Whimster* [1976] QB 297. See also *National Smokeless Fuels Ltd v. IRC*, *The Times*, 23 April 1986, p. 36; Lord Oliver in *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry* [1989] 3 All ER 523, 545; 81 ILR, pp. 671, 702; and *R (Adams) v. Secretary of State for Justice* [2011] UKSC 18, para. 14 (Lord Phillips).

¹⁴⁵ Section 1(4) of the Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act 1987 permits the Secretary of State to change the status of diplomatic and consular premises by giving or withdrawing consent or withdrawing acceptance to such status only ‘if he is satisfied that to do so is permissible under international law’.

¹⁴⁶ Lord Hoffmann noted in *R v. Lyons* [2002] UKHL 44, para. 27, that ‘there is a strong presumption in favour of interpreting English law (whether common law or statute) in a way which does not place the United Kingdom in breach of an international obligation’. See also *Assange v. The Swedish Prosecution Authority* [2012] UKSC 22, para. 10 (Lord Phillips); *Hounga v. Allen* [2014] UKSC 47, para. 50 (Lord Wilson); and *Pham v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2015] UKSC 19, para. 77 (Lord Mance), noting: ‘But it is not axiomatic that consistency is either always achievable or what Parliament intended or did achieve’, *ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ellerman Lines v. Murray* [1931] AC 126; 5 AD, p. 342; and *IRC v. Collco Dealings Ltd* [1962] AC 1; 33 ILR, p. 1. See Sinclair, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation’; and C. Schreuer, ‘The Interpretation of Treaties by Domestic Courts’, 45 *BYIL*, 1971, p. 255. See also F. A. Mann, *Foreign Affairs in English Courts*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 97–114; R. Gardiner, ‘Treaty Interpretation in the English Courts since *Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines* (1980)’, 44 *ICLQ*, 1995, p. 620; and Fatima, *Using International Law*, pp. 65 ff. The UK Supreme Court emphasised in *HM Treasury v. Ahmed* [2010] UKSC 2, paras. 45 ff., that the principle of legality required that general or ambiguous statutory words should not be interpreted in a manner that infringed fundamental rights.

¹⁴⁸ See above, p. 118.

¹⁴⁹ See e.g. *Blathwayt v. Baron Cawley* [1976] AC 397.

150 See e.g. in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights prior to its incorporation by the Human Rights Act 1998, *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bhajan Singh* [1975] 2 All ER 1081; 61 ILR, p. 260; *R v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, ex parte Salamat Bibi* [1976] 3 All ER 843; 61 ILR, p. 267; *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Phansopkar* [1976] QB 606; 61 ILR, p. 390; *Waddington v. Miah* [1974] 1 WLR 683; 57 ILR, p. 175; *Cassell v. Broome* [1972] AC 1027; *Malone v. MPC* [1979] Ch 344; 74 ILR, p. 304; *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Anderson* [1984] 1 All ER 920; *Trawnik v. Ministry of Defence* [1984] 2 All ER 791; and *Ex parte Launder* [1997] 1 WLR 839. In *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind* [1991] 1 AC 696, it was held that subordinate legislation and executive discretion did not fall into this category. See also *Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd* [1993] AC 534 HL; *Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers (1986) Ltd* [1993] 3 WLR 953 (CA); *Attorney-General v. Associated Newspapers Ltd* [1993] 3 WLR 74; *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Wynne* [1993] 1 WLR 115; and *R v. Brown* [1993] 2 WLR 556. See also A. Cunningham, 'The European Convention on Human Rights, Customary International Law and the Constitution', **43 ICLQ**, 1994, p. 537.

151 See e.g. *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fernandes* [1984] 2 All ER 390.

152 See e.g. the Iraq and Kuwait (UN Sanctions) Order 1990, SI 1990 No. 1651; the Serbia and Montenegro (UN Sanctions) Orders 1992 and 1993, SI 1992 No. 1302 and SI 1993 No. 1188; the Libya (UN Sanctions) Orders 1992 and 1993, SI 1992 Nos. 973 and 975 and SI 1993 No. 2807; the Former Yugoslavia (UN Sanctions) Order 1994, SI 1994 No. 2673.

153 See e.g. *R v. HM Treasury and the Bank of England, ex parte Centro-Com*, Decision of the ECJ, [1994] 1 CMLR 109; [1997] ECR I-81; [1997] 3 WLR 239; 117 ILR, p. 444. See also R. Pavoni, 'UN Sanctions in EU and National Law: The Centro-Com Case', **48 ICLQ**, 1999, p. 582.

154 The UN (International Tribunal) (Former Yugoslavia) Order 1996, SI 1996 No. 716. See for differing approaches to this procedure, C. Warbrick, 'Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia', **45 ICLQ**, 1996, p. 947; and H. Fox, 'The Objections to Transfer of Criminal Jurisdiction to the Tribunal', **46 ICLQ**, 1997, p. 434.

¹⁵⁵ See e.g. *R (Akarçay) v. Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police* [2017] EWHC 159 (Admin), para. 20.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 22. See also *R v. Reeves Taylor* [2019] UKSC 51, paras. 23 ff. (per Lord Lloyd-Jones) for a thorough discussion by the UK Supreme Court of the meaning and scope of torture in international law as incorporated into English law by section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

¹⁵⁷ Lord Slynn stated in *R (Al Fawwaz) v. Governor of Brixton Prison* that ‘to apply to extradition treaties the strict canons appropriate to the construction of domestic statutes would often tend to defeat rather than to serve [their] purpose’: [2001] UKHL 69, para. 39, citing Lord Bridge in *Ex parte Postlethwaite* [1988] AC 924, 947; and *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61, para. 10, where Lord Sumption noted: ‘It is not in dispute that so far as an English statute gives effect to an international treaty, it falls to be interpreted by an English court in accordance with the principles of interpretation applicable to treaties as a matter of international law.’ See also M. Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation: Developed for and Applied by National Courts’, in *The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts* (ed. H. P. Aust and G. Nolte), Oxford, 2016, p. 9.

¹⁵⁸ See *Buchanan v. Babco* [1978] AC 141; and *Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines* [1981] AC 251; 74 ILR, p. 648. Cf. in the latter case the restrictive approach of Lord Wilberforce, [1981] AC 278; 74 ILR, p. 656 with that of Lord Diplock, [1981] AC 283; 74 ILR, pp. 661–2. See also *Goldman v. Thai Airways International Ltd* [1983] 3 All ER 693. Note also that in *Wahda Bank v. Arab Bank plc*, Times Law Reports, 16 December 1992, Phillips J referred to UN sanctions resolutions in examining the question of the applicability of the Order in Council implementing the sanctions internally to the case in question. See further *Re H (Minors)* [1998] AC 72. See also *R (ST) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2012] UKSC 12, para. 30 (Lord Hope). It was also noted that ‘however generous and purposive its approach to interpretation may be, the court’s task remains one of interpreting the document to which the contracting parties have committed themselves by their agreement. As Lord Bingham was at pains to emphasise in the *Roma Rights* case, para. 18, it must interpret what the parties have agreed to’ (para. 31).

¹⁵⁹ [1997] 1 All ER 193, 202.

¹⁶⁰ [1977] UKHL 2. See below, [Chapter 15](#).

161 [1997] 1 All ER 502, 512.

162 [2016] EWHC 212 (QB), para. 39.

163 Section 3(2)(b). Nor that of incompatible subordinate legislation where primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility: section 3(2)(c).

164 Section 3(2)(a). See further H. Fenwick, *Civil Liberties and Human Rights*, 3rd ed., London, 2002, p. 139; and R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, *Human Rights Law*, London, 2000, chapter 4.

165 See e.g. the Decision of the House of Lords in *R v. A* [2001] 2 WLR 1546; and *R (Alconbury Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions* [2001] 2 All ER 929. Note also the issue raised in *HM Treasury v. Ahmed* [2010] UKSC 2 concerning the application of UN sanctions imposed within the UK by Orders in Council under the terms of section 1(1) of the UN Act 1946. Lord Hope emphasised that ‘fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words’, para. 61.

166 Section 2 of the Human Rights Act.

167 See further below, [Chapter 6](#), p. 292.

168 See e.g. *Nold v. EC Commission* [1974] ECR 491, 508; and *Rutili v. Ministry of Interior of French Republic* [1975] ECR 1219.

169 *Pickstone v. Freemans* [1988] 3 WLR 265. See also *Litster v. Forth Dry Dock Engineering* [1989] 1 All ER 1194.

170 See e.g. P. R. Dubinsky, ‘United States’, in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 631; C. A. Bradley, *International Law in the US Legal System*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015; *International Law in the US Supreme Court* (ed. D. L. Sloss, M. D. Ramsay and W. S. Dodge), Cambridge, 2011; J. F. Murphy, *The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs*, Cambridge, 2004, chapter 2; J. J. Paust, *International Law as Law of the United States*, Durham, NC, 1996; J. J. Paust, ‘International Law as Law of the United States: Trends and Prospects’, *1 Chinese JIL*, 2002, p. 615; Morgenstern, ‘Judicial Practice’; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, ‘Transformation or Adoption of International Law into

Municipal Law’, **12** *ICLQ*, 1963, p. 88; *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 74 ff.; C. Dickinson, ‘The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States’, **101** *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 1953, p. 793; L. Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*, New York, 1972; L. Henkin, ‘International Law: as Law in the United States’, **82** *Michigan Law Review*, 1984, p. 1555; J. J. Paust, ‘Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law in the United States’, **12** *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 1990, p. 59; *Treaties and Other International Agreements: A Study Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations*, US Senate, 2001; *Supreme Law of the Land?* (ed. G. H. Fox, P. R. Dubinsky and B. R. Roth), Cambridge, 2017; and A. J. Bellia Jr and B. R. Clark, *The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution*, Cambridge, 2017.

171 99 L.Ed.2d 333, 345–7 (1988); 121 ILR, p. 551.

172 175 US 677 (1900). See also *Respublica v. De Longchamps* 1 Dall. 111 (1784).

173 175 US 677, 700. This is only when there is not already a controlling executive or legislative act, *ibid*. See *Hilton v. Guyot* 159 US 113; and *US v. Melekh* 190 F.Supp. 67 (1960); cf. *Pauling v. McElroy* 164 F.Supp. 390 (1958).

174 See e.g. *Cook v. US* 288 US 102 (1933); 6 AD, p. 3; and *US v. Claus* 63 F.Supp. 433 (1944).

175 See *US v. Belmont* 301 US 324, 331 (1937); 57 S.Ct. 758, 761 (1937); 8 AD, p. 34; and *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 1987, vol. I, pp. 48–52. See also *Kadić v. Karadžić* 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2nd Cir. 1995); 104 ILR, pp. 149, 159; and *Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation* 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992); 103 ILR, pp. 521, 529. However, see C. A. Bradley and J. L. Goldsmith, ‘Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position’, **110** *Harvard Law Review*, 1997, p. 816; and J. Paust, ‘Customary International Law in the United States: Clean and Dirty Laundry’, **40** *German YIL*, 1997, p. 78.

176 See e.g. Bradley, *International Law in the US*, chapter 5. See also G. Born, ‘Customary International Law in United States Courts’, **92** *Washington Law Review*, 2017, p. 1641, who concludes that such rules will only be directly applicable in US courts when the federal political branches have expressly or impliedly provided for judicial application of a particular rule.

¹⁷⁷ See e.g. *Schroeder v. Bissell* 5 F.2d 838, 842 (1925).

¹⁷⁸ 859 F.2d 929 (1988).

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, at 939. See also *Tag v. Rogers* 267 F.2d 664, 666 (1959); 28 ILR, p. 467; and *US v. Yunis* (No. 3) 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (1991); 88 ILR, pp. 176, 181. This position has essentially been reaffirmed in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain* 542 US 692, 737–8 (2004); and *Samantar v. Yousuf* 130 S.Ct. 2278 (2010).

¹⁸⁰ See *Brown v. US* 12 US (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814); and *Whitney v. Robertson* 124 US 190, 194 (1888). See also Henkin, ‘International Law’, p. 1555. See also *Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson* 654 F.2d 1382 (1981); 505 F.Supp. 787 (1980); *US v. PLO* 695 F.Supp. 1456 (1988); and *Klinghoffer v. SNC Achille Lauro* 739 F.Supp. 854 (1990).

¹⁸¹ See *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, pp. 63–9 (§ 115); *Reagan* 859 F.2d 929 (1988); and J. M. Goldklang, ‘Back on Board the Paquete Habana’, 25 *Va. JIL*, 1984, p. 143.

¹⁸² See **previous note**.

¹⁸³ *Valdez v. Oklahoma*, Case No. PCD-2001-1011, US Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 2002.

¹⁸⁴ See *LaGrand (Germany v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2001, p. 466; 134 ILR, p. 1; and *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 12; 134 ILR, p. 120.

¹⁸⁵ See e.g. *Torres v. State of Oklahoma* 43 ILM, 2004, p. 1227; and *Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon* 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006), holding that a violation of article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations did not necessarily require reversal of a criminal conviction or sentence. As to civil remedies, see *US v. Rodriguez* 162 Fed. Appx. 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2006); *Cornejo v. County of San Diego* 504 F.3d 853, 872 (9th Cir. 2007); and *Gandara v. Bennett*, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Judgment of 22 May 2008, holding that the Vienna Convention did not create judicially enforceable individual rights. It was emphasised in *Cornejo* that ‘[f]or any treaty to be susceptible to judicial enforcement it must both confer individual rights and be self-executing’, at p. 856.

186 5 F.2d 838 (1925).

187 *Ibid.*, p. 842. See also *Macleod v. US* 229 US 416 (1913); and *Littlejohn & Co. v. US* 270 US 215 (1926); 3 AD, p. 483.

188 630 F.2d 876 (1980); 77 ILR, p. 169. See e.g. R. B. Lillich, *Invoking Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts*, Charlottesville, 1985; and Comment, ‘Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law’, **33** *Stanford Law Review*, 1981, p. 353.

189 28 USC 1350 (1988). Also termed the Alien Tort Claims Act.

190 630 F.2d 876, 881 (1980); 77 ILR, pp. 169, 175. See also *Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentina* 830 F.2d 421 (1987); 79 ILR, p. 1. The norms of international law were to be found by ‘consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law’, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (1980); 77 ILR, p. 174, quoting *US v. Smith* 18 US (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–1. See also *Kadić v. Karadžić* 34 ILM, 1995, p. 1592. Note that Bradley writes that after *Filartiga*, the ‘leading academic view’ was that customary international law had the status in the US of ‘self-executing federal common law’. However, more recently this has been challenged: see *International Law in the US*, pp. 155 ff. His conclusion is that US courts should proceed cautiously in incorporating it into domestic law, *ibid.*, p.167.

191 See e.g. *Fernandez v. Wilkinson* 505 F.Supp. 787 (1980); and *Re Alien Children Education Litigation* 501 F.Supp. 544 (1980).

192 *Siderman de Blake and Others v. Argentina and Others*, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx); and *International Practitioner’s Notebook*, July 1985, p. 1. See also below, [Chapter 12](#).

193 *Tel-Oren v. Libya* 517 F.Supp. 542 (1981), *aff’d per curiam*, 726 F.2d 774 (1984), *cert. denied* 53 USLW 3612 (1985); 77 ILR, p. 192. See e.g. A. D’Amato, ‘What Does *Tel-Oren* Tell Lawyers?’, **79** *AJIL*, 1985, p. 92. See also *De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua* 770 F.2d 1385, 1398 (1985); 88 ILR, pp. 75, 90; and *Linder v. Portocarrero* 747 F.Supp. 1452 (1990); 99 ILR, p. 55.

194 34 ILM, 1995, p. 1592.

195 Note that the US Torture Victim Protection Act 1991, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 USC § 1350 (1994)), provides a cause of action for official torture and extrajudicial killing where an individual, under actual or apparent authority or colour of law of any foreign law subjects, engages in such activities. In *Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority*, the Supreme Court held that the Act only covered natural persons and did not impose liabilities against legal persons or corporations, Slip Opinion 11-88, 566 US 449 (2012). The Act is not a jurisdictional statute, so that claims of official torture will be pursued under the jurisdiction conferred by the Alien Tort Claims Act or under the general federal question jurisdiction of section 1331: see e.g. *Xuncax v. Gramajo* 886 F.Supp. 162 (1995); 104 ILR, p. 165. In addition, local remedies must have been exhausted. See e.g. E. Apostolova, 'The Relationship between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act', **28** *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, 2010, p. 640.

196 542 US 692, 714 ff. (2004). See also *Sarei v. Rio Tinto, plc* 671 F.3d 736, 747 (CA9 2011) (en banc); and *Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.* 654 F.3d 11, 20 (CADDC 2011).

197 *Ibid.*, 732.

198 *Ibid.*, 725, 738. See also *Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co.*, US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Docket No. 05-1953-cv, Judgment of 22 February 2008.

199 Slip Opinion 10-1491, 569 US (2013).

200 See e.g. Jackson, 'Status of Treaties', p. 310; and D. Vagts, 'The United States and its Treaties: Observance and Breach', **95** *AJIL*, 2001, p. 313. See also Bradley, *International Law in the US*, chapter 2; and The American Law Institute, *Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, St Paul, 2018, Part III.

201 See e.g. *Ware v. Hylton* 3 US (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); *Foster v. Neilson* 27 US (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); and *US v. Belmont* 301 US 324, 331 (1937). See also on treaty powers and the 'reserved powers' of the states, the tenth amendment, *Missouri v. Holland* 252 US 416 (1920); 1 AD, p. 4; and *US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* 299 US 304 (1936); 8 AD, p. 48. See also D. Sloss, *The Death of Treaty Supremacy*, Oxford, 2016.

²⁰² See e.g. *US v. Pink* 315 US 203 (1942); 10 AD, p. 48. See, as regards the President's power to settle claims and create new rules of law applicable to pending legislation, *Dames & Moore v. Regan* 101 SC 2972 (1981); 72 ILR, p. 270. See also Bradley, *International Law in the US*, chapter 3. The *Fourth US Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States* provides in § 301 that: '(1) Treaties made under the authority of the United States are part of the laws of the United States and are supreme over State and local law. (2) Cases arising under treaties fall within the judicial power of the federal courts. (3) Treaties create international legal obligations for the United States, and limitations of the domestic enforceability of treaties do not alter the United States' obligation under international law to comply with relevant treaty provisions.' See also J. Galbraith, 'International Agreements and US Foreign Relations Law: Complexity in Action', in *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law*, chapter 9.

²⁰³ See e.g. Y. Iwasawa, 'The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis', **26** *Va. JIL*, 1986, p. 635; J. Paust, 'Self-Executing Treaties', **82** *AJIL*, 1986, p. 760; T. Buergenthal, 'Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and International Law', **235** *HR*, 1992 IV, p. 303; and C. M. Vázquez, 'The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties', **89** *AJIL*, 1995, p. 695. See also The American Law Institute, *Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law*, § 310, including comments and reporters' notes.

²⁰⁴ See e.g. *Foster v. Neilson* 27 US (2 Pet.) 253, 311 (1829); 7 L.Ed. 415 (1829); *US v. Percheman* 32 US (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); *US v. Postal* 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 444 US 832; and *Linder v. Portocarrero* 747 F.Supp. 1452, 1463 (1990); 99 ILR, pp. 55, 67–8.

²⁰⁵ See Chief Justice Marshall, *Foster v. Neilson* 27 US (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). See also J. C. Yoo, 'Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding', **99** *Columbia Law Review*, 1999, p. 1955; and Vagts, 'US and its Treaties', p. 321. In *US v. Postal* 589 F.2d 862, 877 (5th Cir. 1979), the court referred *inter alia* to the purposes of the treaty, the existence of domestic procedures, the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods and the consequences of self- or non-self execution.

²⁰⁶ 112 US 580 (1884).

207 38 Cal (2d) 718 (1952).

208 *Ibid.*, p. 721.

209 See e.g. *People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. US Department of Interior* 502 F.2d 90 (1974); 61 ILR, p. 113. See also *Camacho v. Rogers* 199 F.Supp. 155 (1961); and *Diggs v. Dent* 14 ILM, 1975, p. 797. Note also O. Schachter, ‘The Charter and the Constitution’, 4 *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 1951, p. 643. In *Medellín v. Texas* 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008), the US Supreme Court held that the Decision of the ICJ in *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 12, requiring the US to provide ‘further review and reconsideration’ of the convictions in question, did not constitute directly enforceable federal law as the relevant treaties (the UN Charter, the ICC Statute and the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations) were non-self-executing. See further as to *Avena*, below, [Chapter 12](#), p. 672 and [Chapter 18](#), p. 968, note 343. See also the similar conclusion adopted by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in *Association of Lawyers for Peace and Four Other Organizations v. State of the Netherlands*, Nr C02/217HR; LJN: AN8071; NJ 2004/329.

210 552 US 491, 508 and 511 (2008).

211 *Ibid.*, 506 n. 3. See also *Bond v. US* 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014); and *Marshall Islands v. US*, No. 15-15636 (9th Cir. 2017).

212 470 F.2d 461, 466–7 (1972); 60 ILR, pp. 393, 397. See also *Breard v. Greene* 523 US 371, 376 (1998); and *Havana Club Holding, Inc. v. Galleon SA* 974 F.Supp. 302 (SDNY 1997), *aff’d* 203 F.3d (2nd Cir. 2000).

213 This, of course, reflects the general rule. See e.g. G. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1940–44, vol. V, pp. 185–6, 324–5. See also *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, 1987, para. 115(1)b.

214 See e.g. Marshall CJ, *Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy* 6 US (2 Cranch) 64; *Weinberger v. Rossi* 456 US 25 (1982); and *Cook v. US* 288 US 102 (1933). See also R. Steinhardt, ‘The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction’, 43 *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 1990, p. 1103; and C. A. Bradley, ‘The *Charming Betsy* Canon and Separation of Powers’, 86 *Georgia Law Journal*, 1998, p. 479.

215 See the Decision of the Supreme Court in *Whitney v. Robertson* 124 US 190 (1888). The *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, pp. 63 ff. suggests that an Act of Congress will supersede an earlier rule of international law or a provision in an international agreement ‘if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled’.

216 695 F.Supp. 1456 (1988).

217 22 USCA, paras. 5201–3.

218 *Ibid.* See the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in *Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate*, ICJ Reports, 1988, p. 12; 82 ILR, p. 225. See also *DUSPIL*, 1981–88, part I, pp. 8 ff.

219 140 L.Ed. 2d 529 (1998); 118 ILR, p. 22. See also S. Breyer, *The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global Realities*, New York, 2015, chapter 9.

220 The issue concerned the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, and the international court in question was the ICJ in *Paraguay v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1998, p. 248; 118 ILR, p. 1.

221 140 L.Ed.2d 529, 537 (1998); 118 ILR, p. 22.

222 *Ibid.* See above, **note 183**. As to the interpretation of treaties, the US Supreme Court in *Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez* 572 US (2014), pp. 8–15, held, citing *US v. Choctaw Nation* 179 US 494, 535 (1900), that the Court’s ‘duty [i]s to ascertain the intent of the parties’ by looking to the document’s text and context. See also *Abbott v. Abbott* 560 US 1 (2010). The courts will accord ‘great weight’ to the executive’s interpretation of treaties, *ibid.*, 15 and *Medellín v. Texas* 552 US 491, 513 (2008). See also Breyer, *The Court and the World*, chapter 7. The reporters’ notes to § 306 of The American Law Institute, *Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law*, concludes in para. 13 that the approach of US courts to treaty interpretation has generally been consistent with the principles in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969; see below, [Chapter 15](#), p. 813.

223 See *Eichmann* 36 ILR, p. 5; T. Einhorn, ‘Israel’, in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 288; R. Lapidoth, *Les Rapports entre le Droit International*

Public et le Droit Interne en Israel, Paris, 1959; and R. Lapidot, 'International Law Within the Israel Legal System', **24 Israel Law Review**, 1990, p. 251. See also the *Affo* case before the Israeli Supreme Court, 29 ILM, 1990, pp. 139, 156–7; 83 ILR, p. 121; and *Public Committee against Torture in Israel and Others v. Government of Israel and Others*, H CJ 769/02. See also *A and B v. State of Israel*, Israeli Supreme Court, Judgment of 11 June 2008; and Y. Ronen, 'The Use of International Jurisprudence by Israel's Supreme Court', in *International Law and Domestic Politics* (ed. M. Wind), Cambridge, 2018, p. 296.

224 But see as to doubts concerning the application of the automatic incorporation of customary international law into Australia, I. Shearer, 'The Internationalisation of Australian Law', **17 Sydney Law Review**, 1995, pp. 121, 124. See also G. Triggs, 'Customary International Law and Australian Law', in *The Emergence of Australian Law* (ed. M. P. Ellinghaus, A. J. Bradbrook and A. J. Duggan), 1989, p. 376. Note that Brennan J in *Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2)* (1992) 175 CLR 1, 41–2, stated that 'international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law'.

225 (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, 399; 115 ILR, p. 536. See also G. La Forest, 'The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law Issues', **34 Canadian YIL**, 1996, p. 89; and S. Beaulac and J. H. Currie, 'Canada', in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 116. See also G. van Ert, 'The Domestic Application of International Law in Canada', in *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law*, chapter 28.

226 See also *Re Powers to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioners' Residences* [1943] SCR 208; *Reference re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia* [1967] SCR 792; 43 ILR, p. 93; and *Re Newfoundland Continental Shelf* [1984] 1 SCR 86; 86 ILR, p. 593.

227 [1937] AC 326; 8 AD, p. 41.

228 *Ibid.*, pp. 347–8; 8 AD, pp. 43–4. See also *Pfizer Inc. v. Canada* [1999] 4 CF 441; and *R v. Council of Canadians* 2003 CanLII 28426, paras. 35–7 (2005), *aff'd* 2006 CanLII 400222, 217 OAC 316.

229 See e.g. *Re Exemption of US Forces from Canadian Criminal Law* [1943] 4 DLR 11, 41; and *Re Powers to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations and High Commissioners'*

Residences [1943] SCR 208. See also *R v. Munyaneza* [2009] QJ No. 4913; ILDC 1339 (CA 2009).

²³⁰ See W. J. Hopkins, 'New Zealand', in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 429; and e.g. *Marine Steel Ltd v. Government of the Marshall Islands* [1981] 2 NZLR 1; 64 ILR, p. 539; and *Governor of Pitcairn and Associated Islands v. Sutton* [1995] 1 NZLR 426; 104 ILR, p. 508. The courts have also referred to a presumption of statutory interpretation that, so far as wording allows, legislation should be read in a way that is consistent with New Zealand's obligations: see e.g. *Rajan v. Minister of Immigration* [1996] 3 NZLR 543, 551; and *Wellington District Legal Services v. Tangiora* [1998] 1 NZLR 129, 137; 115 ILR, pp. 655, 663. See, as to the use of treaties in statutory interpretation, *Attorney-General v. Zaoui* [2005] NZSC 38; [2006] 1 NZLR 289; (2005) 7 HRNZ 860. See also *Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor* [2004] SGCA 47; 134 ILR, p. 660 with regard to Singapore.

²³¹ See e.g. *Potter v. BHP Co. Ltd* (1906) 3 CLR 479, 495, 506–7 and 510; *Wright v. Cantrell* (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 45; *Polites v. Commonwealth* (1945) 70 CLR 60; and *Chow Hung Ching v. R* (1948) 77 CLR 449. These cases are unclear as to whether the incorporationist or transformation approaches have been adopted as the appropriate theoretical basis. As to the view that international law is the 'source' of domestic law, see Dixon J in *Chow Hung Ching* and Merkel J in *Nulyarimma v. Thompson* (1999) 165 ALR 621, 653–5; 120 ILR, p. 353. See also *Public International Law: An Australian Perspective* (ed. S. Blay, R. Piotrowicz and B. M. Tsamenyi), Oxford, 1997, chapter 5; S. Reye, 'The Place of Customary International Law in Australian Law: Unfinished Business', 21 *Australian YIL*, 2001, p. 39; and A. de Jonge, 'Australia', in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 23.

²³² 132 ILR, pp. 407, 442 (emphasis in the original).

²³³ (1995) 128 ALR 353; 104 ILR, p. 466. See also Blay *et al.*, *Public International Law*.

²³⁴ See e.g. judgment by Mason CJ and Deane J, (1995) 128 ALR 353, 361. See also *Dietrich v. The Queen* (1992) 177 CLR 292, 305; and *Coe v. Commonwealth of Australia* (1993) 118 ALR 193, 200–1; 118 ILR, p. 322. Reaffirmed by the High Court in *Kruger v. Commonwealth of Australia* (1997) 146 ALR 126, 161; 118 ILR, p. 371. See e.g. *Kenneth Good v. Attorney-General*, Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 028 of 2005 for the similar situation in Botswana. In *Dube v. American Embassy*, ILDC 1347 (BW 2006), the Court in

Botswana noted that the rules of customary international law became part of the law of the land unless they were in conflict with statutes or common law. See also *Nallaratnam Singarasa v. Attorney General*, SC Spl (LA) No. 182/99 (2006) with regard to Sri Lanka.

235 (1995) 128 ALR 353, 362; and see e.g. *Simsek v. Macphee* (1982) 148 CLR 636, 641–2.

236 Judgment of Mason CJ and Deane J. See also *Chung Kheng Lin v. Minister for Immigration* (1992) 176 CLR 1, 38. In *Kruger v. Commonwealth of Australia*, Dawson J noted that such a construction was not required where the obligations arise only under a treaty and the legislation in question was enacted before the treaty, (1997) 146 ALR 126, 161; 118 ILR, p. 371.

237 See also *Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth* (1998) 195 CLR 337 at 384; and *Ahmed Ali Al-Kateb v. Goodwin* [2004] HCA 37. In the latter case, McHugh J criticised the rule, but concluded that it was too well established to be repealed by judicial decision: *ibid.*, para. 65.

238 (1995) 128 ALR 353, 361. See also *Polites v. Commonwealth* (1945) 70 CLR 60, 68–9, 77, 80–1.

239 [1991] 1 AC 696 at 748; 85 ILR, p. 29.

240 (1995) 128 ALR 353, 362.

241 *Ibid.*, 365. See also the judgment of Toohey J, *ibid.*, at 371–2, and the judgment of Gaudron J, *ibid.*, at 375–6. Cf. the judgment of McHugh J, *ibid.*, at 385–7.

242 Note that after the decision in *Teoh*, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney-General issued a Joint Statement (10 May 1995) denying the existence of any such legitimate expectation upon the ratification of a treaty: see M. Allars, ‘One Small Step for Legal Doctrine, One Giant Leap Towards Integrity in Government: *Teoh*’s Case and the Internationalisation of Administrative Law’, 17 *Sydney Law Review*, 1995, pp. 204, 237–41. The government also introduced the Administrative Decisions (Effect of International Instruments) Bill 1995 into the Parliament with the specific purpose of denying that treaties or conventions give rise to a legitimate expectation of how a decision-maker will make a decision in an area affected by such international instruments. See also *Trick or Treaty?*

Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement Treaties, a Report by the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, November 1995. See now also *Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, ex parte Lam* [2003] HCA 6, which is critical of *Teoh*.

²⁴³ [2004] NZCA 34, para. 6.

²⁴⁴ *Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)* [2005] 2 SCR 100, para. 82; 132 ILR, pp. 295–6. See also *Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)* [1999] 2 SCR 817, paras. 69–71.

²⁴⁵ See e.g. D. Hovell and G. Williams, ‘A Tale of Two Systems: The Use of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation in Australia and South Africa’, 29 *Melbourne University Law Review*, 2005, p. 95; H. Charlesworth, M. Chiam, D. Hovell and G. Williams, ‘Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Order’, 25 *Sydney Law Review*, 2003, pp. 423, 446–63; *International Law in Australia* (ed. K. W. Ryan), Sydney, 1984; Blay *et al.*, *Public International Law*; A. Byrnes and H. Charlesworth, ‘Federalism and the International Legal Order: Recent Developments in Australia’, 79 *AJIL*, 1985, p. 622; and *Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen*, High Court of Australia, 39 ALR 417 (11 May 1982); 68 ILR, p. 181; *Tabag v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs*, Federal Court of Australia, 45 ALR 705 (23 December 1982); *Commonwealth of Australia v. State of Tasmania*, High Court of Australia, 46 ALR 625 (1 July 1983); 68 ILR, p. 266; *Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth* (1991) 172 CLR 501; and *Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v. Magno* (1992) 37 FCR 298.

²⁴⁶ [2004] HCA 37, para. 63 (McHugh J).

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 190 (Kirby J).

²⁴⁸ Simpson and Williams have concluded that ‘[j]udges will approach extrinsic materials, such as international law, differently depending on whether they favour rigidly applying the Constitution as originally drafted and intended or, at the other extreme, updating the instrument for societal change consistent with a vision of the Constitution as a “living force”’: A. Simpson and G. Williams, ‘International Law and Constitutional Interpretation’, 11 *Public Law Review*, 2000, pp. 205, 226.

²⁴⁹ See e.g. D. D. Basu, *Commentaries on the Constitution of India*, New Delhi, 1962, vol. II; and *Constitutions of the World* (ed. R. Peaslee), 3rd ed., New York, 1968, vol. II, p. 308. See also K. Thakore, 'National Treaty Law and Practice: India', in Leigh and Blakeslee, *National Treaty Law and Practice*, p. 79.

²⁵⁰ Peaslee, *Constitutions*, vol. III, p. 463 (article 29(5)2). Article 29 also states that Ireland accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other states. See e.g. *Re O'Laighléis* 24 ILR, p. 420; and *Re Woods* 53 ILR, p. 552. See also *Crotty v. An Taoiseach* 93 ILR, p. 480; *McGimpsey v. Ireland* [1988] IR 567; and *Kavanagh v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison* [2002] 3 IR 97, 125–6; 132 ILR, pp. 394, 401–2. Note also the Decision of the Irish High Court in *Horgan v. An Taoiseach* on 28 April 2003 reaffirming that article 29 does not confer individual rights, 132 ILR, pp. 407, 446.

²⁵¹ See e.g. *Malachtou v. Armefti and Armefti* 88 ILR, p. 199.

²⁵² See e.g. *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada* (ed. H. Kindred), 6th ed., Toronto, 2000, chapter 4; *Re Newfoundland Continental Shelf* [1984] 1 SCR 86; and C. Okeke, *The Theory and Practice of International Law in Nigeria*, London, 1986.

²⁵³ See e.g. L. Wildhaber and S. Breitenmoser, 'The Relationship Between Customary International Law and Municipal Law in Western European Countries', 48 *ZaöRV*, 1988, p. 163; *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 63 ff.; and L. Henkin, R. C. Pugh, O. Schachter and H. Smit, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 3rd ed., St Paul, 1993, pp. 154 ff.

²⁵⁴ See H. D. Treviranus and H. Beemelmans, 'National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany', in Leigh and Blakeslee, *National Treaty Law and Practice*, p. 43; and H.-P. Folz, 'Germany', in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 240. See also S. Kadelbach, 'International Treaties and the German Constitution', in *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law*, chapter 10.

²⁵⁵ See e.g. *Parking Privileges for Diplomats* 70 ILR, p. 396.

²⁵⁶ See e.g. *German Consular Notification* (Individual Constitutional Complaint Procedure), BVerfG, 2 BvR 2115/01, German Constitutional Court, Judgment of 19

September 2006; and *Görgülü* (Individual Constitutional Complaint), BVerfG, 2 BvR 1481/04 of 14 October 2004, 111 *Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts* (BVerfGE), 307–32; [2004] *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift* (NJW) 3407–12. See also D. P. O’Connell, *International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1970, vol. I, pp. 71–6, and sources therein cited. See also generally A. Drzemczewski, *The European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law*, Oxford, 1983; and Peaslee, *Constitutions*, vol. III, p. 361.

²⁵⁷ See H.-P. Folz, ‘Germany’, in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, pp. 240, 245–6.

²⁵⁸ See *Unification Treaty Constitutionality* 94 ILR, pp. 2, 54. See also *East Treaties Constitutionality* 73 ILR, p. 691; and *Görgülü*, (Individual Constitutional Complaint), BVerfG, 2 BvR 1481/04 of 14 October 2004, 111 *Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts* (BVerfGE), 307–32, [2004] *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift* (NJW) 3407–12.

²⁵⁹ 2BvL 1/12, see A. Peters, ‘New German Constitutional Court Decision on “Treaty Override”: Trieplianism Continued’, EJIL: Talk!, www.ejiltalk.org/new-german-constitutional-court-decision-on-treaty-override-trieplianism-continued-2/#more-14105.

²⁶⁰ See e.g. E. A. Alkema, ‘Netherlands’, in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 407; E. A. Alkema, ‘Fundamental Human Rights and the Legal Order of the Netherlands’, in *International Law in the Netherlands* (ed. H. Van Panhuys *et al.*), Dordrecht, 1980, vol. III, p. 109; Peaslee, *Constitutions*, vol. III, p. 652; *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 69; and H. Schermers, *The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law* (ed. F. Jacobs and S. Roberts), Leiden, 1987, p. 109. See also e.g. *Nordstern Allgemeine Versicherungs AG v. Vereinigte Stinees Rheinreedereien* 74 ILR, p. 2; and *Public Prosecutor v. JO* 74 ILR, p. 130. Note also J. Klabbers, ‘The New Dutch Law on the Approval of Treaties’, 44 *ICLQ*, 1995, p. 629.

²⁶¹ See e.g. H. F. van Panhuys, ‘The Netherlands Constitution and International Law: A Decade of Experience’, 58 *AJIL*, 1964, pp. 88–108. See also *Handelskwekerij GJ Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA* 11 *Netherlands YIL*, 1980, p. 326.

²⁶² See *Reinier van Arkel Foundation and Others v. Minister for Transport, Public Works and Water Management*, Case No. 200401178/1; LJN: AR2181; AB 2005/12.

²⁶³ See G. Cataldi, 'Italy', in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 328; and Cassese, *International Law*, p. 225, note 21. See also the Decision of the Italian Court of Cassation in *Canada v. Cargnello* 114 ILR, p. 559, and, for a similar view in Latvia, *Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia on a Request for Constitutional Review*, No. 2004-01-06 of 7 July 2004, *Latvian Herald*, 9 July 2004, No. 108, 3056.

²⁶⁴ 54 ILM, 2015, p. 471. The Court found that there was an inconsistency between the customary rule on state immunity as defined by the ICJ in *Germany v. Italy* (Greece Application to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 2011, p. 99 and articles 2 and 24 of the Italian Constitution.

²⁶⁵ See F. F. de Almeida, 'Portugal', in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 500; and e.g. the Decision of the Supreme Court of Portugal in *Brazilian Embassy Employee*, May 1984, 116 ILR, p. 625.

²⁶⁶ See *Resolution of the Supreme Court of 19 February 2003*, I KZP 47/02.

²⁶⁷ B.M., Cass. 16 November 2004, nr P.04.0644.N, *Pas.* 2004, I, 1795, *RCJB* 2007, 36, *RW* 2005-06, 387, *CDPK* 2005, 610, *RABG* 2005, 504, *T.Strafr.* 2005, 285. See also *Gruyetz and Rolland v. Municipality of Sint-Genesius-Rode*, AR nr 2002/KR/412, Court of Appeal of Brussels, Judgment of 28 January 2003.

²⁶⁸ *Franco-Suisse Le Ski (Hof van Cassatie/Cour de Cassation)*, 21 May 1971, *Pas.* 1971, I, 886.

²⁶⁹ See Title VI of the Constitution. See also e.g. E. Decaux, 'France', in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 207; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, pp. 251 ff.; Dupuy and Kerbrat, *Droit International*, pp. 466 ff.; D. Alland, 'Jamais, Parfois, Toujours. Réflexions sur la Compétence de la Cour de Cassation en Matière d'Interprétation des Conventions Internationales', *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1996, p. 599; V. Kronenberger, 'A New Approach to the Interpretation of the French Constitution in Respect to International Conventions: From Hierarchy of Norms to Conflict of Competence', *NILR*, 2000, p. 323.

²⁷⁰ See e.g. O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 65–8; Rousseau, *Droit International Public*; and Peaslee, *Constitutions*, vol. **III**, p. 312. See also *SA Rothmans International France* and *SA Philip Morris France* 93 ILR, p. 308.

²⁷¹ See *Cafés Jacques Vabre*, **16** *Common Market Law Review*, 1975, p. 336; and *Re Nicolo* **84** *AJIL*, 1990, p. 765; 93 ILR, p. 286. Under article 54 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Council may declare a treaty to be contrary to the Constitution, so that the Constitution must first be amended before the treaty may be ratified or approved. See e.g. *Re Treaty on European Union* 93 ILR, p. 337. See also *Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme*, AFDI, 1993, p. 963 and AFDI, 1994, pp. 963 ff.

²⁷² See Pauline Fraisse, 2 June 2000, *Bulletin de l’Assemblée Plénière*, No. 4, p. 7; and *Levacher*, RFDA, 2000, p. 79. The position with regard to customary law is unclear: see e.g. *Aquarone*, RGDIP, 1997–94, pp. 1053–4; *Barbie*, Cass. Crim., 6 October 1983, Bull., p. 610; and *Kadahfi*, RGDIP, 2001–02, pp. 474–6. See also Decaux, ‘France’, pp. 235 ff. with regard to divergent positions taken by the Conseil d’Etat and the Conseil Constitutionnel.

²⁷³ See 33 ILM, 1994, p. 1043. The interim constitution came into force on 27 April 1994 and was intended to remain in force for five years to be replaced by a constitution adopted by a Constitutional Assembly consisting of the National Assembly and Senate of Parliament: see below. See J. Dugard, M. du Plessis, T. Maluwa and D. Tladi, *Dugard’s International Law: A South African Perspective*, 5th ed., Capetown, 2019; and Hovell and Williams, ‘A Tale of Two Systems’, pp. 113 ff. See also E. de Wet, ‘South Africa’, in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 567; and D. Tladi, ‘Interpretation of Treaties in an International Law-Friendly Framework: The Case of South Africa’, in *The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts*, p. 135.

²⁷⁴ See 36 ILM, 1997, p. 744.

²⁷⁵ Section 231(2). This is unless either such an agreement is of a ‘technical, administrative or executive nature’ or it is one not requiring ratification (or accession), in which case tabling in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time is required: section 231(3).

²⁷⁶ Section 231(4). See also *Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others*, High Court of South Africa, Judgment of 22 February 2017, where it was held that prior parliamentary approval was necessary before South Africa could withdraw from the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. See also *Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union* [2017] UKSC 5, above, p. 131 and p. 133, note 142.

²⁷⁷ Note that O'Regan J stated in *Kaunda v. President of South Africa* that 'our Constitution recognises and asserts that, after decades of isolation, South Africa is now a member of the community of nations, and a bearer of obligations and responsibilities in terms of international law': CCT 23/04, [2004] ZACC 5, para. 222.

²⁷⁸ Case No. 83145/2016, High Court of South Africa, Judgment of 22 February 2017.

²⁷⁹ Note that article 144 of the Namibian Constitution provides that 'unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia': see B. Erasmus, 'The Namibian Constitution and the Application of International Law', *15 South African Yearbook of International Law*, 1989–90, p. 81.

²⁸⁰ See G. M. Danilenko, 'The New Russian Constitution and International Law', *88 AJIL*, 1994, p. 451; G. M. Danilenko, 'Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice', *10 EJIL*, 1999, p. 51; V. S. Vereshchetin, 'New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship Between International Law and National Law', *7 EJIL*, 1996, p. 29; and S. Y. Marochkin, 'International Law in the Courts of the Russian Federation: Practice of Application', *6 Chinese JIL*, 2007, p. 329. See also Y. Tikhomirov, 'Russia', in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 517; L. Mälksoo, *Russian Approaches to International Law*, Oxford, 2015, chapter 3(9); and S. Y. Marochkin, *The Operation of the International Law in the Russian Legal System: A Changing Approach*, Leiden, 2019. See, as regards the practice of the Soviet Union, K. Grzybowski, *Soviet Public International Law*, Leiden, 1970, pp. 30–2.

²⁸¹ See e.g. *Re Khordodovskiy* 133 ILR, p. 365 (2006).

282 See also article 5 of the Russian Federal Law on International Treaties adopted on 16 June 1995, 34 ILM, 1995, p. 1370. This repeats article 15(4) of the Constitution and also provides that: ‘the provisions of officially published international treaties of the Russian Federation which do not require the publication of intra-state acts for application shall operate in the Russian Federation directly. Respective legal acts shall be adopted in order to effectuate other provisions of international treaties of the Russian Federation.’ See further W. E. Butler, *The Law of Treaties in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Cambridge, 2002, who notes (at p. 36) that the change brought about by article 15(4) ‘is among the most momentous changes of the twentieth century in the development of Russian Law’.

283 Butler, *Law of Treaties in Russia*, p. 37. See also generally, *Constitutional Reform and International Law in Central and Eastern Europe* (ed. R. Müllerson, M. Fitzmaurice and M. Andenas), The Hague, 1998; T. Schweisfurth and R. Alleweldt, ‘The Position of International Law in the Domestic Legal Orders of Central and Eastern European Countries’, 40 *German YIL*, 1997, p. 164; I. Ziemele, ‘The Application of International Law in the Baltic States’, 40 *German YIL*, 1997, p. 243; and W. Czaplinski, ‘International Law and Polish Municipal Law’, 53 *ZaöRV*, 1993, p. 871.

284 *Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia*, No. 12-II/2016, 111 *AJIL*, 2019, p. 461. See also the Decision of the Constitutional Court in *Ministry of Justice v. Shareholders of Yukos*, No. 1-P/2017, No. 1-II/ 2017, *ILDC* 2648 (RU 2017).

285 See Shin Hae Bong, ‘Japan’, in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 360. See generally S. Oda, *The Practice of Japan in International Law 1961–1970*, Leiden, 1982; Y. Iwasawa, ‘The Relationship Between International Law and National Law: Japanese Experiences’, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 333; H. Oda, *Japanese Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1999; and Y. Iwasawa, *International Law, Human Rights, and Japanese Law – the Impact of International Law on Japanese Law*, Oxford, 1998. See also T. Mori, ‘The Current Practice of Making and Applying International Agreements in Japan’, in *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law*, chapter 11.

286 Iwasawa, ‘Relationship’, p. 345.

287 *Ibid.*, pp. 349 ff.

²⁸⁸ See generally with regard to China, T. Wang, ‘International Law in China’, **221** *HR*, 1990, p. 195; J. Z. Li and S. Guo, ‘China’, in Shelton, *International Law and Domestic Legal Systems*, p. 158; and H. Xue and Q. Jin, ‘International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System’, **8** *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2009, p. 299. See also Jia Guide, ‘New China and International Law: Practice and Contribution in 70 Years’, **18** *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2019, p. 727.

²⁸⁹ See above, [Chapter 1](#), p. 31.

²⁹⁰ See also C. Cai, ‘International Law in Chinese Courts during the Rise of China’, **1110** *AJIL*, 2016, p. 269.

²⁹¹ See www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm.

²⁹² See Xue and Jin, ‘International Treaties’, p. 299; and Cai, ‘International Law’, pp. 272 ff.

²⁹³ See *Interpretation No. 27, Re Judicial Interpretation* [2002] no. 27, ILDC 263. See also Nollkaemper *et al.*, *International Law in Domestic Courts*, p. 22.

²⁹⁴ See article 68 of the Constitution, which deals basically with treaties of commerce and treaties which impose obligations on the state or on individuals.

²⁹⁵ See generally Drzemczewski, *Domestic Law*; and Peaslee, *Constitutions*, vol. **III**, pp. 76, 689. See also, as regards the Philippines, the Decision of the Supreme Court (en banc) in *Holy See v. Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc.* 102 ILR, p. 163; and, as regards Poland, W. Czaplinski, ‘International Law and Polish Municipal Law – a Case Study’, **8** *Hague Yearbook of International Law*, 1995, p. 31.

²⁹⁶ On 23 June 2016, the UK held a referendum in which the majority voted to leave the EU. On 29 March 2017, the UK made the required notification under article 50 of the Treaty on European Union providing a two-year notice to leave the EU; see www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50 and www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29-euco-50-statement-uk-notification/. The UK withdrew from the EU as from 11.00 pm (UK time) on 31 January 2020; see Withdrawal Agreement, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C

384 I/1, 12.11.2019. As to the EU, see e.g. S. Weatherill, *Cases and Materials on EU Law*, 12th ed., Oxford, 2016; P. Craig and G. de Búrca, *EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials*, 6th ed., Oxford, 2015; *Steiner and Woods EU Law* (ed. L. Woods and P. Watson), Oxford, 2014; L. Collins, *European Community Law in the United Kingdom*, 4th ed., London, 1990; and H. Kovar, 'The Relationship Between Community Law and National Law', in *Thirty Years of Community Law* (Commission of the European Communities), 1981, p. 109.

²⁹⁷ Case No. C-366/10, [2012] 2 CMLR 4, para. 101, citing *Poulsen and Diva Navigation*, Case No. C-286/90, [1992] ECR I-6019, paras. 9, 10; and *Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz*, Case No. C-162/96, [1998] ECR I-3655, paras. 45, 46.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 107 (citing *Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v. Commission*, Joined Case Nos. 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125–129/85, [1988] ECR 5193, paras. 14–18; and *Mondiet v. Armement Ishis*, Case No. C-405/92, [1993] ECR I-6133, paras. 11–16). Note the Advocate General's Opinion in *Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities*, that: 'The application and interpretation of Community law is accordingly guided by the presumption that the Community wants to honour its international commitments. The Community Courts therefore carefully examine the obligations by which the Community is bound on the international stage and take judicial notice of those obligations': Case No. C-402/05 P, 2008, para. 22, citing the cases of *Van Duyn v. Home Office*, Case No. 41/74, [1974] ECR 1337, para. 22; *Poulsen and Diva Navigation*, Case No. C-286/90, [1992] ECR I-6019, paras. 9–11; *Merck Genéricos-Produtos Farmacêuticos*, Case No. C-431/05, [2007] ECR I-07001; *Dior and Others*, Case No. C-300/98, [2000] ECR I-11307, para. 33; *Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz*, Case No. C-162/96, [1998] ECR I-3655; and *International Fruit Co. and Others*, Joined Case Nos. 21–24/72, [1972] ECR 1219.

²⁹⁹ See *Flaminio Costa v. ENEL*, Case No. 6/64, [1964] ECR 585; 93 ILR, p. 23.

³⁰⁰ See *Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel* [1970] ECR 1125. However, see now the Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the case concerning the legality of the European Central Bank's decisions on the Public Sector Purchase Programme, ruling that the ECJ had acted outside its mandate in *Weiss*, Decision of the Grand Chamber of 11 December 2018, <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?>

[text=&docid=208741&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6385187](http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html), which allowed the Bank's quantitative easing measures, BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, www.bverfg.de/e/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html.

301 Including the treaties of Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007, in force from 1 December 2009).

302 See also section 2(4).

303 See [1990] 2 AC 85, 140 (per Lord Bridge); 93 ILR, p. 652. See also *R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2)* [1991] 1 AC 603; 93 ILR, p. 731; *R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame*, Case No. C-213/89, 93 ILR, p. 669 and Case No. C-221/89, 93 ILR, p. 731.

304 See above, **note** 128.

305 See the lecture by Lord Sumption of the UK Supreme Court on 'Foreign Affairs in the English Courts Since 9/11', 14 May 2012, www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_120514.pdf. (2012); and Mann, *Foreign Affairs*, chapter 4. See also Lord Mance, 'Justiciability', 67 *ICLQ*, 2018, p. 739; L. Collins, 'Foreign Relations and the Judiciary', 51 *ICLQ*, 2002, p. 485; R. Singh, 'Justiciability in the Areas of Foreign Relations and Defence', in *The Iraq War and International Law* (ed. P. Shiner and A. Williams), 2008, chapter 9; D. McGoldrick, 'The Boundaries of Justiciability', 59 *ICLQ*, 2010, p. 981; P. Daly, 'Justiciability and the "Political Question" Doctrine', *Public Law*, 2010, p. 160; Sales and Clement, 'International Law in Domestic Courts'; and O'Keefe, 'The Doctrine of Incorporation Revisited'. See also McLachlan, *Foreign Relations Law*, chapter 6 and pp. 523 ff.; H. Fox and P. Webb, *The Law of State Immunity*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2013, chapter 3; and M. Nicholson, 'The Political Unconscious of the English Foreign Act of State and Non-justiciability Doctrines', 64 *ICLQ*, 2015, p. 743.

306 See e.g. *Oppenheimer v. Cattermole* [1976] AC 249; and *Shergill v. Khaira* [2014] UKSC 33, para. 41. The question of Crown act of state was discussed in *Rahmatullah (No. 2) v. Ministry of Defence* [2017] UKSC 1. This doctrine was defined as a 'prerogative act of policy in the field of international affairs performed by the Crown in the course of its relationship with another state or its subjects', *ibid.*, para. 2 (as cited by Lady Hale). It was unanimously held that this doctrine (not to be confused with foreign act of state or non-

justiciability, as discussed in this section, where the acts of foreign states are in issue and not that, or not only that, of the UK) defeated claims brought by non-UK citizens seeking to sue the government in the English courts in respect of alleged torts committed abroad.

307 See e.g. Wade and Phillips, *Constitutional and Administrative Law*, pp. 299–303; J. B. Moore, *Acts of State in English Law*, New York, 1906; Mann, *Foreign Affairs*, chapter 9; M. Singer, ‘The Act of State Doctrine of the UK’, **75 AJIL**, 1981, p. 283; M. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, **46 BYIL**, 1972–3, pp. 145, 240; and M. Zander, ‘The Act of State Doctrine’, **53 AJIL**, 1959, p. 826. Note that judicial acts will not be regarded as acts of state for the purposes of the act of state doctrine: see *Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v. Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd* [2012] 1 WLR 1804; *Yukos v. Rosneft* [2012] EWCA Civ 855, paras. 73 ff., 87 ff.; and *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, para. 54.

308 See Lord Pearson, *Nissan v. Attorney-General* [1970] AC 179, 239; 44 ILR, pp. 359, 390.

309 See *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 365.

310 See *R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)* [2000] 1 AC 147 at 269 (per Lord Millett) noting the connection between act of state and certain aspects of sovereign immunity, but noting that ‘state immunity is a creature of international law and operates as a bar to the jurisdiction of the national court, whereas the act of state doctrine is a rule of domestic law which holds the national court incompetent to adjudicate upon the lawfulness of the sovereign acts of a foreign state’. See also *Yukos v. Rosneft* [2012] EWCA Civ 855, paras. 43 ff.; and *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, paras. 48 ff. See further as to sovereign or state immunity and diplomatic immunity, below, [Chapter 12](#).

311 See e.g. *Amalgamated Metal Trading v. Department of Trade and Industry*, *The Times*, 21 March 1989, p. 40. See also *Shergill v. Khaira* [2014] UKSC 33, para. 41.

312 *Ibid.*, para. 42.

313 In the UK, areas traditionally covered by the Crown prerogative: see below, p. 166.

314 See e.g. Lord Hoffmann in *R v. Lyons* [2002] UKHL 44, para. 40; 131 ILR, p. 555; Lord Millett in *R v. Lyons*, para. 105; 131 ILR, p. 575; and Richards J in *Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin), para. 60.

315 See *Underhill v. Hernandez* 168 US 250, 252 (1897).

316 See *Nissan v. Attorney-General* [1970] AC 179; and *Buron v. Denman* (1848) 145 ER 450. See also de Smith and Brazier, *Constitutional and Administrative Law*, pp. 145–51; and Mann, *Foreign Affairs*, chapter 10.

317 See *Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union* [2017] UKSC 5, 54, referring to the royal prerogative in foreign affairs as including diplomatic relations, deployment of armed forces abroad and the treaty-making power (including terminating or withdrawing from treaties). This is not simply because such powers form part of the Crown's prerogative powers, but also because such powers are discretionary: see *Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service* [1984] 3 All ER 935, 956; and Lord Hoffmann in *R v. Jones* [2006] UKHL 16, para. 65; 132 ILR, pp. 695–6. See also Lord Reid in *Chandler v. DPP* [1964] AC 763, 791; Simon Brown LJ, *R v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith* [1996] QB 517, 539; Laws LJ, *Marchiori v. Environment Agency* [2002] EWCA Civ 3, paras. 38, 40; 127 ILR, pp. 642, 643; *R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister* [2002] EWHC 2759, paras. 15 (Simon Brown LJ), 50 (Maurice Kay J), 59 (Richards J); 126 ILR, pp. 735, 750, 753; and *R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, para. 106(iii); 126 ILR, p. 725. See also *R (Al-Rabbat) v. Blair and Others* [2017] EWHC 1969 (Admin).

318 See *The Fagernes* [1927] P 311, 324 (per Atkin LJ). See also *Christian v. The Queen* [2006] UKPC 47, paras. 9–10 (Lord Hoffmann) and 33 (Lord Woolf); 130 ILR, pp. 699–700, 707.

319 See e.g. *R (Al-Rawi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2006] EWCA Civ 1279, paras. 131 ff. (Laws LJ), and cases cited in note 314 above.

320 [2006] UKHL 16, para. 65; 132 ILR, p. 696. He concluded: ‘The decision to go to war [against Iraq], whether one thinks it was right or wrong, fell squarely within the discretionary powers of the Crown to defend the realm and conduct its foreign affairs . . . The discretionary nature or non-justiciability of the power to make war is in my opinion

simply one of the reasons why aggression is not a crime in domestic law’ (paras. 66, 67, *ibid.*), and see also Lord Mance, para. 103; *ibid.*, pp. 705–6. More cautiously, Lord Bingham noted that ‘there are well established rules that the courts will be very slow to review the exercise of prerogative powers in relation to the conduct of foreign affairs and the deployment of the armed services’ (para. 30, *ibid.*, p. 684). The *Jones* approach was applied by the Court of Appeal in *R (Gentle) v. Prime Minister* [2006] EWCA Civ 1689, para. 33 (Clarke MR); 132 ILR, p. 737, where it was held that the question whether the UK had acted unlawfully in sending troops to Iraq was non-justiciable for two reasons: first, because it would require consideration of at least two international instruments (Security Council resolutions 678 and 1441); and, secondly, because it would require detailed consideration of policy decisions in the fields of foreign affairs and defence ‘which are the exclusive responsibility of the executive government’. In the House of Lords, [2008] UKHL 20, their Lordships essentially focused on the meaning of article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but Lord Bingham referred to the ‘restraint traditionally shown by the courts in ruling on what has been called high policy – peace and war, the making of treaties, the conduct of foreign relations’, *ibid.*, para. 2, while Lord Hope noted: ‘The issue of legality in this area of international law [the use of force by states] belongs to the area of relations between states . . . [and] . . . is a matter of political judgment . . . It is not part of domestic law reviewable here’, *ibid.*, para. 24 (and see para. 26). See also Lady Hale, *ibid.*, para. 58.

321 [2015] UKSC 69, para. 145.

322 [1982] AC 888; 64 ILR, p. 331.

323 [1982] AC 888, 931; 64 ILR, p. 344. See also *Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover* (1848) 2 HLC 1. See Fatima, *Using International Law*, pp. 385 ff. Note also *R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office and BAE Systems* [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), paras. 74, 160.

324 See *Korea National Insurance Corp. v. Allianz Global Corporate & Speciality AG* [2008] EWCA Civ 1355, para. 32. A distinction needs to be drawn between mild or marginal embarrassment and the disruption of international relations. The former would not be a bar as such to justiciability, but the latter clearly underpinned the doctrine of non-justiciability: see *Yukos v. Rosneft* [2012] EWCA Civ 855, para. 65; and *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, para. 66. See also *Habib v. Australia*, Decision on justiciability, (2010) FCAFC 12; ILDC 1518 (AU 2010), para. 118.

325 [1982] AC 888, 938; 64 ILR, p. 351.

326 See the analysis in *Shergill v. Khaira* [2014] UKSC 33, below p. 170.

327 See e.g. *R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Pirbhai* 107 ILR, p. 462. But see the *Abbasi* case below, p. 169.

328 *R (Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2013] EWHC 1502 (Admin), para. 153.

329 *A Ltd v. B Bank* 111 ILR, pp. 590, 594–6.

330 So that, e.g., issues related to war crimes were justiciable in the light of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001: see *R v. Jones* [2006] UKHL 16, paras. 4, 28; 132 ILR, pp. 672, 683.

331 See *Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria Azucarera Nacional SA* [1983] 2 LL. R 171, 194–5; 64 ILR, p. 368. Note the view expressed in *Yukos v. Rosneft* [2012] EWCA Civ 855, paras. 92 ff.; and *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, paras. 54 ff. that there was a commercial exception to the non-justiciability or act of state rule. See further below as to state immunity, [Chapter 12](#).

332 [1988] 3 WLR 1169; 80 ILR, p. 191.

333 [1988] 3 WLR 1169, 1188 per Kerr LJ; 80 ILR, p. 209.

334 *R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister* [2002] EWHC 2759, para. 47, cited with approval by the Irish High Court in *Horgan v. An Taoiseach*, Judgment of 28 April 2003, as emphasising ‘the strictly circumspect role which the courts adopt when called upon to exercise jurisdiction in relation to the Executive’s conduct of international relations generally’, 132 ILR, pp. 407, 440.

335 [2006] UKHL 16, para. 30; 132 ILR, p. 684. See also *R (Islamic Human Rights Commission) v. CAA* [2006] EWHC 2465; 132 ILR, p. 707; and *R (Gentle) v. Prime Minister* [2008] UKHL 20, above, p. 161, **note** 320.

336 [1988] 3 WLR 1033; 80 ILR, p. 49.

337 [1989] 3 All ER 523; 81 ILR, p. 671.

338 [1988] 3 WLR 1033, 1075; 80 ILR, pp. 49, 86.

339 [1988] 3 WLR 1033, 1075–6. See also Nourse LJ, *ibid.*, p. 1130; 80 ILR, p. 148.

340 [1989] 3 All ER 523, 544; 81 ILR, pp. 671, 700. See also *R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office and BAE Systems* [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), para. 107.

341 [1989] 3 All ER 523, 545; 81 ILR, p. 701. See also *AY Bank Ltd v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Others* [2005] EWCA Civ 1116; and *Croatia v. Serbia* [2009] EWHC 1559 (Ch), para. 40. Note that in *Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics* 110 S.Ct. 701, 822 ff. (1990); 88 ILR, p. 93, the US Supreme Court underlined that the act of state doctrine was not a doctrine of judicial abstention, but a rule of decision which, where applicable, requires the court to decide cases by deeming acts of a foreign state to be valid. The Court noted that the doctrine does not apply where the only issue was whether certain official acts of a foreign sovereign had occurred, as opposed to where the Court was asked to inquire into them for the purpose of adjudicating upon their legal validity. This became known as the ‘Kirkpatrick exception’: see *Yukos v. Rosneft* [2012] EWCA Civ 855, paras. 95 ff.; and *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, paras. 54, 89.

342 [1989] 3 All ER 523, 559; 81 ILR, p. 722. See also Ralph Gibson LJ in the Court of Appeal judgment [1988] 3 WLR 1033, 1143–4; 80 ILR, pp. 49, 163.

343 But see *Re McKerr*, where Lord Steyn noted that faced with the narrowness of this decision, a critical re-examination of this area of the law might become necessary in the future in the light of the ‘growing support for the view that human rights treaties enjoy a special status’: [2004] UKHL 12, paras. 51–2.

344 [1995] 1 WLR 82, 93.

345 Similarly, Colman J in *Westland Helicopters Ltd v. Arab Organization for Industrialization* [1995] 2 WLR 126, 149, held that reference to the terms of the treaty establishing an international organisation and to the terms of the basic statute of that

organisation in order to ascertain the governing law of that organisation and its precise nature did not transgress the boundary between what was justiciable and what was non-justiciable.

346 See *British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd* [1985] AC 58, 85–6; *Ex parte Molyneaux* [1986] 1 WLR 331; 87 ILR, p. 329; and *Westland Helicopters Ltd v. Arab Organization for Industrialization* [1995] 2 WLR 126, 136. See also *Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd* (1987) 75 ALR 218, 250–4; 90 ILR, pp. 32, 51–5, where the Australian Federal Court held that a Cabinet decision involving Australia’s international relations in implementing a treaty was not a justiciable matter; and *Syria v. Egypt* 91 ILR, pp. 288, 305–6, where the Supreme Court of Brazil held that the courts of a third state could not exercise jurisdiction in a matter essentially of state succession between two other states even where the property was within the jurisdiction.

347 *R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister* [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin), paras. 23, 36, 47. See also *R v. Lyons* [2002] 3 WLR 1562; 131 ILR, p. 538.

348 See Lord Oliver in *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry* [1989] 3 All ER 523, 544. Lord Steyn in *Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. (Nos. 4 and 5)* [2002] 2 AC 883, 1101 considered that the principle was not ‘a categorical rule’. See also Fatima, *Using International Law*, pp. 273 ff.

349 See e.g. *R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister* [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin), paras. 35–6 (Simon Brown LJ), 61(iii) (Richards J). See also above, **note** 314, p. 161. See also *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, para. 92, noting that ‘when it is necessary to do so for the vindication of justiciable rights, courts in this jurisdiction will be under an obligation to decide issues of public international law’; *R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2002] EWCA Civ 1598; *R (Gentle) v. Prime Minister* [2008] 1 AC 1356, para. 8; and *Shergill v. Khaira* [2014] UKSC 33, para. 43.

350 See e.g. *Ex parte Adan* [2000] UKHL 67.

351 [2005] EWCA Civ 1116, paras. 31, 37. Mance LJ went on to say: ‘For the English Court to treat the extent of such rights as non-justiciable would appear to us to involve an extension, rather than an application, of existing doctrines developed in different contexts’,

ibid. See also paras. 39–42. Somewhat confusingly, Mance LJ concluded that the doctrine of non-justiciability could not be ousted by consent, *ibid.*, para. 57.

³⁵² [2006] EWHC 830 (Ch), paras. 51 ff. See also *R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office and BAE Systems* [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), paras. 118–20; and *Croatia v. Serbia* [2009] EWHC 1559 (Ch), paras. 27 ff. Note that in this case, Briggs J declared (para. 31) that the *AY Bank* case was also authority for a further exception to the non-justiciability principle, to the effect that even where the English courts will not adjudicate upon the merits of a dispute between foreign states, they may nonetheless grant protective measures so as to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of such disputes.

³⁵³ *R (Corner House Research) v. Serious Fraud Office* (HL(E)) [2009] 1 AC 756, paras. 118–19.

³⁵⁴ See e.g. Lord Hoffmann, *Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman* [2003] 1 AC 153, para. 62; and Laws LJ, *Marchiori v. Environment Agency* [2002] EWCA Civ 3, para. 38. See also *Binyam Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2010] EWCA Civ 65; and *R (Noor Khan) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2014] EWCA Civ 24.

³⁵⁵ [2016] EWHC 2010, para. 57.

³⁵⁶ Simon Brown LJ in *R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister* [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin), para. 40; see also paras. 36, 37, 47(i).

³⁵⁷ See *R (Al-Haq) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2009] EWHC 1910 (Admin), para. 60. See also *Ukraine v. Law Debenture Trust* [2018] EWCA Civ 2026, paras. 159 ff. Issues of international law may constitute the necessary domestic foothold where implicated by some relevant plea of domestic law, *ibid.*, para. 163; and *Serdar Mohamed v. Ministry of Defence* [2017] UKSC 1, paras. 58, 79.

³⁵⁸ A distinction has been drawn between a narrower doctrine of act of state, which concerns the recognition of acts of a foreign state within its own territory, and a broader principle of non-justiciability in respect of ‘certain sovereign acts’ of a foreign state with effects beyond its own territory: see Mance J in *Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co.* [1999] CLC 31, 56; 116 ILR, pp. 534, 568, basing himself upon Lord Wilberforce in *Buttes Gas and Oil v. Hammer (No. 3)* [1982] AC 888, 930–2; 64 ILR, p. 331. Mance J’s analysis

was approved by Lord Lloyd in *R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet (No. 1)* [2000] 1 AC 61, 102; 119 ILR, pp. 51, 91. See also *Shergill v. Khaira* [2014] UKSC 33, para. 41; *Rahmattullah v. Ministry of Defence* [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), paras. 120, 123; *Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence* [2015] EWCA Civ 843, paras. 318, 320, 339 ff.; and *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, para. 129.

359 See e.g. *Yukos v. Rosneft* [2012] EWCA Civ 855, paras. 40 ff., 66, particularly noting that non-justiciability was ‘not so much a *separate* principle’ from act of state but rather a ‘more *general and fundamental* principle’, para. 48 (emphasis in the original). See further *Yukos v. Rosneft (No. 2)* [2014] QB 458; and *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, paras. 53–5, 67. See also *Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence* [2015] EWCA Civ 843, para. 318.

360 See e.g. the Decision of the Belgian Conseil d’État in *T v. Belgium* on 9 April 1998 that the process of declaring a foreign diplomat persona non grata was not justiciable both because the request from the receiving state was a matter between states and because it was the sending state that had to recall the person in question or terminate his functions and the Conseil d’État had no jurisdiction over an act emanating from a foreign state: 115 ILR, p. 442.

361 See e.g. *Ex parte Turkish Cypriot Association* 112 ILR, p. 735.

362 See *Buck v. Attorney-General* [1965] 1 Ch 745; 42 ILR, p. 11.

363 See *Yukos v. Rosneft* [2012] EWCA Civ 855, paras. 68 ff. Note that in this case Rix LJ stated that where a foreign court has acted in a way which is an abuse of its own responsibilities as a court of law: ‘the courts of this country are not obliged to give effect to the potential jurisdiction or past acts of such a court, provided that the failings of the foreign court are sufficiently cogently brought home to the English court. We consider that this is the teaching of the Privy Council in *AK Investment v. Kyrgyz Mobil* [2011] 4 All ER 1027, paras. 73, 87. See also *Berezovsky v. Abramovich* [2011] EWCA Civ 153, paras. 93 ff.

364 Decision of 16 May 2002: [2002] UKHL 19; 125 ILR, p. 677.

365 *Ibid.*, para. 26.

³⁶⁶ See above, p. 163.

³⁶⁷ [2002] UKHL 19, para. 28. See also *Blathwayt v. Baron Cawley* [1976] AC 397, 426; and *Oppenheimer v. Cattermole* [1976] AC 249, 278.

³⁶⁸ [2002] UKHL 19, para. 29. See also *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 371 ff.

³⁶⁹ [2002] UKHL 19, para. 114.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 138–40.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, para. 148. See also Lord Scott, *ibid.*, para. 192.

³⁷² See e.g. *R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, paras. 57, 66 (per Lord Phillips MR); 126 ILR, pp. 710, 713. See also *Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v. Rahmatullah* [2012] UKSC 48. See views expressed in *Belhaj and Rahmatullah (No. 1) v. Ministry of Defence* [2017] UKSC 3.

³⁷³ See e.g. *Dubai Bank v. Galadari* [1990] 1 WLR 731. See also *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, para. 89, where the Court of Appeal noted that ‘the act of state doctrine would not impose any constraints upon such an investigation or examination by our courts in circumstances where the validity, legality, lawfulness or effectiveness of an act of a foreign state or its agents is not directly in issue in the proceedings’, citing *Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics* 110 S.Ct. 701, 822 ff. (1990).

³⁷⁴ See *Ex parte Everett* [1989] 1 QB 811; 84 ILR, p. 713; *Ex parte Ferhut Butt* 116 ILR, pp. 607, 620–1; and *Foday Saybana Sankoh* 119 ILR, pp. 389, 396. See further above, p. 161. In *Belhaj and Rahmatullah (No. 1) v. Ministry of Defence* [2017] UKSC 3, however, there are indications that certain of the Supreme Court justices seemed to regard foreign act of state as the overriding category with non-justiciability referring to a sub-category, that is the rule of judicial restraint concerning the acts of foreign states outside their own territory: *ibid.*, 40 (Lord Mance) and 123 (Lord Neuberger).

³⁷⁵ See e.g. *Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service* [1985] 1 AC 374, 411 (per Lord Diplock); *R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth*

Affairs, ex parte Pirbhai 107 ILR, pp. 462, 479; *Ex parte Ferhut Butt* 116 ILR, pp. 607, 615, 622; and *R (Suresh and Manickavasagam) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2001] EWHC Admin 1028, para. 19; 123 ILR, p. 598.

376 See Lord Phillips MR in *R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, paras. 80 ff.; 126 ILR, p. 718. See also *Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v. Rahmatullah* [2012] UKSC 48.

377 See e.g. S. A. De Smith, H. Woolf and J. Jowell, *Judicial Review*, 5th ed., London, 1998, pp. 419 ff.

378 See *Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office v. The Queen (on the application of Bancoult)* [2007] EWCA Civ 498, paras. 72 ff.

379 Per Lord Phillips MR in *R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, para. 99.

380 [1989] 1 QB 811, paras. 96–8.

381 [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, paras. 104–7. The Court concluded that this discretion was a very wide one, but there was no reason why the decision or inaction of the Foreign Office should not be reviewable if it can be shown that the same is irrational or contrary to legitimate expectation. However, the Court could not enter into the forbidden areas, including decisions affecting foreign policy: *ibid.*, para. 106(iii). See also *R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office and BAE Systems* [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), para. 56.

382 [2006] EWCA Civ 1279, para. 89. Note, however, that in *Ramadan Bashir v. Sovereign Base Authority* [2016] EWHC 954 (Admin), Foskett J held that while the Refugee Convention 1951 did not apply as a matter of international law to the British Sovereign Bases on the island of Cyprus, the UK government acting in its own right and through the Sovereign Base Authority had adopted a policy of treating the claimants as refugees and acting within the spirit of the Convention with regard to them and that as a matter of domestic public law, the adoption of this policy required the Secretary of State when making any decision concerning the claimants to have regard to the spirit of the Convention obligations.

383 [2014] UKSC 33, paras. 37 ff. See also *Ukraine v. Law Debenture Trust* [2018] EWCA Civ 2026, paras. 154 ff.

384 See above, p. 168.

385 [2014] UKSC 33, para. 40.

386 *Ibid.*, paras. 42–3, citing *R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister* [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin); *R (Al-Haq) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2009] EWHC 1910 (Admin); *R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2003] UKHRR 76; and *R (Gentle) v. Prime Minister* [2008] 1 AC 1356. These comments were cited by the Court of Appeal in *Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2015] EWCA Civ 843, para. 320. See also the discussion in *States of Guernsey and Another v. Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs* [2016] EWHC 1847 (Admin), paras. 67 ff.

387 See here *Keyu v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2015] UKSC 69; and *Ministry of Defence v. Iraqi Civilians* [2016] UKSC 25.

388 See *High Commissioner of Pakistan v. Jah* [2016] EWHC 1465 (Ch), para. 89. See further on state immunity, [Chapter 12](#).

389 [2017] UKSC 3. See also *Ukraine v. Law Debenture Trust* [2018] EWCA Civ 2026, paras. 169 ff.

390 *Ibid.*, paras. 11(iv)(c), 90 (Lord Mance).

391 *Ibid.*, paras. 101, 107(v) (Lord Mance). Lord Sumption noted that an English court had to ask whether the matter was one that could properly be resolved by reference to domestic law: para. 239.

392 *Ibid.*, paras. 11(iii)(a)–(c), 11(iv) (Lord Mance), 159 (Lord Neuberger). It was accepted, however, on the existing case-law that this was subject to an exception where foreign legislation was inconsistent with fundamental principles of public policy: see para. 153 (Lord Neuberger) citing *Oppenheimer v. Cattermole and Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co.*

393 *Ibid.*, paras. 89 ff. (Lord Mance), 147 (Lord Neuberger), 234 ff. (Lord Sumption). It was accepted that this principle (termed ‘foreign act of state’) was one of judicial restraint: *ibid.*, paras. 40 ff. (Lord Mance), 146, 151 (Lord Neuberger), 234 ff. (Lord Sumption).

394 *Ibid.*, para. 123.

395 *Ibid.*, paras. 107(iii) (Lord Mance), 234 (Lord Sumption).

396 *Ibid.*, paras. 155 ff. (Lord Neuberger), 249 ff. (Lord Sumption); cf. para. 11(iv)(c) (Lord Mance). Note that the Court of Appeal had regarded it as ‘established that the doctrine [of act of state] may be disapplied on grounds of public policy where there is a violation of international law or a grave infringement of fundamental human rights’, [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, para. 81.

397 [2018] EWCA Civ 2026, para. 173.

398 *Ibid.*, paras. 175–80.

399 CCT 23/04, [2004] ZACC 5, para. 77 (per Chief Justice Chaskalson). See also *Swissborough Diamond Mines v. South Africa*, Supreme Court, Transvaal Provincial Division, 1997, 132 ILR, p. 454; and the Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in *Hess*, where it was held that ‘the Federal Government enjoys wide discretion in deciding the question of whether and in what manner to grant protection against foreign States’, BVerfGE 55, 349; 90 ILR 386, 395.

400 CCT 23/04, [2004] ZACC 5, paras. 78–80.

401 See the Decision of the High Court of Australia in *Thorpe v. Commonwealth of Australia* (No. 3) (1997) 144 ALR 677, 690–1; 118 ILR, p. 353; *Re Ditfort* (1988) 19 FCR 347, 369; 87 ILR, p. 170; *Petrotimor Companhia de Petroleos SARL v. Commonwealth of Australia* [2003] FCAFC 3; and *Victoria Leasing Ltd v. US* (2005) 218 ALR 640. See also McLachlan, *Foreign Relations Law*, p. 533; G. Lindell, ‘The Justiciability of Political Questions: Recent Developments’, in *Australian Constitutional Perspectives* (ed. H. P. Lee and G. Winterton), Sydney, 1992, p. 180; and R. Garnett, ‘Foreign States in Australian Courts’, *Melbourne University Law Review*, 2005, p. 704.

402 *Wilson v. Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs* [1996] HCA 18; (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11.

403 *Thomas v. Mowbray* [2007] HCA 33, para. 107.

404 Decision on justiciability, (2010) FCAFC 12; ILDC 1518 (AU 2010). See e.g. B. Batros and P. Webb, ‘Accountability for Torture Abroad and the Limits of the Act of State Doctrine: Comments on *Habib v Commonwealth of Australia*’, **8** *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2010, p. 1153.

405 See e.g. *Underhill v. Hernandez* 168 US 250 (1897); *Baker v. Carr* 369 US 181 (1962); and *American Insurance Association v. Garamendi*, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 23 June 2003. See also Henkin *et al.*, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, p. 178; L. Henkin, ‘Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?’, **85** *Yale Law Journal*, 1976, p. 597; J. Charney, ‘Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations’, **83** *AJIL*, 1989, p. 805; and T. M. Franck, *Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs?*, Princeton, 1992. See also Bradley, *International Law in the US*, pp. 4 ff.; and Breyer, *The Court and the World*, pp. 19 ff.

406 591 F.Supp. 1332 (1984); 99 ILR, p. 44.

407 But see *Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society* 478 US 221 (1986), where the Supreme Court held that the judicial interpretation of a US statute, even if it involved foreign relations, was not a political question precluding justiciability. See also *Dellums v. Bush* 752 F.Supp. 1141 (1990).

408 See e.g. *Can and Others v. US* 14 F.3d 160 (1994); 107 ILR, p. 255.

409 963 F.2d 332, 337 (1992); 99 ILR, pp. 54, 79.

410 976 F.2d 1328, 1331–2 (1992); 99 ILR, pp. 80, 84–5.

411 369 US 186, 211 (1962).

412 That there should be (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and

manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment of multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question: *Baker v. Carr* 369 US 181, 217 (1962). See also *Schneider v. Kissinger* 412 F.3d 190 (DC Cir. 2005); *Bancoult v. McNamara* 445 F.3d 427 (DC Cir. 2006); *Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger* 449 F.3d 1260 (2006).

413 1995 US App. LEXIS 28826.

414 See e.g. *Klinghoffer v. SNC Achille Lauro* 937 F.2d 44 (1991); *Nixon v. US* 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); *Can v. US* 14 F.3d 160 (1994); *Schneider v. Kissinger* 310 F.Supp.2d 251, 257–64 (DDC 2004).

415 503 F.3d 974 CA 9 (Wash.), 2007.

416 607 F.3d 836, 844 (DC Cir. 2010) (en banc). See also *Ali Jaber v. US*, No. 16-5093, 2017.

417 196 Fed. Appx. 93, 98 (3rd Cir. 2006).

418 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1425 (2012).

419 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 116 Stat. 1350.

420 See above, **note** 412, p. 174.

421 See e.g. *Kaplan v. Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran* 961 F.Supp.2d 185, 191–3 (DDC 2013).

422 1987, para. 443, pp. 366–7. See also e.g. J. Harrison, 'The American Act of State Doctrine', 47 *Georgetown Journal of International Law*, 2016, p. 507.

423 This doctrine is subject to modification by act of Congress: *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, para. 444.

424 376 US 398 (1964); 35 ILR, p. 2.

425 376 US 398, 427–8 (1964); 35 ILR, p. 37. In *US v. Noriega* 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1521–3 (1990); 99 ILR, pp. 143, 163–5, the US District Court noted that the act of state doctrine was a function of the separation of powers, since it precluded judicial examination of the acts of foreign governments which might otherwise hinder the executive’s conduct of foreign relations.

426 376 US 398 (1964); 35 ILR, p. 2.

427 This approach was reversed by Congress in the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 86–663, para. 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013 (1964), 79 Stat. 653, 659, as amended 22 USC, para. 23470(e)(2), (1982). Note that in *Williams & Humbert Ltd v. W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd* [1986] 1 All ER 129; 75 ILR, p. 312, the House of Lords held that an English court would recognise a foreign law effecting compulsory acquisition and any change of title to property which came under the control of the foreign state as a result and would accept and enforce the consequences of that compulsory acquisition without considering its merits.

428 *First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba* 406 US 759 (1972); 66 ILR, p. 102.

429 96 S.Ct. 1854 (1976); 66 ILR, p. 212. See also M. Halberstam, ‘Sabbatino Resurrected’, 79 *AJIL*, 1985, p. 68.

430 See *Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia* 729 F.2d 422 (1984). See also *AIG v. Iran* 493 F.Supp. 522 (1980); 4 Iran–US CTR 96; and Justice Harlan in *Sabbatino*, 376 US 398, 428 (1964); 35 ILR, pp. 25, 37. Note also *McKesson Corp. v. Iran* 672 F.3d 1066 (DDC 2012).

431 110 S.Ct. 701 (1990); 88 ILR, p. 93.

432 110 S.Ct. 701, 705 (1990) (emphasis in the original).

433 See also *Fourth US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, § 441, pp. 303 ff.; *Bandes v. Harlow & Jones*, 82 *AJIL*, 1988, p. 820, where the Court of Appeals held that the act of

state doctrine was inapplicable to takings by a foreign state of property located outside its territory; and *First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan* 948 F.Supp. 1107 (1996). Note that the party claiming the application of the doctrine bears the burden of proving its applicability: see *Daventree Ltd v. Azerbaijan* 349 F.Supp.2d 736, 754 (SDNY 2004).

⁴³⁴ See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 1046 ff.

⁴³⁵ [1924] AC 797; 2 AD, p. 124. See also *The Fagernes* [1927] P 311; 3 AD, p. 126; and *Post Office v. Estuary Radio Ltd* [1968] 2 QB 740; 43 ILR, p. 114. But cf. *Hesperides Hotels v. Aegean Turkish Holidays* [1978] QB 205; [1978] 1 All ER 277; 73 ILR, p. 9.

⁴³⁶ Note that under section 7, Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 and section 21, State Immunity Act 1978, such certificates are 'conclusive evidence' as to issues of diplomatic and state immunity. See *R (Alamieyeseigha) v. Crown Prosecution Service* [2005] EWHC 2704 (Admin); and *Sultan of Pahang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2011] EWCA Civ 616. See also section 8, International Organisations Act 1968; and see further below, [Chapter 12](#).

⁴³⁷ *The Times*, 18 April 1985, p. 4. See also C. Warbrick, 'Executive Certificates in Foreign Affairs: Prospects for Review and Control', 35 *ICLQ*, 1986, p. 138; and E. Wilmschurst, 'Executive Certificates in Foreign Affairs: The United Kingdom', 35 *ICLQ*, 1986, p. 157.

⁴³⁸ [2012] EWCA Crim 280, paras. 20 ff.

⁴³⁹ [2011] EWHC 2029 (Admin).

⁴⁴⁰ At that time there was no formal procedure for the reception of special missions. In a written ministerial statement made on 4 March 2013, the then Foreign Secretary announced a new pilot process so that the government's consent to a special mission could be addressed expressly before the mission arrives in the UK. Embassies and High Commissions in London were to be invited to inform the Foreign Office of forthcoming visits in cases where they wished to seek the government's express consent as a special mission. It was noted that any legal consequences would ultimately be a matter for the courts:

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130304/wmstext/130304m0001.htm>. See also *Bouhadi v. Breish* [2016] EWHC 602 (Comm), para. 43.

⁴⁴¹ See further below, Chapter 8, p. 408 ff.

⁴⁴² [1993] QB 54, 64–8; 94 ILR, pp. 608, 618–23.

⁴⁴³ [1993] QB 54, 65; 94 ILR, pp. 608, 619. See also *Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co. Ltd v. Barclays Bank* [1998] 2 All ER 821; 114 ILR, p. 466; and *North Cyprus Tourism Centre Ltd v. Transport for London* [2005] EWHC 1698 (Admin).

⁴⁴⁴ O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 119–22. See *The Pisaro* 255 US 216 (1921); *Anderson v. NV Transandine Handelmaatschappij* 289 NY 9 (1942); 10 AD, p. 10; *Mexico v. Hoffman* 324 US 30 (1945); 12 AD, p. 143; *The Navemar* 303 US 68 (1938); and *Samantar v. Yousuf* (2010) 130 S.Ct. 2278. See also M. Chorazak, ‘Clarity and Confusion: Did *Republic of Austria v. Altmann* Revive State Department Suggestions of Foreign Sovereign Immunity?’, 55 *Duke Law Journal*, 2005, p. 373; and H. Koh, ‘Foreign Official Immunity After *Samantar*: A US Government Perspective’, 44 *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 2011, p. 1141.

⁴⁴⁵ See e.g. *Manoharan v. Rajapaksa* 711 F.3d 178, 179 (DC Cir. 2013); *Habyarimana v. Kagame* 696 F.3d 1029, 1031–3 (10th Cir. 2012); *Giraldo v. Drummond Co.* 493 F. App’x 106 (DC Cir. 2012) (*per curiam*), *cert. denied*, 133 S.Ct. 1637 (2013); *Matar v. Dichter* 563 F.3d 9, 13–15 (2nd Cir. 2009); *Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin* 383 F.3d 620, 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2004); *Doe v. Zedillo*, No. 3:11-cv-01433-MPS (D. Conn. July 18, 2013); and *Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba*, No. 1:10-cv-5381-DLI-CLP, 2013 WL 5502851, at *5–*7 (EDNY 30 September 2013).

5

The Subjects of International Law

Legal Personality – Introduction

In any legal system, certain entities, whether they be individuals or companies, will be regarded as possessing rights and duties enforceable at law.¹ Thus, an individual may prosecute or be prosecuted for assault and a company can sue for breach of contract. They are able to do this because the law recognises them as ‘legal persons’ possessing the capacity to have and to maintain certain rights, and being subject to perform specific duties. Just which persons will be entitled to what rights in what circumstances will depend upon the scope and character of the law. But it is the function of the law to apportion such rights and duties to such entities as it sees fit. Legal personality is crucial. Without it institutions and groups cannot operate, for they need to be able to maintain and enforce claims. In municipal law individuals, limited companies and public corporations are recognised as each possessing a distinct legal personality, the terms of which are circumscribed by the relevant legislation.² It is the law which will determine the scope and nature of personality. Personality involves the examination of certain concepts within the law such as status, capacity and competence, as well as the nature and extent of particular rights and duties. The status of a particular entity may well be determinative of certain powers and obligations, while capacity will link together the status of a person with particular rights

and duties. The whole process operates within the confines of the relevant legal system, which circumscribes personality, its nature and definition. This is especially true in international law. A particular view adopted of the system will invariably reflect upon the question of the identity and nature of international legal persons.³

Personality in international law necessitates the consideration of the interrelationship between rights and duties afforded under the international system and capacity to enforce claims. One needs to have close regard to the rules of international law in order to determine the precise nature of the capacity of the entity in question. Certain preliminary issues need to be faced. Does the personality of a particular claimant, for instance, depend upon its possession of the capacity to enforce rights? Indeed, is there any test of the nature of enforcement, or can even the most restrictive form of operation on the international scene be sufficient? One view suggests, for example, that while the quality of responsibility for violation of a rule usually co-exists with the quality of being able to enforce a complaint against a breach in any legal person, it would be useful to consider those possessing one of these qualities as indeed having juridical personality.⁴ Other writers, on the other hand, emphasise the crucial role played by the element of enforceability of rights within the international system.⁵

However, a range of factors needs to be carefully examined before it can be determined whether an entity has international personality and, if so, what rights, duties and competences apply in the particular case. Personality is a relative phenomenon varying with the circumstances. One of the distinguishing characteristics of contemporary international law has been the

wide range of participants. These include states, international organisations, regional organisations, non-governmental organisations, public companies, private companies and individuals. To these may be added groups engaging in international terrorism. Not all such entities will constitute legal persons, although they may act with some degree of influence upon the international plane. International personality is participation plus some form of community acceptance. The latter element will be dependent upon many different factors, including the type of personality under question. It may be manifested in many forms and may in certain cases be inferred from practice. It will also reflect a need. Particular branches of international law here are playing a crucial role. Human rights law, the law relating to armed conflicts and international economic law are especially important in generating and reflecting increased participation and personality in international law. Groups, entities of various kinds, international organisations, multinational corporations and individuals not constituting states are often referred to as non-state actors, a term which brings together a large and increasing collection of those affecting or affected by international law in a manner which perhaps does not fully recognise the many differences between such persons.⁶ It is, indeed, a characteristic of the modern international legal system that a wide range of participants act on the international scene and therefore have an impact upon the development and content of international law.

States

Despite the increasing range of actors and participants in the international legal system, states remain by far the most important legal persons and,

despite the rise of globalisation and all that this entails, states retain their attraction as the primary focus for the social activity of humankind and thus for international law.

Lauterpacht observed that ‘the orthodox positivist doctrine has been explicit in the affirmation that only states are subjects of international law’.⁷

However, it is less clear that in practice this position was maintained. The Holy See (particularly from 1871 to 1929), insurgents and belligerents, international organisations, chartered companies and various territorial entities such as the League of Cities were all at one time or another treated as possessing the capacity to become international persons.⁸

Creation of Statehood⁹

The relationship in this area between factual and legal criteria is a crucial shifting one. Whether the birth of a new state is primarily a question of fact or law and how the interaction between the criteria of effectiveness and other relevant legal principles may be reconciled are questions of considerable complexity and significance. Since *terrae nullius* are no longer apparent,¹⁰ the creation of new states in the future, once the decolonisation process is at an end, can only be accomplished as a result of the diminution or disappearance of existing states, and the need for careful regulation thus arises. Recent events such as the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and Czechoslovakia underline this. In addition, the decolonisation movement has stimulated a re-examination of the traditional criteria. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933¹¹ lays down the most widely accepted formulation of the criteria of statehood in international law. It notes that the state as an international person should possess the following qualifications: ‘(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states’.

The Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia¹² in Opinion No. 1 declared that ‘the state is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political authority’ and that ‘such a state is characterised by sovereignty’. It was also noted that the form of internal political organisation and constitutional provisions constituted ‘mere facts’, although it was necessary to take them

into account in order to determine the government's sway over the population and the territory.¹³

Such provisions are neither exhaustive nor immutable. As will be seen below, other factors may be relevant, including self-determination and recognition, while the relative weight given to such criteria in particular situations may very well vary. What is clear, however, is that the relevant framework revolves essentially around territorial effectiveness.¹⁴

The existence of a permanent population¹⁵ is naturally required and there is no specification of a minimum number of inhabitants, as examples such as Nauru and Tuvalu¹⁶ demonstrate. However, one of the issues raised by the Falkland Islands conflict does relate to the question of an acceptable minimum with regard to self-determination issues,¹⁷ and it may be that the matter needs further clarification as there exists a number of small islands awaiting decolonisation.¹⁸

The need for a defined territory focuses upon the requirement for a particular territorial base upon which to operate. However, there is no necessity in international law for defined and settled boundaries. A state may be recognised as a legal person even though it is involved in a dispute with its neighbours as to the precise demarcation of its frontiers, so long as there is a consistent band of territory which is undeniably controlled by the government of the alleged state. For this reason at least, therefore, the 'State of Palestine' declared in November 1988 at a conference in Algiers cannot be regarded as a valid state. The Palestinian organisations did not control any part of the territory they claim.¹⁹

Albania prior to the First World War was recognised by many countries even though its borders were in dispute.²⁰ More recently, Israel has been accepted by the majority of nations as well as the United Nations as a valid state despite the fact that its frontiers have not been finally settled and despite its involvement in hostilities with its Arab neighbours over its existence and territorial delineation.²¹ What matters is the presence of a stable community within a certain area, even though its frontiers may be uncertain. Indeed, it is possible for the territory of the state to be split into distinct parts, for example Pakistan prior to the Bangladesh secession of 1971 or present-day Azerbaijan.

For a political society to function reasonably effectively it needs some form of government or central control. However, this is not a precondition for recognition as an independent country.²² It should be regarded more as an indication of some sort of coherent political structure and society, than the necessity for a sophisticated apparatus of executive and legislative organs.²³ A relevant factor here might be the extent to which the area not under the control of the government is claimed by another state as a matter of international law as distinct from *de facto* control. The general requirement might be seen to relate to the nineteenth-century concern with ‘civilisation’ as an essential of independent statehood and ignores the modern tendency to regard sovereignty for non-independent peoples as the paramount consideration, irrespective of administrative conditions.²⁴

As an example of the former tendency one may note the *Aaland Islands* case of 1920. The report of the International Committee of Jurists appointed to investigate the status of the islands remarked, with regard to the

establishment of the Finnish Republic in the disordered days following the Russian Revolution, that it was extremely difficult to name the date that Finland became a sovereign state. It was noted that:

This certainly did not take place until a stable political organisation had been created, and until the public authorities had become strong enough to assert themselves throughout the territories of the state without the assistance of the foreign troops.²⁵

Recent practice with regard to the new states of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina emerging out of the former Yugoslavia suggests the modification of the criterion of effective exercise of control by a government throughout its territory. Both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were recognised as independent states by European Community member states²⁶ and admitted to membership of the United Nations (which is limited to ‘states’ by article 4 of the UN Charter²⁷)²⁸ at a time when both states were faced with a situation where non-governmental forces controlled substantial areas of the territories in question in civil war conditions. More recently, Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008 with certain Serb-inhabited areas apparently not under the control of the central government.²⁹ In such situations, lack of effective central control might be balanced by significant international recognition, culminating in membership of the United Nations. Nevertheless, a foundation of effective control is required for statehood. Conversely, however, a comprehensive breakdown in order and

the loss of control by the central authorities in an independent state will not obviate statehood. Whatever the consequences in terms of possible humanitarian involvement, whether by the United Nations or otherwise depending upon the circumstances, the collapse of governance within a state (sometimes referred to as a 'failed state') has no necessary effect upon the status of that state as a state. Indeed, the very designation of 'failed state' is controversial and, in terms of international law, misleading.³⁰

The capacity to enter into relations with other states is an aspect of the existence of the entity in question as well as an indication of the importance attached to recognition by other countries. It is a capacity not limited to sovereign nations, since international organisations, non-independent states and other bodies can enter into legal relations with other entities under the rules of international law. But it is essential for a sovereign state to be able to create such legal relations with other units as it sees fit. Where this is not present, the entity cannot be an independent state. The concern here is not with political pressure by one country over another, but rather the lack of competence to enter into legal relations. The difference is the presence or absence of legal capacity, not the degree of influence that may affect decisions.

The essence of such capacity is independence. This is crucial to statehood and amounts to a conclusion of law in the light of particular circumstances. It is a formal statement that the state is subject to no other sovereignty and is unaffected either by factual dependence upon other states or by submission to the rules of international law.³¹ It is arguable that a degree of actual as well as formal independence may also be necessary. This question was raised in

relation to the grant of independence by South Africa to its Bantustans. In the case of the Transkei, for example, a considerable proportion, perhaps 90 per cent, of its budget at one time was contributed by South Africa, while Bophuthatswana was split into a series of areas divided by South African territory.³² Both the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations declared such 'independence' invalid and called upon all states not to recognise the new entities. These entities were, apart from South Africa, totally unrecognised.³³ However, many states are as dependent upon aid from other states, and economic success would not have altered the attitude of the international community. Since South Africa as a sovereign state was able to alienate parts of its own territory under international law, these entities would appear in the light of the formal criteria of statehood to have been formally independent. However, it is suggested that the answer as to their status lay elsewhere than in an elucidation of this category of the criteria of statehood. It lay rather in understanding that actions taken in order to pursue an illegal policy, such as apartheid, cannot be sustained.³⁴

An example of the complexities that may attend such a process is provided by the unilateral declaration of independence by Lithuania, one of the Baltic states unlawfully annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, on 11 March 1990.³⁵ The 1940 annexation was never recognised *de jure* by the Western states and thus the control exercised by the Soviet Union was accepted only upon a *de facto* basis. The 1990 declaration of independence was politically very sensitive, coming at a time of increasing disintegration within the Soviet Union, but went unrecognised by any state. In view of the continuing constitutional crisis within the Soviet Union and the possibility of a new confederal association freely accepted by the fifteen Soviet republics, it was

at that time premature to talk of Lithuania as an independent state, not least because the Soviet authorities maintained substantial control within that territory.³⁶ The independence of Lithuania and the other Baltic states was recognised during 1991 by a wide variety of states, including crucially the Soviet Union.³⁷

It is possible, however, for a state to be accepted as independent even though, exceptionally, certain functions of government are placed in the hands of an outside body. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 provided for a High Representative to be appointed as the ‘final authority in theatre’ with regard to the implementation of the agreement,³⁸ and the High Representative has, for example, removed a number of persons from public office. None of this has been understood by the international community to affect Bosnia’s status as an independent state, but the arrangement did arise as an attempt to reach and implement a peace agreement in the context of a bitter civil war with third-party intervention. More controversially, after a period of international administration,³⁹ Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008, noting specifically that it accepted the obligations for Kosovo under the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the Ahtisaari Plan).⁴⁰ This Plan called for ‘independence with international supervision’ and the obligations for Kosovo included human rights and decentralisation guarantees, together with an international presence to supervise implementation of the Settlement. The provisions of the Settlement were to take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo. The international presence was to take the form of an International Civilian Representative (ICR), who would also be the European Union Special Representative, to be appointed by the International Steering

Group.⁴¹ The ICR would be the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of the Settlement and, in particular, would have the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by the Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions were determined to be inconsistent with the Settlement terms.⁴² In addition, an international military presence, led by NATO, would ensure a safe environment throughout Kosovo.⁴³

Self-Determination and the Criteria of Statehood

It is the criterion of government which, as suggested above, has been most affected by the development of the legal right to self-determination. The traditional exposition of the criterion concentrated upon the stability and effectiveness needed for this factor to be satisfied,⁴⁴ while the representative and democratic nature of the government has also been put forward as a requirement. The evolution of self-determination has affected the standard necessary as far as the actual exercise of authority is concerned, so that it appears a lower level of effectiveness, at least in traditional decolonisation situations, has been accepted.⁴⁵ This can be illustrated by reference to a couple of cases.

The former Belgian Congo became independent on 30 June 1960 in the midst of widespread tribal fighting which had spread to the capital. Within a few weeks the Force Publique had mutinied, Belgian troops had intervened and the province of Katanga announced its secession. Notwithstanding the virtual breakdown of government, the Congo was recognised by a large number of states after independence and was admitted to the United Nations as a

member state without opposition. Indeed, at the time of the relevant General Assembly resolution in September 1960, two different factions of the Congo government sought to be accepted by the United Nations as the legitimate representatives of the state. In the event, the delegation authorised by the head of state was accepted and that of the Prime Minister rejected.⁴⁶ A rather different episode occurred with regard to the Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau. In 1972, a UN Special Mission was dispatched to the ‘liberated areas’ of the territory and concluded that the colonial power had lost effective administrative control of large areas of the territory.⁴⁷ On 24 September 1973, the PAIGC proclaimed the Republic of Guinea Bissau an independent state. The issue of the ‘illegal occupation by Portuguese military forces of certain sections of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau’ came before the General Assembly and a number of states affirmed the validity of the independence of the new state in international law. Western states denied that the criteria of statehood had been fulfilled. However, ninety-three states voted in favour of Assembly resolution 3061 (XXVIII), constitutionally no more than a recommendation, which mentioned ‘the recent accession to independence of the people of Guinea-Bissau thereby creating the sovereign state of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau’.⁴⁸ In such cases, admission to membership of the United Nations is likely to be determinative in the light of the requirement of statehood for membership (article 4, UN Charter) and the universality of membership, requiring positive votes by both the General Assembly and the Security Council.

In addition to modifying the traditional principle with regard to the effectiveness of government in certain circumstances, the principle of self-determination may also be relevant as an additional criterion of statehood. In

the case of Rhodesia, UN resolutions denied the legal validity of the unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965 and called upon member states not to recognise it.⁴⁹ No state did recognise Rhodesia and a civil war ultimately resulted in its transformation into the recognised state of Zimbabwe. Rhodesia might have been regarded as a state by virtue of its satisfaction of the factual requirements of statehood, but this is a dubious proposition. The evidence of complete non-recognition, the strenuous denunciations of its purported independence by the international community and the developing civil war militate strongly against this. It could be argued, on the other hand, that, in the absence of recognition, no entity could become a state, but this constitutive theory of recognition is not acceptable.⁵⁰ The best approach is to accept the development of self-determination as an additional criterion of statehood, denial of which would obviate statehood. This can only be acknowledged in relation to self-determination situations and would not operate in cases, for example, of secessions from existing states.⁵¹ In other words, in the case of an entity seeking to become a state and accepted by the international community as being entitled to exercise the right of self-determination, it may well be necessary to demonstrate that the internal requirements of the principle have not been offended. One cannot define this condition too rigorously in view of state practice to date, but it would appear to be a sound proposition that systematic and institutionalised discrimination might invalidate a claim to statehood.

In particular, one may point to the practice of the international community concerning the successor states to the former Yugoslavia. The European Community adopted Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on 16 December 1991,⁵² which constituted a

common position on the process of recognition of such new states and referred specifically to the principle of self-determination. The Guidelines underlined the need to respect the rule of law, democracy and human rights and mentioned specifically the requirement for guarantees for the rights of minorities. Although these Guidelines deal with the issue of recognition and not as such the criteria for statehood, the two are interlinked and conditions required for recognition may in the circumstances, especially where expressed in general and not specific terms, often in practice be interpreted as additions to the criteria for statehood.

Recognition

Recognition is a method of accepting certain factual situations and endowing them with legal significance, but this relationship is a complicated one. In the context of the creation of statehood, recognition may be viewed as constitutive or declaratory, as will be noted in more detail in Chapter 8. The former theory maintains that it is only through recognition that a state comes into being under international law, whereas the latter approach maintains that once the factual criteria of statehood have been satisfied, a new state exists as an international person, recognition becoming merely a political and not a legal act in this context. Various modifications have been made to these theories, but the role of recognition, at the least in providing strong evidential demonstration of satisfaction of the relevant criteria, must be acknowledged. In many situations, expressed requirements for recognition may be seen as impacting upon the question of statehood as the comments in the previous section on the EC Guidelines indicate. There is also an integral relationship between recognition and the criteria for statehood in the sense that the more

overwhelming the scale of international recognition is in any given situation, the less may be demanded in terms of the objective demonstration of adherence to the criteria. Conversely, the more sparse international recognition is, the more attention will be focused upon proof of actual adherence to the criteria concerned.

Extinction of Statehood⁵³

Extinction of statehood may take place as a consequence of merger, absorption or, historically, annexation. It may also occur as a result of the dismemberment of an existing state.⁵⁴ In general, caution needs to be exercised before the dissolution of a state is internationally accepted.⁵⁵ While the disappearance, like the existence, of a state is a matter of fact,⁵⁶ it is a matter of fact that is legally conditioned in that it is international law that will apportion particular legal consequences to particular factual situations and the appreciation of these facts will take place within a certain legal framework.

While it is not unusual for governments to disappear, it is rather rarer for states to become extinct. This will not happen in international law as a result of the illegal use of force, as the Kuwait crisis of August 1990 and the consequent UN response clearly demonstrates,⁵⁷ nor as a consequence of internal upheavals within a state,⁵⁸ but it may occur by consent. Three recent examples may be noted. On 22 May 1990, North and South Yemen united, or merged, to form one state, the Republic of Yemen,⁵⁹ while on 3 October 1990, the two German states reunified as a result of the constitutional accession of the *Länder* of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany.⁶⁰ The dissolution of Czechoslovakia⁶¹ on 1 January

1993 and the establishment of the two new states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia constitutes a further example of the dismemberment, or disappearance, of a state.⁶²

During 1991, the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union gathered force as the Baltic states reasserted their independence⁶³ and the other republics of the Soviet Union stated their intention to become sovereign. In December of that year, the Commonwealth of Independent States was proclaimed, and it was stated in the Alma Ata Declaration⁶⁴ that, with the establishment of the CIS, ‘the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist’. The states of the CIS agreed to support ‘Russia’s continuance of the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United Nations, including permanent membership of the Security Council, and other international organisations’.⁶⁵ It has been commonly accepted that Russia constitutes a continuation of the Soviet Union, with consequential adjustments to take account of the independence of the other former republics of the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ It is therefore a case of dismemberment basically consisting of the transformation of an existing state. The disappearance of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the claim, internationally accepted, of the Russian Federation to be the continuation of that state. While the element of continuity is crucial in the framework of the rules of state succession,⁶⁷ it does constitute a complication in the context of extinction of states.

By way of contrast, not all the relevant parties accepted that the process of dissolution of the former SFRY during 1991 to 1992 resulted in the dissolution of that state.⁶⁸ The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising the former Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, saw itself as the

continuation of the former state within reduced boundaries, while the other former republics disputed this and maintained rather that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was a successor to the former Yugoslavia precisely on the same basis as the other former republics such as Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The matter was discussed by the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission. In Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991, it was noted that at that stage the SFRY was ‘in the process of dissolution’.⁶⁹ However, in Opinion No. 8, adopted on 4 July 1992, the Arbitration Commission stated that the process of dissolution had been completed and that the SFRY no longer existed. This conclusion was reached on the basis of the fact that Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised as new states, the republics of Serbia and Montenegro had adopted a new constitution for the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ and UN resolutions had been adopted referring to ‘the former SFRY’.⁷⁰ The Commission also emphasised that the existence of federal states was seriously compromised when a majority of the constituent entities, embracing a majority of the territory and population of the federal state, constitute themselves as sovereign states with the result that federal authority could no longer be effectively exercised.⁷¹ The UN Security Council in resolution 777 (1992) stated that ‘the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist’. This was reiterated in resolution 1022 (1995) in which the Security Council, in welcoming the Dayton Peace Agreement (the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) between the states of the former Yugoslavia and suspending the application of sanctions, stated that the SFRY ‘has ceased to exist’. On 1 November 2000, Yugoslavia was admitted to the United Nations as a new

member,⁷² following its request sent to the Security Council on 27 October 2000.⁷³

The Fundamental Rights of States

The fundamental rights of states exist by virtue of the international legal order, which is able, as in the case of other legal orders, to define the characteristics of its subjects.⁷⁴

Independence⁷⁵

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of a state is its independence, or sovereignty.⁷⁶ This was defined in the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States prepared in 1949 by the International Law Commission as the capacity of a state to provide for its own well-being and development free from the domination of other states, providing it does not impair or violate their legitimate rights.⁷⁷ By independence, one is referring to a legal concept and it is no deviation from independence to be subject to the rules of international law. Any political or economic dependence that may in reality exist does not affect the legal independence of the state, unless that state is formally compelled to submit to the demands of a superior state, in which case dependent status is concerned.

A discussion on the meaning and nature of independence took place in the *Austro-German Customs Union* case before the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1931.⁷⁸ It concerned a proposal to create a free trade customs union between the two German-speaking states and whether this was incompatible with the 1919 Peace Treaties (coupled with a subsequent

protocol of 1922) pledging Austria to take no action to compromise its independence. In the event, and in the circumstances of the case, the Court held that the proposed union would adversely affect Austria's sovereignty. Judge Anzilotti noted that restrictions upon a state's liberty, whether arising out of customary law or treaty obligations, do not as such affect its independence. As long as such restrictions do not place the state under the legal authority of another state, the former maintains its status as an independent country.⁷⁹

The Permanent Court emphasised in the *Lotus* case⁸⁰ that '[r]estrictions upon the independence of states cannot therefore be presumed'. A similar point in different circumstances was made by the International Court of Justice in *Nicaragua v. United States*,⁸¹ where it was stated that 'in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the state concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign state can be limited, and this principle is valid for all states without exception'. The Court also underlined in the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*⁸² that '[s]tate practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does not result from an absence of authorisation but, on the contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibition'. The starting point for the consideration of the rights and obligations of states within the international legal system remains that international law permits freedom of action for states, unless there is a rule constraining this. However, such freedom exists within and not outside the international legal system and it is therefore international law which dictates the scope and content of the independence of states and not the states themselves individually and unilaterally.

The notion of independence in international law implies a number of rights and duties: for example, the right of a state to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and permanent population, or the right to engage upon an act of self-defence in certain situations. It implies also the duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Precisely what constitutes the internal affairs of a state is open to dispute and is in any event a constantly changing standard. It was maintained by the Western powers for many years that any discussion or action by the United Nations⁸³ with regard to their colonial possessions was contrary to international law.

However, this argument by the European colonial powers did not succeed and the United Nations examined many colonial situations.⁸⁴ In addition, issues related to human rights and racial oppression do not now fall within the closed category of domestic jurisdiction. It was stated on behalf of the European Community, for example, that the ‘protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms can in no way be considered an interference in a state’s internal affairs’. Reference was also made to ‘the moral right to intervene whenever human rights are violated’.⁸⁵

This duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state was included in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States adopted in October 1970 by the UN General Assembly. It was emphasised that:

No state or group of states has the right to
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of

any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.

The prohibition also covers any assistance or aid to subversive elements aiming at the violent overthrow of the government of a state. In particular, the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity amounts to a violation of this principle of non-intervention.⁸⁶

The principles surrounding sovereignty, such as non-intervention, are essential in the maintenance of a reasonably stable system of competing states. Setting limits on the powers of states vis-à-vis other states contributes to some extent to a degree of stability within the legal order. As the International Court of Justice pointed out in the *Corfu Channel* case in 1949, ‘between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations’.⁸⁷

By a similar token a state cannot purport to enforce its laws in the territory of another state without the consent of the state concerned. However, international law would seem to permit in some circumstances the state to continue to exercise its jurisdiction, notwithstanding the illegality of the apprehension.⁸⁸ It also follows that the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a sovereign state requires the consent of that state.⁸⁹

Equality⁹⁰

One other crucial principle is the legal equality of states, that is equality of legal rights and duties. States, irrespective of size or power, have the same juridical capacities and functions, and are likewise entitled to one vote in the UN General Assembly. The doctrine of the legal equality of states is an umbrella category for it includes within its scope the recognised rights and obligations which fall upon all states.

This was recognised in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law. This provides that:

All states enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature.

In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:

- (a) States are juridically equal;
- (b) Each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
- (c) Each state has the duty to respect the personality of other states;
- (d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the state are inviolable;

- (e) Each state has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems;
- (f) Each state has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in peace with other states.⁹¹

In many respects this doctrine owes its origins to Natural Law thinking. Just as equality was regarded as the essence of man and thus contributed philosophically to the foundation of the state, so naturalist scholars treated equality as the natural condition of states. With the rise in positivism, the emphasis altered and, rather than postulating a general rule applicable to all and from which a series of rights and duties may be deduced, international lawyers concentrated upon the sovereignty of each and every state, and the necessity that international law be founded upon the consent of states.

The notion of equality before the law is accepted by states in the sense of equality of legal personality and capacity. However, it would not be strictly accurate to talk in terms of the equality of states in creating law. The major states will always have an influence commensurate with their status, if only because their concerns are much wider, their interests much deeper and their power more effective.⁹²

Within the UN General Assembly, the doctrine of equality is maintained by the rule of one state, one vote.⁹³ However, one should not overlook the existence of the veto possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council.⁹⁴

Peaceful Co-Existence

This concept has been formulated in different ways and with different views as to its legal nature by the Soviet Union, China and the Developing Countries. It was elaborated in 1954 as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence by India and China, which concerned mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's affairs and the principle of equality.⁹⁵

The idea was expanded in a number of international documents such as the final communiqué of the Bandung Conference in 1955 and in various resolutions of the United Nations.⁹⁶ Its recognised constituents also appear in the list of Principles of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. Among the points enumerated are the concepts of sovereign equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, as well as a condemnation of subversive activities carried out from one state and aimed against another. Other concepts that have been included in this category comprise such principles as non-aggression and the execution of international obligations in good faith. The Soviet Union had also expressed the view that peaceful co-existence constituted the guiding principle in contemporary international law.⁹⁷ Interest in the concept has recently been renewed with the adoption of the Russia–China Declaration on the Promotion of International Law of 25 June 2016, which underlined the continuing relevance of the Five Principles of Co-existence of 1954.⁹⁸

Protectorates and Protected States⁹⁹

A distinction is sometimes made between a protectorate and a protected state. In the former case, in general, the entity concerned enters into an arrangement with a state under which, while separate legal personality may be involved, separate statehood is not. In the case of a protected state, the entity concerned retains its status as a separate state, but enters into a valid treaty relationship with another state affording the latter certain extensive functions possibly internally and externally. However, precisely which type of arrangement is made and the nature of the status, rights and duties in question will depend upon the circumstances and, in particular, the terms of the relevant agreement and third-party attitudes.¹⁰⁰

In the case of Morocco, the Treaty of Fez of 1912 with France gave the latter the power to exercise certain sovereign powers on behalf of the former, including all of its international relations. Nevertheless, the International Court of Justice emphasised that Morocco had in the circumstances of the case remained a sovereign state.¹⁰¹

In the case of sub-Saharan Africa in the colonial period, treaties of protection were entered into with tribal entities that were not states. Such institutions were termed ‘colonial protectorates’ and constituted internal colonial arrangements. They did not constitute international treaties with internationally recognised states.¹⁰²

The extent of powers delegated to the protecting state in such circumstances may vary, as may the manner of the termination of the arrangement. In these cases, formal sovereignty remains unaffected and the entity in question retains its status as a state, and may act as such in the various international

fora, regard being had of course to the terms of the arrangement. The obligation may be merely to take note of the advice of the protecting state, or it may extend to a form of diplomatic delegation subject to instruction, as in the case of Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein was refused admission to the League of Nations since it was held unable to discharge all the international obligations imposed by the Covenant in the light of its delegation of sovereign powers, such as diplomatic representation, administration of post, telegraph and telephone services and final decisions in certain judicial cases.¹⁰³ Liechtenstein, however, has been a party to the ICJ Statute and was a party to the *Nottebohm*¹⁰⁴ case before the Court, a facility only open to states. Liechtenstein joined the United Nations in 1990.

Federal States¹⁰⁵

There are various forms of federation or confederation, according to the relative distribution of power between the central and local organs. In some states, the residue of power lies with the central government, in others with the local or provincial bodies. A confederation implies a more flexible arrangement, leaving a considerable degree of authority and competence with the component units to the detriment of the central organ.¹⁰⁶

The Yugoslav Arbitration Commission noted in Opinion No. 1 that in the case of a federal state embracing communities possessing a degree of autonomy where such communities participate in the exercise of political power within the framework of institutions common to the federation, the ‘existence of the state implies that the federal organs represent the components of the federation and wield effective power’.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the

existence of such a federal state would be seriously compromised ‘when a majority of these entities, embracing the greater part of the territory and population, constitute themselves as sovereign states with the result that federal authority may no longer be effectively exercised’.¹⁰⁸

The division of powers inherent in such arrangements often raises important questions for international law, particularly in the areas of personality, responsibility and immunity. Whether the federation dissolves into two or more states also brings into focus the doctrine of self-determination in the form of secession. Such dissolution may be the result of an amicable and constitutional agreement or may occur pursuant to a forceful exercise of secession. In the latter case, international legal rules may be pleaded in aid, but the position would seem to be that (apart from recognised colonial situations) there is no right of self-determination applicable to independent states that would justify the resort to secession. There is, of course, no international legal duty to refrain from secession attempts, in the absence of a Security Council decision to the contrary: the situation remains subject to the domestic law. However, should such a secession prove successful in fact, then the concepts of recognition and the appropriate criteria of statehood would prove relevant and determinative as to the new situation.¹⁰⁹

The federal state will itself, of course, have personality, but the question of the personality and capability of the component units of the federation on the international plane can really only be determined in the light of the constitution of the state concerned and state practice. For instance, the then Soviet Republics of Byelorussia and the Ukraine were admitted as members of the United Nations in 1945 and to that extent possessed international

personality.¹¹⁰ Component states of a federation that have been provided with a certain restricted international competence may thus be accepted as having a degree of international personality. The issue has arisen especially with regard to treaties. Lauterpacht, in his Report on the Law of Treaties, for example, noted that treaties concluded by component units of federal states ‘are treaties in the meaning of international law’,¹¹¹ although Fitzmaurice adopted a different approach in his Report on the Law of Treaties by stating that such units act as agents for the federation which alone possesses international personality and which is the entity bound by the treaty and responsible for its implementation.¹¹² Article 5(2) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties provided that

[s]tates members of a federal union may
possess a capacity to conclude treaties if such
capacity is admitted by the federal constitution
and within the limits there laid down

but this was ultimately rejected at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,¹¹³ partly on the grounds that the rule was beyond the scope of the Convention itself. The major reasons for the rejection, however, were that the provision would enable third states to intervene in the internal affairs of federal states by seeking to interpret the constitutions of the latter and that, from another perspective, it would unduly enhance the power of domestic law to determine questions of international personality to the detriment of international law. This perhaps would indeed have swung the balance too far away from the international sphere of operation.

Different federations have evolved different systems with regard to the allocation of treaty-making powers. In some cases, component units may enter into such arrangements subject to varying conditions. The Constitution of Switzerland, for example, enables the cantons to conclude treaties with foreign states on issues concerning public economy, frontier relations and the police, subject to the provision that the Federal Council acts as the intermediary.¹¹⁴ In the case of the United States, responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations rests exclusively with the Federal Government,¹¹⁵ although American states have entered into certain compacts with foreign states or component units (such as Manitoba and Quebec, provinces of Canada) dealing with the construction and maintenance of highways and international bridges, following upon consultations with the foreign state conducted by the federal authorities. In any event, it is clear that the internal constitutional structure is crucial in endowing the unit concerned with capacity. What, however, turns this into international capacity is recognition.

An issue recently the subject of concern and discussion has been the question of the domestic implementation of treaty obligations in the case of federations, especially in the light of the fact that component units may possess legislative power relating to the subject-matter of the treaty concerned. Although this issue lies primarily within the field of domestic constitutional law, there are important implications for international law. In the United States, for example, the approach adopted has been to insert ‘federal’ reservations to treaties in cases where the states of the Union have exercised jurisdiction over the subject-matter in question, providing that the Federal Government would take appropriate steps to enable the competent

authorities of the component units to take appropriate measures to fulfil the obligations concerned.¹¹⁶ In general, however, there have been few restrictions on entry into international agreements.¹¹⁷

The question as to divided competence in federations and international treaties has arisen in the past, particularly with regard to conventions of the International Labour Organization, which typically encompass areas subject to the law-making competence of federal component units. In Canada, for example, early attempts by the central government to ratify ILO conventions were defeated by the decisions of the courts on constitutional grounds, supporting the views of the provinces,¹¹⁸ while the United States has a poor record of ratification of ILO conventions on similar grounds of local competence and federal treaty-making.¹¹⁹ The issue that arises therefore is either the position of a state that refuses to ratify or sign a treaty on grounds of component unit competence in the area in question or alternatively the problem of implementation and thus responsibility where ratification does take place. In so far as the latter is concerned, the issue has been raised in the context of article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, to which the United States is a party, and which requires, among other things, that states parties inform a foreigner under arrest of his or her right to communicate with the relevant consulate. The International Court of Justice has twice held the United States in violation of this requirement, noting that the domestic doctrine known as the procedural default rule, preventing a claimant from raising an issue on appeal or on review if it had not been raised at trial, could not excuse or justify that violation.¹²⁰ The US Supreme Court has held that while the International Court's decisions were entitled to 'respectful consideration', they were not binding.¹²¹ This was so even though

the US President in a memorandum dated 28 February 2005 had declared that the United States would fulfil its obligations under the *Avena* decision by having states' courts give effect to it.¹²² The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, held that neither the International Court's *Avena* decision nor the President's memorandum constituted binding federal law pre-empting Texas law, so that Medellín (the applicant) would not be provided with the review called for by the International Court and by the President.¹²³

In Australia, the issue has turned on the interpretation of the constitutional grant of federal power to make laws 'with respect to . . . external affairs'.¹²⁴ Two recent cases have analysed this, in the light particularly of the established principle that the Federal Government could under this provision legislate on matters, not otherwise explicitly assigned to it, which possessed an intrinsic international aspect.¹²⁵

In *Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen*¹²⁶ in 1982, the Australian High Court, in dealing with an action against the Premier of Queensland for breach of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (which incorporated parts of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted in 1965), held that the relevant legislation was valid with regard to the 'external affairs' provision under section 51(29) of the Constitution. In other words, the 'external affairs' power extended to permit the implementation of an international agreement, despite the fact that the subject-matter concerned was otherwise outside federal power. It was felt that if Australia accepted a treaty obligation with regard to an aspect of its own internal legal order, the subject of the obligation thus became an 'external affair' and legislation dealing with this fell within section 51(29), and was

thereby valid constitutionally.¹²⁷ It was not necessary that a treaty obligation be assumed: the fact that the norm of non-discrimination was established in customary international law was itself sufficient in the view of Stephen J to treat the issue of racial discrimination as part of external affairs.¹²⁸

In *Commonwealth of Australia v. Tasmania*,¹²⁹ the issue concerned the construction of a dam in an area placed on the World Heritage List established under the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, to which Australia was a party. The Federal Government in 1983 wished to stop the scheme by reference *inter alia* to the ‘external affairs’ power as interpreted in *Koowarta*, since it possessed no specific legislative power over the environment. The majority of the Court held that the ‘external affairs’ power extended to the implementation of treaty obligations. It was not necessary that the subject-matter of the treaty be inherently international.

The effect of these cases seen, of course, in the context of the Australian Constitution, is to reduce the problems faced by federal states of implementing international obligations in the face of local jurisdiction.

The difficulties faced by federal states have also become evident with regard to issues of state responsibility.¹³⁰ As a matter of international law, states are responsible for their actions, including those of subordinate organs irrespective of domestic constitutional arrangements.¹³¹ The International Court in the *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur* case stated that it was a well-established rule of customary international law that ‘the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded

as an act of that State’¹³² and this applies to component units of a federal state. As the Court noted in its Order of 3 March 1999 on provisional measures in the *LaGrand* case, ‘the international responsibility of a State is engaged by the action of the competent organs and authorities acting in that State, whatever they may be’. In particular, the United States was under an obligation to transmit the Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona, while the Governor was under an obligation to act in conformity with the international undertakings of the United States.¹³³ Similarly, the Court noted in the *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur* case that the government of Malaysia was under an obligation to communicate the Court’s Advisory Opinion to the Malaysian courts in order that Malaysia’s international obligations be given effect.¹³⁴

Thus, international responsibility of the state may co-exist with an internal lack of capacity to remedy the particular international wrong. In such circumstances, the central government is under a duty to seek to persuade the component unit to correct the violation of international law,¹³⁵ while the latter is, it seems, under an international obligation to act in accordance with the international obligations of the state.

Federal practice in regulating disputes between component units is often of considerable value in international law. This operates particularly in cases of boundary problems, where similar issues arise.¹³⁶ Conversely, international practice may often be relevant in the resolution of conflicts between component units.¹³⁷

Sui Generis Territorial Entities¹³⁸

Mandated and Trust Territories¹³⁹

After the end of the First World War and the collapse of the Axis and Russian empires, the Allies established a system for dealing with the colonies of the defeated powers that did not involve annexation. These territories would be governed according to the principle that ‘the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation’. The way in which this principle would be put into effect would be to entrust the tutelage of such people to ‘advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position’ could undertake the responsibility. The arrangement would be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.¹⁴⁰

Upon the conclusion of the Second World War and the demise of the League, the mandate system was transmuted into the UN trusteeship system under Chapters XII and XIII of the UN Charter.¹⁴¹ The strategic trust territory of the Pacific, taken from Japan, the mandatory power, was placed in a special category subject to Security Council rather than Trusteeship Council supervision for security reasons,¹⁴² while South Africa refused to place its mandated territory under the system. Quite who held sovereignty in such territories was the subject of extensive debates over many decades.¹⁴³

As far as the trust territory of the Pacific was concerned, the United States signed a Covenant with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia and with the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Upon their entry into force in autumn 1986, it was determined that the trusteeship had been terminated.

This procedure providing for political union with the United States was accepted by the Trusteeship Council as a legitimate exercise of self-determination.¹⁴⁴ However, the proposed Compact of Free Association with the Republic of Palau (the final part of the former trust territory) did not enter into force as a result of disagreement over the transit of nuclear-powered or armed vessels and aircraft through Palauan waters and airspace and, therefore, the United States continued to act as administering authority under the trusteeship agreement.¹⁴⁵ These difficulties were eventually resolved.¹⁴⁶

South West Africa was administered after the end of the First World War as a mandate by South Africa, which refused after the Second World War to place the territory under the trusteeship system. Following this, the International Court of Justice in 1950 in its Advisory Opinion on the *International Status of South West Africa*¹⁴⁷ stated that, while there was no legal obligation imposed by the UN Charter to transfer a mandated territory into a trust territory, South Africa was still bound by the terms of the mandate agreement and the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the obligations that it had assumed at that time. The Court emphasised that South Africa alone did not have the capacity to modify the international status of the territory. This competence rested with South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations, as successor to the League of Nations. Logically flowing from this decision was the ability of the United Nations to hear petitioners from the territory in consequence of South Africa's refusal to heed UN decisions and in pursuance of League of Nations practices.¹⁴⁸

In 1962, the International Court of Justice heard the case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia, the two African members of the League, that South Africa was

in breach of the terms of the mandate and had thus violated international law. The Court initially affirmed that it had jurisdiction to hear the merits of the dispute.¹⁴⁹ However, by the Second Phase of the case, the Court (its composition having slightly altered in the meanwhile) decided that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have any legal interest in the subject-matter of the claim (the existence and supervision of the mandate over South West Africa) and accordingly their contentions were rejected.¹⁵⁰ Having thus declared on the lack of standing of the two African appellants, the Court did not discuss any of the substantive questions which stood before it.

This judgment aroused a great deal of feeling, particularly in the Developing Countries, and occasioned a shift in emphasis in dealing with the problem of the territory in question.¹⁵¹

The General Assembly resolved in October 1966 that since South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations, the mandate was therefore terminated. South West Africa (or Namibia as it was to be called) was to come under the direct responsibility of the United Nations.¹⁵² Accordingly, a Council was established to oversee the territory and a High Commissioner appointed.¹⁵³ The Security Council in a number of resolutions upheld the action of the Assembly and called upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from the territory. It also requested other states to refrain from dealing with the South African government in so far as Namibia was concerned.¹⁵⁴

The Security Council ultimately turned to the International Court and requested an Advisory Opinion as to the *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*.¹⁵⁵ The Court concluded that

South Africa's presence in Namibia was indeed illegal in view of the series of events culminating in the UN resolutions on the grounds of a material breach of a treaty (the mandate agreement) by South Africa, and further that 'a binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence'. South Africa was obligated to withdraw its administration from the territory, and other states members of the United Nations were obliged to recognise the illegality and the invalidity of its acts with regard to that territory and aid the United Nations in its efforts concerning the problem.¹⁵⁶

The opinion was approved by the Security Council in resolution 301 (1971), which also reaffirmed the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia. In 1978, South Africa announced its acceptance of proposals negotiated by the five Western contact powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Canada and West Germany) for Namibian independence involving a UN supervised election and peacekeeping force.¹⁵⁷ After some difficulties,¹⁵⁸ Namibia finally obtained its independence on 23 April 1990.¹⁵⁹

Germany 1945

With the defeat of Germany on 5 June 1945, the Allied Powers assumed 'supreme authority' with regard to that country, while expressly disclaiming any intention of annexation.¹⁶⁰ Germany was divided into four occupation zones with four-power control over Berlin. The Control Council established by the Allies acted on behalf of Germany and in such capacity entered into binding legal arrangements. The state of Germany continued, however, and the situation, as has been observed, was akin to legal representation or agency

of necessity.¹⁶¹ Under the 1952 Treaty between the three Western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, full sovereign powers were granted to the latter subject to retained powers concerning the making of a peace treaty, and in 1972 the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, established in 1954 by the Soviet Union in its zone, recognised each other as sovereign states.¹⁶²

However, following a series of dramatic events during 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, deriving in essence from the withdrawal of Soviet control, the drive for a reunified Germany in 1990 became unstoppable.¹⁶³ A State Treaty on German Economic, Monetary and Social Union was signed by the Finance Ministers of the two German states on 18 May and this took effect on 1 July.¹⁶⁴ A State Treaty on German Unification was signed on 31 August, providing for unification on 3 October by the accession to the Federal Republic of Germany of the *Länder* of the German Democratic Republic under article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, with Berlin as the capital.¹⁶⁵ The external obstacle to unity was removed by the signing on 12 September of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, between the two German states and the four wartime allies (the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France).¹⁶⁶ Under this treaty, a reunified Germany agreed to accept the current Oder–Neisse border with Poland and to limit its armed forces to 370,000 persons, while pledging not to acquire atomic, chemical or biological weapons. The Agreement on the Settlement of Certain Matters Relating to Berlin between the Federal Republic and the three Western powers on 25 September 1990 provided for the relinquishment of Allied rights with regard to Berlin.¹⁶⁷

Condominium

In this instance two or more states equally exercise sovereignty with regard to a territory and its inhabitants. There are arguments as to the relationship between the states concerned, the identity of the sovereign for the purposes of the territory and the nature of the competences involved.¹⁶⁸ In the case of the New Hebrides, a series of Anglo–French agreements established a region of joint influence, with each power retaining sovereignty over its nationals and neither exercising separate authority over the area.¹⁶⁹ A Protocol listed the functions of the condominiumal government and vested the power to issue joint regulations respecting them in a British and a French High Commissioner. This power was delegated to resident commissioners who dealt with their respective nationals. Three governmental systems accordingly co-existed, with something of a legal vacuum with regard to land tenure and the civil transactions of the indigenous population.¹⁷⁰ The process leading to the independence of the territory also reflected its unique status as a condominium.¹⁷¹ It was noted that the usual independence Bill would not have been appropriate, since the New Hebrides was not a British colony. Its legal status as an Anglo-French condominium had been established by international agreement and could only be terminated in the same fashion. The nature of the condominium was such that it assumed that the two metropolitan powers would always act together and unilateral action was not provided for in the basic constitutional documents.¹⁷² The territory became independent on 30 July 1980 as the state of Vanuatu. The entity involved prior to independence grew out of an international treaty and established an administrative entity arguably distinct from its metropolitan governments, but

more likely operating on the basis of a form of joint agency with a range of delegated powers.¹⁷³

The Central American Court of Justice in 1917¹⁷⁴ held that a condominium existed with regard to the Gulf of Fonseca providing for rights of co-ownership of the three coastal states of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. The issue was raised in the *El Salvador/Honduras* case before the International Court of Justice.¹⁷⁵ The Court noted that a condominium arrangement being ‘a structured system for the joint exercise of sovereign governmental powers over a territory’ was normally created by agreement between the states concerned, although it could be created as a juridical consequence of a succession of states (as in the Gulf of Fonseca situation itself), being one of the ways in which territorial sovereignty could pass from one state to another. The Court concluded that the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca beyond the three-mile territorial sea were historic waters and subject to a joint sovereignty of the three coastal states. It based its decision, apart from the 1917 judgment, upon the historic character of the Gulf waters, the consistent claims of the three coastal states and the absence of protest from other states.¹⁷⁶

International Administration of Territories

In such cases a particular territory is placed under a form of international regime, but the conditions under which this has been done have varied widely, from autonomous areas within states to relatively independent entities.¹⁷⁷ The United Nations is able to assume the administration of territories in specific circumstances. The trusteeship system was founded

upon the supervisory role of the United Nations,¹⁷⁸ while in the case of *South West Africa*, the General Assembly supported by the Security Council ended South Africa's mandate and asserted its competence to administer the territory pending independence.¹⁷⁹ Beyond this, UN organs exercising their powers may assume a variety of administrative functions over particular territories where issues of international concern have arisen. Attempts were made to create such a regime for Jerusalem under the General Assembly partition resolution for Palestine in 1947 as a '*corpus separatum* under a special international regime . . . administered by the United Nations', but this never materialised for a number of reasons.¹⁸⁰ Further, the Security Council in 1947 adopted a Permanent Statute for the Free Territory of Trieste, under which the Council was designated as the supreme administrative and legislative authority of the territory.¹⁸¹

More recently, the United Nations has become more involved in important administrative functions, authority being derived from a mixture of international agreements, domestic consent and the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII to adopt binding decisions concerning international peace and security, as the case may be. For example, the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements between the four Cambodian factions authorised the United Nations to establish civil administrative functions in that country pending elections and the adoption of a new constitution. This was accomplished through the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), to which were delegated 'all powers necessary to ensure the implementation' of the peace settlement and which also exercised competence in areas such as foreign affairs, defence, finance and so forth.¹⁸²

Annex 10 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Peace Agreement)¹⁸³ established the post of High Representative with extensive powers with regard to the civilian implementation of the peace agreement and with the final authority to interpret the civilian aspects of the settlement.¹⁸⁴ This was endorsed and confirmed by the Security Council in binding resolution 1031 (1995). The relatively modest powers of the High Representative under Annex 10 were subsequently enlarged in practice by the Peace Implementation Council, a body with fifty-five members established to review progress regarding the peace settlement, in the decisions it took at the Bonn Summit of December 1997 (the Bonn Conclusions).¹⁸⁵ These provided, for example, for measures to be taken against persons found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement. This has included removal from public office, the competence to impose interim legislation where Bosnia's institutions had failed to do so¹⁸⁶ and 'other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions'.¹⁸⁷ The High Representative has taken a wide-ranging number of decisions, from imposing the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1997¹⁸⁸ and imposing the Law on the Flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina in February 1998¹⁸⁹ to enacting the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Election Law in January 2006 to mark the ongoing process of transferring High Representative powers to the domestic authorities in the light of the improving situation.¹⁹⁰ This unusual structure with regard to an independent state arises, therefore, from a mix of the consent of the parties and binding Chapter VII activity by the Security Council.

In resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council authorised the Secretary-General to establish an interim international civil presence in Kosovo (United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK),¹⁹¹ following the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from that part of the country consequent upon NATO action. Under this resolution, UNMIK performed a wide range of administrative functions, including health and education, banking and finance, post and telecommunications, and law and order. It was tasked *inter alia* to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, to coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief, support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, maintain civil law and order, promote human rights and assure the return of refugees. Administrative structures were established and elections held. The first regulation adopted by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General appointed under resolution 1244 vested all legislative and executive authority in Kosovo in UNMIK as exercised by the Special Representative.¹⁹² This regulation also established that the law in the territory was that in existence in so far as this did not conflict with the international standards referred to in section 2 of the regulation, the fulfilment of the mandate given to UNMIK under resolution 1244, or the present or any other regulation issued by UNMIK. A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government was promulgated by the Special Representative in May 2001.¹⁹³ This comprehensive administrative competence was founded upon the reaffirmation of Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial integrity (and thus continuing territorial title over the province) and the requirement for 'substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo'.¹⁹⁴ Accordingly, this arrangement illustrated a complete division between title to the territory and the exercise of power and control over it. It flowed from a

binding Security Council resolution, which referred to Yugoslavia's consent to the essential principles therein contained.¹⁹⁵

The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established by Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) acting under Chapter VII. It was 'endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor' and 'empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice'.¹⁹⁶ Its widespread mandate included, in addition to public administration, humanitarian responsibilities and a military component and it was authorised to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate. UNTAET's mandate was extended to 20 May 2002, the date of East Timor's independence as the new state of Timor-Leste.¹⁹⁷ It was thereafter succeeded by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET).¹⁹⁸

Taiwan¹⁹⁹

This territory was ceded by China to Japan in 1895 by the Treaty of Shimonoseki and remained in the latter's hands until 1945. Japan undertook on surrender not to retain sovereignty over Taiwan and this was reaffirmed under the Peace Treaty 1951 between the Allied Powers (but not the Soviet Union and China) and Japan, under which all rights to the island were renounced without specifying any recipient. After the Chinese Civil War, the communist forces took over the mainland while the nationalist regime installed itself on Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores. Both the United States and the United Kingdom took the view at that stage that sovereignty over Taiwan was uncertain or undetermined.²⁰⁰ The key point affecting status has been that both governments have claimed to represent the whole of China. No claim of separate statehood for Taiwan has been made and in such a case it is difficult to maintain that such an unsought status exists. Total lack of recognition of Taiwan as a separate independent state merely reinforces this point. In 1979, the United States recognised the People's Republic of China as the sole and legitimate government of China.²⁰¹ Accordingly, Taiwan would appear to be a non-state territorial entity which is capable of acting independently on the international scene, but is most probably *de jure* part of China. It is interesting to note that when in early 1990 Taiwan sought accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it did so by requesting entry for the 'customs territory' of 'Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu', thus avoiding an assertion of statehood.²⁰² The accession of 'Chinese Taipei' to the World Trade Organization was approved by the Ministerial Conference in November 2001.²⁰³

The ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC)²⁰⁴

In 1974, following a coup in Cyprus backed by the military regime in Greece, Turkish forces invaded the island. The Security Council in resolution 353 (1974) called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the island that was contrary to such respect. On 13 February 1975, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed in the area occupied by Turkish forces. A resolution adopted at the same meeting of the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration at which the proclamation was made, emphasised the determination ‘to oppose resolutely all attempts against the independence of Cyprus and its partition or union with any other state’ and resolved to establish a separate administration until such time as the 1960 Cyprus Constitution was amended to provide for a federal republic.²⁰⁵

On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed their independence as the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.²⁰⁶ This was declared illegal by the Security Council in resolution 541 (1983) and its withdrawal called for. All states were requested not to recognise the ‘purported state’ or assist it in any way. This was reiterated in Security Council resolution 550 (1984). The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided that it continued to regard the government of the Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus and called for respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.²⁰⁷ The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 10 May 2001 in *Cyprus v. Turkey* concluded that ‘it is evident from international practice . . . that the international community does not

recognise the “TRNC” as a state under international law’ and declared that ‘the Republic of Cyprus has remained the sole legitimate government of Cyprus’.²⁰⁸ In the light of this and the very heavy dependence of the territory upon Turkey, it cannot be regarded as a sovereign state, but remains as a *de facto* administered entity within the recognised confines of the Republic of Cyprus and dependent upon Turkish assistance.²⁰⁹

The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic²¹⁰

In February 1976, the Polisario liberation movement conducting a war to free the Western Saharan territory from Moroccan control declared the independent sovereign Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).²¹¹ Over the succeeding years, many states recognised the new entity, including a majority of Organisation of African Unity members. In February 1982, the OAU Secretary-General sought to seat a delegation from SADR on that basis, but this provoked a boycott by some nineteen states and a major crisis. However, in November 1984, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU did agree to seat a delegation from SADR, despite Morocco's threat of withdrawal from the organisation.²¹² This, therefore, can be taken as OAU recognition of statehood and, as such, of evidential significance. However, although in view of the arguably reduced importance of the effectiveness of control criterion in such self-determination situations a credible argument could now be made regarding SADR's statehood, the issue is still controversial in view of the continuing hostilities and effective Moroccan control. It is to be noted that the legal counsel to the United Nations gave an opinion in 2002 to the effect that Western Sahara continued as a non-self-governing territory and that this status was unaffected by the transfer of administrative authority to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. The view was also taken that exploration and exploitation activities undertaken in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara would violate international law.²¹³ The Council of the European Union approved a trade agreement with Morocco in 2010, being a development of a 2000 Association Agreement, which was challenged by Polisario on the basis that

Morocco had been applying the 2000 agreement to Western Sahara. The Court of Justice of the European Union issued a judgment in December 2016, denying the standing of Polisario to challenge the decision, but holding that the General Court had erred in law when it assumed that the Association Agreement applied also to Western Sahara.²¹⁴

Kosovo

Following a period of UN administration authorised by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999),²¹⁵ the Yugoslav (later Serbian) province of Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. This was preceded by the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement formulated by Martti Ahtisaari which had in March 2007 called for independence for Kosovo with international supervision.²¹⁶ This was rejected by Serbia. The international community was divided as to the question of recognition of Kosovo's independence. It was recognised swiftly by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and the majority of EU states, Japan and others. Russia and Serbia, on the other hand, made it clear that they opposed recognition, as did Spain and Greece. Accordingly, in the current circumstances, while many countries recognise Kosovo, many do not and entry into the United Nations is not possible until, for example, Russia is prepared to lift its opposition in view of its veto power.²¹⁷ The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, although faced with wide-ranging arguments as to that entity and the criteria of statehood, confined itself to a narrow interpretation of the issue

and found that the declaration of independence was not itself contrary to international law.²¹⁸

At the moment of writing, Kosovo is recognised as a state by 116 states;²¹⁹ however, this excludes some key members of the international community so that the question as to the status of Kosovo as a sovereign state is still, for the moment, open.

Palestine²²⁰

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was permitted by the Security Council from 1972 to participate in its debates with the same rights of participation as conferred upon a member state not a member of the Council, although this was controversial.²²¹ In 1974, the General Assembly invited the PLO to participate as an observer.²²² In December 1988, the General Assembly decided that the designation ‘Palestine’ should be used in place of the designation ‘Palestine Liberation Organization’ in the UN system.²²³

The position of the PLO, however, began to evolve considerably with the Israel–PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed in Washington, DC on 13 September 1993.²²⁴ By virtue of this Declaration, the PLO team in the Jordanian–Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference was accepted as representing the Palestinian people. It was agreed to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority as an elected Council for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza (occupied by Israel since 1967) for a transitional period of up to five years leading to a permanent solution. Its jurisdiction was to

cover the territory of the West Bank and Gaza, save for issues to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. Upon the entry into force of the Declaration, a transfer of authority was to commence from the Israel military government and its civil administration. The Cairo Agreement of 4 May 1994²²⁵ provided for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Jericho and the Gaza Strip and transfer of authority to a separately established Palestinian Authority. This Authority, distinct from the PLO it should be emphasised, was to have certain specified legislative, executive and judicial powers. The process continued with a transfer of further powers and responsibilities in a Protocol of 27 August 1995 and with the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza of 28 September 1995, under which an additional range of powers and responsibilities was transferred to the Palestinian Authority pending the election of the Council and arrangements were made for Israeli withdrawal from a number of cities and villages on the West Bank.²²⁶ An accord concerning Hebron followed in 1997²²⁷ and the Wye River agreement in 1998, both marking further Israeli redeployments, while the Sharm el Sheikh memorandum and a later Protocol of 1999 concerned safe-passage arrangements between the Palestinian Authority areas in Gaza and the West Bank.²²⁸ The increase in the territorial and jurisdictional competence of the Palestinian Authority established as a consequence of these arrangements raised the question of legal personality. While Palestinian statehood was clearly not accepted by the international community, the Palestinian Authority could be regarded as possessing some form of limited international personality.²²⁹ Such personality, however, derived from the agreements between Israel and the PLO and existed separately from the personality of the PLO as a national liberation movement, which relied upon the recognition of third parties.²³⁰ Since neither side has to

date denounced the Oslo Accords and succeeding instruments, they remain in effect.

However, on 22 January 2009, the Palestinian Authority purported to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court,²³¹ such jurisdiction being limited under the Court's Statute to states.²³² After extensive argument, the Prosecutor of the Court made a decision on 3 April 2012 refusing the request on the basis that he did not possess the necessary competence.²³³ On 23 September 2011, the Palestinian Authority applied to become a member of the United Nations,²³⁴ but this did not succeed due to deep divisions (and the existence of the veto power) in the Security Council, whose approval is required for membership.²³⁵ In November 2012, the General Assembly voted to accord 'Palestine' the status of non-member observer state.²³⁶ On 1 January 2015, the President of the Palestine Authority (in the name of 'Palestine') issued a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court with regard to alleged crimes committed since 13 June 2014. On the following day Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute by depositing its instrument of accession with the UN Secretary-General and the Statute of the Court was deemed to enter into force on 1 April 2015.²³⁷ On 16 January 2016, the Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine.²³⁸ On 22 May 2018, Palestine further referred the situation to the Prosecutor.²³⁹ The Prosecutor concluded that there was a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation, but in view of the complexity of the situation sought an opinion from the Pre-Trial Chamber as to whether the Court's territorial jurisdiction included 'the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that is the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza'.²⁴⁰

A number of states recognise Palestine as an independent state²⁴¹ and Palestine has joined a number of international organisations and become a party to a number of international treaties.²⁴²

However, the matter remains controversial due to the divisions within the international community and the continuing application of the Oslo Accords (in the absence of the denunciation of the agreements by the parties), as well as the efforts to seek a peace agreement founded upon the acceptance of two states (Israel and Palestine) within the boundaries of mandated Palestine.

Various Secessionist Claimants

A number of secessionist claims from recognised independent states exist where such claimants in practice exercise some degree of effective control over all or part of the territory claimed. The former territory of British Somaliland, being the northern part of the new state of Somalia after its independence in 1960, asserted its own independence on 17 May 1991.²⁴³ A constitution was adopted in 2001, but the Organisation of African Unity refused to support any action that would affect the unity and sovereignty of Somalia.²⁴⁴ ‘Somaliland’ is unrecognised by any state or international organisation, although a number of dealings with the authorities of that entity have taken place.²⁴⁵ Following an armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, Armenian forces captured and occupied the area of Nagorno-Karabakh (and seven surrounding districts) from Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, an area with a majority ethnic Armenian population, declared its independence from Azerbaijan as the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ (‘NKR’). However, this has not been recognised by any state

(including Armenia) and the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 reaffirming the sovereign and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and calling for withdrawal from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.²⁴⁶ The issue of the status of the NKR came before the European Court of Human Rights in the context of individual applications. In *Chiragov v. Armenia* (Merits), the leading case, the court in its judgment,²⁴⁷ reflecting the similar cases concerning northern Cyprus,²⁴⁸ concluded that Armenia ‘has had a significant and decisive influence over the “NKR”’ and

that the two entities are highly integrated in virtually all important matters and that this situation persists to this day. In other words, the ‘NKR’ and its administration survives by virtue of the military, political, financial and other support given to it by Armenia which, consequently, exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, including the district of Lachin. The matters complained of therefore come within the jurisdiction of Armenia for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.

The former Soviet republic of Moldova became independent on 23 June 1990 as the Soviet Union dissolved. On 2 September 1990, the ‘Moldavian Republic of Transdnistria’ was proclaimed as an independent state in an area of Moldova bordering Ukraine. This entity has been able to maintain itself as a result of Russian assistance. However, it has not been recognised by any

state.²⁴⁹ Similarly, the areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia have established separate *de facto* governments respectively with Russian support.²⁵⁰ Russia and a very few states have recognised them,²⁵¹ but in the light of effective Russian control and the paucity of international recognition, there can be no question of independent statehood.²⁵² The region of Catalonia sought to secede from Spain following a referendum in October 2017 authorised by a Catalanian Referendum Law adopted the previous month. The Spanish Constitutional Court held that the Constitution did not recognise a unilateral right of secession and that international law only recognised such a right in the context of people under foreign subjugations, domination or exploitation. Beyond that, the principle of territorial integrity applied. Accordingly, the Referendum Law was unlawful.²⁵³ International reaction was unanimous in reaffirming Spain's territorial integrity and disregarding Catalonia's declaration of independence.²⁵⁴

Associations of States

There are a number of ways in which states have become formally associated with one another. Such associations do not constitute states, but have a certain effect upon international law. Confederations, for example, are probably the closest form of cooperation and they generally involve several countries acting together by virtue of an international agreement, with some kind of central institutions with limited functions.²⁵⁵ This is to be contrasted with federations. A federal unit is a state with strong centralised organs and usually a fairly widespread bureaucracy with extensive powers over the citizens of the state, even though the powers of the state are divided between

the different units.²⁵⁶ However, a state may comprise component units with extensive powers.²⁵⁷

There are in addition certain ‘associated states’ which by virtue of their smallness and lack of development have a close relationship with another state. One instance is the connection between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, where internal self-government is allied to external dependence.²⁵⁸ Another example was the group of islands which constituted the Associated States of the West Indies. These were tied to the United Kingdom by the terms of the West Indies Act 1967, which provided for the latter to exercise control with regard to foreign and defence issues. Nevertheless, such states were able to and did attain their independence.²⁵⁹

The status of such entities in an association relationship with a state will depend upon the constitutional nature of the arrangement and may in certain circumstances involve international personality distinct from the metropolitan state depending also upon international acceptance. It must, however, be noted that such status is one of the methods accepted by the United Nations of exercising the right to self-determination.²⁶⁰ Provided that an acceptable level of powers, including those dealing with domestic affairs, remain with the associated state, and that the latter may without undue difficulty revoke the arrangement, some degree of personality would appear desirable and acceptable.

The Commonwealth of Nations (the former British Commonwealth) is perhaps the most well-known of the loose associations which group together sovereign states on the basis usually of common interests and historical ties.

Its members are all fully independent states who cooperate through the assistance of the Commonwealth Secretariat and periodic conferences of Heads of Government. Regular meetings of particular ministers also take place. The Commonwealth does not constitute a legally binding relationship, but operates as a useful forum for discussions. Relations between Commonwealth members display certain special characteristics: for example, ambassadors are usually referred to as High Commissioners. It would appear unlikely in the circumstances that it possesses separate international personality.²⁶¹ However, the more that the Commonwealth develops distinctive institutions and establishes common policies with the capacity to take binding decisions, the more the argument may be made for international legal personality.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the coming to independence of the constituent republics, with the Russian Federation being deemed the continuation of the Soviet Union, it was decided to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States.²⁶² Originally formed by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine on 8 December 1991, it was enlarged on 21 December 1991 to include eleven former republics of the Soviet Union. Georgia joined the CIS on 8 October 1993. Thus all the former Soviet Republics, excluding the three Baltic states, are now members of that organisation.²⁶³ The agreement establishing the CIS provided for respect for human rights and other principles and called for co-ordination between the member states. The Charter of the CIS was adopted on 22 June 1993 as a binding international treaty²⁶⁴ and laid down a series of principles ranging from respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, self-determination of peoples, prohibition of the use or threat of force and settlement of disputes by peaceful

means. It was noted that the CIS was neither a state nor ‘supranational’ (article 1) and a number of common coordinating institutions were established. In particular, the Council of Heads of State is the ‘highest body of the Commonwealth’ and it may ‘take decisions on the principal issues relating to the activity of the member states in the field of their mutual interests’ (article 21), while the Council of the Heads of Government has the function of coordinating cooperation among executive organs of member states (article 22). Both Councils may take decisions on the basis of consensus (article 23). A Council of Foreign Ministers was also established together with a Co-ordination and Consultative Committee, as a permanent executive and coordinating body of the Commonwealth.²⁶⁵ The CIS has adopted in addition a Treaty on Economic Union²⁶⁶ and a Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.²⁶⁷ The increasing development of the CIS as a directing international institution suggests its possession of international legal personality.

The European Union²⁶⁸ is an association, of twenty-seven states,²⁶⁹ which has established a variety of common institutions and which has the competence to adopt not only legal acts binding upon member states, but also acts having direct effect within domestic legal systems. The Union consists essentially of the European Community (itself an amalgam of the European Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM and the European Economic Community) and two additional pillars, viz. the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. Only the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty provided explicitly for international legal personality (article 6), but the case-law of the European Court of Justice demonstrates its belief that the other two communities also possess such

personality.²⁷⁰ It is also established that Community law has superiority over domestic law. The European Court of Justice early in the history of the Community declared that the Community constituted ‘a new legal order of international law’.²⁷¹ It has also been noted that although the European Union constitutes a separate and autonomous legal order,²⁷² it is one that is founded upon international treaties and thus part of international law at least to that extent.²⁷³ In the circumstances, it seems hard to deny that the Community possesses international legal personality, but unlikely that the cooperative processes involved in the additional two pillars are so endowed.²⁷⁴ The European Community has the power to conclude and negotiate agreements in line with its external powers, to become a member of an international organisation and to have delegations in non-member countries. However, the Treaty on European Union contained no provision on the legal personality of the Union. The Union does not have institutionalised treaty-making powers, but is able to conclude agreements through the Council of the European Union or by asserting its position on the international stage, especially in connection with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, article 55 of the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 provided for the insertion into the Treaty on European Union of a new article 46A, which expressly asserts that the Union has legal personality.²⁷⁵

Conclusions

Whether or not the entities discussed above constitute international persons or indeed states or merely part of some other international person is a matter for careful consideration in the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the claims made by the entity in question, the facts on the ground,

especially with regard to third-party control and the degree of administrative effectiveness manifested, and the reaction of other international persons. The importance here of recognition, acquiescence and estoppel is self-evident. Acceptance of some international personality need not be objective so as to bind non-consenting states nor unlimited as to time and content factors. These elements will be considered below. It should, however, be noted here that the international community itself also has needs and interests that bear upon this question as to international status. This is particularly so with regard to matters of responsibility and the protection of persons via the rules governing the recourse to and conduct of armed conflicts.²⁷⁶

Special Cases

The Sovereign Order of Malta

This Order, established during the Crusades as a military and medical association, ruled Rhodes from 1309 to 1522 and was given to Malta by treaty with Charles V in 1530 as a fief of the Kingdom of Sicily. This sovereignty was lost in 1798, and in 1834 the Order established its headquarters in Rome as a humanitarian organisation.²⁷⁷ The Order already had international personality at the time of its taking control of Malta and even when it had to leave the island it continued to exchange diplomatic legations with most European countries. The Italian Court of Cassation in 1935 recognised the international personality of the Order, noting that ‘the modern theory of the subjects of international law recognises a number of collective units whose composition is independent of the nationality of their constituent members and whose scope transcends by virtue of their universal

character the territorial confines of any single state'.²⁷⁸ This is predicated upon the functional needs of the entity as accepted by third parties. It is to be noted, for example, that the Order maintains diplomatic relations with or is recognised by over eighty states and has observer status in the UN General Assembly.²⁷⁹ It is not a state and it is questionable whether it has general international personality beyond those states and organisations expressly recognising it.²⁸⁰

The Holy See and the Vatican City²⁸¹

In 1870, the conquest of the Papal states by Italian forces ended their existence as sovereign states. The question therefore arose as to the status in international law of the Holy See, deprived, as it then was, of normal territorial sovereignty. In 1929, the Lateran Treaty was signed with Italy which recognised the state of the Vatican City and 'the sovereignty of the Holy See in the field of international relations as an attribute that pertains to the very nature of the Holy See, in conformity with its traditions and with the demands of its mission in the world'.²⁸² The question thus interrelates with the problem of the status today of the Vatican City. The latter has no permanent population apart from Church functionaries and exists only to support the work of the Holy See. Italy carries out a substantial number of administrative functions with regard to the City. Some writers accordingly have concluded that it cannot be regarded as a state.²⁸³ Nevertheless, it is a party to many international treaties and is a member of the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union. It would appear that by virtue of recognition and acquiescence in the context of its claims, it does

exist as a state. The Vatican City is closely linked with the Holy See and they are essentially part of the same construct.

The Holy See, the central organisational authority of the Catholic Church, continued after 1870 to engage in diplomatic relations and enter into international agreements and concordats.²⁸⁴ Accordingly, its status as an international person was accepted by such partners. In its joint eleventh and twelfth report submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1993,²⁸⁵ the Holy See reminded the Committee of its ‘exceptional nature within the community of nations; as a sovereign subject of international law, it has a mission of an essentially religious and moral order, universal in scope, which is based on minimal territorial dimensions guaranteeing a basis of autonomy for the pastoral ministry of the Sovereign Pontiff’.²⁸⁶ Crawford has concluded that the Holy See is both an international legal person in its own right and the government of a state (the Vatican City).²⁸⁷

Insurgents and Belligerents

International law has recognised that such entities may in certain circumstances, primarily dependent upon the *de facto* administration of specific territory, enter into valid arrangements.²⁸⁸ In addition they will be bound by the rules of international law with regard to the conduct of hostilities and may in due course be recognised as governments. The traditional law is in process of modification as a result of the right to self-determination, and other legal principles such as territorial integrity,

sovereign equality and non-intervention in addition to recognition will need to be taken into account.²⁸⁹

International Public Companies

This type of entity, which may be known by a variety of names, for example multinational public enterprises or international bodies corporate, is characterised in general by an international agreement providing for cooperation between governmental and private enterprises.²⁹⁰ One writer, for example, defined such entities as corporations which

have not been constituted by the exclusive application of one national law; whose members and directors represent several national sovereignties; whose legal personality is not based, or at any rate not entirely, on the decision of a national authority or the application of a national law; whose operations, finally, are governed, at least partially, by rules that do not stem from a single or even from several national laws.²⁹¹

Such enterprises may vary widely in constitutional nature and in competences. Examples of such companies would include INTELSAT, established in 1973 as an intergovernmental structure for a global commercial telecommunications satellite system; Eurofima, established in 1955 by fourteen European states in order to lease equipment to the railway

administrations of those states; and the Bank of International Settlement, created in 1930 by virtue of a treaty between five states, and the host country, Switzerland. The personality question will depend upon the differences between municipal and international personality. If the entity is given a range of powers and is distanced sufficiently from municipal law, an international person may be involved, but it will require careful consideration of the circumstances.

Transnational Corporations

Another possible candidate for international personality is the transnational or multinational enterprise. Various definitions exist of this important phenomenon in international relations.²⁹² They in essence constitute private business organisations comprising several legal entities linked together by parent corporations and are distinguished by size and multinational spread. In the years following the *Barcelona Traction* case,²⁹³ an increasing amount of practice has been evident on the international plane dealing with such corporations. What has been sought is a set of guidelines governing the major elements of the international conduct of these entities.²⁹⁴ Progress has been slow and several crucial issues remain to be resolved, including the legal effect, if any, of such guidelines.²⁹⁵ The question of the international personality of transnational corporations remains an open one.²⁹⁶ However, on 6 July 2011, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the Guiding Principles on ‘Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’.²⁹⁷ These Principles do not create international legal obligations as such. They emphasise the duty of states to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of individuals and in

particular to protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. States must ensure that those affected by abuses taking place within their territory and/or jurisdiction must have access to an effective remedy. The Principles declare that business enterprises should respect human rights, avoid infringing on the rights of others and address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved. The reference to human rights here refers to internationally recognised human rights. It is provided that the responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard of expected conduct for business enterprises. The realm is that of ‘soft law’, of expectations, of anticipation, not of binding international (as opposed to national) legal regulation. This responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities and to seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are *directly linked* to their operations, products or services by their business relationships.²⁹⁸

The Right of All Peoples to Self-Determination²⁹⁹

The Establishment of the Legal Right

This principle, which traces its origin to the concepts of nationality and democracy as evolved primarily in Europe, first appeared in major form after the First World War. Despite President Wilson’s efforts, it was not included in the League of Nations Covenant and it was clearly not regarded as a legal

principle.³⁰⁰ However, its influence can be detected in the various provisions for minority protection³⁰¹ and in the establishment of the mandates system based as it was upon the sacred trust concept. In the ten years before the Second World War, there was relatively little practice regarding self-determination in international law. A number of treaties concluded by the Soviet Union in this period noted the principle,³⁰² but in the *Aaland Islands* case it was clearly accepted by both the International Commission of Jurists and the Committee of Rapporteurs dealing with the situation that the principle of self-determination was not a legal rule of international law, but purely a political concept.³⁰³ The situation, which concerned the Swedish inhabitants of an island alleged to be part of Finland, was resolved by the League's recognition of Finnish sovereignty coupled with minority guarantees.

The Second World War stimulated further consideration of the idea and the principle was included in the UN Charter. Article 1(2) noted as one of the organisation's purposes the development of friendly relations among nations based upon respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination, and article 55 reiterated the phraseology. It is disputed whether the reference to the principle in these very general terms was sufficient to entail its recognition as a binding right, but the majority view is against this. Not every statement of a political aim in the Charter can be regarded as automatically creative of legal obligations. On the other hand, its inclusion in the Charter, particularly within the context of the statement of purposes of the United Nations, provided the opportunity for the subsequent interpretation of the principle both in terms of its legal effect and consequences and with regard to its definition. It is also to be noted that Chapters XI and XII of the Charter

deal with non-self-governing and trust territories and may be seen as relevant within the context of the development and definition of the right to self-determination, although the term is not expressly used.³⁰⁴

Practice since 1945 within the United Nations, both generally as regards the elucidation and standing of the principle and more particularly as regards its perceived application in specific instances, can be seen as having ultimately established the legal standing of the right in international law. This may be achieved either by treaty or by custom or indeed, more controversially, by virtue of constituting a general principle of law. All these routes are relevant, as will be seen. The UN Charter is a multilateral treaty which can be interpreted by subsequent practice, while the range of state and organisation practice evident within the UN system can lead to the formation of customary law. The amount of material dealing with self-determination in the United Nations testifies to the importance of the concept and some of the more significant of this material will be briefly noted.

Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted in 1960 by eighty-nine votes to none, with nine abstentions, stressed that:

all peoples have the right to self-determination;
by virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.

Inadequacy of political, social, economic or educational preparedness was not to serve as a protest for delaying independence, while attempts aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country were deemed incompatible with the UN Charter. The Colonial Declaration set the terms for the self-determination debate in its emphasis upon the colonial context and its opposition to secession. The International Court described the Declaration as having ‘a declaratory character with regard to the right to self-determination as a customary norm, in view of its content and the conditions of its adoption’³⁰⁵ and underlined that ‘the wording used . . . has a normative character, in so far as it affirms that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination”’.

The Declaration was reinforced by the establishment of a Special Committee on Decolonisation, which now deals with all dependent territories and has proved extremely active, and virtually all UN resolutions dealing with self-determination expressly refer to it.

In 1966, the General Assembly adopted the International Covenants on Human Rights. Both these Covenants have an identical first article, declaring *inter alia* that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status’, while states parties to the instruments ‘shall promote the realisation of the right of self-determination and shall respect that right in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations’. The Covenants came into force in 1976 and thus constitute binding provisions as between the parties, but in addition they also may be regarded as authoritative interpretations of several human rights provisions in the Charter, including self-determination. The 1970

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations can be regarded as constituting an authoritative interpretation of the seven Charter provisions it expounds. The Declaration states *inter alia* that ‘by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all people have the right freely to determine . . . their political status’, while all states are under the duty to respect this right in accordance with the Charter. The Declaration was specifically intended to act as an elucidation of certain important Charter provisions and was indeed adopted without opposition by the General Assembly.³⁰⁶

In addition to this general, abstract approach, the UN organs have dealt with self-determination in a series of specific resolutions with regard to particular situations and this practice may be adduced as reinforcing the conclusions that the principle has become a right in international law by virtue of a process of Charter interpretation. Numerous resolutions have been adopted in the General Assembly and also the Security Council.³⁰⁷ It is also possible that a rule of customary law has been created since practice in the UN system is still state practice, but the identification of the *opinio juris* element is not easy and will depend upon careful assessment and judgment.

Judicial discussion of the principle of self-determination has been relatively rare and centres on the *Namibia*³⁰⁸ and *Western Sahara*³⁰⁹ Advisory Opinions by the International Court. In the former case, the Court emphasised that ‘the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them’.³¹⁰ The *Western*

Sahara case reaffirmed this point.³¹¹ This case arose out of the decolonisation of that territory, controlled by Spain as the colonial power, but subject to irredentist claims by Morocco and Mauritania. The Court was asked for an opinion with regard to the legal ties between the territory at that time and Morocco and the Mauritanian entity. The Court stressed that the request for an opinion arose out of the consideration by the General Assembly of the decolonisation of Western Sahara and that the right of the people of the territory to self-determination constituted a basic assumption of the questions put to the Court.³¹² After analysing the Charter provisions and Assembly resolutions noted above, the Court concluded that the ties which had existed between the claimants and the territory during the relevant period of the 1880s were not such as to affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV), the Colonial Declaration, in the decolonisation of the territory and in particular the right to self-determination. In other words, it is clear that the Court regarded the principle of self-determination as a legal one in the context of such territories.

The Court moved one step further in the *East Timor (Portugal v. Australia)* case³¹³ when it declared: ‘Portugal’s assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an *erga omnes* character, is irreproachable.’ The Court emphasised that the right of peoples to self-determination was ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’.³¹⁴ However, in that case, the Court, while noting that for both Portugal and Australia, East Timor (under Indonesian military occupation since the invasion of 1975) constituted a non-self-governing territory and pointing out that the people of East Timor had the right to self-determination, held that the absence of Indonesia from

the litigation meant that the Court was unable to exercise its jurisdiction.³¹⁵ These propositions were all reaffirmed by the International Court in the *Construction of a Wall* Advisory Opinion,³¹⁶ in the *Kosovo* Advisory Opinion³¹⁷ and in the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion.³¹⁸

The issue of self-determination came before the Supreme Court of Canada in *Re Secession of Quebec* in 1998 in the form of three questions posed. The second question asked whether there existed in international law a right to self-determination which would give Quebec the right unilaterally to secede.³¹⁹ The Court declared that the principle of self-determination ‘has acquired a status beyond “convention” and is considered a general principle of international law’.³²⁰

The Definition of Self-Determination

If the principle exists as a legal one, and it is believed that such is the case, the question arises then of its scope and application. As noted above, UN formulations of the principle from the 1960 Colonial Declaration to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law and the 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights stress that it is the right of ‘all peoples’. If this is so, then all peoples would become thereby to some extent subjects of international law as the direct repositories of international rights, and if the definition of ‘people’ used was the normal political–sociological one,³²¹ a major rearrangement of international law perceptions would have been created. In fact, that has not occurred and an international law concept of what constitutes a people for these purposes has been evolved, so that the ‘self’ in question must be determined within the accepted colonial territorial

framework. Attempts to broaden this have not been successful and the United Nations has always strenuously opposed any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country.³²² The United Nations has based its policy on the proposition that ‘the territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has under the Charter a status separate and distinct from the territory of the state administering it’ and that such status was to exist until the people of that territory had exercised the right to self-determination.³²³ Self-determination has also been used in conjunction with the principle of territorial integrity so as to protect the territorial framework of the colonial period in the decolonisation process and to prevent a rule permitting secession from independent states from arising.³²⁴ The Canadian Supreme Court noted in *Re Secession of Quebec* that ‘international law expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states’.³²⁵ It clearly applies within the context, however, of decolonisation of the European empires and thus provides the peoples of such territories with a degree of international personality. Self-determination as a concept is capable of developing further so as to include the right to secession from existing states, but that has not as yet convincingly happened. There is an argument, however, that seeks to build upon a savings clause in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations in order to justify an exception to the principle of territorial integrity and self-determination in this context. The clause in question states that nothing in the section on self-determination shall be construed as authorising or encouraging the dismembering or impairing of the territorial integrity of states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of self-

determination ‘and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour’.³²⁶ However, whether this apparent affirmation of the principle of territorial integrity and internal self-determination can be seen *a contrario* as offering legitimacy to secession from an independent state in exceptional circumstances is highly controversial and indeed very doubtful.

The Canadian Supreme Court in *Re Secession of Quebec* emphasised that a right to *external* self-determination (i.e. a claim to a right to unilateral secession) ‘arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances’.³²⁷ The issue was raised in the *Kosovo* case. The Court in its Advisory Opinion noted that:

Whether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the international law of self-determination confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to separate from that State is, however, a subject on which radically different views were expressed by those taking part in the proceedings and expressing a position on the question. Similar differences existed regarding whether international law provides for a right of ‘remedial secession’ and, if so, in what circumstances.³²⁸

The Court did not take the matter further as it felt that it was not necessary to decide on such matters for the purposes of the case.³²⁹ Nevertheless, it would be extraordinary for such a foundational principle as territorial integrity to be subject to a critical exception by way of an *a contrario* argument and not by way of positive affirmation. Furthermore, there is no international practice demonstrating the unequivocal acceptance of the so-called right of remedial secession, whether in general terms or with regard to specific situations.

To summarise: the principle of self-determination provides that the people of the colonially defined territorial unit in question may freely determine their own political status. Such determination may result in independence, integration with a neighbouring state, free association with an independent state or any other political status freely decided upon by the people concerned.³³⁰ Self-determination also has a role within the context of creation of statehood, preserving the sovereignty and independence of states, in providing criteria for the resolution of disputes, and in the area of the permanent sovereignty of states over natural resources.³³¹

Individuals³³²

The question of the status in international law of individuals is closely bound up with the rise in the international protection of human rights and, increasingly, with regard to investment protection. This section will be confined to some general comments about the former. The object theory in this regard maintains that individuals constitute only the subject-matter of intended legal regulation as such. Only states, and possibly international organisations, are subjects of the law.³³³ This has been a theory of limited value. The essence of international law has always been its ultimate concern for the human being and this was clearly manifest in the Natural Law origins of classical international law.³³⁴ The growth of positivist theories, particularly in the nineteenth century, obscured this and emphasised the centrality and even exclusivity of the state in this regard. Nevertheless, modern practice does demonstrate that individuals have become increasingly recognised as participants and subjects of international law. This has occurred primarily, but not exclusively, through human rights law.

The link between the state and the individual for international law purposes has historically been the concept of nationality. This was and remains crucial, particularly in the spheres of jurisdiction and the international protection of the individual by the state. It is often noted that the claim of an individual against a foreign state, for example, becomes subsumed under that of his national state.³³⁵ Each state has the capacity to determine who are to be its nationals and this is to be recognised by other states in so far as it is consistent with international law, although in order for other states to accept

this nationality there has to be a genuine connection between the state and the individual in question.³³⁶

Individuals as a general rule lack standing to assert violations of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the state of nationality,³³⁷ although states may agree to confer particular rights on individuals which will be enforceable under international law, independently of municipal law. Under article 304(b) of the Treaty of Versailles 1919, for example, nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers could bring cases against Germany before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in their own names for compensation, while the Treaty of 1907 between five Central American states establishing the Central American Court of Justice provided for individuals to bring cases directly before the Court.³³⁸

This proposition was reiterated in the *Danzig Railway Officials* case³³⁹ by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which emphasised that under international law treaties did not as such create direct rights and obligations for private individuals, although particular treaties could provide for the adoption of individual rights and obligations enforceable by the national courts where this was the intention of the contracting parties. Under the provisions concerned with minority protection in the 1919 Peace Treaties, it was possible for individuals to apply directly to an international court in particular instances. Similarly, the Tribunal created under the Upper Silesia Convention of 1922 decided that it was competent to hear cases by the nationals of a state against that state.³⁴⁰

Since then, a wide range of other treaties have provided for individuals to have rights directly and have enabled individuals to have direct access to international courts and tribunals. One may mention as examples the European Convention on Human Rights 1950; the European Communities treaties 1957; the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 1969; the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965; and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 1965.

However, the question of the legal personality of individuals under international law extends to questions of direct criminal responsibility also. It is now established that international law proscribes certain heinous conduct in a manner that imports direct individual criminal responsibility. This is dealt with in [Chapter 7](#).

International Organisations

International organisations have played a crucial role in the sphere of international personality. Since the nineteenth century, a growing number of such organisations have appeared and thus raised the issue of international legal personality. In principle, it is now well established that international organisations may indeed possess objective international legal personality.³⁴¹ Whether that will be so in any particular instance will depend upon the particular circumstances of that case. Whether an organisation possesses personality in international law will hinge upon its constitutional status, its actual powers and practice. Significant factors in this context will include the

capacity to enter into relations with states and other organisations and conclude treaties with them, and the status it has been given under municipal law. Such elements are known in international law as the indicia of personality. International organisations will be dealt with in Chapter 22.

The Acquisition, Nature and Consequences of Legal Personality – Some Conclusions

The above survey of existing and possible subjects of international law demonstrates both the range of interaction upon the international scene by entities of all types and the pressures upon international law to come to terms with the contemporary structure of international relations. The International Court clearly recognised the multiplicity of models of personality in stressing that ‘the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights’.³⁴² There are, however, two basic categories – objective and qualified personality. In the former case, the entity is subject to a wide range of international rights and duties and it will be entitled to be accepted as an international person by any other international person with which it is conducting relations. In other words, it will operate *erga omnes*. The creation of objective international personality will of necessity be harder to achieve and will require the action in essence of the international community as a whole or a substantial element of it. The Court noted in the *Reparation for Injuries* case that:

fifty states, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, have

the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality and not merely personality recognised by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims.³⁴³

The attainment of qualified personality, on the other hand, binding only the consenting subject, may arise more easily and it is clear that in this respect at least theory ought to recognise existing practice. Any legal person may accept that another entity possesses personality in relation to itself and that determination will operate only *in personam*.

States are the original and major subjects of international law. Their personality derives from the very nature and structure of the international system. Statehood will arise as a result of the factual satisfaction of the stipulated legal criteria. The constitutive theory of recognition is not really acceptable, although recognition, of course, contributes valuable evidence of adherence to the required criteria. All states, by virtue of the principle of sovereign equality, will enjoy the same degree of international legal personality. It has been argued that some international organisations, rather than being derivative subjects of international law, will as sovereign or self-governing legal communities possess an inherent personality directly from the system and will thus constitute general and even objective subjects of international law. Non-sovereign persons, including non-governmental organisations and individuals, would be derived subjects possessing only such international powers as conferred exceptionally upon them by the

necessary subjects of international law.³⁴⁴ This view may be questioned, but it is true that the importance of practice via the larger international organisations cannot be underestimated.

Similarly, the role of the Holy See (particularly prior to 1929) as well as the UN experience demonstrates that the derivative denomination is unsatisfactory. The significance of this relates to their ability to extend their international rights and duties on the basis of both constituent instruments and subsequent practice and to their capacity to affect the creation of further international persons and to play a role in the norm-creating process.

Recognition, acquiescence and estoppel are important principles in the context of international personality, not only with regard to states and international organisations, but throughout the range of subjects. They will affect not only the creation of new subjects, but also the definition of their nature and rights and duties.

Personality may be acquired by a combination of treaty provisions and recognition or acquiescence by other international persons. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross, a private non-governmental organisation subject to Swiss law, was granted special functions under the 1949 Geneva Red Cross Conventions and has been accepted as being able to enter into international agreements under international law with international persons, such as with the EEC under the World Food Programme.³⁴⁵ Another possible method of acquiring international personality is by subjecting an agreement between a recognised international person and a private party directly to the rules of international law. This would have the effect of

rendering the latter an international person in the context of the arrangement in question so as to enable it to invoke in the field of international law the rights it derives from that arrangement.³⁴⁶ While this currently may not be entirely acceptable to Developing Countries, this is probably because of a perception of the relevant rules of international law which may very well alter.³⁴⁷ Personality may also be acquired by virtue of being directly subjected to international duties. This would apply to individuals in specific cases such as war crimes, piracy and genocide, and might in the future constitute the method by which transnational corporations may be accepted as international persons.

Community needs with regard to the necessity to preserve international stability and life may well be of relevance in certain exceptional circumstances. In the case of non-state territorial entities that are not totally dominated by a state, there would appear to be a community need to ensure that at least the rules relating to the resort to force and the laws of war operate. Not to accept some form of qualified personality in this area might be to free such entities from having to comply with such rules and that clearly would affect community requirements.³⁴⁸ The determining point here, it is suggested, must be the degree of effective control maintained by the entity in its territorial confines. However, even so, recognition may overcome this hurdle, as the recognition of Byelorussia and the Ukraine as non-sovereign state entities prior to the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of these entities as the independent states of Belarus and Ukraine demonstrated.³⁴⁹

All these entities may be easily contained within the category of qualified personality, possessing a limited range of rights and duties valid as against those accepting their personality. There are no pre-set rules governing the extent of rights and duties of international persons. This will depend upon the type of entity concerned, its claims and expectations, functions and attitude adopted by the international community. The exception here would be states which enter upon life with an equal range of rights and obligations. Those entities with objective personality will, it is suggested, benefit from a more elastic perception of the extent of their rights and duties in the form of a wider interpretation of implied powers through practice. However, in the case of qualified subjects implied powers will be more difficult to demonstrate and accept and the range of their rights and duties will be much more limited. The presumption, thus, will operate the other way.

The precise catalogue of rights and duties is accordingly impossible to list in advance; it will vary from case to case. The capacity to function on the international scene in legal proceedings of some description will not be too uncommon, while the power to make treaties will be less widespread. As to this the International Law Commission noted that ‘agreements concluded between entities other than states or than international organisations seem too heterogeneous a group to constitute a general category, and the relevant body of international practice is as yet too exiguous for the characteristics of such a general category to be inferred from it’.³⁵⁰ The extent to which subjects may be internationally responsible is also unclear, although in general such an entity will possess responsibility to the extent of its rights and duties; but many problem areas remain. Similarly controversial is the norm-creating role of such diverse entities, but the practice of all international persons is

certainly relevant material upon which to draw in an elucidation of the rules and principles of international law, particularly in the context of the entity in question.

International personality thus centres not so much upon the capacity of the entity as such to possess international rights and duties, as upon the actual attribution of rights and/or duties on the international plane as determined by a variety of factors ranging from claims made to prescribed functions.

Procedural capacity with regard to enforcement is important, but not essential,³⁵¹ but in the case of non-individual entities the claimant will have to be in 'such a position that it possesses, in regard to its members, rights which it is entitled to ask them to respect'.³⁵² This, noted the International Court, expressed 'the essential test where a group, whether composed of states, of tribes or of individuals, is claimed to be a legal entity distinct from its members'.³⁵³

A wide variety of non-subjects exist and contribute to the evolution of the international system. Participation and personality are two concepts, but the general role played in the development of international relations and international law by individuals and entities of various kinds that are not international legal subjects as such cannot be ignored. The structure of participation in international law is a pyramid, with states at the top and descending levels of other persons and entities with lesser rights and obligations, and with the base constituted by those of no recognised personality as such in the system, but interested in, contributing to and affected by the rules, principles and structures of international law. However, what is clear is that international law is in the process of evolving towards a

more inclusive and flexible position with regard to personality and participation.

Suggestions for Further Reading

A. Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples*, Cambridge, 1995

J. Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006

R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994

Non-State Actors in International Law (ed. M. Noortmann, A. Reinisch and C. Ryngaert), Oxford, 2015

R. Portmann, *Legal Personality in International Law*, Cambridge, 2010

¹ See e.g. R. Portmann, *Legal Personality in International Law*, Cambridge, 2010; J. E. Nijman, *The Concept of International Legal Personality*, The Hague, 2004; *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, part II; J. Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006; D. P. O'Connell, *International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1970, vol. I; J. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, Leiden, 1969, vol. II; O. Lissitzyn, 'Territorial Entities other than Independent States in the Law of Treaties', **125 HR**, 1968, p. 5; H. Lauterpacht, *International Law: Collected Papers*, Cambridge, 1975, vol. II, p. 487; C. Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, Paris, 1974, vol. II; N. Mugerwa, 'Subjects of International Law', in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, p. 247; G. Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, 3rd ed., London, 1957, vol. I, p. 89; A. Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World*, Oxford, 1986, chapter 4; A. Cassese, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005, part II; *International Law: Achievements and Prospects* (ed. M. Bedjaoui), Paris, 1991, part 1, title 1; *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, chapter 2; R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, chapter 3; and S. Rosenne, 'The Perplexities of Modern International Law', **291 HR**, 2001, chapter VII.

² R. Dias, *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., London, 1985, chapter 12.

³ See e.g. the Soviet view: G. I. Tunkin, *Theory of International Law*, London, 1974.

⁴ See e.g. M. Sørensen, ‘Principes de Droit International Public’, **101 HR**, 1960, pp. 5, 127. For a wider definition, see H. Mosler, *The International Society as a Legal Community*, Dordrecht, 1980, p. 32.

⁵ See e.g. Verzijl, *International Law*, p. 3.

⁶ See generally *Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law* (ed. J. d’Aspremont), London, 2011; *Non-State Actors in International Law* (ed. M. Nortmann, A. Reinisch and C. Ryngaert), London, 2015; and R. McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of Law: Defying Gravity?’, **65 ICLQ**, 2016, p. 277. There are varying definitions of non-state actors: some regard them as simply actors that are not state, more elaborate definitions refer *inter alia* to absence of state control, actual performance of functions in the international law arena and legally recognised and organised entities; see also International Law Association, Committee on Non-State Actors, Draft Final Report 2016, paras. 17 ff., www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1023.

⁷ Lauterpacht, *International Law*, p. 489.

⁸ See Verzijl, *International Law*, pp. 17–43; and Lauterpacht, *International Law*, pp. 494–500. See also *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 39; 59 ILR, pp. 30, 56; and *Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commission*, Memorandum of the Secretary-General, 1949, A/CN.4/1/Rev.1, p. 24.

⁹ See in particular Crawford, *Creation of States*, chapter 2; R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford, 1963, pp. 11–57; K. Marek, *Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law*, 2nd ed., Leiden, 1968; N. Casperson, *Unrecognised States*, Cambridge, 2012; A. Duxbury, *The Participation of States in International Organisations*, Cambridge, 2013; R. Nicholson, *Statehood and the State-Like in International Law*, Oxford, 2019; M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1963, vol. I, pp. 221–33, 283–476; P.-M. Dupuy and Y. Kerbrat, *Droit International Public*, 14th ed., Paris, 2018, pp. 31 ff.; and P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 449. See also Société Française pour le Droit International, *L’État Souverain*, Paris, 1994; L. Henkin,

International Law: Politics and Values, Dordrecht, 1995, chapter 1; A. James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*, London, 1986; and J. Vidmar, *Democratic Statehood in International Law*, Oxford, 2013.

¹⁰ See, as regards Antarctica, O’Connell, *International Law*, p. 451. See also below, [Chapter 9](#), p. 457.

¹¹ 165 LNTS 19. See also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 12–22; and Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 45–6. International law does not require the structure of a state to follow any particular pattern: *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 43–4; 59 ILR, pp. 30, 60–1.

¹² Established pursuant to the Declaration of 27 August 1991 of the European Community: see Bull. EC, 7/8 (1991). See generally M. Craven, ‘The EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia’, 65 *BYIL*, 1994, p. 333, and below, p. 182. See also *Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic*, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 16 June 2004, paras. 85–7; and the *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 1987, pp. 72–3.

¹³ 92 ILR, pp. 162, 165. Note that *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 120, provides that ‘a state proper is in existence when a people is settled in a territory under its own sovereign government’.

¹⁴ See e.g. the rather flexible approach by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to the question of the criteria for statehood in the *Prosecution Request Pursuant to Article 19(3) for a Ruling on the Court’s Jurisdiction in Palestine*, ICC-01/18, 22 January 2020; cf. e.g. M. N. Shaw, *Submission of Observations to the Pre-Trial Chamber Pursuant to Rule 103*, 16 March 2020, ICC-01/18; *Observation by the Federal Republic of Germany*, 16 March 2020; and the *Observations of Australia*, ICC-01/18, 16 March 2020. See also the *Prosecution Response to the Observations of Amici Curiae, Legal Representatives of Victims, and States*, ICC-01/18, 30 April 2020.

¹⁵ A nomadic population might not thus count for the purposes of territorial sovereignty, although the International Court in *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 63–5; 59 ILR, pp. 30, 80–2, held that nomadic peoples did have certain rights with regard to the land they traversed.

¹⁶ Populations of some 12,000 and 10,000 respectively: see *Whitaker's Almanack*, London, 2003, pp. 1010, 1089.

¹⁷ See below, p. 228.

¹⁸ But see, as regards artificial islands, *US v. Ray* 51 ILR, p. 225; *Chierici and Rosa v. Ministry of the Merchant Navy and Harbour Office of Rimini* 71 ILR, p. 283; and *Re Duchy of Sealand* 80 ILR, p. 683. See also [Chapter 10](#), p. 484.

¹⁹ See *Keesing's Record of World Events*, p. 36438 (1989). See also General Assembly resolution 43/77; R. Lapidot and K. Calvo-Goller, 'Les Éléments Constitutifs de l'État et la Déclaration du Conseil National Palestinien du 15 Novembre 1988', *AFDI*, 1992, p. 777; J. Crawford, 'The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?', 1 *EJIL*, 1990, p. 307; J. Crawford, 'Israel (1948–1949) and Palestine (1998–1999): Two Studies in the Creation of States', in *The Reality of International Law* (ed. G. Goodwin-Gill and S. Talmon), Oxford, 1999, p. 95. See below, p. 215, with regard to the evolution of Palestinian autonomy in the light of the Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Declaration on Principles.

²⁰ See e.g. *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 32.

²¹ In fact, most of the new states emerging after the First World War were recognised *de facto* or *de jure* before their frontiers were determined by treaty: H. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law*, Cambridge, 1948, p. 30. See *Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State* (1929) 5 AD, pp. 11, 15; *Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 12, 1925, p. 21; *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 32; and *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 22, 26; 100 ILR, pp. 5, 21, 25. See also Jessup speaking on behalf of the US regarding Israel's admission to the UN, SCOR, 3rd year, 383rd meeting, p. 41. The Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in a statement on 5 February 1991, UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, p. 557, noted that the UK 'recognises many states whose borders are not fully agreed with their neighbours'. See as to the doctrine of *uti possidetis*, the presumption that on independence entities will retain existing boundaries, below, [Chapter 9](#), p. 448.

²² See the example of the Congo; Higgins, *Development*, pp. 162–4; and C. Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence*, Oxford, 1965. See also Higgins, *Problems and Process*, p. 40; and P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, pp. 415 ff.

²³ See *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 43–4; 59 ILR, pp. 30, 60–1.

²⁴ See below, p. 228, on the right to self-determination.

²⁵ LNOJ Sp. Supp. No. 4 (1920), pp. 8–9. But cf. the view of the Commission of Rapporteurs in this case, LN Council Doc. B7 21/68/106 (1921), p. 22.

²⁶ On 15 January 1992 and 6 April 1992 respectively: see *Keesing's Record of World Events*, pp. 38703, 38704, 38833 (1992). But see the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission's Opinion No. 5 of 11 January 1992 noting that Croatia had not met the requirements laid down in the Draft Convention on Yugoslavia of 4 November 1991 and in the Declaration on Yugoslavia and Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union of 16 December 1991: see 92 ILR, p. 178. Opinion No. 4 expressed reservations concerning the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina pending the holding of a referendum. A referendum showing a majority for independence, however, was held prior to recognition by the EC member states and admission by the UN, *ibid.*, p. 173. See also below, p. 392.

²⁷ See e.g. V. Gowlland-Debbas, 'Collective Responses to the Unilateral Declarations of Independence of Southern Rhodesia and Palestine', **61** *BYIL*, 1990, p. 135.

²⁸ On 22 May 1992. See M. Weller, 'The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', **86** *AJIL*, 1992, p. 569.

²⁹ See further below, p. 214.

³⁰ See e.g. Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 719–22; S. Ratner, 'The Cambodia Settlement Agreements', **87** *AJIL*, 1993, p. 1; and T. M. Franck, 'The Democratic Entitlement', **29** *University of Richmond Law Review*, 1994, p. 1.

³¹ See *Austro-German Customs Union* (1931) PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 41, pp. 41 (Court's Opinion) and 57–8 (Separate Opinion of Judge Anzilotti); 6 AD, pp. 26, 28. See also Marek, *Identity*, pp. 166–80; Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 62 ff.; and Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, vol. II, pp. 53, 93. The choice of name of the new state would be that of the new state itself, but see as to the dispute between 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', one of the successor states to the Former Yugoslavia, and Greece over the latter's objection to the former's use of the name 'Macedonia', the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 1891 UNTS, p. 7 and *Application of the Interim Accord (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)*, ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 644, 653 ff. The issue was resolved in the Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences, 17 June 2018, www.ekathimerini.com/resources/article-files/aggliko-1.pdf, under which it was agreed that 'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' would be known to all as the Republic of North Macedonia, see also A. Ventouratou, 'The Settlement Agreement between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', EJIL: Talk!, www.ejiltalk.org/the-settlement-agreement-between-greece-and-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia/.

³² This was cited as one of the reasons for UK non-recognition, by the Minister of State, FCO: see UKMIL, 57 BYIL, 1986, pp. 507–8.

³³ The 1993 South African Constitution provided for the repeal of all laws concerning apartheid, including the four Status Acts which purported to create the 'independent states' of the four Bantustans, thus effectively reincorporating these areas into South Africa: see J. Dugard, *International Law, A South African Perspective*, Kenwyn, 1994, p. 346.

³⁴ See M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 161–2. See also OAU Resolution CM.Res.493 (XXVII), General Assembly resolution 31/61A and Security Council statements on 21 September 1979 and 15 December 1981. Note that the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office declared that 'the very existence of Bophuthatswana is a consequence of apartheid and I think that that is the principal reason why recognition has not been forthcoming', 126 HC Deb., cols. 760–1, 3 February 1988.

³⁵ See *Keesing's Record of World Events*, p. 37299 (1990).

³⁶ See e.g. the view of the UK government, 166 HC Deb., col. 697, Written Answers, 5 February 1990.

³⁷ See e.g. R. Müllerson, *International Law, Rights and Politics*, London, 1994, pp. 119 ff.

³⁸ See Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. See also R. Caplan, 'International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina', *10 Global Governance*, 2004, p. 53; and International Crisis Group, *Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery*, November 2001. The High Representative is nominated by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, a group of fifty-five countries and international organisations that sponsor and direct the peace implementation process, and this nomination is then endorsed by the Security Council. See further below, p. 209.

³⁹ See, as to the international administration of Kosovo, below, p. 210 and, as to recognition, below, Chapter 8.

⁴⁰ See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7249677.stm>.

⁴¹ To consist of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK, the US, the EU, the European Commission and NATO.

⁴² See S/2007/168 and S/2007/168/Add.1. Annex IX of the latter document details the role of the ICR.

⁴³ See Annex XI. An EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) was established on 16 February 2008 to support the Kosovan authorities. In the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, the Court found that the declaration of independence was not contrary to international law: ICJ Reports, 2010, p. 403.

⁴⁴ See Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, p. 28.

⁴⁵ See e.g. Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 107 ff.

⁴⁶ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, pp. 17594–5, 17639–40 (1960); and Hoskyns, *Congo*, pp. 96–9.

⁴⁷ *Yearbook of the UN*, 1971, pp. 566–7; and A/AC.109/L 804, p. 19. See also A/8723/Rev.1 and Assembly resolution 2918 (XXVII).

⁴⁸ See GAOR, 28th Session, General Committee, 213th meeting, pp. 25–6, 28, 30, 31; GAOR, 28th session, plenary, 2156th meeting, pp. 8, 12, 16; and 2157th meeting, pp. 22–5, 65–7. See also *Yearbook of the UN*, 1973, pp. 143–7; and CDDH/SR.4, pp. 33–7. See also the Western Sahara situation, below, p. 213, and the recognition of Angola in 1975 despite the continuing civil war between the three liberation movements nominally allied in a government of national unity: see Shaw, *Title*, pp. 155–6.

⁴⁹ E.g. General Assembly resolutions 2024 (XX) and 2151 (XXI) and Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1966). See R. Higgins, ‘International Law, Rhodesia and the UN’, 23 *The World Today*, 1967, p. 94; and Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 129 ff. See also Shaw, *Title*.

⁵⁰ Below, [Chapter 8](#), p. 379.

⁵¹ See further below, p. 218.

⁵² For the text, see 31 ILM, 1992, pp. 1486–7 and 92 ILR, p. 173.

⁵³ See e.g. Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 700 ff.; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 206. See also H. Ruiz-Fabri, ‘Genèse et Disparition de l’État à l’Époque Contemporaine’, *AFDI*, 1992, p. 153.

⁵⁴ *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 206–7. Extinction of statehood may also take place as a consequence of the geographical disappearance of the territory of the state: see e.g. with regard to the precarious situation of Tuvalu, *Guardian*, 29 October 2001, p. 17.

⁵⁵ See e.g. Yugoslav Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 8, 92 ILR, pp. 199, 201.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See further below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1100.

⁵⁸ Such as Somalia since the early 1990s: see e.g. Security Council resolutions 751 (1992); 767 (1992); 794 (1992); 814 (1993); 837 (1993); 865 (1993); 885 (1993); and 886 (1993). See also Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 412 ff.

⁵⁹ See *Keesing's Record of World Events*, p. 37470 (1990). See also 30 ILM, 1991, p. 820; and R. Goy, 'La Réunification du Yémen', *AFDI*, 1990, p. 249.

⁶⁰ See below, p. 206. See also C. Schrike, 'L'Unification Allemande', *AFDI*, 1990, p. 47; and W. Czaplinski, 'Quelques Aspects sur la Réunification de l'Allemagne', *AFDI*, 1990, p. 89.

⁶¹ Termed at that stage the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

⁶² See e.g. J. Malenovsky, 'Problèmes Juridiques Liés à la Partition de la Tchécoslovaquie', *AFDI*, 1993, p. 305.

⁶³ See L. Kherad, 'La Reconnaissance Internationale des États Baltes', *RGDIP*, 1992, p. 843.

⁶⁴ See 31 ILM, 1992, pp. 148–9.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁶⁶ See further below, p. 837.

⁶⁷ See below, [Chapter 16](#).

⁶⁸ See also A. Pellet, 'La Commission d'Arbitrage de la Conférence Européenne pour la Paix en Yougoslavie', *AFDI*, 1991, p. 329; *AFDI*, 1992, p. 220; and *AFDI*, 1993, p. 286.

⁶⁹ 92 ILR, pp. 164–5. One should note the importance of the federal structure of the state in determining the factual situation regarding dissolution. The Arbitration Commission pointed out that in such cases 'the existence of the state implies that the federal organs represent the components of the Federation and wield effective power', *ibid.*, p. 165.

⁷⁰ See e.g. Security Council resolutions 752 and 757 (1992). See also the resolution adopted by the European Community at the Lisbon Council on 27 June 1992, quoted in part in Opinion No. 9, 92 ILR, pp. 204–5.

⁷¹ 92 ILR, p. 201. In Opinion Nos. 9 and 10, the Arbitration Commission noted that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not consider itself as the continuation of the SFRY, but was instead one of the successors to that state on the same basis as the recognised new states: *ibid.*, pp. 205, 208.

⁷² General Assembly resolution 55/12.

⁷³ See the *Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)*, ICJ Reports, 2003, p. 7.

⁷⁴ See e.g. A. Kiss, *Répertoire de la Pratique Française en Matière de Droit International Public*, Paris, 1966, vol. II, pp. 21–50; and *Survey of International Law*, prepared by the UN Secretary-General, A/CN.4/245. See also O. Spiermann, ‘General Legal Characteristics of States: A View from the Past of the Permanent Court of International Justice’, in *Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility: Essays in Honour of James Crawford* (ed. C. Chinkin and F. Baetens), Cambridge, 2015, p. 144; and A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Dynamics of Statehood in the Practice of International and English Courts’, in *ibid.*, p. 172.

⁷⁵ *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 382. See also N. Schrijver, ‘The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 65; C. Rousseau, ‘L’Indépendance de l’État dans l’Ordre International’, 73 *HR*, 1948 II, p. 171; H. G. Gelber, *Sovereignty Through Independence*, The Hague, 1997; and Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 465.

⁷⁶ *Brownlie’s Principles*, p. 119, notes: ‘Independence is the decisive criterion of statehood.’

⁷⁷ *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1949, p. 286. Judge Huber noted in *Island of Palmas* that ‘independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state’, 2 *RIAA*, pp. 829, 838 (1928); 4 *AD*, p. 3.

⁷⁸ *PCIJ*, Series A/B, No. 41, 1931; 6 *AD*, p. 26.

⁷⁹ *PCIJ*, Series A/B, No. 41, 1931, p. 77 (dissenting); 6 *AD*, p. 30. See also *North Atlantic Coast Fisheries* (1910); Scott, *Hague Court Reports*, p. 141 at p. 170; and *SS Wimbledon*, *PCIJ*, Series A, No. 1, 1923, p. 25; 2 *AD*, p. 99.

⁸⁰ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 18; 4 AD, pp. 153, 155.

⁸¹ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 135; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 469. See also the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 238–9; 110 ILR, p. 163.

⁸² ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 247; 110 ILR, p. 163.

⁸³ Article 2(7) of the UN Charter provides that ‘nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.

⁸⁴ See Higgins, *Development*, pp. 58–130; M. Rajan, *United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction*, 2nd ed., London, 1961; and H. Kelsen, *Principles of International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1966.

⁸⁵ E/CN.4/1991/SR. 43, p. 8, quoted in UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, p. 556. See also statement of the European Community in 1992 to the same effect, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, pp. 635–6. By way of contrast, the Iranian *fatwa* condemning the British writer Salman Rushdie to death was criticised by the UK government as calling into question Iran’s commitment to honour its obligations not to interfere in the internal affairs of the UK, *ibid.*, p. 635. See also M. Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’, 84 *AJIL*, 1990, p. 866.

⁸⁶ See also the use of force, below, [Chapter 19](#).

⁸⁷ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 35; 16 AD, pp. 155, 167.

⁸⁸ See e.g. *Eichmann*, 36 ILR, p. 5. But see further below, p. 585.

⁸⁹ See the statement made on behalf of the European Community on 25 November 1992 with regard to the presence of Russian troops in the Baltic states, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 724.

⁹⁰ *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 339; and Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 472.

⁹¹ See also Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1975, Cmnd 6198, pp. 2–3. See also O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 322–4; P. Kooijmans, *The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States*, Leiden, 1964; and Marshall CJ, *The Antelope*, 10 Wheat., 1825, pp. 66, 122.

⁹² See Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, pp. 1098 ff.

⁹³ See e.g. L. Sohn, *Cases on UN Law*, 2nd ed., Brooklyn, 1967, pp. 232–90; and G. Clark and L. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, 3rd ed., New York, 1966, pp. 399–402.

⁹⁴ The doctrine of equality of states is also influential in areas of international law such as jurisdictional immunities, below, [Chapter 12](#), and act of state, above, [Chapter 4](#), p. 159.

⁹⁵ See e.g. Tunkin, *Theory*, pp. 69–75. See also B. Ramondo, *Peaceful Co-existence*, Baltimore, 1967; and R. Higgins, *Conflict of Interests*, London, 1965, pp. 99–170.

⁹⁶ See e.g. General Assembly resolutions 1236 (XII) and 1301 (XIII). See also *Yearbook of the UN*, 1957, pp. 105–9; *ibid.*, 1961, p. 524; and *ibid.*, 1962, p. 488.

⁹⁷ Tunkin, *Theory*, pp. 35–48.

⁹⁸ See www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698.

⁹⁹ See *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 266; Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 286 ff.; O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 341–4; and Verzijl, *International Law*, pp. 412–27.

¹⁰⁰ See *Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923, p. 27; 2 AD, p. 349. See also the question of the Ionian Islands, M. F. Lindley, *The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law*, London, 1926, pp. 181–2.

¹⁰¹ *Rights of Nationals of the USA in Morocco*, ICJ Reports, 1952, pp. 176, 188; 19 ILR, pp. 255, 263. See also to the same effect, *Benaïm v. Procureur de la République de Bordeaux*, AFDI, 1993, p. 971.

¹⁰² See *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 404–7. See also *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 826, 858–9 (1928); and Shaw, *Title*, chapter 1.

¹⁰³ See Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 479 ff.; Report of the 5th Committee of the League, 6 December 1920; G. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1940, vol. I, pp. 48–9; and Higgins, *Development*, p. 34, note 30.

¹⁰⁴ ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 4; 22 ILR, p. 349.

¹⁰⁵ See Oppenheim's *International Law*, p. 245. See also I. Bernier, *International Legal Aspects of Federalism*, London, 1973, and 17 *Revue Belge de Droit International*, 1983, p. 1; and G. I. Hernández, 'Federated Entities in International Law', in *Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law* (ed. D. French), Cambridge, 2013, p. 491.

¹⁰⁶ See also below, p. 220.

¹⁰⁷ 92 ILR, p. 165.

¹⁰⁸ Opinion No. 8, *ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁰⁹ See below, p. 233.

¹¹⁰ See e.g. Bernier, *Federalism*, pp. 64–6. These entities were also members of a number of international organisations and signed treaties.

¹¹¹ *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1953, vol. II, p. 139.

¹¹² *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1958, vol. II, p. 24. Cf. Waldock, *ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, p. 36.

¹¹³ A/CONF.39/SR.8, 28 April 1969.

¹¹⁴ See e.g. A. Looper, 'The Treaty Power in Switzerland', 7 *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 1958, p. 178.

¹¹⁵ See e.g. Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution; *US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* 299 US 304 (1936); 8 AD, p. 48; and *Zachevning v. Miller* 389 US 429 (1968). See also generally, Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. 14, pp. 13–17; and Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, pp. 138–213, 264–8.

¹¹⁶ See e.g. the proposed reservations to four human rights treaties in 1978, *US Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties* (ed. R. B. Lillich), Charlottesville, 1981, pp. 83–103.

¹¹⁷ See e.g. *Missouri v. Holland* 252 US 416 (1920); 1 AD, p. 4.

¹¹⁸ See especially, *Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario* [1937] AC 326; 8 AD, p. 41.

¹¹⁹ Bernier, *Federalism*, pp. 162–3; and A. Looper, ‘Federal State Clauses in Multilateral Instruments’, 32 *BYIL*, 1955–56, p. 162.

¹²⁰ *LaGrand*, ICJ Reports, 2001, p. 104; and *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 12; 134 ILR, p. 120.

¹²¹ *Medellín v. Dretke* 118 S.Ct. 1352 (2005); and *Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon* 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006); 134 ILR, p. 719.

¹²² 44 ILM, 2005, p. 964.

¹²³ *Medellín v. Dretke*, Application No. AP-75,207 (Tex. Crim. App. 15 November 2006). Note that the US Supreme Court held that a writ of certiorari to consider the effect of the International Court’s decision had been ‘improvidently granted’ prior to the Texas appeal: see 44 ILM, 2005, p. 965. However, the Supreme Court did grant certiorari on 30 April 2007 (after the Texas decision) to consider two questions: ‘1. Did the President of the United States act within his constitutional and statutory foreign affairs authority when he determined that the states must comply with the United States’ treaty obligation to give effect to the *Avena* judgment in the cases of the 51 Mexican nationals named in the judgment? [and] 2. Are state courts bound by the Constitution to honor the undisputed international obligation of the United States, under treaties duly ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, to give effect to the *Avena* judgment in the cases

that the judgment addressed?’ See now *Medellín v. Texas* 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) and above, p. 143.

¹²⁴ See e.g. L. R. Zines, *The High Court and the Constitution*, Sydney, 1981; and A. Byrnes and H. Charlesworth, ‘Federalism and the International Legal Order: Recent Developments in Australia’, **79 AJIL**, 1985, p. 622.

¹²⁵ *R v. Burgess, ex parte Henry* 55 CLR 608 (1936); 8 AD, p. 54.

¹²⁶ 68 ILR, p. 181.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 223–4 (Stephen J), p. 235 (Mason J), p. 255 (Brennan J).

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 223–4.

¹²⁹ 68 ILR, p. 266. The case similarly came before the High Court.

¹³⁰ See e.g. R. Higgins, ‘The Concept of “the State”: Variable Geometry and Dualist Perceptions’, in *The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality* (ed. L. Boisson de Chazournes and V. Gowlland-Debas), The Hague, 2001, p. 547.

¹³¹ Article 4(1) of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility 2001 provides that: ‘The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organisation of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.’ See also J. Crawford, *The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility*, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 94 ff.

¹³² ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 62, 87; 121 ILR, p. 367.

¹³³ ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 9, 16; 118 ILR, p. 37. See also e.g. *Pellat* 5 RIAA, p. 534 (1929).

¹³⁴ ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 62, 88; 121 ILR, p. 367.

135 Such issues arise from time to time with regard to human rights matters before international or regional human rights bodies: see e.g. *Toonen v. Australia*, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 488/1992, 112 ILR, p. 328; and *Tyrer v. UK* (1978) 2 EHRR 1. See also *Matthews v. UK* 28 EHRR 361; and *RMD v. Switzerland*, *ibid.*, 224.

136 See e.g. E. Lauterpacht, 'River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt-Al-Arab Frontier', 9 *ICLQ*, 1960, pp. 208, 216; and A. O. Cukwurah, *The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law*, Manchester, 1967.

137 See also below, [Chapters 12](#) and [13](#).

138 See generally e.g. Nicholson, *Statehood*.

139 See generally H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships*, London, 1948; Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. I, pp. 598–911, vol. XIII, pp. 679 ff.; C. E. Toussaint, *The Trusteeship System of the United Nations*, New York, 1957; Verzijl, *International Law*, vol. II, pp. 545–73; Q. Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations*, New York, 1930; J. Dugard, *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute*, Berkeley, 1973; and S. Slonim, *South West Africa and the United Nations*, Leiden, 1973. See also Oppenheim's *International Law*, pp. 295, 308; and Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 565 ff.

140 See article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. See also the *International Status of South West Africa*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 128, 132; 17 ILR, p. 47; *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 28–9; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 18–19; *Certain Phosphate Lands (Nauru v. Australia)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 240, 256; 97 ILR, pp. 1, 23; and *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, para. 212.

141 See e.g. *Certain Phosphate Lands (Nauru v. Australia)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 240, 257; 97 ILR, pp. 1, 24. See also the discussion by Judge Shahabuddeen in his Separate Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 276 ff.; 97 ILR, p. 43. Note that the Court in this case stated that the arrangements whereby Nauru was to be administered under the trusteeship agreement by the governments of the UK, Australia and New Zealand together as 'the administering authority' did not constitute that authority an international legal person separate from the three states so designated: ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 258; 97 ILR, p. 25. See also *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, para. 212.

¹⁴² See O. McHenry, *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed*, New York, 1975; Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. I, pp. 769–839; S. A. de Smith, *Micro-States and Micronesia*, New York, 1970; *DUSPIL*, 1973, pp. 59–67; *ibid.*, 1974, pp. 54–64; *ibid.*, 1975, pp. 94–104; *ibid.*, 1976, pp. 56–61; *ibid.*, 1977, pp. 71–98; and *ibid.*, 1978, pp. 204–31.

¹⁴³ See in particular Judge McNair, *International Status of South West Africa*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 128, 150 and the Court’s view, *ibid.*, p. 132; 17 ILR, pp. 47, 49.

¹⁴⁴ See Security Council resolution 683 (1990).

¹⁴⁵ See ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’, 81 *AJIL*, 1987, pp. 405–8. See also *Bank of Hawaii v. Balos* 701 F.Supp. 744 (1988).

¹⁴⁶ See Security Council resolution 956 (1994).

¹⁴⁷ ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 128, 143–4; 17 ILR, pp. 47, 57–60.

¹⁴⁸ ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 68; 22 ILR, p. 651; and ICJ Reports, 1956, p. 23; 23 ILR, p. 38.

¹⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 141, 143.

¹⁵⁰ ICJ Reports, 1966, p. 6; 37 ILR, p. 243.

¹⁵¹ See e.g. Dugard, *South West Africa/Namibia*, p. 378.

¹⁵² Resolution 2145 (XXI).

¹⁵³ See General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (XXII).

¹⁵⁴ See e.g. Security Council resolutions 263 (1969), 269 (1969) and 276 (1970).

¹⁵⁵ ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 16; 49 ILR, p. 3.

¹⁵⁶ ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 52–8.

157 17 ILM, 1978, pp. 762–9; *DUSPIL*, 1978, pp. 38–54. See Security Council resolution 435 (1978). See also *Africa Research Bulletin*, April 1978, p. 4829 and July 1978, p. 4935.

158 See S/14459; S/14460/Rev.1; S/14461; and S/14462.

159 See 28 ILM, 1989, p. 944.

160 See Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. I, pp. 325–6; and R. W. Piotrowicz, ‘The Status of Germany in International Law’, **38 ICLQ**, 1989, p. 609. See also Crawford, *Creation of States*, p. 523.

161 *Brownlie’s Principles*, p. 126. See also Whiteman, *Digest*, p. 333; and I. D. Hendry and M. C. Wood, *The Legal Status of Berlin*, Cambridge, 1987.

162 12 AD, p. 16. Note also *Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon* 94 ILR, p. 135. Both states became members of the UN the following year. See Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 523–6; and F. A. Mann, *Studies in International Law*, Oxford, 1973, pp. 634–59, 660–706.

163 See e.g. J. Frowein, ‘The Reunification of Germany’, **86 AJIL**, 1992, p. 152; Schrike, ‘L’Unification Allemande’, p. 47; Czaplinski, ‘Quelques Aspects’, p. 89; and R. W. Piotrowicz and S. Blay, *The Unification of Germany in International and Domestic Law*, Amsterdam, 1997.

164 See *Keesing’s Record of World Events*, p. 37466 (1990). See also 29 ILM, 1990, p. 1108.

165 *Keesing’s Record of World Events*, p. 37661 (1990). See also 30 ILM, 1991, pp. 457, 498.

166 See 29 ILM, 1990, p. 1186.

167 See 30 ILM, 1991, p. 445. See also the Exchange of Notes of the same date concerning the presence of allied troops in Berlin, *ibid.*, p. 450.

168 See O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 327–8; A. Coret, *Le Condominium*, Paris, 1960; *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 565; and V. P. Bantz, 'The International Legal Status of Condominia', **12** *Florida Journal of International Law*, 1998, p. 77. See also J. H. Samuels, 'Condominium Arrangements in International Practice: Reviving an Abandoned Concept of Boundary Dispute Resolution', **29** *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 2007–08, p. 727.

169 See e.g. 99 BFSP, p. 229 and 114 BFSP, p. 212.

170 O'Connell, *International Law*, p. 328.

171 Lord Trefgarne, the government spokesman, moving the second reading of the New Hebrides Bill in the House of Lords, 404 HL Deb., cols. 1091–2, 4 February 1980.

172 See Mr Luce, Foreign Office Minister, 980 HC Deb., col. 682, 8 March 1980 and 985 HC Deb., col. 1250, 3 June 1980. See also D. P. O'Connell, 'The Condominium of the New Hebrides', **43** *BYIL*, 1968–69, p. 71.

173 See also the joint Saudi Arabian–Kuwaiti administered Neutral Zone based on the treaty of 2 December 1922, 133 BFSP, 1930 Part II, pp. 726–7. See e.g. *The Middle East* (ed. P. Mansfield), 4th ed., London, 1973, p. 187. Both states enjoyed an equal right of undivided sovereignty over the whole area. However, on 7 July 1965, both states signed an agreement to partition the neutral zone, although the territory apparently retained its condominium status for exploration of resources purposes: see 4 ILM, 1965, p. 1134; and H. M. Alba-harna, *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States*, 2nd rev. ed., Beirut, 1975, pp. 264–77. See also F. Ali Taha, 'Some Legal Aspects of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over the Sudan: 1899–1954', **76** *BYIL*, 2005, p. 337.

174 11 *AJIL*, 1917, p. 674.

175 ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 597 ff.; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 513 ff. El Salvador and Nicaragua were parties to the 1917 decision, but differed over the condominium solution. Honduras was not a party to that case and opposed the condominium idea.

176 ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 601; 97 ILR, p. 517.

¹⁷⁷ See e.g. B. Knoll, *The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International Organisations*, Cambridge, 2008; C. Stahn, *The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration*, Cambridge, 2008; R. Wilde, *International Territorial Administration*, Oxford, 2008; M. Ydit, *Internationalised Territories*, Leiden, 1961; Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 501 ff.; M. Benzing, 'International Administration of Territories', *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2010; M. N. Shaw, 'Territorial Administration by Non-Territorial Sovereigns', in *The Allocation of Authority in International Law* (ed. T. Broude and Y. Shany), Oxford, 2008, p. 369; and Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, vol. II, pp. 413–48.

¹⁷⁸ See further above, p. 203.

¹⁷⁹ See above, p. 204.

¹⁸⁰ Resolution 18(II). See e.g. E. Lauterpacht, *Jerusalem and the Holy Places*, London, 1968; and Ydit, *Internationalised Territories*, pp. 273–314. Note that on 28 September 2018, the state of Palestine instituted proceedings against the US alleging a violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations due to the relocation of the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It was claimed that Jerusalem had a 'special status', *Application Instituting Proceedings*, p. 2, www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/176/176-20180928-APP-01-00-EN.pdf.

¹⁸¹ See Security Council resolution 16 (1947). Like the Jerusalem idea, this never came into being. See also the experiences of the League of Nations with regard to the Saar and Danzig, Ydit, *Internationalised Territories*, chapter 3.

¹⁸² See Article 6 and Annex I of the Paris Peace Settlement. See also C. Stahn, 'International Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and Challenges Ahead', *ZaöRV*, 2001, p. 107. UNTAC lasted from March 1992 to September 1993 and involved some 22,000 military and civilian personnel: see <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untac.htm>. Note also e.g. the operations of the UN Transition Group in Namibia which, in the process leading to Namibian independence, exercised a degree of administrative power: see Report of the UN Secretary-General, A/45/1 (1991), and the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), which facilitated the transfer of the territory from Serb to Croat rule over a two-year period: see Security Council resolution 1037 (1996).

183 Initialled at Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris, 1995.

184 The final authority with regard to the military implementation of the agreement remains the commander of SFOR: see article 12 of the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Note also the establishment of the War Crimes Chamber, the majority of whose members are from other states: see below, [Chapter 7](#), p. 357, and the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees: see Annexes 6 and 7 of the Peace Agreement.

185 See e.g. the documentation available at www.ohr.int/?page_id=1220. See also Security Council resolutions 1144 (1997), 1256 (1999) and 1423 (2002).

186 See www.ohr.int/?cat=350. The competence of the High Representative to adopt binding decisions with regard to interim measures when the parties are unable to reach agreement remains in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned.

187 Para. XI of the Bonn Conclusions. See also Security Council resolutions 1247 (1999), 1395 (2000), 1357 (2001), 1396 (2002) and 1491 (2003).

188 See www.refworld.org/docid/58b971424.html.

189 See www.ohr.int/?p=67196.

190 See www.ohr.int/?p=65011.

191 See Stahn, 'International Territorial Administration', p. 111; T. Garcia, 'La Mission d'Administration Intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo', *RGDIP*, 2000, p. 61; and M. Ruffert, 'The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the International Community', *50 ICLQ*, 2001, p. 613. See also *Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment* (ed. C. Tomuschat), The Hague, 2002; B. Knoll, 'From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate', *16 European Journal of International Law*, 2005, p. 637; *Kosovo: KFOR and Reconstruction*, House of Commons Research Paper 99/66, 1999; A. Yannis, 'The UN as Government in Kosovo', *10 Global Governance*, 2004, p. 67; International Crisis Group (ICG), *Kosovo: Towards Final Status*, January 2005; ICG, *Kosovo: The Challenge of*

Transition, February 2006; ICG, *Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan*, 14 May 2007; ICG, *Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Transition*, 6 December 2007; and M. Weller, *Contested Statehood: Kosovo's Struggle for Independence*, Oxford, 2009. Resolution 1244 also authorised an international military presence.

¹⁹² Regulation 1 (1999). This was backdated to the date of adoption of resolution 1244.

¹⁹³ See UNMIK Regulation 9 (2001).

¹⁹⁴ Resolution 1244 (1999).

¹⁹⁵ See S/1999/649 and Annex 2 to the resolution. Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008: see below, p. 214 and above, p. 187.

¹⁹⁶ East Timor, a Portuguese non-self-governing territory, was occupied by Indonesia in 1974. These two states agreed with the UN on 5 May 1999 to a process of popular consultation in the territory over its future. The inhabitants expressed a clear wish for a transitional process of UN authority leading to independence. Following the outbreak of violence, a multinational force was sent to East Timor pursuant to resolution 1264 (1999): see also the Report of the Secretary-General, S/1999/1024, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/etimor/etimor.htm>.

¹⁹⁷ See resolutions 1388 (2001) and 1392 (2002).

¹⁹⁸ See resolution 1410 (2002).

¹⁹⁹ See e.g. Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 198 ff.; *China and the Question of Taiwan* (ed. H. Chiu), New York, 1979; W. M. Reisman, 'Who Owns Taiwan?', **81** *Yale Law Journal*, p. 599; F. P. Morello, *The International Legal Status of Formosa*, The Hague, 1966; V. H. Li, *De-Recognising Taiwan*, Washington, DC, 1977; and L. C. Chiu, 'The International Legal Status of the Republic of China', **8** *Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs*, 1990, p. 1. See also *The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order* (ed. J. M. Henckaerts), London, 1996; *Let Taiwan be Taiwan* (ed. M. J. Cohen and E. Teng), Washington, DC, 1990; and J. I. Charney and J. R. V. Prescott, 'Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan', **94** *AJIL*, 2000, p. 453.

²⁰⁰ See Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **III**, pp. 538, 564, 565.

²⁰¹ See Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 209 ff. Note that the 1972 USA–China communiqué accepted that Taiwan was part of China, 11 ILM, pp. 443, 445. As to the 1979 changes, see 73 *AJIL*, p. 227. See also 833 HC Deb., col. 32, 13 March 1972, for the new British approach, i.e. that it recognised the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the position of that government that Taiwan was a province of China, and see e.g. UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 537. See also *Reel v. Holder* [1981] 1 WLR 1226.

²⁰² See *Keesing’s Record of World Events*, p. 37671 (1990). This failed, however, to prevent a vigorous protest by China: *ibid.* Note also the Agreements Concerning Cross-Straits Activities between unofficial organisations established in China and Taiwan in order to reach functional, non-political agreements, 32 ILM, 1993, p. 1217. A degree of evolution in Taiwan’s approach was evident in the Additional Articles of the Constitution adopted in 1997.

²⁰³ See www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr253_e.htm. Taiwan became an observer to the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization in 2009 under the name of ‘Chinese Taipei’, www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwan-in-the-world-health-assembly-a-victory-with-limits/, but its participation was blocked as from 2016 due to pressure from China, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/05/12/asia-pacific/science-health-asia-pacific/us-senate-taiwan-who/. As to Rhodesia (1965–79) and the Bantustans, see above, pp. 186 and 188.

²⁰⁴ See Z. M. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1993; G. White, ‘The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus: A Lawyer’s View’, *The World Today*, April 1981, p. 135; and Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 143 ff.

²⁰⁵ Resolution No. 2 in Supplement IV, Official Gazette of the TFSC, cited in Necatigil, *Cyprus Conflict*, p. 123.

²⁰⁶ See *The Times*, 16 November 1983, p. 12; and 21(4) *UN Chronicle*, 1984, p. 17.

²⁰⁷ Resolution (83)13 adopted on 24 November 1983.

²⁰⁸ Application No. 25781/94; 120 ILR, p. 10. See *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995; 103 ILR, p. 622; and *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Merits), Reports 1996-VI, p. 2216; 108 ILR, p. 443. See also to the same effect, *Autocephalous Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg* 917 F.2d 278 (1990); 108 ILR, p. 488; and *Caglar v. Billingham* [1996] STC (SCD) 150; 108 ILR, p. 510.

²⁰⁹ See also Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report, Session 1986–87, Cyprus: HCP 23 (1986–87).

²¹⁰ See Shaw, *Title*, chapter 3. See also M. Dawidowicz, ‘Trading Fish or Human Rights in Western Sahara? Self-Determination, Non-Recognition and the EC-Morocco Fisheries Agreement’, in *Statehood and Self-Determination*, p. 250.

²¹¹ *Africa Research Bulletin*, June 1976, p. 4047 and July 1976, pp. 4078, 4081.

²¹² See *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, pp. 33324–45 (1984).

²¹³ S/2002/161. The UK has stated that it regards ‘the sovereignty of Western Sahara as undetermined pending United Nations efforts to find a solution to the dispute over the territory’, UKMIL, 76 *BYIL*, 2005, p. 720. UN-sponsored discussions continue, see e.g. Security Council resolution 2152 (2014) and General Assembly resolution 70/98 (2015).

²¹⁴ Case No. C-104/16 P, <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=186489&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=397652>. This decision was followed in the EU Court of Justice’s judgment of 27 February 2018 on a preliminary reference from the English High Court in *Western Sahara Campaign UK v. HM Revenue & Customs*, Case No. C-266/16, [2015] EWHC 2898 (Admin), <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=199683&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=474551>.

²¹⁵ See above, p. 210.

²¹⁶ See S/2007/168 and S/2007/168/Add.1.

²¹⁷ See e.g. ‘Kosovo’s First Month’, International Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 47, 18 March 2008, p. 3.

²¹⁸ ICJ Reports, 2010, p. 403. See also *The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion* (ed. M. Milanovic and M. Wood), Oxford, 2015.

²¹⁹ See <https://mfa-ks.net/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-s-kosovs/483>.

²²⁰ See Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 442 ff.; J. Quigley, *The Statehood of Palestine*, Cambridge, 2010; R. Barnidge, *Self-determination, Statehood and the Law of Negotiation: The Case of Palestine*, Oxford, 2016; and J. Vidmar, ‘Palestine and the Conceptual Problem of Implicit Statehood’, 12 *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2013, p. 19.

²²¹ See below, p. 226, note 289.

²²² Resolution 3237 (XXIX).

²²³ Resolution 43/177.

²²⁴ 32 ILM, 1993, p. 1525. Note that letters of mutual recognition and commitment to the peace process were exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO on 9 September 1993. See e.g. K. Calvo-Goller, ‘L’Accord du 13 septembre 1993 entre L’Israël et l’OLP: le régime d’autonomie prévu par la déclaration Israël/OLP’, *AFDI*, 1993, p. 435. See also *New Political Entities in Public and Private International Law* (ed. A. Shapira and M. Tabory), The Hague, 1999; E. Benvenisti, ‘The Status of the Palestinian Authority’, in *Arab–Israeli Accords: Legal Perspectives* (ed. E. Cotrainand and C. Mallat), The Hague, 1996, p. 47; E. Benvenisti, ‘The Israeli–Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A Framework for Future Settlement’, 4 *EJIL*, 1993, p. 542; and P. Malanczuk, ‘Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law’, 7 *EJIL*, 1996, p. 485.

²²⁵ 33 ILM, 1994, p. 622.

²²⁶ See e.g. M. Benchikh, ‘L’Accord Intérimaire Israélo-Palestinien sur la Cisjordanie et la bande de Gaza du 28 September 1995’, *AFDI*, 1995, p. 7; and *The Arab–Israeli Accords: Legal Perspectives* (ed. E. Cotran and C. Mallat), The Hague, 1996.

²²⁷ See e.g. A. Bockel, ‘L’Accord d’Hebron (17 janvier 1997) et la Tentative de Relance du Processus de Paix Israélo-Palestinien’, *AFDI*, 1997, p. 184.

²²⁸ See A. Bockel, ‘L’Issue du Processus de Paix Israélo-Palestinien en Vue?’, *AFDI*, 1999, p. 165.

²²⁹ See e.g. K. Reece Thomas, ‘Non-recognition, Personality and Capacity: The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine Authority in English Law’, *29 Anglo-American Law Review*, 2000, p. 228; Shapira and Tabory, *New Political Entities*; and C. Wasserstein Fassberg, ‘Israel and the Palestinian Authority’, *28 Israel Law Review*, 1994, p. 319.

²³⁰ See e.g. M. Tabory, ‘The Legal Personality of the Palestinian Autonomy’, in Shapira and Tabory, *New Political Entities*, p. 139.

²³¹ See www.icc-cpi.int/palestine.

²³² See article 12 of the Statute. See also e.g. M. N. Shaw, ‘The Article 12(3) Declaration of the Palestinian Authority, the International Criminal Court and International Law’, *9 Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2011, p. 301; Y. Ronen, ‘ICC Jurisdiction over Acts Committed in the Gaza Strip’, *8 Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2010, p. 3; Y. Shany, ‘In Defence of Functional Interpretation of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute’, *8 Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2010, p. 329; A. Pellet, ‘The Palestinian Declaration and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’, *8 Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2010, p. 981; J. Quigley, ‘The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue’, *35 Rutgers Law Record*, 2009, p. 1; and R. Ash, ‘Is Palestine a “State”? A Response to Professor John Quigley’s Article “The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue”’, *36 Rutgers Law Record*, 2009, p. 186. See further as to the International Criminal Court, [Chapter 7](#).

²³³ See www.icc-cpi.int/palestine.

²³⁴ A/66/371-S/2011/592.

²³⁵ See S/2011/705.

²³⁶ Resolution 67/19. See also the UN Book of Permanent Missions (March 2013 ed.), p. 314.

²³⁷ See www.icc-cpi.int/palestine. See also ICC-ASP, The State of Palestine accedes to the Rome Statute, ICC-ASP-20150107-PR1082, 7 January 2015; and ICC-ASP, Official Records of the Resumed Thirteenth Session, The Hague, 24–5 June 2015, para. 16 and Annexes I and II.

²³⁸ See www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1083. See also Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 2015, pp. 11 ff.

²³⁹ See www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180522-otp-stat.

²⁴⁰ *Prosecution Request Pursuant to Article 19(3) for a Ruling on the Court's Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine*, ICC-01/18, 22 January 2020. This prompted a wide range of amicus curiae opinions, see www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/crm-refined.aspx?situation=ICC-01/18. The Prosecutor produced her response on 30 April 2020. The matter is at the date of writing before the Pre-Trial Chamber.

²⁴¹ See <http://palestineun.org/about-palestine/diplomatic-relations/>.

²⁴² For example, the General Conference of UNESCO accepted Palestine as a member on 31 October 2011, www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/general_conference_admits_palestine_as_unesco_member/.

In April 2014, Palestine presented letters for accession to fifteen international conventions, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47490#.V6S0XJMrJjR. See also L. Trigeaud, 'L'Influence des Reconnaissances d'Etat sur la Formation des Engagements Conventionnels', 119 *RGDIP*, 2015, p. 571.

²⁴³ See e.g. Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 412 ff.; and *Somalia: A Country Study* (ed. H. C. Metz), 4th ed., Washington, DC, 1993. See generally P. Kolsto, 'The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States', 43 *Journal of Peace Research*, 2006, p. 723.

²⁴⁴ See Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/2001/963, paras. 16 ff. (2001).

²⁴⁵ See e.g. the provision of assistance to the authorities of the area by the UK and the visit to the UK and meetings with UK government officials by the ‘president of Somaliland’ in July 2006: see FCO Press Release, 16 August 2006. See also *Secretary of State for the Home Department v. CC and CF* [2012] EWHC 2837 (Admin); UKMIL, 76 *BYIL*, 2005, p. 715; UKMIL, 81 *BYIL*, 2010, p. 503; and UKMIL, 83 *BYIL*, 2012, pp. 360–1.

²⁴⁶ See e.g. the Reports of the International Crisis Group on Nagorno-Karabakh of 14 September 2005, 11 October 2005, 14 November 2007 and 4 July 2016. See also resolution 1416 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 2005.

²⁴⁷ ECtHR, Judgment of 16 June 2015, paras. 168 ff. at para. 186.

²⁴⁸ See above, p. 212.

²⁴⁹ See the Reports of the International Crisis Group on Moldova of 12 August 2003, 17 June 2004 and 17 August 2006. See also *Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 8 July 2004, pp. 8–40.

²⁵⁰ See the Reports of the International Crisis Group on South Ossetia of 26 November 2004, 19 April 2005 and 7 June 2007; and the Reports on Abkhazia of 15 September 2006 and 18 January 2007.

²⁵¹ Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states on 26 August 2008: International Crisis Group, Europa Report No. 202, *Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence*, 2010, p. 1. In April 2009, Russia signed a five-year agreement with South Ossetia to take formal control of its frontiers with Georgia proper, as well as those of Abkhazia. In 2014, Russia and Abkhazia signed a ‘strategic partnership’ agreement: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18175394. In 2015, Russia signed an ‘alliance and integration agreement’ with South Ossetia that abolished border checkpoints: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18269210. Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008–09: <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-44730620091215>. Vanuatu apparently recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2011 and then withdrew this recognition: <https://eurasianet.org/abkhazia-vanuatu-changes-its-mind-again>. See also A. Nußberger, ‘South Ossetia’ and ‘Abkhazia’, *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2013. Note the statement by the US Department of State on 17 March 2015 emphasising that South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained integral parts of

Georgia and declaring that the US did not recognise the legitimacy of the ‘treaty’ between Russia and the ‘*de facto* leaders’ of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: <https://ge.usembassy.gov/statement-intended-signing-agreement-de-facto-leaders-georgias-south-ossetia-region-russian-federation-march-17/>. See also <https://osce.usmission.gov/russias-violations-georgian-sovereignty/>. The UK has taken the same position as to the status of these territories: see e.g. Foreign and Commonwealth Minister’s statement, 568 HC Deb., cols. 46W–47W, 8 October 2013.

²⁵² As to the secession of Crimea and its subsequent annexation by Russia, see *Chapter 9*, p. 446.

²⁵³ *Prime Minister of Spain v. Parliament of Catalonia*, STC/114/2017, ILDC 2814 (ES 2017), Spanish Constitutional Court, Judgment of 17 October 2017. Acting under article 155 emergency powers, the central government dissolved the Catalan parliament and called for an election for 21 December that year. The former Catalan president and four other leaders fled abroad and extradition proceedings followed, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41584864 and www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29478415.

²⁵⁴ See www.politico.eu/article/how-the-world-reacted-to-catalan-independence-declaration, particularly referencing the reaction of the German, British and US governments. See also www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41464712. Note that a referendum calling for the independence of the Kurdistan Regional Government, a part of Iraq, was passed in September 2017, but provoked international condemnation. See eg. the reaction of the US, www.rudaw.net/english/world/080620172 and the UK, www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-the-kurdish-regional-governments-intention-to-hold-a-referendum-on-independence-from-iraq. Iraq took armed action and on 24 October 2017 the Kurdistan Regional Government suspended the results of the referendum, www.cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=0400000&1=12&a=55938. See generally M. Sterio, ‘Self-Determination and Secession under International Law: The Cases of Kurdistan and Catalonia’, 22 *ASIL Insights*, 2018; and P. S. Hadji, ‘The Case for Kurdish Statehood in Iraq’, 41 *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 2009, p. 513.

²⁵⁵ Note e.g. the Preliminary Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Confederation between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, 1994, 33 ILM, 1994, p. 605. This Agreement ‘anticipated’ the creation of a Confederation, but provides that its ‘establishment shall not change the international identity or legal

personality of Croatia or of the Federation'. The Agreement provided for cooperation between the parties in a variety of areas and for Croatia to grant the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina free access to the Adriatic through its territory. This Confederation did not come about.

²⁵⁶ See Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 479 ff.; and above, p. 198. See also with regard to the proposed arrangement between Gambia and Senegal, 21 ILM, 1982, pp. 44–7.

²⁵⁷ See e.g. the Dayton Peace Agreement 1995, Annex 4 laying down the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state consisting of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The boundary between the two entities was laid down in Annex 2.

²⁵⁸ Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 625 ff. and *ibid.* as regards Puerto Rico and Niue. See also as to the Cook Islands, M. N. Shaw, 'The Article 12(3) Declaration of the Palestinian Authority, the International Criminal Court and International Law', pp. 36 ff., https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1782668.

²⁵⁹ See e.g. J. E. S. Fawcett, *Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law*, London, 1967, pp. 709–11.

²⁶⁰ See, with regard to the successors of the trust territory of the Pacific, above, p. 204.

²⁶¹ See J. E. S. Fawcett, *The British Commonwealth in International Law*, London, 1963; Oppenheim's *International Law*, p. 256; O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 346–56; Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. I, pp. 476–544; Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, vol. II, pp. 214–64; and Sale, *The Modern Commonwealth*, 1983. See also, as regards the French Community, Whiteman, *Digest*, pp. 544–82; and O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 356–9.

²⁶² See e.g. J. Lippott, 'The Commonwealth of Independent States as an Economic and Legal Community', 39 *German YIL*, 1996, p. 334.

²⁶³ See 31 ILM, 1992, pp. 138, 147, and 34 ILM, 1995, p. 1298.

²⁶⁴ See 34 ILM, 1995, p. 1279.

²⁶⁵ Note also the creation of the Council of Defence Ministers, the Council of Frontier Troops Chief Commanders, an Economic Court, a Commission on Human Rights, an Organ of Branch Co-operation and an Interparliamentary Assembly (articles 30–35).

²⁶⁶ 24 September 1993, 34 ILM, 1995, p. 1298.

²⁶⁷ 26 May 1995, see Council of Europe Information Sheet No. 36, 1995, p. 195.

²⁶⁸ Established as such by article A, Title I of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) signed in February 1992 and in force as from 1 January 1993. See also the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, the Treaty of Nice 2001 and the Treaty of Lisbon 2007. The latter entered into force on 1 December 2009. See above, Chapter 4, p. 158.

²⁶⁹ On 23 June 2016, the UK held a referendum in which the majority voted to leave the EU. On 29 March 2017, the UK made the required notification under article 50 of the Treaty on European Union providing a two-year notice to leave the EU: see www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50 and www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29-euco-50-statement-uk-notification/. The UK withdrew from the UK as from 11.00 pm (UK time) on 31 January 2020, see Withdrawal Agreement, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 384 I/1, 12.11.2019.

²⁷⁰ See e.g. *Flaminio Costa v. ENEL* [1964] ECR 585, 593; *Commission v. Council* [1971] ECR 263, 274; *Kramer* [1976] ECR 1279, 1308; and *Protection of Nuclear Materials* [1978] ECR 2151, 2179. See also A. Peters, ‘The Position of International Law Within the European Community Legal Order’, 40 *German YIL*, 1997, p. 9; D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, *European Union Law*, 4th ed., Cambridge, 2019; D. Chalmers and A. Tomkins, *European Union Public Law*, Cambridge, 2007; S. Weatherill, *Cases and Materials on EU Law*, 12th ed., Oxford, 2016; P. Craig and G. de Búrca, *EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials*, 7th ed., Oxford, 2020; L. Woods, P. Watson and M. Costa, *Steiner and Woods EU Law*, 13th ed., Oxford, 2017; *The Oxford Handbook on European Law* (ed. A. Arnall and D. Chalmers), Oxford, 2015; S. Weatherill, *Law and Values in the European Union*, Oxford, 2016; and R. Schütze, *Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution*, Cambridge, 2014.

²⁷¹ *Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie des Belastingen* [1963] ECR 1. However, see now the Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the case concerning the legality of the European Central Bank's decisions on the Public Sector Purchase Programme, ruling that the ECJ had acted outside its mandate in the *Weiss* case, Decision of the Grand Chamber of 11 December 2018, <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=208741&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6385187>, which allowed the Bank's quantitative easing measures, BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate, 5 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, www.bverfg.de/e/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html.

²⁷² See e.g. J. Weiler and U. Haltern, 'The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order – Through the Looking Glass', 37 *Harvard International Law Journal*, 1996, p. 411.

²⁷³ See *Vattenfall and Others v. Germany* 182 ILR, pp. 1, 43.

²⁷⁴ See e.g. the Second Legal Adviser of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 660. But see also *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 20. Note also the ECJ's *Opinion No. 1/94, Community Competence to Conclude Certain International Agreements* [1994] ECR I-5276; 108 ILR, p. 225.

²⁷⁵ See now article 47 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C202.

²⁷⁶ As to the specific regime established in the Antarctica Treaty 1959, see below, p. 457. See also below, p. 541, with regard to the International Seabed Authority under the Law of the Sea Convention 1982.

²⁷⁷ *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 329, note 7; O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 85–6; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. I, pp. 584–7. See also Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 231 ff.; and B. J. Theutenberg, *The Holy See, the Order of Malta and International Law*, Skara, 2003.

²⁷⁸ *Nanni v. Pace and the Sovereign Order of Malta* 8 AD, p. 2. See also *Scarfò v. Sovereign Order of Malta* 24 ILR, p. 1; *Sovereign Order of Malta v. Soc. An. Commerciale* 22 ILR, p. 1; and Cassese, *International Law*, pp. 132–3.

279 Crawford, *Creation of States*, p. 231.

280 *Ibid.*, p. 233.

281 See Oppenheim's *International Law*, p. 325; Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 221 ff.; J. Duursma, *Fragmentation and the International Relations of Microstates: Self-determination and Statehood*, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 374 ff.; Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, vol. II, pp. 353–77; *Le Saint-Siège dans les Relations Internationales* (ed. J. P. D'Onorio), Aix-en-Provence, 1989; R. Graham, *Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane*, Princeton, 1959; and J. R. Morss, 'The International Legal Status of the Vatican/Holy See Complex', **26** *EJIL*, 2015, p. 927.

282 130 BFSP, p. 791. See also O'Connell, *International Law*, p. 289; and *Re Marcinkus, Mennini and De Strobel* 87 ILR, p. 48.

283 See M. Mendelson, 'The Diminutive States in the United Nations', **21** *ICLQ*, 1972, p. 609.

284 See e.g. the Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel of 30 December 1993, 33 ILM, 1994, p. 153.

285 CERD/C/226/Add. 6 (15 February 1993).

286 See also the Decision of the Philippines Supreme Court (en banc) in *Holy See v. Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc.* 102 ILR, p. 163.

287 Crawford, *Creation of States*, p. 230. The International Committee of the Red Cross also appears on the basis of state practice, particularly its participation in international agreements, to be an international legal person to a limited extent: see Cassese, *International Law*, pp. 133–4. The US has recognised the Holy See as a foreign government: see *O'Bryan v. Holy See* 556 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009).

288 See Oppenheim's *International Law*, p. 165; Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, pp. 494–5; and T. C. Chen, *Recognition*, London, 1951. See also Cassese, *International Law*, pp. 124 ff.; S. C. Neff, 'The Prerogatives of Violence – in Search of the Conceptual Foundations of

Belligerents' Rights', 38 *German YIL*, 1995, p. 41; and S. C. Neff, *The Rights and Duties of Neutrals*, Manchester, 2000, pp. 200 ff. See further [Chapter 20](#).

²⁸⁹ See below, p. 444. See as to the status of national liberation movements, M. N. Shaw, 'The International Status of National Liberation Movements', 5 *Liverpool Law Review*, 1983, p. 19; and R. Ranjeva, 'Peoples and National Liberation Movements', in Bedjaoui, *International Law*, p. 101. See also Cassese, *International Law*, pp. 140 ff.; and H. Wilson, *International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements*, Oxford, 1988.

²⁹⁰ See e.g. D. Fligler, *Multinational Public Corporations*, Washington, DC, 1967; and D. A. Ijalaye, *The Extension of Corporate Personality in International Law*, Leiden, 1978, pp. 57–146. See also P. Muchlinski, *Multinational Enterprises and the Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2007.

²⁹¹ Cited in Ijalaye, *Corporate Personality*, p. 69.

²⁹² See e.g. K. Hamdani and L. Ruffing, *United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations: Corporate Conduct and the Public Interest*, London, 2015; J. Wouters and A.-L. Chané, 'Multinational Corporations in International Law', in *Non-State Actors in International Law* (ed. M. Noortmann, A. Reinisch and C. Ryngaert), Oxford, 2015, p. 225; C. W. Jenks, 'Multinational Entities in the Law of Nations', in *Transnational Law in a Changing Society* (ed. W. Friedman, L. Henkin and O. Lissitzyn), New York, 1972, p. 70; H. Baade, 'Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises: An Introductory Survey', in *Legal Problems of a Code of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises* (ed. N. Horn), Boston, 1980, p. 407; J. Charney, 'Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law', *Duke Law Journal*, 1983, p. 748; F. Rigaux, 'Transnational Corporations', in Bedjaoui, *International Law*, p. 121; and Henkin *et al.*, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, p. 368. See also Muchlinski, *Multinational Enterprises*; C. M. Vazquez, 'Direct vs Indirect Obligations of Corporations under International Law', 43 *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 2005, p. 927; F. Johns, 'The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal Theory', 19 *Melbourne University Law Review*, 1993–94, p. 893; D. Eshanov, 'The Role of Multinational Corporations from the Neoinstitutionalist and International Law Perspectives', 16 *New York University Environmental Law Journal*, 2008, p. 110; and S. R. Ratner, 'Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility', 111 *Yale Law Journal*, 2001, p. 443.

293 ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 46–7; 46 ILR, pp. 178, 220–1.

294 See e.g. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 75 US Dept State Bull., p. 83 (1976); and ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 ILM, pp. 423–30. See also Baade, *Legal Problems*, pp. 416–40. Note the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1998 and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 2000. See also the Draft Norms on Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights produced by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’ Sessional Working Group on the working methods and activities of transnational corporations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13, August 2002; and *Human Rights Standards and the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations* (ed. M. Addo), The Hague, 1999.

295 See the Draft Code of Conduct produced by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, 22 ILM, pp. 177–206; 23 ILM, p. 627 and *ibid.*, p. 602 (Secretariat report on outstanding issues); E/1990/94 (1990); and the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1366. The Commission ceased work in 1993. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ in 2003: see E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2. Note the Andean Group commission decision 292 on a uniform code on Andean multinational enterprises, 30 ILM, 1991, p. 1295, and the Eastern and Southern African states charter on a regime of multinational industrial enterprises, *ibid.*, p. 696. See also **note 294**, above.

296 The *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 1987, p. 126 notes that the transnational corporation, while an established feature of international life, ‘has not yet achieved independent status in international law’.

297 Resolution 17/4. For the Guiding Principles, see A/HRC/17/31. See also J. Ruggie, *Just Business Multinational Corporations and Human Rights*, New York, 2013. See also UNHCR, *The Corporate Responsibility to Protect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide*, New York, 2012.

298 See Guiding Principle 13. The UN Human Rights Council established a Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business

enterprises in 2011, A/HRC/17/4. This body is working currently on a legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises and a revised draft was produced by the chairmanship on 16 July 2019. See generally www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx and www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/wgtranscorp/pages/igwgontnc.aspx.

²⁹⁹ See in general e.g. A. Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples*, Cambridge, 1995; K. Knop, *Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law*, Cambridge, 2002; U. O. Umzurike, *Self-Determination in International Law*, Hamden, 1972; A. Rigo-Sureda, *The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination*, Leiden, 1973; M. Pomerance, *Self-Determination in Law and Practice*, Leiden, 1982; Shaw, *Title*, pp. 59–144; A. Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination*, Oxford, 2004; D. Raic, *Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination*, The Hague, 2002; Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 107 ff.; J. Crawford, ‘The General Assembly, the International Court and Self-Determination’, in *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice* (ed. A. V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice), Cambridge, 1996, p. 585; Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, vol. II, pp. 17–35; Tunkin, *Theory*, pp. 60–9; and C. Tomuschat, *Modern Law of Self-Determination*, New York, 1993. See also M. Koskeniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’, 43 *ICLQ*, 1994, p. 241; W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, ‘Self Determination’, in *United Nations Legal Order* (ed. O. Schachter and C. Joyner), Cambridge, 1995, vol. I, p. 349; A. B. Lorca, ‘Petitioning the International: A “Pre-History” of Self-determination’, 25 *EJIL*, 2014, p. 497; A. Coleman, *Resolving Claims to Self-Determination*, London, 2015; M. Sterio, *The Right to Self-Determination under International Law*, London, 2013; J. Summers, *Peoples and International Law*, Leiden, 2014; D. French, ‘Statehood and Self-Determination’, in *The Theory of Self-Determination* (ed. F. R. Tesón), Cambridge, 2016; and J. Trinidad, *Self-Determination in Disputed Colonial Territories*, Cambridge, 2018.

³⁰⁰ See A. Cobban, *The Nation-State and National Self-Determination*, London, 1969; D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, New York, 1928, vol. II, pp. 12–13; S. Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War*, Washington, DC, 1933, vol. I, p. 42; and Pomerance, *Self-Determination*.

³⁰¹ See e.g. I. Claude, *National Minorities*, Cambridge, 1955; and J. Lador-Lederer, *International Group Protection*, Leiden, 1968.

302 See e.g. the Baltic States' treaties, Martens, *Recueil Général de Traités*, 3rd Series, XI, pp. 864, 877, 888; and Cobban, *Nation-State*, pp. 187–218. See also Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. IV, p. 56.

303 LNOJ Supp. No. 3, 1920, pp. 5–6 and Doc. B7/21/68/106[VII], pp. 22–3. See also J. Barros, *The Aaland Islands Question*, New Haven, 1968; and Verzijl, *International Law*, pp. 328–32.

304 See e.g. O'Connell, *International Law*, p. 312; N. Bentwich and A. Martin, *Commentary on the Charter of the UN*, New York, 1950, p. 7; D. Nincic, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and the Practice of States*, The Hague, 1970, p. 221; H. Kelsen, *Law of the United Nations*, London, 1950, pp. 51–3; and H. Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights*, London, 1950, pp. 147–9. See also Judge Tanaka, *South West Africa (Second Phase)*, ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 288–9; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 451–2.

305 The *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, para. 153. This was confirmed, noted the Court by the terms of General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970 (the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations), see para. 155. See also for an earlier view, O. Asamoah, *The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations*, The Hague, 1966, pp. 177–85; and Shaw, *Title*, chapter 2. In *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 31, 32; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 49, the International Court had already specifically referred to the Colonial Declaration as an 'important stage' in the development of international law regarding non-self-governing territories and as the 'basis for the process of decolonisation'.

306 Adopted in resolution 2625 (XXV) without a vote. See e.g. R. Rosenstock, 'The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations', 65 *AJIL*, 1971, pp. 16, 111, 115.

307 See e.g. Assembly resolutions 1755 (XVII); 2138 (XXI); 2151 (XXI); 2379 (XXIII); 2383 (XXIII) and Security Council resolutions 183 (1963); 301 (1971); 377 (1975); and 384 (1975).

308 ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 16; 49 ILR, p. 3.

309 ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12; 59 ILR, p. 30. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘The Western Sahara Case’, **49 BYIL**, p. 119.

310 ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 31; 49 ILR, pp. 3, 21.

311 ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 31; 59 ILR, pp. 30, 48.

312 ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 68; 59 ILR, p. 85. See in particular the views of Judge Dillard that ‘a norm of international law has emerged applicable to the decolonisation of those non-self-governing territories which are under the aegis of the United Nations’, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 121–2; 59 ILR, p. 138. See also Judge Petren, ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 110; 59 ILR, p. 127.

313 ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 102; 105 ILR, p. 226.

314 *Ibid.*

315 ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 105–6. The reason related to the principle that the Court is unable to exercise jurisdiction over a state without the consent of that state. The Court took the view that Portugal’s claims against Australia could not be decided upon without an examination of the position of Indonesia, which had not consented to the jurisdiction of the Court. See further below, Chapter 18, p. 944.

316 ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 171–2; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 89–91.

317 ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 436. See also G. Zyberi, ‘Self-Determination Through the Lens of the International Court of Justice’, **56 Netherlands International Law Review**, 2009, p. 429; and I. Urrutia, ‘Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination: The Approach of the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’, **16 Revista d’Estudis Autònoms i Federals**, 2012, p. 107.

318 ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 118, 131 ff.; and M. Sterio, *Secession in International Law*, Cheltenham, 2018. See also S. Allen, ‘Self-Determination, the *Chagos Advisory Opinion* and the Chagossians’, **69 ICLQ**, 2020, p. 203.

319 (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385; 115 ILR, p. 536. The first question concerned the existence or not in Canadian constitutional law of a right to secede, and the third question asked whether in the event of a conflict constitutional or international law would have priority. See further below, Chapter 9, p. 444, on the question of secession and self-determination.

320 (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 434–5.

321 See e.g. Cobban, *Nation-State*, p. 107; and K. Deutsche, *Nationalism and Social Communications*, New York, 1952. See also *Greco-Bulgarian Communities*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 17, 1930; 5 AD, p. 4.

322 See e.g. the Colonial Declaration 1960; the 1970 Declaration on Principles and article III[3] of the OAU Charter.

323 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law. Note also that resolution 1541 (XV) declared that there is an obligation to transmit information regarding a territory ‘which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it’.

324 See e.g. T. M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, Oxford, 1990, pp. 153 ff.; T. M. Franck, ‘Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System’, **240 HR**, 1993 III, pp. 13, 127–49; Higgins, *Problems and Process*, chapter 11; and Shaw, *Title*, chapters 3 and 4. See also below, Chapter 9, p. 444.

325 (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, 436; 115 ILR, p. 536.

326 See Cassese, *Self-Determination*, pp. 118 ff. See also Trinidad, *Self-Determination*, chapter 2.

327 (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, pp. 437–8. Cassese concludes that ‘[e]xtreme and unremitting persecution and the lack of any reasonable prospect for peaceful challenge may make secession legitimate’, *ibid.*, p. 120. See also R. Rosenstock, ‘The Declaration on Principles of International Law’, **65 AJIL**, 1971, pp. 713, 732.

328 ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 438.

329 *Ibid.*

330 *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 33, 68. See also Judge Dillard, *ibid.*, p. 122; 59 ILR, pp. 30, 50, 85, 138. See Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law.

331 See *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 102; 105 ILR, p. 226, where Portugal claimed *inter alia* that Australia's agreement with Indonesia dealing with the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf in the 'Timor Gap' violated the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination.

332 See e.g. A. Clapham, 'The Role of the Individual and International Law', **21** *EJIL*, 2010, p. 25; K. Parlett, *The Individual in the International Legal System*, Cambridge, 2011; *Oppenheim's International Law*, chapter 8; Higgins, *Problems and Process*, pp. 48–55; O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 106–12; C. Norgaard, *Position of the Individual in International Law*, Leiden, 1962; Cassese, *International Law*, pp. 142 ff.; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 709; R. Müllerson, 'Human Rights and the Individual as a Subject of International Law: A Soviet View', **1** *EJIL*, 1990, p. 33; P. M. Dupuy, 'L'individu et le Droit International', **32** *Archives de Philosophie du Droit*, 1987, p. 119; H. Lauterpacht, *Human Rights in International Law*, London, 1951; Lauterpacht, *International Law: Collected Papers*, vol. **II**, p. 487; and *The Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, study prepared by Daes, 1983, E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2. See also below, [Chapter 6](#).

333 See e.g. O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 106–7.

334 See e.g. Grotius, *De Jure Praedae Commentarius*, 1604, cited in Daes, *Individual's Duties*, p. 44; and Lauterpacht, *Human Rights*, pp. 9, 70, 74.

335 See *Panevezys–Saldutiskis*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 76, 1939; 9 AD, p. 308. See also *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions* (Jurisdiction), PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924; 2 AD, p. 27. See also below, [Chapter 13](#), p. 704.

336 See *Nottebohm*, ICJ Reports, 1955, pp. 4, 22–3; 22 ILR, p. 349.

337 See e.g. *US v. Noriega* 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1533 (1990); 99 ILR, pp. 143, 175.

338 See Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. I, p. 39.

339 PCIJ, Series B, No. 15, 1928; 4 AD, p. 287.

340 See e.g. *Steiner and Gross v. Polish State* 4 AD, p. 291.

341 See *Reparation for Injuries*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174; 16 AD, p. 318. See also *Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 73, 89–90; 62 ILR, pp. 450, 473–4. See as to non-governmental organisations: A.-K. Lindblom, *Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law*, Cambridge, 2005; *NGOs in International Law* (ed. P.-M. Dupuy and L. Vierucci), Cheltenham, 2008; and M. Noortmann, ‘Non-Governmental Organisations: Recognition, Roles, Rights and Responsibilities’, in *Non-State Actors in International Law* (ed. M. Noortmann, A. Reinisch and C. Ryngaert), Oxford, 2015, p. 205.

342 ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 178; 16 AD, p. 321.

343 ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 185; 16 AD, p. 330. H. Lauterpacht wrote that, ‘in each particular case the question whether . . . a body is a subject of international law must be answered in a pragmatic manner by reference to actual experience and to the reason of the law as distinguished from a preconceived notion as to who can be subjects of international law’, *International Law and Human Rights*, p. 12.

344 See e.g. F. Seyersted, ‘International Personality of Intergovernmental Organisations’, 4 *IJIL*, 1964, p. 19.

345 See e.g. Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. I, p. 48; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. II, p. 12.

346 See in particular *Texaco v. Libya* 53 ILR, pp. 389, 457–62.

347 Note the intriguing suggestion raised in the study prepared for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, that an agreement between autonomous public entities (not being subjects of international law) might create an international person: UNJYB, 1971, pp. 215–18. The study was very cautious about this possibility.

348 See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 56, 134, 149; 49 ILR, pp. 3, 46, 124, 139. See also Security Council resolutions 326 (1973), 328 (1973), 403 (1977), 406 (1977), 411 (1977) and 424 (1978), in which the Council condemned Rhodesian attacks against neighbouring states and recognised that the entity was subject to the norms relating to the use of force.

349 See e.g. UKMIL, 49 *BYIL*, 1978, p. 340. Byelorussia and the Ukraine were separate members of the UN and parties to a number of conventions: *ibid.*

350 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, pp. 125–6.

351 See e.g. Norgaard, *Position of the Individual*, p. 35. See also Peter Pázmány University, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 61, 1933; 7 AD, p. 490.

352 *Reparation for Injuries*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 174, 178; 16 AD, pp. 318, 321.

353 *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 63; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 80.

6

The International Protection of Human Rights

The Nature of Human Rights¹

The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted on 10 December 1948 emphasises that ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. While there is widespread acceptance of the importance of human rights in the international structure, there is considerable confusion as to their precise nature and role in international law.² The question of what is meant by a ‘right’ is itself controversial and the subject of intense jurisprudential debate.³ Some ‘rights’, for example, are intended as immediately enforceable binding commitments, others merely as specifying a possible future pattern of behaviour.⁴ The problem of enforcement and sanctions with regard to human rights in international law is another issue which can affect the characterisation of the phenomenon. There are writers who regard the high incidence of non-compliance with human rights norms as evidence of state practice that argues against the existence of a structure of human rights principles in international law.⁵ Although sight must not be lost of violations of human rights laws, such an approach is not only academically incorrect, but also profoundly negative.⁶ The concept of human rights is closely allied with ethics and morality. Those rights that reflect the values of a community will be those with the most chance of successful implementation. Positive rights may be taken to include those rights enshrined within a legal system, whether or not reflective of moral considerations, whereas a moral right is not necessarily enforceable by law. One may easily discover positive rights. Deducing or

inferring moral rights is another matter entirely and will depend upon the perception of the person seeking the existence of a particular right.⁷

Rights may be seen as emanating from various sources, whether religion or the nature of man or the nature of society. The Natural Law view, as expressed in the traditional formulations of that approach or by virtue of the natural rights movement, is that certain rights exist as a result of a higher law than positive or man-made law. Such a higher law constitutes a universal and absolute set of principles governing all human beings in time and space. The natural rights approach of the seventeenth century, associated primarily with John Locke, founded the existence of such inalienable rights as the rights to life, liberty and property upon a social contract marking the end of the difficult conditions of the state of nature. This theory enabled recourse to be had to a superior type of law and thus was able to provide a powerful method of restraining arbitrary power.⁸ Although this approach fell out of favour in the nineteenth century due to the problems of its non-empirical and diffuse methodology, it proved of immense value in the last century in the establishment of human rights within the international community as universal principles. Positivism as a theory emphasised the authority of the state and as such left little place for rights in the legal system other than specific rights emanating from the constitutional structure of that system,⁹ while the Marxist doctrine, although based upon the existence of certain immutable historical laws governing the development of society, nevertheless denied the existence of rights outside the framework of the legal order.¹⁰ Modern rights theories cover a wide range of approaches, and this clearly emphasises the need to come to terms with the requirements of an evolving

legal system that cannot be totally comprehended in terms of that system itself.¹¹

Of particular interest is the work of the policy-oriented movement that seeks to identify, characterise and order a wide variety of relevant factors in the process of human rights creation and equipment. Eight interdependent values are noted (viz. demands relating to respect, power, enlightenment, well-being, health, skill, affection and rectitude) and various environmental influences stressed. Human dignity is seen as the key concept in relation to these values and to the ultimate goal of a world community in which a democratic distribution of values is sought.¹²

All these theories emphasise the complexity of the nature of the concept of human rights in the context of general legal and political processes, but also the importance and centrality of such notions. The broad issues are similarly raised within the framework of international law.

Of particular interest is the tension between the universalism of human rights and the relativism of cultural traditions. This has led to arguments by some adherents of the latter tendency that human rights can only be approached within the context of particular cultural or religious traditions, thus criticising the view that human rights are universal or transcultural. The danger, of course, is that states violating human rights that they have accepted by becoming parties to human rights treaties, as well as being bound by relevant customary international law, might seek to justify their actions by pleading cultural differences.¹³

The Development of International Human Rights Law¹⁴

In the nineteenth century, the positivist doctrines of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction reigned supreme. Virtually all matters that today would be classified as human rights issues were at that stage universally regarded as within the internal sphere of national jurisdiction. The major exceptions to this were related to piracy *jure gentium* and slavery. In the latter case, a number of treaties were entered into to bring about its abolition.¹⁵ Concern also with the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers and with prisoners of war developed as from 1864 in terms of international instruments,¹⁶ while states were required to observe certain minimum standards in the treatment of aliens.¹⁷ In addition, certain agreements of a general welfare nature were beginning to be adopted by the turn of the century.¹⁸ The nineteenth century also appeared to accept a right of humanitarian intervention, although its range and extent were unclear.¹⁹

An important change occurred with the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919.²⁰ Article 22 of the Covenant of the League set up the mandates system for peoples in ex-enemy colonies ‘not yet able to stand by themselves in the strenuous conditions of the modern world’. The mandatory power was obliged to guarantee freedom of conscience and religion and a Permanent Mandates Commission was created to examine the reports the mandatory authorities had undertaken to make. The arrangement was termed ‘a sacred trust of civilisation’. Article 23 of the Covenant provided for just treatment of the native populations of the territories in question.²¹ The 1919

Peace Treaties with Eastern European and Balkan states included provisions relating to the protection of minorities,²² providing essentially for equality of treatment and opportunities for collective activity.²³ These provisions were supervised by the League of Nations, to whom there was a right of petition.²⁴

Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles provided for the creation of the International Labour Organization, among the purposes of which were the promotion of better standards of working conditions and support for the right of association. The impact of the Second World War upon the development of human rights law was immense as the horrors of the war and the need for an adequate international system to maintain international peace and protect human rights became apparent to all. In addition, the rise of non-governmental organisations, particularly in the sphere of human rights, has had an immense effect.²⁵ While the post-Second World War world witnessed the rise of intergovernmental committees and organs and courts to deal with human rights violations, whether by public debate, states' reports, comments, inter-state or individual petition procedures, recent years have seen the interposition of domestic amnesty laws and this has given rise to the question of the acceptability of impunity.²⁶ Further developments have included the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions²⁷ and various other alternative justice systems such as the Rwandan Gacaca court system,²⁸ while the extent to which participants in the international legal system apart from states have become involved both in the process of formulating and seeking the implementation of human rights and in being the subjects of human rights concern and regulation is marked.²⁹

Some Basic Principles

Domestic Jurisdiction³⁰

The basic rule of international law providing that states have no right to encroach upon the preserve of other states' internal affairs is a consequence of the equality and sovereignty of states and is mirrored in article 2(7) of the UN Charter. It has, however, been subject to a process of reinterpretation in the human rights field³¹ as this and the two succeeding chapters will make apparent, so that states may no longer plead this rule as a bar to international concern and consideration of internal human rights situations.³² It is, of course, obvious that where a state accepts the right of individual petition under an international procedure, it cannot thereafter claim that the exercise of such a right constitutes interference with its domestic affairs.³³

The Rule on the Exhaustion of Domestic (or Local) Remedies³⁴

This rule flows from the above principle. It is a method of permitting states to solve their own internal problems in accordance with their own constitutional procedures before accepted international mechanisms can be invoked, and is well established in general international law.³⁵ However, where such internal remedies are non-existent or unduly and unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief, the resort to international measures will not be required.³⁶ The existence of such a remedy must be certain not only in theory, but also in practice.³⁷ A provision regarding the need to exhaust domestic remedies before the various international mechanisms may be resorted to appears in all the international and regional human rights instruments³⁸ and has been the subject of much consideration by the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol procedure of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,³⁹ and within the European Convention⁴⁰ and Inter-American Convention human rights systems.⁴¹

Priorities of Rights

Certain rights may not be derogated from in the various human rights instruments even in times of war or other public emergency threatening the nation. In the case of the European Convention,⁴² these are the rights to life (except in cases resulting from lawful acts of war), the prohibition on torture and slavery, and non-retroactivity of criminal offences.⁴³ In the case of the Inter-American Convention,⁴⁴ the following rights are non-derogable: the

rights to juridical personality, life and humane treatment, freedom from slavery, freedom from *ex post facto* laws, freedom of conscience and religion, rights of the family, to a name, of the child, nationality and participation in government.⁴⁵ By article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the rights to life and recognition as a person before the law, the freedoms of thought, conscience and religion and the prohibition on torture, slavery, retroactivity of criminal legislation and imprisonment on grounds solely of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation are non-derogable.⁴⁶

Such non-derogable rights clearly are regarded as possessing a special place in the hierarchy of rights.⁴⁷ In addition, it must be noted, many rights are subject to a limitation or clawback clause, whereby the absolute right provided for will not operate in certain situations.⁴⁸ Those rights therefore that are not so limited may be regarded as of particular value.⁴⁹

The COVID-19 Crisis⁵⁰

These considerations came to the fore in the COVID-19 pandemic that commenced in late 2019 in view of the extraordinary measures that have been needed to be taken to deal with the disease, ranging from various forms of quarantine or lockdown to regulating social distancing and the wearing of masks and to the various surveillance measures taken to control movement and thus the spread of the disease. Large-scale shutdown of industries and shops taken together with the closing of schools and places of worship have underlined the unprecedented interference with rights in the circumstances. Faced with the global crisis, the various human rights bodies have issued

guidance. The Human Rights Committee, for example, declared in its statement of 30 April 2020,⁵¹ that

in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, states parties must take effective measures to protect the right to life and health of all individuals within their territory and all those subject to their jurisdiction. It also recognizes that such measures may, in certain circumstances, result in restrictions on the enjoyment of individual rights guaranteed by the Covenant.

Furthermore, the Committee acknowledges that states parties confronting the threat of widespread contagion may, on a temporary basis, resort to exceptional emergency powers and invoke their right of derogation from the Covenant under article 4 provided that it is required to protect the life of the nation.

However, it was emphasised that there were certain conditions to such derogation, these being official proclamation of a state of emergency; formal notification to the Secretary-General; the strict necessity and proportionality of any derogating measure taken; the conformity of measures taken with other international obligations; non-discrimination; and the prohibition on derogating from certain non-derogable rights. The Committee added that there should be no toleration even in such emergency situations of national, racial or religious hatred that would constitute incitement to discrimination,

hostility or violence, and steps must be taken to ensure that public discourse in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic did not constitute advocacy or incitement against specific marginalised or vulnerable groups, including minorities and foreign nationals. The other human rights bodies issued similar statements.⁵²

More generally, the crisis focused on the right to health in international law and the role of the World Health Organization (WHO).⁵³ The recognition of a right to health may be traced to the preamble of the Constitution of the WHO 1946, which emphasises that '[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition',⁵⁴ while article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 states: 'Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.' Moving beyond these essentially hortatory or non-binding statements, article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 declares that 'the States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health'.⁵⁵ This provision, like the other provisions of this binding treaty, is reviewed by the Committee established under the Covenant.⁵⁶ In General Comment No. 14, the Committee analysed article 12 in detail.⁵⁷ In particular, it noted that the right included the freedoms to control one's health and body, including sexual and

reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation. In addition, the right included entitlements to a system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health, taking into account both the individual's biological and socio-economic preconditions and a state's available resources. The Committee noted that the right to health was an inclusive one and extended to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and information. A number of relevant principles was noted, including availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality.⁵⁸

Article 12(2) of the Covenant continues by providing that the steps to be taken by the states parties to achieve the full realisation of this right shall include those necessary for *inter alia* '(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; and (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness'. A number of other general conventions refer to the right to health either generally or with regard to specific groups,⁵⁹ as do a number of regional conventions.⁶⁰ A Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health was appointed in 2002 and their mandate has been extended and expanded subsequently.⁶¹

The Assembly of the WHO adopted the binding International Health Regulations in 2005 (revising those adopted in 1969) and these were subsequently amended in 2014. The purposes of the Regulations are ‘to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’. The Regulations are not limited to any specific disease, provide for certain minimum core public health capacities, oblige states parties to notify the WHO of events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern and establish procedures for the determination by the Director-General of a ‘public health emergency of international concern’ and provide for the issuance of corresponding temporary recommendations.⁶² Criticisms have been made of the WHO’s response to the COVID-19 crisis and the organisation has responded.⁶³ It appears that the WHO lacks the necessary executive competences to deal with a pandemic outbreak in the absence of the cooperation of states.

Customary International Law and Human Rights

In addition to the many international and regional treaty provisions concerning human rights to be noted in this chapter,⁶⁴ certain human rights may now be regarded as having entered into the category of customary international law in the light of state practice. These would certainly include the prohibition of torture, genocide and slavery and the principle of non-discrimination.⁶⁵ In addition, human rights established under treaty may constitute obligations *erga omnes* for the states parties.⁶⁶

The UN System – General⁶⁷

There are a number of human rights provisions in the Charter.⁶⁸ Article 1 includes in the purposes of the organisation the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. Article 13(1) notes that the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations regarding the realisation of human rights for all, while article 55 provides that the United Nations shall promote universal respect for and observance of human rights. In a significant provision, article 56 states that:

all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55.⁶⁹

The League of Nations mandate system was replaced by the trusteeship system in 1945, one of the basic objectives of which was, by article 76, the encouragement of respect for human rights, while, with regard to non-self-governing territories, the administering powers under article 73 of the Charter recognised the principle that the interests of the inhabitants were paramount, and accepted as a sacred trust the obligation to promote the well-being of the inhabitants. It can thus be seen that the Charter provisions on human rights were very general and vague. No enforcement procedures were laid down. Some have argued that the term ‘pledge’ in article 56 had the effect of

converting the enumerated purposes of article 55 into legal obligations,⁷⁰ but this has been disputed.⁷¹ Certainly, as of 1946, this would have been a difficult proposition to sustain, particularly in view of the hortatory language used in the provisions and the fact that the respect for human rights stipulation does not identify precise legal rights.⁷² However, in *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia* of 1971, the Court noted that under the UN Charter:

the former Mandatory had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a territory having international status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. To establish instead and to enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations, exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.⁷³

It may be that this provision can only be understood in the light of the special, international status of that territory, but in the light of extensive practice since the 1940s in the general area of non-discrimination and human rights, the broader interpretation is to be preferred.

The Charter does contain a domestic jurisdiction provision. Article 2(7) provides that:

nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorise the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state

but as noted later,⁷⁴ this has over the years been flexibly interpreted, so that human rights issues are no longer recognised as being solely within the domestic jurisdiction of states.

The elucidation, development and protection of human rights through the United Nations has proved to be a seminal event. A range of declarations and treaties has emerged, coupled with the establishment of a variety of advisory services and implementation and enforcement mechanisms. Large numbers of studies and reports of various kinds have appeared, while the whole process has been accompanied by extensive debate and consideration in a variety of UN organs and committees. Notwithstanding a certain degree of cynicism, it can be concluded that the acceptance of the centrality of human rights concerns within the international community has been due in no small measure to the unceasing consideration of human rights issues within the framework of the United Nations.

The cornerstone of UN activity has been without doubt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948.⁷⁵ The Declaration was approved without a dissenting vote (the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia abstained). It was intended not as a legally binding document as such but, as its preamble proclaims ‘a common

standard of achievement for all peoples and nations'. Its thirty articles cover a wide range of rights, from liberty and security of the person (article 3), equality before the law (article 7), effective remedies (article 8), due process (articles 9 and 10), prohibitions on torture (article 5) and arbitrary interference with privacy (article 12), to rights protecting freedom of movement (article 13), asylum (article 14), expression (article 19), conscience and religion (article 18) and assembly (article 20). One should also note that included in the Declaration are social and economic rights such as the right to work and equal pay (article 23), the right to social security (article 25) and the right to education (article 26).

Although clearly not a legally enforceable instrument as such, the question arises as to whether the Declaration has subsequently become binding either by way of custom⁷⁶ or general principles of law, or indeed by virtue of interpretation of the UN Charter itself by subsequent practice.⁷⁷ The Declaration has had a marked influence upon the constitutions of many states and upon the formulation of subsequent human rights treaties and resolutions.⁷⁸ The Declaration has also been referred to in many cases,⁷⁹ and its importance within the context of UN human rights law should not be disregarded.⁸⁰ The intention had been that the Declaration would be followed immediately by a binding universal convention on human rights, but this process took considerably longer than anticipated. In the meantime, a number of important international conventions dealing with selective human rights issues were adopted, including the Genocide Convention 1948⁸¹ and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965.⁸²

The Protection of the Collective Rights of Groups and

Individuals⁸³

International law since 1945 has focused primarily upon the protection of individual human rights, as can be seen from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In recent years, however, more attention has been given to various expressions of the concept of collective rights, although it is often difficult to maintain a strict differentiation between individual and collective rights. Some rights are purely individual, such as the right to life or freedom of expression; others are individual rights that are necessarily expressed collectively, such as freedom of assembly or the right to manifest one's own religion. Some rights are purely collective, such as the right to self-determination or the physical protection of the group as such through the prohibition of genocide; others constitute collective manifestations of individual rights, such as the right of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture and practise their own religion or use their own language. In addition, the question of the balancing of the legitimate rights of the state, groups and individuals is in practice crucial and sometimes not sufficiently considered. States, groups and individuals have legitimate rights and interests that should not be ignored. All within a state have an interest in ensuring the efficient functioning of that state in a manner consistent with respect for the rights of groups and individuals, while the balancing of the rights of groups and individuals may itself prove difficult and complex.

Prohibition of Discrimination

Apart from the overwhelming requirement of protection from physical attack upon their very existence as a group,⁸⁴ groups need protection from

discriminatory treatment as such.⁸⁵ The norm of non-discrimination thus constitutes a principle relevant both to groups and to individual members of groups.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination⁸⁶ was signed in 1965 and entered into force in 1969. It builds on the non-discrimination provisions in the UN Charter. Racial discrimination is defined as:

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

States parties undertake to prohibit racial discrimination and guarantee equality for all in the enjoyment of a series of rights and to assure to all within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies regarding such human rights. As noted later in this chapter, a Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was established.⁸⁷ In addition to the existence of this Convention, the prohibition of discrimination on racial grounds is contrary to customary international law.⁸⁸ This conclusion may be reached on the basis *inter alia* of articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, articles 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the

International Covenants on Human Rights,⁸⁹ regional instruments on human rights protection⁹⁰ and general state practice. Discrimination on other grounds, such as religion⁹¹ and gender,⁹² may also be contrary to customary international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides in article 2(1) that all states parties undertake to respect and ensure to all individuals within their territories and within their jurisdictions the rights recognised in the Covenant ‘without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.⁹³ Article 26 stipulates that all persons are equal before the law and, thus, ‘the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.⁹⁴ The UN Human Rights Committee established under this Covenant⁹⁵ has noted in its General Comment No. 18 on Non-Discrimination⁹⁶ that non-discrimination ‘constitutes a basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights’. The Committee, while adopting the definition of the term ‘discrimination’ as used in the Racial Discrimination and Women’s Discrimination Conventions, concludes that it should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.

The principle of non-discrimination requires the establishment of equality in fact as well as formal equality in law. As the Permanent Court of International Justice noted in the *Minority Schools in Albania* case,⁹⁷ ‘equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between different situations’.⁹⁸ The appropriate test of acceptable differentiation in such circumstances will centre upon what is just or reasonable⁹⁹ or objectively and reasonably justified.¹⁰⁰ The application of equality in fact may also require the introduction of affirmative action measures in order to diminish or eliminate conditions perpetuating discrimination. Such measures would need to be specifically targeted and neither absolute nor of infinite duration.¹⁰¹

The Principle of Self-Determination as a Human Right¹⁰²

The right to self-determination has already been examined in so far as it relates to the context of decolonisation.¹⁰³ The question arises whether this right, which has been widely proclaimed, has an application beyond the colonial context. Article 1 of both International Covenants on Human Rights provides that ‘all peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’, while the Helsinki Final Act of 1975¹⁰⁴ refers to ‘the principle of equal rights and self-determination . . . all peoples have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development’. Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981¹⁰⁵ stipulates that ‘all peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have chosen.’ The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations¹⁰⁶ referred to the colonial situation and noted that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a violation of the principle. A number of UN resolutions have discussed the relevance of self-determination also to situations of alien occupation where the use of force has been involved.¹⁰⁷ The International

Law Commission in 1988 expressed its view that the principle of self-determination was of universal application,¹⁰⁸ while the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee has been of particular significance.

Before this is briefly noted, reference must be made to the crucial importance of the principle of territorial integrity.¹⁰⁹ This norm protects the territorial framework of independent states and is part of the overall concept of the sovereignty of states. In terms of the concept of the freezing of territorial boundaries as at the moment of independence (save by mutual consent), the norm is referred to as *uti possidetis juris*.¹¹⁰ This posits that boundaries established and existing at the moment of independence cannot be altered unless the relevant parties consent to change. It is supported by international instruments¹¹¹ and by judicial pronouncement. In the *Burkina Faso/Mali* case,¹¹² the Chamber of the International Court of Justice emphasised that *uti possidetis* constituted a general principle, whose purpose was to prevent the independence and stability of new states from being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers. This essential requirement of stability had induced newly independent states to consent to the respecting of colonial borders ‘and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples’. The Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia emphasised in Opinion No. 2¹¹³ that ‘it is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (*uti possidetis juris*) except where the states concerned agree otherwise’.

The principle of self-determination, therefore, applies beyond the colonial context, within the territorial framework of independent states. It cannot be utilised as a legal tool for the dismantling of sovereign states.¹¹⁴ Its use, however, as a crucial principle of collective human rights¹¹⁵ has been analysed by the Human Rights Committee in interpreting article 1 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant.¹¹⁶ In its General Comment on Self-Determination adopted in 1984,¹¹⁷ the Committee emphasised that the realisation of the right was ‘an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights’. Nevertheless, the principle is seen as a collective one and not one that individuals could seek to enforce through the individual petition procedures provided in the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant.¹¹⁸ The Committee takes the view, as Professor Higgins¹¹⁹ noted,¹²⁰ that ‘external self-determination requires a state to take action in its foreign policy consistent with the attainment of self-determination in the remaining areas of colonial or racist occupation. But internal self-determination is directed to their own peoples.’ In the context of the significance of the principle of self-determination within independent states, the Committee has encouraged states parties to provide in their reports details about participation in social and political structures,¹²¹ and in engaging in dialogue with representatives of states parties, questions are regularly posed as to how political institutions operate and how the people of the state concerned participate in the governance of their state.¹²² This necessarily links in with consideration of other articles of the Covenant concerning, for example, freedom of expression (article 19), freedom of assembly (article 21), freedom of association (article 22) and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs and to vote (article 25). The right of self-determination, therefore, provides the overall framework for the

consideration of the principles relating to democratic governance.¹²³ The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination adopted General Recommendation No. 21 in 1996 in which it similarly divided self-determination into an external and an internal aspect and noted that the latter referred to the ‘right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs at any level’.¹²⁴ The Canadian Supreme Court has noted that self-determination ‘is normally fulfilled through *internal* self-determination – a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state’.¹²⁵

The Protection of Minorities¹²⁶

Various attempts were made in the post-First World War settlements, following the collapse of the German, Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires and the rise of a number of independent nation-based states in Eastern and Central Europe, to protect those groups to whom sovereignty and statehood could not be granted.¹²⁷ Persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities were to be given the same treatment and the same civil and political rights and security as other nationals in the state in question. Such provisions constituted obligations of international concern and could not be altered without the assent of a majority of the League of Nations Council. The Council was to take action in the event of any infraction of obligations concerning minorities. There also existed a petition procedure by minorities to the League, although they had no standing as such before the Council or the Permanent Court of International Justice.¹²⁸ However, the schemes of protection did not work well, ultimately for a variety of reasons ranging from the sensitivities of newly independent states

to international supervision of minority issues to overt exploitation of minority issues by Nazi Germany in order to subvert neighbouring countries. After the Second World War, the focus shifted to the international protection of universal individual human rights, although several instruments dealing with specific situations incorporated provisions concerning the protection of minorities,¹²⁹ and in 1947 the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities was established.¹³⁰ It was not, however, until the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 that the question of minority rights came back onto the international agenda. Article 27 of this Covenant provides that ‘in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language’.

This modest and rather negative provision as formulated centres upon ‘persons belonging’ to minorities rather than upon minorities as such and does not define the concept of minorities.¹³¹ Nevertheless, the UN Human Rights Committee has taken the opportunity to consider the issue in discussing states’ reports, individual petitions and in a General Comment. In commenting upon states’ reports made pursuant to the International Covenant, the Committee has made clear, for example, that the rights under article 27 apply to all members of minorities within a state party’s territory and not just nationals,¹³² and it has expressed concern with regard to the treatment of minorities within particular states.¹³³

In the *Lovelace* case,¹³⁴ the Committee decided that there had been a violation of article 27 with regard to an Indian woman who, by having married a non-Indian, had lost her rights by Canadian law to reside on the Tobique Reserve, something which she wished to do upon the collapse of her marriage. The Committee noted that statutory restrictions affecting the right to residence on a reserve of a person belonging to the minority concerned had to have both a reasonable and objective justification and be consistent with the other provisions of the Covenant read as a whole. This had not been the case. There was no place outside the reserve where her right to access to her native culture and language could be conducted in community with other members of the minority in question.¹³⁵

The Committee adopted a General Comment on article 27 in 1994 after much discussion and hesitation due to fears that such a comment might be perceived to constitute an encouragement to secession.¹³⁶ The General Comment pointed to the distinction between the rights of persons belonging to minorities on the one hand, and the right to self-determination and the right to equality and non-discrimination on the other. It was emphasised that the rights under article 27 did not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, although certain minority rights, in particular those pertaining to indigenous communities, might consist of a way of life closely associated with territory and the use of its resources, such as fishing, hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law. The Committee, in an important part of the General Comment, underlined that persons belonging to a minority need not be nationals or permanent residents of the state concerned so that migrant workers or even visitors might be protected under article 27. Whether an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority exists was an

objective question, not dependent upon a decision of the state party. Although article 27 is negatively formulated, the Committee pointed out that positive measures of protection were required not only against the acts of the state party itself, but also against the acts of other persons within the state party. Positive measures may also be necessary to protect the identity of the minority concerned and legitimate differentiation was permitted so long as it was based on reasonable and objective criteria.

The UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in December 1992.¹³⁷ Article 1 provides that states ‘shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories’ and shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve these ends. The Declaration states that persons belonging to minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, practise and profess their own religion and use their own language in private and in public without hindrance. Such persons also have the right to participate effectively in cultural, social, economic and public life. The UN Sub-Commission has been considering the question of minorities for many years and in 1994 agreed to establish a five-person inter-sessional working group¹³⁸ to examine peaceful and constructive solutions to situations involving minorities and, in particular, to review the practical application of the Declaration, to provide recommendations to *inter alia* the Sub-Commission and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to protect minorities where there is a risk of violence and generally to promote dialogue between minority groups in society and between those groups and governments. In 2005, the Commission on Human Rights appointed an

Independent Expert on Minorities (termed Special Rapporteur as from 2011) with the mandate to promote the implementation of the Declaration; to identify best practices and possibilities for technical cooperation by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the request of governments; and to cooperate closely with existing relevant UN bodies, while taking into account the views of non-governmental organisations and applying a gender perspective.¹³⁹ In 2012, for example, the UN Network on Racial Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was established bringing together a wide range of UN agencies, departments, programmes and funds.¹⁴⁰

As has been noted, the UN Human Rights Committee has pointed to the special position of indigenous peoples as minorities with a particular relationship to their traditional territory. It has been accepted that such communities form a specific category of minorities with special needs.¹⁴¹ The International Labour Organization adopted Convention No. 107 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations in 1957, an instrument with a predominantly assimilationist approach to the question of indigenous peoples. It was partially revised in Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 1989. The change in terminology from ‘populations’ to ‘peoples’ is instructive¹⁴² and the latter Convention focuses far more upon the protection of the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of indigenous peoples. Unlike the prevailing approach to the definition of minorities generally, which intermingles objective and subjective criteria, this Convention stipulates in article 1(2) that ‘self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion’ for determining the groups to which the Convention applies. The

Sub-Commission recommended that a study of discrimination against indigenous populations should be made and this was completed in 1984.¹⁴³ A definition of indigenous populations was suggested and various suggestions made as to future action. In 1982, the Sub-Commission established a Working Group on Indigenous Populations¹⁴⁴ and a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was finally adopted in 2007.¹⁴⁵

The Declaration notes that indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law (article 1). They have the right to self-determination (article 3) and, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions (article 4). They further have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive political, economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal systems, while retaining the right to participate fully in the life of the state (article 5), the right to a nationality (article 6) and the collective right to live in freedom and security as distinct peoples free from any act of genocide or violence (article 7(2)).¹⁴⁶ An expert mechanism, consisting of five independent experts, on the rights of indigenous peoples was called for in Human Rights Council resolution 6/36, 2007, in order to provide the Council with thematic expertise.

The question of an American Declaration on Indigenous Peoples has also been under discussion within the Organization of American States.¹⁴⁷ The Inter-American Court of Human Rights discussed the issue of the rights of

indigenous peoples to ancestral lands and resources in *Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua* in 2001.¹⁴⁸ The Court emphasised the communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective property of the land and consequential close ties of indigenous people with that land,¹⁴⁹ and noted that the customary law of such people had especially to be taken into account so that ‘possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title’.¹⁵⁰ In *Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay*, the Court emphasised that the close ties of members of the indigenous communities with their traditional lands and the natural resources associated with their culture had to be secured under article 21 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights concerning the right to the use and enjoyment of property. The Court, in interpreting this provision, also took account of Convention No. 169 of the ILO, which required *inter alia* respect for the special importance for the cultural and spiritual values of the communities concerned of their relationship with their lands. The collective nature of property ownership was also noted.¹⁵¹

In addition, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted a decision in the *Endorois* case, concerning the eviction of the Endorois people from their ancestral lands in Kenya in order to establish a game reserve. The Commission concluded that the traditional possession of land by indigenous people had the equivalent effect as that of a state-granted full property title and that traditional possession entitled indigenous people to demand official recognition and registration of property title.¹⁵² However, difficulties of implementation ensued.¹⁵³

The UN System – Implementation¹⁵⁴

The UN system has successfully generated a wide-ranging series of international instruments dealing with the establishment of standards and norms in the human rights field.¹⁵⁵ The question of implementation will now be briefly addressed.

Political Bodies

The General Assembly has power under article 13 of the Charter to initiate studies and make recommendations regarding *inter alia* human rights.

Human rights items on its agenda may originate in Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) reports or decisions taken by the Assembly at earlier sessions to consider particular matters, or are proposed for inclusion by the UN organs, the Secretary-General or member states. Most items on human rights go to the Assembly's Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee), but others may be referred to other committees such as the Sixth Committee (Legal), the First Committee (Political and Security) or the Special Political Committee.¹⁵⁶ ECOSOC may, under article 62 of the Charter, make recommendations on human rights, draft conventions for the Assembly and call international conferences on human rights matters. It consists of fifty-four UN members elected by the General Assembly and hears annually the reports of a wide range of bodies, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,¹⁵⁷ the UN Children's Fund, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the UN Environment Programme and the World Food Council. Of its subsidiary bodies, the Commission on Human Rights

and the Commission on the Status of Women have the most direct connection with human rights issues.¹⁵⁸ The Commission on Human Rights¹⁵⁹ was established in 1946 as a subsidiary organ of ECOSOC with extensive terms of reference, including making studies, preparing recommendations and drafting international instruments on human rights.¹⁶⁰ In 1967, having previously taken the view that it had no power to hear complaints about human rights violations, ECOSOC resolution 1235 (XLII) authorised the Commission and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to examine information relevant to gross violations of human rights contained in communications, and to study such situations as revealed a consistent pattern of violations with a view to making recommendations to ECOSOC.¹⁶¹ This constituted the public debate function of the Commission relating to specific situations. The situations in question referred at first primarily to Southern Africa. The Commission also set up an ad hoc working group of experts on South Africa and then working groups on a variety of topics¹⁶² and appointed Special Rapporteurs to deal with situations in specific countries.¹⁶³ A series of informal working groups were created to prepare drafts of international instruments, such as the Declaration on Religious Intolerance, the Convention against Torture and instruments on minority rights and the rights of the child.¹⁶⁴ The Commission also established a Group of Three pursuant to article IX of the Apartheid Convention to consider states' reports under that Convention. In 1970, a new procedure for dealing with human rights complaints was introduced in ECOSOC resolution 1503 (XLVIII).¹⁶⁵ By virtue of this resolution as modified in 2000,¹⁶⁶ the Sub-Commission appointed annually a Working Group on Communications to meet to consider communications received and to pass on to the Sub-Commission those that appeared to reveal 'a consistent

pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights’.¹⁶⁷ The procedure, which was confidential until the final stage, did not fulfil initial high expectations. The confidentiality requirement and the highly political nature of the Commission itself combined to frustrate hopes that had been raised.¹⁶⁸

Despite good work in the field of standard-setting and in drawing attention to abuses of human rights, albeit on rather less than a universalist basis, the Commission began to attract an increasing level of criticism, mainly concerning political selectivity and the failure to review objectively the situation in particular countries.¹⁶⁹ As a result, the Human Rights Council was created to replace the Commission by General Assembly resolution 60/251 on 3 April 2006.

The Council was established with a higher status in the UN hierarchy as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly with forty-seven members,¹⁷⁰ elected by a majority of members of the Assembly for three years for up to two consecutive terms. The Commission’s special procedures function was retained and a new Universal Periodic Review mechanism established by which the human rights record of all countries would be examined. This was intended as a partial response to the criticisms of the Commission’s selectivity.¹⁷¹ The Council adopted resolution 5/1 on 18 June 2007 entitled ‘United Nations Human Rights Council: Institution-Building’, which ranged over a wide area and established the details of the Universal Periodic Review mechanism. The principles laid down for this mechanism include the universality of human rights, universal coverage and equal treatment of all states and the conduct of the review in an objective, transparent, non-

selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicised manner. This resolution also laid down details for the conduct and review of the special procedures,¹⁷² provided for the creation of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, composed of eighteen experts serving in their personal capacity, intended to function as a think-tank for the Council and work at its direction, and provided for the establishment of a confidential complaints procedure based upon the mechanism created by ECOSOC resolution 1503 (1970).¹⁷³ The spectre of politicisation has not, however, vanished.¹⁷⁴

Expert Bodies Established by UN Organs

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights¹⁷⁵

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Article 2 provides that each state party undertakes to take steps to the maximum of its available resources ‘with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant’. In other words, an evolving programme is envisaged depending upon the goodwill and resources of states rather than an immediate binding legal obligation with regard to the rights in question. The rights included range from self-determination (article 1), the right to work (articles 6 and 7), the right to social security (article 9), and adequate standard of living (article 11) and education (article 13), to the right to take part in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (article 15).

Under the Covenant itself, states parties were obliged to send periodic reports to ECOSOC.¹⁷⁶ In 1978, a Sessional Working Group was set up, consisting of fifteen members elected by ECOSOC from among states parties for three-year renewable terms. The Group met annually and reported to the Council. It was not a success, however, and in 1985 it was decided to establish a new committee of eighteen members, this time composed of independent experts.¹⁷⁷ Accordingly in 1987 the new Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights commenced operation.¹⁷⁸ But it is to be especially noted that unlike, for example, the Racial Discrimination Committee, the Human Rights Committee and the Torture Committee, the Economic Committee is not autonomous and it is responsible not to the states parties, but to a main organ of the United Nations.

The Committee initially met annually in Geneva for three-week sessions, though it now meets twice per year. Its primary task lies in examining states' reports, drawing upon a list of questions prepared by its pre-sessional working group. The problem of overdue reports from states parties applies here as it does with regard to other human rights implementation committees. The Committee adopted a decision at its sixth session, whereby it established a procedure allowing for the consideration of the situation of particular states where those states had not produced reports for a long time, thus creating a rather valuable means of exerting pressure upon recalcitrant states parties.¹⁷⁹ Additional information may also be requested from states parties where this is felt necessary.¹⁸⁰ The Committee also prepares 'General Comments', the second of which on international technical assistance measures was adopted at its fourth session in 1990.¹⁸¹ The third general comment, adopted in 1991, is of particular interest and underlines that although the Covenant itself

appears promotional and aspirational, nevertheless certain obligations of immediate effect are imposed upon states parties. These include the non-discrimination provisions and the undertaking to take steps which should be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant has entered into force for the state concerned and which should be ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognised in the Covenant’. The Committee also emphasised that international cooperation for development, and thus for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, was an obligation for all states.¹⁸² The Committee also holds general discussions on particular rights in the form of a ‘day of general discussion’.¹⁸³ In December 2008, the Optional Protocol to the Covenant was adopted by the UN General Assembly, under which the Committee was enabled to hear individual petitions, and was provided with an inter-state complaints competence with regard to states accepting this procedure.¹⁸⁴ Although the Committee was not as such established by treaty, it is now regarded as one of the (currently) ten UN human rights treaty bodies.

Expert Bodies Established under Particular Treaties¹⁸⁵

A number of expert committees have been established under particular treaties. They are not subsidiary organs of the United Nations, but autonomous, although in practice they are closely connected with it, being serviced, for example, by the UN Secretariat through the UN Centre for Human Rights in Geneva.¹⁸⁶ These committees are termed ‘UN Treaty Organs’.

The Committee on the Elimination of Racial

Discrimination¹⁸⁷

Under Part II of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965, a Committee of eighteen experts was established consisting of persons serving in their personal capacity and elected by the states parties to the Convention.¹⁸⁸ States parties undertook to submit reports every two years regarding measures adopted to give effect to the provisions of the Convention to the Committee, which itself would report annually through the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly. The Committee may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of the reports and information received from the states parties, which are reported to the General Assembly together with any comments from states parties.¹⁸⁹ The Committee is also able to operate early warning measures and urgent procedures and action has been taken in relation to more than twenty states parties. The Committee has, for example, conducted field visits in connection with the procedure and has drawn the attention of the Secretary-General, the Security Council or other relevant bodies to relevant issues.¹⁹⁰

The Committee has also established a procedure to deal with states whose reports are most overdue. Under this procedure, the Committee proceeds to examine the situation in the state party concerned on the basis of the last report submitted.¹⁹¹

Under article 11, one state party may bring a complaint against another state party and the Committee will seek to resolve the complaint. Should the matter not be so settled, either party may refer it back to the Committee and

by article 12 an ad hoc Conciliation Commission may be established, which will report back to the Committee with any recommendation thought proper for the amicable solution of the dispute.¹⁹² The inter-state communications procedure has been used thus far in three cases: *Qatar v. Saudi Arabia*, *Qatar v. United Arab Emirates* and *Palestine v. Israel*, brought in March and April 2018. In the case of the two Qatari communications, the Committee concluded that it had jurisdiction and that the cases were admissible and, accordingly, decided to establish an ad hoc Conciliation Commission.¹⁹³ In the case of *Palestine v. Israel*, the Committee concluded that it had jurisdiction.¹⁹⁴

In addition to hearing states' reports and inter-state complaints, the Committee may also hear individual petitions under the article 14 procedure. This, however, is subject to the state complained of having made a declaration recognising the competence of the Committee to receive and consider such communications. If such a declaration has not been notified by a state, therefore, the Committee has no authority to hear a petition against the state.¹⁹⁵ Under this procedure, consideration of communications is confidential and the Committee may be assisted by a five-person working group making recommendations to the full Committee. The Committee began hearing individual communications in 1984 and a number of important cases have been completed.¹⁹⁶

The Committee regularly meets twice a year and has interpreted articles of the Convention, discussed reports submitted to it, adopted decisions¹⁹⁷ and general recommendations,¹⁹⁸ obtained further information from states parties and cooperated closely with the International Labour Organization and

UNESCO. Many states have enacted legislation as a consequence of the work of the Committee and its record of impartiality is very good.¹⁹⁹ The general article 9 reporting system appears to work well, with large numbers of reports submitted and examined, but some states have proved tardy in fulfilling their obligations.²⁰⁰ The Committee has published guidelines for states parties as to the structure of their reports.²⁰¹

The Committee, in order to speed up consideration of states' reports, has instituted the practice of appointing country rapporteurs, whose function it is to prepare analyses of reports of states parties.²⁰² The Committee has also called for additional technical assistance to be provided by the United Nations to help in the reporting process, while it has expressed serious concern that financial difficulties are beginning to affect its functioning.²⁰³

Article 22 of the Convention provides that the International Court of Justice would have jurisdiction with regard to a dispute between two or more states parties to the Convention, not settled by negotiation or Convention procedures, at the request of one of the parties. This procedure has been used in a number of cases. In *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections),²⁰⁴ the Court upheld one of Russia's preliminary objections and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction as the procedural conditions laid down in article 22 had not been complied with, while in *Ukraine v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections),²⁰⁵ the Court rejected Russia's preliminary objections with regard to article 22 and so will proceed to the merits. In *Qatar v. United Arab Emirates*, a number of provisional measures were indicated by the Court,²⁰⁶ and the matter as of the date of writing is at the stage of preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

The Human Rights Committee²⁰⁷

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976.²⁰⁸ By article 2, all states parties undertake to respect and to ensure to all individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction the rights recognised in the Covenant. These rights are clearly intended as binding obligations. They include the right of peoples to self-determination (article 1), the right to life (article 6), prohibitions on torture and slavery (articles 7 and 8), the right to liberty and security of the person (article 9), due process (article 14), freedom of thought, conscience and religion (article 18), freedom of association (article 22) and the rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture (article 27).

A Human Rights Committee was established under Part IV of the Covenant. It consists of eighteen independent and expert members, elected by the states parties to the Covenant for four-year terms, with consideration given to the need for equitable geographical distribution and representation of the different forms of civilisation and of the principal legal systems.²⁰⁹ The Committee meets three times a year (in Geneva and New York) and operates by way of consensus.²¹⁰ The Covenant is primarily implemented by means of a reporting system, whereby states parties provide information on the measures adopted to give effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant. Initial reports are made within one year of the entry into force of the Covenant for the state in question and general guidelines have been issued.²¹¹ The Committee has decided that subsequent reports would be required every five years,²¹² and the first of the second periodic reports became due in 1983. The reports are discussed by the Committee with representatives of the state

concerned (following upon the precedent established by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination).²¹³ Information may be received from many sources, including from named non-governmental organisations.²¹⁴ The Committee may also seek additional information from the state concerned.²¹⁵ The Committee has also noted that the peoples within a territory of a former state party to the Covenant remain entitled to the guarantees of the Covenant.²¹⁶ Where states parties have failed to report over several reporting cycles, or request a postponement of their scheduled appearance before the Committee at short notice, the Committee may continue to examine the situation in the particular state on the basis of material available to it.²¹⁷

Under article 40(4), the Committee is empowered to make such ‘general comments as it may deem appropriate’. ‘The aim of the Committee is to engage in a constructive dialogue with each reporting state. In 1992, the Committee decided that at the end of the consideration of each state party’s report, specific comments would be adopted referring to the country in question and such comments would express both the satisfaction and the concerns of the Committee as appropriate.’²¹⁸ These specific comments are in a common format and refer to ‘positive aspects’ of the report and ‘principal subjects for concern’, as well as ‘suggestions and recommendations’.²¹⁹ The Committee has also adopted the practice, where a due report has not been forthcoming, of considering the measures taken by the state party in question to give effect to rights in the Covenant in the absence of a report but in the presence of representatives of the state and of adopting provisional concluding observations.²²⁰

The Committee has also adopted a variety of General Comments.²²¹ These comments are generally non-controversial.²²² For example, in April 1989, the Committee adopted a General Comment on the rights of the child, as the process of adopting the Convention on the Rights of the Child neared its climax. It noted the importance of economic, social and cultural measures, such as the need to reduce infant mortality and prevent exploitation. Freedom of expression was referred to, as was the requirement that children be protected against discrimination on grounds such as race, sex, religion, national or social origin, property or birth. Responsibility for guaranteeing the necessary protection lies, it was stressed, with the family, society and the state, although it is primarily incumbent upon the family. Special attention needed to be paid to the right of every child to acquire a nationality.²²³

Under article 41 of the Covenant, states parties may recognise the competence of the Committee to hear inter-state complaints. Both the complainant and the object state must have made such declarations. The Committee will seek to resolve the issue and, if it is not successful, it may under article 42 appoint, with the consent of the parties, an ad hoc Conciliation Commission.²²⁴

The powers of the Human Rights Committee were extended by Optional Protocol I to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant with regard to ratifying states to include the competence to receive and consider individual communications alleging violations of the Covenant by a state party to the Protocol.²²⁵ The individual must have exhausted all available domestic remedies (unless unreasonably prolonged) and the same matter must not be in the process of examination under another international procedure.²²⁶ The

procedure under the Optional Protocol is divided into several stages. The gathering of basic information is done by the Secretary-General and laid before the Working Group on Communications of the Committee, which recommends whether, for example, further information is required from the applicant or the relevant state party and whether the communication should be declared inadmissible. The procedure before the Committee itself is divided into an admissibility and a merits stage. Interim decisions may be made by the Committee and ultimately a ‘final view’ communicated to the parties.²²⁷

An increasing workload, however, began to cause difficulties as the number of parties to the Optional Protocol increased. In order to deal with the growth in applications, the Committee decided at its thirty-fifth session to appoint a Special Rapporteur to process new communications as they were received (i.e. between sessions of the Committee), and this included requesting the state or individual concerned to provide additional written information or observations relevant to the question of the admissibility of the communication.²²⁸ The Committee has also authorised its five-member Working Group on Communications to adopt a decision declaring a communication admissible, providing there is unanimity.²²⁹ The Committee may also adopt interim measures of protection under Rule 92 of its Rules of Procedure 2005. This has been used primarily in connection with cases submitted by or on behalf of persons sentenced to death and awaiting execution.²³⁰ Where the state concerned has disregarded the Committee’s decisions under Rule 92, the Committee has found that the state party has violated its obligations under the Optional Protocol.²³¹

The Committee, however, is not a court with the power of binding decision on the merits of cases. Indeed, in instances of non-compliance with its final views, the Optional Protocol does not provide for an enforcement mechanism, nor indeed for sanctions, although follow-up techniques are being developed in order to address such problems.²³²

The first group of cases concerned complaints against Uruguay, in which the Committee found violations by that state of rights recognised in the Covenant.²³³ In the *Lovelace* case,²³⁴ the Committee found Canada in breach of article 27 of the Covenant protecting the rights of minorities since its law provided that an Indian woman, whose marriage to a non-Indian had broken down, was not permitted to return to her home on an Indian reservation. In the *Mauritian Women* case,²³⁵ a breach of Covenant rights was upheld where the foreign husbands of Mauritian women were liable to deportation, whereas the foreign wives of Mauritian men would not have been.²³⁶

The Committee has dealt with the death penalty issue in several cases²³⁷ and has noted, for example, that such a sentence may only be imposed in accordance with due process rights.²³⁸ The Committee has also taken the view that where the extradition of a person facing the death penalty may expose the person to violation of due process rights in the receiving state, the extraditing state may be in violation of the Covenant.²³⁹ The Committee has also noted that execution by gas asphyxiation would violate the prohibition in article 7 of cruel and inhuman treatment.²⁴⁰ In *Vuolanne v. Finland*,²⁴¹ the Committee decided that the right of a person deprived of liberty to have recourse to the courts was held to apply also to military disciplinary detention. One issue of growing importance concerns the question of the

extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, that is whether a state party to a particular human rights treaty is obliged to apply it outside its own territory where it is acting abroad either by way of its state agents or organs or because it is in control of an area beyond its border. The Committee has consistently taken the view that the Covenant does apply in such circumstances, whether it be with regard to state agents acting abroad²⁴² or with regard to the obligations of Israel within the occupied territories.²⁴³ In the *Yaker* and *Hebbadj* cases,²⁴⁴ the Committee concluded in 2018 that France's law banning the wearing of the niqab (full-face veil) in public places contravened the human rights of its citizens. Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights had reached the opposite decision earlier.²⁴⁵

It is already apparent that the Committee has proved a success and is performing a very important role in the field of human rights protection.²⁴⁶

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women

The Commission on the Status of Women was established in 1946 as one of the functional commissions of ECOSOC and has played a role both in standard-setting and in the elaboration of further relevant instruments.²⁴⁷ The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was established under article 22 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.²⁴⁸ This Convention is implemented by means of states' reports. It is composed of twenty-three experts serving in individual capacities for four-year terms. It held its first regular session in October 1982 and it reports annually to the UN

General Assembly through ECOSOC.²⁴⁹ The Committee has provided guidelines to states parties on reporting, whereby initial reports are intended to be detailed and comprehensive with subsequent reports being of an updating nature.²⁵⁰ Since 1990, subsequent reports are examined first by a pre-sessional working group. Following discussion of a report, the Committee provides concluding comments. The Committee, in addition to hearing states' reports, may make suggestions and general recommendations, which are included in the report.²⁵¹ General Recommendation No. 5, for example, called upon states parties to make more use of 'temporary special measures such as positive action, preferential treatment or quota systems to advance women's integration into education, the economy, politics and employment', while General Recommendation No. 8 provided that states parties should take further measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with men and without discrimination, the opportunity to represent their government at the international level.²⁵²

As from 1997, the Committee meets for two sessions a year.²⁵³ An Optional Protocol adopted in 1999 and in force as from December 2000 allows for the right of individual petition provided a number of conditions are met, including the requirement for the exhaustion of domestic remedies. In addition, the Protocol creates an inquiry procedure enabling the Committee to initiate inquiries into situations of grave or systematic violations of women's rights where it has received reliable information of grave or systematic violations by a state party of rights established in the Convention.²⁵⁴ In recent years, the importance of women's rights has received greater recognition.²⁵⁵ In addition, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in February 1994,²⁵⁶ and a Special Rapporteur

on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences was appointed in 1994.²⁵⁷ The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also discussed the issue of the ‘girl-child’ and the question of child prostitution.²⁵⁸

The Committee against Torture²⁵⁹

The prohibition of torture is contained in a wide variety of human rights²⁶⁰ and humanitarian law treaties,²⁶¹ and has become part of customary international law. Indeed, it is now established as a norm of *jus cogens*.²⁶² Issues concerning torture have come before a number of human rights organs, such as the Human Rights Committee,²⁶³ the European Court of Human Rights²⁶⁴ and the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia.²⁶⁵

The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was signed on 10 December 1984 and entered into force in 1987.²⁶⁶

Torture is defined in article 1 of the Convention against Torture to mean:

Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any

reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or the
acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

The states parties to the Convention are under duties *inter alia* to take measures to prevent such activities in territories under their jurisdiction (article 2), not to return a person to a country where he may be subjected to torture (article 3), to make torture a criminal offence and establish jurisdiction over it (articles 4 and 5),²⁶⁷ to prosecute or extradite persons charged with torture (article 7) and to provide a remedy for persons tortured (article 14).

The Committee against Torture was established under Part II of the Convention against Torture 1984 and commenced work in 1987. It consists of ten independent experts. In an interesting comment on the proliferation of international human rights committees and the dangers of inconsistencies developing, article 17(2) provides that, in nominating experts, states parties should ‘bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who are also members of the Human Rights Committee’.

The Committee receives states’ reports (article 19), has an inter-state complaint competence (article 21) and may hear individual communications (article 22). In both the latter cases, it is necessary that the state or states concerned should have made a declaration accepting the competence of the

Committee. Article 20 of the Convention provides that if the Committee receives ‘reliable evidence’ that torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a state party, it may invite the state in question to cooperate in examining the evidence. The Committee may designate one or more of its members to make a confidential inquiry. In doing so, it shall seek the cooperation of the state concerned and, with the latter’s agreement, such an inquiry may include a visit to its territory. The Committee will transmit the findings of the inquiry to the state, together with appropriate comments or suggestions. The proceedings up to this point are to be confidential, but the Committee may, after consulting the state, decide to include a summary account of the results in its annual report. This additional, if cautiously phrased, power may provide the Committee with a significant role.²⁶⁸ It should be noted that states parties have the ability to ‘opt out’ of this procedure if they so wish at the time of signature or ratification, or accession.²⁶⁹

The conduct of the reporting procedure bears much resemblance to the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee.²⁷⁰ Guidelines have been issued for states parties and the discussions with state representatives are held with a view to establishing a constructive dialogue. Many problems facing other treaty bodies also appear with regard to the Committee against Torture, for example, overdue reports and problems relating to implementation of the Convention generally. The Committee may also make comments on states’ reports in the form of concluding observations²⁷¹ and may issue general comments.²⁷² Interim measures of protection may also be granted under Rule 108(1) and this is monitored by the rapporteurs for new complaints and interim measures.²⁷³

The first three cases before the Committee under article 22 were admissibility decisions concerning Argentinian legislation exempting junior military officers from liability for acts of torture committed during the 1976–83 period and its compatibility with the Torture Convention.²⁷⁴ In May 2002, the Committee revised its rules of procedure and established the function of a Rapporteur for follow-up of decisions on complaints submitted under article 22.²⁷⁵ The Committee has held that where substantial grounds exist for believing that the applicant would be in danger of being subjected to torture, the expulsion or return of the applicant by the state party concerned to the state in which he might be tortured would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention.²⁷⁶ The Committee has also emphasised that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. The risk need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. While the Committee does give considerable weight to findings of fact made by the organs of the state party concerned, it is not bound by these and has the power of free assessment of the facts arising in the circumstances of each case. It has been particularly underlined that the prohibition enshrined in article 3 of the Convention was an absolute one.²⁷⁷ It has also been noted that where complaints of torture are made during court proceedings, it is desirable that they be elucidated by means of independent proceedings.²⁷⁸ A complaint must be submitted by the alleged victim, or by a close relative or a duly authorised representative, and must first be declared admissible. Requirements include that the matter must not be before another tribunal, that domestic remedies have been exhausted and that the complaint must reach a ‘basic level of substantiation’.²⁷⁹

An Optional Protocol to the Convention to enable the Committee through a new Subcommittee on Prevention to conduct regular visits to places of detention and make recommendations to states parties was adopted by the General Assembly in December 2002 and came into force in 2006. Under the Protocol, states parties must establish a ‘national preventive mechanism’ for the prevention of torture at the domestic level. Visits by the Subcommittee and the national preventive mechanism to any place under the state party’s jurisdiction and control where persons are, or may be, deprived of their liberty must be permitted by the state concerned.²⁸⁰

The Committee on the Rights of the Child²⁸¹

The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1989.²⁸² It provides that in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. A variety of rights are stipulated, including the inherent right to life (article 6); the right to a name and to acquire a nationality (article 7); the right to freedom of expression (article 13); the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (article 14); the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence (article 16); and the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (article 24).

States parties agree to take all appropriate measures to protect the child from all forms of physical and mental violence (article 19) and from economic exploitation (article 32) and the illicit use of drugs (article 33), and there are specific provisions relating to refugees and disabled children. In addition,

states parties agree to respect the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts relevant to children (article 38). This provision was one response to the use of children in the Iran–Iraq war.

Article 43 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for the establishment of a Committee. This Committee, which was elected in 1991, is composed of eighteen independent experts and has the competence to hear states' reports (article 44). The Committee itself submits reports every two years to the General Assembly through ECOSOC. The Committee can recommend to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General be requested to undertake on its behalf studies on specific issues relating to the rights of the child, an innovation in the functions of such treaty bodies, and it can make suggestions and general recommendations (article 45). The Committee (like the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) sets aside time for general discussions on particular topics in accordance with Rule 79 of its rules of procedure.²⁸³

As part of the general reporting process, the Committee adopted an urgent action procedure at its second session. Provided that the state concerned has ratified the Convention, that the situation is serious and there is a risk of further violations, the Committee may send a communication to the state 'in a spirit of dialogue' and may request the provision of additional information or suggest a visit.²⁸⁴ At its fourth session, the Committee established a working group to study ways and means whereby the urgent action procedure could be pursued effectively.²⁸⁵ The Committee has produced a set of guidelines concerning states' reports²⁸⁶ and a pre-sessional working group considers these reports and draws up a list of issues needing further clarification which

is sent to the state concerned.²⁸⁷ As is the case with other reporting mechanisms, the state whose report is being considered by the Committee is invited to send representatives to the appropriate meetings. After the process is completed, the Committee issues Concluding Observations in which both the positive aspects of the report considered and the problems identified are noted, together with suggestions and recommendations.²⁸⁸ Various follow-up measures to the consideration of reports exist, but usually they consist of the request for the provision of further information.²⁸⁹ The Committee also issues General Comments.²⁹⁰ An Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure was adopted in 2011, providing for the Committee to hear petitions by individuals or groups of individuals alleging a breach of the Convention or its two earlier protocols and inter-state complaints and an inquiry mechanism was created for grave or systematic violations.²⁹¹

The Committee on the Protection of Migrant Workers²⁹²

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families was adopted by the General Assembly and opened for signature in December 1990 and came into force on 1 April 2003. The Convention defines a migrant worker as ‘a person who is to be engaged, is engaged, or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national’ (article 2). This includes, for example, frontier and seasonal workers, workers on offshore installations and specified-employment workers, but excludes employees of international organisations or official state employees abroad, refugees, stateless persons, students and workers on offshore installations who have not been admitted to

take up residence and engage in a remunerated activity in the state of employment (article 3).

Migrant workers are entitled to equality of treatment with nationals in areas such as matters before courts and tribunals (article 18), terms of employment (article 25), freedom to join trade unions (article 26), medical treatment (article 28), access to education for their children (article 30) and respect for cultural identity (article 31). Migrant workers are protected from collective expulsion (article 22). Further provisions deal with additional rights for migrant workers and members of their families in a documented or regular situation (Part IV).

The Convention provided for the creation of a Committee of fourteen independent experts (Part VII). States parties are required to provide reports on measures taken to give effect to the provisions of the Convention (article 73). An inter-state complaints procedure is provided for in article 76, on the condition that the states concerned have made a declaration expressly recognising the competence of the Committee to hear such complaints, while under article 77 an individual complaints procedure can be used with regard to states that have made a declaration recognising the competence of the Committee in this regard.²⁹³

The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities²⁹⁴

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted in December 2006 and came into force on 3 May 2008. The Convention

provides for the prohibition of discrimination against persons with disability and for equality of opportunity and accessibility. States parties are to undertake immediate, effective and appropriate measures to raise awareness and combat prejudices and harmful practices (articles 5–9). An eighteen-person Committee examines states' reports on measures taken to give effect to the obligations under the Convention (articles 34–36). States parties to the Optional Protocol, which also came into force on 3 May 2008, recognise the competence of the Committee to hear individual communications alleging a violation of the Convention against them. Further, where the Committee receives reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations by a state party of Convention rights, the Committee may invite the state to cooperate in the examination of the information and submit observations. The Committee may proceed to conduct an inquiry confidentially. A state party may, however, on signature or ratification of the Optional Protocol, declare that it does not accept the inquiry competence of the Committee. The Committee also issues General Comments.²⁹⁵

The Committee on Enforced Disappearances²⁹⁶

The Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance was adopted in December 2006 and entered into force on 23 December 2010. It requires states parties to make enforced disappearance, defined as the deprivation of liberty by agents of the state or persons acting with the support or acquiescence of the state coupled with the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or concealment of the fate of the person in question (article 2), a criminal law offence (article 4). It is stated to be a crime against humanity (article 5). A ten-person Committee on Enforced

Disappearances is provided for to examine states' reports on measures taken to give effect to the obligations under the Convention (article 29), to hear inter-state complaints (article 32) and to hear individual communications concerning a state party which has accepted this competence of the Committee (article 31). The Committee may also, upon receiving a request for urgent action, transmit a request to the state party concerned to take interim measures to locate and protect the person in question (article 30). Article 32 provides for inter-state complaints. Where the Committee receives reliable information indicating a serious violation, it may seek, in consultation with the state party concerned, to organise a visit (article 33). Further, where the Committee receives information appearing to contain well-founded indications that enforced disappearance is being practised on a widespread or systematic basis in the territory under the jurisdiction of a state party, it may, after seeking information from the state, urgently bring the matter to the attention of the General Assembly through the Secretary-General (article 34).

Conclusions

Most international human rights conventions obligate states parties to take certain measures with regard to the provisions contained therein, whether by domestic legislation or otherwise.²⁹⁷ In addition, all nine of the treaty bodies (plus the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) discussed above require states parties to make periodic reports.²⁹⁸ Nine have the competence to consider individual communications,²⁹⁹ seven may consider inter-state complaints,³⁰⁰ while six have the competence to inquire into allegations of grave or systematic violations.³⁰¹

The proliferation of committees raises problems concerned both with resources and with consistency.³⁰² The question of resources is a serious and ongoing difficulty. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 emphasised the necessity for a substantial increase in the resources for the human rights programme of the United Nations and particularly called for sufficient funding to be made available to the UN Centre for Human Rights, which *inter alia* provides the administrative support for the human rights organs and committees discussed in this chapter.³⁰³ The various human rights committees themselves have pointed to the resource problem.³⁰⁴ The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee against Torture changed their financing system so that, since January 1994, they have been financed under the regular budget of the United Nations.³⁰⁵ The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights sought additional resources from the Economic and Social Council.³⁰⁶ Nevertheless, the fact remains that human rights activity within the UN system is seriously underfunded.

The question of consistency in view of the increasing number of human rights bodies within the UN system has been partially addressed by the establishment of an annual system of meetings between the chairpersons of the treaty bodies.³⁰⁷ Issues of concern have been discussed, ranging from the need to encourage states to ratify all human rights treaties, concern about reservations made to human rights treaties,³⁰⁸ attempts to establish that successor states are automatically bound by obligations under international human rights treaties from the date of independence irrespective of confirmation,³⁰⁹ the formulation of new norms and instruments and the promotion of human rights education, to consideration of the continuing

problem of overdue reports³¹⁰ and the role of non-governmental organisations.³¹¹ The development of early warning and preventive procedures by the committees is to be particularly noted.³¹² The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for example, under its urgent procedures may, since 1994, review the human rights situation in states parties that give rise for especial concern, while the Human Rights Committee is able to request states parties to submit special urgent reports.

A continuing process of seeking to strengthen the human rights treaty bodies is underway.³¹³

It is also to be noted that particular UN Specialised Agencies have human rights mechanisms, especially the International Labour Organization³¹⁴ and UNESCO (the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).³¹⁵

The Regional Protection of Human Rights

Europe³¹⁶

The European Convention on Human Rights³¹⁷

The European Convention on Human Rights functions under the auspices of the Council of Europe, which was founded in 1949 as a European organisation for encouraging and developing intergovernmental and interparliamentary cooperation. Its aim as laid down in article 1 of the Statute is to achieve a greater unity between member states for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress. The principles of

the Council of Europe as established in article 3 of the Statute include pluralist democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Its principal organs are the Committee of Ministers, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of member states, and a Parliamentary Assembly, consisting of delegations of members of national parliaments, together with a Secretary-General and supporting secretariat. There are currently forty-seven members.³¹⁸ In 1999, the Council of Europe established the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights within the General Secretariat to promote education and awareness in the field of human rights.³¹⁹ The Commissioner may also issue opinions,³²⁰ make recommendations³²¹ and undertake visits.³²²

The European Convention on Human Rights was signed on 4 November 1950 and entered into force in September 1953.³²³ Together with the fifteen Protocols currently in force, it covers a wide variety of primarily civil and political rights.³²⁴ The preamble notes that the European states are like-minded and have a common heritage of political tradition, ideals, freedoms and the rule of law. The rights covered in the Convention itself include the right to life (article 2), prohibition of torture and slavery (articles 3 and 4), right to liberty and security of person (article 5), right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law (article 6), prohibition of retroactive criminal legislation (article 7), right to respect for private and family life (article 8), freedom of thought, conscience and religion (article 9), freedom of expression (article 10), freedom of assembly and association (article 11), the right to marry and found a family (article 12), the right to an effective remedy before a national authority if one of the Convention rights or freedoms is violated (article 13) and a non-discrimination provision regarding the enjoyment of rights and

freedoms under the Convention (article 14). In addition, several protocols have been added to the substantive rights protected under the Convention. Protocol No. 1 protects the rights of property, education and free elections by secret ballots; Protocol No. 4 prohibits imprisonment for civil debt and protects *inter alia* the rights of free movement and choice of residence and the right to enter one's own country; and Protocol No. 6 provides for the abolition of the death penalty; while Protocol No. 7 provides *inter alia* that an alien lawfully resident in a state shall not be expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with the law, that a person convicted of a criminal offence shall have the right to have that conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal and that no one may be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted. Protocol No. 12 prohibits discrimination, while Protocol No. 13 abolishes the death penalty. Protocol No. 14 is discussed below.³²⁵ Protocol No. 16, which came into force in 2018, allows the highest courts and tribunals of a state party to request the Court to give advisory opinions on questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

Like other international treaties, the European Convention imposes obligations upon states parties to respect a variety of provisions. In this instance the Convention has also been incorporated into the domestic legislation of all current states parties,³²⁶ although the Convention does not provide as to how exactly the states parties are to implement internally the relevant obligations.³²⁷ It has been emphasised that,

unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting states. It creates, over and above a network of mutual and bilateral undertakings, objective obligations, which in the words of the preamble, benefit from a ‘collective enforcement’.³²⁸

In addition, a more teleological and flexible approach to the interpretation of the Convention has been adopted.³²⁹ The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised that the Convention is a living instrument to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and this approach applies not only to the substantive rights protected under the Convention, but also to those provisions which govern the operation of the Convention’s enforcement machinery.³³⁰ In addition, the Court has noted that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individuals requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.³³¹ The Convention should also be interpreted as far as possible in harmony with other principles of international law.³³² It has been emphasised that the Convention constitutes a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order (“ordre public”)’.³³³

The Convention applies, of course, within the territory of contracting states,³³⁴ but the issue of its extraterritorial application has been addressed. The Court has interpreted the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ under article 1 to include the possibility of application to extradition or expulsion of a person

by a contracting state to the territory of a non-contracting state³³⁵ and the situation where acts of the authorities of contracting states, whether performed within or outside national boundaries, produce effects outside their own territory.³³⁶ Further, in a significant move, the Court in *Loizidou v. Turkey* emphasised that the responsibility of a contracting state may also arise when it exercises effective control or ‘effective overall control’ of an area outside its national territory, irrespective of the lawfulness of such control, whether by the state’s own agents and officials or by the acts of a subordinate local administration.³³⁷ This was underlined in *Banković v. Belgium*, where the Court stated that its recognition of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a contracting state was exceptional and that the Convention’s notion of jurisdiction was essentially territorial.³³⁸ These principles were reaffirmed in *Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia*, where the Court, while emphasising that jurisdiction was primarily territorial, noted that in exceptional circumstances the state might not be responsible for Convention violations where it was prevented from exercising its authority in a part of its territory, whether as a result of military occupation by the armed forces of another state which effectively controls the territory concerned, acts of war or rebellion, or the acts of a foreign state supporting the installation of a separatist state within the territory of the state concerned.³³⁹ Further, a state’s responsibility will be engaged where, as a consequence of military action, whether lawful or unlawful, it exercises in practice effective control of an area situated outside its national territory. Overall control of an area would suffice and the responsibility of the state would extend not only to the acts of its own soldiers and officials, but also to acts of the local administration which survives there by virtue of its military and other support.³⁴⁰

In *Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom*,³⁴¹ building upon the *Issa* case,³⁴² the Court declared that extraterritorial jurisdiction (which remained as exceptional) flowed not only from effective control over foreign territory,³⁴³ but also from the activities of state officials and agents. It was noted that ‘the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s authorities into the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction’ and that ‘whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual’.³⁴⁴ Accordingly, as the United Kingdom had assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in south-east Iraq, its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah at the relevant time ‘exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention’.³⁴⁵ This approach has been reaffirmed in *Hassan v. United Kingdom*, which concerned earlier activities in Iraq.³⁴⁶

Linked with the territorial jurisdictional issue is the question whether the Court has jurisdiction over the states in question (or jurisdiction *ratione personae*) in the light of the involvement of other states or international organisations. In *Behrami v. France*, the Court, in an application against a number of states with regard to activities undertaken as part of the international presence in Kosovo (whether military, KFOR, or civil, UNMIK), had to decide whether the acts in question were attributable or imputable to the states concerned such as to found jurisdiction or whether the

acts were imputable rather to the United Nations. The Court concluded that KFOR was exercising lawfully delegated Chapter VII powers of the UN Security Council so that the impugned action was, in principle, ‘attributable’ to the United Nations and thus not to the states brought before the Court.³⁴⁷

In *Jaloud v. Netherlands*, the argument was that the respondent state was not responsible as its troops on the ground (in Iraq) were effectively subordinate to either the United Kingdom or the United States as the two occupying powers in Iraq at the time or the United Kingdom as the ‘lead nation’ with regard to south-east Iraq commanding the Dutch forces.³⁴⁸ The Court noted that ‘the fact of executing a decision or an order given by an authority of a foreign state is not in itself sufficient to relieve a Contracting State of the obligations which it has taken upon itself under the Convention’ and concluded that the Netherlands troops were not placed ‘at the disposal’ of any foreign power, whether it be Iraq or the United Kingdom or any other power, or that they were ‘under the exclusive direction or control’ of any other state. Accordingly, the Netherlands was responsible under article 1 of the Convention.

In *Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom*, the Court tackled the relationship between the Convention and binding resolutions of the UN Security Council in a situation where article 103 of the UN Charter states that obligations under the Charter have priority over obligations arising under any other international agreement. The Court declared that,

in interpreting its [Security Council]
resolutions, there must be a presumption that
the Security Council does not intend to impose

any obligation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a Security Council Resolution, the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations. In the light of the United Nations' important role in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security Council to intend States to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations under international human rights law.³⁴⁹

The Convention System

With the coming into force of Protocol No. 11 on 1 November 1998, a single permanent and full-time Court was established, so that the former Court and Commission ceased to exist. The system and procedure since the coming into force of Protocol No. 14 will be briefly described. The Court consists of a number of judges equal to that of the contracting parties to the Convention. Judges are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for non-renewable nine-year terms.³⁵⁰ To consider cases before it, the Court may sit in single judges formation, in Committees of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges.³⁵¹

The Rules of Court provide for the establishment of at least four Sections, the compositions of which are to be geographically and gender-balanced and reflective of the different legal systems among the contracting states.³⁵² The Chambers of seven judges provided for in the amended Convention are constituted from the Sections, as are the Committees of three judges.³⁵³ The plenary Court is responsible for the election of the President and Vice-Presidents of the Court, the appointment of the Presidents of the Chambers, constituting Chambers and adopting rules of procedure.³⁵⁴

A single judge may declare inadmissible or strike out of the Court's list of cases an individual application, where such a decision can be taken without further examination on the basis of the material supplied by the applicant. This decision shall be final. Where the single judge does not declare an application inadmissible or strike it out, that judge shall forward it to a committee or to a Chamber for further examination.³⁵⁵ A committee may, by a unanimous vote, declare an application inadmissible or strike it out of its list of cases, where such decision can be taken without further examination; or declare it admissible and render at the same time a judgment on the merits, if the underlying question in the case, concerning the interpretation or the application of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, is already the subject of well-established case-law of the Court.³⁵⁶ Where neither of these applies, a Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of individual applications submitted under article 34. The decision on admissibility may be taken separately.³⁵⁷

In ascertaining whether an application is admissible in an inter-state case, the President of the Section to which it has been assigned will appoint a judge as

Judge Rapporteur to examine the application and submit a report.³⁵⁸ Once an application is declared admissible in an individual application, the Chamber may invite the parties to submit further evidence and written observations and a hearing on the merits may be held if the Chamber decides or one of the parties so requests.³⁵⁹ At this point, the respondent government is usually contacted for written observations.³⁶⁰ Where a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or its Protocols is raised in a case, or where the resolution of a question might lead to a result inconsistent with earlier case-law, the Chamber may, unless one of the parties to the case objects, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber.³⁶¹ A pilot judgment procedure has also been introduced which enables the Court to identify structural problems underlying repetitive cases and imposing an obligation on states to address those problems. Where several applications with a common cause have been received, the Court can select one or more for priority treatment under the pilot procedure. In a pilot judgment, the Court's task is not only to decide whether a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights occurred in the specific case, but also to identify the systemic problem and to give the state in question clear indications of the type of remedial measures needed to resolve it.³⁶²

The Court may give advisory opinions, although in very restrictive circumstances.³⁶³ In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, a contracting party, one of whose nationals is an applicant, shall have the right to submit written comments and to take part in hearings, while the President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, invite any contracting party which is not a party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is not the applicant, to submit written comments or take part

in hearings.³⁶⁴ Once an application has been declared admissible, the Court will pursue the examination of the case and place itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.³⁶⁵ If a friendly settlement is reached, the Court will strike the case out of its list.³⁶⁶ Hearings before the Court will be in public unless the Court in exceptional circumstances decides otherwise. The Court will be able to afford just satisfaction to the injured party if necessary, where a violation is found and the domestic law of the contracting party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made.³⁶⁷ Under article 43, within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber will accept this request if the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance. If the panel does accept the request, the Grand Chamber will decide the case by means of a judgment. Judgments of the Grand Chamber will be final, as will those of a Chamber where the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber, or three months after the date of judgment if reference to the Grand Chamber has not been requested, or when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer. The final judgment will be published³⁶⁸ and is binding upon the parties,³⁶⁹ and it will be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.³⁷⁰

The Convention provides for the right of both inter-state and individual application. Under article 33, any contracting state may institute a case against another contracting state. To date, applications have been lodged with

the Commission by states involving a variety of situations.³⁷¹ Such applications are a means of bringing to the fore an alleged breach of the European public order, so that, for example, it is irrelevant whether the applicant state has been recognised by the respondent state.³⁷² Article 34 provides for the right of individual petition to the Commission and this has proved to be a crucial provision.³⁷³ This right is now automatic.³⁷⁴ The Convention system does not contemplate an *actio popularis*.³⁷⁵ Individuals cannot raise abstract issues, but must be able to claim to be the victim of a violation of one or more of the Convention rights.³⁷⁶

The Court may only deal with a matter once all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally accepted rules of international law and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.³⁷⁷ Such remedies must be effective. Where there are no domestic remedies to exhaust, the act or decision complained against will itself normally be taken as the ‘final decision’ for the purposes of article 26.³⁷⁸ The need to exhaust domestic remedies applies also in the case of inter-state cases, as does the six-month rule.³⁷⁹ In addition, no petition may be dealt with which is anonymous or substantially the same as a matter already examined, and any petition which is incompatible with the Convention, manifestly ill-founded³⁸⁰ or an abuse of the right of petition is to be rendered inadmissible.³⁸¹ Further, an application shall be declared inadmissible where the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.³⁸²

The Court, in an ever-increasing number of judgments,³⁸³ has developed a jurisprudence of considerable importance.³⁸⁴ It has operated on the basis of a number of evolving principles. In particular, the Court will allow states a degree of leeway in a system composed of obligations of contracting states and a European-level supervisory mechanism. The doctrine of ‘the margin of appreciation’ means that the Court will not interfere in certain domestic spheres while retaining a general overall supervision. For example, in *Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom*, the Court held that states benefit from a ‘wide margin of appreciation’ with regard to the process of determining the existence and scope of a public emergency permitting derogation from certain provisions of the Convention under article 15.³⁸⁵ This margin of appreciation will vary depending upon the content of the rights in question in substantive proceedings or on the balancing of rights in contention. It will be wider with regard to issues of personal morality,³⁸⁶ but narrower in other cases.³⁸⁷ The essential point is, as the Court noted in *Z v. United Kingdom*, that: ‘It is fundamental to the machinery of protection established by the Convention that the national systems themselves provide redress for breaches of its provision, the Court exercising its supervisory role subject to the principle of subsidiarity.’³⁸⁸ This also means that the Court is wary of undertaking fact-finding³⁸⁹ and similarly cautious about indicating which measures a state should take in order to comply with its obligations under the Convention.³⁹⁰

The Court has dealt with a number of critical issues. In *Ireland v. United Kingdom*,³⁹¹ for example, the Court found that the five interrogation techniques used by the UK Forces in Northern Ireland amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment, contrary to article 3, but not torture.³⁹²

In *McCann v. United Kingdom*,³⁹³ the Court narrowly held that the killing by members of the security forces of three members of an IRA unit suspected of involvement in a bombing mission in Gibraltar violated the right to life under article 2. In *Golder v. United Kingdom*,³⁹⁴ the Court inferred from article 6(1) a fundamental right of access to the courts, and the Court has emphasised the importance of fair trial mechanisms such as the principle of contempt of court.³⁹⁵ The Court has also developed a considerable jurisprudence in the field of due process³⁹⁶ that is having a significant impact upon domestic law, not least in the United Kingdom. A brief reference to some further examples will suffice. In the *Marckx* case,³⁹⁷ the Court emphasised that Belgian legislation discriminating against illegitimate children violated the Convention, while in the *Young, James and Webster* case,³⁹⁸ it was held that railway workers dismissed for refusing to join a trade union in the United Kingdom were entitled to compensation. In the *Brogan* case,³⁹⁹ the Court felt that periods of detention under anti-terrorist legislation in the United Kingdom before appearance before a judge or other judicial officer of at least four days violated the Convention. This decision, however, prompted a notice of derogation under article 15 of the Convention by the UK government.⁴⁰⁰

In the important *Soering* case,⁴⁰¹ the Court unanimously held that the extradition of a German national from the United Kingdom to the United States, where the applicant feared he would be sentenced to death on a charge of capital murder and be subjected to the ‘death row’ phenomenon, would constitute a breach of article 3 of the Convention prohibiting torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. Further, the Court has held that the deportation to Iran of a woman who in the circumstances would have been at risk of punishment by stoning would violate article 3.⁴⁰² The

Court has also emphasised that national security considerations had no application where article 3 violations were in question.⁴⁰³

The Court has approached its task in a generally evolving way. For example, it has deduced from a number of substantive provisions that circumstances may arise in which a state would have a positive obligation to conduct an inquiry or effective official investigation. This would arise, for instance, where individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by agents of the state,⁴⁰⁴ or while in custody,⁴⁰⁵ or ‘upon proof of an arguable claim that an individual, who was last seen in the custody of agents of the state, subsequently disappeared in a context which may be considered life-threatening’.⁴⁰⁶ Similarly, the Court has held that the right to life under article 2 entails also the obligation upon states to take appropriate steps for the safeguarding of life within the jurisdiction.⁴⁰⁷ Linked with these provisions is article 13, which requires the state party to provide a remedy, effective in law and in practice, which is able both to deal with the substance of the applicant’s complaint and to provide an appropriate legal redress.⁴⁰⁸ The jurisprudence of the Court with regard to article 13 demonstrates that in an increasing number of cases that provision is understood as requiring states to undertake an effective investigation into arguable claims of the violation of Convention rights. This has included claims of violations of articles 2, 3, 5 and 6.⁴⁰⁹

Execution of Court decisions is the responsibility of the Committee of Ministers.⁴¹⁰ This is a political body, the executive organ of the Council of Europe,⁴¹¹ and consists of the Foreign Ministers, or their deputies, of all the member states.⁴¹²

Where the Court has found a violation, the matter will be placed on the agenda of the Committee of Ministers and will stay there until the respondent government has confirmed that any sum awarded in just satisfaction under article 41 has been paid and/or any required individual measure has been taken and/or any general measures have been adopted preventing new similar violations or putting an end to continuing violation.⁴¹³ Article 16 of Protocol No. 14 (amending article 46 of the Convention) provides for referral of a matter back to the Court by the Committee for a ruling on interpretation of a judgment where the judgment is ‘hindered by a problem of interpretation’ and where a state refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party.⁴¹⁴

The European Social Charter⁴¹⁵

The Charter⁴¹⁶ consists of a statement of long-term objectives coupled with a list of more restricted rights. The Charter covers labour rights and trade union rights,⁴¹⁷ the protection of specific groups such as children, women, disabled persons and migrant workers,⁴¹⁸ social security rights⁴¹⁹ and protection of the family.⁴²⁰ In an attempt to deal with economic disparities within Europe, the Charter provides for a system whereby only ten of the forty-five paragraphs (including five ‘key articles’⁴²¹) need to be accepted upon ratification. The Charter⁴²² is implemented by the European Committee of Social Rights, consisting of fifteen independent experts elected for a six-year period, renewable once. States parties submit annual reports on some of the provisions of the Charter. These provisions have been divided since 2007 into four thematic groups, each group being the subject of an annual review.⁴²³ These reports are examined by the Committee and its conclusions published.

If a state does not implement a Committee decision, the Committee of Ministers addresses a recommendation to the state to the same effect. A system of Collective Complaints was established by an Additional Protocol adopted in 1995. This provides that international organisations of employers and trade unions, other international non-governmental organisations with consultative status with the Council of Europe placed on a list for this purpose by the Governmental Committee, and representative national organisations of employers and trade unions within the jurisdiction of the contracting party against which they have lodged a complaint may submit complaints alleging unsatisfactory application of the Charter.⁴²⁴ Contracting parties may also make a declaration recognising the right of any other representative national non-governmental organisation within their jurisdiction which has particular competence in the matters governed by the Charter to lodge complaints against them.⁴²⁵ Such complaints are lodged with the European Committee of Social Rights, which makes a decision on both admissibility and on the merits. Its decision is sent to the parties concerned and to the Committee of Ministers, which adopts a resolution on the matter.

The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment⁴²⁶

This innovative Convention was signed in 1987 and came into force on 1 February 1989.⁴²⁷ The purpose of the Convention is to enable the supervision of persons deprived of their liberty and, in particular, to prevent the torture or other ill-treatment of such persons.⁴²⁸ The Committee for the Prevention of Torture was established under the Convention,⁴²⁹ placing, as it has noted, a ‘proactive non-judicial mechanism alongside the existing reactive judicial

mechanisms of the European Commission and European Court of Human Rights'.⁴³⁰ The Committee is given a fact-finding and reporting function. The Committee is empowered to carry out both visits of a periodic nature and ad hoc visits to places of detention in order to examine the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of such persons from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Periodic visits are carried out to all contracting parties on a regular basis, while ad hoc visits are organised when they appear to the Committee to be required in the circumstances.⁴³¹ Thus, periodic visits are planned in advance.⁴³² The real innovation of the Convention, however, lies in the competence of the Committee to visit places of detention when the situation so warrants.⁴³³ When the Committee is not in session, the Bureau (i.e. the President and Vice-President of the Committee)⁴³⁴ may in cases of urgency decide, on the Committee's behalf, on the carrying out of such an ad hoc visit.⁴³⁵ States parties agree to permit visits to any place within their jurisdiction where persons are deprived of their liberty by a public authority,⁴³⁶ although in exceptional circumstances, the competent authorities of the state concerned may make representations to the Committee against a visit at the time or place proposed on grounds of national defence, public safety, serious disorder, the medical condition of a person or because an urgent interrogation relating to a serious crime is in progress.⁴³⁷ The Committee may interview in private persons deprived of their liberty and may communicate freely with any person whom it believes can supply relevant information.⁴³⁸

After each visit, the Committee draws up a report for transmission to the party concerned. That report will remain confidential⁴³⁹ unless and until the

state party concerned decides to make it public.⁴⁴⁰ Where a state refuses to cooperate or to improve matters in the light of recommendations made, the Committee may decide, after the state has had an opportunity to make known its views, by a two-thirds majority to issue a public statement.⁴⁴¹ The Committee makes an annual general report on its activities to the Committee of Ministers, which is transmitted to the Parliamentary Assembly and made public.⁴⁴² The relationship between the approach taken by the Committee as revealed in its published reports and the practice under the European Human Rights Convention is particularly interesting and appears to demonstrate that the Committee has adopted a more flexible attitude to issues relating to detention and ill-treatment.⁴⁴³

The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities⁴⁴⁴

The question of minorities is addressed in the European Convention on Human Rights only in terms of one possible ground of prohibited discrimination stipulated in article 14. However, the Council of Europe has been dealing with the issue of minorities in a more vigorous manner in more recent years. Resolution 192 (1988) of the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe proposed the text of a European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, while Recommendation 1134 (1990) of the Parliamentary Assembly on the Rights of Minorities called for either a protocol to the European Convention or a special convention on this topic.⁴⁴⁵ The Committee of Ministers adopted on 22 June 1992 the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.⁴⁴⁶ Under this Charter, a variety of measures to promote the use of regional or minority languages is suggested,

for example, in the fields of education, court proceedings, public services, media, cultural facilities, economic and social life, and transfrontier exchanges. Implementation is by periodic reports to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe in a form prescribed by the Committee of Ministers.⁴⁴⁷ The Secretary-General also makes a two-yearly detailed report to the Parliamentary Assembly on the application of the Charter.⁴⁴⁸ The Committee of Ministers may invite any non-member state of the Council of Europe to accede to the Charter.⁴⁴⁹

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 10 November 1994 and opened for signature on 1 February 1995.⁴⁵⁰ The Framework Convention underlines the right to equality before the law of persons belonging to national minorities and prohibits discrimination based on belonging to a national minority. Contracting parties to the Framework Convention undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures to promote in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and to the majority.⁴⁵¹ The parties agree to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to minorities to develop their culture and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage.⁴⁵² The collective expression of individual human rights of persons belonging to national minorities is to be respected,⁴⁵³ while in areas inhabited by such persons traditionally or in substantial numbers, the parties shall endeavour to ensure as far as possible the condition which would make it possible to use the minority languages in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities.⁴⁵⁴ By article 15, the parties agree

to refrain from measures which alter the geographic proportions of the population in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities.

The implementation of this Framework Convention is monitored by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe⁴⁵⁵ with the assistance of an advisory committee of experts⁴⁵⁶ and on the basis of periodic reports from contracting states.⁴⁵⁷ The Committee of Ministers adopted rules on monitoring arrangements in 1997⁴⁵⁸ and the Advisory Committee started operating in June 1998. The Committee examines state reports, which are made public by the Council of Europe upon receipt from the state party, and prepares an opinion on the measures taken by that party.⁴⁵⁹ The Committee may request additional information from a state party or other sources, including individuals and NGOs, but cannot deal with individual complaints. Having received the opinion of the Advisory Committee, the Committee of Ministers will take the final decisions (called conclusions) concerning the adequacy of the measures taken by the state party. Where appropriate, it may also adopt recommendations in respect of the state party concerned. The conclusions and recommendations of the Committee of Ministers shall be made public upon their adoption, together with any comments the state party may have submitted in respect of the opinion delivered by the Advisory Committee. The opinion of the Advisory Committee is as a rule made public together with the conclusions of the Committee of Ministers. A first cycle of monitoring began in 1998 with thirty-four opinions adopted by the Advisory Committee and twenty-nine resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers. Such monitoring cycles take place every five years.

While the range of rights accorded to members of minorities is clearly greater than that envisaged in UN instruments,⁴⁶⁰ its ambit is narrower in being confined to ‘national minorities’. The Framework Convention itself provides no definition of that term since no consensus existed as to its meaning.⁴⁶¹ The issue of the protection of minority rights is the subject of continuing discussion as to both their nature and scope.⁴⁶²

The European Union⁴⁶³

The Treaty of Rome 1957 established the European Economic Community and is not of itself a human rights treaty. However, the European Court of Justice has held that subsumed within Community law are certain relevant unwritten general principles of law, emanating from several sources.⁴⁶⁴ The Court noted in the *Internationale Handelsgesellschaft* case⁴⁶⁵ that ‘respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice’,⁴⁶⁶ while in *Nold v. EC Commission*,⁴⁶⁷ the Court emphasised that measures incompatible with fundamental rights recognised and protected by the constitutions of member states could not be upheld. It was also held that international treaties for the protection of human rights on which member states have collaborated, or of which they are signatories, could supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law.⁴⁶⁸ The European Convention on Human Rights is clearly the prime example of this and it has been referred to on several occasions by the Court.⁴⁶⁹ It is intended that the European Union will accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. The effect of this would be to subject the Union and its legal acts to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.⁴⁷⁰

The Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) 1992 amended the Treaty of Rome and established the European Union, founded on the European Communities supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established under the 1992 Treaty. Article F(2) of Title I noted that the Union ‘shall respect fundamental rights’, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and as they result from common constitutional traditions, ‘as general principles of Community law’.⁴⁷¹ From the early 1990s, the European Communities began to include human rights references in their trade and aid policies, formalised in article 177(2), and from the mid-1990s, all trade and cooperation agreements contained provisions concerning respect for human rights.⁴⁷²

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on 1 May 1999, inserted a new article 6 into the Treaty on European Union (now the Consolidated Treaty on European Union since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009), which stated that the European Union ‘is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’, and provided that the Union ‘shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by’ the European Convention on Human Rights.⁴⁷³ Member states violating these principles in a ‘serious and persistent’ manner risk the suspension of certain of their rights deriving from the application of the Union Treaty.⁴⁷⁴ In addition, candidate countries have to respect these principles to join the Union.⁴⁷⁵ The European Union adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights in December 2000,⁴⁷⁶ although its status at that time was uncertain. However, Advocates-General of the European Court of Justice began referring to the Charter with great frequency as part of a shared set of

values within the Union,⁴⁷⁷ as has the Court of First Instance⁴⁷⁸ and more recently the European Court of Justice.⁴⁷⁹ The Charter became binding with the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.

The European Parliament is also active in consideration of human rights issues.⁴⁸⁰

The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)⁴⁸¹

What was initially termed the ‘Helsinki process’, and which more formally was referred to as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, developed out of the Final Act of the Helsinki meeting, which was signed on 1 August 1975 after two years of discussions by the representatives of the then thirty-five participating states.⁴⁸² The Final Act⁴⁸³ dealt primarily with questions of international security and state relations, and was seen as the method by which the post-war European territorial settlement would be finally accepted. In the Western view, the Final Act constituted a political statement and accordingly could not be regarded as a binding treaty.

Nonetheless, the impact of the Final Act on developments in Europe has far exceeded the impact of most legally binding treaties.

The Final Act set out in ‘Basket I’ a list of ten fundamental principles dealing with relations between participating states, principle 7 of which refers to ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief’. ‘Basket III’ dealt with Co-operation

in Humanitarian and Other Fields and covered family reunification, free flow of information and cultural and educational cooperation.⁴⁸⁴

The Charter of Paris, adopted at the Summit of Heads of State and of Government in 1990,⁴⁸⁵ called for more regular consultations at ministerial and senior official level and marked an important stage in the institutionalisation of the process, with a Council of Foreign Ministers, a Committee of Senior Officials and a secretariat being established. The section on Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law consisted of a list of human rights, including the right to effective remedies, full respect for which constituted ‘the bedrock’ for the construction of ‘the new Europe’. The Moscow Human Dimension meeting of 1991⁴⁸⁶ described the Human Dimension mechanism as an essential achievement of the CSCE process and it was strengthened.⁴⁸⁷

By the time of the Helsinki Conference in 1992, the number of participating states had risen to fifty-two,⁴⁸⁸ the political climate in Europe having changed dramatically after the establishment of democratic regimes in Eastern Europe, the ending of the Soviet Union and the rise of tensions in Yugoslavia and other parts of Eastern Europe. At Helsinki, the CSCE was declared to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.⁴⁸⁹ The post of High Commissioner on National Minorities was established in order to provide early warning and early action where appropriate, concerning tensions relating to national minority issues that have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area affecting peace, stability or relations between participating states.⁴⁹⁰ The High Commissioner, who acts in confidence, was also mandated to collect relevant information

and make visits. Where the High Commissioner concludes that there is a *prima facie* risk of potential conflict in such situations, an early warning is to be issued, which will be promptly conveyed by the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE to the Committee of Senior Officials. The High Commissioner is able to make recommendations to participating states regarding the treatment of national minorities. In addition, a number of general recommendations have been made with regard to Roma and other matters.⁴⁹¹

The next major step in the process took place at Budapest at the end of 1994.⁴⁹² The CSCE, in recognition of the institutional changes underway in recent years, changed its name to the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and took a number of steps in the field of security and conflict management. The Conference emphasised that human rights, the rule of law and democratic institutions represented a crucial contribution to conflict prevention and that the protection of human rights constituted an ‘essential foundation of democratic civil society’,⁴⁹³ and it was decided that Human Dimension issues would be regularly dealt with by the Permanent Council,⁴⁹⁴ with the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (based in Warsaw) acting as the main institution of the Human Dimension in an advisory capacity to the organisation, with enhanced roles in election monitoring and the dispatch of missions.⁴⁹⁵ States were encouraged to use the Human Dimension mechanism (now termed the Moscow Mechanism) and the Chairman-in-Office was encouraged to inform the Permanent Council of serious cases of alleged non-implementation of Human Dimension commitments. Further, an OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media was appointed in 1997 and the role increased in 2004 to include

the task of combating the misuse of hate speech regulations in order to silence legitimate dissent and alternative opinion.⁴⁹⁶

Thus, step by step over recent years, the Helsinki process has transformed itself into an institutional structure with a particular interest in describing and requiring the implementation of human rights.⁴⁹⁷ The OSCE has also established a number of missions in order to help mitigate conflicts⁴⁹⁸ and adopted a Treaty on Open Skies and a Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration in 1992.⁴⁹⁹

The CIS Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms⁵⁰⁰

The Commonwealth of Independent States, which links together the former republics of the Soviet Union (with the exception of the three Baltic states), adopted a Convention on Human Rights in May 1995. Under this Convention, a standard range of rights is included, ranging from the right to life, liberty and security of person, equality before the judicial system and respect for private and family life, to freedom of religion, expression, assembly and the right to marry. The right to work is included (article 14), as is the right to social security, the right to education and the right of every minor child to special protective measures (article 17). The right of persons belonging to national minorities to express and develop their ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural identity is protected (article 21), while everyone has the right to take part in public affairs, including voting (article 29). It is intended that the implementation of the Convention be monitored by the Human Rights Commission of the CIS (article 34). Under Section II of

the Regulations of the Human Rights Commission, adopted in September 1993, states parties may raise human rights matters falling within the Convention with other states parties and, if no satisfactory response is received within six months, the matter may be referred to the Commission. Domestic remedies need to be exhausted. Under Section III of the Regulations, the Commission may examine individual and collective applications submitted by any person or non-governmental organisation. The Convention entered into force on 11 August 1998 upon the third ratification.⁵⁰¹

The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights⁵⁰²

The Inter-American Convention, which came into force in 1978, contains a range of rights to be protected by the states parties.⁵⁰³ The rights are fundamentally those protected by the European Convention, but with some interesting differences.⁵⁰⁴ For example, under article 4, the right to life is deemed to start in general as from conception,⁵⁰⁵ while the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is more extensively expressed and is in the context of the right to have one's physical, mental and moral integrity respected (article 5). In addition, articles 18 and 19 of the Inter-American Convention protect the right to a name and the specific rights of the child, article 23 provides for a general right to participation in the context of public affairs and article 26 provides for the progressive achievement of the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States 1948, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires 1967.⁵⁰⁶

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was created in 1959 and its first Statute approved by the OAS Council in 1960. In 1971, it was recognised as one of the principal organs of the OAS.⁵⁰⁷ Under its original Statute, it had wide powers to promote the awareness and study of human rights in America and to make recommendations to member states. In 1965, the Statute was revised and the Commission's powers expanded to include *inter alia* the examination of communications. With the entry into force of the 1969 Convention in 1978, the Commission's position was further strengthened. The Commission has powers regarding all member states of the

OAS, not just those that have ratified the Convention, and its Statute emphasises that the human rights protected include those enumerated in both the Convention and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.⁵⁰⁸ Article 44 of the Convention provides that any person or group of persons or any non-governmental entity legally recognised in one or more of the OAS states may lodge petitions with the Commission alleging a violation of the Convention by a state party.⁵⁰⁹ Contrary to the European Convention prior to its reform in Protocol 11, this right is automatic, whereas the right of inter-state complaint, again contrary to the European Convention, is under article 45 subject to a prior declaration recognising the competence of the Commission in this regard. The admissibility requirements in articles 46 and 47 are very broadly similar to those in the European Convention, as is the procedure laid down in article 48 and the drawing-up of a report in cases in which a friendly settlement has been achieved.⁵¹⁰ The Commission has dealt with a number of issues in the individual application procedure. During 2019, for example, 733 petitions were opened for processing, and the number of petitions received reached 3,034, with 3,212 pending initial review (having dropped from 6,963 in 2018).⁵¹¹

The Commission has a wide-ranging competence to publicise human rights matters by way of reports, studies, lectures and so forth. It may also make recommendations to states on the adoption of progressive measures in favour of human rights and conduct on-site investigations with the consent of the state in question.⁵¹² It provides states generally with advisory services in the human rights field and submits an annual report to the OAS General Assembly. Many special reports have been published dealing with human rights in particular states, for example, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,

Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Suriname and Uruguay.⁵¹³ The Commission has also devoted attention to certain themes, such as disappearances, torture, refugees and economic and social rights, and rights of lesbian, gay and transsexual persons.⁵¹⁴ Special Rapporteurs have been appointed, for example, on the rights of indigenous peoples, the rights of women and the rights of the child.⁵¹⁵ The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has declared that the Commission also has the authority to determine that any domestic law of a state party has violated the obligations assumed in ratifying or acceding to the Convention⁵¹⁶ and that the Commission may consequentially recommend that states repeal or amend the law that is in violation of the Convention. For the Commission to be able to do this, the law may have come to its attention by any means, regardless of whether or not that law is applied in any specific case before the Commission.⁵¹⁷

In 1985, the OAS General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,⁵¹⁸ while in 1988 an Additional Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was signed.⁵¹⁹

A Protocol on the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted on 8 June 1990⁵²⁰ and a Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons was adopted on 9 June 1994.⁵²¹ Under article 13 of this Convention, states parties agree that the processing of petitions or communications presented to the Inter-American Commission alleging the forced disappearance of persons will be subject to the procedures established under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the Statute and Regulations of the Commission and the Statute and Rules of the Court. Particular reference is made to precautionary

measures.⁵²² Under article 14, when the Commission receives a petition or communication alleging forced disappearance, its Executive Secretariat shall urgently and confidentially address the respective government and shall request that government to provide as soon as possible information as to the whereabouts of the allegedly disappeared person. The OAS also adopted the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women in 1994, which entered into force in March the following year. Article 10 provides that states parties are to include in their national reports to the Inter-American Commission of Women information on measures taken in this area, while under article 11, both states parties and the Commission of Women may request of the Inter-American Court advisory opinions on the interpretations of this Convention. Article 12 provides a procedure whereby any person, group of persons or any non-governmental entity legally recognised in one or more member states of the OAS may lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging violations of the duties of states under article 7 to pursue without delay and by all appropriate means policies to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women.⁵²³ The question of indigenous peoples has also been addressed and on 18 September 1995, the Inter-American Commission adopted a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.⁵²⁴

The Commission itself consists of seven members elected in a personal capacity by the OAS General Assembly for four-year terms.⁵²⁵ The Commission may indicate precautionary measures as provided for in article 25 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. This grants the Commission the power in serious and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according to the information available, either on its own initiative or upon request by a party,

to request that the state concerned adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons. The Commission may also request information from the interested parties related to any aspect of the adoption and observance of the precautionary measures.⁵²⁶ Of particular interest has been the granting of precautionary measures in favour of individuals captured in connection with the US-led military operation against the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Al-Qaida organisation and their detention at the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.⁵²⁷

Where, in the case of petitions received, a friendly settlement has not been achieved,⁵²⁸ then under article 50 a report will be drawn up, together with such proposals and recommendations as are seen fit, and transmitted to the parties. The Commission may, under article 46 of the Rules of Procedure, adopt the follow-up measures it deems appropriate, such as requesting information from the parties and holding hearings in order to verify compliance with friendly settlement agreements and its recommendations and report thereon. It also publishes a table indicating whether its recommendations have achieved total or partial compliance from the state concerned or whether compliance is pending.⁵²⁹

After its report, a three-month period is then available during which the Commission or the state concerned (but not the individual concerned) may go to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.⁵³⁰ The Court consists of seven judges serving in an individual capacity and elected by an absolute majority of the states parties to the Convention in the OAS General Assembly for six-year terms.⁵³¹ The jurisdiction of the Court is subject to a prior declaration under article 62. Article 63(2) of the Convention provides that, in cases of

extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court, in matters not yet submitted to it, may adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters under its consideration. Where a case has not yet been submitted to it, the Court may act at the request of the Commission. This power has been used on a number of occasions.⁵³²

Under article 64, the Court also possesses an advisory jurisdiction with regard to the interpretation of the Inter-American Convention and other conventions concerning the protection of human rights in the American states at the request of any member state of the OAS. The Court has dealt with a variety of important issues by way of advisory opinions.⁵³³ In *Definition of Other Treaties Subject to the Interpretation of the Inter-American Court*,⁵³⁴ the Court took the view that the object of the Convention was to integrate the regional and universal systems of human rights protection and that, therefore, any human rights treaty to which American states were parties could be the subject of an advisory opinion. In *Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights*,⁵³⁵ the Court stressed that human rights treaties involve the establishment of legal orders within which obligations are created towards all individuals within their jurisdiction and concluded that an instrument of ratification of adherence containing a reservation compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention does not require acceptance by the other states parties and the instrument thus enters into force as of the moment of deposit.⁵³⁶ In a manner reminiscent of, and clearly influenced by, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court stated that human rights treaties were different in nature from traditional multilateral treaties, since they focused not upon the

reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting states, but rather upon the protection of the basic rights of individuals. The obligations were *erga omnes*, rather than with regard to particular other states.⁵³⁷

The Court has also addressed the issue of the relationship between itself and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 in the *Interpretation of the American Declaration* case.⁵³⁸ In an opinion likely to be of significance in view of the fact that, for example, the United States is not a party to the Convention, but, as a member of the OAS, has signed the Declaration, the Court stressed that in interpreting the Declaration regard had to be had to the current state of the Inter-American system and that, by a process of authoritative interpretation, the member states of the OAS have agreed that the Declaration contains and defines the human rights norms referred to in the OAS Charter.⁵³⁹ Since the Charter was a treaty, the Court could, therefore, interpret the Declaration under article 64.⁵⁴⁰ In the *Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights*, the Court held that in the case of large-scale transboundary infrastructure projects, states parties to the Convention could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction and be responsible for the human rights of the people in the affected areas.⁵⁴¹

The exercise of the Court's contentious jurisdiction was, however, less immediately successful. In the *Gallardo* case,⁵⁴² the Court remitted the claim to the Commission declaring it inadmissible, noting that a state could not dispense with the processing of the case by the Commission, while in the *Velásquez Rodríguez*⁵⁴³ and *Godínez Cruz*⁵⁴⁴ cases, the Court in 'disappearance' situations found that Honduras had violated the

Convention.⁵⁴⁵ In the former case, it was emphasised that states had a legal responsibility to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at their disposal to investigate and punish such violations. Where this did not happen, the state concerned had failed in its duty to ensure the full and free exercise of these rights within the jurisdiction.⁵⁴⁶ In *Loayza Tamayo v. Peru* (Merits), the Court held Peru responsible for a number of breaches of the Convention concerned with the detention and torture of the applicant and for the absence of a fair trial.⁵⁴⁷ In *Chumbipuma Aguirre v. Peru*, the *Barrios Altos* case, the Court tackled the issue of domestic amnesty laws and held that the Peruvian amnesty laws in question were incompatible with the Inter-American Convention and thus void of any legal effect.⁵⁴⁸ The Court has also addressed the question of indigenous peoples in several cases, in which it has emphasised the close ties of such peoples with their traditional lands and the natural resources associated with their culture in the context particularly of the right to the use and enjoyment of property in article 21 of the Convention. It has concluded that the traditional possession of their lands by indigenous peoples has equivalent effects to those of a state-granted full property title; that traditional possession entitles indigenous peoples to demand official recognition and registration of property titles; that members of such peoples who have been obliged to leave their traditional lands maintain property rights thereto even though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to innocent third parties; and that, in the latter instance, such members are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality.⁵⁴⁹ It has also decided that a Chilean court was wrong to revoke custody of children on the basis of a woman's sexual orientation.⁵⁵⁰

The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights⁵⁵¹

This Charter was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity in 1981 and came into force in 1986. All fifty-four members of the African Union (as the OAU was renamed in 2000) are parties.⁵⁵² The Charter contains a wide range of rights, including in addition to the traditional civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights and various peoples' rights. In this latter category are specifically mentioned the rights to self-determination, development and a generally satisfactory environment.⁵⁵³ The reference to the latter two concepts is unusual in human rights instruments and it remains to be seen both how they will be interpreted and how they will be implemented.

One question that is immediately posed with regard to the notion of 'peoples' rights' is to ascertain the definition of a people. If experience with the definition of self-determination in the context of the United Nations is any guide,⁵⁵⁴ and bearing in mind the extreme sensitivity which African states have manifested with regard to the stability of the existing colonial borders,⁵⁵⁵ then the principle is likely to be interpreted in the sense of independent states. This was confirmed in the *Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire*,⁵⁵⁶ where the Commission declared that Katanga was obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that was compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.

The African Charter is the first human rights convention that details the duties of the individual to the state, society and family.⁵⁵⁷ Included are the

duties to avoid compromising the security of the state and to preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity and independence. It remains to be seen whether this distinctive approach brings with it more problems than advantages.

The Charter set up the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, consisting of eleven persons appointed by the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU for six-year renewable terms, to implement the Charter. The Secretary to the Commission is appointed by the Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity. The Commission has important educational and promotional responsibilities,⁵⁵⁸ including undertaking studies, organising conferences, disseminating information and making recommendations to governments. This is quite unlike the European Commission as it used to be prior to Protocol 11, but rather more similar to the Inter-American Commission. The African Commission has developed a range of special mechanisms, including the appointment of Special Rapporteurs (not being independent experts, but Commission members)⁵⁵⁹ and working groups;⁵⁶⁰ and the adoption of country and thematic resolutions.⁵⁶¹

The Commission may hear as of right inter-state complaints.⁵⁶² The first such complaint was brought in 1999 by the Democratic Republic of the Congo alleging *inter alia* that it had been the victim of aggression perpetrated by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The Commission held that the respondent states had contravened the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and had violated article 23 of the African Charter concerning the right to peace. It concluded that the three states concerned had occupied parts of the Congo in

violation of the Charter and had committed a series of human rights violations as a consequence.⁵⁶³

Other, non-state, communications may also be sent to the Commission and the terminology used is far more flexible than is the case in the other regional human rights systems.⁵⁶⁴ Where it appears that one or more communications apparently relates to special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of rights, the Commission will draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to these special cases. The Commission may then be asked to conduct an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual report, accompanied by its finding and recommendations.⁵⁶⁵ The Commission is able to suggest provisional measures where appropriate.⁵⁶⁶ The Commission adopted Rules of Procedure in 1988, which were amended in 1995 and again in 2010 and 2020.⁵⁶⁷ A number of important individual communications have been dealt with.⁵⁶⁸ In addition, there is an obligation upon states parties to produce reports every two years upon the measures taken to implement the rights under the Charter.⁵⁶⁹ The Commission was given authority by the OAU to study the reports and make observations upon them and has indeed adopted guidelines. However, to date, it is fair to conclude that the reporting procedure has encountered serious problems, not least in that many states have failed to submit reports or adequate reports,⁵⁷⁰ while the financial resources difficulties faced by the Commission have been significant.

No provision was made for a Court in the Charter, but a Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights was signed in 1998.⁵⁷¹ Under this Protocol, the Court has advisory, conciliatory and

contentious jurisdiction.⁵⁷² The African Commission, states parties and African intergovernmental organisations have automatic access to the Court,⁵⁷³ but not individuals or non-governmental organisations, whose access depends upon the state concerned having made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to hear relevant applications.⁵⁷⁴ A Protocol to the Statute of the African Union was adopted in 2003 concerning establishing the AU Court of Justice. The AU decided to merge the two courts and the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights accomplishing this was adopted in 2008, replacing the 1998 and 2003 Protocols. This requires that the Constitutive Act of the AU be read in reference to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. The new Court was to be divided into two Sections, a General Affairs Section and a Human Rights Section, each composed of eight judges. The former has the competence to hear all cases, except those concerning human and/or peoples' rights, which are reserved for the Human Rights Section. Each Section may decide to refer a case to the Full Court for consideration.⁵⁷⁵ A number of other regional courts exist in Africa,⁵⁷⁶ including with regard to Arab states,⁵⁷⁷ and elsewhere.⁵⁷⁸

Suggestions for Further Reading

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³ See e.g. W. N. Hohfeld, 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning', 23 *Yale Law Journal*, 1913, p. 16; and R. Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, London, 1977. See also J. Shestack, 'The Jurisprudence of Human Rights', in Meron, *Human Rights in International Law*, vol. I, p. 69; and M. Cranston, *What Are Human Rights?*, London, 1973.

⁴ Cf. e.g. article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 with article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.

⁵ See e.g. J. S. Watson, 'Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in International Law', *University of Illinois Law Forum*, 1979, p. 609; J. S. Watson, 'Autointerpretation, Competence and the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter', *71 AJIL*, 1977, p. 60; and J. S. Watson, *Theory and Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights*, Ardsley, 1999.

⁶ See e.g. R. Higgins, 'Reality and Hope and International Human Rights: A Critique', *9 Hofstra Law Review*, 1981, p. 1485.

⁷ See M. Cranston, 'What are Human Rights?', in *Human Rights Reader* (ed. W. Laqueur and B. Rubin), Michigan, 1979, pp. 17, 19.

⁸ See e.g. Lauterpacht, *International Law*; R. Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories*, Cambridge, 1979; J. Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, Oxford, 1980; and McDougal *et al.*, *Human Rights*, pp. 68–71. See also Tomuschat, *Human Rights*, chapter 2; and above, [Chapter 1](#).

⁹ See e.g. D. Lloyd, *Introduction to Jurisprudence*, 4th ed., London, 1979, chapter 4. See also H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, Oxford, 1961; McDougal *et al.*, *Human Rights*, pp. 73–5; and above, [Chapters 1](#) and [2](#).

¹⁰ See e.g. Lloyd, *Jurisprudence*, chapter 10; and McDougal *et al.*, *Human Rights*, pp. 76–9.

¹¹ See e.g. J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford, 1971; E. Cahn, *The Sense of Injustice*, Bloomington, 1949; R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Oxford, 1974; and Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*. See also S. Davidson, *Human Rights*, Buckingham, 1993, chapter 3.

¹² See McDougal *et al.*, *Human Rights*, especially pp. 82–93. See also *Examining Critical Perspectives on Human Rights* (ed. R. Dickinson, E. Katselli, C. Murray and O. W. Pedersen), Cambridge, 2014.

¹³ See e.g. Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*, pp. 517 ff.; E. Brems, *Human Rights: Universality and Diversity*, The Hague, 2001; and A. D. Renteln, *International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism*, Newbury Park, 1990. See also for a Chinese view, Xue Hanquin, *Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law*, The Hague, 2012, chapter III.

¹⁴ See e.g. *The International Protection of Human Rights* (ed. E. Luard), London, 1967; *International Protection of Human Rights* (ed. L. B. Sohn and T. Buergenthal), Indianapolis, 1973; Lauterpacht, *International Law*; M. Moscovitz, *International Concern with Human Rights*, London, 1968; and M. Ganji, *The International Protection of Human Rights*, New York, 1962.

¹⁵ See e.g. C. Greenidge, *Slavery*, London, 1958; and V. Nanda and M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Slavery and the Slave Trade: Steps towards Eradication’, *12 Santa Clara Law Review*, 1972, p. 424. See also ST/SOA/4.

¹⁶ See generally G. Best, *War and Law Since 1945*, Oxford, 1994; and *Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles* (ed. C. Swinarski), The Hague, 1984.

¹⁷ See below, [Chapter 13](#).

¹⁸ E.g. regarding the Prohibition of Night Work for Women in Industrial Employment and regarding the Prohibition of the Use of White Phosphorus in the Manufacture of Matches.

¹⁹ See below, [Chapter 19](#), p. 1016.

²⁰ See below, [Chapter 21](#).

²¹ See above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 203.

²² See generally P. Thornberry, ‘Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes? – International Law and Minority Rights’, *15 Texas International Law Journal*, 1980, p. 421; C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, London, 1934; and I. Claude, *National Minorities: An International Problem*, Cambridge, 1955. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘The

Definition of Minorities in International Law’, in *Protection of Minorities and Human Rights* (ed. Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory), Dordrecht, 1992, p. 1.

²³ See e.g. *Minority Schools in Albania*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 64, 1935, p. 17.

²⁴ See Thornberry, ‘Phoenix’, pp. 433–54; and M. Jones, ‘National Minorities: A Case Study in International Protection’, **14** *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 1949, pp. 599, 610–24. See further below, p. 261.

²⁵ See e.g. Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*, pp. 1420 ff.; and C. Chinkin, ‘The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in Standard Setting, Monitoring and Implementation of Human Rights’, in *The Changing World of International Law in the 21st Century* (ed. J. J. Norton, M. Andendas and M. Footer), The Hague, 1998. See also L. Hodson, *NGOs and the Struggle for Human Rights in Europe*, Oxford, 2011.

²⁶ See e.g. J. Gavron, ‘Amnesties in the Light of Developments in International Law and the Establishment of the International Criminal Court’, **51** *ICLQ*, 2002, p. 91. See also C. Jenkins, ‘Amnesty for Gross Violations of Human Rights: A Better Way of Dealing with the Past?’, in *Comparative Law in a Global Perspective* (ed. I. Edge), London, 2000, p. 345; and J. Dugard, ‘Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime: Is Amnesty Still an Option?’, **16** *Leiden JIL*, 2000, p. 1. Note the Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights, E/CN.4/2000/62, January 2000, and *Chumbipuma Aguirre v. Peru*, the *Barrios Altos* case, where the IACHR held that Peruvian amnesty laws were incompatible with the Inter-American Convention and thus void of any legal effect, Judgment of 14 March 2001, 41 *ILM*, 2002, p. 93. Peru accepted this and altered its legislation, *ibid.*

²⁷ See e.g. Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*, pp. 1344 ff.; the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of South Africa 1995; R. G. Teitel, *Transitional Justice*, Oxford, 2001; and J. Dugard, ‘Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions’, in *The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary* (ed. A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones), Oxford, 2002.

²⁸ See e.g. Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*, pp. 1319 ff. See also below, [Chapter Z](#), p. 337.

²⁹ See e.g. *Non-State Actors and Human Rights* (ed. P. Alston), Oxford, 2005; A. Clapham, *Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors*, Oxford, 2006; *Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law* (ed. J. d'Aspremont), London, 2011, Part IV; *Non-State Actors in International Law* (ed. M. Nortmann, A. Reinisch and C. Rygaert), London, 2015. See also International Law Association, Committee on Non-State Actors, Reports of 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and Draft Final Report 2016, www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1023.

³⁰ See e.g. R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford, 1963; M. Rajan, *United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction*, 2nd ed., London, 1961; and A. Cançado Trindade, 'The Domestic Jurisprudence of States in the Practice of the United Nations and Regional Organisations', 25 *ICLQ*, 1976, p. 715.

³¹ Note that the question of the extent and content of domestic jurisdiction is a matter for international law: see *Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923; 2 AD, p. 349. See also below, [Chapter 11](#).

³² See also the resolution of the Institut de Droit International, 1989, H/Inf (90) 1, p. 131.

³³ See e.g. *Miha v. Equatorial Guinea*, CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990, Human Rights Committee, Judgment of 10 August 1994, para. 63.

³⁴ See e.g. A. Cançado Trindade, *The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law*, Cambridge, 1983; C. Law, *The Local Remedies Rule in International Law*, Geneva, 1961; C. F. Amerasinghe, *Local Remedies in International Law*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2004; and K. Wellens, *Remedies Against International Organisations*, Cambridge, 2002. See also C. F. Amerasinghe, 'The Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the International Protection of Human Rights', 17 *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs*, 1974, p. 3; and below, [Chapter 13](#), p. 712.

³⁵ See e.g. *Ambatielos*, 23 ILR, p. 306; *Finnish Ships*, 3 RIAA, p. 1479 (1934); 7 AD, p. 231; and *Interhandel*, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 26–7; 27 ILR, pp. 475, 490.

³⁶ See e.g. *Robert E. Brown*, 6 RIAA, p. 120 (1923); 2 AD, p. 66. See also *Salem*, 2 RIAA, p. 1161 (1932); 6 AD, p. 188; *Nielsen*, 2 *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1958–59, p. 413; 28 ILR,

p. 210; and *Greece v. UK (Second Cyprus Case)*, 2 *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1958–59, p. 186. See also the cases cited in the succeeding footnotes.

³⁷ See e.g. *Johnston v. Ireland*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 112, 1986; 89 ILR, p. 154; and *Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 246, 1992.

³⁸ See e.g. article 41(c), Civil and Political Rights Covenant and article 2, Optional Protocol; article 11(3), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965; article 26, European Convention; article 50, Inter-American Convention; and article 50, Banjul Charter. See also ECOSOC resolution 1503 and UNESCO decision 104 EX/3.3, 1978, para. 14(IX).

³⁹ See e.g. S. Joseph and M. Castan, *The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2013, chapter 6; Weinberger, Reports of the Human Rights Committee, A/36/40, p. 114 and A/44/40, p. 142; and *Sara*, A/49/40, annex X, Section C, para. 8.3. States are required to provide evidence that there would be a reasonable prospect that available remedies would be effective, *Torres Ramírez v. Uruguay*, *Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol*, CCPR/C/OP/1, 1985, p. 3. See also e.g. *Baboeram-Adhin v. Suriname*, A/40/40, p. 187; 94 ILR, p. 377; *Muhonen v. Finland*, A/40/40, p. 164; 94 ILR, p. 389; *Solórzano v. Venezuela*, A/41/40, p. 134; 94 ILR, p. 400; *Holland v. Ireland* 115 ILR, p. 277; and *Faurisson v. France* 115 ILR, p. 355. See also, with regard to the UN Convention against Torture, *AE v. Switzerland*, CAT/C/14/D/24/1995.

⁴⁰ See, as to the position under the European Convention on Human Rights, e.g. *Nielsen*, 2 *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1958–59, p. 413; *Greece v. UK (Second Cyprus Case)*, 2 *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1958–59, p. 186; *Donnelly*, 16 *Yearbook of the ECHR*, p. 212; *Kjeldsen v. Denmark*, 15 *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1976, p. 428; 58 ILR, p. 117; *Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain* 64 DR 97 (1989); and *Akdivar v. Turkey* 23 EHRR, 1997, p. 143. See also W. Schabas, *The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary*, Oxford, 2015, p. 764; *Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights* (ed. B. Rainey, E. Wicks and C. Ovey), 7th ed., Oxford, 2017, pp. 34 ff.; *Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights* (ed. D. J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. P. Bates and C. M. Buckley), 4th ed., Oxford, 2018, pp. 49 ff. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies applies also in inter-state cases: see *Cyprus v. Turkey* 2 DR 125 at 137–8 (first and second applications) and 13 DR 85, 150–3 (third application), although not with regard to legislative measures nor with regard to administrative actions

in certain circumstances: see e.g. the *Greek Case*, 12 *European Yearbook of Human Rights*, p. 196.

⁴¹ See e.g. article 46(1)(a) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 1969 and article 37 of the Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See also *Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies in Cases of Indigency*, IACHR, Advisory Opinion, 1990, 12 HRLJ, 1991, p. 20; and *Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1993*, Washington, DC, 1994, pp. 148, 185, 266.

⁴² Article 15. See generally R. Higgins, ‘Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties’, 48 *BYIL*, 1976–77, p. 281.

⁴³ Articles 2, 3, 4(1) and 7.

⁴⁴ Article 27.

⁴⁵ Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 23.

⁴⁶ Articles 6, 7, 8(1) and (2), 11, 15, 16 and 18. Note that the Banjul Charter contains no specific derogations clause.

⁴⁷ The fact that a right may not be derogated from may constitute evidence that the right concerned is part of *jus cogens*.

⁴⁸ See e.g. articles 8–11 of the European Convention, articles 12–14, 15–16 and 21–22 of the Inter-American Convention and articles 12, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. See also Higgins, ‘Derogations’.

⁴⁹ See e.g. the due process rights.

⁵⁰ See generally as to the range of human rights issues concerning COVID-19 issues e.g. the World Health Organization, ‘Addressing Human Rights as Key to the COVID-19 Response’ (21 April 2020), www.who.int/publications/i/item/addressing-human-rights-as-key-to-the-covid-19-response. As to the right to health generally, see e.g. J. Tobin, *Right to Health in International Law*, Oxford, 2012; and L. O. Gostin, *Global Health Law*, London, 2014. See also below pp. 737, 753 and 1100.

⁵¹ CCPR/C/128/2.

⁵² The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee noted, E/C.12/2020/1 on 17 April 2020, in addition: ‘All states parties should, as a matter of urgency, adopt special, targeted measures, including through international cooperation, to protect and mitigate the impact of the pandemic on vulnerable groups such as older persons, persons with disabilities, refugees and conflict-affected populations, as well as communities and groups subject to structural discrimination and disadvantage. Such measures include, among others, providing water, soap and sanitizer to communities that lack them; implementing targeted programmes to protect the jobs, wages and benefits of all workers, including undocumented migrant workers; imposing a moratorium on evictions or mortgage bond foreclosures against people’s homes during the pandemic; providing social relief and income-support.’ See also the statements of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/COVID-19-and-TreatyBodies.aspx, and the wide-ranging guidance provided by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/COVID19Guidance.aspx. See also Council of Europe, ‘Respecting Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights in the Framework of the COVID-19 Sanitary Crisis’, SG/Inf (2020) 11 (7 April 2020). As of 10 June 2020, ten states had notified the Council of Europe regarding derogations under article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/webContent/62111354.

⁵³ See e.g. Tobin, *Right to Health*; and *Human Rights in Global Health* (ed. B. M. Meier and L. O. Gostin), Oxford, 2018.

⁵⁴ But see for earlier attempt to deal with international diseases, A. von Bogdandy and P. A. Villarreal, ‘International Law on Pandemic Response: A First Stocktaking in Light of the Coronavirus Crisis’, MPIL Research Paper Series, No. 2020-07.

⁵⁵ See also article 7(ii)(b) concerning the right to enjoy safe and healthy working conditions.

⁵⁶ See further below, p. 271, as to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

⁵⁷ E/C.12/2000/4, adopted on 11 August 2000.

⁵⁸ See articles 7–13. Note also the role of the Universal Periodic Review process and the right to health, see e.g. J. B. de Mesquito, ‘The Universal Periodic Review: A Valuable New Procedure for the Right to Health’, *21 Health and Human Rights Journal*, 2019, p. 263. See also below, p. 270.

⁵⁹ See e.g. article 5(e)(iv), International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 1965; articles 11(1)(f), 12 and 14(2)(b), Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1979; article 24, Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989; articles 28, 43(e) and 45(c), International Convention on Migrant Workers 1990; and article 25, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006.

⁶⁰ See e.g. articles 10 and 11, San Salvador Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 1988; and article 16, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981. See also European Court of Human Rights, *Thematic Report on Health-Related Issues in the Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights*, 2015.

⁶¹ See Commission of Human Rights resolution 2002/31 and Human Rights Council resolutions [6/29](#) of 14 December 2007; [15/22](#) of 6 October 2010; [24/6](#) of 8 October 2013; and [33/9](#) of 6 October 2016. The mandate is essentially to monitor, report and communicate.

⁶² See WHO, *International Health Regulations 2005*, 3rd ed., 2016.

⁶³ See e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-52294623 and www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline. See also E. Benvenisti, ‘The WHO-Destined to Fail? Political Cooperation and COVID-19 Pandemic’, University of Cambridge Legal Studies Paper Series, No. 24/2020; and S. Besson, ‘COVID-19 and the WHO’s Political Moment’, EJIL: Talk!, 25 June 2020.

⁶⁴ Note that questions relating to the interpretation of and reservations to human rights treaties will be noted below in [Chapter 15](#), while the issue of succession to human rights treaties will be noted below in [Chapter 16](#). Individual criminal responsibility is covered in [Chapter 7](#) and international humanitarian law in [Chapter 20](#).

⁶⁵ See e.g. *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 1987, vol. **II**, pp. 161 ff.; and *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala* 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980); 77 ILR, p. 169. See also T. Meron, *Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law*, Oxford, 1989; and the articles published in the Special Issue on Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 1995–96.

⁶⁶ See below, [Chapter 13](#), pp. 702–3.

⁶⁷ See *Oppenheim's International Law United Nations* (ed. R. Higgins *et al.*), Oxford, 2017, chapter 22. See also [Chapter 21](#) below and particularly the references in **note 1**.

⁶⁸ Largely as a result of lobbying by non-governmental organisations at the San Francisco Conference: see J. Humphrey, 'The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', in Luard, *International Protection*, chapter 3.

⁶⁹ Under article 62, the Economic and Social Council has the power to make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for and observance of human rights.

⁷⁰ See e.g. Lauterpacht, *International Law*, pp. 47–9; Q. Wright, 'National Courts and Human Rights – the Fujii Case', 45 *AJIL*, 1951, p. 73; and B. Sloan, 'Human Rights, the United Nations and International Law', 20 *Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret*, 1950, pp. 30–1. See also Judge Tanaka, *South West Africa*, ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 6, 288–9; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 451–2.

⁷¹ See M. O. Hudson, 'Integrity of International Instruments', 42 *AJIL*, 1948, pp. 105–8 and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1949, p. 178. See also H. Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations*, London, 1950, p. 29.

⁷² See D. Driscoll, 'The Development of Human Rights in International Law', in Laqueur and Rubin, *Human Rights Reader*, pp. 41, 43.

⁷³ ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 57; 49 ILR, pp. 3, 47. See also E. Schwelb, 'The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter', 66 *AJIL*, 1972, p. 337; and O. Schachter, 'The Charter and the Constitution', 4 *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 1951, p. 443.

⁷⁴ See below, p. 557.

⁷⁵ See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, p. 1001; M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1965, vol. V, p. 237; J. Humphrey, 'The Universal Declaration on Human Rights', in *Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration* (ed. B. S. Ramcharan), New York, 1979, p. 21; J. Kunz, 'The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights', **43 AJIL**, 1949, p. 316; E. Schwelb, *The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law*, *PASIL*, 1959, p. 217; A. Verdoodt, *Naissance et Signification de la Déclaration Universelle de Droits de l'Homme*, Paris, 1964; *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary* (ed. A. Eide, G. Alfredsson, G. Melander, L. A. Rehof and A. Rosas), Dordrecht, 1992; *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement* (ed. G. Alfredsson and A. Eide), The Hague, 1999; and P. R. Ghandi, 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 Years', **41 German YIL**, 1998, p. 206.

⁷⁶ Note that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in a document issued in January 1991 on 'Human Rights in Foreign Policy' took the view that, although the Declaration was 'not in itself legally binding, much of its content can now be said to form part of customary international law', UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, p. 592.

⁷⁷ See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 1002. In 1968, the Proclamation of Tehran at the conclusion of the UN-sponsored International Conference on Human Rights declared that the Declaration constituted 'an obligation for members of the international community', 23 GAOR, A/Conf. 32/41. See also the non-governmental Montreal Statement, 9 *Review of the International Commission of Jurists*, 1968, p. 94.

⁷⁸ See e.g. Schwelb, *Influence*; J. Humphrey, 'The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation', **17 William and Mary Law Review**, 1975, p. 527; *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 1002–5; Judge Tanaka, *South West Africa* (Second Phase), ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 6, 288, 293; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 451, 454; and the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, below, p. 292.

⁷⁹ See e.g. *Re Flesche* 16 AD, pp. 266, 269; *State (Duggan) v. Tapley* 18 ILR, pp. 336, 342; *Robinson v. Secretary-General of the UN* 19 ILR, pp. 494, 496; *Extradition of Greek National* 22 ILR, pp. 520, 524; and *Beth El Mission v. Minister of Social Welfare* 47 ILR, pp. 205, 207. See also *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 22; 16 AD, pp. 155, 158; and *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala* 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).

⁸⁰ The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted on 25 June 1993 at the UN Conference on Human Rights referred to the Declaration as the ‘source of inspiration’ and the ‘basis for the United Nations in making advances in standard setting as contained in the existing international human rights instruments’, 32 ILM, 1993, pp. 1661, 1663. Note the establishment by the UN Secretary-General in 2013 of the Human Rights Upfront Initiative, see <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/01/521092-human-rights-front-initiative-ever-more-vital-strengthen-uns-preventive-work>.

⁸¹ See below, Chapter 7, p. 362.

⁸² See below, p. 256.

⁸³ See e.g. D. Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’, 13 *HRQ*, 1991, p. 368; and N. Lerner, *Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law*, 2nd ed., The Hague, 2003.

⁸⁴ As to the prohibition of genocide, see below Chapter 7, p. 362.

⁸⁵ See e.g. Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 12; W. Vandenhoe, *Non-discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies*, Antwerp, 2005; Joseph and Castan, *International Covenant*, chapter 23; A. Bayefsky, ‘The Principle of Equality or Non-discrimination in International Law’, 11 *HRLJ*, 1990, p. 1; J. Greenberg, ‘Race, Sex and Religious Discrimination’, in Meron, *Human Rights in International Law*, p. 307; W. McKean, *Equality and Discrimination under International Law*, Oxford, 1983; and T. Meron, *Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations*, Oxford, 1986, chapters 1–3.

⁸⁶ See e.g. P. Thornberry, *The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary*, Oxford, 2016; and N. Lerner, *The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, 2nd ed., Dordrecht, 1980.

⁸⁷ See further below, p. 273. Note also the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973.

⁸⁸ See e.g. the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in *South West Africa* (Second Phase), ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 3, 293; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 455.

⁸⁹ See below, p. 275.

⁹⁰ See below, pp. 292 ff.

⁹¹ See e.g. the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 1981, General Assembly resolution 36/55 and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to examine situations inconsistent with the Declaration by the UN Commission on Human Rights, resolution 1986/20 of 10 March 1986. See also E. Odio Benito, *Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief*, New York, 1989; and Report on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, E/CN.4/1995/91, 1994. In 2000, the Commission on Human Rights changed the mandate title to ‘Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief’: see ECOSOC decision 2000/261 and General Assembly resolution 55/97. The UN Human Rights Committee has produced a General Comment on article 18 concerning freedom of thought, conscience and religion: see General Comment No. 22, 1993, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 1994; and Joseph and Castan, *International Covenant*, chapter 17. Note also S. Neff, ‘An Evolving International Legal Norm of Religious Freedom: Problems and Prospects’, 7 *California Western International Law Journal*, 1975, p. 543; A. Krishnaswami, *Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices*, New York, 1960, E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1; N. Lerner, ‘Towards a Draft Declaration against Religious Intolerance and Discrimination’, 11 *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, 1981, p. 82; and *The Changing Nature of Religious Rights under International Law* (ed. M. Evans, P. Petkoff and J. Rivers), Oxford, 2015.

⁹² See the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979, below, p. 280. Article 1 of the Convention provides that discrimination against women means any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality with men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. See e.g. McKean, *Equality*, chapter 10; Bayefsky, ‘Equality’; Meron, *Human Rights Law-Making*, chapter 2; R. Cook, ‘Women’s International Human Rights Law’, 15 *HRQ*, 1993, p. 230; and *Human Rights of Women* (ed. R. Cook), Philadelphia, 1994. Note also the UN General Assembly Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women, 33 ILM, 1994, p. 1049; and the London Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons adopted by the International Law Association, *Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference*, London, 2000, p. 794.

⁹³ See also, for example, articles 2(2) and 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. See M. C. Craven, *The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, Oxford, 1995, chapter 4; and see further below, p. 271.

⁹⁴ Note that this provision constitutes an autonomous or free-standing principle, whereas article 2(1) of that Covenant and article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and article 2(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibit discrimination in the context of specific rights and freedoms laid down in the instrument in question: see Bayefsky, 'Equality', pp. 3–4; and the Human Rights Committee's General Comment on Non-Discrimination, para. 12.

⁹⁵ See further below, p. 275.

⁹⁶ Adopted on 9 November 1989, CCPR/C/Rev.1/Add.1.

⁹⁷ PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 64, p. 19, 1935; 8 AD, pp. 386, 389–90.

⁹⁸ See also the Human Rights Committee's General Comment on Non-Discrimination, para. 8.

⁹⁹ See Judge Tanaka's Dissenting Opinion in *South West Africa* (Second Phase), ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 3, 306; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 464.

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. *Belgian Linguistics*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 6, 1986, para. 10; 45 ILR, pp. 114, 165. See also *Amendments to the Naturalisation Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica*, IACHR, 1984, para. 56; 5 HRLJ, 1984, p. 172; and the Human Rights Committee's General Comment on Non-Discrimination, para. 13, which notes that 'not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant'.

¹⁰¹ See the Human Rights Committee's General Comment on Non-Discrimination, para. 10, 1989. See also article 1(4) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965, article 4(1) of the Women's Discrimination Convention and article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

¹⁰² See e.g. A. Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination*, Oxford, 2004; J. Summers, *Peoples and International Law*, The Hague, 2007; K. Knop, *Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law*, Cambridge, 2002; T. D. Musgrave, *Self-Determination and National Minorities*, Oxford, 1997; W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, ‘Self-Determination’, in *United Nations Legal Order* (ed. O. Schachter and C. C. Joyner), Cambridge, 1995, vol. I, p. 349; J. Fisch, *The Right of Self-Determination of Peoples*, Cambridge, 2015; A. Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples*, Cambridge, 1995; *Modern Law of Self-Determination* (ed. C. Tomuschat), Dordrecht, 1993; Higgins, *Problems and Process*, chapter 7; T. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, Oxford, 1990, pp. 153 ff.; T. Franck, ‘Fairness in the International and Institutional System’, **240 HR**, 1993 III, pp. 13, 125 ff.; *The Rights of Peoples* (ed. J. Crawford), Oxford, 1988; *Peoples and Minorities in International Law* (ed. C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck), Dordrecht, 1993; and P. Thornberry, ‘Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments’, **38 ICLQ**, 1989, p. 867. See also M. Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’, **43 ICLQ**, 1994, p. 241; G. Simpson, ‘The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age’, **32 Stanford Journal of International Law**, 1996, p. 255; and R. McCorquodale, ‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach’, **43 ICLQ**, 1994, p. 857.

¹⁰³ See above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 228.

¹⁰⁴ See further below, p. 313.

¹⁰⁵ See further below, p. 323.

¹⁰⁶ General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).

¹⁰⁷ See, for an examination of state practice, e.g. Cassese, *Self-Determination*, pp. 90–9.

¹⁰⁸ *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1988, vol. II, Part 2, p. 64.

¹⁰⁹ General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) 1960 (the Colonial Declaration) underlines that ‘any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN’, while resolution 2625 (XXV) 1970 (the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations) emphasises that ‘nothing in the foregoing paragraphs

shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign or independent states'. See further below, [Chapter 9](#), p. 444.

110 See further below, [Chapter 9](#), p. 448. Note that the International Court in the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 134, referred to the 'customary law character of the right to territorial integrity of a non-self-governing territory as a corollary of the right to self-determination . . . and a key element of the exercise of the right to self-determination under international law'.

111 See e.g. General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) and Organisation of African Unity resolution 16 (I) 1964.

112 ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 566–7; 80 ILR, pp. 440, 470–1.

113 92 ILR, pp. 167, 168. See further above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 191.

114 See above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 233 and below, [Chapter 9](#), p. 444.

115 Note Brownlie's view that the principle of self-determination has a core of reasonable certainty and this consists in 'the right of a community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in the institutions of government under which it lives': 'The Rights of Peoples in International Law', in Crawford, *Rights of Peoples*, pp. 1, 5.

116 See in particular D. McGoldrick, *The Human Rights Committee*, Oxford, 1994, chapter 5; Cassese, *Self-Determination*, pp. 59 ff.; and M. Nowak, *UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, *CCPR Commentary*, 2nd ed., Kehl, 2005, part 1.

117 General Comment No. 12.

118 See *Kitok*, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 1988, A/43/40, pp. 221, 228; 96 ILR, pp. 637, 645; *Lubicon Lake Band*, A/45/40, vol. II, pp. 1, 27; 96 ILR, pp. 667, 702; *EP v. Colombia*, A/45/40, vol. II, pp. 184, 187; and *RL v. Canada*, A/47/40, pp. 358, 365; 96 ILR, p. 706. However, in *Mahuika and Others v. New Zealand*, the Committee took the view that the provisions of article 1 may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, in particular article 27 on the rights of persons belonging to

minorities, A/56/40, vol. II, annex X, A. See also *Diergaardt and Others v. Namibia*, A/55/40, vol. II, annex IX, sect. M, para. 10.3.

119 A member of the Committee from 1985 to 1995.

120 Higgins, 'Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession', in Brölmann *et al.*, *Peoples and Minorities*, p. 31.

121 See e.g. the report of Colombia, CCPR/C/64/Add.3, pp. 9 ff., 1991.

122 See e.g. with regard to Canada, A/46/40, p. 12. See also A/45/40, pp. 120–1, with regard to Zaire.

123 See T. Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', **86** *AJIL*, 1992, p. 46. See also P. Thornberry, 'The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination', in Tomuschat, *Modern Law of Self-Determination*, p. 101.

124 A/51/18.

125 *Re Secession of Quebec* (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, 437–8; 115 ILR, p. 536 (emphasis in the original).

126 See e.g. Bantekas and Oette, *International Human Rights*, pp. 478 ff.; Oppenheim's *International Law*, pp. 972 ff.; Nowak, *UN Covenant*, pp. 480 ff.; M. Weller, *Universal Minority Rights: A Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies*, Oxford, 2007; *Political Participation of Minorities: A Commentary on International Standards and Practice* (ed. M. Weller and K. Nobbs), Oxford, 2010; Special Issue on Minority Rights in International Law, **13** *International Community Law Review*, 2011; R. Higgins, 'Minority Rights: Discrepancies and Divergencies Between the International Covenant and the Council of Europe System', in *Liber Amicorum for Henry Schermers*, Dordrecht, 1994, p. 193; Shaw, 'Definition of Minorities'; Thornberry, *International Law and Minorities*; Thornberry, 'Phoenix'; Thornberry, 'Self-Determination', p. 867; G. Alfredsson, 'Minority Rights and a New World Order', in *Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of A. Eide* (ed. D. Gomien), Oslo, 1993; *Peoples and Minorities in International Law; The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in Europe* (ed. J. Packer and K. Myntti), Turku, 1993; *Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights* (ed. H. Hannum), Dordrecht, 1993; N. Rodley, 'Conceptual

Problems in the Protection of Minorities: International Legal Developments’, 17 *HRQ*, 1995, p. 48; H. W. Wei, *A Dialogical Concept of Minority Rights*, The Hague, 2016; J. Rehman, *The Weakness in the International Protection of Minority Rights*, The Hague, 2000; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapters 13 and 14; T. D. Musgrave, *Self-Determination, and Minority and Group Rights in the New Millennium* (ed. D. Fottrell and B. Bowring), The Hague, 1999. See also the Capotorti Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, 1979 and www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/MinoritiesIndex.aspx.

127 The minorities regime of the League consisted of five special minorities treaties binding Poland, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene state, Romania, Greece and Czechoslovakia; special minorities clauses in the treaties of peace with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey; five general declarations made on admission to the League by Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Iraq; a special declaration by Finland regarding the Aaland Islands; and treaties relating to Danzig, Upper Silesia and Memel: see generally Thornberry, *International Law and Minorities*, pp. 38 ff.

128 In the early 1930s, several hundred petitions were received, but this dropped to virtually nil by 1939: see Thornberry, *International Law and Minorities*, pp. 434–6, and the Capotorti Report on the *Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*, 1979, E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, pp. 20–2. See also Macartney, *National States*, pp. 370 ff.; J. Stone, *International Guarantees of Minority Rights*, London, 1932; and M. Richard, *Le Droit de Petition*, Paris, 1932.

129 See e.g. Annex IV of the Treaty of Peace with Italy 1947; the Indian–Pakistan Treaty 1950; and article 7 of the Austrian State Treaty 1955. See also the provisions in the documents concerning the independence of Cyprus, Cmnd 1093, 1960.

130 See further below, p. 268.

131 Attempts to define minorities have invariably focused upon the numerically inferior numbers of minorities and their non-dominant position, the existence of certain objective features differentiating them from the majority population (e.g. ethnic, religious or linguistic) coupled with the subjective wish of the minority concerned to preserve those characteristics. See e.g. Shaw, ‘Definition of Minorities’; and the Capotorti Report, p. 96. See also Council of Europe Assembly Recommendation 1255 (1955), H/Inf (95) 3, p. 88. Note that the Human Rights Committee in the *Ballantyne* case held that English-speaking

citizens in Quebec did not constitute a minority since the term ‘minority’ applied to the whole state and not a part of it, 14 HRLJ, 1993, pp. 171, 176.

¹³² See e.g. comments upon Norway’s third periodic report, A/49/40, p. 23 and Japan’s third periodic report, *ibid.*, p. 25. See also Joseph and Castan, *International Covenant*, chapter 24.

¹³³ See e.g. with regard to the third periodic report of Romania, A/49/40, p. 29 and that of Mexico, *ibid.*, p. 35, and the fourth periodic report of Russia, CCPR/C/79/Add.54, p. 5 and that of Ukraine, CCPR/C/79/Add.52, p. 4. Note also the criticism of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its marginalisation, discrimination and, at times, persecution of some of the country’s minorities, including pygmies, see CCPR/C/SR.2358, 2006, and of the situation in Kosovo, CCPR/C/SR.2394, 2006.

¹³⁴ Report of the Human Rights Committee 1981, A/36/40, p. 166; 68 ILR, p. 17.

¹³⁵ See also *Kitok*, A/43/40, p. 221; 96 ILR, p. 637, where the Committee took the view with regard to a petition by a member of the Sami community in Sweden that where the regulation of economic activity was an essential element in the culture of an economic community, its application to an individual could fall within article 27. It was emphasised that a restriction upon an individual member of a minority must be shown to have a reasonable and objective justification and to be necessary for the continued viability and welfare of the minority as a whole. In *Lubicon Lake Band*, A/45/40, vol. II, p. 1; 96 ILR, p. 667, the Committee upheld the complaint that the Canadian government, in allowing the Provincial Government of Alberta to expropriate the Band’s territory for the benefit of private corporate interests, violated article 27. It was held that the rights protected under article 27 included the right of persons in community with others to engage in economic and social activities which were part of the culture of the community to which they belonged. However, measures with only a limited impact on the way of life and livelihood of persons belonging to a minority would not necessarily violate article 27. See also the *Länsmann* cases against Finland, 511/92 and 671/95, 115 ILR, p. 300, and Report of the Human Rights Committee 2005, A/60/40, vol. II, pp. 90 ff.

¹³⁶ General Comment No. 23, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, p. 38.

¹³⁷ Resolution 47/135. See e.g. *The UN Minority Rights Declaration* (ed. A. Phillips and A. Rosas), London, 1993.

138 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56. This was authorised by the Commission on Human Rights on 3 March 1995: see resolution 1995/24. See also E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/51.

139 Resolution 2005/79. See also resolution 25/5, 2014. Attention has, for example, been drawn to the rights of women facing multiple forms of discrimination, exclusion and violence, such as women from minority communities, Press Release of 7 March 2006, and to problems faced by the Roma in Hungary, Press Release of 4 July 2006.

140 Policy Committee decision No. 2012/4 of 6 March 2012, www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/UNNetworkRacialDiscriminationProtectionMinorities.aspx. On 29 April 2020, the Network issued a statement on the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, warning of the increase in discrimination against minorities, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Minorities/UN_Network_Racial_Discrimination_Minorities_COVID.pdf.

141 See e.g. *The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary* (ed. J. Hohmann and M. Weller), Oxford, 2018; M. Åhrén, *Indigenous Peoples' Status in the International Legal System*, Oxford, 2016; P. Thornberry, *Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights*, Manchester, 2002; S. Marquardt, 'International Law and Indigenous Peoples', 3 *International Journal on Group Rights*, 1995, p. 47; J. Berger and P. Hunt, 'Towards the International Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights', 12 *NQHR*, 1994, p. 405; C. Tennant, 'Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal Literature from 1945–1993', 16 *HRQ*, 1994, p. 1; E. Stamatopoulou, 'Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights as a Developing Dynamic', 16 *HRQ*, 1994, p. 58; Crawford, *Rights of Peoples*; R. Barsh, 'Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law', 80 *AJIL*, 1986, p. 369; J. Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2004; G. Bennett, *Aboriginal Rights in International Law*, London, 1978; and Bantekas and Oette, *International Human Rights*, pp. 490 ff. See also *Justice Pending: Indigenous Peoples and Other Good Causes* (ed. G. Alfredsson and M. Stavropoulou), The Hague, 2002. Note in particular the cases of *Delgamuukw v. British Columbia* (1998) 153 DLR (4th) 193; 115 ILR, p. 446, Canadian Supreme Court; and *Mabo v. Queensland (No. 1)* (1988) 83 ALR 14; 112 ILR, p. 412 and *(No. 2)* (1992) 107 ALR 1; 112 ILR, p. 457. See also *Richtersveld Community*, Supreme Court of South Africa, Judgment of 24 March 2003, 127 ILR, p. 507.

¹⁴² But note that the Convention provides that the use of the term ‘peoples’ is not to be construed as having any implication as regards the rights that may attach to the term under international law (article 1(3)).

¹⁴³ The Martinez Cobo Report, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Adds. 1–4.

¹⁴⁴ See E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33.

¹⁴⁵ A Draft Declaration was adopted in 1994: see resolution 1994/45, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, p. 103. See also R. T. Coulter, ‘The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: What Is It? What Does It Mean?’, 13 *NQHR*, 1995, p. 123.

¹⁴⁶ See General Assembly resolution 40/131. Note also the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture, (article 8); the rights to practise cultural traditions, and to education, access to media and health practices, and a range of rights concerning their distinctive relationship to the land (articles 9–37). A Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples was appointed in 2001 and UN Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues were produced in 2008, see www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/IndigenousPeoplesIndex.aspx.

¹⁴⁷ See the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted in 1995, OEA/Ser.L/V/II/90; Doc. 9, rev. 1. For further discussions on the Draft Declaration, see e.g. GT/DADIN/doc.1/99 rev.2, 2000; Report of the Rapporteur of the Working Group, GT/DADIN/doc.83/02, 2002 and OEA/Ser.K/XVI, GT/DADIN/doc.301/07, 2007. See also e.g. resolutions AG/RES.1780 (XXI-0/01), 2001 and AG/RES. 2073 (XXXV-0/05), 2007. See further www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/.

¹⁴⁸ IACHR, Series C, No. 79, 2001.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 149.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 151. Nicaragua was held to be obliged to create ‘an effective mechanism for delimitation, demarcation and titling of the property of indigenous communities, in accordance with their customary law, values, customs and mores’, *ibid.*, para. 164. See also *Moiwana Community v. Suriname*, IACHR, Series C, No. 124, Judgment of 15 June 2005;

and *Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay*, Judgment of 17 June 2005, Series C, No. 125.

¹⁵¹ The Court ordered the state to adopt all legislative, administrative and other measures to guarantee the members of the community ownership rights over their traditional lands, Judgment of 29 March 2006, Series C, No. 146, paras. 17 ff., 187 ff., 210 ff. See also *Fernández Ortega and Others v. Mexico*, Judgment of 15 May 2011, Series C, No. 215; and *Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala*, IACHR, Judgment of 4 September 2012. See also the work of the Commission in this area, www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/decisions/iachr.asp.

¹⁵² See www.worldcourts.com/achpr/eng/decisions/2009.11_CM RD_v_Kenya.htm (2009), especially para. 209.

¹⁵³ See e.g. www.achpr.org/news/viewdetail?id=203. See also the Decision of the ACtHPR in *African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights v. Kenya*, Application No. 006/2012 (2017) concerning the eviction of the Ogiek people, www.escri-net.org/sites/default/files/caselaw/ogiek_case_full_judgment.pdf. Note also the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the *Case of the Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat Association v. Argentina*, 6 February 2020, holding Argentina responsible for violating *inter alia* the rights of 132 indigenous communities to a unique communal property title for the land they inhabit.

¹⁵⁴ See Bantekas and Oette, *International Human Rights*, chapters 4 and 5; *The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring* (ed. P. Alston and J. Crawford), Cambridge, 2000; *Human Rights: International Protection, Monitoring and Enforcement* (ed. J. Symonides), Aldershot, 2003; Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapters 3–6; Tomuschat, *Human Rights*, chapters 6–8; UN Centre for Human Rights, *United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights*, New York, 1994; *The United Nations and Human Rights* (ed. P. Alston), Oxford, 1992; Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*; Ramcharan, *Human Rights: Thirty Years*; and UN *Law/Fundamental Rights* (ed. A. Cassese), Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979. See also Lauterpacht, *International Law*, chapter 11; De Schutter, *International Human Rights Law*, chapters 9 and 10; and A. A. Cançado Trindade, 'Co-existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human Rights', *202 HR*, 1987, p. 9. See also the UN Human Rights Treaty System, Fact Sheet 30/Rev. 1, UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2012.

¹⁵⁵ See also e.g. the Slavery Convention 1926 and Protocol 1953; the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 1956; the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 1949; the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and Protocol 1967; the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954; and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961.

¹⁵⁶ See *UN Action*, chapter 1. The Assembly has also established subsidiary organs under Rule 161, several of which deal with human rights issues, such as the Special Committee on Decolonisation, the UN Council for Namibia, the Special Committee against Apartheid, the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices in the Occupied Territories and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestine People. Note also the relevant roles of the other UN organs, the Security Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court and Secretariat, *ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ See as to refugees, J. C. Hathaway and M. Foster, *The Law of Refugee Status*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2014; and G. S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, *The Refugee in International Law*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2007.

¹⁵⁸ *UN Action*, pp. 13 ff. See also Assembly resolutions 1991B (XVIII) and 2847 (XXVI).

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. N. Rodley and D. Weissbrodt, 'United Nations Non-Treaty Procedures for Dealing with Human Rights Violations', in Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*, p. 65; Lauterpacht, *International Law*, chapter 11; Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*, chapter 9; and T. Buergenthal and J. V. Torney, *International Human Rights and International Education*, Washington, DC, 1976, pp. 75 ff. See also *UN Action*, p. 20; and H. Tolley, 'The Concealed Crack in the Citadel', *6 HRQ*, 1984, p. 420. A Commission on the Status of Women was also created: see *UN Action*, p. 15, and below, p. 280.

¹⁶⁰ Originally consisting of forty-three representatives of UN member states selected by ECOSOC on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, ECOSOC resolutions 6 (I), 1946; 9 (II), 1946; 845 (XXXII), 1961; 1147 (XLI), 1966; and 1979/36, 1979, that number was increased to fifty-three by resolution 1990/48 in May 1990.

161 See e.g. Report of the First Session of the Commission, E/259, para. 22. See also Tolley, 'Concealed Crack', pp. 421 ff.; and ECOSOC resolution 728F.

162 E.g. on Chile: Situations revealing a Consistent Pattern of Gross Violations of Human Rights; Disappearances; the Right to Development and Structural Adjustment Programmes and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

163 Afghanistan, Cuba, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Iran, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq. Special Rapporteurs were also appointed to deal with particular thematic concerns such as summary executions, torture, mercenaries, religious intolerance and the sale of children. In an attempt to provide some coordination, the first meeting of Special Rapporteurs and other mechanisms of the special procedures of the Commission took place in 1994, see E/CN.4/1995/5. Note also the report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions with regard to the death of Saudi journalist, Jamal Kashoggi, A/HRC/41/36, 19 June 2019.

164 See e.g. *UN Action*, pp. 20–3.

165 See e.g. P. Alston, 'The Commission on Human Rights', in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, pp. 126, 145 ff.; and M. Bossuyt, 'The Development of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights', 6 *HRLJ*, 1985, p. 179.

166 ECOSOC resolution 2000/3.

167 See also Sub-Committee resolution 1 (XXIV), 1971. These were examined by the Working Group on Situations of the Sub-Commission which then determined whether or not to refer particular situations to the Commission. Those so transmitted were examined in two separate closed meetings by the Commission, which then decided whether or not to take further action, such as appointing an independent expert or discussing the matter under the resolution 1235 public procedure.

168 See e.g. T. Van Boven, 'Human Rights Fora at the United Nations', in *International Human Rights Law and Practice* (ed. J. C. Tuttle), Philadelphia, 1978, p. 83; H. Möller, 'Petitioning the United Nations', 1 *Universal Human Rights*, 1979, p. 57; N. Rodley, 'Monitoring Human Rights by the UN System and Non-governmental Organisations', in *Human Rights and American Foreign Policy* (D. P. Kommers and G. Loescher), Notre

Dame, 1979, p. 157; and Tolley, ‘Concealed Crack’, pp. 429 ff. Note that the Commission chairman began the practice of announcing the names of the countries subject to complaints under resolution 1503, although no further details were disclosed: see e.g. E/CN.4/1984/77, p. 151, naming Albania, Argentina, Benin, Haiti, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, Turkey and Uruguay.

169 See e.g. the Amnesty International Report, ‘Meeting the Challenge’, AI Index, IOR 40/008/2005. See also UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Report on ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, New York, 2004, para. 283. See also the Secretary-General’s Report, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’, A/59/2005, para. 182. It was noted that the Commission had been ‘undermined by the politicisation of its sessions and the selectivity of its work’, A/59/2005/Add.1, para. 2.

170 Distributed regionally with thirteen seats for the African group; thirteen seats for the Asian group; six seats for the Eastern European group; eight seats for the Latin American and Caribbean group; and seven seats for the Western European and Other group. See e.g. R. Freedman, *The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment*, London, 2015.

171 See General Assembly resolution 60/251 (2006) and for the period 2017–21, see www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/PPP_UPR_3rd_cycle_EN.pdf. See also F. J. Hampson, ‘An Overview of the Reform of the UN Human Rights Machinery’, 7 *Human Rights Law Review*, 2007, p. 7.

172 The Special Procedures are independent human rights experts with mandates to report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective. As of August 2017, there are forty-four thematic and twelve country mandates, see Annual Report for 2018, A/HRC/40/3 (2019) and www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx.

173 The Council also adopted at its first session in June 2006 the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-holders was adopted at the fifth session of the Council. See generally on the Council, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx. The Advisory Committee replaced the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, initially

entitled the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, established by the Commission in 1947. See resolutions E/259, 1947; E/1371, 1949; and 17 (XXXVII), 1981; and A. Eide, 'The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities', in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, p. 211.

¹⁷⁴ The US withdrew from the Human Rights Council on 19 June 2018, see **112 AJIL**, 2018, p. 745.

¹⁷⁵ See e.g. B. Saul and D. Kinley, *The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases and Materials*, Oxford, 2014; M. Ssenyonjo, *Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016; B. Saul, *The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Travaux Préparatoires*, Oxford, 2016; Craven, *Covenant*; and Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 6. See also M. Odello and F. Seatzu, *The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Law, Process and Practice*, London, 2012; and *Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law* (ed. E. Riedel, G. Giacca and C. Golay), Oxford, 2014.

¹⁷⁶ See articles 16–22 of the Covenant, and *UN Chronicle*, July 1982, pp. 68–70. See generally on implementation B. S. Ramcharan, 'Implementing the International Covenants on Human Rights', in Ramcharan, *Human Rights: Thirty Years*, p. 159; P. Alston, 'Out of the Abyss: The Challenge Confronting the New UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', **9 HRQ**, 1987, p. 332; P. Alston and G. Quinn, 'The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', **9 HRQ**, 1987, p. 156; P. Alston, 'The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, p. 473; B. Simma, 'The Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in *The Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ed. F. Matscher), Kehl am Rhein, 1991, p. 75; and S. Leckie, 'The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', in Alston and Crawford, *Future*, chapter 6.

¹⁷⁷ See ECOSOC resolution 1985/17.

¹⁷⁸ See P. Alston and B. Simma, 'First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', *AJIL*, 1987, p. 747; P. Alston and B. Simma, 'Second Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', **82 AJIL**, 1988, p. 603. See generally www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/pages/cescrindex.aspx.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g. E/C.12/1994/20, p. 18.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 16–18.

¹⁸¹ See HRI/GEN/Rev.1, p. 45.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 48. Further general comments have discussed the right to adequate housing (General Comment No. 4, 1991); the rights of persons with disabilities (General Comment No. 5, 1994); the economic, social and cultural rights of older persons (General Comment No. 6, 1995); equal treatment of economic, social and cultural rights (General Comment No. 16, 2005); and the right to work and social security (General Comment No. 18, 2005 and No. 19, 2006). General Comment No. 21 (2009) discussed the right of everyone to take part in cultural rights, while General Comment No. 25 (2020) discussed science and technology in the context of economic, social and cultural rights. Note also the statement of 17 April 2020 on the COVID-19 pandemic and economic, social and cultural rights, E/C.12/2020/1, <https://undocs.org/E/C.12/2020/1>.

¹⁸³ At the ninth session, for example, in the autumn of 1993, the Committee discussed the right to health, E/1994/23, p. 56, while at the tenth session in May 1994 the role of social safety-nets as a means of protecting economic, social and cultural rights was discussed: see E/1995/22, p. 70. In 2010, the Committee discussed the right to sexual and reproductive health, E/C.12/2010/SR.49 and 50 and in 2019, the discussion focused on land and the International Covenant, E/C.12/2019/SR. 51 and 52, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/DiscussionDays.aspx. See also generally C. Dommen, ‘Building from a Solid Basis: The Fourth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 8 *NQHR*, 1990, p. 199; and C. Dommen and M. C. Craven, ‘Making Way for Substance: The Fifth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 9 *NQHR*, 1991, p. 93.

¹⁸⁴ A/63/435. The Optional Protocol came into force on 5 May 2013.

¹⁸⁵ See e.g. Alston and Crawford, *Future*; and S. Lewis-Anthony and M. Scheinin, ‘Treaty-Based Procedures for Making Human Rights Complaints Within the UN System’, in Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*, p. 43. See also M. O’Flaherty, *Human Rights and the UN: Practice Before the Treaty Bodies*, 2nd ed., The Hague, 2002.

186 This link with the Secretariat has been termed ambiguous, particularly in the light of the difficulties in performing the two functions carried out by the Secretariat (Charter-based political activities and expert activities): see e.g. T. Opsahl, ‘The Human Rights Committee’, in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, pp. 367, 388.

187 See e.g. Thornberry, *International Convention*; M. Banton, ‘Decision-Taking in the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’, in Alston and Crawford, *Future*, p. 55; K. J. Partsch, ‘The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’, in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, p. 339; Meron, *Human Rights Law-Making*, chapter 1; K. Das, ‘The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’, in *The International Dimension of Human Rights* (ed. K. Vasak and P. Alston), Paris, 1982, p. 307; Lerner, *UN Convention*; N. Lerner, ‘Curbing Racial Discrimination – Fifteen Years CERD’, **13** *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, 1983, p. 170; M. R. Burrowes, ‘Implementing the UN Racial Convention – Some Procedural Aspects’, **7** *Australian YIL*, p. 236; T. Buergenthal, ‘Implementing the UN Racial Convention’, **12** *Texas International Law Journal*, 1977, p. 187; and www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/CERDIndex.aspx.

188 Rules of Procedure have been adopted, see CERD/C/35/Rev. 3 (1986), and are revised from time to time: see e.g. A/48/18, p. 137.

189 Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.

190 A/48/18, paras. 496–506. For example, in 1993, the Committee, concerned at events in the former Yugoslavia, sought additional information on the implementation of the Convention as a matter of urgency: see e.g. CERD/C/248/Add.1 (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); CERD/C/249/Add.1 (Croatia); and CERD/C/247/Add.1 (Bosnia and Herzegovina). See also CERD/C/65/DEC.1 (Darfur, 2004); CERD/C/66/DAR/Dec.2 (Darfur, 2005); CERD/C/DEC/1 (US, 2006); and CERD/C/DEC/SUR/5 (Suriname, 2006). Revised Guidelines were adopted in 2007, see A/62/18, Annexes, Chapter III. See also A/69/18, paras. 14 ff.

191 See e.g. A/48/18, p. 20. At its forty-ninth session, the Committee further decided that states parties whose initial reports were excessively overdue by five years or more would also be scheduled for a review of implementation of the provisions of the Convention. See also A/69/18, paras. 46 ff.

¹⁹² Article 13.

¹⁹³ See CERD/C/99/3 and CERD/C/99/4, UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Judgment of 30 August 2019; CERD/C/99/5 and CERD/C/99/6, UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Judgment of 30 August 2019.

¹⁹⁴ CERD/C/100/3, CERD/C/100/4 and CERD/C/100/5, Judgment of 12 December 2019. The large number of dissenting opinions is to be noted.

¹⁹⁵ The provision entered into force on 31 December 1982 upon the tenth declaration.

¹⁹⁶ See e.g. the Report of the Committee for its forty-eighth session, A/48/18, 1994, pp. 105, 130, and for the sixtieth and sixty-first sessions, A/57/18, p. 128. Note e.g. *Durmic v. Serbia and Montenegro* concerning discrimination against Roma in Serbia, CERD/C/68/D/29/2003, 2006.

¹⁹⁷ E.g. the decision adopted on 19 March 1993 requesting the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia to submit further information concerning implementation of the Convention: see A/48/18, p. 112.

¹⁹⁸ See e.g. General Recommendation XII (42) encouraging successor states to declare that ‘they continue to be bound’ by the obligations of the Convention if predecessor states were parties to it; General Recommendation XIV (42) concerning non-discrimination, A/48/18, pp. 113 ff.; and General Recommendation XXIX concerning discrimination based upon descent, A/57/18, p. 111.

¹⁹⁹ See e.g. Lerner, *UN Convention*.

²⁰⁰ See e.g. A/38/18, pp. 14–24. Note e.g. that by late 1983 fifteen reminders had been sent to Swaziland requesting it to submit its fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh overdue periodic reports, *ibid.*, p. 21. See also A/44/18, pp. 10–16 and A/69/18, paras. 46 ff.

²⁰¹ See CERD/C/70/Rev.1, 6 December 1983.

²⁰² See e.g. A/44/18, 1990, p. 7 and A/48/18, 1994, p. 149.

203 A/44/18, p. 91.

204 ICJ Reports, 2011, p. 70.

205 ICJ Reports, 2019.

206 ICJ Reports, 2018.

207 See e.g. Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 5; Joseph and Castan, *International Covenant*; Nowak, *UN Covenant*; Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*, pp. 844 ff.; P. M. Taylor, *A Commentary on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The UN Human Rights Committee's Monitoring of ICCPR Rights*, Cambridge, 2020; McGoldrick, *Human Rights Committee*; Opsahl, 'Human Rights Committee', p. 367; D. Fischer, 'Reporting under the Convention on Civil and Political Rights: The First Five Years of the Human Rights Committee', **76 AJIL**, 1982, p. 142; Ramcharan, 'Implementing the International Covenants'; E. Schwelb, 'The International Measures of Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the Optional Protocol', **12 Texas International Law Review**, 1977, p. 141; M. Nowak, 'The Effectiveness of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – Stock-taking after the First Eleven Sessions of the UN Human Rights Committee', **2 HRLJ**, 1981, p. 168 and **5 HRLJ**, 1984, p. **199**. See also M. Bossuyt, *Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, The Hague, 1987; and P. R. Gandhi, 'The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication', **57 BYIL**, 1986, p. 201. See also generally www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx.

208 See Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, p. 83.

209 See articles 28–32 of the Covenant.

210 See e.g. Nowak, 'Effectiveness', p. 169, **3 HRLJ**, 1982, p. 209 and 1984, p. 202. See also A/36/40, annex VII, Introduction; CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 and A/44/40, p. 173.

211 See article 40 and CCPR/C/5. Supplementary reports may be requested: see Rule 70(2) of the provisional rules of procedure, CCPR/C/3/Rev.1. See now the Rules of Procedure 2012, CCPR/C/3/Rev.10.

²¹² See CCPR/C/18; CCPR/C/19 and CCPR/C/19/Rev.1. See also CCPR/C/20 regarding guidelines. Several states have been lax about producing reports, e.g. Zaire and the Dominican Republic, while the initial report of Guinea was so short as to be held by the Committee as not providing sufficient information: see Nowak, 'Effectiveness', 1984, p. 200.

²¹³ See Buergenthal, 'Implementing', pp. 199–201; and Fischer, 'Reporting', p. 145. Note that in 2009, the Committee adopted a new reporting procedure whereby it would send states parties a list of issues prior to reporting and consider their written replies in lieu of a periodic report. The state party's answer would constitute the report for the purposes of article 40 of the Covenant: see CCPR/C/99/4, 2010 and for a recent example, CCPR/C/ARG/QPR/5, 2014, concerning Argentina. The Committee adopted in July 2018 a simplified reporting procedure as a permanent feature of its reporting procedures and decided to strive to limit the number of questions in each list of issues to twenty-five questions, see www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/PredictableReviewCycle.aspx.

²¹⁴ Such documents may now be officially distributed, rather than being informally made available to Committee members individually: see McGoldrick, *Human Rights Committee*, p. liii.

²¹⁵ E.g. in October 1992, the Committee adopted a decision requesting the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to submit a short report concerning measures to prevent *inter alia* ethnic cleansing and arbitrary killings, CCPR/C/SR/1178/Add.1. The Committee thereafter adopted an amendment to its rules of procedure permitting it to call for reports at any time deemed appropriate, New Rule 66(2), see CCPR/C/SR/1205/Add.1. In the case of an exceptional situation when the Committee is not in session, a request may be made through the Chairperson, acting in consultation with the members of the Committee: *ibid*. See also S. Joseph, 'New Procedures Concerning the Human Rights Committee's Examination of State Reports', 13 *NQHR*, 1995, p. 5.

²¹⁶ See, with regard to former Yugoslavia, CCPR/C/SR.1178/Add.1, pp. 2–3 and CCPR/C/79/Add.14–16. See, with regard to the successor states of the Soviet Union, CCPR/C/79/Add.38 (Azerbaijan). See also I. Boerefijn, 'Towards a Strong System of Supervision', 17 *HRQ*, 1995, p. 766.

²¹⁷ See e.g. A/56/40, vol. I, p. 25.

²¹⁸ See A/47/40, p. 4.

²¹⁹ See e.g. the comments concerning Colombia in September 1992, CCPR/C/79/Add.2; Guinea in April 1993, CCPR/C/79/Add.20; Norway in November 1993, CCPR/C/79/Add.27; Morocco in November 1994, CCPR/C/79/Add.44; the Russian Federation in July 1995, CCPR/C/79/Add.54; Estonia in November 1995, CCPR/C/79/Add.59; and the UK in July 1995, CCPR/C/79/Add.55; and, relating to Hong Kong in November 1995, CCPR/C/79/Add.57. Note that in September 1995, Mexico responded to the Committee's Concluding Comments upon its report by issuing Observations, CCPR/C/108.

²²⁰ See Rule 70 of its Rules of Procedure 2012. The procedures are described e.g. in the 2005–06 Report of the Committee, A/61/40, paras. 49 ff. (2006).

²²¹ See e.g. T. Opsahl, 'The General Comments of the Human Rights Committee', in *Festschrift für Karl Josef Partsch zum 75.*, Berlin, 1989, p. 273.

²²² Note, however, that in a General Comment on article 6 (the right to life), the Committee emphasised its view that 'the designing, testing, manufacture, possession and development of nuclear weapons are among the greatest threats to the right to life', and that the 'production, testing, possession and deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited and recognised as crimes against humanity', CCPR/C/21/Add.4, 14 November 1984. The ICJ gave an Advisory Opinion on 8 July 1996 at the request of the UN General Assembly concerning the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, in which it was noted that the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one's life applied also in hostilities. Whether a particular loss of life was arbitrary within the terms of article 6 would depend on the situation and would be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself: ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 226, 240; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 190. The Committee adopted an extensive new General Comment on the right to life in October 2019, CCPR/C/GC/36, noting *inter alia* that the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (in particular nuclear weapons) was incompatible with the right to life and may amount to a crime under international law, *ibid.*, para. 66.

²²³ A/44/40, pp. 173–5. See also the General Comments adopted in 1989 on non-discrimination, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1, pp. 3, 4; and on Minorities, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 1995 and Reservations, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6.

²²⁴ The inter-state procedure has not been used to date.

²²⁵ Signed in 1966 and in force as from 23 March 1976. See e.g. H. Steiner, ‘Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights Committee?’, in Alston and Crawford, *Future*, p. 15; P. R. Ghandi, *The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication: Law and Practice*, Aldershot, 1998; A. de Zayas, H. Möller and T. Opsahl, ‘Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under the Optional Protocol by the Human Rights Committee’, *28 German YIL*, 1985, p. 9; and *Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol*, New York, vol. I, 1985, vol. II, 1990. Two states (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) have denounced the Protocol.

²²⁶ Article 5, Optional Protocol.

²²⁷ See Nowak, ‘Effectiveness’, 1980, pp. 153 ff.; and 1981 Report of Human Rights Committee, A/36/40, pp. 85–91.

²²⁸ A/44/40, pp. 139–40. See also Rule 95(3) of the Rules of Procedure, 2012.

²²⁹ Rules 95(1) and 97 of the Rules of Procedure, 2012.

²³⁰ See, in particular, *Canepa v. Canada*, A/52/40, vol. II, annex VI, sect. K. See also *Ruzmetov v. Uzbekistan*, A/61/40, vol. II, p. 31 (2006); and *Boucherf v. Algeria*, *ibid.*, p. 312. Such a request was made e.g. to Trinidad and Tobago in the *Ashby* case pending examination of the communication, but to no avail. After the individual was executed, the Committee adopted a decision expressing its indignation at the failure of the state party to comply with the request for interim measures and deciding to continue consideration of the case, A/49/40, pp. 70–1.

²³¹ See *Piandiong and Others v. Philippines*, A/54/40, para. 420(b).

²³² Note that in October 1990, the Committee appointed a Special Rapporteur to follow up cases, CCPR/C/SR.1002, p. 8. See Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure 2012. In 1994, the Committee decided that every form of publicity would be given to follow-up activities, including separate sections in annual reports, the issuing of annual press communiqués and the institution of such practices in a new rule of procedure (Rule 99) emphasising that follow-up activities were not confidential: A/49/40, pp. 84–6. See also A/56/40, vol. I, p. 131.

²³³ These cases are reported in 1 *HRLJ*, 1980, pp. 209 ff. See, for other cases, 2 *HRLJ*, 1981, pp. 130 ff.; *ibid.*, pp. 340 ff.; 3 *HRLJ*, 1982, p. 188; 4 *HRLJ*, 1983, pp. 185 ff.; and 5 *HRLJ*, 1984, pp. 191 ff. See also Annual Reports of the Human Rights Committee, 1981 to date.

²³⁴ Report of the Human Rights Committee 1981, A/36/40, p. 166.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²³⁶ See e.g. *Waksman*, 1 *HRLJ*, 1980, p. 220; and *Lichtensztejn*, 5 *HRLJ*, 1984, p. 207. In *Robinson*, A/44/40, p. 241 (1989), the Committee emphasised that it was axiomatic that legal assistance be available in capital cases and decided that the absence of counsel constituted unfair trial.

²³⁷ See e.g. *Thompson v. St Vincent and the Grenadines*, A/56/40, vol. II, annex X, sect. H, para. 8.2.

²³⁸ See e.g. the *Berry, Hamilton, Grant, Currie and Champagnie* cases against Jamaica, A/49/40, vol. II, pp. 20, 37, 50, 73, 136.

²³⁹ See the *Ng* case, concerning extradition from Canada to the US. The Committee found that there was no evidence of such a risk, A/49/40, vol. II, p. 189.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

²⁴² See e.g. *López Burgos v. Uruguay*, Case No. 52/79, 68 ILR, p. 29; or *Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay*, Case No. 56/79, 68 ILR, p. 41, concerning the activities of Uruguayan agents in Brazil and Argentina respectively.

²⁴³ See e.g. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para. 10 and CCPR/C0/78/1SR, para. 11 (concluding observations on Israel's reports). This approach was affirmed by the ICJ in *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 178–9; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 97–8.

²⁴⁴ 58 ILM, 2019, p. 195.

²⁴⁵ *SAS v. France*, Judgment of 1 July 2014.

²⁴⁶ The Second Optional Protocol aimed at the abolition of the death penalty was adopted in 1990, while the desirability of a third optional protocol to the Covenant, concerning the right to a fair trial and a remedy, was considered by the Commission on Human Rights: see E/CN.4/Sub.2.1994/24, Sub-Commission resolution 1994/35 and Commission resolution 1994/107.

²⁴⁷ See ECOSOC resolutions 1/5 (1946), 2/11 (1946) and 48 (IV) (1947). See also L. Reanda, 'The Commission on the Status of Women', in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, p. 265. The mandate of the Commission was revised by ECOSOC resolutions 1987/22 and 1996/6. There is also an individual petition procedure by which complaints are considered by a Working Group on Communications which then reports to the Commission. The Commission in turn reports to ECOSOC.

²⁴⁸ This came into force in 1981. See *Women's Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional and National Law* (ed. A. Hellum and H. S. Aasen), Cambridge, 2015; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 15; R. Jacobson, 'The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women', in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, p. 444; A. Byrnes, 'The "Other" Human Rights Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women', 14 *Yale Journal of International Law*, 1989, p. 1; Cook, 'Women's International Human Rights Law', p. 230; *Human Rights of Women* (ed. R. Cook), Philadelphia, 1994; M. Freeman and A. Fraser, 'Women's Human Rights', in Henkin and Hargrove, *Human Rights*, p. 103; Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*, pp. 175, 541; J. Morsink, 'Women's Rights in the Universal Declaration', 13 *HRQ*, 1991, p. 229; H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, *The Boundaries of International*

Law: A Feminist Analysis, Manchester, 2000; and M. Bustelo, ‘The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women at the Crossroads’, in Alston and Crawford, *Future*, p. 79. See also www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx.

249 See articles 17–21 of the Convention and the first Report of the Committee, A/38/45.

250 See CEDAW/C/7Rev.3. In 2014, the Committee introduced on a pilot basis a simplified reporting procedure for the submission of overdue periodic reports provided using an updated common core document, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/ReportingProcedures.aspx, HRI/MC/2006/3 and Corr. 1.

251 Article 21. Since 1997, the process of adopting a general recommendation is preceded by an open dialogue between the Committee, non-governmental organisations and others regarding the topic of the general recommendation and a discussion of a draft prepared by a Committee member.

252 HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 1994, pp. 72 ff. Other examples include General Recommendation No. 12 calling upon states parties to include in their reports information on measures taken to deal with violence against women; General Recommendation No. 14 calling for measures to be taken to eradicate the practice of female circumcision; General Recommendation No. 19 (1992) concerning the problem of violence against women; General Recommendation No. 21 concerning equality in marriage and family relations; General Recommendation No. 29 dealing with the economic consequences of marriage, family relations and dissolution; General Recommendation No. 32 concerning gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women; and General Recommendation No. 37 concerning climate change, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx.

253 Although the Committee met exceptionally for three sessions during 2002 to deal with backlog reports. However, see General Assembly resolution 60/230 concerning the extension of meeting time in 2005 and 2006.

254 Article 8 of the Optional Protocol. See e.g. for an earlier view, R. Cook, ‘The Elimination of Sexual Apartheid: Prospects for the Fourth World Conference on Women’, *ASIL Issue Papers on World Conferences*, Washington, DC, 1995, pp. 48 ff.

²⁵⁵ The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted in 1993 emphasised that the human rights of women should be brought into the mainstream of UN system-wide activity and that women's rights should be regularly and systematically addressed throughout the UN bodies and mechanisms, see Part II, Section 3, 32 ILM, 1993, p. 1678. See also the Beijing Conference 1995; Cook, 'Elimination of Sexual Apartheid'; and the Beijing plus 5 process, see General Assembly resolution 55/71.

²⁵⁶ Resolution 48/104, see 33 ILM, 1994, p. 1049. Note also the adoption of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women in June 1994, *ibid.*, p. 1534; and the March 2002 Joint Declaration by the Special Rapporteur on women's rights of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and its Consequences of the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which called for the elimination of violence and discrimination against women: see www.cidh.org/declaration.women.htm.

²⁵⁷ See E/CN.4/2003/75.

²⁵⁸ See further below, p. 285.

²⁵⁹ See e.g. M. Nowak and E. McArthur, *The UN Convention Against Torture: A Commentary*, Oxford, 2008; A. Byrnes, 'The Committee Against Torture', in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, p. 509; R. Bank, 'Country-Oriented Procedures under the Convention against Torture: Towards a New Dynamism', in Alston and Crawford, *Future*, p. 145; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 22; N. Rodley and M. Pollard, *The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2009; A. Boulesbaa, *The UN Convention on Torture and Prospects for Enforcement*, The Hague, 1999; M. Evans, 'Getting to Grips with Torture', 51 ICLQ, 2002, p. 365; J. Burgers and H. Danelius, *The United Nations Convention against Torture*, Boston, 1988; Meron, *Human Rights in International Law*, pp. 126–30, 165–6, 511–15; Z. Haquani, 'La Convention des Nations Unies Contre la Torture', 90 RGDIP, 1986, p. 127; N. Lerner, 'The UN Convention on Torture', 16 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 1986, p. 126; and R. St J. Macdonald, 'International Prohibitions against Torture and other Forms of Similar Treatment or Punishment', in *International Law at a Time of Perplexity* (ed. Y. Dinstein),

Dordrecht, 1987, p. 385. See also generally www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/CATIndex.aspx.

260 See e.g. article 5 of the Universal Declaration; article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant; article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; article 5 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights; article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; the UN Convention against Torture 1984; the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture 1987; and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 1985.

261 See e.g. the four Geneva Red Cross Conventions 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977.

262 See *Belgium v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 2012, para. 99. See also *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)* [2000] 1 AC 147, 198; 119 ILR, p. 135; *Furundžija*, 121 ILR, pp. 213, 260–2; and *Al-Adsani v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 21 November 2001, para. 61; 123 ILR, pp. 24, 41–2. See also above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 104.

263 See e.g. *Vuolanne v. Finland*, Case No. 265/87, 96 ILR, p. 649; and generally Joseph and Castan, *International Covenant*, chapter 9.

264 See e.g. *Selmouni v. France*, ECtHR, Judgment of 28 July 1999.

265 See e.g. *Delalić*, Case No. IT-96-21, ICTY, Judgment of 16 November 1998.

266 The Convention built particularly upon the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted by the General Assembly in 1975, see General Assembly resolution 3452 (XXX). Other relevant instruments preceding the Convention were the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1955; the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers, 1979 (article 5); the Principles of Medical Ethics 1982 (Principles 1 and 2); and the Principles on the Protection of Persons under Detention or Imprisonment adopted by the General Assembly in 1989.

267 See, as far as the UK is concerned, sections 134 and 135 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

²⁶⁸ Note e.g. the report of the Committee on Sri Lanka in this context, A/57/44, p. 59 (2002). See also E. Zoller, ‘Second Session of the UN Commission against Torture’, 7 *NQHR*, 1989, p. 250.

²⁶⁹ Article 28(1). See e.g. A/57/44, p. 81.

²⁷⁰ As at 17 May 2019, the Committee had received a total of 448 reports and had examined 426; twenty-six states parties had overdue initial reports and thirty-nine states had overdue periodic reports: see A/74/44, p. 5 (2019).

²⁷¹ See e.g. A/61/44, pp. 6 ff. (2006).

²⁷² As of the date of writing, four have been issued, see https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=1&DocTypeID=11.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 82–3. See also A/57/44, p. 219.

²⁷⁴ *OR, MM and MS v. Argentina*, Communication Nos. 1–3/1988, UN Committee against Torture, Decisions of 23 November 1989. See 5 *Interights Bulletin*, 1990, p. 12. The Committee noted that there existed a general rule of international law obliging all states to take effective measures to prevent and punish acts of torture. However, the Convention took effect only from its date of entry (26 June 1987) and could not be applied retroactively to cover the enactment of legislation prior to that date. Therefore, the communications were inadmissible: see e.g. *AA v. Azerbaijan*, A/61/44, pp. 255, 259 (2006). Note also *Belgium v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 422, 457–8.

²⁷⁵ See e.g. A/61/44, p. 86 (2006).

²⁷⁶ *Khan v. Canada*, Case No. CAT/C/13/D/15/1994.

²⁷⁷ See *Dadar v. Canada*, A/61/44, pp. 233 ff. (2006).

²⁷⁸ *Parot v. Spain*, CAT/C/14/D/6/1990.

279 *RT v. Switzerland*, A/61/44, pp. 249, 253 (2006). See also article 22 of the Convention and Rule 107(b) of the Rules of Procedure.

280 See General Assembly resolution 57/199. Note that in 1985, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on Torture to examine questions relevant to torture and to seek and receive credible and reliable information on such questions and to respond to that information without delay: resolution 1985/33. The work of the rapporteur includes the sending of urgent appeals and an increasing number of country visits. He is directed to cooperate closely with the Committee against Torture, see e.g. E. Zoller, ‘46th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’, **8 NQHR**, 1990, pp. 140, 166.

281 See e.g. *Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence* (ed. T. Liefarrrd and J. E. Doek), Heidelberg, 2014; *The Rights of the Child in a Changing World: 25 Years after the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child* (ed. O. C. Jančič), Heidelberg, 2015; T. Buck, *International Child Law*, 3rd ed., Abingdon, 2014; G. Lansdown, ‘The Reporting Procedures under the Convention on the Rights of the Child’, in Alston and Crawford, *Future*, p. 113; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 16; *Revisiting Children’s Rights: 10 Years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child* (ed. D. Fottrell), The Hague, 2000; D. M. Santos Pais, ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Work of the Committee’, **26 Israel Law Review**, 1992, p. 16; and Santos Pais, ‘Rights of Children and the Family’, in Henkin and Hargrove, *Human Rights*, p. 183. See also G. Van Bueren, *The International Law on the Rights of the Child*, Dordrecht, 1995; and *The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child* (ed. S. Detrick), Dordrecht, 1992. See generally www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx.

282 The Convention came into force on 2 September 1990. Note also the Declaration on the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1386 (XIV), 1959 and the proclamation of 1979 as the International Year of the Child in resolution 31/169.

283 CRC/C/4/Rev.4, 2015. For example, at its second session in 1992, the Committee discussed the question of children in armed conflicts, A/49/41, pp. 94 ff. This led to a recommendation to the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to undertake a special study on the means to protect children in armed conflicts: see CRC/C/SR.72, p. 2 and resolution 48/157, which in turn led to the adoption of the Optional Protocol on the

Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, General Assembly resolution 54/263, 25 May 2000, which entered into force on 12 February 2002. Note that the question of the protection of children in armed conflicts was referred to in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993, Part II, B, 4: see 32 ILM, 1993, p. 1680. See also G. Van Bueren, 'The International Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts', 43 *ICLQ*, 1994, p. 809; and M. Happold, *Child Soldiers in International Law*, Manchester, 2005. At its fourth session, the problem of the economic exploitation of children was discussed, A/49/41, pp. 99 ff.; at its eighth session, a discussion on the 'girl-child' was held, CRC/C/38, p. 47. This led to the adoption of the Optional Protocol on the Question of the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography: see General Assembly resolution 54/263 of 25 May 2000, which entered into force on 18 January 2002. In 2016, the topic chosen was children's rights and the environment, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/Discussion2016.aspx.

²⁸⁴ See CRC/C/SR.42, p. 2 and A/49/41, pp. 69–71.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ See CRC/C/5.

²⁸⁷ See e.g. CRC/C/121, 2002.

²⁸⁸ See e.g. A/49/41, pp. 20 ff.; CRC/C/38, pp. 10 ff.; and CRC/C/43, pp. 10 ff. See also CRC/C/121, 2002, pp. 8 ff.

²⁸⁹ See e.g. CRC/C/27/Rev.3, 1995 detailing such measures up to mid-1995.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 159 (on 'The role of national human rights institutions in promoting and protecting children's rights'). In 2007, the Committee adopted General Comment No. 10 on the rights of children in juvenile justice and in 2014 a joint general recommendation/general comment no. 31 of the Committee with CEDAW was adopted on harmful practices, CRC/C/GC/14, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=5&DocTypeID=11. In 2019, General Comment No. 24 was adopted on children's rights in the civil justice system, see CRC/C/GC/24.

²⁹¹ This came into force in April 2014. The first decision concerned the determination of age within proceedings to grant special protection to a child deprived of his family environment, but was declared inadmissible, CRC/C/69/D/I/2014. See further, <https://juris.ohchr.org/en/search/results?Bodies=5&sortOrder=Date>.

²⁹² See e.g. *Migration and Human Rights: The United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers' Rights* (ed. P. de Guchteneire, A. Pecoud and R. Cholewinski), Cambridge, 2009; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 19; K. Samson, 'Human Rights Co-ordination within the UN System', in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, pp. 620, 641 ff.; S. Hune and J. Niessen, 'Ratifying the UN Migrant Workers Convention: Current Difficulties and Prospects', 12 *NQHR*, 1994, p. 393; and S. Hune and J. Niessen, 'The First UN Convention on Migrant Workers', 9 *NQHR*, 1991, p. 133. See generally www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/CMWIndex.aspx.

²⁹³ See e.g. the Reports of the Committee for 2006–07, A/62/48 (2007) and 2014–15, A/70/48. The article 77 procedure is not yet in force.

²⁹⁴ See e.g. *The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities* (ed. I. Bantekas, M. A. Stein and D. Anastasiou), Oxford, 2018; *The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities* (ed. V. Della Fina, R. Cera and G. Palmisano), Heidelberg, 2016; E. Flynn, *From Rhetoric to Action: Implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities*, Cambridge, 2013; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 17; and A. Lawson, 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities', 34 *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce*, 2007, p. 563. See also generally www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx. This Convention is the first human rights treaty to be ratified by a regional integration organisation, the EU, *ibid.*

²⁹⁵ See www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/GC.aspx.

²⁹⁶ See M. L. Vermeulen, *Enforced Disappearance: Determining State Responsibility under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance*, Intersentia, 2012; T. Scovazzi and G. Citroni, *The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United Nations Convention*, The Hague, 2007; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 23; and S. McCrory, 'The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance', 7 *Human*

Rights Law Review, 2007, p. 545. See also the report of its first two sessions, A/67/56, and its 2014–15 report, A/70/56. See generally www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/CEDIndex.aspx.

297 See e.g. article 2 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant 1966; article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950; articles 1 and 2 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 1969; article V of the Genocide Convention 1948; article 4 of the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973; and article 3 of the Slavery Convention 1926.

298 See also article 7 of the Apartheid Convention 1973. Several conventions provide for the communication of information to the UN Secretary-General: see e.g. article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954; and articles 35 and 36 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951.

299 Although neither the Optional Protocol on Communications of the Convention on the Rights of the Child nor article 77 of the Migrant Workers Convention is yet in force.

300 The Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on Migrant Workers, the Committee against Torture, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on Enforced Disappearances and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (although this provision is not yet in force).

301 The Committee against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Committee on Enforced Disappearance, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (although this provision is not yet in force). Note the competence to visit under the Convention on Enforced Disappearance.

302 See e.g. E. Tistounet, ‘The Problem of Overlapping among Different Treaty Bodies’, in Alston and Crawford, *Future*, p. 383.

303 See Part II, Section A of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 32 ILM, 1993, pp. 1674–5.

304 See e.g. the Human Rights Committee, A/49/44, and the Committee against Torture, A/50/44. See also the Report of the Secretary-General to the sixth meeting of chairpersons of treaty bodies, HRI/MC/1995/2, p. 13.

305 See General Assembly resolution 47/111 and HRI/MC/1995/2, p. 14.

306 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

307 See General Assembly resolution 49/178, 1994, which endorsed the recommendation of the chairpersons that the meetings be held annually. The first meeting of the chairpersons of treaty bodies was held in 1984, A/39/484 and the second in 1988, A/44/98. See also e.g. A/62/224 (2007). Note also that the first inter-committee meeting of the human rights treaty bodies took place in September 2002, HRI/ICM/2002/3. A working group on the harmonisation of working methods of the treaty bodies has been established: see e.g. HRI/MC/2006/3 and HRI/MC/2007/2.

308 See further below, [Chapter 15](#), p. 804.

309 See further below, [Chapter 16](#), p. 855.

310 For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have established procedures enabling them to examine the situation in the state concerned: see above, pp. 271 and 274. Other Committees have sought to hold meetings with the officials of the states concerned in order to encourage submission of overdue reports, HRI/MC/1995/2, p. 7.

311 See e.g. HRI/MC/1995.

312 The role of the treaty bodies in seeking to prevent human rights violations has been emphasised: see e.g. A/47/628, para. 44.

313 The UN Secretary-General in his report entitled ‘In Larger Freedom’ emphasised the need for streamlining procedures and called for the implementation of harmonised guidelines on reporting, A/59/2005 and A/59/2005/Add.3. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights proposed at one stage for a unified standing treaty body: Concept Paper on the Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, HRI/MC/2006/2, 2006. However, this

was not accepted. In June 2012, the High Commissioner produced a report on the strengthening of the treaty body system: N. Pillay, *Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System*, Office for the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, A/66/860, 2012. In 2012, an intergovernmental process was launched to strengthen and enhance the effective functioning of the treaty body system and the Ambassadors of Iceland and Indonesia appointed as Co-facilitators by the President of the General Assembly. Note also General Assembly resolution 68/268 (2014) and the three biennial reports by the UN Secretary General on the status of the treaty body system, A/71/118 (2016); A/73/309 (2018); and A/74/643 (2020), see www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRTD/Pages/TBStrengthening.aspx.

³¹⁴ See e.g. D. Weissbrodt, F. Ní Aoláin, J. Fitzpatrick and F. Newman, *International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process*, 4th ed., New Providence, 2009, chapter 16; L. Betten, 'At its 75th Anniversary, the International Labour Organization Prepares Itself for an Active Future', *12 NQHR*, 1994, p. 425; L. Swepston, 'Human Rights Complaints Procedures of the International Labour Organisation', in Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*, p. 89; V. Leary, 'Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organization', in Alston, *United Nations and Human Rights*, p. 580; C. W. Jenks, 'Human Rights, Social Justice and Peace', in *The International Protection of Human Rights* (ed. A. Schou and A. Eide), Stockholm, 1968, p. 227; C. W. Jenks, *Social Justice in the Law of Nations*, Oxford, 1970; E. A. Landy, *The Effectiveness of International Supervision: Thirty Years of ILO Experience*, New York, 1966; E. A. Landy, 'The Implementation Procedures of the International Labour Organization', *20 Santa Clara Law Review*, 1980, p. 633; N. Valticos, 'The Role of the ILO: Present Action and Future Perspectives', in Ramcharan, *Human Rights: Thirty Years*, p. 211; N. Valticos, *Le Droit International du Travail*, Paris, 1980; N. Valticos, 'The International Labour Organization', in Vasak and Alston, *International Dimensions of Human Rights*, vol. I, p. 363; F. Wolf, 'ILO Experience in Implementation of Human Rights', *10 Journal of International Law and Economics*, 1975, p. 599; J. M. Servais, 'ILO Standards on Freedom of Association and Their Implementation', *123 International Labour Review*, 1984, p. 765; and A. H. Robertson and J. G. Merrills, *Human Rights in the World*, Manchester, 1996, p. 282. See also H. K. Nielsen, 'The Concept of Discrimination in ILO Convention No. 111', *43 ICLQ*, 1994, p. 827. See generally www.ilo.org/global/lang-en/index.htm.

³¹⁵ See e.g. S. Marks, 'The Complaints Procedure of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization', in Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*, p. 107; D. Weissbrodt and R. Farley, 'The UNESCO Human Rights

Procedure: An Evaluation', **16 HRQ**, 1994, p. 391; P. Alston, 'UNESCO's Procedures for Dealing with Human Rights Violations', **20 Santa Clara Law Review**, 1980, p. 665; H. S. Saba, 'UNESCO and Human Rights', in Vasak and Alston, *International Dimensions of Human Rights*, vol. **II**, p. 401; Robertson and Merrills, *Human Rights*, p. 288; and *UN Action*, pp. 308, 321. See generally <http://en.unesco.org/>.

316 See generally *Monitoring Human Rights in Europe* (ed. A. Bloed, L. Leicht, M. Nowak and A. Rosas), Dordrecht, 1993; *Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms of the Council of Europe* (ed. G. de Beco), London, 2011; and *Human Rights Law in Europe* (ed. K. Dzehtsiarou, T. Konstadinides; T. Lock and N. O'Meara), London, 2014.

317 See e.g. Schabas, *European Convention*; Rainey *et al.*, Jacobs, White and Ovey; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*; Harris *et al.*, Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick; S. Greer, *The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects*, Cambridge, 2006; F. Sudre, *Droit Européen et International des Droits de l'Homme*, 11th ed., Paris, 2012; *La Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme* (ed. P. Imbert, E. Decaux and L. Pettiti), 2nd ed., Paris, 1999; P. Leach, *Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2011; K. Reid, *A Practitioner's Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights*, 6th ed., London, 2019; P. Van Dijk, G. J. H. Van Hoof, A. Van Rijn and L. Zwaak, *Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights*, 5th ed., Antwerp, 2018; D. Xenos, *The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention on Human Rights*, London, 2013. See also J. G. Merrills, *The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights*, 2nd ed., Manchester, 1993; A. Drzemczewski, *The European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law*, Oxford, 1983; and R. Kunz, 'Judging International Judgments Anew: The Human Rights Courts before Domestic Courts', **30 EJIL**, 2020, p. 1129. See generally <http://echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home>.

318 See M. Bond, *The Council of Europe*, London, 2013; and see generally www.coe.int/en/web/portal/home.

319 Committee of Ministers resolution (99) 50. The Commissioner cannot consider individual petitions and exercises functions other than those of the supervisory bodies of Council of Europe human rights instruments. No general reporting system exists in this framework. See www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner.

320 See e.g. CommDH(2002)7, Opinion 1/2002 on certain aspects of the UK 2001 derogation from article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

321 See e.g. Recommendations CommDH/Rec(2001)1 concerning the rights of aliens wishing to enter a Council of Europe member state and the enforcement of expulsion orders, and CommDH/Rec(2002)1 concerning certain rights that must be guaranteed during the arrest and detention of persons following ‘cleansing’ operations in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation.

322 See e.g. the visit to Russia including Chechnya, Press Release 072a (2003).

323 All forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the Convention.

324 Note that Protocol No. 15, which is not yet in force, introduces a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. It also reduces from six to four months the time limit within which an application may be made to the Court following the date of a final domestic decision. Economic and social rights are covered in the European Social Charter 1961.

325 See below, p. 297.

326 The UK incorporated the Convention in the Human Rights Act 1998. See e.g. J. Polakiewicz and V. Jacob-Foltzer, ‘The European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law’, **12 HRLJ**, 1991, pp. 65, 125.

327 See e.g. *Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union*, Series A, No. 20, 1976, p. 18; 58 ILR, pp. 19, 36. See also *Belgian Linguistics*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 6, 1968, p. 35; 45 ILR, pp. 136, 165.

328 See article 1; and *Ireland v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 25, 1978, pp. 90–1; 58 ILR, pp. 188, 290–1. See also *Loizidou v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995, pp. 22–3; 103 ILR, p. 622.

329 See e.g. *Tyrer*, Series A, No. 26, 1978; 58 ILR, p. 339; and see also *Marckx*, Series A, No. 31, 1979; 58 ILR, p. 561, although not to the extent of adding new rights or new jurisdictions thereby; see *Johnston v. Ireland*, Judgment of 18 December 1986; and

Banković v. Belgium, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 December 2001, 123 ILR, p. 94. See also below, [Chapter 15](#), p. 817.

330 See *Loizidou v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995, p. 23; 103 ILR, p. 622.

331 See *Soering v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 161, 1989, p. 34; 98 ILR, p. 270; *Artico v. Italy*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 37, 1980, p. 16; and *Loizidou v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995, p. 23, 103 ILR, p. 622.

332 See *Al-Adsani v. UK*, Judgment of 21 November 2001, para. 60; 123 ILR, p. 41.

333 *Loizidou v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995, pp. 24, 27; 103 ILR, p. 622.

334 Note jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout a state's territory, see *Al Nashiri v. Romania*, ECtHR, Judgment of 31 May 2018, para. 592.

335 See e.g. *Soering v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 161, 1989, pp. 35–6. See also M. Milanovic, *Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy*, Oxford, 2013.

336 See e.g. *Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 240, 1992, p. 29. See also *Issa v. Turkey* (Admissibility), ECtHR, Judgment of 30 May 2000; and *Öcalan v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 December 2000.

337 ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995, p. 20; 103 ILR, p. 622. See also *Cyprus v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras. 75 ff.; 120 ILR, p. 10.

338 ECtHR, Judgment of 12 December 2001, paras. 63, 67, 71; 123 ILR, pp. 110, 111, 113. The Court noted that ‘the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating . . . in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (*espace juridique*) of the contracting states’, *ibid.*, para. 80. See also *Issa v. Turkey* (Merits), ECtHR, Judgment of 16 November 2004, paras. 65 ff., where the Court held that the degree of control exercised by Turkish troops during a large-scale incursion into northern Iraq did not amount to overall control, and *Assanidze v. Georgia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 8 April 2004.

339 Judgment of 8 July 2004, paras. 312–13.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 314–19. Note that this did not absolve the legitimate state deprived of control from all responsibility, *ibid.*, para. 331. See also *Catan v. Moldova and Russia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 19 October 2012, paras. 103 ff.; *Chiragov v. Armenia* (Merits), ECtHR, Judgment of 16 June 2015, paras. 168 ff.; and *Sandu v. Moldova and Russia*, Judgment of 17 July 2018.

³⁴¹ ECtHR, Judgment of 7 July 2011.

³⁴² Judgment of 16 November 2004. See also *Pad v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 28 June 2007.

³⁴³ See also *Medvedyev v. France*, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 March 2010, with regard to France’s control over a Cambodian vessel; and *Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 3 July 2009 with regard to UK control over a prison.

³⁴⁴ Judgment of 7 July 2011, paras. 136–7. See also *Jaloud v. Netherlands*, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 20 November 2014, para. 139.

³⁴⁵ This was accepted and applied by the UK Supreme Court in *Smith v. MOD* [2013] UKSC 41. See also *Al-Saadoon v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2016] EWCA Civ 811.

³⁴⁶ Judgment of 16 September 2014, paras. 74 ff. Note the Court’s rejection of the government’s argument that jurisdiction arising out of physical power and control did not apply in the active hostilities phase of an international armed conflict. The Convention and international humanitarian law could apply concurrently, *ibid.*, para. 77. The Court interpreted article 5 on the right to liberty and security of the person as permitting detention (in addition to the grounds listed in the article itself) in the case of the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a risk to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949: *ibid.*, para. 104. However, see now *Georgia v. Russia (II)*, Judgment of 21 January 2021, paras. 125 ff., accepting that jurisdiction based on effective control as above did indeed not apply in the active hostilities phase of an international armed conflict.

³⁴⁷ Judgment of 2 May 2007, paras. 141 ff.; similarly with regard to those activities falling within the framework of the UNMIK, deemed to be a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, para. 143. But see *Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 30 June

2005. Cf. G. Gaja, *Seventh Report on Responsibility of International Organizations*, A/CN.4/610, 2009, pp. 10–12. See also *Kontic v. Ministry of Defence* [2016] EWHC 2034 (QB) applying *Behrami*.

348 ECtHR, Judgment of 20 November 2014, para. 143.

349 Judgment of 7 July 2011, para. 102.

350 Articles 22 and 23. Note that there will no longer be a prohibition on two judges having the same nationality. The terms of office of the judges will end at the age of seventy.

351 Article 26.

352 Rule 25, European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, January 2020. There are now five Sections.

353 Rules 26 and 27.

354 Article 25 and Rule 8.

355 Article 27 and Rules 27A, 49 and 52A.

356 Article 28.

357 Article 29.

358 Rule 48.

359 Rule 59.

360 In the case of inter-state cases, the respondent government will be automatically contacted: see Rule 51.

361 Article 30. Note that the provision ‘unless one of the parties objects’ will be removed once Protocol No. 15 is in force. While there is no specific power in the Convention under which the Court may order interim measures of protection with binding effect, Rule 39 of

the Rules of Court provides that the Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it. The Court in *Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 6 February 2003, referring to the practice of other international organs including the ICJ and the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights, held that article 34 of the Convention requires that applicants are entitled to exercise their right to individual application effectively, while article 3, relevant in the context of expulsion, also necessitated an effective examination of the issues in question. The Court noting that Rule 39 indications ‘permit it to carry out an effective examination of the application and to ensure that the protection afforded by the Convention is effective’, concluded that ‘any state party to the Convention to which interim measures have been indicated in order to avoid irreparable harm being caused to the victim of an alleged violation must comply with those measures and refrain from any act or omission that will undermine the authority and effectiveness of the final judgment’, paras. 107–10. See also the Court’s Practice Direction on Interim Measures, last amended in 2011, www.echr.coe.int/Documents/PD_interim_measures_ENG.pdf, and the interim measures granted on 13 March 2014 in the Ukraine–Russia inter-state application calling on both Ukraine and Russia to refrain from taking any measures, in particular military actions, which might entail breaches of the rights of civilians under the European Convention on Human Rights, <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4699472-5703982>. Note the interim measures granted on 29 September 2020 in *Armenia v. Azerbaijan* and extended on 6 October 2020 in *Armenia v. Turkey*, to ‘all states directly or indirectly involved in the conflict, including Turkey’, ECHR 264 (2020) and ECHR 276 (2020).

³⁶² See the initial case, *Broniowski v. Poland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 22 June 2004; and see now Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, 2016 (introduced in 2011). See e.g. *Kurić v. Slovenia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 26 June 2012.

³⁶³ Article 47. Only the Committee of Ministers can make such a request and advisory opinions cannot deal with any question relating to the content or scope of the rights and freedoms laid down in Section 1 of the Convention and its Protocols or with any question which the Court or Committee of Ministers might have to consider during proceedings instituted in accordance with the Convention. The first request for an advisory opinion concerned the co-existence of the Convention on Human Rights of the Commonwealth of

Independent States and the European Convention on Human Rights, but on 2 June 2004 the Court concluded unanimously that the request did not come within its advisory competence. The first Advisory Opinion was given on 12 February 2008, where the Court unanimously concluded that it was not compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights for a list of candidates for election to the post of judge at the Court to be rejected on the sole ground that there was no woman included in the proposed list and called for exceptions to the principle that lists must contain a candidate of the under-represented sex to be defined as soon as possible. See now Protocol No. 16, which came into force on 1 August 2018 and allows for the ‘highest courts and tribunals’ of contracting states to seek an advisory opinion from the Grand Chamber, but only in the context of a case before such requesting court or tribunal. The government of the state of the requesting court or tribunal and the Commissioner of Human Rights would have the right to participate, while the Court has expressed the view that it would, as a matter of course, invite the parties to the domestic proceedings before the requesting court or tribunal to take part in the procedure before the European Court: see Opinion of the Court of 6 May 2013, http://echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c=#n13739062744461326038770_pointer.

364 Article 36.

365 Articles 38 and 39. Proceedings in the latter case will be confidential.

366 Article 39.

367 Article 41 and Rule 60. See for an example of non-pecuniary damage in an inter-state case, *Georgia v. Russia (I)*, ECtHR, Judgment of 31 January 2019; and *Chiragov v. Armenia* (Just Satisfaction) and *Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan*, ECtHR, Judgments of 12 December 2017 concerning pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in individual application cases where full reparation was impossible due to the ongoing conflict.

368 Article 44.

369 Article 46(1).

370 Article 46(2). If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision of the execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A referral

decision requires a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation under para. 1. If the Court finds a violation of para. 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken. If the Court finds no violation of article 46(1), it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers, which shall close its examination of the case: article 46(3)–(5).

371 *Cyprus case (Greece v. UK)*, 1956 and 1957, two applications; *Austria v. Italy*, 4 *European Yearbook of Human Rights*, 1960; five applications against Greece, 1967–70; *Ireland v. UK*, 1971; *Cyprus v. Turkey*, 1974–94, four applications, and five applications against Turkey, 1982 brought by Denmark and four other states; application brought by Denmark against Turkey, 1997; *Georgia v. Russia*, three applications brought by Georgia, 2007 (Admissibility Decision of 30 June 2009), 2008, 2009 (struck out) and 2018; application brought by Slovenia against Croatia in 2016 and a number of applications brought by Ukraine against Russia in 2014, 2016 and 2018, with applications brought by Latvia against Denmark, the Netherlands against Russia, Liechtenstein against the Czech Republic, Armenia against Azerbaijan and Armenia against Turkey in 2020, www.echr.coe.int/Documents/InterState_applications_ENG.pdf (6 October 2020).

372 *Cyprus v. Turkey (Third Application)* 13 DR 85 (1978).

373 The total number of applications allocated to a judicial formation in 2019 was 44,500. 29,800 of these were identified as Single-Judge cases likely to be declared inadmissible (an increase of 2 per cent in relation to 2018). Single-judge applications continue to be processed as soon as they are identified as qualifying for such a procedure. 14,700 applications were identified as probable Chamber or Committee cases: see https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2019_ENG.pdf.

374 Note that the issue of reservations to former articles 25 and 46 (concerning the jurisdiction of the Court prior to Protocol XI) was discussed in the case-law. The Court noted that while temporal reservations could be valid, reservations beyond this were not: see *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995; 103 ILR, p. 622. The Court, in dismissing the territorial limitations upon the Turkish declarations under articles 25 and 46, held that such declarations therefore took effect as

valid declarations without such limitations: Series A, No. 310, pp. 27–9. Not to adopt this approach would, the Court noted, have entailed a weakening of the Convention system for the protection of human rights, which constituted a European constitutional public order: *ibid.* See also the Commission Report in *Chrysostomos v. Turkey* 68 DR 216.

³⁷⁵ See e.g. *X v. Austria* 7 DR 87 (1976) concerning legislation on abortion.

³⁷⁶ See e.g. *Pine Valley v. Ireland*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 222, 1991; *Johnston v. Ireland*, Series A, No. 112, 1986; *Marckx v. Belgium*, Series A, No. 31, 1979; *Campbell and Cosans v. UK*, Series A, No. 48, 1982; *Eckle v. Germany*, Series A, No. 51, 1982; and *Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 241-B, 1992. An individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him; see e.g. *Klass*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 28, 1979, pp. 17–18; 58 ILR, pp. 423, 442. See also e.g. *Marckx*, Series A, No. 31, 1979, pp. 12–14; 58 ILR, pp. 561, 576; *Dudgeon*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 45, 1982, p. 18; 67 ILR, pp. 395, 410; *Belgian Linguistics*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 6, 1968; 45 ILR, p. 136; and *Norris v. Ireland*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 142, 1988; 89 ILR, p. 243. A near relative of the victim, for example, could also raise an issue where the violation alleged was personally prejudicial or where there existed a valid personal interest; see e.g. Application 100/55, *X v. FRG*, 1 *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1955–57, p. 162 and Application 1478/62; *Y v. Belgium*, *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1963, p. 590. See also *Cyprus v. Turkey*, Judgment of 10 May 2001; 120 ILR, p. 10.

³⁷⁷ Article 35. See *Akdivar v. Turkey*, Judgment of 16 September 1996. Note that the six-month time limit will be reduced to four months once Protocol No. 15 is in force. As to the meaning of domestic or local remedies in international law, see below, p. 712.

³⁷⁸ See e.g. *X v. UK*, 8 DR, pp. 211, 212–13; and *Cyprus v. Turkey*, *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1978, pp. 240–2. Where, however, there is a permanent state of affairs which is still continuing, the question of the six-month rule can only arise after the state of affairs has ceased to exist: see e.g. *De Becker v. Belgium*, 2 *Yearbook of the ECHR*, 1958, pp. 214, 244. The rule is strict and cannot be waived by the state concerned: see *Walker v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 25 January 2000.

³⁷⁹ See *Cyprus v. Turkey*, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras. 82 ff. Note that the Court suggested that the remedies provided by the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ had to

be taken into account in this situation, *ibid*.

380 See e.g. *Boyle and Rice v. UK*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 131, 1988. This does not apply to inter-state cases.

381 Article 35. See e.g. *Vagrancy*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 12, 1971; 56 ILR, p. 351.

382 Article 35(3)(b). See e.g. N. Vogiatzis, ‘The Admissibility Criterion under Article 35(3)(b) ECHR: A “Significant Disadvantage” to Human Rights Protection?’, 65 *ICLQ*, 2016, p. 185. The phrase ‘and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal’ is to be deleted once Protocol No. 15 is in force.

383 One judgment was delivered in its first year of operation in 1960; six in 1976; seventeen in 1986; 126 in 1996; 844 in 2002; 1,678 in 2012; and 2,187 in 2019: see *Analysis of Statistics 2019*, https://echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2019_ENG.pdf.

384 See e.g. P. Mahoney, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin’, 11 *HRLJ*, 1990, p. 57.

385 Series A, No. 258-B, 1994, para. 43.

386 See e.g. *Handyside v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 24, 1981; 58 ILR, p. 150.

387 E.g. fair trial and due process questions: see e.g. *Sunday Times v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 30, 1979; 58 ILR, p. 491.

388 ECtHR, Judgment of 10 May 2001, para. 103. Note that once Protocol No. 15 is in force, the phrase ‘Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention’ will be inserted at the end of the preamble to the Convention.

389 See e.g. *Tanli v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 April 2001.

390 *Vgt Verein gegen Tierfabriken*, Judgment of 28 June 2001, para. 78.

391 ECtHR, Series A, No. 25, 1978; 58 ILR, p. 188.

392 The Court turned down a request to revise this judgment under Rule 80(1) (‘discovery of a fact which might by its nature have a decisive influence and which, when a judgment was delivered, was unknown to the Court and could not reasonably have been known to that party’) so as to designate these practices as torture, *Ireland v. UK*, Judgment of 20 March 2018. See also *Cyprus v. Turkey*, where the Court held that the discriminatory treatment of the Greek Cypriots in the Turkish occupied north of Cyprus amounted to degrading treatment, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras. 302–11; 120 ILR, p. 10.

393 ECtHR, Series A, No. 324, 1995.

394 ECtHR, Series A, No. 18, 1975; 57 ILR, p. 200.

395 See e.g. *Handyside v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 24, 1981; 58 ILR, p. 150; *Dudgeon*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 45, 1982; 67 ILR, p. 395; and *Sunday Times*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 30, 1979; 58 ILR, p. 491.

396 See e.g. S. Trechsel, ‘Liberty and Security of Person’, in Macdonald *et al.*, *European System*, p. 277; P. Van Dijk, ‘Access to Court’, *ibid.*, p. 345; and O. Jacot-Guillarmod, ‘Rights Related to Good Administration (Article 6)’, *ibid.*, p. 381.

397 Series A, No. 31, 1979; 58 ILR, p. 561.

398 ECtHR, Series A, No. 44, 1981; 62 ILR, p. 359.

399 Series A, No. 145, 1988.

400 For the text, see e.g. 7 NQHR, 1989, p. 255. See also *Brannigan and McBride v. UK*, Series A, No. 258-B, 1993.

401 ECtHR, Series A, No. 161, 1989. See also *Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 6 February 2003, paras. 66 ff.; and *El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 13 December 2012.

402 *Jabari v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 11 July 2000.

403 *Chahal v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 November 1996.

404 See e.g. *McCann v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 324, 1995.

405 E.g. *Tanli v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 April 2001, para. 152.

406 *Cyprus v. Turkey*, Judgment of 10 May 2001, para. 132; 120 ILR, p. 10.

407 *LCB v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 June 1998.

408 *Soering v. UK*, Judgment of 7 July 1989, para. 120. See also *Aksoy v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 December 1996, para. 95, and *Akdeniz v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 31 May 2005, para. 138.

409 E.g. *Kaya v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 19 February 1998, para. 107; *Ilhan v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 27 June 2000, para. 97; *Kurt v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 25 May 1998, para. 140; and *Kudla v. Poland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 26 October 2000, paras. 146–9. The Court has noted that ‘the requirements of Article 13 are broader than a Contracting State’s obligation under Article 2 to conduct an effective investigation into the disappearance of a person last seen in the hands of the authorities’: *Akdeniz v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 31 May 2005, para. 139; and *Estamirov and Others v. Russia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 October 2006, para. 118.

410 Article 46(2).

411 Article 13 of the CoE Statute.

412 Article 14 of the CoE Statute.

413 Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee of Ministers. Note that where the Court finds a systemic defect in the national legal order, which has or is likely to produce a large number of applications, a remedy may be required of the state that would apply to the class of individuals in the same category: see *Broniowski v. Poland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 22 June 2004. See also *Burmych v. Ukraine*, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 October

2017, where the Court decided to strike out a number of applications from the Court's list following the pilot judgment in *Ivanov v. Ukraine*, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 October 2009, and transmit them to the Committee of Ministers for implementation. See generally V. Colandrea, 'On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-monetary Measures', 7 *Human Rights Law Review*, 2007, p. 396.

414 The first example of such infringement proceedings took place with regard to *Mammadov v. Azerbaijan*, Judgment of 22 May 2014, see Interim Resolution CM/RESDH (2017) 429, 57 ILM, 2018, p. 358; and *Proceedings under Article 46(4) in the Case of Mammadov v. Azerbaijan*, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 May 2019, concluding that Azerbaijan was in breach of article 46(1) for failing to abide by the judgment of 22 May 2014.

415 See e.g. D. J. Harris, *The European Social Charter*, 2nd ed., Charlottesville, 2000; D. J. Harris, 'A Fresh Impetus for the European Charter', 41 *ICLQ*, 1992, p. 659; D. J. Harris, 'The System of Supervision of the European Social Charter – Problems and Options for the Future', in *The Future of European Social Policy* (ed. L. Betten), 2nd ed., Deventer, 1991, p. 1; *25 Years of the European Social Charter* (ed. A. P. C. M. Jaspers and L. Betten), 1988; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, pp. 233 ff.; H. Wiebringhaus, 'La Charte Sociale Européenne: 20 Ans Après la Conclusion du Traité', *AFDI*, 1982, p. 934; O. Kahn-Freund, 'The European Social Charter', in *European Law and the Individual* (ed. F. G. Jacobs), London, 1976; O. Kahn-Freund, 'La Charte Sociale Européenne et la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme', 8 *HRJ*, 1975, p. 527; F. M. Van Asbeck, 'La Charte Sociale Européenne', in *Mélanges Rolin*, Paris, 1964, p. 427; and T. Novitz, 'Remedies for Violation of Social Rights Within the Council of Europe', in *The Future of Remedies in Europe* (ed. C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P. Skidmore), London, 2000, p. 230. See also www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter/home.

416 As at 21 March 2019, there were forty-three states parties to the Charter.

417 Articles 1–6, 9–10.

418 Articles 7–8, 15, 18–19.

419 Articles 11–14.

420 Articles 16–17. An Additional Protocol was signed in 1988 which added four more economic and social rights, guaranteeing: the rights to equal opportunities in employment

without discrimination based on sex; information and consultation of workers within the undertaking; participation in the determination and improvement of working conditions; and social protection of elderly persons. The Protocol entered into force on 4 September 1992.

421 Out of the following seven rights: the right to work, organise, bargain collectively, social security, social and medical assistance, and the rights of the family to special protection, and of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance: see article 20.

422 As amended by the Turin Protocol 1991 and as revised in 1996. The revised Charter came into force in 1999 and gathered together the rights contained in the 1961 instrument as amended and the 1988 Protocol and added new rights, such as the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion, the right to housing, the right to protection in cases of termination of employment, and the right to protection against sexual harassment in the workplace.

423 These groups are employment, training and equal opportunities; health, social security and social protection; labour rights; and children, families and migrants respectively.

424 Article 1.

425 Article 2.

426 See e.g. M. Evans and R. Morgan, *Combating Torture in Europe – the Work and Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture*, Strasbourg, 2001; J. Murdoch, ‘The Work of the Council of Europe’s Torture Committee’, 5 *EJIL*, 1994, p. 220; M. Evans and R. Morgan, ‘The European Torture Committee: Membership Issues’, 5 *EJIL*, 1994, p. 249; A. Cassese, ‘A New Approach to Human Rights: The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture’, 83 *AJIL*, 1989, p. 128; A. Cassese, ‘Une Nouvelle Approche des Droits de l’Homme: La Convention Européenne pour la Prévention de la Torture’, 93 *RGDIP*, 1989, p. 6; M. Evans and R. Morgan, ‘The European Convention on the Prevention of Torture: Operational Practice’, 41 *ICLQ*, 1992, p. 590; and C. Jenkins, ‘An Appraisal of the Role and Work of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’, SOAS Working Paper No. 11, 1996. See also www.cpt.coe.int/en/.

⁴²⁷ All forty-seven members of the Council of Europe are parties. By Protocol No. 1 non-member states of the Council of Europe are allowed to accede to the Convention at the invitation of the Committee of Ministers, CPT/Inf (93) 17. This came into force in March 2002.

⁴²⁸ The Committee established under the Convention described its function in terms of strengthening ‘the *cordon sanitaire* that separates acceptable and unacceptable treatment or behaviour’: see First General Report, CPT (91) 3, para. 3.

⁴²⁹ See Resolution DH (89) 26 of the Committee of Ministers adopted on 19 September 1989 for the election of the members of the Committee. Note that under Protocol 2 to the Convention, the members of the Committee may be re-elected twice (rather than once as specified in article 5). The Protocol came into force in March 2002.

⁴³⁰ See Fifth General Report, CPT/Inf (95) 10, 1995, p. 3.

⁴³¹ See articles 1 and 7. See also the Rules of Procedure of the Committee, 1989, CPT/Inf (89) 2, especially Rules 29–35. The Rules have been amended on a number of occasions, the most recent being in 2008: see <https://rm.coe.int/16806db824>.

⁴³² Note that 265 periodic visits had been made as of April 2019: see www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm.

⁴³³ As of April 2019, ad hoc visits had been made on 191 occasions: see www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm. See also Murdoch, ‘Work of the CoE’s Torture Committee’, p. 227.

⁴³⁴ Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure 2008.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, Rule 30.

⁴³⁶ Article 2.

⁴³⁷ Article 9(1).

⁴³⁸ Article 8.

439 As does the information gathered by the Committee in relation to a visit and its consultations with the contracting state concerned: article 11(1).

440 See Rule 39. Most reports have been published together with the comments of contracting states upon them, see 28th Annual General Report for 2018, <https://rm.coe.int/16809420e3>.

441 Article 10(2). See e.g. the public statements concerning police detention conditions in Turkey: CPT/Inf (93) 1, paras. 21, 37. The situation concerning Chechnya, Russia, has also led to public statements being made in 2001, 2003 and 2007: see e.g. CPT/Inf (2002) 15, Appendix 6 and CPT/Inf (2007), Appendix 9. A public statement was made concerning Bulgaria in 2015: see www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/CPT-Report-2015.pdf, p. 7.

442 Article 12. This is subject to the rules of confidentiality in article 11.

443 See e.g. Murdoch, ‘Work of the CoE’s Torture Committee’, pp. 238 ff.

444 See generally *Minorities, their Rights and the Monitoring of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (ed. T. H. Malloy and U. Caruso), The Hague, 2013; *The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (ed. M. Weller), Oxford, 2006; *The European Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (ed. P. Lemmens, A. Alen, B. de Witte and A. Verstichel), Strasbourg, 2008; P. Thornberry and M. Estebanez, *The Council of Europe and Minorities*, Strasbourg, 1994; and G. Pentasuglia, *Minorities in International Law*, Strasbourg, 2002. See also www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/home.

445 See also Recommendations 1177 (1992) and 1201 (1993).

446 It came into force in March 1998. See www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/.

447 Article 15. See e.g. the reports by Germany, MIN-LANG (2013) PR 02, by the UK, MIN-LANG (2013) PR 01 and by Poland, MIN-LANG (2015) PR 03. Such reports are examined by a committee of experts, composed of one member per contracting party, nominated by the party concerned, appointed for a period of six years and eligible for re-appointment (articles 16 and 17). Bodies or associations legally established in a party may draw the attention of the committee of experts to matters relating to the undertakings

entered into by that party and, on the basis of states' reports, the committee will itself report to the Committee of Ministers. The committee of experts' report may be accompanied by the comments which the parties have been requested to make and may also contain the proposals of the committee of experts to the Committee of Ministers for the preparation of such recommendations of the latter body to one or more of the parties as may be required: see e.g. the Committee of Ministers Recommendations to the UK, CM/RecChL (2014) 3; and Germany, CM/RecChL (2014) 5.

448 Article 16. See the first biennial report in 2000, Doc. 8879, and the second in 2002, Doc. 9540.

449 Article 20.

450 The Convention came into force on 1 February 1998. See also the Explanatory Report to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995. An ad hoc Committee for the Protection of National Minorities (CAHMIN) was established. Note that in January 1996, it was decided to suspend the work of the Committee on the drafting of an Additional Protocol: see CAHMIN (95) 22 Addendum, 1996.

451 Article 4.

452 Article 5. The parties also agree to refrain from assimilation policies and practices where this is against the will of persons belonging to national minorities.

453 E.g. the freedoms of peaceful assembly, association, expression and thought, conscience and religion: article 7. See also articles 8 and 9.

454 Upon request and where such a request corresponds to a real need, article 10(2). Similarly, with regard to the display of traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public in the minority language, article 11(3), and with regard to adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in that language, article 14(2).

455 Article 24. Note that parties which are not members of the Council of Europe shall participate in the implementation mechanism according to modalities to be determined. Accordingly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became a party to the Convention on 11 May 2001 and its first report became due on 1 September 2002.

⁴⁵⁶ Article 26.

⁴⁵⁷ Article 25. The first reports became due on 1 February 1999.

⁴⁵⁸ Resolution (97) 10 and see H(1998)005 rev.11.

⁴⁵⁹ See, for a list of opinions, www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/compilation-of-opinions.

⁴⁶⁰ See above, p. 261.

⁴⁶¹ See the Explanatory Report to the Convention, which states: ‘It was decided to adopt a pragmatic approach, based on the recognition that at this stage, it is impossible to arrive at a definition capable of mustering general support of all Council of Europe member States’, H(1995)010, para. 12. The European Court of Human Rights has also referred to the problem of defining national minorities: see *Gorzelik v. Poland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 20 December 2001, para. 62. Recommendations 1201 (1993) and 1255 (1995) suggest that it refers to persons who: reside on the territory of the state concerned and are citizens of it; maintain long-standing, firm and lasting ties with that state; display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; are sufficiently representative, although smaller in numbers than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state; and are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language.

⁴⁶² See e.g. Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation Rec. 1492 (2001) and the response of the Advisory Committee dated 14 September 2001. The Council of Europe has adopted measures with regard to other areas of human rights activities of some relevance to the above issues: see e.g. the European Charter of Local Self-Government 1985; the European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level 1992; the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities 1980; the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers 1977; and the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights 1995.

⁴⁶³ See e.g. D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, *European Union Law: Cases and Materials*, 4th ed., Cambridge, 2019; *The European Union and Human Rights: Law and Policy* (ed. J. Wouters, M. Nowak, A.-L. Chané and N. Hachez), Oxford, 2020; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, pp. 243 ff.; *The European Union and Human Rights* (ed.

N. Neuwahl and A. Rosas), Dordrecht, 1995; *The EU and Human Rights* (ed. P. Alston), Oxford, 1999; L. Betten and N. Grief, *EU Law and Human Rights*, London, 1998; *Steiner and Woods: EU Law* (ed. M. Costa and S. Peers), 14th ed., Oxford, 2020; *The Oxford Handbook on European Law* (ed. A. Arnall and D. Chalmers), Oxford, 2015; T. C. Hartley, *The Foundations of European Union Law*, 8th ed., Oxford, 2014; M. Mendelson, 'The European Court of Justice and Human Rights', 1 *Yearbook of European Law*, 1981, p. 126; and H. Schermers, 'The European Communities Bound by Fundamental Human Rights', 27 *Common Market Law Review*, 1990, p. 249.

⁴⁶⁴ See e.g. *Stauder v. City of Ulm* [1969] ECR 419; *Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel* [1970] ECR 1125; *Nold v. EC Commission* [1974] ECR 491; *Kirk* [1984] ECR 2689; and *Johnston v. Chief Constable of the RUC* [1986] 3 CMLR 240. See also the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 5 April 1979, *Official Journal*, 1977, C103/1; the Joint Declaration Against Racism and Xenophobia, 11 June 1986, *Official Journal*, 1986, C158/1; and the European Parliament's Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 1989, *EC Bulletin*, 4/1989.

⁴⁶⁵ [1970] ECR 1125, 1134.

⁴⁶⁶ See also *Re Accession of the European Community to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* 108 ILR, p. 225; and *Kremzow v. Austria* [1997] ECR I-2629; 113 ILR, p. 264.

⁴⁶⁷ [1974] ECR 491, 507.

⁴⁶⁸ See e.g. *Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz* [1979] ECR 3727; and *SPUC v. Grogan* [1991] ECR I-4685.

⁴⁶⁹ See e.g. *Rutili v. Ministry of Interior of French Republic* [1975] ECR 1219; *Valsabbia v. Commission* [1980] ECR 907; *Kirk* [1984] ECR 2689; *Dow Chemical Ibérica v. Commission* [1989] ECR 3165; *ERT* [1991] ECR I-2925; and *X v. Commission* [1992] ECR II-2195; 16 *HRLJ*, 1995, p. 54.

⁴⁷⁰ See article 6(2) of the Consolidated Treaty of European Union, OJ, 2012, C326/15 and article 59(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. A draft accession agreement of the EU to the Convention was prepared, www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-

[area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-completion-of-eu-accession-to-the-echr](#), but the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg rejected the draft agreement in December 2014 in Opinion 2/13, <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-12/cp140180en.pdf>. See as to continuing efforts to achieve this, www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-completion-of-eu-accession-to-the-echr.

⁴⁷¹ Under article K.1 of Title VI, the member states agreed that asylum, immigration, drug, fraud, civil and criminal judicial cooperation, customs cooperation and certain forms of police cooperation would be regarded as ‘matters of common interest’, which under article K.2 would be dealt with in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951.

⁴⁷² See e.g. E. Riedel and M. Will, ‘Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements’, in Alston, *The EU and Human Rights*, p. 723.

⁴⁷³ See the discussion by the ECJ of these principles in the context of *European Arrest Warrant*, *Advocaten voor de Wereld*, Case No. C-303/05, Judgment of 3 May 2007. See A. Hinarejos, ‘Recent Human Rights Developments in the EU Courts’, 7 *Human Rights Law Review*, 2007, p. 793.

⁴⁷⁴ Article 7 of the Consolidated Treaty.

⁴⁷⁵ Article 49 of the Consolidated Treaty. See also the Copenhagen Criteria 1993, including stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities: EC Bulletin 6-1993, I.13.

⁴⁷⁶ This provided for a wide range of rights, including the principle of equality before the law (article 20) and the prohibition of discrimination (article 21). See e.g. *The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights* (ed. S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward), Oxford, 2014.

⁴⁷⁷ See e.g. *BECTU* [2001] ECR I-4881; and *Netherlands v. Parliament and Council* [2001] ECR I-7079.

⁴⁷⁸ See e.g. *Jégo-Quéré v. Commission* [2002] ECR II-2365.

⁴⁷⁹ See e.g. *European Parliament v. Council* [2006] ECR I-5769; and *Salzgitter Mannesmann v. Commission*, Case No. C-411/04 P, ECJ, Judgment of 25 January 2007. See also Peers *et al.*, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; and *A, B and C v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie*, Joined Case Nos. C-148–150/13, CJEU, Judgment of 2 December 2014.

⁴⁸⁰ See e.g. the Annual Reports of the Parliament on Respect for Human Rights in the European Community,
www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00015/Human-rights.

⁴⁸¹ See e.g. Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, pp. 267 ff.; A. Bloed, ‘Monitoring the CSCE Human Dimension: In Search of its Effectiveness’, in *Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms* (ed. A. Bloed, L. Leicht, M. Nowak and A. Rosas), Dordrecht, 1993, p. 45; *The CSCE* (ed. A. Bloed), Dordrecht, 1993; *Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord* (ed. T. Buergenthal), Montclair, 1977; T. Buergenthal, ‘The Helsinki Process: Birth of a Human Rights System’, in *Human Rights in the World Community* (ed. R. Claude and B. Weston), 2nd ed., Philadelphia, 1992, p. 256; *Essays on Human Rights in the Helsinki Process* (ed. A. Bloed and P. Van Dijk), Dordrecht, 1985; A. Bloed and P. Van Dijk, *The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process*, Dordrecht, 1991; D. McGoldrick, ‘Human Rights Developments in the Helsinki Process’, **39 ICLQ**, 1990, p. 923; and D. McGoldrick, ‘The Development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – from Process to Institution’, in *Legal Visions of the New Europe* (ed. B. S. Jackson and D. McGoldrick), London, 1993, p. 135. See also www.osce.org/what/human-rights.

⁴⁸² I.e. all the states of Western and Eastern Europe, except Albania, plus the US and Canada.

⁴⁸³ For the text, see e.g. 14 ILM, 1975, p. 1292.

⁴⁸⁴ ‘Basket II’ covered cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment. This was built upon at the third follow-up meeting in Vienna in 1989; in particular the part entitled ‘Questions Relating to Security in Europe’ contained a Principles section, in which *inter alia* the parties confirmed their respect for human rights and their determination to guarantee their effective exercise. Paragraphs 13–27 contain in a detailed and concrete manner a list of human rights principles to be respected, ranging from

due process rights to equality and non-discrimination and the rights of religious communities, and from the rights of minorities to the rights of refugees; see the text of the Concluding Document in 10 HRLJ, 1989, p. 270. The Vienna Concluding Document also contained a part entitled ‘Human Dimension of the CSCE’ in which some implementation measures were provided for; see Bloed and Van Dijk, *Human Dimension*, p. 79; and McGoldrick, ‘Development of the CSCE’, p. 139. See also H. Tretter, ‘Human Rights in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of January 15, 1989’, 10 HRLJ, 1989, p. 257.

485 See 30 ILM, 1991, p. 190.

486 See 30 ILM, 1991, p. 1670 and Cm 1771 (1991).

487 See generally *OSCE Handbook*, Vienna, 2007.

488 There are currently fifty-seven participating states. Note also the report entitled ‘Common Purposes: Towards a More Effective OSCE’ produced by a Panel of Eminent Persons in 2005 and the new OSCE Rules of Procedure adopted in 2006: see *OSCE Handbook*.

489 See further below, p. 892.

490 See Section II of the Helsinki Decisions. Note that the High Commissioner deals with situations and not with individual complaints. See also *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (ed. W. A. Kemp), The Hague, 2001; K. Drzewicki, ‘The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities – Confronting Traditional and Emerging Challenges’, in *OSCE and Minorities: Assessment and Priorities* (ed. S. Parzymies), Warsaw, 2007; and J. Packer, ‘The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Pyrometer, Prophylactic, Pyrovestis’, in *Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination* (ed. N. Ghanea and A. Xanthaki), Leiden, 2005, p. 249.

491 See e.g. the Hague Recommendation on Education Rights of National Minorities 1996; the Oslo Recommendations on Linguistic Rights of National Minorities 1998; the Lund Recommendations on Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life 1999; the Guidelines on the Use of Minority Languages in the Broadcast Media 2003; and the Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies 2006: see www.osce.org/hcnm.

⁴⁹² See 5 *HRLJ*, 1994, p. 449.

⁴⁹³ Section VIII of the Budapest Decisions.

⁴⁹⁴ This group is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the OSCE and its members are the permanent representatives of the member states meeting weekly. It is based in Vienna.

⁴⁹⁵ Note also that the Monitoring Section within the ODIHR analyses human rights developments and compliance with Human Dimension commitments by participating states and alerts the Chairman-in-Office to serious deteriorations in respect for human rights.

⁴⁹⁶ See *OSCE Handbook*, p. 34; and the Sofia Decision 12, para. 16, 2004.

⁴⁹⁷ An OSCE Advisory Panel for the Prevention of Torture was established in 1998: see e.g. the Final Report of the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Human Rights and Inhuman Treatment and Punishment 2000; and a restructured Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief was established in 2000. Note that as a consequence of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia 1995, it was agreed that the OSCE would supervise elections in that country, closely monitor human rights throughout Bosnia and appoint an international human rights Ombudsman: see MC (5) Dec/1, 1995. The OSCE also has a role in Kosovo: see *OSCE Handbook*, p. 46.

⁴⁹⁸ See *OSCE Handbook*, pp. 39 ff. Of particular importance, perhaps, is the Minsk Process, dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, *ibid.*, p. 76.

⁴⁹⁹ This established a Court: see generally www.osce.org/cca.

⁵⁰⁰ See H/INF (95) 3, pp. 195 ff. See also the essays contained in 17 *HRLJ*, 1996 concerning the CIS and human rights.

⁵⁰¹ Resolution 1249 (2001). See also recommendation 1519 (2001) stating that recourse to the CIS Commission should not be regarded as another procedure of international settlement within the meaning of article 35(2)(b) of the European Convention. Note that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution in 2001 calling

upon member or applicant states which are also members of the CIS not to sign or ratify the CIS Convention due to concerns over the level of protection afforded.

⁵⁰² See generally C. Medina, *The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights*, Intersentia, 2014; T. M. Antkowiak and A. Gonza, *The American Convention on Human Rights*, Oxford, 2017; J. M. Pasqualucci, *The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2013; L. Burgorgue-Larsen and A. U. de Torres, *The Inter-American Court of Human Rights*, Oxford, 2011; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 9; H. J. Steiner, P. Alston and R. Goodman, *International Human Rights in Context*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2008, pp. 1020 ff.; *The Inter-American System of Human Rights* (ed. D. J. Harris and S. Livingstone), Oxford, 1998; *The Inter-American Human Rights System* (ed. P. Engstrom and C. Hillebrecht), London, 2019; L. Cavallero, C. Vargas, C. Sandoval and B. Duhaime, *Doctrine, Practice and Advocacy in the Inter-American Human Rights System*, Oxford, 2019; D. Shelton, 'The Inter-American Human Rights System', in Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*, p. 127; T. Buergenthal and R. Norris, *The Inter-American System*, Dobbs Ferry, 5 vols., 1983–84; S. Davidson, 'Remedies for Violations of the American Convention on Human Rights', 44 *ICLQ*, 1995, p. 405; and C. Grossman, 'Proposals to Strengthen the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights', 32 *German YIL*, 1990, p. 264.

⁵⁰³ The Convention currently has twenty-five parties: see www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm.

⁵⁰⁴ See e.g. J. Frowein, 'The European and the American Conventions on Human Rights – a Comparison', 1 *HRLJ*, 1980, p. 44. See also the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948.

⁵⁰⁵ See e.g. 10 DR, 1977, p. 100.

⁵⁰⁶ The Charter of the OAS has also been amended by the Protocols of Cartagena de Indias 1985; Washington, DC 1992; and Managua 1993. But note Venezuela's denunciation of the Inter-American Convention in September 2012, effective a year later; see Kunz, 'Judging International Judgments Anew', p. 1130.

⁵⁰⁷ See e.g. C. Medina, 'The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture', 12 *HRQ*, 1990, p. 439.

508 See generally the *Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System*, Washington, DC, 1992. The competence of the Commission to hear petitions relates to the rights in the Convention for states parties and to rights in the American Declaration for states not parties to the Convention. See also www.oas.org/en/iachr/.

509 Note that this is far broader than the equivalent article 34 of the European Convention, which requires that the applicant be a victim.

510 Articles 49–51. The Secretary-General of the OAS has played the role assigned in the European Convention to the Committee of Ministers.

511 See www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/statistics/statistics.html.

512 In 1994 e.g. with regard to Guatemala, Haiti, the Bahamas, Ecuador and Jamaica, see *Annual Report 1994*, pp. 21 ff., while in 2006 on-site visits were made to Haiti, Colombia, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Argentina and Peru, *Annual Report 2006*, chapter II C, paras. 34 ff. In 2015, an on-site visit was made to Mexico and by October 2015, a total of ninety-five such visits had been made, www.oas.org/en/iachr/activities/countries_all.asp. See also the Rules of Procedure 2009, 49 ILM, 2010, p. 597.

513 See *Annual Report 1994*, chapter IV, with regard to Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador and Guatemala, and *Annual Report 2006*, chapter IV, with regard to Colombia, Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela. See also www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/country.asp.

514 See e.g. *Annual Report 1992–3*, pp. 539 ff.; and *Annual Report 2015*, chapter III. See also e.g. AG/Res.443, 1979; AG/Res.666, 1983; AG/Res.547, 1981; AG/Res.624, 1982; and AG/Res.644, 1983 (torture).

515 *Annual Report 2006*, chapter II D, paras. 49 ff. See as to the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, *Annual Report 2006*, vol. II. See also *Annual Report 2015*, chapter III.

516 *Some Powers of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights*, Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of 16 July 1993, Series A, No. 13, para. 26.

517 *International Responsibility for Issuing and Applying Laws in Violation of the Convention*, IACHR, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of 9 December 1994, Series A, No. 14, para. 39. In the light of this, the Commission in 1994, for example, made a thorough study of the contempt laws (*leyes de desacato*), and concluded that many of these do not meet international human rights standards. The Commission recommended that all member states of the OAS that have such laws should repeal or amend them to bring them into line with international instruments, and with the obligations acquired under those instruments, so as to harmonise their laws with human rights treaties: *Annual Report 1994*, pp. 199 ff.

518 This entered into force in February 1987. Under the Convention, states parties agree to inform the Inter-American Commission of measures taken in application of the Convention, and the Commission ‘will endeavour in its annual report to analyse the existing situation in the member states of the Organization of American States in regard to the prevention and elimination of torture’: article 17.

519 This came into force in November 1999. Eleven states parties were required for the Additional Protocol to come into force. See also L. Le Blanc, ‘The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protocol to the American Convention and its Background’, *10 NQHR*, 1992, 130. Under article 19 of this instrument, states parties agreed to provide periodic reports on the progressive measures undertaken to ensure respect for the rights set forth therein. Such reports go to the Secretary-General of the OAS, who sends them to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture, with a copy to both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the specialised agencies of the inter-American system. Violations by a state party of the rights to organise and join trades unions (article 8(a)) and to education (article 13) ‘may give rise’ to application of the system of individual or inter-state petition under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.

520 This entered into force the following year. It currently has thirteen parties. See e.g. C. Cerna, ‘US Death Penalty Tested Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’, *10 NQHR*, 1992, p. 155.

521 This entered into force in March 1996.

522 Article 63(2) of the Convention states that in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such

provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With regard to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission. Article 19(c) of the Statute of the Commission provides that the Commission has the power to request the Court to take such provisional measures as it considers appropriate in serious and urgent cases which have not yet been submitted to it for consideration, whenever this becomes necessary to prevent irreparable injury to persons. Under article 29 of the Regulations of the Commission, the Commission may on its own initiative or at the request of a party take any action it considers necessary for the discharge of its functions. In particular, in urgent cases, when it becomes necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Commission may request that provisional measures be taken to avoid irreparable damage in cases where the denounced facts are true. Article 24 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court provides that at any stage of the proceeding involving cases of extreme gravity and urgency and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court may, at the request of a party or on its own motion, order whatever provisional measures it deems appropriate, pursuant to article 63(2) of the Convention.

523 Note also the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities 1999. This came into force in September 2001. The Inter-American Convention against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance was signed in June 2013.

524 See above, p. 266.

525 See articles 34–38 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.

526 See e.g. *Annual Report 2019*, chapter II.

527 See *Annual Report 2006*, chapter III E and see also 45 ILM, 2006, pp. 669 ff. Such measures were first granted on 12 March 2002 and requested that the US take the ‘urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo determined by a competent tribunal’. Such measures were repeated on a number of separate occasions. As these measures were not complied with – the US arguing that the Commission lacked jurisdiction – the Commission adopted resolution no. 2/06 on 28 July 2006, noting that the failure of the US to give effect to the Commission’s precautionary measures had resulted in irreparable prejudice to the fundamental rights of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, including their rights to liberty and to humane treatment, and urging the US to close the

Guantanamo Bay facility without delay; see also www.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/decisions/Guantanamo.asp.

528 See, for examples of friendly settlement procedures, *Annual Report 2001*, chapter III C.4.

529 See e.g. *Annual Report 2006*, chapter III D; and *Annual Report 2015*, chapter II.

530 Article 51 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. If this does not happen and the matter is not settled with the state concerned, the Commission by a majority vote may set forth its own opinion and conclusions on the matter, which may be published. See e.g. *Annual Report 1983–4*, pp. 23–75. See also www.corteidh.or.cr/.

531 Articles 52–54. See also L. L. Burgogue-Larsen, A. A. Ubeda de Torres and R. R. Greenstein, *The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case-Law and Commentary*, Oxford, 2011; J. S. Davidson, *The Inter-American Court of Human Rights*, Aldershot, 1992; C. Cerna, ‘The Structure and Functioning of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979–1992)’, **63 BYIL**, 1992, p. 135; and L. E. Frost, ‘The Evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, **14 HRQ**, 1992, p. 171.

532 The first time was in January 1988, against Honduras, following the killing of a person due to testify before it and concerns expressed about the safety of other witnesses, H/Inf. (88) 1, p. 64. See also the provisional measures adopted by the Court against Peru, in similar circumstances, in August 1990, 11 *HRLJ*, 1990, p. 257; and *Alemán Lacayo v. Nicaragua*, Series E, Order of 2 February 1996; *Álvarez and Others v. Colombia*, Series E, Order of 22 July 1997; and *Constitutional Court*, Series E, Order of 14 August 2000. See also *Hilaire and Others v. Trinidad and Tobago*, IACHR, Judgment of 21 June 2002. The Court also granted provisional measures e.g. to protect the lives and personal integrity of witnesses in the *Mapiripán Massacre* case against Colombia, see *Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2005*, p. 39, and in the case of the *Children and Adolescents Deprived of Liberty in the ‘Complexo do Tatuapé’ of FEBEM v. Brazil*, *ibid.*, p. 41.

533 Of the twenty-five Advisory Opinions issued between 1959 and 2019, seventeen concerned the interpretation of the Convention, five concerned the interpretation of other treaties and three concerned the compatibility between domestic laws and international

instruments: see

www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busqueda_opiniones_consultivas.cfm?lang=en.

534 22 ILM, 1983, p. 51; 67 ILR, p. 594.

535 22 ILM, 1983, p.33; 67 ILR, p. 559.

536 Paragraph 37. See article 74 of the Convention.

537 *Ibid.*, para. 29. In the *Licensing of Journalists* case, the Court advised that the compulsory licensing of journalists was incompatible with article 13, the freedom of expression provision in the Convention, if it denied any person access to the full use of the media as a means of expressing opinions. The Court emphasised that freedom of expression could only be restricted on the basis of ‘compelling governmental interest’ and that the restriction must be ‘closely tailored to the accomplishment of the legitimate governmental objective necessitating it’, 7 *HRLJ*, 1986, p. 74; 75 ILR, p. 31. See also *Sunday Times*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 30, 1979. In the *Habeas Corpus* case, the Court declared that the writ of habeas corpus was a non-suspendable ‘judicial guarantee’ for the protection of rights from which no derogation was permitted under the Convention under article 27. Reference was made to the ‘inseparable bond between the principle of legality, democratic institutions and the rule of law’. The Court also emphasised that only democratic governments could avail themselves of the right to declare a state of emergency and then only under closely circumscribed conditions, 9 *HRLJ*, 1988, p. 94; 96 ILR, p. 392.

538 28 ILM, 1989, p. 378; 96 ILR, p. 416.

539 *Ibid.*, pp. 388–9. See also T. Buergenthal, ‘The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights’, 69 *AJIL*, 1975, p. 828.

540 The problem was that the Declaration clearly was not a treaty and article 64 provides for advisory opinions regarding the Convention itself and ‘other treaties’. Note, in addition, that in the *Right to Information on Consular Assistance* opinion requested by Mexico the Court declared that article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, providing for the right to consular assistance of detained foreign nationals was part of international human rights law and that the state must comply with its duty to inform the detainee of the rights that the article confers upon him at the time of his arrest or at least before he makes his first statement before the authorities: IACHR, Series A, No. 16, OC-

16/99, 1999; and see [Chapter 12](#), p. 672. Note also the Advisory Opinions on the rights and guarantees of children in the context of migration and/or in need of international protection, Series A, No. 21, 2014, and on the entitlement of legal entities to held rights under the Inter-American Convention, Series A, No. 22, 2016.

⁵⁴¹ IACHR, OC-23/17, 15 November 2017; 112 *AJIL*, 2018, p. 460. In *Gender Identity and Non-Discrimination of Same Sex Couples*, 112 *AJIL*, 2018, p. 480, the Court, based on the principles of dignity and autonomy, inferred the rights of ‘individual self-determination’, which included *inter alia* the right to identity incorporating the equal protection of same-sex couples. See by way of contrast the ECtHR judgment in *Schalk and Kopf v. Austria*, Judgment of 24 June 2010, which held that the question of same-sex marriage fell within the margin of appreciation and was thus a matter within the jurisdiction of states parties.

⁵⁴² 20 ILM, 1981, p. 1424; 67 ILR, p. 578.

⁵⁴³ 9 *HRLJ*, 1988, p. 212; 95 ILR, p. 232.

⁵⁴⁴ H/Inf (90) 1, p. 80; 95 ILR, p. 320 (note).

⁵⁴⁵ Note also the award of compensation to the victims in both of these cases, *ibid.*, pp. 80–1.

⁵⁴⁶ At paras. 174–6. See also *Castillo Páez v. Peru*, Series C, No. 34, 1997; 116 ILR, p. 451.

⁵⁴⁷ Series C, No. 33, 1997; 116 ILR, p. 338.

⁵⁴⁸ IACHR, Judgment of 14 March 2001, 41 ILM, 2002, p. 93. See also *Barrios Altos and La Cantuta v. Peru*, 113 *AJIL*, 2019, p. 568, where the Court discussed impunity and the Convention. See generally C. Martin, ‘Catching Up with the Past: Recent Decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Addressing Gross Human Rights Violations Perpetrated During the 1970–1980s’, 7 *Human Rights Law Review*, 2007, p. 774.

⁵⁴⁹ See e.g. *Sawhoyamaya Indigenous Community v. Paraguay*, Judgment of 29 March 2006.

⁵⁵⁰ *Caso Atala Riffo y Ninas v. Chile*, IACHR, Judgment of 24 February 2012. See also the important case of *Gonzalez (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico* 49 ILM, 2010, p. 637, concerning violence and discrimination against women; and *Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname*, where the IACHR held that since Suriname did not recognise the collective legal personality of the indigenous and tribal peoples, it was in violation of the convention, Judgment of 25 November 2015.

⁵⁵¹ See e.g. R. Murray, *The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Commentary*, Oxford, 2019; R. Murray, *The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights*, London, 2000; *The African Regional Human Rights System* (ed. M. Ssenyonjo), The Hague, 2011; U. O. Umozurike, *The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights*, The Hague, 1997 and 2012; *The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986–2006* (ed. M. Evans and R. Murray), 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2008; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, chapter 10; Steiner *et al.*, *International Human Rights*, p. 1062; E. Ankumah, *The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights*, Dordrecht, 1996; R. Gittleman, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis’, 22 *Va. JIL*, 1981, p. 667; A. Bello, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 194 *HR*, 1985, p. 5; S. Neff, ‘Human Rights in Africa’, 33 *ICLQ*, 1984, p. 331; U. O. Umozurike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 77 *AJIL*, 1983, p. 902; B. Ramcharan, ‘The Travaux Préparatoires of the African Commission on Human Rights’, *HRLJ*, 1992, p. 307; W. Benedek, ‘The African Charter and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: How to Make It More Effective’, 14 *NQHR*, 1993, p. 25; C. Flinterman and E. Ankumeh, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice*, p. 171; M. A. Baderin, ‘Recent Developments in the African Regional Human Rights System’, 5 *Human Rights Law Review*, 2005, p. 117; and C. Beyani, ‘Recent Developments in the African Human Rights System 2004–2006’, 7 *Human Rights Law Review*, 2007, p. 582. See also F. Ouguergouz, ‘La Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples’, *AFDI*, 1989, p. 557; and K. Mbaye, *Les Droits de l’Homme en Afrique*, Paris, 1992. See also generally www.achpr.org/.

⁵⁵² See www.achpr.org/statepartiestotheafricancharter.

⁵⁵³ See articles 19–22.

⁵⁵⁴ See above, *Chapter 5*, p. 233.

555 See e.g. M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa*, Oxford, 1986.

556 Case No. 75/92: see 13 NQHR, 1995, p. 478.

557 See articles 27–29.

558 See article 45 and Rules 69–72 of the Rules of Procedure 2010. See also A. Bello, ‘The Mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 1 *African Journal of International Law*, 1988, p. 31.

559 Covering topics such as the rights of women, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons in Africa; freedom of expression; human rights defenders in Africa; prisons and conditions of detention in Africa; older persons and disabled persons; and extractive industries, the environment and human rights: see e.g. Beyani, ‘Recent Developments’, p. 588; and www.achpr.org/specialmechanisms.

560 Covering issues such as economic, social and cultural rights; indigenous populations and communities; and the death penalty: e.g. *ibid.*, p. 589 and www.achpr.org/specialmechanisms.

561 Such as the resolutions expressing deep concern about the violation of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur, e.g. ACHPR/Res.74(XXXVII)05, 2005 and about the continued attacks on the independence of the judiciary by the government of Zimbabwe, e.g. resolution adopted by the Executive Council of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9th Ordinary Session, June 2006, Ex. CL/279 (ix), Annex III, p. 99. See also Beyani, ‘Recent Developments’, pp. 592 ff.; and the resolution concerning the protection of human rights defenders in Africa, ACHPR/Res.69(XXXV)04, 2004.

562 Articles 47–54. See also Rules 87 ff. of the Rules of Procedure.

563 Communication 227/99, African Commission, *Twentieth Activity Report*, EX.CL/279 (IX), Annex IV, pp. 111 ff. See also Beyani, ‘Recent Developments’, pp. 598 ff.

564 See article 55. There are a number of admissibility requirements: see article 56. For recent decisions on communications, see www.achpr.org/communications/.

⁵⁶⁵ Article 58(1) and (2). Further, a case of emergency duly noted by the Commission shall be submitted to the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government who may request an in-depth study: article 58(3).

⁵⁶⁶ Rule 98. See e.g. G. J. Naldi, 'Interim Measures of Protection in the African System for the Protection of Human and Peoples' Rights', 2 *African Human Rights Law Journal*, 2002, p. 1. The Commission has taken the view that the adoption of interim measures is binding on the parties: see e.g. *Saro-Wiwa v. Nigeria*, 7 *International Human Rights Reports*, 2000, p. 274.

⁵⁶⁷ See 40 *The Review*, *International Commission of Jurists*, 1988, p. 26; [www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/Rules_of_Procedure_of_the_African Commission on Human and PeoplesRights2010_%20Legal%20Instruments%20%20ACHPR.pdf](http://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/Rules_of_Procedure_of_the_African_Commission_on_Human_and_PeoplesRights2010_%20Legal%20Instruments%20%20ACHPR.pdf); and www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=518 www.achpr.org/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/.

⁵⁶⁸ See e.g. *Lawyers for Human Rights v. Swaziland*, Communication 251/2002, 13 *International Human Rights Reports*, 2006, p. 887, concerning the overthrow of constitutional democracy and the banning of political parties. See also *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe*, African Commission, *Twenty-First Activity Report*, Annex III, pp. 54 ff.; and *Sudan Human Rights Org. v. Sudan and Ctr for Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan* 49 ILM, 2010, p. 1569. See S. Gumudz, 'Bringing Communications Before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights', 3 *African Human Rights Law Journal*, 2003, p. 118.

⁵⁶⁹ Article 62. See also Rules 83–86.

⁵⁷⁰ See e.g. G. Oberleitner and C. Welch, 'Africa: 15th Session African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights', 12 *NQHR*, 1994, p. 333; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, p. 255; and M. Vans, T. Ige and R. Murray, 'The Reporting Mechanism of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights', in *The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* (ed. M. Evans and R. Murray), Cambridge, 2002, p. 36. Thirty-one states have not submitted any reports, while twelve are late by three or more reports: see www.achpr.org/states/.

⁵⁷¹ This came into force on 25 January 2004. Judges were first elected in 2006. See e.g. D. Padilla, ‘An African Human Rights Court: Reflections from the Perspective of the Inter-American System’, *2 African Human Rights Law Journal*, 2002, p. 185; R. W. Eno, ‘The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, *2 African Human Rights Law Journal*, 2002, p. 223; and R. Murray, ‘A Comparison Between the African and European Courts of Human Rights’, *2 African Human Rights Law Journal*, 2002, p. 195. To date, thirty states are parties to the Protocol, [https://en.african-court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/Ratification and Deposit of the Declaration final-May-2020.pdf](https://en.african-court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/Ratification%20and%20Deposit%20of%20the%20Declaration%20final-May-2020.pdf). See generally www.african-court.org/en/.

⁵⁷² See e.g. *Anudo v. Tanzania* 58 ILM, 2018, p. 603, in which the Court held that there had been a violation of the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of nationality; *APDF v. Mali*, Judgment of 11 May 2018, in which the Court noted that human rights obligations applied regardless of religious concerns; and *Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Rwanda*, ACHPR, Judgment of 24 November 2017, in which the Court discussed the rights of freedom of expression and fair trial in the context of Rwanda’s law prohibiting the minimising of genocide and noted that it could only order release as a remedy in exceptional and compelling circumstances.

⁵⁷³ Article 5. See also Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure 2010.

⁵⁷⁴ Articles 5(3) and 34(6). Ten states made the necessary declaration. However, by April 2020, three of these states (Tanzania, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire) had withdrawn their declarations, see www.ejiltalk.org/another-one-bites-the-dust-cote-divoire-to-end-individual-and-ngo-access-to-the-african-court/. By April 2020, 272 applications had been made to the Court, and eighty cases decided. The Court delivered its first judgment in 2009 following an application dated 11 August 2008 by Michelot Yogogombaye against the Republic of Senegal; see 49 ILM, 2010, p. 850.

⁵⁷⁵ See 48 ILM, 2009, p. 334. Fifteen ratifications are required for the Protocol to come into force. As of April 2020, there were only seven ratifications; see <https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights>.

⁵⁷⁶ See e.g. the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Community Court of Justice, following the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975 and the Protocol establishing the Court in 1991. Since the Supplemental Protocol of 2005, the Court has been able to hear

communications alleging breaches of human rights: see www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?lang=en. See also 'Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice', **107 AJIL**, 2013, p. 737. Note also the SADC (Southern African Development Community) Tribunal established by a Protocol adopted in 2000 and operative since 2005. After several judgments holding Zimbabwe in breach of human rights (see e.g. *Campbell v. Zimbabwe* 48 ILM, 2009, p. 530), the Tribunal was *de facto* suspended at the 2010 SADC Summit. On 17 August 2012, in Maputo, Mozambique, the SADC Summit decided that a new tribunal should be negotiated and that its mandate should be confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States: see www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/. Note also the existence of the East African Court of Justice, created by the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community in 1999 and as amended in 2006 and 2007. This has under article 27(2) 'such other original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council [of Ministers of the Community]'. This apparently has yet to be determined: see generally <http://eacj.org/?page>. See also K. J. Alter, J. T. Gathii and L. R. Helfer, 'Backlash against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences', **27 EJIL**, 2016, p. 293.

⁵⁷⁷ An Arab Charter on Human Rights was adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 15 September 1994 and a revised version was adopted by the League of Arab States in May 2004. It affirms the principles contained in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. A number of traditional human rights are also provided for, including the right to liberty and security of persons, equality of persons before the law, fair trial, protection of persons from torture, the right to own private property, freedom to practise religious observance and freedom of peaceful assembly and association. The right to self-determination is also noted. See e.g. M. Rishmawi, 'The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: A Step Forward?', **5 Human Rights Law Review**, 2005, p. 361; M. Rishmawi, 'The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States: An Update', **10 Human Rights Law Review**, 2010, p. 169; Rehman, *International Human Rights Law*, pp. 377 ff.; R. K. M. Smith, *Textbook on International Human Rights*, Oxford, 2002, p. 87; and A. A. A. Naim, 'Human Rights in the Arab World: A Legal Perspective', **23 HRQ**, 2001, p. 70. The Charter also provides for the election of a seven-person Arab Human Rights Committee to consider states' reports and came into force on 24 January 2008. Note, however, the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressing concern with regard to the incompatibility of some of the provisions of the Arab Charter with international norms and standards. These concerns included the

approach to the death penalty for children and the rights of women and non-citizens. The High Commissioner also noted that, in equating Zionism with racism, the Arab Charter was ‘not in conformity with General Assembly resolution 46/86, which rejects that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination’: see statement of 30 January 2008, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25447#.V6tgE5MrJjR.

⁵⁷⁸ Note also the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009, which has various functions, including research and promotional activity, and which drafted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012. It is stated to be a consultative body and there is no competence to hear communications, see <http://aichr.org/>. See also Tae-Ung Baik, *Emerging Regional Human Rights Systems in Asia*, Cambridge, 2012. See also N. Doyle, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, 63 *ICLQ*, 2014, p. 67.

Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law¹

The rise of individual criminal responsibility directly under international law marks the coming together of elements of traditional international law with more modern approaches to human rights law and humanitarian law, and involves consideration of domestic as well as international enforcement mechanisms. Although the rights of individuals in international law have evolved significantly in the post-1945 era, the placing of obligations directly upon persons as opposed to states has a distinct, if narrow, pedigree.² Those committing piracy or slave trading³ have long been regarded as guilty of crimes against international society bearing direct responsibility, for which they may be punished by international tribunals or by any state at all.

Jurisdiction to hear the offence is not confined to, for example, the state on whose territory the act took place, or the national state of the offender or the victim. This universal jurisdiction over piracy constitutes a long-established principle of the world community.⁴ All states may both arrest and punish pirates, provided of course that they have been apprehended on the high seas⁵ or within the territory of the state concerned. The punishment of the offenders takes place whatever their nationality and wherever they happened to carry out their criminal activities.

Piracy under international law (or piracy *jure gentium*) must be distinguished from piracy under municipal law. Offences that may be characterised as piratical under municipal laws do not necessarily fall within the definition of piracy in international law, and thus are not susceptible to universal jurisdiction (depending of course upon the content and form of international conventions). Piracy *jure gentium* was defined in article 15 of the High Seas Convention 1958 (and reaffirmed in article 101 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea) as illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft and directed against another ship or aircraft (or persons or property therein) on the high seas or *terra nullius*.⁶ Attempts to commit such acts are sufficient to constitute piracy and it is not essential for the attempt to have been successful.⁷

However, the range of offences under international law for which individuals bore international responsibility was narrow indeed.⁸ It is doubtful whether it had extended beyond piracy and slave trading by the turn of the twentieth century. Even then, jurisdiction was exercisable in practice only by domestic courts. It is a modern phenomenon to establish international courts or tribunals to exercise jurisdiction directly over individuals with regard to specified crimes. As will be seen in Chapter 11, domestic courts are indeed exercising a greater jurisdiction with regard to offences with international elements, for example, with regard to torture or war crimes committed outside the territory of the state concerned provided that the alleged offender is within the territory of the state, but this is only where an international treaty authorises states to exercise such jurisdiction and this has been brought into effect internally.⁹ However, the focus of this chapter is upon courts

established internationally or with an international element in order to prosecute individuals directly accused of international offences.

International Criminal Courts and Tribunals¹⁰

After the conclusion of the First World War, a commission set up by the Allied Powers recommended that as the defeated powers had violated the laws of war, high officials, including the Kaiser, be prosecuted for ordering such crimes and on the basis of command responsibility. It was also suggested that an Allied High Tribunal be established to try violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity.¹¹ Accordingly, the Treaty of Versailles 1919 noted that the German government recognised the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring individuals accused of crimes against the laws and customs of war before military tribunals (article 228) and established the individual responsibility of the Kaiser (article 227). In the event, the Netherlands refused to hand over the Kaiser and only a few trials were held before German courts in Leipzig with, at best, mixed results.¹²

The Charter annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals 1945 provided specifically for individual responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. There was also a conspiracy charge.¹³ The Nuremberg Tribunal, composed of four principal judges (from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France) and four alternates, was the first international criminal tribunal and marks the true starting-point for international criminal law. It affirmed in ringing and lasting terms that ‘international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as

upon states' as 'crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced'. Included in the relevant category for which individual responsibility was posited were crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹⁴ In addition, a number of war crimes trials were instituted within Allied-occupied Germany under the authority of Control Council Law No. 10.¹⁵ The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established in January 1946 to deal with Japanese war crimes.¹⁶ This Tribunal was composed of judges from eleven states¹⁷ and it essentially reaffirmed the Nuremberg Tribunal's legal findings as to, for example, the criminality of aggressive war and the rejection of the absolute defence of superior orders.¹⁸ The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (or Tokyo Charter) also provided for individual responsibility with regard to certain crimes.¹⁹

The provisions of the Nuremberg Charter can now be regarded as part of international law, particularly since the General Assembly in 1946 affirmed the principles of this Charter and the decision of the Tribunal.²⁰ The Assembly also stated that genocide was a crime under international law bearing individual responsibility.²¹ This was reaffirmed in the Genocide Convention of 1948, which also called for prosecutions by either domestic courts or 'an international penal tribunal'.²² The International Law Commission produced a Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1954, article 1 of which provided that 'offences against the peace and security of mankind, as defined in this Code, are crimes under international law, for which the responsible individuals shall be punishable'.²³

Individual responsibility has also been confirmed with regard to grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Red Cross Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols I and II dealing with armed conflicts. It is provided specifically that the High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or ordering to be committed any of a series of grave breaches.²⁴ Such grave breaches include wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, unlawful deportation or transfer of protected persons and the taking of hostages.²⁵ Additional Protocol I of 1977 extends the list to include, for example, making the civilian population the object of attack and launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life or damage to civilians or their property when committed wilfully and causing death or serious injury; other activities such as transferring civilian population from the territory of an occupying power to that of an occupied area or deporting from an occupied area, apartheid and racial discrimination, and attacking clearly recognised historic monuments, works of art or places of worship, may also constitute grave breaches when committed wilfully.²⁶

Any individual, regardless of rank or governmental status, would be personally liable for any war crimes or grave breaches committed, while the principle of command (or superior) responsibility means that any person in a position of authority ordering the commission of a war crime or grave breach would be as accountable as the subordinate committing it.²⁷ The International Law Commission in 1991 provisionally adopted a Draft Code of Crimes

Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,²⁸ which was revised in 1996.²⁹ The 1996 Draft Code provides for individual criminal responsibility³⁰ with regard to aggression,³¹ genocide,³² a crime against humanity,³³ a crime against UN and associated personnel,³⁴ and war crimes.³⁵ The fact that an individual may be responsible for the crimes in question is deemed not to affect the issue of state responsibility.³⁶ The Security Council in two resolutions on the Somali situation in the early 1990s unanimously condemned breaches of humanitarian law and stated that the authors of such breaches or those who had ordered their commission would be held ‘individually responsible’ for them,³⁷ while Security Council resolution 674 (1990) concerning Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, reaffirming Iraq’s liability under the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 dealing with civilian populations of occupied areas, noted that such responsibility for grave breaches extended to ‘individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches’.³⁸

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)³⁹

It was, however, the events in the former Yugoslavia that impelled a renewal of interest in the establishment of an international criminal court, which had long been under consideration, but in a desultory fashion.⁴⁰ The Yugoslav experience, and the Rwanda massacres of 1994, led to the establishment of two specific war crimes tribunals by the use of the authority of the UN Security Council to adopt decisions binding upon all member states of the organisation under Chapter VII of the Charter, rather than by an international conference as was to be the case with the International Criminal Court. This method was used in order both to enable the tribunal in question to come into operation as quickly as possible and to ensure that the parties most closely associated with the subject-matter of the war crimes alleged should be bound in a manner not dependent upon their consent (as would be necessary in the case of a court established by international agreement). The establishment of the Tribunal was preceded by a series of steps. In Security Council resolutions 764 (1992), 771 (1992) and 820 (1993), grave concern was expressed with regard to breaches of international humanitarian law and the responsibilities of the parties were reaffirmed. In particular, individual responsibility for the commission of grave breaches of the 1949 Conventions was emphasised. Under resolution 780 (1992), the Security Council established an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information concerning evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.⁴¹

The Security Council then adopted resolution 808 (1993) calling for the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute ‘persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991’. The UN Secretary-General produced a report incorporating a draft statute and commentary,⁴² which was adopted by the Security Council in resolution 827 (1993) acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁴³

The Tribunal had the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (articles 1 and 8 of the Statute) and the absence of a closing date meant that the later conflict in Kosovo could be the subject of prosecutions.⁴⁴ The Tribunal, which operated from 1993 to the end of 2017, consisted of three main organs: the Registry, the office of the Prosecutor and the Chambers.⁴⁵ The Registry was the administrative body,⁴⁶ while the Office of the Prosecutor is responsible for investigations, issuing of indictments and bringing matters to trial. There were three Trial Chambers, each consisting of a presiding judge and two other judges, and an Appeals Chamber, consisting of seven members but sitting in a panel of five, headed by a President. Of the seven, five came from the ICTY and two from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.⁴⁷ The Chambers had a maximum of sixteen permanent judges and a maximum of twelve *ad litem* judges drawn from a pool of twenty-seven such judges elected by the General Assembly for four-year renewable terms.⁴⁸

Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute lay down the crimes with regard to which the Tribunal could exercise jurisdiction. These were: grave breaches of the

Geneva Conventions of 1949, violation of the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity.⁴⁹

Article 7 established that persons who ‘planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution’ of crimes listed in articles 2 to 5 shall be individually responsible for the crime. This article also provided that the official position of any accused person was not to relieve a person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment, while the fact that a subordinate committed the crime was not to relieve a superior of responsibility if the latter knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to or had committed the crime and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a government or of a superior was not to relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, although this could constitute a mitigating factor if the Tribunal determined that justice so requires. The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal in the *Tadić* case confirmed that customary international law had imposed criminal responsibility for serious violations of humanitarian law governing internal as well as international armed conflicts.⁵⁰

The Tribunal and national courts had concurrent jurisdiction with regard to the prosecution of relevant accused persons, but the Tribunal had primacy over national courts, so that the former was able to request the latter to defer to its competence.⁵¹ States were obliged to cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law and had to

comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including the identification and location of persons; the taking of testimony and the production of evidence; the arrest or detention of persons; and the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.⁵² No person could be tried by a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under the Statute, for which he or she had already been tried by the International Tribunal, but the Tribunal was able to try a person for relevant acts after trial by a national court where the act for which he or she was tried was characterised as an ordinary crime; or where the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted.⁵³

Investigations into alleged offences under the Statute were initiated by the Prosecutor either *ex officio* or on the basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from governments, UN organs, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. Information received was assessed by the Prosecutor, who then decided whether there was a sufficient basis to proceed. The Prosecutor could question suspects, victims and witnesses, collect evidence and conduct on-site investigations. Where it was determined that a *prima facie* case existed, the Prosecutor was to prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of the facts and the crime or crimes with which the accused was charged, and this indictment was then transmitted to a judge of the Trial Chamber for review. If satisfied that a *prima facie* case had been established by the Prosecutor, the judge would confirm the indictment. If not so satisfied, the indictment was to be dismissed. Upon confirmation of

an indictment, the judge could, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial. It was then for the Trial Chambers to ensure that the trial was fair and expeditious and that proceedings were conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.⁵⁴ Judgment was then be reached by the Trial Chamber concerned and punishment, limited to imprisonment, imposed upon conviction.⁵⁵ Appeal was to the Appeals Chamber on the grounds either of an error of law invalidating the decision or of an error of fact occasioning a miscarriage of justice. The Appeals Chamber could affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chambers.⁵⁶

The Tribunal dealt with a number of significant issues.⁵⁷ In an early case, the Appeal Chamber held that it had the power to review the question of the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal and noted that the Security Council had adopted a decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter binding on all member states to create the Tribunal in the framework of the restoration of international peace and security.⁵⁸

By the end of 2017, the Tribunal had issued 161 indictments, with regard to which ninety individuals had been sentenced, nineteen acquitted, thirty-seven indictments withdrawn (including where the accused had died) and thirteen persons transferred to national jurisdictions. Two individuals were sent for retrial before the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals.⁵⁹ The UN Security Council had confirmed a completion strategy, under which the Tribunal concentrated on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders

while referring other cases involving intermediate and lower-rank accused to national courts.⁶⁰ Cases began to be transferred to the national courts of successor states to the former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Croatia, in 2005.⁶¹ The Tribunal ceased operation on 31 December 2017.⁶²

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)⁶³

Following events in Rwanda during 1994 and the mass slaughter that took place, the Security Council decided in resolution 955 (1994) to establish an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, with the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Statute of this Tribunal was annexed to the body of the Security Council resolution and bears many similarities to the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal.

The Rwanda Tribunal consisted of three Trial Chambers, an Office of the Prosecutor and a Registry with the same functions as those of the Yugoslav Tribunal.⁶⁴ The Chambers were composed of sixteen permanent independent judges, no two of whom could be nationals of the same state, and a maximum at any one time of nine *ad litem* independent judges. The ICTR and the ICTY shared a joint Appeals Chamber, two members of whom were members of the Rwanda Tribunal.⁶⁵

Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute stipulated the crimes over which the Tribunal had jurisdiction. Article 2 dealt with genocide; article 3 with crimes against humanity, being the crimes of (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; and (i) other inhumane acts, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds; and

article 4 dealt with violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.⁶⁶ Article 6 provided for individual criminal responsibility with regard to persons planning, ordering, committing or aiding the crimes listed, while provisions similar to the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal with regard to the absence of immunity for persons holding official positions, command responsibility and superior orders applied.

The Tribunal had jurisdiction with regard to serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.⁶⁷ As in the case of the ICTY, the ICTR had concurrent jurisdiction with national courts and had primacy over national courts of all states, while at any stage of the procedure, the Tribunal could formally request national courts to defer to its competence.⁶⁸ Similarly, no person may be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she had already been tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, while a person who had been tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law could be subsequently tried by the Tribunal only if either the act for which he or she was tried was characterised as an ordinary crime; or the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted.⁶⁹

After several difficult early years, during which problems of mismanagement with regard to the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry predominated,⁷⁰

the Tribunal began to produce some significant decisions. These commenced with the *Kambanda* case,⁷¹ which was the first time that a former head of government was convicted for the crime of genocide (after having pleaded guilty), and the *Akayesu* case,⁷² in which for the first time an international tribunal was called upon to interpret the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention 1948 and to define the crime of rape in international law. However, the rate of progress was disappointing and tensions with Rwanda have surfaced from time to time.

As in the case of the ICTY, the Rwanda Tribunal formulated a completion strategy, affirmed by Security Council resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004), although it had in 2002 adopted Rule 11 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure permitting the transfer of cases to national jurisdictions, as had the ICTY.⁷³ The Security Council, as with the ICTY, increased the number of *ad litem* judges and various other management decisions were taken. A separate Prosecutor for the ICTR was appointed in 2003. Attention was focused upon the prosecution of individuals who allegedly were in positions of leadership, and those who allegedly bore the greatest responsibility for the genocide, while the Prosecutor held discussions with states, including Rwanda, regarding the referral of cases to national jurisdictions for trial, in particular with regard to accused persons who were investigated but not indicted by his office. Considerations of fair trial in the state concerned were also a relevant factor, as well as the alleged status and extent of participation of the individual during the genocide, the alleged connection that the individual may have had with other cases, the need to cover the major geographical areas of Rwanda, the availability of evidence with regard to the individual concerned and the availability of investigative material for transmission to a

state for national prosecution. The ICTR delivered its final trial judgment on 20 December 2012⁷⁴ and its final appeal judgment on 14 December 2015.⁷⁵ On 31 December 2015, the Tribunal came to a close, handing over its functions to the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals.⁷⁶

The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals

An international residual mechanism for the international criminal tribunals to carry out a number of essential functions of the ICYT and ICTR after the closure of the Tribunals, including the trial of fugitives who were among the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes, was established in 2010.⁷⁷ The Mechanism was intended to be a small, temporary and efficient structure. In accordance with its statute, the Mechanism has a President, a Prosecutor and a Registrar, who together have responsibility over two branches, one in Arusha and the other in The Hague. The Mechanism is planned to operate for an initial period of four years and then for subsequent periods of two years following reviews of its progress, unless the Security Council decides otherwise. The Mechanism commenced operations at its Arusha branch on 1 July 2012, covering functions inherited from the ICTR and the branch in The Hague commenced on 1 July 2013 with regard to functions inherited from the ICTY. Its functions include attending to judicial matters such as the trial of fugitives indicted by the ICTR,⁷⁸ providing for witness protection, supervising the enforcement of sentences and managing archives. As of May 2020, eight persons indicted by the ICTR remained at large, of whom three were expected to be tried by the Mechanism, and the cases of the remaining five to be transferred to Rwanda for trial.⁷⁹

The International Criminal Court (ICC)⁸⁰

Article VI of the Genocide Convention 1948 provided for persons charged with genocide to be tried either by a court in the territory where the act had been committed or by an ‘international penal tribunal’ to be established. The International Law Commission was asked to study the possibility of the establishment of such an international court and a report was produced.⁸¹ The matter was then transmitted to the General Assembly, which produced a draft statute.⁸² However, the question was postponed until a definition of aggression had been achieved and the draft Code of Offences completed. Due primarily to political reasons, no further progress was made until Trinidad and Tobago proposed the creation of a permanent international criminal court to deal with drug trafficking in 1989. Given additional urgency by the developing Yugoslav situation in the early 1990s, the International Law Commission adopted a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court in 1994.⁸³ This draft statute proposed that an international criminal court be established with jurisdiction not only over genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression, but also over certain ‘treaty crimes’ such as terrorism and drugs offences found in UN conventions. The draft statute was also less expansive than the International Criminal Court Statute proved to be in a number of ways, including not providing for the Prosecutor to initiate investigations on his or her own authority. However, the ILC draft proved very influential and a Preparatory Committee was convened in December 1995.⁸⁴ The work of this Committee⁸⁵ led to the Rome Conference in 1998, which produced after some effort the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. Sixty states were needed to ratify the Rome

Statute in order for it to come into force and this duly happened on 1 July 2002. Unlike the two international criminal tribunals (for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda), the ICC is the product not of a binding Security Council resolution, but of an international treaty. This was essentially because states, while being prepared to accept the creation of geographically limited (the Former Yugoslavia) and temporally constrained (in Rwanda's case) tribunals by Security Council action, were not willing to be so bound by the establishment of a permanent international criminal court with much more extensive jurisdiction without express consent. Secondly, it is to be noted that the range and content of the Rome Statute is far greater than those of the two international criminal tribunals. The Rome Statute contains 128 articles, while the ICTY Statute contains thirty-four articles and the ICTR Statute thirty-two articles.

The Statute provides that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is limited to the 'most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole', being genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression,⁸⁶ and that a person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 'shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment' in accordance with the Statute.⁸⁷ The ICC only has jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed after the Statute came into force and with regard to states which have become parties to the Statute.⁸⁸ Further, jurisdiction may only be exercised provided either the state on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred (or if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the state of registration of that vessel or aircraft) or the state of which the person accused of the crime is a national is a party to the Statute.⁸⁹ This means that the jurisdiction of the ICC is not universal, but

territorial or personal in nature. It also means that the national of a state which is not a party to the Statute may be prosecuted where the crime is committed in the territory of a state which is a party. However, the Court may also have jurisdiction where a situation has been referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, which is thereby binding and in which case it is unnecessary that a relevant state be a party to the Statute.⁹⁰ This has happened with regard to the situation in Darfur, Sudan, which was referred to the Prosecutor on 31 March 2005 by the Security Council in resolution 1593. After a preliminary examination of the situation, an investigation was opened on 1 June 2005 and after a twenty-month investigation into crimes allegedly committed in Darfur since 1 July 2002, the Prosecutor presented evidence to the judges and a summons to two named Sudanese individuals, one being a government minister and the other a military officer, to appear was issued with regard to charges alleging the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.⁹¹ Warrants of arrest were issued on 27 April 2007 against the two individuals by Pre-Trial Chamber I.⁹² Two warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against President Al-Bashir.⁹³ On 26 February 2011, the situation in Libya was referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011). This resulted in warrants of arrest being issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I for Muammar Gaddafi (the then leader of Libya), Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdualla Al-Senussi.⁹⁴

In addition to the Security Council referral, the ICC is also able to exercise its jurisdiction with regard to one or more of the crimes in question where the situation in which one or more of these crimes appears to have been committed has been referred to the Prosecutor by a state party to the

Statute,⁹⁵ or where the Prosecutor has himself or herself initiated an investigation.⁹⁶ In the latter case, where the Prosecutor concludes, after having analysed the seriousness of the information received, that there is a reasonable basis to proceed to an investigation, a request for authorisation of an investigation, together with any supporting material collected, will be submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber. Victims may also make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Where the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorise the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.⁹⁷

There have been five examples to date of referral by a state party. In December 2003, Uganda referred to the Prosecutor the situation with regard to the Lord's Resistance Army;⁹⁸ in April 2004, the Democratic Republic of the Congo referred to the Prosecutor the situation of crimes committed in its territory;⁹⁹ in December 2004, the Central African Republic referred the situation in its country during the armed conflict of 2002–03 to the Prosecutor.¹⁰⁰ In May 2014, the government made a further referral concerning alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the context of renewed violence as from 2012 in that country.¹⁰¹ In July 2012, the government of Mali referred the situation in its country to the Prosecutor.¹⁰² The Prosecutor may also initiate an investigation under article 13 *proprio motu* on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court received from individuals or organisations. For example, Pre-

Trial Chamber II granted the Prosecution authorisation to open an investigation *proprio motu* in the situation of Kenya on 31 March 2010.¹⁰³ In addition, on 3 October 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber III granted the Prosecutor's request for authorisation to open investigations *proprio motu* into the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.¹⁰⁴ In January 2016, the Prosecutor was authorised to open a *proprio motu* investigation concerning alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the armed conflict in Georgia between July and October 2008,¹⁰⁵ while a *proprio motu* investigation was authorised concerning Burundi in October 2017.¹⁰⁶ In addition, on 14 November 2019, the Prosecutor was authorised to proceed with an investigation with regard to alleged crimes within the Court's jurisdiction in Bangladesh/Myanmar,¹⁰⁷ and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁸

At the time of writing, the Prosecutor is conducting preliminary examinations¹⁰⁹ concerning alleged crimes committed on the territories of Guinea, Colombia, Iraq (with regard to alleged crimes committed by the United Kingdom), Nigeria, the Philippines, Ukraine, Venezuela and with regard to vessels registered in Comoros, Greece and Cambodia.¹¹⁰ As regards Palestine, the Prosecutor decided on 20 December 2019 that the preliminary examination had concluded and the conditions for an investigation had been met, but that a jurisdictional ruling on the scope of the territorial jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court under article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute in Palestine would be sought.¹¹¹

In a concession to obtain the support of states to the ICC, article 16 provides that no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with for a period of twelve months after the Security Council, in a resolution

adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, has so requested the Court. Such request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.¹¹² Article 98(2) provides that the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending state is required to surrender a person of that state to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending state for the giving of consent for the surrender. The provision, which was intended to deal with conflicting obligations, such as the position of soldiers stationed overseas under Status of Forces agreements which allow the sending state to exercise elements of criminal jurisdiction with regard to its soldiers, has been used by the United States for a much broader purpose. The United States has signed a number of bilateral agreements with states, some parties to the Rome Statute and some not, which provide that no nationals, current or former officials, or military personnel of either party may be surrendered or transferred by the other state to the ICC for any purpose. This tactic was widely criticised.¹¹³ Also of great concern is the difficult relations between the African Union and the Court. The African Union has adopted a number of resolutions critical of the Court with allegations of double standards in view of the large number of cases involving African states. However, this reflects the fact that a significant number of African states are parties to the Rome Statute, while many such states are subject to political instability and conflict.¹¹⁴

A key feature of the ICC, and one that distinguished it from the two international criminal tribunals, is that it is founded upon the concept of complementarity, which means essentially that the national courts have

priority. A case will be inadmissible and the Court will be unable to exercise jurisdiction in a number of situations.¹¹⁵ These are: first, where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; secondly, where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it and the state has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness¹¹⁶ or inability¹¹⁷ of the state genuinely to prosecute; and, thirdly, where the person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, unless the proceedings before the court other than the ICC were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC or where those proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially.¹¹⁸ Case-law has, however, revealed a variety of problems. While it is clear that the same person must be actively investigated by the domestic court as the Prosecutor,¹¹⁹ it is far from clear what kinds of investigations by the domestic courts would suffice for the purposes of article 17. In the *Simone Gbagbo* case, the Appeals Chamber reaffirmed that the state in question bears the burden of proof to show that the case is inadmissible and that ‘a genuine investigation or prosecution’ is being conducted. It must provide the Court with ‘evidence of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value’ that demonstrates that it is indeed investigating the case with evidence of ‘concrete and progressive investigative steps’.¹²⁰ Similarly, it is unclear to what extent the conduct in question being investigated by both the ICC and the domestic system has to be the same. In the *Kenyatta* case, the Appeals Chamber held that it was sufficient if the domestic proceedings involved ‘substantially the same conduct’ as the ICC case.¹²¹ In the *Gaddafi* case, the

Appeals Chamber noted that the real issue was the degree of overlap required between the ICC and domestic investigations ‘with the focus being upon whether the conduct is *substantially* the same . . . this will depend upon the facts of the individual case’.¹²²

A case will be inadmissible if it is ‘not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’.¹²³ It has been noted: ‘Gravity includes an assessment of the scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes, and their impact, bearing in mind the potential cases that would likely arise from an investigation of the situation.’ Also of relevance will be the persons or groups of persons deemed most responsible for the alleged crimes committed.¹²⁴

A countervailing consideration is constituted by the ‘interests of justice’. The Prosecutor must assess whether, taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.¹²⁵

The Court consists of four organs. These are, respectively: the Presidency; an Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division; the Office of the Prosecutor; and the Registry.¹²⁶ The eighteen judges elected must be independent and serve on a full-time basis,¹²⁷ have competence in criminal law or in relevant areas of international law, and must represent the principal legal systems in the world, as well as reflect equitable geographical representation and the need for a fair representation of male and female judges. The judges are elected by the Assembly of States Parties using rather complicated voting rules.¹²⁸ The Presidency, consisting of the President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents, is responsible for the proper

administration of the Court (apart from the Office of the Prosecutor),¹²⁹ while the Registry is responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court.¹³⁰ The Office of the Prosecutor acts independently as a separate organ of the Court. It is responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court.¹³¹ The Office is headed by the Prosecutor, who is elected by secret ballot by members of the Assembly of States Parties and assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors.¹³²

The Pre-Trial Division is composed of judges with predominantly criminal trial experience, who serve in the Division for a period of three years. The Pre-Trial Chamber is composed either of a single judge or of a bench of three judges¹³³ and confirms or rejects the authorisation to commence an investigation and makes a preliminary determination that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case. The Pre-Trial Chamber may also review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation either on its own initiative, or at the request of the state making a referral under article 14, or the UN Security Council under article 13(b),¹³⁴ and can issue warrants of arrests and summons to appear before the Court at the request of the Prosecutor, issue orders to grant the rights of the parties in the proceeding and, where necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of persons who have been arrested or appeared in response to a summons, and the protection of national security information. Within a reasonable time after the person's surrender or voluntary appearance before

the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber holds a hearing in the presence of the Prosecutor, the person charged and his or her counsel to confirm or reject the charges. Once the Pre-Trial Chamber has confirmed the charges and committed the person for trial by the Trial Chamber, the Presidency will establish a Trial Chamber to conduct subsequent proceedings.

The Trial Division is also predominantly composed of judges with criminal trial experience who serve for a period of three years. Three judges of the Division carry out the judicial functions of the Trial Chamber.¹³⁵ The primary function of the Trial Chamber is to ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious, and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused with regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.¹³⁶ The Trial Chamber will determine whether the accused is innocent or guilty. In the latter case, imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of thirty years or a term of life imprisonment, may be imposed. Financial penalties may also be imposed¹³⁷ and the Trial Chamber can also order a convicted person to pay money for compensation, restitution or rehabilitation for victims.¹³⁸ The trial must be held in public unless special circumstances require that certain proceedings be in closed session to protect confidential or sensitive information to be given in evidence, or to protect victims and witnesses.¹³⁹

The Appeals Division is composed of judges with established competence in relevant areas of international law and the Appeals Chamber is composed of all the judges assigned to the Appeals Division.¹⁴⁰ The Prosecutor or the convicted person can appeal against the decisions of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers to the Appeals Chamber. A sentence may be appealed on the

ground of procedural error, error of fact, error of law, or any other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or decision. Further, a sentence may be appealed on the ground of disproportion between the crime and the sentence.¹⁴¹ The Appeals Chamber may decide to reverse or amend the decision, judgment or sentence, or order a new trial before a different Trial Chamber.¹⁴²

Hybrid Courts and Other Internationalised Domestic Courts and Tribunals¹⁴³

In addition to the temporary and geographically limited international criminal tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court, a new style of judicial institution has made an appearance recently in which both international and national elements co-exist in varying combinations. Such institutions, which may for convenience be termed hybrid courts, exist primarily to enhance legitimacy and increase acceptability both locally and internationally, invariably in difficult post-conflict situations where reliance upon purely domestic mechanisms carries significant political risks or costs. However, as will be seen, there are a number of models adopted which differ as to formal legal origin, constitutional status, applicable law and structure. Some of these mechanisms may more correctly be termed internationalised courts or tribunals¹⁴⁴ as the balance between the international and the domestic tips far to the latter. They are essentially domestic courts applying domestic law, but with a heightened international element in terms, for example, of their function or origins, the basis of their applicable law or the use of international experts. Some courts are difficult to place along the spectrum, but together this category marks an extension of international concern and involvement in issues focusing upon individual criminal responsibility for what are international crimes, even if subsequently incorporated into domestic law.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone

The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established, following a particularly violent civil war, by virtue of an agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone dated 16 January 2002, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1315 (2000), in order to prosecute persons bearing ‘the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996’ on the basis of individual criminal responsibility.¹⁴⁵ However, it is stipulated that any transgressions by peacekeepers and related personnel present in the country by virtue of agreements with the United Nations or other governments or regional organisations or otherwise with the consent of the Sierra Leonean government were within the ‘primary jurisdiction’ of the sending state.¹⁴⁶

The Special Court consisted of the Chambers (two Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber), the Prosecutor and the Registry. Three judges served in each Trial Chamber, of whom one was appointed by the Sierra Leonean government and two appointed by the UN Secretary-General.¹⁴⁷ Five judges sat in the Appeals Chamber, of whom two were appointed by the government and three by the UN Secretary-General.¹⁴⁸ The Appeals Chamber heard appeals from persons convicted by the Trial Chamber or from the Prosecutor on the grounds of procedural error, an error on a question of law invalidating the decision or an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The Appeals Chamber could affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chamber. In so acting, the judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court were to be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In the

interpretation and application of the laws of Sierra Leone, they were to be guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁹

The Prosecutor, who was appointed by the UN Secretary-General for a three-year term and acted independently as a separate organ of the Special Court, was responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes under Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. The Office of the Prosecutor had the power to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations. The Prosecutor was assisted by a Sierra Leonean Deputy Prosecutor, and by a mixture of Sierra Leonean and international staff.¹⁵⁰ The Registry was responsible for the administration and servicing of the Special Court and was appointed by the UN Secretary-General after consultation with the President of the Special Court.¹⁵¹

The jurisdiction of the Special Court mirrored the hybrid nature of its creation and staffing. The Court had jurisdiction with regard to crimes against humanity; violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; other serious violations of international humanitarian law¹⁵² and certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law.¹⁵³ Article 8 of the Statute provided that the Special Court and the national courts of Sierra Leone had concurrent jurisdiction, but that the Special Court had primacy over the national courts and that at any stage of the procedure it could formally request a national court to defer to its competence. The Annual Report of the Special Court for 2006–07 noted that thirteen persons were indicted, all between March and September 2003. Of these, nine were in

custody, one dead and one still at large, while two indictments were withdrawn. Trials of the nine in custody began in 2004 and 2005 in three joint trials. Of particular interest has been the Charles Taylor case. He was the former President of Liberia. His claim to immunity was rejected by the Appeals Chamber in May 2004¹⁵⁴ and he stood trial in The Hague at the premises of the ICC. He was convicted on all counts on 26 April 2012 and sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment.¹⁵⁵ Judgment in the *AFRC* trial was handed down on 20 June 2007 and the three accused convicted of offences. Sentencing took place on 19 July 2007 and the appeal against sentencing was dismissed on 22 February 2008.¹⁵⁶ On 2 August 2007, Trial Chamber I reached a decision in the trial of three persons accused of being leaders of the so-called 'Civil Defence Forces', of whom one died prior to pronouncement of judgment, in which the two remaining accused were convicted.¹⁵⁷ The Special Court adopted a completion strategy under which proceedings were due to be completed in 2007.¹⁵⁸ However, this date could not be met and the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone was created in order to oversee the continuing legal obligations of the Special Court after its closure in 2013, including witness protection, supervision of prison sentences and management of archives.¹⁵⁹ The Residual Special Court has a roster of national and international judges and the Prosecutor and Registrar are appointed by the UN Secretary-General.¹⁶⁰

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

The Khmer Rouge regime under Pol Pot took power in Cambodia in 1975 following a civil war and proceeded to commit widescale atrocities which are believed to have resulted in the death of well over 1 million people. The

regime was ousted by a Vietnamese invasion in 1979. In 1997, the Cambodian government requested the United Nations to assist in establishing a trial process in order to prosecute the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge. In 2001, the Cambodian National Assembly passed a law to create a court to try serious crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. On 13 May 2003, after a long period of negotiation, the UN General Assembly approved a Draft Agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia providing for Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia, with the aim of bringing to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognised by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.¹⁶¹ The Agreement was ratified by Cambodia on 19 October 2004.

Article 2 of the Agreement provided that the Extraordinary Chambers were to have subject-matter jurisdiction consistent with that laid down in the Cambodian Law (of 2001) and that the Agreement was to be implemented via that law. However, it is provided also that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 is to apply to the Agreement. Accordingly, the Agreement must be seen as an international treaty, although one closely linked with the relevant domestic law. The Chambers are composed of a Trial Chamber, consisting of three Cambodian judges and two international judges, and a Supreme Court Chamber, serving as both appellate chamber and final instance and consisting of four Cambodian judges and three international judges. The UN Secretary-General was to nominate seven judges and the Cambodian Supreme Council of Magistracy, the highest domestic judicial

body, was to choose five of these to serve in the Chambers.¹⁶² The Agreement also provided for independent co-investigation judges, one Cambodian and one international, who are responsible for the conduct of investigations,¹⁶³ and two independent co-prosecutors, one Cambodian and one international, competent to appear in both Chambers, who are responsible for the conduct of the prosecutions.¹⁶⁴

The jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers covers the crime of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention 1948, crimes against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and such other crimes as are defined in Chapter II of the Cambodian Law of 2001 with regard to senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea.¹⁶⁵ The procedure of the Chambers is to be in accordance with Cambodian law, but where Cambodian law does not deal with a particular matter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the interpretation or application of a relevant rule of Cambodian law, or where there is a question regarding the consistency of such a rule with international standards, guidance may also be sought in procedural rules established at the international level. It is also provided that the Extraordinary Chambers are to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Cambodia is a party.¹⁶⁶

A list of five suspects was submitted by the prosecutors on 19 July 2007 to the Chambers with a request that they be indicted and, on 31 July 2007, the first suspect (Khang Khék Ieu, known as ‘Duch’) was indicted.¹⁶⁷ He was

convicted on 26 July 2010 of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court on 3 February 2012.¹⁶⁸ Two further persons were convicted and appeals are pending, proceedings were terminated against three persons and dismissed against another person. Three persons have been charged by the International Co-Investigating Judge.¹⁶⁹

Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office¹⁷⁰

Following the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (as it then was, today Serbia) and NATO in 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1244, which *inter alia* called for the establishment of an 'international civil presence' in Kosovo. The international civil presence was granted responsibilities, including: promoting 'the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government'; performing basic civilian administrative functions; organising the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement; and protecting and promoting human rights.¹⁷¹ The competence of the international civil presence carried out by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was extensive. Section 1.1 of the first regulation issued by UNMIK in 1999 stated that '[a]ll legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary General',¹⁷² while section 1.2 provided that the Special Representative could appoint any person to perform

functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or remove such person in accordance with the applicable law.¹⁷³

Following a series of disturbances in 2000, UNMIK Regulation 2000/6 was adopted, providing for the appointment of international judges and prosecutors,¹⁷⁴ and UNMIK Regulation 2000/64 was adopted, providing for UNMIK to create panels (known as Regulation 64 panels) of three judges, including at least two international judges, at the request of the accused, defence counsel or prosecutor. Such international judges functioned as regular court judges in Kosovo with powers derived from domestic legislation, but their involvement in a case was under either their own control or at the behest of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Kosovo. The applicable law was stated to be regulations promulgated by the Special Representative and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder and the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989.¹⁷⁵ However, problems surfaced, particularly with regard to the high rate of national judge convictions overturned by retrials by international judges and lack of systematic publication of case decisions and the brevity of such decisions.¹⁷⁶ Kosovo declared independence in early 2008.¹⁷⁷ Subsequently, the Panels were replaced by a system involving EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) judges up until 15 April 2014, thereafter criminal investigations and new criminal trials were to be conducted by Kosovo authorities, with judicial panels composed of Kosovo judges. However, and only in extraordinary circumstances, a case could be assigned to a EULEX Prosecutor or a panel be composed of a majority of EULEX judges.¹⁷⁸

On 3 August 2015, the Kosovo Assembly adopted article 162 of the Kosovo Constitution allowing for the establishment of the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office, following an Exchange of Letters between the President of Kosovo and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in 2014. This followed a Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly report in 2011 alleging serious violations of international law, including illicit trafficking in human organs.¹⁷⁹ The Specialist Chambers are attached to each level of the court system in Kosovo and are to operate under Kosovo law as well as customary international law and international human rights law. Their jurisdiction is limited to certain crimes against humanity allegedly committed between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000. The Specialist Chambers consists of Chambers and a Registry with a Specialist Prosecutor's Office as an independent office for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Chambers. Both the Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor's Office are staffed with international judges, prosecutors and officers and have a seat in The Hague, the Netherlands. Rules of Procedure and Evidence before the Special Chambers were adopted in 2017.¹⁸⁰ On 24 June 2020, a ten-count indictment filed on 24 April 2020 by the Specialist Prosecutor's Office with the Specialist Chambers was published. This charged Hashim Thaçi, the President of Kosovo, and others, with a range of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, enforced disappearance of persons, persecution and torture.¹⁸¹

East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes¹⁸²

Following a period of violence in East Timor instigated by pro-Indonesian militia after the ending of the long Indonesian occupation, the Security Council established the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) with a wide-ranging mandate to administer the territory.¹⁸³ By Regulation No. 1 adopted on 27 November 1999, all legislative and executive authority with respect to East Timor, including the administration of the judiciary, was vested in UNTAET and exercised by the Transitional Administrator. This administrator was given the competence further to appoint any person to perform functions in the civil administration in the territory, including the judiciary, or remove such person and to issue regulations and directives. UNTAET created a new courts system,¹⁸⁴ including the establishment of special panels to deal with serious crimes within the District Court of Dili and in the Court of Appeal.¹⁸⁵ These serious crimes were defined as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture,¹⁸⁶ for which there was individual criminal responsibility.¹⁸⁷ The applicable law was the law of East Timor as promulgated by sections 2 and 3 of UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/1 and any subsequent UNTAET regulations and directives; and, where appropriate, applicable treaties and recognised principles and norms of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict.

The Panels in the District Court of Dili were to be composed of two international judges and one East Timorese judge, as were the Panels in the Court of Appeal in Dili. In cases of special importance or gravity, a panel of five judges composed of three international and two East Timorese judges could be established.¹⁸⁸ However, the system had barely started before 2003 and in the *Armando Dos Santos* case, the Court of Appeal held, in a decision

much criticised,¹⁸⁹ that since the Indonesian occupation was illegal, Indonesian law was never validly in force so that domestic law was Portuguese law, and, further, Regulation 2000/15 could not be applied retroactively so that only Portuguese law could be applied to crimes committed before 6 June 2000.¹⁹⁰ On 20 May 2002, the United Nations handed over its authority to the new institutions of East Timor and UNTAET was replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), although UNTAET regulations continued in force. In May 2005, UNMISSET came to an end and the Serious Crimes Unit closed. Partly no doubt as a consequence, the Special Panels suspended operations indefinitely. By this time, fifty-five trials, most involving relatively low-level defendants, had taken place, eighty-four individuals had been convicted and three acquitted.¹⁹¹

The Bosnia War Crimes Chamber¹⁹²

In January 2003, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia¹⁹³ and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia issued a set of joint conclusions recommending the creation of a specialised chamber within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to try war crimes cases.¹⁹⁴ This was supported by the UN Security Council.¹⁹⁵ The Chamber came into being in 2005 with jurisdiction concerning cases referred to it by the ICTY pursuant to Rule 11 *bis* of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence with regard to lower- to mid-level accused persons. As such, this procedure forms part of the completion strategy of the ICTY.¹⁹⁶ In addition, the Chamber has jurisdiction with regard to cases submitted to it by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY where investigations have not been completed, and

the first case was referred to the Chamber on 1 September 2005.¹⁹⁷ Further, the Chamber also has jurisdiction over what have been termed ‘Rules of the Road’ cases. The ‘Rules of the Road’ procedure was first established in response to the widespread fear of arbitrary arrest and detention immediately after the conflict in Bosnia. Originally, the Bosnian authorities were obliged to submit every war crimes case proposed for prosecution in Bosnia to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY to determine whether the evidence was sufficient by international standards before proceeding to arrest. This review function was subsequently assumed by the Special Department for War Crimes within the Office of the Prosecutor of the State Court of Bosnia in October 2004. Where the case has not yet led to a confirmed indictment and where the prosecutor determines that the case is ‘highly sensitive’, it will be passed to the Chamber, otherwise it will be tried before the relevant cantonal or district court. If, however, the indictment has been confirmed, the case will remain with the relevant cantonal or district court.

The Chamber has both trial and appeals chambers. The Office of the Prosecutor of the State Court includes a Special Department for War Crimes and there were five international Prosecutors and one international acting prosecutor, as well as eight local prosecutors, including the Deputy Prosecutor.¹⁹⁸ The Registry managed the process of appointing and engaging international judges and prosecutors. The international judges were appointed by the High Representative after a joint recommendation of the President of the State Court and the President of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, while the international prosecutors were appointed by the High Representative following a joint recommendation from the Bosnian Chief

Prosecutor, the President of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and the Registry.¹⁹⁹

As of the tenth anniversary of the Chamber in 2015, the Chamber had dealt with a total of 130 war crimes cases, including six cases transferred to it by the ICTY.²⁰⁰ The applicable law is that of Bosnia, including criminal and criminal procedure codes introduced by the High Representative in 2003. However, the European Court of Human Rights held in *Maktouf-Damjanović v. Bosnia-Herzegovina* that the Chamber had violated article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights as the applicants had been convicted on the basis of the retroactive application of criminal legislation in their war crimes cases.²⁰¹

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon²⁰²

Following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, in February 2005, the Security Council established an International Independent Investigation Commission to aid the Lebanese authorities in their investigation. As a result of its report and the request of the Lebanese government to establish ‘a tribunal of an international character’ to try those persons accused of the assassination,²⁰³ the Security Council adopted resolution 1664 (2006) calling upon the UN Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the government of Lebanon aimed at establishing a tribunal of an international character based on the highest international standards of criminal justice. The Secretary-General’s report²⁰⁴ was accepted by the Council in resolution 1757 (2007). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon by virtue

of an agreement with the government of Lebanon, annexed to the resolution. The Statute of the Tribunal is attached to the agreement.

The Tribunal has jurisdiction not only with regard to those responsible for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, but also with regard to those responsible for other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, or any later date decided by the parties and with the consent of the Security Council, that are seen as connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005.²⁰⁵ The Tribunal was inaugurated on 1 March 2009 and is composed of four organs: the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, the Registry and the Defence Office. The Chambers is composed of eleven independent judges, divided into a Pre-Trial Judge, a Trial Chamber and an Appeals Chamber. A single international judge serves as Pre-Trial Judge, while three judges serve in the Trial Chamber, being one Lebanese judge and two international judges. Five judges serve in the Appeals Chamber, of whom two are Lebanese and three international judges.²⁰⁶ The Prosecutor and the Registrar were appointed by the UN Secretary-General after consultation with the Lebanese government, while the Head of the Defence Office was appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the President of the Tribunal.²⁰⁷ The applicable law is Lebanese criminal law and the Tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction with Lebanese courts and possesses primacy over them.²⁰⁸ A number of cases are currently before the Tribunal and a decision has been taken, for example, to hold a trial in absentia.²⁰⁹ In an important interlocutory decision, the Appeals Chamber held that customary international law now recognises a distinct crime of terrorism, applicable to individuals, in peacetime.²¹⁰ In a judgment on 15 July

2016, the Contempt Judge of the Special Tribunal convicted a corporation of contempt – the first time, it is believed, that such a decision has been taken by an international criminal tribunal, albeit relying upon domestic law.²¹¹

The Iraqi High Tribunal²¹²

The Governing Council of Iraq was authorised by the Coalition Provisional Authority on 10 December 2003 to establish the Iraqi Special Tribunal to hear crimes alleged against the former regime of Saddam Hussein.²¹³ A revised Statute was enacted in 2005 and the Tribunal renamed the Iraqi High Tribunal. The Tribunal has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the definitions of which are based upon the provisions of the Rome Statute and newly incorporated into Iraqi law, committed between 16 July 1968 and 1 May 2003²¹⁴ by Iraqi nationals or residents.²¹⁵ Persons accused of committing crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal bear individual criminal responsibility.²¹⁶ The Tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but primacy over them. Article 6(b) of the Statute provides that the President of the Tribunal shall be required to appoint non-Iraqi nationals to act in advisory capacities or as observers to the Trial Chambers and to the Appeals Chamber. The role of the non-Iraqi nationals is stated to be to provide assistance to the judges with regard to international law and the experience of similar tribunals (whether international or otherwise), and to monitor the protection by the Tribunal of general due process of law standards. In appointing such non-Iraqi experts, the President of the Tribunal is entitled to request assistance from the international community, including the United Nations. However, the judges and prosecutors of the Tribunal are all Iraqi nationals. Criticisms have been

made of the Tribunal, including the fact that it can impose the death penalty, as for example with regard to Saddam Hussein upon his conviction in the *Dujail* case.²¹⁷

The Serbian War Crimes Departments

On 1 July 2003, the Serbian National Assembly adopted a law establishing a specialised War Crimes Chamber within the Belgrade District Court to prosecute and investigate crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law as defined in Serbian law. A War Crimes Prosecutor's Office was established in Belgrade. The Departments (originally a Chamber) consist of two panels of three judges each selected from the Belgrade District Court or seconded from other courts, and two investigative judges.²¹⁸ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has referred some cases to this Chamber, both where no indictment was issued and under rule 11 *bis*.²¹⁹ It is, however, essentially a national court.²²⁰

Of course, not all situations of egregious violations of international law have been rendered subject to international judicial action, still less domestic legal processes. In an increasing number of cases in more recent years, impunity remains the norm, the most serious examples being Syria, Libya and Yemen.²²¹

International Crimes²²²

A brief survey of some of the main features of international crimes for which individual criminal responsibility now exists will follow, noting that issues concerning the jurisdiction of purely domestic courts for those international crimes that have been incorporated into domestic legislation are covered in Chapter 11, while state responsibility for such offences is covered in Chapter 13.

Genocide²²³

Prohibition of Genocide

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide signed in 1948 reaffirmed that genocide, whether committed in time of war or peace, was a crime under international law. Genocide was defined as any of the following acts committed ‘with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such’:

(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The Convention, which does not have an implementational system,²²⁴ provides that persons charged with genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed or by an international penal tribunal. Several points should be noted. First, the question of intent is such that states may deny genocidal activity by noting that the relevant intent to destroy in whole or in part was in fact absent.²²⁵ Secondly, the groups protected do not include political groups.²²⁶ Thirdly, the

concept of cultural genocide is not included.²²⁷ Fourthly, there is virtually no mention of means to prevent the crime (although the obligation is stated).

In the 1990s, the issue of genocide unfortunately ceased to be an item of primarily historical concern. Events in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda stimulated increasing anxiety in this context. The Statutes of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda provide for the prosecution of individuals for the crime of genocide and a significant case-law has now developed through these tribunals. In addition, the question of state responsibility for the crime of genocide has been raised.²²⁸ The International Court of Justice in *Application of the Genocide Convention* reaffirmed in its Order of 8 April 1993 on provisional measures²²⁹ the view expressed in the Advisory Opinion on *Reservations to the Genocide Convention* that the crime of genocide ‘shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity . . . and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations’.²³⁰ The Court called upon both parties not to take any action that might aggravate or extend the dispute over the prevention or punishment of the crime of genocide.²³¹

On 11 July 1996, the Court rejected the preliminary objections raised by Yugoslavia.²³² In particular, the Court emphasised that it followed from the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention that the rights and obligations contained therein were rights and obligations *erga omnes* and that the obligation upon each state to prevent and punish the crime of genocide was not dependent upon the type of conflict involved in the particular situation (whether international or domestic) and was not territorially limited

by the Convention.²³³ The type of state responsibility envisaged under article IX of the Convention did not exclude any form of state responsibility.²³⁴ In addition, the Court observed that the Convention did not contain any clause the object or effect of which was to limit the scope of its jurisdiction *ratione temporis* so as to exclude events prior to a particular date.²³⁵ On 26 February 2007, the Court rendered its judgment on the merits. The Court affirmed that the effect of the categorisation of genocide as a ‘crime under international law’, coupled with the obligation to prevent genocide contained in the Genocide Convention, is to prohibit states from committing genocide through the actions of their organs or persons or groups whose acts are attributable to them.²³⁶ The Court also held that state responsibility could arise under the Convention for genocide and complicity, without an individual being convicted of the crime or an associated one,²³⁷ and that such responsibility for genocide applied to a state wherever it may be acting.²³⁸ It was noted that the essence of the intent, at the heart of the definition of genocide, is to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part, as such. It is a group which must have particular positive characteristics – national, ethnical, racial or religious – and not the lack of them. The intent must also relate to the group ‘as such’. That means that the crime requires an intent to destroy a collection of people who have a particular group identity²³⁹ and such intent refers to the intent to destroy at least a substantial part of the particular group and this may apply to a geographically limited area (such as Srebrenica).²⁴⁰ The Court, however, was not convinced, on the basis of the evidence before it, that it had been conclusively established that the massive killings of members of the protected group were committed with the specific intent (*dolus specialis*) on the part of the perpetrators to destroy, in whole or in part, the group as such,²⁴¹ nor that deportations and expulsions of the protected group

amounted to genocide for the same reason, nor indeed the imposition of terrible conditions on camp detainees and other allegations.²⁴² The exception to this was with regard to Srebrenica, where the Court found that the necessary intent had been established to the required standard of proof.²⁴³ The Court emphasised that claims against a state involving charges of exceptional gravity, such as genocide, must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive.²⁴⁴

However, the Court emphasised that the Convention established a separate and distinct duty to prevent genocide, which was both ‘normative and compelling’²⁴⁵ and an obligation of conduct, not of result,²⁴⁶ provided that the offence was actually committed.²⁴⁷ Such obligation arose at the instant that the state learned of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide would be committed.²⁴⁸ It was also held that Serbia was in violation of its duty to punish genocide.²⁴⁹

The prohibition of genocide also appears in the relevant instruments in the sphere of international criminal law.²⁵⁰ Article 4 of the ICTY Statute, by way of example, provides that:

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life

calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group

and that the following acts shall be punishable:

(a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to commit genocide; (e) complicity in genocide.²⁵¹

Genocide has been regarded as an international crime since the Second World War and the Genocide Convention 1948 was a critical step in that process. The crime of genocide has also been included in the operative provisions of the statutes of most of the courts and tribunals discussed in the previous section. Case-law before the two international criminal tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) has, however, helped clarify many of the relevant principles. For example, perhaps the distinctive feature of the crime is the importance of establishing the specific intent to destroy the group in question in whole or in part, for genocide is more than the act of killing. This was emphasised by the ICTY in the *Jelisić* case, which noted that ‘it is in fact the *mens rea* [i.e. the intention as distinct from the actual act] which gives genocide its speciality and distinguishes it from an ordinary crime and other crimes against international humanitarian law’.²⁵² This was reaffirmed by the ICTR in the

Akayesu case,²⁵³ which defined the specific intent necessary as ‘the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged’. The Trial Chamber underlined the difficulties in establishing the critical intent requirement and held that recourse may be had in the absence of confessions to inferences from facts.²⁵⁴ In the *Ruggiu* case, the ICTR held that a person who incites others to commit genocide must himself have a specific intent to commit genocide.²⁵⁵ However, in the *Jelisić* case, the ICTY pointed to the difficulty in practice of proving the genocidal intention of an individual if the crimes committed were not widespread or backed up by an organisation or a system.²⁵⁶ This may be distinguished from the *Ruggiu* case, where a systematic scheme to destroy the Tutsis was not in doubt.

The element of intention was further discussed by the ICTY in the *Krstić* case, where it was noted that the intent to eradicate a group within a limited geographical area, such as a region of a country or even a municipality, could be characterised as genocide,²⁵⁷ while ‘the intent to destroy a group, even if only in part, means seeking to destroy a distinct part of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated individuals within it’. The part of the group sought to be destroyed had to constitute a distinct element.²⁵⁸ In the Decision of the Appeal Chamber in this case, it was emphasised that it was well established that

where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a protected group ‘in part’, the part must be a substantial part of that group. The aim of the Genocide Convention is to

prevent the intentional destruction of entire human groups, and the part targeted must be significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole.²⁵⁹

It was concluded that the intent requirement of genocide under article 4 of the Statute was satisfied where evidence shows that the alleged perpetrator

intended to destroy at least a substantial part of the protected group. The determination of when the targeted part is substantial enough to meet this requirement may involve a number of considerations. The numeric size of the targeted part of the group is the necessary and important starting point, though not in all cases the ending point of the inquiry. The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group. In addition to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4.²⁶⁰

It was also emphasised that each perpetrator must possess the necessary specific intent.²⁶¹

The intention to ‘destroy’ means the physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group and not, for example, attacks upon the cultural or sociological characteristics of a group in order to remove its separate identity.²⁶² The sometimes difficult question of the definition of membership of the groups specifically referred to in the relevant instruments has also been analysed. In *Akayesu*,²⁶³ the Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal leaned towards the objective definition of membership of groups,²⁶⁴ but this has been mitigated by other cases emphasising the importance of subjective elements as part of the relevant framework.²⁶⁵

In so far as the material elements of the crime are concerned, killing is clearly the key conduct involved and it has been held that the act in question must be intentional, if not necessarily premeditated.²⁶⁶ Forced migration (or ‘ethnic cleansing’) as such does not constitute genocide,²⁶⁷ but may amount to a pattern of conduct demonstrating genocidal intent.²⁶⁸ The *Akayesu* case has also been important in emphasising that rape and sexual violence may amount to genocide when committed with the necessary specific intent to commit genocide. The Trial Chamber concluded: ‘Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.’²⁶⁹ Further, where it is intended to prevent births within the group whether by impelling the child born of rape to be part of another group or where the woman raped refuses subsequently to procreate,

this may amount to genocide.²⁷⁰ The Rwanda Tribunal has also held that genocide may be committed by omission as well as by acts.²⁷¹

As far as the International Criminal Court is concerned, the first person charged with the crime of genocide was President Al Bashir of Sudan in the context of the Darfur situation and following a referral by the Security Council in resolution 1593 (2005). Arrest warrants were issued on 4 March 2009 and on 12 July 2010.²⁷²

The International Court of Justice has also addressed the question of the relationship between the Genocide Convention and international humanitarian law, in *Croatia v. Serbia*,²⁷³ where it was emphasised that these two sources were two distinct bodies of rules with different aims. While the Convention seeks to prevent and punish genocide as a crime under international law, humanitarian law governs the actual conduct of hostilities in an armed conflict, protecting diverse categories of persons and objects. In so far as both of these bodies of rules may be applicable in the context of a particular armed conflict, the Court noted that the rules of international humanitarian law could be relevant in order to decide whether the acts alleged by the Parties constituted genocide within the meaning of the Convention.

War Crimes²⁷⁴

War crimes are essentially serious violations of the rules of customary and treaty law concerning international humanitarian law, otherwise known as the law governing armed conflicts.²⁷⁵ Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, by way of example, provides for jurisdiction with regard to:

grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: (a) wilful killing; (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; (c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; (f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; (h) taking civilians as hostages.

Article 3 provides for jurisdiction for violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violations include, but are not be limited to:

(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; (d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science; (e) plunder of public or private property.²⁷⁶

Accordingly, war crimes are a discrete part of the principles of international humanitarian law, being those which have become accepted as criminal offences for which there is individual responsibility (in addition to state responsibility). Essentially, war crimes law applies to individuals and international humanitarian law to states. There is a long history of provision for individual responsibility for war crimes,²⁷⁷ and article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter included war crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, while the concept of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 recognised certain violations as crimes subject to universal jurisdiction. Traditionally, international humanitarian law has distinguished between

international and non-international armed conflicts, with legal provision being relatively modest with regard to the latter. However, common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions laid down certain minimum standards which were elaborated in Additional Protocol II of 1977.²⁷⁸ In addition, since the conflict in Rwanda was clearly an internal one, the ICTR Statute necessarily provided for individual responsibility for violations of the principles concerning non-international armed conflicts, in effect recognising that common article 3 and Additional Protocol II formed the basis of criminal liability.

The key modern decision has been the *Tadić* case before the ICTY. The Appeals Chamber in the jurisdictional phase of the case noted that an armed conflict existed whenever there was a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a state. International humanitarian law applied from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extended beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace was reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continued to apply in the whole territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.²⁷⁹ The distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts was thus minimised. Although it was noted that international law did not regulate internal conflict in all aspects, it was held to ‘cover such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare

proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities'.²⁸⁰ Further, it was held that individual criminal responsibility existed with regard to violations laid down in customary and treaty law, irrespective of whether the conflict was an international or an internal one.²⁸¹ It was concluded that in order for article 3 of the ICTY Statute to be applicable, the violation had to be 'serious', which meant that it had to constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim. In addition, the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.²⁸²

This *Tadić* judgment can now be taken as reflecting international law and it is to be noted that a significant number of provisions dealing with international conflicts now apply to internal conflicts as laid down in the ICC Statute.²⁸³

The International Criminal Court's first conviction for sexual slavery was in the *Bosco Ntaganda* case, where it was determined that sexual slavery constituted both a crime against humanity and a war crime.²⁸⁴

Crimes against Humanity²⁸⁵

Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter included ‘crimes against humanity’ within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and these were defined as ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the law of the country where perpetrated’.²⁸⁶

Article 5 of the ICTY Statute provided for jurisdiction with regard to the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: ‘(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts’. Article 3 of the ICTR Statute is in similar form, other than that it is specified that the crimes in question (which are the same as those specified in the ICTY Statute) must have been committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. Article 7 of the ICC Statute notes that the crimes in question (enforced disappearance and apartheid are added to the list appearing in the Statutes of the two international criminal tribunals) have to be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.²⁸⁷

Although article 5 of the ICTY Statute did not specifically refer, unlike the other instruments, to the necessity of a widespread or systematic attack as the required framework for the commission of acts amounting to crimes against humanity, this was incorporated into the jurisprudence through the *Tadić* trial Decision of 7 May 1997. This interpreted the phrase ‘directed against any civilian population’ as meaning ‘that the acts must occur on a widespread or systematic basis, that there must be some form of a governmental, organizational or group policy to commit these acts and that the perpetrator must know of the context within which his actions are taken’.²⁸⁸

The requirement of ‘widespread or systematic’ was examined in *Akayesu*, where the Trial Chamber declared that the concept of widespread could be defined as ‘massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims’, while ‘systematic’ could be defined as ‘thoroughly organised and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources’. It was noted that there was no requirement that this policy must be adopted formally as the policy of a state, although there had to be some kind of preconceived plan or policy.²⁸⁹ In *Blaškić*, the ICTY Trial Chamber defined ‘systematic’ in terms of

the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack is perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad sense of the word, that is, to destroy, persecute or weaken a community; the perpetration of a criminal act on a very large scale against a group of

civilians or the repeated and continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another; the preparation and use of significant public or private resources, whether military or other, and the implication of high-level political and/or military authorities in the definition and establishment of the methodical plan. The plan, however, need not necessarily be declared expressly or even stated clearly and precisely. It may be surmised from the occurrence of a series of events.²⁹⁰

In *Kunarac*, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that while proof that the attack was directed against a civilian population and proof that it was widespread or systematic were legal elements of the crime, it was not necessary to show that they were the result of the existence of a policy or plan. The existence of a policy or plan could be evidentially relevant, but it was not a legal element of the crime.²⁹¹ In *Mudacumura*, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II held that it must be demonstrated that a state or organisational policy existed which had a civilian population as the *primary object* of the attack.²⁹² As to the nature of the organisation in question, the Chamber emphasised the elements of hierarchical structure and well-defined decision-making processes.²⁹³

Many of the same acts may constitute both war crimes and crimes against humanity, but what is distinctive about the latter is that they do not need to take place during an armed conflict. However, to constitute crimes against humanity the acts in question have to be committed as part of a widespread or

systematic activity, and to be committed against any civilian population, thus any reference to nationality is irrelevant. However, it is important to maintain a clear distinction between civilian and non-civilian in this context. The Trial Chamber in the *Martić* case noted that one could not allow the term ‘civilian’ for the purposes of a crime against humanity to include all persons who were not actively participating in combat, including those who were *hors de combat*, at the time of the crimes, as this would blur the necessary distinction between combatants and non-combatants.²⁹⁴

Of course, any act of genocide by definition will constitute also a crime against humanity, although the reverse is clearly not the case. What is required for crimes against humanity is an ‘attack’ and this has been broadly defined. In the *Akayesu* case, for example, this term was defined as an

unlawful act of the kind enumerated in Article 3(a) to (i) of the Statute, like murder, extermination, enslavement etc. An attack may also be non-violent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid, which is declared a crime against humanity in Article 1 of the Apartheid Convention of 1973, or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular manner, may come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a massive scale or in a systematic manner.²⁹⁵

It is also necessary for the alleged perpetrator to be aware that his act was part of a broader attack. The Appeals Chamber in its jurisdiction decision in *Tadić* concluded that to convict an accused of crimes against humanity, it had to be proved that the crimes were related to the attack on a civilian population and that the accused knew that his crimes were so related.²⁹⁶ This is so even if he does not identify with the aims of the attack and his act was committed for personal reasons.²⁹⁷

Aggression²⁹⁸

Aggression is recognised as a crime in customary international law. Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter defined its jurisdiction as including ‘(a) Crimes against peace. Namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing’ and a number of defendants were convicted of offences under this head. General Assembly resolution 95(1) affirmed the principles recognised by the Nuremberg Charter and its judgment. Aggression was termed the ‘supreme international crime’ in one of the judgments.²⁹⁹ The Tokyo Charter included the same principle, as did Allied Control Council Law No. 10. General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 contained a definition of aggression in contravention of the Charter.³⁰⁰ The crime of aggression is referred to in article 5 of the ICC Statute, but in no other such instrument. Indeed, article 5(2) provides that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until a provision is adopted defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court may exercise jurisdiction with regard to it. The delay in achieving this has been caused by several problems. The first is that, unlike the other substantive international crimes, aggression is a crime of ‘leadership’ and necessarily requires that it be determined as an initial point that the state, of whom the accused is a ‘leader’ in some capacity, has committed aggression. This is a wholly different proposition from asserting the responsibility of individuals for genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. It is also unclear what differences may exist between the state’s act

of aggression and the individual's crime of aggression. Secondly, article 5(2) of the ICC Statute provides that the conditions for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction must be consistent with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. The Security Council has the competence under Chapter VII of the Charter to determine whether an act of aggression has taken place and it has been argued that a prior determination by the Council is necessary before the Court may exercise jurisdiction with regard to individual responsibility for aggression. This has been contested.³⁰¹ At the ICC Review Conference held in Kampala in 2010, amendments to the Statute were adopted,³⁰² which defined the crime of aggression in a new article 8 bis,³⁰³ and laid down jurisdictional conditions.³⁰⁴

Suggestions for Further Reading

The Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law (ed. W. Schabas), Cambridge, 2016

R. Cryer, D. Robinson and S. Vasiliev, *An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure*, 4th ed., Cambridge, 2019

R. O'Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, Oxford, 2015

W. Schabas, *An Introduction to the International Criminal Court*, 6th ed., Cambridge, 2020

C. Stahn, *A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law*, Cambridge, 2019

¹ See e.g. R. O'Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, Oxford, 2015; *The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law* (ed. K. J. Heller, F. Mégret, S. Nouwen, J. D. Ohlin and D. Robinson), Oxford, 2020; *The Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law* (ed. W. Schabas), Cambridge, 2016; C. Stahn, *A Critical Introduction to International Criminal Law*, Cambridge, 2019; K. Ambos, *Treatise on International Criminal Law*, Oxford, vol. I, 2013, vol. II, 2014 and vol. III, 2016; *Research Handbook on International Criminal Law*

(ed. B. S. Brown), Cheltenham, 2011; *Cassese's International Criminal Law* (ed. A. Cassese and P. Gaeta), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2013; W. Schabas, *An Introduction to the International Criminal Court*, 6th ed., Cambridge, 2020; W. Schabas, *The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016; G. Boas and P. Chifflet, *International Criminal Justice*, Cheltenham, 2017; *The New Histories of International Criminal Law: Retrials* (ed. I. Tallgren and T. Skouteris), Oxford, 2019; O. Triffterer and K. Ambos, *The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, 3rd ed., Munich, 2016; R. Cryer, D. Robinson and S. Vasiliev, *An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure*, 4th ed., Cambridge, 2019; G. Werle and F. Jeßberger, *Principles of International Criminal Law*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2014; D. Guilfoyle, *International Criminal Law*, Oxford, 2016; and S. R. Ratner and J. Abrams, *Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2009.

² See e.g. M. C. Bassiouni, *Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law*, 2nd ed., The Hague, 1999. As to state responsibility for international offences, see below, [Chapter 13](#).

³ See as to slave trading, article 99 of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982; and below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 529.

⁴ See e.g. *Re Piracy Jure Gentium* [1934] AC 586; 7 AD, p. 213. See also D. H. Johnson, 'Piracy in Modern International Law', **43** *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, 1957, p. 63, and G. E. White, 'The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy Cases', **83** *AJIL*, 1989, p. 727. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume in *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 37–8; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 92–4; and *R v. Jones* [2006] UKHL 16; 132 ILR, p. 668.

⁵ Article 105 of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (reproducing article 19 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958).

⁶ See further below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 528.

⁷ *Re Piracy Jure Gentium* [1934] AC 586; 7 AD, p. 213.

⁸ See the IACHR's Advisory Opinion in *Re-Introduction of the Death Penalty in the Peruvian Constitution*, 16 *HRLJ*, 1995, pp. 9, 14, noting that individual responsibility may

only be invoked for violations that are defined in international instruments as crimes under international law.

⁹ See below, p. 579.

¹⁰ See e.g. G.-J. Knoops, *An Introduction to the Law of International Criminal Tribunals*, The Hague, 2014; and the references in footnote 1. See also *Oppenheim's International Law United Nations* (ed. R. Higgins *et al.*), Oxford, 2017, chapter 31.

¹¹ See the Report of the Commission to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 *AJIL*, 1920, p. 95. See also Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 115–16; and T. Meron, 'Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals', 100 *AJIL*, 2006, p. 551.

¹² See C. Mullins, *The Leipzig Trials*, London, 1921. See also e.g. the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables 1884; the Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications 1910; the International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene Publications 1924; the Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium-Smoking 1931; the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs 1936; and the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency 1929 with regard to the establishment of individual responsibility in the case of specific issues.

¹³ See article 6, 39 *AJIL*, 1945, Supp., p. 259. See also H. Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights*, London, 1950, p. 6; and Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 116 ff.

¹⁴ See 41 *AJIL*, 1947, p. 220. See also I. Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Oxford, 1963, p. 167; T. Taylor, *An Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trial*, London, 1993; A. Tusa and J. Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial*, London, 1983; and K. J. Heller, *The Nuremberg Military Tribunal and the Origins of International Criminal Law*, Oxford, 2011.

¹⁵ 36 *ILR*, p. 31. Twelve major US trials took place in Nuremberg (see H. Levie, *Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes*, New York, 1992, pp. 72 ff.), while trials took place in the British-occupied sector of Germany under the Royal Warrant of 1946 (see A. P. Rogers, 'War Crimes Trials under the Royal Warrant, British Practice 1945–1949', 39

ICLQ, 1990, p. 780); and see also *R v. Jones* [2006] UKHL 16, para. 22 (Lord Bingham); 132 ILR, p. 679; and *Re Sandrock and Others* 13 ILR, p. 297.

¹⁶ Established by a proclamation by General MacArthur of 19 January 1946, so authorised by the Allied Powers in order to implement the Potsdam Declaration: see *Hirota v. MacArthur* 335 US 876 and TIAS, 1946, No. 1589, p. 3; 15 AD, p. 485.

¹⁷ US, UK, USSR, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippines.

¹⁸ See e.g. B. V. Röling and A. Cassese, *The Tokyo Trial and Beyond*, Cambridge, 1992; and S. Horowitz, *The Tokyo Trial*, International Conciliation No. 465 (1950). But see as to criticisms of the process, R. Minear, *Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*, Princeton, 1971. See also *Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited* (ed. Y. Tanaka, T. McCormack and G. Simpson), The Hague, 2012.

¹⁹ Article 5.

²⁰ Resolution 95(I). See also the International Law Commission's Report on Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1950, vol. II, p. 195; and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 1968.

²¹ Resolution 96(I).

²² Note that the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973 declared apartheid to be an international crime involving direct individual criminal responsibility.

²³ A/2693, and 45 *AJIL*, 1954, Supp., p. 123.

²⁴ See article 49 of the First Geneva Convention, article 50 of the Second Geneva Convention, article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention and article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See further below, [Chapter 20](#).

²⁵ See e.g. article 50 of the First Geneva Convention, article 51 of the Second Geneva Convention, article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention and article 147 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention. See also L. C. Green, *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict*, 3rd ed., Manchester, 2008, chapter 18.

²⁶ See article 85 of Additional Protocol I.

²⁷ See further below, pp. 370 and 362, **note 222**.

²⁸ 27 A/46/10 and 30 ILM, 1991, p. 1584.

²⁹ A/51/10, p. 9.

³⁰ See article 2.

³¹ See article 16.

³² Article 17.

³³ Article 18.

³⁴ Article 19.

³⁵ Article 20.

³⁶ Article 4.

³⁷ Resolutions 794 (1992) and 814 (1993).

³⁸ See also e.g. the Special Section on Iraqi War Crimes, 31 *Va. JIL*, 1991, p. 351.

³⁹ See e.g. *Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* (ed. C. Stahn et al.), Oxford, 2020; *Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY* (ed. R. Steinbert), The Hague, 2012; *The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* (ed. B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. Sluiter), Oxford, 2011; M. Shahabuddeen, *International Criminal Justice at the Yugoslav Tribunal*, Oxford, 2012; W. Schabas, *The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone*, Cambridge, 2006; *The Legacy of Ad Hoc Tribunals in International Criminal Law* (ed. M.

Sterio and M. Scharf), Cambridge, 2019; *The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals* (ed. N. Hayashi and C. M. Bailliet), Cambridge, 2017; R. Kerr, *The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics and Diplomacy*, Oxford, 2004; the series of articles on the ICTY published in 2 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2004, pp. 353 ff. and 37 *New England Law Review*, 2002–03, pp. 865 ff.; T. Meron, *The Making of International Criminal Justice: A View from the Bench*, Oxford, 2011; O’Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, chapter 12; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 127 ff. and R. Kolb, ‘The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal Tribunals on Their Jurisdiction and on International Crimes’, **84** *BYIL*, 2014, p. 131.

⁴⁰ See e.g. B. Ferencz, ‘An International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand and Where They’re Going’, **30** *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 1992, p. 375.

⁴¹ The Commission produced a report in early 1993 in which it concluded that grave breaches and other violations of international humanitarian law had been committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including wilful killing, ‘ethnic cleansing’, mass killings, torture, rape, pillage and destruction of civilian property, the destruction of cultural and religious property and arbitrary arrests; see S/25274. See also M. C. Bassiouni, ‘The United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)’, **88** *AJIL*, 1994, p. 784.

⁴² S/25704 (1993).

⁴³ The Statute has been subsequently amended: see Security Council resolutions 1166 (1998), 1329 (2000), 1411 (2002), 1431 (2002), 1481 (2003), 1597 (2005) and 1660 (2006).

⁴⁴ See Security Council resolution 1160 (1998); and *Milutinović*, ICTY, A. Ch. 8 June 2004. See also as to events in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, *Re The Republic of Macedonia I*, ICTY, T. Ch., Judgment of 4 October 2002.

⁴⁵ Article 11. See also www.icty.org/.

⁴⁶ Article 17.

⁴⁷ Article 14.

⁴⁸ Articles 12 and 13.

⁴⁹ See further below, p. 369.

⁵⁰ See Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, p. 70; 105 ILR, p. 419. See further below, Chapter 20, p. 1055.

⁵¹ Article 9. Under Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as amended, deferral of national proceedings may be requested where the act being investigated or which is the subject of those proceedings is characterised as an ordinary crime; or there is a lack of impartiality or independence, or the investigations or proceedings are designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case is not diligently prosecuted; or what is in issue is closely related to, or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal questions which may have implications for investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal. See as to the different situation with regard to the International Criminal Court, below, p. 342.

⁵² Article 29.

⁵³ Article 10.

⁵⁴ Articles 18–20.

⁵⁵ Article 24.

⁵⁶ Article 25.

⁵⁷ See further below, pp. 362 ff.

⁵⁸ *Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, p. 70, paras. 30 ff.; 105 ILR, p. 419. After this decision, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, which includes the obligation placed upon all states of the former Yugoslavia to cooperate with the Tribunal: see Article X, Annex 1-A.

⁵⁹ See www.icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty-facts-figures. As to the Mechanism, see below, p. 339. Note the death in custody of the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević on

11 March 2006 during his trial on sixty-six counts of violations of the Statute, including genocide: see ICTY Annual Report 2006, A/61/271 – S/2006/666, para. 55. See also the important *Mladic* trial and conviction, Case No. IT-09-92-T, ICTY, Judgment of 22 November 2017.

⁶⁰ See resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004); and D. Raab, ‘Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy’, 3 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2005, p. 82.

⁶¹ See M. Bohlander, ‘Referring an Indictment from the ICTY and ICTR to Another Court – Rule 11 bis and the Consequences for the Law of Extradition’, 55 *ICLQ*, 2006, p. 219. See also below, pp. 358 ff.

⁶² See www.icty.org/.

⁶³ See e.g. UN Secretary-General Reports S/1994/879 and S/1994/906; Report of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the UN Commission on Human Rights, S/1994/1157, annex I and annex II; and Report of the Commission of Experts, S/1994/1125. See also L. Sadat, ‘The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, Washington University in St Louis School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2012; L. Sadat, ‘Transjudicial Dialogue and the Rwandan Genocide: Aspects of Antagonism and Complementarity’, 22 *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 2009, p. 543; A. Dieng, ‘Capacity-Building Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind of Legacy’, *Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights*, 2011, p. 403; V. Morris and M. P. Scharf, *The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*, New York, 1998; L. J. van den Herik, *The Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of International Law*, The Hague, 2005; R. S. Lee, ‘The Rwanda Tribunal’, 9 *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 1996, p. 37; O’Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, chapter 12; and Kolb, ‘Jurisprudence’.

⁶⁴ Article 10.

⁶⁵ See Security Council resolution 1329 (2000). The two Tribunals shared a Prosecutor until a separate Prosecutor was appointed to the ICTR in 2003; see Security Council resolution 1503 (2003).

⁶⁶ See below, [Chapter 20](#), p. 1060.

⁶⁷ Article 7.

⁶⁸ Article 8.

⁶⁹ Article 9.

⁷⁰ See e.g. Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, A/51/789 and ICTR Annual Report 1997, A/52/582 – S/1997/868.

⁷¹ Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, T. Ch., 4 September 1998.

⁷² ICTR, T. Ch., 12 September 1998.

⁷³ Note that on 16 December 2011, the ICTR Appeals Chamber upheld the first referral of an international criminal indictment to Rwanda for trial, in the case against Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-01-75-AR11 *bis*. A total of eight ICTR cases were referred to Rwanda. Two additional cases were referred to France for trial. Monitoring in all referred cases is presently being conducted by the Mechanism (see next section).

⁷⁴ See <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/trial-chamber-delivers-judgement-ngirabatware-case>.

⁷⁵ *Nyiramasuhoko and Others (Butare)*, Case No. ICTR-98-42-A.

⁷⁶ See the address to the UN Security Council by the President of the Tribunal on 9 December 2015, <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/address-united-nations-security-council-final-report-completion-strategy-international-criminal>. By its close, the Tribunal had completed its work at the trial level with regard to all of the ninety-three persons indicted. This included fifty-five first-instance judgments and forty-five appeal judgments: sixty-one individuals were sentenced, fourteen acquitted, ten referred to national jurisdictions for trial, three died prior to or during trial, three fugitives were referred to the Mechanism, while two indictments were withdrawn before trial, <http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal>. See also the Final Report of the ICTR, S/2015/884, 17 November 2015.

⁷⁷ Security Council resolution 1966 (2010). See also Security Council resolutions 2256 (2015) and 2422 (2018) and www.unmict.org/.

⁷⁸ See e.g. *Prosecutor v. Karadžić*, Appeals Chamber, MICT-13-55-A, 20 March 2019.

⁷⁹ Further, fifty convicted persons were serving their sentences in fourteen enforcement states under the supervision of the Mechanism,
www.irmct.org/sites/default/files/infographics/judicial-overview-en.pdf.

⁸⁰ See e.g. *The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court* (ed. C. Stahn), Oxford, 2015; Schabas, *Introduction to the ICC*; Schabas, *The ICC*; Triffterer and Ambos, *Rome Statute*; Cryer et al., *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, chapter 8; *Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions* (ed. C. de Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn), Cambridge, 2015; T. M. Funk, *Victims' Rights and Advocacy at the International Criminal Court*, Oxford, 2015; L. Grover, *Interpreting Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, Cambridge, 2014; O'Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, chapter 14; K. Calvo-Goller, *La Procédure et al Jurisprudence de la Court Pénale Internationale*, Paris, 2012; *The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues* (ed. D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe and E. Donnelly), Oxford, 2004; *The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (ed. A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones), Oxford, 2002; M. C. Bassiouni, 'The Permanent International Criminal Court', in Lattimer and Sands, *Justice for Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 173; and *The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute* (ed. R. Lee), The Hague, 1999.

⁸¹ See General Assembly resolution 260 (III) B and A/CN.4/15 and A/CN.4/20 (1950).

⁸² UNGAOR A/2645.

⁸³ See Report of the ILC on the Work of its 46th Session, A/49/10, pp. 43 ff. See in particular J. Crawford, 'The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court', **88** *AJIL*, 1994, p. 140; J. Crawford, 'The Making of the Rome Statute', in *From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice* (ed. P. Sands), Cambridge, 2003, p. 109.

⁸⁴ General Assembly resolution 50/46. See also resolutions 51/207 and 52/160.

⁸⁵ See A/51/22 and A/CONF.183/13 (III), p. 5.

⁸⁶ Article 5. These provisions are further defined in detail in articles 6–8 and see below, p. 362. In addition, article 9 provides for the preparation of Elements of Crimes to assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8. This was adopted on 9 September 2002 by the Assembly of States Parties, together with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. However, jurisdiction could not be exercised with regard to the crime of aggression until the Statute had been amended by its definition and the acceptance of conditions for jurisdiction. A review conference was held in Kampala in 2010 and a definition of the crime of aggression agreed, resulting in the insertion of new article 8 *bis* into the Rome Statute. Under new article 15 *ter*, the Court was to have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression one year after the amendment had entered into force for thirty states parties. This jurisdiction was activated on 17 July 2018: see ICC Assembly of States Parties, resolution 5 (14 December 2017) and www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/search-results.aspx?k=aggression. See e.g. D. Akande and A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression’, 29 *EJIL*, 2018, p. 939; T. Dannenbaum, *The Crime of Aggression, Humanity, and the Soldier*, Cambridge, 2018; Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, 6th ed., 2017, Cambridge, chapter 5; and see further below, p. 374.

⁸⁷ Article 25.

⁸⁸ Article 11. Note, however, that a state may make a declaration under article 12(3) to permit the Court to exercise jurisdiction in the particular case as from 1 July 2002. Note also that under article 124, a state may, upon ratification, decide not to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC over war crimes with regard to its nationals or to crimes committed on its territory for a period of seven years. In fact, only France and Colombia have taken advantage of this provision. In November 2014, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute adopted an amendment for the deletion of article 124, Res. ICC-ASP/14/Res.2, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 14th Session, ICC-ASP/14/20/vol. I, 18–26 November 2015, at 26. See also A. Zimmermann, ‘Finally . . . Or Would Rather Less Have Been More’, 14 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2016, p. 505. As of May 2020, the amendment has been ratified by only fourteen states and is not yet in force, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-c&chapter=18&clang=en.

⁸⁹ Article 12(2).

⁹⁰ Article 13(b).

⁹¹ See www.icc-cpi.int/darfur.

⁹² See ICC-02/05-01/07-2 01-05-2007 1/16 CB PT and ICC-02/05-01/07-3 01-05-2007 1/17 CB PT. The Prosecutor applied for a warrant of arrest against the President of Sudan on 14 July 2008 alleging genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, ICC-OTP-20080714-PR341-ENG.

⁹³ On 4 March 2009 and 12 July 2010, see 23rd Report of the Prosecutor to the Security Council Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), 2016; see www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/23-otp-rep-UNSC-darfur_ENG.pdf. President Al-Bashir was overthrown in April 2019 and it has been reported that Sudan's new rulers have agreed to hand him over to the ICC, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51462613.

⁹⁴ See www.icc-cpi.int/libya. The warrant against Muammar Gaddafi was terminated upon his death in November 2011. On 9 March 2020, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the admissibility of the case against Saif Gaddafi and stated that Libya was under an obligation to arrest him and surrender him to the Court: see Prosecutor's 19th Report to the Security Council Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), 2020, www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/19th-report-icc-otp-UNSC-libya-ENG.pdf.

⁹⁵ Articles 13(a) and 14.

⁹⁶ Article 13(c).

⁹⁷ Article 15. The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorise the investigation will not preclude the presentation of a subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the same situation. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paras. 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall inform those who provided the information. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information submitted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light of new facts or evidence.

⁹⁸ In July 2004, an investigation was opened by the Prosecutor, and on 8 July 2005, warrants of arrest for crimes against humanity and war crimes against five senior

commanders (one of whom died in 2006) of the Lord's Resistance Army were issued under seal by Pre-Trial Chamber II. One member of the LRA surrendered himself in January 2015 and his trial is at the time of writing ongoing; see www.icc-cpi.int/uganda.

99 See ICC-OTP-20040419-50-En. An investigation was opened in June 2004, the first such investigation by the Prosecutor: see ICC-OTP-20040623-59-En. An arrest warrant was issued in early 2006 against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was convicted on 14 March 2012 and sentenced to fourteen years. The verdict and sentence were confirmed on appeal on 1 December 2014. Reparations proceedings are continuing; see www.icc-cpi.int/drc. An arrest warrant was issued against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui in July 2007 and, upon trial, the charges were severed and the latter acquitted (the verdict being upheld on appeal on 27 February 2015), while the former was convicted on 7 March 2014 (the appeal was withdrawn). A further accused (Mbarushimana) was released, while on 8 July 2019, Bosco Ntaganda was found guilty by the Trial Chamber; see www.icc-cpi.int/drc.

100 An investigation was opened by the Prosecutor in May 2007 and an arrest warrant issued. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was convicted on 21 March 2016, but acquitted on 8 June 2018 of charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, he (and others) were convicted in 2016–17 of charges against the administration of justice and sentenced in 2018; see www.icc-cpi.int/car.

101 Two persons were transferred to the Court and proceedings are underway; see www.icc-cpi.int/carII.

102 Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi was convicted and sentenced, while Al Hassan is facing trial; see www.icc-cpi.int/mali.

103 Charges against a number of individuals (including Uhuru Kenyatta, the current President of Kenya) were withdrawn in 2011 or were not confirmed in 2012, arrest warrants have been issued in other cases, but they are not in the Court's custody so cannot be tried; see www.icc-cpi.int/kenya.

104 Côte d'Ivoire had accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC under article 12(3) of the Statute on 18 April 2003 (reconfirmed in December 2010 and in May 2011) even though it only became a party to the Rome Statute on 15 February 2011. Pre-Trial Chamber III granted on 3 October 2011 the Prosecutor's request for authorisation to open investigations *proprio*

motu into alleged crimes committed in that country as from November 2010. The following year, the investigation was extended to cover alleged crimes committed between September 2002 and November 2010. A warrant of arrest was issued against Laurent Gbagbo, who was transferred to the Court in November 2011 and he and another person were acquitted on 15 January 2019. A warrant of arrest has been issued against Simone Gbagbo, who is not currently in the Court's custody: see www.icc-cpi.int/cdi.

¹⁰⁵ See www.icc-cpi.int/georgia.

¹⁰⁶ See www.icc-cpi.int/burundi.

¹⁰⁷ The investigation concerns alleged crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court 'in which at least one element occurred on the territory' of Bangladesh, a state party to the Rome Statute; www.icc-cpi.int/bangladesh-myanmar. This, of course, raises interesting questions as to jurisdiction and the applicable place of commission of the alleged crimes since Myanmar is not a state party to the Statute.

¹⁰⁸ The Appeals Chamber on 5 March 2020 overturned a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber and found that the Prosecutor was authorised to investigate crimes alleged to have been committed on the territory of Afghanistan since 1 May 2003, as well as other alleged crimes that have a nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan and are sufficiently linked to the situation in Afghanistan and were committed on the territory of other states parties to the Rome Statute since 1 July 2002; see www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan.

¹⁰⁹ See www.icc-cpi.int/pages/pe.aspx.

¹¹⁰ On 6 November 2013, the Prosecutor held that the requirements for opening an investigation into the situation had not been met. On 16 July 2015, following a request for review by the government of the Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber I requested the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision. On 6 November 2015, the Appeals Chamber of the Court decided by majority to dismiss without discussing its merits, the Prosecutor's appeal against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber. On 29 November 2017, the Prosecutor notified the Chamber of her 'final decision', as required by rule 108(3), which was that the information available did not provide a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation; see www.icc-cpi.int/comoros/Pages/default.aspx.

¹¹¹ As to Palestine, whose statehood is internationally controversial, see further [Chapter 5](#), p. 215. There were a considerable number of *amicus curiae* interventions on this point; see generally www.icc-cpi.int/palestine.

¹¹² See Security Council resolution 1422 (2002) calling for the ICC to defer any exercise of jurisdiction for twelve months if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing state not a party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a UN established or authorised operation. This was renewed for a further twelve months in resolution 1487 (2003), but not subsequently: see e.g. D. McGoldrick, ‘Political and Legal Responses to the ICC’, in McGoldrick *et al.*, *Permanent International Criminal Court*, p. 415. However, resolutions 1497 (2003) and 1593 (2005) provide that personnel from a state not a party to the Rome Statute will be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that state for all acts related to the multinational force or UN force in Liberia and Darfur respectively. See also C. C. Jalloh, D. Akande and M. du Plessis, ‘Assessing the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 4 *African Journal of Legal Studies*, 2011, p. 5.

¹¹³ See e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 165–7; M. Benzing, ‘US Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements and Article 98 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 8 *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, 2004, p. 182; and Schabas, *International Criminal Court*, pp. 1349 ff.

¹¹⁴ See e.g. *The International Criminal Court and Africa* (ed. C. C. Jalloh and I. Bantekas), Oxford, 2017; and Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 167–9. Burundi withdrew from the Court in 2017. The Gambia subsequently withdrew its initial withdrawal, see C.N. 62.2017.TREATIES – XVIII.10 (depositary notification) and South Africa’s withdrawal was ended, at least temporarily by a constitutional problem; see *Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others*, Case No. 83145/2016, High Court of South Africa, Judgment of 22 February 2017. Note also that the Philippines withdrew as from 19 March 2019, www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1371, and Malaysia announced its withdrawal from the Statute shortly after acceding to it, www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20190412/malaysia-backtracks-accession-rome-statute.

¹¹⁵ Article 17; and see https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/complementarity/List-of-Actors/Pages/default.aspx. See also *Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,

Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 10 February 2006; and Schabas, *International Criminal Court*, pp. 453 ff. Note also K. J. Heller, 'Radical Complementarity', **14** *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2016, p. 637; C. Stahn, 'Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity', **10** *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2012, p. 325; P. Seils, 'Putting Complementarity in Its Place', in Stahn, *Law and Practice of the ICC*, p. 305; S. M. Nouwen, *Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan*, Cambridge, 2013; M. Benzing, 'The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice Between State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity', **7** *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, 2003, p. 591; and M. Tedeschi, 'Complementarity in Practice: The ICC's Inconsistent Approach in the *Gaddafi* and *Al-Senussi* Admissibility Decisions', **7** *Amsterdam Law Forum*, 2015, p. 76.

116 In order to determine this, the Court must consider whether the proceedings were being undertaken or the decision made in order to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC; whether there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings, and whether the proceedings have been conducted independently or impartially: article 17(2)(a)–(c).

117 In order to determine this, the Court must consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or is otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings: article 17(3).

118 Article 20(3).

119 See Appeals Chamber judgment in *Kenyatta*, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11 OA, ICC, Judgment of 30 August 2011, para. 40.

120 Case No. ICC-02/11-01/12 OA, Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 27 May 2015, paras. 128, 122. The Appeals Chamber also confirmed that the expression 'the case is being investigated' in article 17(1)(a) required the 'taking of steps' directed at ascertaining whether the person is responsible for the alleged conduct. These may include 'interviewing witnesses or suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic analyses', paras. 27–8. See also Heller, 'Radical Complementarity'.

121 Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11 OA, ICC, Judgment of 30 August 2011, para. 39.

¹²² Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 4, ICC, Judgment of 21 May 2014, paras. 71–2. Emphasis in the original. See also the *Al-Senussi* admissibility case, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, ICC, Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 11 October 2013, paras. 74–5.

¹²³ Articles 17(1)(d) and 53(1)(c). See also e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 161–2.

¹²⁴ Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 2019, paras. 7, 171, and, giving the example of the Rohingya in Bangladesh/Myanmar (‘in view of the scale of the alleged crimes and the number of approximately 600,000 to one million Rohingya victims allegedly forcibly displaced from Myanmar to Bangladesh’), para. 299.

¹²⁵ Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 2019, para. 8. Note that Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded, in the context of the Bangladesh/Myanmar situation, that the ICC has objective international personality, although this did not imply *erga omnes* jurisdiction; *Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute*, Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Judgment of 6 September 2018, paras. 34 ff.

¹²⁶ Article 34.

¹²⁷ Article 40. Note that a plenary of the judges decided that the position of ambassador was not incompatible with the requirements of judicial independence in the case of a judge wishing to move from a full-time to a non-full-time status, ICC-01/04-02/06, 19 March 2019.

¹²⁸ Article 36.

¹²⁹ Article 38.

¹³⁰ Article 43.

¹³¹ See further articles 53–55.

¹³² Article 42.

133 Article 39(2)(b)(iii).

134 Article 53.

135 Article 39(2)(b)(ii).

136 Article 64.

137 Article 77.

138 Article 75(2).

139 Article 68.

140 Article 39(2)(b)(i).

141 Article 81. Either party may appeal against decisions as to, for example, jurisdiction or admissibility; decisions as to the grant or denial of the release of the person being investigated or prosecuted; and decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative under article 56(3): see article 82.

142 Article 83. The revision of the sentence can be requested if new evidence has been discovered which was not available at the time of the trial and is sufficiently important or decisive for the Appeals Chamber to revise or amend the sentence: see article 84.

143 See e.g. A. Fichtelbert, *Hybrid Tribunals: A Comparative Examination*, Heidelberg, 2015; S. Williams, *Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals*, Oxford, 2013; *Internationalized Criminal Courts* (ed. C. P. Romano, A. Nollkaemper and J. K. Kleffner), Oxford, 2004; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, chapter 9; Schabas, *UN International Criminal Tribunals*; and L. A. Dickinson, 'The Promise of Hybrid Courts', **97** *AJIL*, 2003, p. 295.

144 See for this terminology, M. P. Scharf, 'The Iraqi High Tribunal', **5** *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2007, pp. 258, 259.

145 Article 1 of the Agreement contained in S/2002/246, Appendix II, and articles 1 and 6 of the Statute of the Special Court, contained in S/2002/246, Appendix III, and see Security Council resolution 1436 (2002) affirming ‘strong support’ for the Court, and the Report on the Special Court by Professor A. Cassese, the independent expert commissioned by the UN Secretary-General to review the work of the Special Court, 12 December 2006, www.rscsl.org/Documents/Cassese%20Report.pdf. See also *The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law* (ed. C. C. Jalloh), Cambridge, 2013; C. J. Jalloh, *The Legal Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone*, Cambridge, 2020; O’Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, chapter 13; R. Cryer, ‘A “Special Court” for Sierra Leone’, *50 ICLQ*, 2001, p. 435; Schabas, *UN International Criminal Tribunals*; A. Smith, ‘Sierra Leone: The Intersection of Law, Policy and Practice’, P. Mochochoko and G. Tortora, ‘The Management Committee for the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ and W. A. Schabas, ‘Internationalized Courts and their Relationship with Alternative Accountability Mechanisms’, in Romano *et al.*, *Internationalized Criminal Courts*, pp. 125, 141, 157 respectively; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 176–9; and C. da Silva, ‘The Hybrid Experience of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, in Brown, *Research Handbook on International Criminal Law*, p. 232.

146 Article 1(2) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

147 Note that with the conclusion of the Charles Taylor trial, the functions of Trial Chamber II came to an end: see Ninth Annual Report of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2011–12.

148 Article 12(1). Eight judges were appointed in July 2002: see UN Press Release SG/A/813.

149 Article 20. Under article 21, the convicted person or the Prosecutor may apply to the Appeals Chamber for review where a new fact has been discovered which was not known at the time of the proceedings before the Trial Chamber or Appeals Chamber and which could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision. The Appeals Chamber may reject the application, reconvene the Trial Chamber or retain jurisdiction over the matter.

150 Article 15.

151 Article 16.

152 Articles 2–4 of the Statute.

153 Article 5 of the Statute. These crimes relate to offences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1926 and offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damages Act 1861. However, the Special Court has no jurisdiction with regard to any person under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. No person may be tried before a national court of Sierra Leone for acts for which he or she has already been tried by the Special Court. But a person who has been tried by a national court for the acts referred to in articles 2–4 of the Statute may be subsequently tried by the Special Court if either the act for which he or she was tried was characterised as an ordinary crime; or the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, or were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility or the case was not diligently prosecuted: see article 9.

154 See www.rscsl.org/Taylor.html.

155 *Ibid.*

156 See www.rscsl.org/AFRC.html.

157 See www.rscsl.org/CDF_Trial_Chamber_Decisions.html. See also S. M. Meisenberg, ‘Legality of Amnesties in International Humanitarian Law: The Lomé Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, **86** *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2004, p. 837.

158 See A/59/816 – S/2005/350.

159 In December 2011, the Sierra Leone Parliament passed the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone Agreement (Ratification) Act, ratifying an agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, dated 11 August 2010, on the establishment of the Residual Special Court to continue the work of the Special Court. It became law on 1 February 2012. Annexed to this is the Statute of the Residual Special Court: see www.rscsl.org/Documents/RSCSL-Act.pdf.

160 Articles 13–16 of the Statute of the Residual Special Court.

161 See General Assembly resolutions 57/228A and 57/228B and A/57/806. See also J. D. Ciorciari and A. Heindel, *Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*, Ann Arbor, 2014; N. H. B. Jørgensen, *The Elgar Companion to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*, Cheltenham, 2018; R. Williams, ‘The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers: A Dangerous Precedent for International Justice?’, **53 ICLQ**, 2004, p. 227; G. Acquaviva, ‘New Paths in International Criminal Justice? The Internal Rules of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers’, **6 Journal of International Criminal Justice**, 2008, p. 129; C. Etcheson, ‘The Politics of Genocide Justice in Cambodia’ and E. E. Meijer, ‘The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for Prosecuting Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge: Jurisdiction, Organization and Procedure of an Internationalized Tribunal’, in Romano *et al.*, *Internationalized Criminal Courts*, pp. 181, 207 respectively; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, p. 185; and B. N. McGonigle, ‘Two for the Price of One’, **22 Leiden Journal of International Law**, 2009, p. 127. See also www.eccc.gov.kh/en.

162 Article 3 of the Agreement. The Secretary-General nominated seven judges in March 2006 and the Supreme Council of Magistracy approved a list of thirty Cambodian and international judges in May that year to be followed by appointment by Royal Decree. The judges were duly sworn in in July 2006 and Internal Rules were adopted in June 2007 and revised, most recently on 16 January 2015.

163 Article 5.

164 Article 6. In the case of both the co-investigating judges and co-prosecutors, the UN Secretary-General was to make two nominations out of which the Supreme Council of Magistracy was to choose one international investigating judge and one international prosecutor. Any differences between the two co-investigating judges and the two co-prosecutors are to be settled by a Pre-Trial Chamber of five judges, three appointed by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, with one as President, and two appointed by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy upon nomination by the Secretary-General: see article 7.

165 Article 9.

166 Article 12.

¹⁶⁷ Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ. See also Annual Report 2007, p. 11.

¹⁶⁸ See www.eccc.gov.kh/en/featured/kaing-guek-eav-alias-duch-sentenced-life-imprisonment-supreme-court-chamber. Note that the Supreme Court partially confirmed and amended the Trial Chamber Judgment as well as overturning the decision on sentencing. Subsequently, he has been found guilty pursuant to Articles 5, 6 and 29 (new) of the ECCC Law of a number of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, *ibid*.

¹⁶⁹ See www.eccc.gov.kh/en/who-has-been-prosecuted. See also e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 179–83, detailing various criticisms of the Court.

¹⁷⁰ See e.g. J. Cerone and C. Baldwin, ‘Explaining and Evaluating the UNMIK Court System’ and J. C. Cady and N. Booth, ‘Internationalized Courts in Kosovo: An UNMIK Perspective’, in Romano *et al.*, *Internationalized Criminal Courts*, pp. 41, 59 respectively; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 195 ff.; S. de Bertodano, ‘Current Developments in Internationalized Courts’, 1 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2003, pp. 226, 239 ff.; and *Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo*, International Crisis Group, 2002. See also www.scp-ks.org/en.

¹⁷¹ Paragraphs 10 and 11.

¹⁷² UNMIK/REG/1991/1, S/1999/987, p. 14.

¹⁷³ As amended in UNMIK/REG/2000/54.

¹⁷⁴ Initially in Mitrovica and then in all domestic courts and the Supreme Court: see UNMIK Regulation 2000/34. Note that attempts to establish a Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court were abandoned in September 2000: see Cady and Booth, ‘Internationalized Courts in Kosovo’, p. 60.

¹⁷⁵ See UNMIK/REG/1999/24 and UNMIK/REG/2000/59. Section 1.3 provided that all persons exercising public functions were to observe internationally recognised human rights standards as reflected in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the

Racial Discrimination Convention, the Women's Discrimination Convention, the Torture Convention and the Rights of the Child Convention.

¹⁷⁶ See e.g. de Bertodano, 'Current Developments', pp. 239 ff.

¹⁷⁷ See above, Chapter 5, p. 214.

¹⁷⁸ See www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,2 and www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16. See also S. Williams, 'The Specialist Chambers of Kosovo', 14 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2016, p. 25.

¹⁷⁹ See <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=12608&lang=en>. See also the Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office, Law No. 05/L-053, 3 August 2015.

¹⁸⁰ See www.scp-ks.org/en.

¹⁸¹ See www.scp-ks.org/en/press-statement.

¹⁸² See e.g. S. de Bertodano, 'East Timor: Trials and Tribulations', in Romano *et al.*, *Internationalized Criminal Courts*, p. 79; S. Linton, 'Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court of Dili', 2 *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, 2001, p. 414; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 190–1; and S. Linton and C. Reiger, 'The Evolving Jurisprudence and Practice of East Timor's Special Panels for Serious Crimes on Admission of Guilt, Duress and Superior Orders', 4 *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, 2001, p. 1.

¹⁸³ Resolution 1272 (1999). See also resolution 1264 (1999) and S/1999/24.

¹⁸⁴ UNTAET Regulations 2000/11 and 2000/14.

¹⁸⁵ Regulation 2000/15.

¹⁸⁶ Defined in sections 4–10 of Regulation 2000/15.

¹⁸⁷ Section 14.

¹⁸⁸ Section 22.

¹⁸⁹ See de Bertodano, 'East Timor', pp. 90 ff.; and S. de Bertodano, 'Current Developments in Internationalized Courts: East Timor – Justice Denied', 2 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2004, p. 910.

¹⁹⁰ Case No. 16/201: see also G. S. McNeal, 'Analysis of the Judgements in Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste, Dili District Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes', 16 *Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals*, 2011, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1087670>.

¹⁹¹ See e.g. C. Reiger and M. Wierda, *The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect*, International Center for Transnational Justice, 2006.

¹⁹² See Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, p. 194; Bohlander, 'Referring an Indictment', p. 219; Human Rights Watch, *Looking for Justice: The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 2006; and Human Rights Watch, *Narrowing the Impunity Gap: Trials Before Bosnia's War Crimes Chamber*, 2007. See also B. Ivanišević, *The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Hybrid to Domestic Court*, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2008.

¹⁹³ As to the High Representative, see above, Chapter 5, p. 209.

¹⁹⁴ See www.icty.org/en/press/ohr-icty-working-group-development-bih-capacity-war-crimes-trial-successfully-completed.

¹⁹⁵ See resolution 1503 (2003).

¹⁹⁶ See above, p. 337. And see also www.sudbih.gov.ba/?jezik=e.

¹⁹⁷ *Prosecutor v. Radovan Stanković*, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11 bis.1, ICTY, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral (Appeals Chamber), 1 September 2005, para. 30.

¹⁹⁸ See Human Rights Watch, *Looking for Justice*, pp. 4 ff.

199 The appointments by the High Representative were made under the powers vested in him by article 5, Annex 10, of the Dayton Peace Accord. The international prosecutors and judges were phased out in 2012: see Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, p. 192.

200 See Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *10th Anniversary of Section I for War Crimes at the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Sarajevo, 2015, p. 7. See also Human Rights Watch, *Narrowing the Impunity Gap*, p. 5; and Human Rights Watch, *Justice for Atrocity Crimes: Lessons of International Support for Trials before the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 2012.

201 ECtHR, Judgment of 18 July 2013.

202 See e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 183 ff.; B. Fassbender, 'Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon', C. Aptel, 'Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon' and N. N. Jurdi, 'The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon', 5 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2007, pp. 1091, 1107, 1125 respectively. See also www.stl-tsl.org/en/.

203 See Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005). See also S/2005/783 and S/2006/375.

204 S/2006/893 and S/2007/150. See resolutions 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007) calling for the work of the Commission to continue.

205 Article 1 of the Statute.

206 Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute. See also www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/structure-of-the-stl/chambers.

207 Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Statute. The Registrar was appointed on 11 March 2008; see www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25925&Cr=Leban&Cr1. See also www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/structure-of-the-stl/the-office-of-the-prosecutor.

208 Articles 2 and 4 of the Statute.

209 *Merhi*, STL-13-04/1/TCF0037/20131220/R099167-R099204/EN/af. Hearings in absentia in the *Ayyash* case started on 16 January 2014, www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01.

210 *Prosecutor v. Ayyash*, STL Casebook, 2011, p. 27, paras. 61 ff., www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01. However, see Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, p. 184. Judgment is, as of late May 2020, still awaited.

211 *Akhbar Beirut SAL and Ibrahim Mohammed Ali Al Amin*, STL-14-06/T/CJ.

212 See e.g. Scharf, ‘Iraqi High Tribunal’; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 193–4; I. Bantekas, ‘The Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes against Humanity’, 54 *ICLQ*, 2004, p. 237; M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal’, 38 *Cornell International Law Journal*, 2005, p. 327; M. Sissons and A. S. Bassin, ‘Was the Dujail Trial Fair?’, 5 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2007, p. 272; G. Mettraux, ‘The 2005 Revision of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal’, 5 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2007, p. 287; S. de Bertodano, ‘Were There More Acceptable Alternatives to the Iraqi High Tribunal?’, 5 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2007, p. 294.

213 Order No. 48.

214 The dates reflect the commencement of the Ba’ath party control of Iraq and the end of the Saddam Hussein regime.

215 Articles 1 and 11–14 of the Statute of the Tribunal.

216 Article 15.

217 See e.g. J. Trahan, ‘A Critical Guide to the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal Judgment’, 30 *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 2009, p. 305; N. Bhuta, ‘Fatal Errors: The Trial and Appeal Judgments in the *Dujail* Case’, 6 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2008, p. 39; M. P. Scharf and M. A. Newton, ‘The Iraq High Tribunal’s *Dujail* Trial Opinion’, *ASIL Insight*, 18 December 2006; and Human Rights Watch report on the *Dujail* trial, www.hrw.org/reports/iraq1106webwcover.pdf <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/22/iraq16230.htm>.

²¹⁸ The War Crimes Chamber's first trial, the *Ovcara* case, began on 9 March 2004. As of 2006, three trials had been completed and three others were ongoing: see Human Rights Watch, *Unfinished Business: Serbia's War Crimes Chamber*, 2007, pp. 1 ff. See also Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 194–5; M. Ellis, 'Coming to Terms with its Past: Serbia's New Court for the Prosecution of War Crimes', 22 *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, 2004, p. 165. See also www.icty.org/en/outreach/capacity-building/development-local-judiciaries.

²¹⁹ Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, p. 195; see e.g. Vladimir Kovačević, ICTY Referral Bench, 2006.

²²⁰ See also the Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic, established in 2015, and staffed by national and international prosecutors and judges, with logistical and technical support from the [UN peacekeeping mission](#) in that country. It is a national court with primacy over other domestic courts with regard to grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The inaugural session took place in October 2018; see P. Labuda, 'Open for Business', EJIL: Talk!, 8 February 2019; and Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 197–8. See also the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which has a criminal jurisdiction, above, p. 326.

²²¹ However, note the case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar before the ICJ, Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention; and see General Assembly resolution 71/248 adopted on 21 December 2016 establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under International Law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. Its mandate is to 'collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law', see <https://iiim.un.org/>.

²²² See e.g. Ambos, *Treatise on International Criminal Law*, vol. II. Note, among a number of relevant issues that cannot be covered in this work, the principle of command responsibility, whereby a superior is criminally responsible for acts committed by subordinates that he knew or had reason to know had been or were about to be committed

and no action was taken: see e.g. G. Mettraux, *The Law of Command Responsibility*, Oxford, 2009; Green, *Armed Conflict*, pp. 303–4; I. Bantekas, ‘The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility’, **93** *AJIL*, 1999, p. 573; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law and Practice*, p. 384; and O’ Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, p. 201. See also article 87 of Additional Protocol I 1977; article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute 1993; article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute 1994; and article 28 of the ICC Statute 1998. Note *Čelebići Camp*, Case No. IT-96-21, ICTY, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 16 November 1998, paras. 370 ff.; *Krnjela*, Case No. IT-97-25-A, ICTY, Judgment of 17 September 2003; and *Blagojević*, Case No. IT-02-60-A, 2007. Further, military necessity may not be pleaded as a defence, see e.g. *Re Lewinski (called von Manstein)* 16 AD, p. 509, and the claim of superior orders will not provide a defence, although it may be taken in mitigation depending upon the circumstances: see e.g. Green, *Armed Conflict*, pp. 305–7; Green, *Superior Orders in National and International Law*, Leiden, 1976; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law and Practice*, p. 411; and Y. Dinstein, *The Defence of ‘Obedience to Superior Orders’ in International Law*, Leiden, 1965. See also article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter, 39 *AJIL*, 1945, Supp., p. 259; Principle IV of the International Law Commission’s Report on the Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal 1950, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1950, vol. **II**, p. 195; article 7(4) of the ICTY Statute 1993; article 6(4) of the ICTR Statute 1994; and article 33 of the ICC Statute.

²²³ See e.g. W. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2009; P. Akhavan, *Reducing Genocide to Law: Definition, Meaning and the Ultimate Crime*, Cambridge, 2015; N. Robinson, *The Genocide Convention*, London, 1960; R. Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, London, 1944; *The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary* (ed. P. Gaeta), Oxford, 2009; *The Concept of Genocide in International Criminal Law* (ed. M. Odello and P. Lubinski), London, 2020; L. Kuper, *Genocide*, Harmondsworth, 1981; and *International Action Against Genocide*, Minority Rights Group Report No. 53, 1984; *Genocide and Human Rights* (ed. J. Porter), Washington, DC, 1982; and I. Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*, New Brunswick, 1980. See also N. Ruhashyankiko, *Study on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 1978, E/CN.4/Sub.2/416; B. Whittaker, *Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 1985, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6; M. Nash Leich, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’, **79** *AJIL*, 1985, pp. 116 ff.; M. Shaw, *War and Genocide*, Oxford, 2003; C. Fournet, *The Crime of Destruction and the Law of Genocide*, London, 2007; M. N. Shaw, ‘Genocide and International Law’, in *International Law at a Time of Perplexity* (ed. Y. Dinstein), Dordrecht, 1989, p. 797; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to*

International Criminal Law, chapter 10; O’Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, chapter 4(V); C. Kreß, ‘The ICC’s First Encounter with Crime of Genocide’, in Stahn, *Law and Practice of the ICC*, p. 669; and G. Verdirame, ‘The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the *Ad Hoc* Tribunals’, **49 ICLQ**, 2000, p. 578.

224 But see Sub-Commission resolution 1994/11.

225 See Kuper, *Genocide*, pp. 32–5; and N. Lewis, ‘The Camp at Cecilio Baez’, in *Genocide in Paraguay* (ed. R. Arens), Philadelphia, 1976, p. 58. See also Ruhashyankiko, *Study*, p. 25.

226 See e.g. Kuper, *Genocide*, pp. 25–30; and Ruhashyankiko, *Study*, p. 21. See also Robinson, *Genocide Convention*, p. 59.

227 See e.g. Kuper, *Genocide*, p. 31; Robinson, *Genocide Convention*, p. 64; and Ruhashyankiko, *Study*, pp. 21 ff.

228 See further generally below, [Chapter 13](#).

229 ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 3, 16, 23; 95 ILR, pp. 1, 31. See also R. Maison, ‘Les Ordonnances de la CIJ dans l’Affaire Relative à l’Application de la Convention sur la Prévention et la Répression du Crime du Génocide’, **5 EJIL**, 1994, p. 381.

230 ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 15, 23; 18 ILR, pp. 364, 370, quoting the terms of General Assembly resolution 96(I) of 11 December 1946.

231 The government of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was requested to take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide, and was specifically called upon to ensure that ‘any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organisations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of genocide’, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 3, 24; 95 ILR, pp. 1, 39. These provisional measures were reaffirmed by the Court in its Order on Provisional Measures of 13 September 1993 as measures which should be ‘immediately and effectively implemented’, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 350; 95 ILR, pp. 43, 68. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 407, 431–2; 95 ILR, pp. 125, 149–50. Yugoslavia introduced an application in April 2001 for revision of the 1996 judgment on the basis that a ‘new fact’

had appeared since that state had become a new member of the UN during 2000. This was rejected by the Court, ICJ Reports, 2003, p. 7. See further below, [Chapter 18](#), p. 957.

²³² Now so called, rather than the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), as from, and in consequence of, the Dayton Peace Agreement initialled at Dayton, US, on 11 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.

²³³ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 615; 115 ILR, p. 1.

²³⁴ ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 616.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 617. See also the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 240; 110 ILR, p. 163. Yugoslavia subsequently withdrew the counter-claims it had introduced against Bosnia: ICJ, Order of 10 September 2001.

²³⁶ ICJ Reports, 2007, paras. 161–7. See also *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 31–2, where the Court noted that the rights and obligations in the Genocide Convention were rights and obligations *erga omnes* and stated that the prohibition of genocide was ‘assuredly’ a norm of *jus cogens*.

²³⁷ ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 119–20. See also *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 61.

²³⁸ *Application of the Genocide Convention*, p. 120.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 124–5. The Court noted in *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 64: ‘Since it is the group, in whole or in part, which is the object of the genocidal intent, the Court is of the view that it is difficult to establish such intent on the basis of isolated acts. It considers that, in the absence of direct proof, there must be evidence of acts on a scale that establishes an intent not only to target certain individuals because of their membership of a particular group, but also to destroy the group itself in whole or in part.’

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 126–7. The Court in *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 65, reaffirmed this, but noted that ‘[a]ccount must also be taken of the prominence of the allegedly targeted part within the group as a whole. With respect to this criterion, the ICTY Appeals Chamber specified in its Judgment rendered in the *Krstić* case that “[i]f a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may

support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4 [of the ICTY Statute, paragraph 2 of which essentially reproduces Article II of the Convention]” (Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment of 19 April 2004, para. 12)’.

²⁴¹ *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, p. 155. The Court accepted the possibility that genocidal intent could be established indirectly by reference, *ibid.*, pp. 196–7, and in *Croatia v. Serbia*, it noted that this meant that ‘in order to infer the existence of *dolus specialis* from a pattern of conduct, it is necessary and sufficient that this is the only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the acts in question’, pp. 3, 67.

²⁴² *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 181–2, 190, 194–5, 198.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 15–66.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 128–9 and see also p. 175.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 219–20.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 221–2.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 229. Note the appointment of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide commencing in 2004, www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/.

²⁵⁰ See e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, chapter 10; Werle and Jeßberger, *Principles of International Criminal Law*, part 3; and Cassese’s *International Criminal Law* (ed. A. Cassese and P. Gaeta), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2013, chapter 6. See also Human Rights Watch, *Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*, 2010, chapter 1. Note also *Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania*, ECtHR, Judgment of 20 October 2015, paras. 170 ff., reaffirming the definition of genocide as contained in the 1948 Convention, particularly noting the absence of political groups among the list of target groups and concluding in

para. 175 that ‘there is no sufficiently strong basis for finding that customary international law as it stood in 1953 included “political groups” among those falling within the definition of genocide’. See now *Drélingas v. Lithuania*, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 March 2019, paras. 96 ff. Note also the Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, A/HRC/39/64, 12 September 2018 and the resolution of the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/39/L.22, 25 September 2018, establishing an ongoing independent mechanism to collect, preserve and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes committed in Myanmar since 2011.

²⁵¹ See also article 2 of the ICTR Statute and article 6 of the ICC Statute, which repeats article 4(2). See also ICC Elements of Crimes, 2011, which adds a further material element so that with regard to each prohibited act, the element requires that ‘[t]he conduct takes place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction’.

²⁵² Case No. IT-95-10, para. 66.

²⁵³ Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1998, para. 498.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 523. See also *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 1999, paras. 7 ff.; and *Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, 2000, paras. 884 ff.

²⁵⁵ Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, 2000, para. 14.

²⁵⁶ Case No. IT-95-10, paras. 100–1.

²⁵⁷ Case No. IT-98-33-T, 2001, para. 589. See also *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, p3, 65.

²⁵⁸ *Krstić*, para. 590.

²⁵⁹ Case No. IT-98-33-A, 2004, para. 8.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 12. In *Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania*, ECtHR, Judgment of 20 October 2015, the Court reaffirmed subsequent case-law that ‘the intentional destruction of a “distinct” part of the protected group could be considered as genocide of the entire protected group, provided that the “distinct” part was substantial because of the very large number of its members.

Furthermore, in addition to the numerical size of the targeted part, judicial interpretation confirmed that its “prominence” within the protected group could also be a useful consideration’, para. 177.

²⁶¹ *Krstić*, para. 134. See also *Mladić*, Case No. IT-09-92-T, ICTY, Judgment of 22 November 2017, paras. 3432 ff. In particular, it was held that where only a part of a group was targeted, that part must be a substantial part of that group such that it is significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole. In determining substantiality, considerations may include: the relative numerical size of the targeted part, the prominence of that part of the group within the larger whole, and the area of the perpetrators’ activity and control, *ibid.*, para. 3437.

²⁶² *Krstić*, para. 25.

²⁶³ Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1998, paras. 511 ff.

²⁶⁴ In *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 1999, paras. 522 ff., the Trial Chamber emphasised the importance of the designation contained in identity cards.

²⁶⁵ See *Rutaganda*, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, 1999, paras. 55 ff. See also *Bagilishima*, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, 2001, para. 65, where the Trial Chamber concluded that ‘if a victim was perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, the victim could be considered by the Chamber as a member of the protected group, for the purposes of genocide’. See also the Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, S/2005/60, paras. 500 ff.

²⁶⁶ See e.g. *Stakić*, Case No. IT-97-24-T, 2003, para. 515.

²⁶⁷ See e.g. *Eichmann* 36 ILR, p. 5; and *Brdjanin*, Case No. IT-99-36-T, 2004, para. 118. See also the *Blagojević* case, where, in addition, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that awareness of facts related to the forcible transfer operation was insufficient to prove complicity in genocide in the absence of knowledge of mass killings at Srebrenica, Case No. IT-02-60-A, 2007, paras. 119 ff.

²⁶⁸ See e.g. *Review of the Indictments Concerning Karadžić and Mladić Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence*, ICTY, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Judgment of 11 July 1996, para. 94, 108 ILR, pp. 134–5. See also ad hoc Judge

Lauterpacht's Separate Opinion in *Application of the Genocide Convention*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 431–2, and the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 6(c), footnote 4, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000).

²⁶⁹ Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 731.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 507–8.

²⁷¹ *Kambanda*, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 1998, paras. 39–40.

²⁷² President Al-Bashir was overthrown in April 2019 and it has been reported that Sudan's new rulers have agreed to hand him over to the ICC; see www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51462613 and generally www.icc-cpi.int/darfur. See also *Popović*, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 30 January 2015, particularly paras. 1065 ff. concerning the complex joint criminal enterprise doctrine in this context.

²⁷³ ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 68. See also [Chapter 20](#).

²⁷⁴ See e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, chapter 12; O'Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, chapter 4(III); M. A. Newton, 'Charging War Crimes: Policy and Prognosis from a Military Perspective', in Stahn, *Law and Practice of the ICC*, p. 732; and Cassese's *International Criminal Law*, chapter 4. See also Human Rights Watch, *Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*, 2010, chapter 3.

²⁷⁵ See further as to international humanitarian law, below, [Chapter 20](#).

²⁷⁶ See article 8 of the ICC Statute, which is exhaustive rather than illustrative in its exposition of fifty offences and is divided into sections dealing with: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law; in the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law. Note in particular article 8(2)(b)(xxii): rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and any other

form of sexual violence were deemed to constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and thus war crimes. In addition, article 8(2)(b)(viii) differs from article 49 of Geneva Convention IV in that it adds a key phrase to the definition, so that the former provision reads: ‘The transfer, directly *or indirectly*, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory’ (the added phrase is emphasised; to this extent it cannot be regarded as reflective of customary international law). Note also the ICC Elements of Crimes. See also article 4 of the ICTR Statute concerning violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions 1949 and of Additional Protocol II 1977; article 3 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and article 14 of the Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal.

²⁷⁷ See e.g. the US Army Lieber Code, April 1864.

²⁷⁸ See below, [Chapter 20](#), p. 1060.

²⁷⁹ Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision of 2 October 1995, para. 70; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 486.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 127.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 129.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 94. See also e.g. *Galić*, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 2003, para. 11; and the *Kanyabashi* Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, 1997, para. 8.

²⁸³ See article 8(2)(c) and (e) of the Statute.

²⁸⁴ Case No. ICC-01/04/-02/06, ICC, Judgment of 8 July 2019, paras. 949 ff.

²⁸⁵ See e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, chapter 11; O’Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, chapter 4(IV); D. Robinson, ‘Crimes against Humanity: A Better Policy on “Policy”’, in Stahn, *Law and Practice of the ICC*, p. 705; and Cassese’s *International Criminal Law*, chapter 5. See also Bassiouni, *Crimes Against Humanity*; and Human Rights Watch, *Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*, 2010, chapter 2. Note that the UN International Law Commission included the topic of Crimes against Humanity

in its programme of work at its 66th session in July 2014 and appointed a Special Rapporteur (Prof. Sean Murphy): see his fourth report, A/CN.4/725, 18 February 2019.

286 The Tokyo Charter was in similar terms, as was Allied Control Council Law No. 10 save that it added rape, imprisonment and torture to the list of inhumane acts and did not require a connection to war crimes or aggression: see Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 120 ff.

287 Article 7(1)(g) of the ICC Statute specifically refers to: ‘Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.’ See the *Bosco Ntaganda* case, where it was determined that sexual slavery constituted both a crime against humanity and a war crime, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, ICC, Judgment of 8 July 2019, paras. 949 ff. See also e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure*, p. 251. See also *Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1998, paras. 597 ff.; *Kunarac*, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, ICTY, Judgment of 22 February 2001, paras. 437 ff.; and the Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(g)(1)-I, Element 1, 2011.

288 Case No. IT-94-1-T, para. 644; 112 ILR, pp. 1, 214. See also paras. 645 ff. This was reaffirmed in the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 15 July 1999, para. 248; 124 ILR, pp. 61, 164.

289 Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 580.

290 Case No. IT-95-14-T, 2000, paras. 203–4; 122 ILR, pp. 1, 78.

291 Case Nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, ICTY, Judgment of 22 February 2001, para. 98.

292 ICC-01/04-01/12, 13 July 2012, para. 22. Note that the ICC Elements of Crimes added that the ‘policy to commit such attack’ required that the state or organisation ‘actively promote or encourage such an attack against the civilian population’, article 7(3) of the Elements of Crimes. See also Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, para. 76.

293 Case No. ICC-01/04-01/12, para. 24.

²⁹⁴ Case No. IT-95-11-T, 2007, paras. 55–6.

²⁹⁵ Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1998, para. 581.

²⁹⁶ Case No. IT-94-1-A, 1999, para. 271; 124 ILR, pp. 61, 173.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 255 ff. Note that the International Criminal Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber I in *Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute*, Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Judgment of 6 September 2018, paras. 50 ff., discussed the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to deportation as a crime against humanity (with regard to the Bangladesh/Myanmar situation).

²⁹⁸ See e.g. *The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary* (ed. C. Kreß and S. Barriga), Cambridge, 2016; Akande and Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law’, p. 939; Dannenbaum, *The Crime of Aggression*; P. Grzebyk, *Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression*, London, 2013; H. H. Koh and T. F. Buchwald, ‘The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective’, **109 AJIL**, 2015, p. 257; A. Pellet, ‘Response to Koh and Buchwald’s Article: Don Quixote and Sancho Panza Tilt at Windmills’, **109 AJIL**, 2015, p. 557; C. McDougall, *The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, Cambridge, 2015; S. D. Murphy, ‘Aggression, Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court’, **20 EJIL**, 2010, p. 1147; Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, chapter 13; O’Keefe, *International Criminal Law*, chapter 4(VI); R. S. Clark, ‘The Crime of Aggression’, in Stahn, *Law and Practice of the ICC*, p. 778; and Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, chapter 5; and see further below, Chapter 21, pp. 1100 ff.

²⁹⁹ See Judgment 186, 41 *AJIL*, 1947, p. 172.

³⁰⁰ See also the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (the ‘Kellogg–Briand Pact’) 1928, which condemned recourse to war as an instrument of international policy; article 1 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security 1954, and article 1(2) of the revised Draft Code adopted in 1996. Article 16 of the latter instrument provides that a leader who as leader or organiser actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a state shall be responsible for a crime of aggression.

301 See e.g. Cryer *et al.*, *Introduction to International Criminal Law*, pp. 314 ff. See also A. Carpenter, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression’, **64** *Nordic Journal of International Law*, 1995, p. 223; T. Ruys, ‘Criminalizing Aggression: How the Future of the Law on the Use of Force Rests in the Hands of the ICC’, **29** *EJIL*, 2018, p. 887; A. Zimmermann, ‘The Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court’, **25** *Suffolk Transnational Law Review*, 2005, p. 1; and C. Kress, ‘Versailles–Nuremberg–The Hague: Germany and the International Criminal Law’, **40** *International Lawyer*, 2006, p. 15.

302 See e.g. A. Zimmermann, ‘Amending the Amendment Provisions of the Rome Statute: The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression and the Law of Treaties’, **10** *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2012, p. 209.

303 This states that: ‘1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:

The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;

Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;

The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;

An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;

The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;

The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;

The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.’ See Resolution 6, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-8-Res.6-ENG.pdf.

³⁰⁴ See article 15 *bis* and *ter*. This jurisdiction was activated on 17 July 2018; see ICC Assembly of States Parties, resolution 5 (14 December 2017) and www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/search-results.aspx?k=aggression.

8

Recognition

International society is not an unchanging entity, but is subject to the ebb and flow of political life.¹ New states are created and old units fall away. New governments come into being within states in a manner contrary to declared constitutions whether or not accompanied by force. Insurgencies occur and belligerent administrations are established in areas of territory hitherto controlled by the legitimate government. Each of these events creates new facts and the question that recognition is concerned with revolves around the extent to which legal effects should flow from such occurrences. Each state will have to decide whether or not to recognise the particular eventuality and the kind of legal entity it should be accepted as.

Recognition involves consequences both on the international plane and within municipal law. If an entity is recognised as a state in, for example, the United Kingdom, it will entail the consideration of rights and duties that would not otherwise be relevant. There are privileges permitted to a foreign state before the municipal courts that would not be allowed to other institutions or persons.

It is stating the obvious to point to the very strong political influences that bear upon this topic.² In more cases than not, the decision whether or not to recognise will depend more upon political considerations than exclusively

legal factors. Recognition is not merely applying the relevant legal consequences to a factual situation, for sometimes a state will not want such consequences to follow, either internationally or domestically.

To give one example, the United States refused for many years to recognise either the People's Republic of China or North Korea, not because it did not accept the obvious fact that these authorities exercised effective control over their respective territories, but rather because it did not wish the legal effects of recognition to come into operation.³ It is purely a political judgment, although it has been clothed in legal terminology. In addition, there are a variety of options open as to what an entity may be recognised as. Such an entity may, for example, be recognised as a full sovereign state, or as the effective authority within a specific area or as a subordinate authority to another state.⁴ It is a matter of fact in all cases what precisely is being sought and granted and recognition may in certain circumstances constitute a significant political gesture without any legal consequences being intended, such as recognition as 'representative of the people'. More usually, recognition is a statement by an international legal person as to the status in international law of another real or alleged international legal person or of the validity of a particular factual situation. Once recognition has occurred, the new situation is deemed opposable to the recognising state, that is the pertinent legal consequences will flow. As such, recognition constitutes participation in the international legal process generally while also being important within the context of bilateral relations and, of course, domestically.

Recognition of States

There are basically two theories as to the nature of recognition. The constitutive theory maintains that it is the act of recognition by other states that creates a new state and endows it with legal personality and not the process by which it actually obtained independence. Thus, new states are established in the international community as fully fledged subjects of international law by virtue of the will and consent of already existing states.⁵ The disadvantage of this approach is that an unrecognised 'state' may not be subject to the obligations imposed by international law and may accordingly be free from such restraints as, for instance, the prohibition on aggression. A further complication would arise if a 'state' were recognised by some but not other states. Could one talk then of, for example, partial personality?

The second theory, the declaratory theory, adopts the opposite approach and is a little more in accord with practical realities.⁶ It maintains that recognition is merely an acceptance by states of an already existing situation. A new state will acquire capacity in international law not by virtue of the consent of others, but by virtue of a particular factual situation. It will be legally constituted by its own efforts and circumstances and will not have to await the procedure of recognition by other states. This doctrine owes much to traditional positivist thought on the supremacy of the state and the concomitant weakness or non-existence of any central guidance in the international community.

For the constitutive theorist, the heart of the matter is that fundamentally an unrecognised 'state' can have no rights or obligations in international law. The opposite stance is adopted by the declaratory approach that emphasises

the factual situation and minimises the power of states to confer legal personality.

Actual practice leads to a middle position between these two perceptions. The act of recognition by one state of another indicates that the former regards the latter as having conformed with the basic requirements of international law as to the creation of a state. Of course, recognition is highly political and is given in a number of cases for purely political reasons. This point of view was emphasised by the American representative on the Security Council during discussions on the Middle East in May 1948. He said that it would be:

highly improper for one to admit that any country on earth can question the sovereignty of the United States of America in the exercise of the high political act of recognition of the *de facto* status of a state.

Indeed, he added that there was no authority that could determine the legality or validity of that act of the United States.⁷ This American view that recognition is to be used as a kind of mark of approval was in evidence with regard to the attitude adopted towards communist China for a generation.⁸

The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has often tended to extend recognition once it is satisfied that the authorities of the state in question have complied with the minimum requirements of international law, and have effective control which seems likely to continue over the country.⁹

Recognition is constitutive in a political sense, for it marks the new entity out

as a state within the international community and is evidence of acceptance of its new political status by the society of nations. This does not imply that the act of recognition is legally constitutive, because rights and duties do not arise as a result of the recognition.

Practice over the last century or so is not unambiguous, but does point to the declaratory approach as the better of the two theories. States which for particular reasons have refused to recognise other states, such as in the Arab world and Israel and the United States and certain communist nations,¹⁰ rarely contend that the other party is devoid of powers and obligations before international law and exists in a legal vacuum. The stance is rather that rights and duties are binding upon them, and that recognition has not been accorded for primarily political reasons. If the constitutive theory were accepted, it would mean, for example, in the context of the former Arab non-recognition of Israel, that the latter was not bound by international law rules of non-aggression and non-intervention. This has not been adopted in any of the stances of non-recognition of 'states'.¹¹

Of course, if an entity, while meeting the conditions of international law as to statehood, went totally unrecognised, this would undoubtedly hamper the exercise of its rights and duties, especially in view of the absence of diplomatic relations, but it would not seem in law to amount to a decisive argument against statehood itself.¹² For example, the Charter of the Organization of American States adopted at Bogotá in 1948 notes in its survey of the fundamental rights and duties of states that:

the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states. Even before being recognised the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence.¹³

And the Institut de Droit International emphasised in its resolution on recognition of new states and governments in 1936 that the

existence of the new state with all the legal effects connected with that existence is not affected by the refusal of one or more states to recognise.¹⁴

In the period following the end of the First World War, the courts of the new states of Eastern and Central Europe regarded their states as coming into being upon the actual declaration of independence and not simply as a result of the Peace Treaties. The tribunal in one case pointed out that the recognition of Poland in the Treaty of Versailles was only declaratory of the state which existed 'par lui-même'.¹⁵ In addition, the Arbitration Commission established by the International Conference on Yugoslavia in 1991 stated in its Opinion No. 1 that 'the existence or disappearance of the state is a question of fact' and that 'the effects of recognition by other states are purely declaratory'.¹⁶

On the other hand, the constitutive theory is not totally devoid of all support in state practice. In some cases, the creation of a new state, or the

establishment of a new government by unconstitutional means, or the occupation of a territory that is legally claimed will proceed uneventfully and be clearly accomplished for all to see and with little significant opposition. However, in many instances, the new entity or government will be insecure and it is in this context that recognition plays a vital role. In any event, and particularly where the facts are unclear and open to different interpretations, recognition by a state will amount to a declaration by that state of how it understands the situation, and such an evaluation will be binding upon it. It will not be able to deny later the factual position it has recognised, unless, of course, circumstances radically alter in the meantime. In this sense, recognition can be constitutive. Indeed, the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission noted in Opinion No. 8 that ‘while recognition of a state by other states has only declarative value, such recognition, along with membership of international organisations, bears witness to these states’ conviction that the political entity so recognised is a reality and confers on it certain rights and obligations under international law’.¹⁷ By way of contrast, the fact of non-recognition of a ‘new state’ by a vast majority of existing states will constitute tangible evidence for the view that such an entity has not established its conformity with the required criteria of statehood.¹⁸

Another factor which leans towards the constitutive interpretation of recognition is the practice in many states whereby an unrecognised state or government cannot claim the rights available to a recognised state or government before the municipal courts. This means that the act of recognition itself entails a distinct legal effect and that after recognition a state or government would have enforceable rights within the domestic jurisdiction that it would not have had prior to the recognition.¹⁹

This theoretical controversy is of value in that it reveals the functions of recognition and emphasises the impact of states upon the development of international law. It points to the essential character of international law, poised as it is between the state and the international community. The declaratory theory veers towards the former and the constitutive doctrine towards the latter.

There have been a number of attempts to adapt the constitutive theory.²⁰ Lauterpacht maintained, for example, that once the conditions prescribed by international law for statehood have been complied with, there is a duty on the part of existing states to grant recognition. This is because, in the absence of a central authority in international law to assess and accord legal personality, it is the states that have to perform this function on behalf, as it were, of the international community and international law.²¹

This operation is both declaratory, in that it is based upon certain definite facts (i.e. the entity fulfils the requirements of statehood) and constitutive, in that it is the acceptance by the recognising state of the particular community as an entity possessing all the rights and obligations that are inherent in statehood. Before the act of recognition, the community that is hoping to be admitted as a state will only have such rights and duties as have been expressly permitted to it, if any.

The Lauterpacht doctrine is an ingenious bid to reconcile the legal elements in a coherent theory. It accepts the realities of new creations of states and governments by practical (and occasionally illegal) means, and attempts to assimilate this to the supremacy of international law as Lauterpacht saw it.

However, in so doing it ignores the political aspects and functions of recognition, that is, its use as a method of demonstrating or withholding support from a particular government or new community. The reality is that in many cases recognition is applied to demonstrate political approval or disapproval. Indeed, if there is a duty to grant recognition, would the entity involved have a right to demand this where a particular state (or states) is proving recalcitrant? If this were so, one would appear to be faced with the possibility of a non-state with as yet no rights or duties enforcing rights against non-recognising states.

Nevertheless, state practice reveals that Lauterpacht's theory has not been adopted.²² The fact is that few states accept that they are obliged in every instance to accord recognition. In most cases, they will grant recognition, but that does not mean that they have to, as history with regard to some communist nations and with regard to Israel illustrates. This position was supported in Opinion No. 10 of the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission in July 1992, which emphasised that recognition was 'a discretionary act that other states may perform when they choose and in a manner of their own choosing, subject only to compliance with the imperatives of general international law'.²³

The approach of the United States was emphasised in 1976. The Department of State noted:

In the view of the United States, international law does not require a state to recognise another entity as a state; it is a matter for the

judgment of each state whether an entity merits recognition as a state. In reaching this judgment, the United States has traditionally looked to the establishment of certain facts. These facts include effective control over a clearly defined territory and population; an organised governmental administration of that territory and a capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign relations and to fulfil international obligations. The United States has also taken into account whether the entity in question has attracted the recognition of the international community of states.²⁴

The view of the UK government was expressed as follows:

The normal criteria which the government apply for recognition as a state are that it should have, and seem likely to continue to have, a clearly defined territory with a population, a government who are able of themselves to exercise effective control of that territory, and independence in their external relations. Other factors, including some United Nations resolutions, may also be relevant.²⁵

Recent practice suggests that ‘other factors’ may, in the light of the particular circumstances, include human rights and other matters. The European Community adopted a Declaration on 16 December 1991 entitled ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’ in which a common position on the process of recognition of the new states was adopted. It was noted in particular that recognition required:

- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris,²⁶ especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;

- guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;²⁷

- respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement;

- acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability;

- commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes.²⁸

On the same day that the Guidelines were adopted, the European Community also adopted a Declaration on Yugoslavia,²⁹ in which the Community and its

member states agreed to recognise the Yugoslav republics fulfilling certain conditions. These were that such republics wished to be recognised as independent; that the commitments in the Guidelines were accepted; that provisions laid down in a draft convention under consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia were accepted, particularly those dealing with human rights and the rights of national or ethnic groups; and that support would be given to the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council and the Conference on Yugoslavia. The Community and its member states also required that the particular Yugoslav republic seeking recognition would commit itself prior to recognition to adopting constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it had no territorial claims towards a neighbouring Community state. The United States took a rather less robust position, but still noted the relevance of commitments and assurances given by the new states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with regard to nuclear safety, democracy and free markets within the process of both recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations.³⁰

Following a period of UN administration authorised by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999),³¹ the Yugoslav (later Serbian) province of Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. This was preceded by the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement formulated by Martti Ahtisaari which had in March 2007 called for independence for Kosovo with international supervision.³² This was rejected by Serbia. The international community was divided as to the question of recognition of Kosovo's independence. It was recognised swiftly by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the majority of EU states, Japan and others. Russia and Serbia, on the other hand, made it clear that they opposed

recognition, as did Spain and Greece. Accordingly, in the current circumstances, while many countries recognise Kosovo, many do not and entry into the United Nations is not possible until, for example, Russia is prepared to lift its opposition in view of its veto power.³³ For those states that have recognised Kosovo, the latter will be entitled to all the privileges and responsibilities of statehood in the international community and within the legal systems of the recognising states. However, for those that have not, the state and diplomatic agents of Kosovo will not be entitled to, for example, diplomatic and state immunities, while the international status of Kosovo will be controversial and disputed.³⁴ While recognition may cure difficulties in complying with the criteria of statehood, a situation where the international community is divided upon recognition will, especially in the absence of UN membership, ensure the continuation of uncertainty.

There are many different ways in which recognition can occur and it may apply in more than one kind of situation. It is not a single, constant idea, but a category comprising a number of factors. There are indeed different entities which may be recognised, ranging from new states, to new governments, belligerent rights possessed by a particular group and territorial changes. Not only are there various objects of the process of recognition, but recognition may itself be *de facto* or *de jure* and it may arise in a variety of manners.

Recognition is an active process and should be distinguished from cognition, or the mere possession of knowledge, for example, that the entity involved complies with the basic international legal stipulations as to statehood. Recognition implies both cognition of the necessary facts and an intention that, so far as the acting state is concerned, it is willing that the legal

consequences attendant upon recognition should operate. For example, the rules as to diplomatic and sovereign immunities should apply as far as the envoys of the entity to be recognised are concerned. It is not enough for the recognising state simply to be aware of the facts: it must desire the coming into effect of the legal and political results of recognition. This is inevitable by virtue of the discretionary nature of the act of recognition, and is illustrated in practice by the lapse in time that often takes place between the events establishing a new state or government and the actual recognition by other states. Once given, courts have generally regarded recognition as retroactive so that the statehood of the entity recognised is accepted as of the date of statehood (which is a question of fact), not from the date of recognition.³⁵

Recognition of Governments³⁶

The recognition of a new government is quite different from the recognition of a new state. As far as statehood is concerned, the factual situation will be examined in terms of the accepted criteria.³⁷ Different considerations apply where it is the government which changes. Recognition will only really be relevant where the change in government is unconstitutional. In addition, recognition of governments as a category tends to minimise the fact that the precise capacity or status of the entity so recognised may be characterised in different ways. Recognition may be of a *de facto*³⁸ government or administration or of a government or administration in effective control of only part of the territory of the state in question. Recognition constitutes acceptance of a particular situation by the recognising state both in terms of the relevant factual criteria and in terms of the consequential legal

repercussions, so that, for example, recognition of an entity as the government of a state implies not only that this government is deemed to have satisfied the required conditions, but also that the recognising state will deal with the government as the governing authority of the state and accept the usual legal consequences of such status in terms of privileges and immunities within the domestic legal order.

Political considerations have usually played a large role in the decision whether or not to grant recognition. However, certain criteria have emerged to cover recognition of illegal changes in government. Such criteria amounted to an acceptance of the realities of the transfer of power and suggested that once a new government effectively controlled the country and that this seemed likely to continue, recognition should not be withheld. The United Kingdom on a number of occasions adopted this approach.³⁹ It was declared by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1970 that the test employed was whether or not the new government enjoyed, ‘with a reasonable prospect of permanence, the obedience of the mass of the population . . . effective control of much of the greater part of the territory of the state concerned’.⁴⁰

It is this attitude which prompted such policies as the recognition of the communist government of China and the Russian-installed government of Hungary in 1956 after the failure of the uprising. However, this general approach cannot be regarded as an absolute principle in view of the British refusal over many years to recognise as states North Vietnam, North Korea and the German Democratic Republic.⁴¹ The effective control of a new government over the territory of the state is thus an important guideline to the

problem of whether to extend recognition or not, providing such control appears well established and likely to continue. But it was no more than that and in many cases appeared to yield to political considerations.

The *Tinoco* arbitration⁴² constitutes an interesting example of the ‘effective control’ concept. In 1919, the government of Tinoco in Costa Rica was overthrown and the new authorities repudiated certain obligations entered into by Tinoco with regard to British nationals. Chief Justice Taft, the sole arbitrator, referred to the problems of recognition or non-recognition as relating to the Tinoco administration. He decided that since the administration was in effective control of the country, it was the valid government irrespective of the fact that a number of states, including the United Kingdom, had not recognised it. This was so despite his opinion that:

the non-recognition by other nations of a government claiming to be a national personality, is usually appropriate evidence that it has not attained the independence and control entitling it by international law to be classed as such.⁴³

Where recognition has been refused because of the illegitimacy or irregularity of origin of the government in question, rather than because of the lack of effectiveness of its control in the country, such non-recognition loses some of its evidential weight. In other words, where the degree of authority asserted by the new administration is uncertain, recognition by other states will be a vital factor. But where the new government is firmly established, non-

recognition will not affect the legal character of the new government. The doctrine of effective control is an indication of the importance of the factual nature of any situation. But in those cases where recognition is refused upon the basis of the improper origins of the new government, it will have less of an impact than if recognition is refused because of the absence of effective control. Taft's view of the nature of recognition is an interesting amalgam of the declaratory and constitutive theories, in that recognition can become constitutive where the factual conditions (i.e. the presence or absence of effective control) are in dispute, but otherwise is purely declaratory or evidential.

A change in government, however accomplished, does not affect the identity of the state itself. The state does not cease to be an international legal person because its government is overthrown. That is not at issue. The recognition or non-recognition of a new administration is irrelevant to the legal character of the country. Accordingly, one can see that two separate recognitions are involved and they must not be confused. Recognition of a state will affect its legal personality, whether by creating or acknowledging it, while recognition of a government affects the status of the administrative authority, not the state.

It is possible, however, for recognition of state and government to occur together in certain circumstances. This can take place upon the creation of a new state. Israel, to take one example, was recognised by the United States and the United Kingdom by the expedient of having its government recognised *de facto*.⁴⁴ Recognition of the government implies recognition of the state, but it does not work the other way.

It should be noted that recognition of a government has no relevance to the establishment of new persons in international law. Where it is significant is in the realm of diplomatic relations. If a government is unrecognised, there is no exchange of diplomatic envoys and thus problems can arise as to the enforcement of international rights and obligations.

Although the effective control doctrine is probably accepted as the most reliable guide to recognition of governments, there have been other theories put forward, the most prominent among them being the Tobar doctrine or the so-called doctrine of legitimacy. This suggested that governments which came into power by extra-constitutional means should not be recognised, at least until the change had been accepted by the people.⁴⁵ This policy was applied particularly by the United States in relation to Central America and was designed to protect stability in that delicate area adjacent to the Panama Canal. Logically, of course, the concept amounts to the promotion of non-recognition in all revolutionary situations and it is, and was, difficult to reconcile with reality and political consideration. In American eyes it became transmuted into the Wilson policy of democratic legitimacy. Where the revolution was supported by the people, it would be recognised. Where it was not, there would be no grant of recognition. It was elaborated with regard to the Soviet Union until 1933, but gradually declined until it can now be properly accepted merely as a political qualification for recognition to be considered by the recognising state.⁴⁶

A doctrine advocating the exact opposite, the automatic recognition of governments in all circumstances, was put forward by Estrada, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations.⁴⁷ But this suffers from the same disadvantage

as the legitimacy doctrine. It attempts to lay down a clear test for recognition in all instances excluding political considerations and exigencies of state and is thus unrealistic, particularly where there are competing governments.⁴⁸ It has also been criticised as minimising the distinction between recognition and maintenance of diplomatic relations.⁴⁹

The problem, of course, was that recognition of a new government that has come to power in a non-constitutional fashion was taken to imply approval. Allied with the other factors sometimes taken into account in such recognition situations,⁵⁰ an unnecessarily complicated process had resulted. Accordingly, in 1977, the United States declared that:

US practice has been to de-emphasise and avoid the use of recognition in cases of changes of governments and to concern ourselves with the question of whether we wish to have diplomatic relations with the new governments . . . The Administration's policy is that establishment of relations does not involve approval or disapproval but merely demonstrates a willingness on our part to conduct our affairs with other governments directly.⁵¹

In 1980, the UK government announced that it would no longer accord recognition to governments as distinct from states.⁵² This was stated to be primarily due to the perception that recognition meant approval, a perception

that was often embarrassing, for example, in the case of regimes violating human rights. There were, therefore, practical advantages in not according recognition as such to governments. This change to a policy of not formally recognising governments had in fact taken place in certain civil law countries rather earlier. Belgium⁵³ and France⁵⁴ appear, for example, to have adopted this approach in 1965. By the late 1980s, this approach was also adopted by both Australia⁵⁵ and Canada,⁵⁶ and indeed by other countries.⁵⁷

The change, however, did not remove all problems, but rather shifted the focus from formal recognition to informal ‘dealings’. The United Kingdom announced that it would continue to decide the nature of dealings with unconstitutional regimes:

in the light of [an] assessment of whether they
are able of themselves to exercise effective
control of the territory of the state concerned,
and seem likely to continue to do so.⁵⁸

The change, therefore, is that recognition of governments is abolished in principle, but that the criterion for dealing with such regimes is essentially the same as the former test for the recognition of governments.⁵⁹ In that context, regard should also be had to the phrase ‘of themselves’.⁶⁰

However, this change of policy should not be taken as meaning that no significant comments as to a change of government would be made in controversial circumstances and it did not preclude the exceptional recognition of governments as such. For example, following the elections in

the Côte d'Ivoire in November 2010 and the acceptance by ECOWAS and the African Union of the election of Mr Ouattara (and the hostility of the sitting president), the United Kingdom recognised Mr Ouattara as the democratically elected president of the country.⁶¹ Further, the United Kingdom decided on 27 July 2011 to recognise and deal with the Libyan National Transitional Council, which was engaged in an armed conflict with the Gaddafi government in that country, 'as the sole governmental authority in Libya'.⁶² This recognition of the Council as the government of Libya was affirmed in an executive certificate dated 24 August 2011 in *British Arab Commercial Bank v. The National Transitional Council of the State of Libya*.⁶³ The United States took the step of recognising Juan Guaidó as the interim President of Venezuela on 23 January 2019 instead of the incumbent President Maduro, following an election in May 2018 widely seen as unfair.⁶⁴ Fifteen member states of the European Union followed on 1 February⁶⁵ and the United Kingdom on 4 February 2019.⁶⁶ Such actions may well have significant consequences within the recognising countries (see the section on 'The Legal Effects of Recognition' later in this chapter), but internationally the absence of effective control by the claimant authority is a significant limitation and the matter will remain controversial.⁶⁷

*De Facto and de Jure Recognition*⁶⁸

In addition to the fact that there are different entities to be recognised, recognition itself may take different forms. It may be either *de facto* or *de jure*. A more correct way of putting this might be to say that a government (or other entity or situation) may be recognised *de facto* or *de jure*.

Recognition *de facto* implies that there is some doubt as to the long-term viability of the government in question. Recognition *de jure* usually follows where the recognising state accepts that the effective control displayed by the government is permanent and firmly rooted and that there are no legal reasons detracting from this, such as constitutional subservience to a foreign power. *De facto* recognition involves a hesitant assessment of the situation, an attitude of wait and see, to be succeeded by *de jure* recognition when the doubts are sufficiently overcome to extend formal acceptance. To take one instance, the United Kingdom recognised the Soviet government *de facto* in 1921 and *de jure* in 1924.⁶⁹ A slightly different approach is adopted in cases of civil war where the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* recognition is sometimes used to illustrate the variance between legal and factual sovereignty. For example, during the 1936–39 Spanish Civil War, the United Kingdom, while recognising the Republican government as the *de jure* government, extended *de facto* recognition to the forces under General Franco as they gradually took over the country. Similarly, the government of the Italian conquering forces in Ethiopia was recognised *de facto* by the United Kingdom in 1936, and *de jure* two years later.⁷⁰

By this method a recognising state could act in accordance with political reality and its own interests while reserving judgment on the permanence of the change in government or its desirability or legality. It is able to safeguard the affairs of its citizens and institutions by this, because certain legal consequences will flow in municipal law from the recognition.⁷¹

There are in reality few meaningful distinctions between a *de facto* and a *de jure* recognition, although only a government recognised *de jure* may enter a

claim to property located in the recognising state.⁷² Additionally, it is generally accepted that *de facto* recognition does not of itself include the exchange of diplomatic relations.

Premature Recognition⁷³

There is often a difficult and unclear dividing line between the acceptable recognition of a new state, particularly one that has emerged or is emerging as a result of secession, and intervention in the domestic affairs of another state by way of premature or precipitate recognition, such as, for example, the view taken by the Nigerian federal government with regard to the recognition of 'Biafra' by five states.⁷⁴ In each case, the state seeking to recognise will need to consider carefully the factual situation and the degree to which the criteria of statehood (or other relevant criteria with regard to other types of entity with regard to which recognition is sought) have been fulfilled. It is therefore a process founded upon a perception of fact. In the case of Croatia, it could be argued that the recognition of that state by the European Community and its member states (together with Austria and Switzerland) on 15 January 1992 was premature.⁷⁵ Croatia at that time, and for several years thereafter, did not effectively control some one-third of its territory. In addition, the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission had taken the view in Opinion No. 5 on 11 January 1992 that Croatia did not meet fully the conditions for recognition laid down in the European Community Guidelines of 16 December 1991,⁷⁶ since the Constitutional Act adopted by Croatia did not fully incorporate the required guarantees relating to human rights and minority rights.⁷⁷ It could also be argued that the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April 1992 by the European Community and member

states and on 7 April 1992 by the United States was premature, particularly since the government of that state effectively controlled less than one-half of its territory, a situation that continued until the Dayton Peace Agreement of November 1995.⁷⁸ On the other hand, it could be argued that in the special circumstances of Former Yugoslavia, the international community (particularly by means of membership of the United Nations, which is restricted to states) was prepared to accept a loosening of the traditional criteria of statehood, so that essentially international recognition compensated for lack of effectivity. A clear example of premature recognition is that of the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have established separate *de facto* governments with Russian support.⁷⁹ Russia and a very few states have recognised them as independent states, but in the light of effective Russian control, the maintenance and international acceptance of Georgia's sovereignty entitlement and the paucity of international recognition, any such recognition can only be regarded at best as premature.⁸⁰

Recognition may also be overdue, in the sense that it occurs long after it is clear as a matter of fact that the criteria of statehood have been satisfied, but in such cases, different considerations apply since recognition is not compulsory and remains a political decision by states.⁸¹

Implied Recognition⁸²

Recognition itself need not be express, that is in the form of an open, unambiguous and formal communication, but may be implied in certain circumstances.⁸³ This is due to the fact that recognition is founded upon the will and intent of the state that is extending the recognition. Accordingly,

there are conditions in which it might be possible to declare that in acting in a certain manner, one state has by implication recognised another state or government. Because this facility of indirect or implied recognition is available, states may make an express declaration to the effect that a particular action involving another party is by no means to be interpreted as comprehending any recognition. This attitude was maintained by Arab countries with regard to Israel, and in certain other cases.⁸⁴ It automatically excludes any possibility of implied recognition, but does suggest that without a definite and clear waiver, the result of some international actions may be recognition of a hitherto unrecognised entity in certain circumstances.

The point can best be explained by mentioning the kind of conditions which may give rise to the possibility of a recognition where no express or formal statement has been made. A message of congratulations to a new state upon attaining sovereignty will imply recognition of that state, as will the formal establishment of diplomatic relations,⁸⁵ but the maintenance of informal and unofficial contacts (such as those between the United States and communist China during the 1960s and early 1970s in Warsaw) will not.⁸⁶ The issuing of a consular *exequatur*, the accepted authorisation permitting the performance of consular functions, to a representative of an unrecognised state will usually amount to a recognition of that state, though not in all cases.⁸⁷ A British Consul has operated in Taiwan, but the United Kingdom does not recognise the Taiwanese government.⁸⁸ It is possible that the conclusion of a bilateral treaty between the recognising and unrecognised state, as distinct from a temporary agreement, might imply recognition, but the matter is open to doubt since there are a number of such agreements between parties not recognising each other. One would have to study the circumstances of the

particular case to clarify the issue.⁸⁹ The making of claims by a state against an entity will not necessarily imply recognition.⁹⁰

Recognition is not normally to be inferred from the fact that both states have taken part in negotiations and signed a multilateral treaty,⁹¹ for example the UN Charter. Practice shows that many of the member states or their governments are not recognised by other member states.⁹² Although Israel and many Arab countries are UN members, this did not affect Arab non-recognition of the Israeli state.⁹³ However, where the state concerned has voted in favour of membership in the United Nations of the entity in question, it is a natural inference that recognition has occurred. The United Kingdom, for example, regarded its vote in favour of UN membership for the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia as amounting to recognition of that entity as a state.⁹⁴ Indeed, irrespective of recognition by individual states, there is no doubt that membership of the United Nations is powerful evidence of statehood since being a state is a necessary precondition to UN membership by virtue of article 4 of the UN Charter.⁹⁵

In the case of common participation in an international conference, similar considerations apply, although the element of doubt has often stimulated non-recognising states to declare expressly that their presence and joint signature on any agreement issuing forth from the meeting is in no way to be understood as implying recognition. Such has been the case particularly with the Arab states over the years with regard to Israel.

State practice has restricted the possible scope of operation of this concept of implied recognition to a few instances only and all the relevant surrounding

circumstances will have to be carefully evaluated before one can deduce from conduct the intention to extend recognition. States like to retain their control of such an important political instrument as recognition and are usually not keen to allow this to be inferred from the way they behave. They prefer recognition to be, in general, a formal act accorded after due thought.

Conditional Recognition

The political nature of recognition has been especially marked with reference to what has been termed conditional recognition. This refers to the practice of making the recognition subject to fulfilment of certain conditions, for example, the good treatment of religious minorities as occurred with regard to the independence of some Balkan countries in the late nineteenth century, or the granting of most-favoured-nation status to the recognised state. One well-known instance of this approach was the 1933 Litvinov Agreement, whereby the United States recognised the Soviet government upon the latter undertaking to avoid acts prejudicial to the internal security of the United States, and to come to a settlement of various financial claims.⁹⁶

However, breach of the particular condition does not invalidate the recognition. It may give rise to a breach of international law and political repercussions, but the law appears not to accept the notion of a conditional recognition as such. The status of any conditions will depend upon agreements specifically made by the particular parties.⁹⁷ It is, however, important to distinguish conditional recognition in this sense from the evolution of criteria for recognition generally, although the two categories may in practice overlap.⁹⁸

Collective Recognition⁹⁹

The expediency of collective recognition has often been noted. This would amount to recognition by means of an international decision, whether by an international organisation or not. It would, of course, signify the importance of the international community in its collective assertion of control over membership and because of this it has not been warmly welcomed, nor can one foresee its general application for some time to come. The idea has been discussed particularly since the foundation of the League of Nations and was re-emphasised with the establishment of the United Nations. However, it rapidly became clear that member states reserved the right to extend recognition to their own executive authorities and did not wish to delegate it to any international institution. The most that could be said is that membership of the United Nations constitutes powerful evidence of statehood. But that, of course, is not binding upon other member states who are free to refuse to recognise any other member state of the United Nations.¹⁰⁰

Withdrawal of Recognition¹⁰¹

Recognition once given may in certain circumstances be withdrawn. This is more easily achieved with regard to *de facto* recognition, as that is by its nature a cautious and temporary assessment of a particular situation. Where a *de facto* government loses the effective control it once exercised, the reason for recognition disappears and it may be revoked. It is in general a preliminary acceptance of political realities and may be withdrawn in

accordance with a change in political factors.¹⁰² *De jure* recognition, on the other hand, is intended to be more of a definitive step and is more difficult to withdraw.

Of course, where a government recognised *de jure* has been overthrown, a new situation arises and the question of a new government will have to be faced, but in such instances withdrawal of recognition of the previous administration is assumed and does not have to be expressly stated, providing always that the former government is not still in existence and carrying on the fight in some way. Withdrawal of recognition of one government without recognising a successor is a possibility and indeed was the approach adopted by the United Kingdom and France, for example, with regard to Cambodia in 1979.¹⁰³ However, with the adoption of the new British policy on recognition with regard to governments,¹⁰⁴ the position is now that the UK government will neither recognise nor withdraw recognition of regimes.¹⁰⁵

Withdrawal of recognition in other circumstances is not a very general occurrence, but in exceptional conditions it remains a possibility. The United Kingdom recognised the Italian conquest of Ethiopia *de facto* in 1936 and *de jure* two years later. However, it withdrew recognition in 1940, with the intensification of fighting and the dispatch of military aid.¹⁰⁶ Recognition of belligerency will naturally terminate with the defeat of either party, while the loss of one of the required criteria of statehood would affect recognition. It is to be noted that the 1979 recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China entailed the withdrawal of recognition or 'derecognition' of the Republic of China (Taiwan). This was explained to

mean that, ‘so far as the formal foreign relations of the United States are concerned, a government does *not* exist in Taiwan any longer’.¹⁰⁷

Nevertheless, this was not to affect the application of the laws of the United States with regard to Taiwan in the context of US domestic law.¹⁰⁸ To some extent, in this instance, the usual consequences of non-recognition have not flowed, but this has taken place upon the background of a formal and deliberate act of policy.¹⁰⁹ It does show how complex the topic of recognition has become.

The usual method of expressing disapproval with the actions of a particular government is to break diplomatic relations. This will adequately demonstrate aversion as did, for example, the rupture in diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in 1927, and between some Arab countries and the United States in 1967, without entailing the legal consequences and problems that a withdrawal of recognition would initiate. But one must not confuse the ending of diplomatic relations with a withdrawal of recognition.

Since recognition is ultimately a political issue, no matter how circumscribed or conditioned by the law, it logically follows that, should a state perceive any particular situation as justifying a withdrawal of recognition, it will take such action as it regards as according with its political interests.

Non-Recognition¹¹⁰

There has been developing since the 1930s a doctrine of non-recognition where, under certain conditions, a factual situation will not be recognised because of strong reservations as to the morality or legality of the actions that have been adopted in order to bring about the factual situation. It is a doctrine that has also been reinforced by the principle that legal rights cannot derive from an illegal situation (*ex injuria jus non oritur*).¹¹¹

This approach was particularly stimulated by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The US Secretary of State declared in 1932 that the illegal invasion would not be recognised as it was contrary to the 1928 Pact of Paris (the Kellogg–Briand Pact) which had outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. The doctrine of not recognising any situation, treaty or agreement brought about by non-legal means was named the Stimson doctrine after the American Secretary of State who put it forward. It was reinforced not long afterwards by a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations stressing that League members should not recognise any situation, treaty or agreement brought about by means contrary to the League's Covenant or the Pact of Paris.¹¹²

However, state practice until the Second World War was not encouraging. The Italian conquest of the Empire of Ethiopia was recognised and the German takeover of Czechoslovakia accepted. The Soviet Union made a series of territorial acquisitions in 1940, ranging from areas of Finland to the Baltic States (of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) and Bessarabia. These were

recognised *de facto* over the years by Western powers (though not by the United States).¹¹³

The doctrine was examined anew after 1945. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force *inter alia* against the territorial integrity of states, while the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States 1949 emphasised that territorial acquisitions by states were not to be recognised by other states where achieved by means of the threat or use of force or in any other manner inconsistent with international law and order. The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law also included a provision to the effect that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognised as legal,¹¹⁴ and Security Council resolution 242 (1967) on the solution to the Middle East conflict emphasised ‘the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’.¹¹⁵

Rhodesia unilaterally proclaimed its independence in November 1965 and in the years of its existence did not receive official recognition from any state at all, although it did maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa and Portugal prior to the revolution of 1974. The day following the Rhodesian declaration of independence, the Security Council passed a resolution calling upon all states not to accord it recognition and to refrain from assisting it.¹¹⁶ The Council imposed selective mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia and these were later made comprehensive.¹¹⁷ Similar action was also taken with regard to the Bantustans, territories of South Africa declared by that state to be independent.¹¹⁸ The Security Council also adopted resolution 541 in 1983, which deplored the purported secession of part of Cyprus occupied by Turkey in 1974 and termed the proposed Turkish Cypriot state ‘legally

invalid'.¹¹⁹ In 1990, the Security Council adopted resolution 662, which declared the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait 'null and void' and called on all states and institutions not to recognise the annexation.¹²⁰ The principle of non-recognition of title to territory acquired through aggression in violation of international law was also reaffirmed in the *Brcko Inter-Entity Boundary* award with regard to aggression in Bosnia.¹²¹

The role of non-recognition as an instrument of sanction as well as a means of pressure and a method of protecting the wronged inhabitants of a territory was discussed more fully in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, 1971, dealing with South Africa's presence in that territory. The Court held that since the continued South African occupancy was illegal, member states of the United Nations were obliged to recognise that illegality and the invalidity of South Africa's acts concerning Namibia and were under a duty to refrain from any actions implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, the South African presence and administration.¹²²

The Legal Effects of Recognition

In this section, some of the legal results that flow from the recognition or non-recognition of an entity, both in the international sphere and within the municipal law of particular states, will be noted. Although recognition may legitimately be regarded as a political tool, it is one that nevertheless entails important consequences in the legal field.

Internationally

In the majority of cases, it can be accepted that recognition of a state or government is a legal acknowledgement of a factual state of affairs.

Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that non-recognition of, for example, a state will deprive that entity of rights and duties before international law, excepting, of course, those situations where it may be possible to say that recognition is constitutive of the legal entity.

In general, the political existence of a state is independent of recognition by other states, and thus an unrecognised state must be deemed subject to the rules of international law. It cannot consider itself free from restraints as to aggressive behaviour, nor can its territory be regarded as *terra nullius*. States which have signed international agreements are entitled to assume that states which they have not recognised but which have similarly signed the agreement are bound by that agreement. For example, the United Kingdom treated the German Democratic Republic as bound by its signature of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty even when the state was not recognised by the United Kingdom.

Non-recognition, with its consequent absence of diplomatic relations, may affect the unrecognised state in asserting its rights or other states in asserting its duties under international law, but will not affect the existence of such rights and duties. The position is, however, different under municipal law.

Internally

Recognition is fundamentally a political act, so it is reserved to the executive branch of government. This means that the judiciary must as a general principle accept the discretion of the executive and give effect to its decisions. The courts cannot recognise a state or government. They can only accept and enforce the legal consequences which flow from the executive's political decision, although this situation has become more complex with the change in policy from express recognition of governments to acceptance of dealings with such entities.

To this extent, recognition is constitutive, because the act of recognition itself creates legal results within the domestic jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom and the United States particularly, the courts feel themselves obliged to accept the verdict of the executive branch of government as to whether a particular entity should be regarded as recognised or not. If the administration has recognised a state or government and so informs the judiciary by means of a certificate, the position of that state or government within the municipal structure is totally transformed.

It may sue in the domestic courts and be granted immunity from suit in certain instances. Its own legislative and executive acts will be given effect to in the courts of the recognising state and its own diplomatic representatives will be able to claim the various immunities accorded to the official envoys of a recognised state. In addition, it will be entitled to possession in the recognising state of property belonging to its predecessor. It is also important to draw a distinction between the actual grant of recognition by the executive and the discussion of the consequences in the domestic legal system by the domestic courts.

The United Kingdom¹²³

The fundamental principle is that once a state has been recognised by the United Kingdom, the state in question has legal personality as a matter of common law. Its position as a legal person in English law is *sui generis*, not to be assimilated with either individuals or corporations.¹²⁴ The capacity of foreign states to act within legal systems (as distinct from the international plane) is a matter for the relevant domestic law.¹²⁵

The English courts have adopted the attitude over many years that an entity unrecognised by the Foreign Office would be treated before the courts as if it did not exist and accordingly it would not be able to claim immunity before the courts.¹²⁶ This meant in one case that ships of the unrecognised 'Provisional Government of Northern Russia' would not be protected by the courts from claims affecting them.¹²⁷ Similarly, an unrecognised state or government is unable to appear before the courts as a plaintiff in an action. This particular principle prevented the revolutionary government of Berne in 1804 from taking action to restrain the Bank of England from dealing with funds belonging to the previous administration of the city.¹²⁸

The leading case in English law on the issue of effects of recognition of an entity within the domestic sphere is *Luther v. Sagor*.¹²⁹ This concerned the operations and produce of a timber factory in Russia owned by the plaintiffs, which had been nationalised in 1919 by the Soviet government. In 1920, the defendant company purchased a quantity of wood from the Soviet Union and this was claimed in England by the plaintiffs as their property since it had come from what had been their factory. It was argued by them that the 1919

Soviet decree should be ignored before the English courts since the United Kingdom had not recognised the Soviet government. The lower court agreed with this contention and the matter then came to the Court of Appeal.¹³⁰

In the meantime, the United Kingdom recognised the Soviet government *de facto* and the Foreign Office informed the Court of Appeal of this in writing. The result was that the higher court was bound to take note of the Soviet decree and accordingly the plaintiffs lost their case, since a court must give effect to the legislation of a recognised state or government. The Court also held that the fact that the Soviet government was recognised *de facto* and not *de jure* did not affect the issue. Another interesting point is that since the Foreign Office certificate included a statement that the former Provisional Government of Russia recognised by the United Kingdom had been dispersed during December 1917, the Court inferred the commencement of the Soviet government from that date.

The essence of the matter was that the Soviet government was now accepted as the sovereign government of the Soviet Union as from December 1917. And since recognition once given is retroactive and relates back to the date that the authority of the government was accepted as being established, and not the date on which recognition is granted, the Soviet decree of 1919 was deemed to be a legitimate act of a recognised government. This was so even though at that date the Soviet government was not recognised by the United Kingdom.

The purpose of the retroactivity provision¹³¹ is to avoid possible influence in the internal affairs of the entity recognised, since otherwise legislation made

prior to recognition might be rejected. However, this will depend always upon the terms of the executive certificate by which the state informs its courts of the recognition. Should the Foreign Office insist that the state or government in question is to be recognised as a sovereign state or government as of the date of the action, the courts would be bound by this.

As is the case with legislation, contracts made by an unrecognised government will not be enforced in English courts. Without the required action by the political authorities, an unrecognised entity does not exist as a legal person before the municipal courts. The case of *Luther v. Sagor* suggested that in general the legal consequences of a *de facto* recognition would be the same as a *de jure* one. This was emphasised in *Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Ltd (No. 2)*,¹³² but regarded as restricted to acts in relation to persons or property in the territory which the *de facto* government has been recognised as effectively controlling.

In other words, a different situation would ensue with regard to persons or property situated outside the territory of the state or government. In the *Haile Selassie* case, the Emperor of Ethiopia was suing a British company for money owing to him under an agreement. The problem was that when the action was brought, the United Kingdom had recognised the Italian forces as the *de facto* authority in Ethiopia, while Haile Selassie was still recognised as the *de jure* sovereign. The Court held that since the case concerned a debt recoverable in England and not the validity of acts with regard to persons or property in Ethiopia, the *de jure* authority, Emperor Haile Selassie was entitled to the sum due from the company, and the *de facto* control of the Italians did not affect this.

However, before the defendant's appeal was heard, the United Kingdom extended *de jure* recognition to the Italian authorities in Ethiopia. The Court of Appeal accepted that this related back to, and was deemed to operate as from the date of, the *de facto* recognition. Since this had occurred prior to the case starting, it meant that the Italian government was now to be recognised as the *de jure* government of Ethiopia, before and during the time of the hearing of the action. Accordingly, Haile Selassie was divested of any right whatsoever to sue for the recovery of the money owing.

This problem of the relationship between a *de facto* government and a *de jure* government, as far as English courts were concerned, manifested itself again during the Spanish Civil War. The case of the *Arantzazu Mendi*¹³³ concerned a private steamship registered in Bilbao in the Basque province of Spain. In June 1937, following the capture of that region by the forces of General Franco, the opposing Republican government issued a decree requisitioning all ships registered in Bilbao. Nine months later, the Nationalist government of Franco also passed a decree taking control over all Bilbao vessels. In the meantime, the *Arantzazu Mendi* itself was in London when the Republican government issued a writ to obtain possession of the ship. The owners opposed this, while accepting the Nationalists' requisition order.

It was an accepted rule of international law that a recognised state cannot be sued or otherwise brought before the courts of another state. Accordingly, the Nationalists argued that since their authority had been recognised *de facto* by the UK government over the areas they actually controlled, their decree was valid and could not be challenged in the English courts. Therefore, the action by the Republican government must be dismissed.

The case came before the House of Lords, where it was decided that the Nationalist government, as the *de facto* authority of much of Spain including the region of Bilbao, was entitled to be regarded as a sovereign state and was able to benefit from the normal immunities which follow therefrom. Thus, the action by the Republican government failed. The House of Lords pointed out that it did not matter that the territory over which the *de facto* authority was exercising sovereign powers was from time to time increased or diminished.¹³⁴ This case marks the high-point in the attribution of characteristics to a *de facto* authority and can be criticised for its over-generous assessment of the status of such an entity.¹³⁵

The problems faced by the English court when the rights and obligations of a *de jure* government and a *de facto* government, claiming the same territory, appear to be in conflict have been briefly noted. Basically, the actions of a *de facto* authority with regard to people and property within this sphere of control will be recognised in an English court, but where property is situated and recoverable in England, the *de jure* sovereign will have precedence. A similarly complicated situation arises where the interests of two recognised *de jure* governments of the same state are involved, as one supersedes the other. Problems can arise concerning the issue of retroactivity, that is, how far the court will relate back actions of a *de jure* government, since recognition is normally retroactive to the moment of inception of the particular state or government.

The matter was discussed in the *Gdynia Ameryka Linie v. Boguslawski* case.¹³⁶ During the Second World War, the Polish government-in-exile stationed in London was recognised by the United Kingdom as the *de jure*

government of Poland. However, on 28 June 1945, the communist provisional government was established with effective control of the country and at midnight on 5 July the United Kingdom recognised that government as the *de jure* government of Poland. A couple of days prior to this recognition, the Polish government-in-exile made an offer to Polish seamen of compensation in the event of leaving the merchant navy service. The money was to be paid by the particular employers to seamen not wanting to work for the communist provisional government. In the *Boguslawski* case, the employers refused to pay the compensation to seamen requesting it, and argued that the UK recognition *de jure* of the provisional government was retroactive to 28 June, this being the date that the government effectively took control of the country. If this was the case, then acts of the government-in-exile after 28 June ceased to be of effect and thus the offers of compensation could not be enforced in the English courts.

The House of Lords emphasised the general proposition that recognition operates retroactively. However, they modified the statement by declaring that the courts had to give effect not only to acts done by the new government after recognition, but also to acts done before the recognition ‘in so far as those acts related to matters under its control at the time when the acts were done’.¹³⁷ It was stated that while the recognition of the new government had certain retroactive effects, the recognition of the old government remained effective down to the date when it was in fact withdrawn. Problems might have arisen had the old government, before withdrawal of recognition, attempted to take action with regard to issues under the control of the new government. However, that was not involved in this case.

In other words, and in the circumstances of the case, the principle of retroactivity of recognition was regarded as restricted to matters within the effective control of the new government. Where something outside the effective control of the new government is involved, it would appear that the recognition does not operate retroactively and that prior to the actual date of recognition one would have to accept and put into effect the acts of the previous *de jure* government.

This could lead to many complicated situations, especially where a court is faced with conflicting courses of action, something which is not hard to envisage when one *de jure* government has been superseded by another. It could permit abuses of government such as where a government, knowing itself to be about to lose recognition, awards its supporters financial or other awards in decrees that may be enforced in English courts. What would happen if the new government issued contrary orders in an attempt to nullify the effect of the old government's decrees is something that was not examined in the *Boguslawski* case.

Another case which came before the courts in the same year was *Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corporation*,¹³⁸ and it similarly failed to answer the question mentioned above. It involved the sale of aircraft belonging to the nationalist government of China, which had been flown to the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong. Such aircraft were sold to an American company after the communist government established effective control over the country, but before it had been recognised by the United Kingdom. The Court accepted that the nationalist government had been entitled to the aircraft and pointed out that:

retroactivity of recognition operates to validate acts of a *de facto* Government which has subsequently become the new *de jure* Government, and not to invalidate acts of the previous *de jure* Government.¹³⁹

It is to be noted that the communist government did not attempt to nullify the sale to the American company. Had it done so, a new situation would have been created, but it is as yet uncertain whether that would have materially altered the legal result.

The general doctrine adhered to by the United Kingdom with regard to recognition (and now diplomatic dealings) is that it will be accorded upon the evidence of effective control. It is used to acknowledge factual situations and not as a method of exhibiting approval or otherwise. However, this is not so in all cases and there are a number of governments in effective control of their countries and unrecognised by the United Kingdom. One major example was the former German Democratic Republic. Since the prime consequence of non-recognition is that the English courts will not give effect to any laws of an unrecognised entity, problems are thus likely to arise in ordinary international political and commercial life.

The issue came before the courts in the *Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No. 2)* case.¹⁴⁰ It concerned the Carl Zeiss foundation which was run by a special board, reconstituted in 1952 as the Council of Gera. The problem was that it was situated in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the establishment of the Council of Gera as the governing body of the

Carl Zeiss foundation was effected by a reorganisation of local government in the GDR. When Carl Zeiss brought a claim before the English courts, the issue was at once raised as to whether, in view of the UK non-recognition of the GDR, the governing body of the foundation could be accepted by the courts. The Court of Appeal decided that since the Foreign Office certified that the United Kingdom recognised 'the State and Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as *de jure* entitled to exercise governing authority in respect of that zone'¹⁴¹ (i.e. the GDR, being the former Soviet zone of occupation), it was not possible to give effect to any rules or regulations laid down by the GDR. The House of Lords, however, extricated the English courts system from a rather difficult position by means of an elaborate fiction.

It stated that as a Foreign Office certificate is binding on the courts as to the facts it contains, it logically followed that the courts must recognise the Soviet Union as the *de jure* governing authority of East Germany, irrespective of the creation of the GDR. The courts were not entitled to enter into a political examination of the actual situation, but were obliged to accept and give effect to the facts set out in the Foreign Office certificate. Thus, the Soviet Union was the *de jure* sovereign and the GDR government must be accepted as a subordinate and dependent body.

Accordingly, the Court could recognise the existence of the Carl Zeiss Stiftung by virtue of the UK recognition of the *de jure* status of the Soviet Union, the GDR as an administrative body being relevant only as a legal creature of the Soviet Union.

The problem brought out in the *Carl Zeiss* case and sidestepped there was raised again in a series of cases concerning Rhodesia, following the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime in 1965. Basically, if a government or state which exercises effective control over its own territory is unrecognised by the United Kingdom, a strict enforcement of the ‘no recognition, no existence’ rule could lead to much hardship and inconvenience. Accordingly, in *Adams v. Adams*,¹⁴² a Rhodesian divorce decree was not recognised in an English court. However, in *Hesperides Hotels Ltd v. Aegean Turkish Holidays*,¹⁴³ concerning an action in trespass with regard to hotels owned by Greek Cypriots but run by Turkish Cypriots following the Turkish invasion of 1974, Lord Denning stated *obiter* that he believed that the courts could recognise the laws and acts of an unrecognised body in effective control of territory, at least with regard to laws regulating the day-to-day affairs of the people.¹⁴⁴ It is certainly an attractive approach, provided it is carefully handled and strictly limited to determinations of a humanitarian and non-sovereign nature.¹⁴⁵ In *Caglar v. Billingham*, it was noted that while the existence of a foreign unrecognised government could be acknowledged in matters relating to commercial obligations or matters of private law between individuals or matters of routine administration such as registration of births, marriages and deaths, the courts would not acknowledge the existence of an unrecognised state if to do so would involve them in acting inconsistently with the foreign policy or diplomatic stance of the United Kingdom.¹⁴⁶ In *Emin v. Yeldag*, the Court held that private acts taking place within an unrecognised state could be regarded as valid within the English legal system provided that there was no statutory prohibition¹⁴⁷ and that such acceptance did not compromise the UK government in the conduct of foreign relations.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, where the issue concerns the lawful

acts of a person recognised as existing in English law, they will be justiciable before the English courts and will not be tainted by illegality because the unrecognised state can be associated with the actions.¹⁴⁹ In *R v. Reeves Taylor*,¹⁵⁰ the Supreme Court, being called upon to define the scope of a ‘public official’ or ‘person acting in an official capacity’ under the definition of torture under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (implementing in part the UN Convention against Torture 1984), agreed that the customary international law of human rights applied to states irrespective of recognition and that included a *de facto* entity not recognised as a state.

In many cases, however, the problems with regard to whether an entity is or is not a ‘state’ arise in connection with the interpretation of a particular statutory provision. The approach of the courts has been to focus upon the construction of the relevant instrument rather than upon the Foreign Office certificate or upon any definition in international law of statehood.¹⁵¹

Some of the consequential problems of non-recognition were addressed in the Foreign Corporations Act 1991. This provides that a corporation incorporated in a territory not recognised by the UK government as a state would be regarded as having legal personality within the United Kingdom where the laws of that territory were applied by a settled court system. In other words, the territory would be treated for this purpose as if it were a recognised state, thereby enabling its legislation to be applied in this circumstance on the normal conflict of rules basis. The point should, however, be stressed that the legislation was not intended at all to impact upon recognition issues as such.¹⁵²

Since the UK decision to abandon recognition of governments in 1980, the question arises as to the attitude of the courts on this matter. In particular, it appears that they may be called upon to examine the nature of the UK government's dealings with a new regime in order to determine its status for municipal law purposes.¹⁵³

In *Gur Corporation v. Trust Bank of Africa*,¹⁵⁴ the Court was in fact called upon to decide the status of Ciskei. This territory, part of South Africa, was one of the Bantustans granted 'independence' by South Africa. This was accomplished by virtue of the Status of Ciskei Act 1981. The preliminary issue that came before the Court in a commercial dispute was whether Ciskei had *locus standi* to sue or be sued in England. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office certified that Ciskei was not recognised as an independent sovereign state either *de facto* or *de jure* and that representations were made to South Africa in relation to matters occurring in Ciskei. The Court of Appeal held that it was able to take account of such declarations and legislation as were not in conflict with the certificates.

The effect of that, noted Lord Donaldson, was that the Status of Ciskei Act 1981 could be taken into account, except for those provisions declaring the territory independent and relinquishing South African sovereignty. This led to the conclusion that the Ciskei legislature was in fact exercising power by virtue of delegation from the South African authorities.¹⁵⁵ Accordingly, the government of Ciskei could sue or be sued in the English courts 'as being a subordinate body set up by the Republic of South Africa to act on its behalf'.¹⁵⁶ Clearly the Court felt that the situation was analogous to the *Carl Zeiss* case. Whether this was in fact so is an open question. It is certainly

open to doubt whether the terms of the certificates in the cases were on all fours. In the *Gur* case, the executive was far more cautious and non-committal. Indeed, one of the certificates actually stated that the UK government did not have a formal position regarding the exercise of governing authority over the territory of Ciskei,¹⁵⁷ whereas in *Carl Zeiss* the certificate noted expressly that the Soviet Union was recognised as *de jure* entitled to exercise governing authority in respect of the territory (the GDR).¹⁵⁸ The gap was bridged by construction and inference.

More widely, it is unclear to what extent the change in policy on recognition of governments has actually led to a change in attitude by the courts. There is no doubt that the attitude adopted by the government in certifying whether or not diplomatic dealings were in existence with regard to the entity in question is crucial. An assertion of such dealing would, it appears, be determinative.¹⁵⁹ The problem arises where the Foreign Office statement is more ambiguous than the mere assertion of dealings with the entity. The consequence is that a greater burden is imposed on the courts as an answer as to status is sought. On the one hand, the *Gur* case suggests that the courts are not willing to examine for themselves the realities of any given situation, but would seek to infer from the terms of any certificate what the answer ought to be.¹⁶⁰ On the other hand, Hobhouse J in the High Court in *Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake and Carey (Suisse) SA*¹⁶¹ took the wider view that in deciding whether a regime was the government of a state, the court would have to take into account the following factors: (a) whether it is the constitutional government of the state; (b) the degree, nature and stability of administrative control, if any, that it of itself exercises over the territory of the state; (c) whether the UK government has any dealings with it, and if so the nature of those

dealings; and (d) in marginal cases, the extent of international recognition that it has as the government of the state.¹⁶² Part of the answer as to why a different emphasis is evident is no doubt due to the fact that, in the latter case, there were competing bodies claiming to be the government of Somalia and the situation on the ground as a matter of fact was deeply confused. It should also be noted that in the *Somalia* case, the Court took the view that Foreign Office statements were no more than part of the evidence in the case, although likely to be the best evidence as to whether the government had dealings with the entity in question.¹⁶³ It is further to be noted that in this case, as in *Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company (Nos. 4 and 5)*,¹⁶⁴ the Foreign Office had written to the relevant court, but not in the form of an actual certificate of recognition.¹⁶⁵

In examining the particular situation, the courts will take note of the constitutional principle that ‘the state cannot speak with two voices on such a matter, the judiciary saying one thing, the executive another’.¹⁶⁶ Where there has been a formal communication from the executive, but in the absence of a categorical assertion of recognition, the court will examine the communication in order to interpret it, but it would not be open to the court to set aside that communication and look at other material in an attempt to identify what the position of the government actually was.¹⁶⁷ However, in such circumstances, the court is not precluded from being able to take account of particular factors. In *Secretary of State for the Home Department v. CC and CF*,¹⁶⁸ the Court, in reaffirming the *Somalia* case, held that the fact that the government had dealings with the Somaliland authorities as a matter of evidence led to the conclusion that: ‘In the light of the evidence as to the nature of its administration of the territory under its control . . . the

Somaliland administration is the effective government of Somaliland and it is open to this court to take cognizance of its legislative, executive and judicial acts.’¹⁶⁹

In *Mohamed v. Breish*,¹⁷⁰ the Court of Appeal dealt with the situation where the executive had made relevant communications as to the status of the entity under review. The Court reaffirmed that the recognition of foreign states or a person or body as the government of a foreign state was an executive function and that ‘the Crown must speak with one voice in its executive and judicial functions in this aspect of international relations’. It concluded, in the light of two FCO communications, that the United Kingdom had recognised the Government of National Accord of Libya as the executive arm of government with sole oversight of executive functions. The Court of Appeal further held that such recognition said nothing about the *de jure* status or constitutional lawfulness of the government under local law. Recognition of a *de facto* government was a recognition of its sovereignty and not a commentary upon its internal legitimacy. Accordingly, what the one voice principle required of the Court was that it should give effect to that sovereignty, irrespective of, or notwithstanding any, constitutional unlawfulness of the government so recognised.¹⁷¹

The United States

The situation in the United States with regard to the recognition or non-recognition of foreign entities is similar to that pertaining in the United Kingdom, with some important differences. Only a recognised state or government can in principle sue in the US courts and benefit in principle

from sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine when sued.¹⁷² This applies irrespective of the state of diplomatic relations, providing there is no war between the two.¹⁷³ However, an unrecognised state or government may in certain circumstances be permitted access before the American courts. This would appear to depend on the facts of each case and a practical appreciation of the entity in question.¹⁷⁴ For example, in *Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair*,¹⁷⁵ it was held that in the particular circumstances where the US State Department had clearly stated that allowing the plaintiff (a corporation owned by the unrecognised government of Angola) access to the Court would be consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States, the jurisdictional bar placed upon the Court would be deemed to have been lifted.

As in the United Kingdom, a declaration by the executive will be treated as binding the courts and, like the United Kingdom, the ‘one voice’ doctrine has been espoused to permit the executive to make the decision in recognition scenarios.¹⁷⁶ In *Zivotofsky v. Kerry*,¹⁷⁷ the US Supreme Court underlined that it was the President who had the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign, noting that the nation must ‘speak . . . with one voice’ regarding which governments were legitimate in the eyes of the United States and which were not, and the Supreme Court emphasised that such unilateral recognition power had long been recognised by that court.

In the absence of the ‘suggestion’ clarifying how far the process of non-recognition is to be applied, the courts have been more willing than their UK counterparts to give effect to particular acts of an unrecognised body, although as seen in the previous section the attitude of the English courts has become more flexible. In the *Carl Zeiss* case, Lords Reid and Wilberforce

referred in approving terms to the trend evident in decisions of US courts to give recognition to the ‘actual facts or realities found to exist in the territory in question’, in the interests of justice and common sense. Such recognition did not apply to every act, but, in Lord Wilberforce’s words, it did apply to ‘private rights, or acts of everyday occurrence, or perfunctory acts of administration’.¹⁷⁸ How far this extends, however, has never been precisely defined.

It was the difficulties engendered by the American Civil War that first stimulated a reappraisal of the ‘no recognition, no existence’ doctrine. It was not possible to ignore every act of the Confederate authorities and so the idea developed that such rules adopted by the Confederate states as were not hostile to the Union or the authority of the Central Government, or did not conflict with the terms of the US Constitution, would be treated as valid and enforceable in the courts system.¹⁷⁹ The doctrine was developed in a case before the New York Court of Appeals, when, discussing the status of the unrecognised Soviet government, Judge Cardozo noted that an unrecognised entity which had maintained control over its territory, ‘may gain for its acts and decrees a validity quasi-governmental, if violence to fundamental principles of justice or to our public policy might otherwise be done’.¹⁸⁰

This thesis progressed rapidly in the period immediately preceding the American recognition of the Soviet Union and led in *Salimoff v. Standard Oil Company of New York*¹⁸¹ to the enforcement of a Soviet oil nationalisation decree, with the comment that: ‘to refuse to recognise that Soviet Russia is a government regulating the internal affairs of the country, is to give to fictions an air of reality which they do not deserve’.

This decision, diametrically opposed to the *Luther v. Sagor* approach,¹⁸² constituted a step towards the abolition of differences between the judicial treatment of the acts of recognised and unrecognised governments.

However, the limits of this broad doctrine were more carefully defined in *The Maret*,¹⁸³ where the Court refused to give effect to the nationalisation of an Estonian ship by the government of the unrecognised Soviet Republic of Estonia. However, the ship in dispute was located in an American port at the date of the nationalisation order, and there appears to be a difference in treatment in some cases depending upon whether the property was situated inside or outside the country concerned.

One can mention, in contrast to *The Maret*, the case of *Upright v. Mercury Business Machines*,¹⁸⁴ in which the non-recognition of the GDR was discussed in relation to the assignment of a bill to the plaintiff by a state-controlled company of the GDR. The judge of the New York Supreme Court declared, in upholding the plaintiff's claim, that a foreign government, although unrecognised by the executive:

may nevertheless have *de facto* existence which is judicially cognisable. The acts of such a *de facto* government may affect private rights and obligations arising either as a result of activity in, or with persons or corporations within, the territory controlled by such *de facto* government.

However, the creation of judicial entities by unrecognised states will not be allowed to circumvent executive policy. In *Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon*,¹⁸⁵ the KZW was an East German governmental agency until 1969, when it was transformed into a separate juristic person in order to avoid the problems relating to unrecognised states in the above litigation. This concerned the recovery of pictures stolen from a museum during the American occupation of Germany.

As a branch of an unrecognised state, the KZW could not of course be permitted to sue in an American court, but the change of status in 1969 was designed to circumvent this. The Court, however, refused to accept this and emphasised that to allow the KZW to intervene in the case ‘would render our government’s non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic a meaningless gesture’.¹⁸⁶ Further, in *Autocephalous Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg*, the Court of Appeals held that it would not give effect to confiscatory decrees adopted by the unrecognised ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’, later called the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.¹⁸⁷

In *Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould*,¹⁸⁸ the Court was faced with an action in which the unrecognised Iranian government sought to enforce an award. However, the United States intervened and filed a statement of interest supporting Iran’s argument and this proved of significant influence. This general approach was reinforced in *National Petrochemical v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf*,¹⁸⁹ where the Court stressed that the executive must have the power to deal with unrecognised governments and that therefore the absence of formal recognition did not necessarily result in a foreign government being barred from access to US courts.¹⁹⁰ However,

where the executive has issued a non-recognition certificate and makes known its view that in the instant case the unrecognised party should not be permitted access to the courts, the courts appear very willing to comply.¹⁹¹

It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the various American cases or to determine the extent to which the acts of an unrecognised state or government may be enforced in the US courts system. But two factors should be particularly noted. First of all, the declaration of the executive is binding. If that intimates that no effect is to be given to acts of the unrecognised entity, the courts will be obliged to respect this. It may also be the case that the State Department 'suggestions' will include some kind of hint or indication which, while not clearly expressed, may lead the courts to feel that the executive is leaning more one way than another in the matter of the government's status, and this may influence the courts. For example, in the *Salimoff*¹⁹² case, the terms of the certificate tended to encourage the Court to regard the Soviet government as a recognised government, whereas in the case of *The Maret*,¹⁹³ the tone of the executive's statement on the Soviet Republic of Estonia was decidedly hostile to any notion of recognition or enforcement of its decrees.

The second point is the location of the property in question. There is a tendency to avoid the enforcement of acts and decrees affecting property situated outside the unrecognised state or government and in any event the location of the property often introduces additional complications as regards municipal law provision.¹⁹⁴

There is some uncertainty in the United States as to the operation of the retroactivity doctrine, particularly as it affects events occurring outside the country. There is a line of cases suggesting that only those acts of the unrecognised government performed in its own territory could be validated by the retroactive operation of recognition,¹⁹⁵ while, on the other hand, there are cases illustrating the opposite proposition decided by the Supreme Court.¹⁹⁶

Suggestions for Further Reading

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J. Dugard, *Recognition and the United Nations*, Cambridge, 1987

H. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law*, Cambridge, 1947

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S. Talmon, *Recognition of Governments in International Law*, Oxford, 1998

¹ See generally e.g. J. Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006; *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992; H. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law*, Cambridge, 1947; T. C. Chen, *The International Law of Recognition*, London, 1951; J. Charpentier, *La Reconnaissance Internationale et l'Évolution du Droit des Gens*, Paris, 1956; T. L. Galloway, *Recognising Foreign Governments*, Washington, DC, 1978; J. Verhoeven, *La Reconnaissance Internationale dans la Pratique Contemporaine*, Paris, 1975; J. Verhoeven, 'La Reconnaissance Internationale, Déclin ou Renouveau?', *AFDI*, 1993, p. 7; M. Fabry, *Recognizing States*, Oxford, 2010; *Recognition in International Relations* (ed. C. Daase, C. Fehl, A. Geis and G. Kolliarkis), Basingstoke, 2015; C. Ryngaert and S. Sobrie, 'Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik?', *24 Leiden Journal of International Law*, 2011, p. 467; J. Dugard, *Recognition and the United Nations*, Cambridge, 1987; J. Dugard, *The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of*

Kosovo, The Hague, 2013; H. Blix, 'Contemporary Aspects of Recognition', **130 HR**, 1970-II, p. 587; J. Salmon, 'Reconnaissance d'État', **25 Revue Belge de Droit International**, 1992, p. 226; E. Wyler, *Théorie pratique de la reconnaissance d'État*, Brussels, 2013; L. Trigeaud, 'L'Influence des Reconnaissances d'Etat sur la Formation des Engagements Conventionnels', **119 RGDIP**, 2015, p. 571; S. Talmon, *Recognition in International Law: A Bibliography*, The Hague, 2000; T. D. Grant, *The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution*, London, 1999; T. D. Grant, *Third US Restatement on Foreign Relations Law*, Washington, DC, 1987, vol. **I**, pp. 77 ff. See also P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, pp. 619 ff.; P. M. Dupuy and Y. Kerbrat, *Droit International Public*, 14th ed., Paris, 2018, pp. 38 ff.; and L. Henkin, R. C. Pugh, O. Schachter and H. Smit, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 3rd ed., St Paul, 1993, pp. 244 ff.

² See e.g. H. A. Smith, *Great Britain and the Law of Nations*, London, 1932, vol. **I**, pp. 77–80.

³ See e.g. M. Kaplan and N. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law*, New York, 1961, p. 109.

⁴ See e.g. *Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No. 2)* [1967] AC 853; 43 ILR, p. 23, where the Court took the view that the GDR was a subordinate agency of the Soviet Union; and the recognition of the Ciskei as a subordinate body of South Africa, *Gur Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa Ltd* [1986] 3 All ER 449; 75 ILR, p. 675.

⁵ See e.g. Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 19 ff.; and J. Salmon, *La Reconnaissance d'État*, Paris, 1971. See also M. Clark, 'A Conceptual History of Recognition in British International Legal Thought', **87 BYIL**, 2016, p. 18; and R. Rich and D. Turk, 'Symposium: Recent Developments in the Practice of State Recognition', **4 EJIL**, 1993, p. 36.

⁶ See e.g. J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 6th ed., Oxford, 1963, p. 138; Brownlie's *Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, p. 135; D. P. O'Connell, *International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1970, vol. **I**, pp. 128 ff.; S. Talmon, 'The Constitutive Versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?', **75 BYIL**, 2004, p. 101; and Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 22 ff. See also the *Tinoco* arbitration, 1 RIAA, p. 369 (1923); 2 AD, p. 34; and *Wulfsohn v. Russia* 138 NE 24; 2 AD, p. 39.

⁷ See M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1968, vol. **II**, p. 10.

⁸ See generally D. Young, ‘American Dealings with Peking’, **45** *Foreign Affairs*, 1966, p. 77; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **II**, pp. 551 ff. See also A/CN.4/2, p. 53.

⁹ See Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, p. 6.

¹⁰ See 39 *Bulletin of the US Department of State*, 1958, p. 385.

¹¹ See e.g. the *Pueblo* incident, 62 *AJIL*, 1968, p. 756; *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, p. 23129 (1968); Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **II**, pp. 604 ff., 651; ‘Contemporary Practice of the UK in International Law’, **6** *ICLQ*, 1957, p. 507; and *British Practice in International Law* (ed. E. Lauterpacht), London, 1963, vol. **II**, p. 90. See also N. Mugerwa, ‘Subjects of International Law’, in *Manual of International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, pp. 247, 269.

¹² See above, [Chapter 5](#).

¹³ Article 9. This became article 12 of the Charter as amended in 1967. See also the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933, article 3.

¹⁴ 39 *Annuaire de L’Institut de Droit International*, 1936, p. 300. See also *Third US Restatement*, pp. 77–8.

¹⁵ *Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State* (1929) 5 AD, p. 11.

¹⁶ 92 ILR, pp. 162, 165. See also the Decision of the ECtHR in *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Preliminary Objections), Series A, No. 310, 1995, p. 14; 103 ILR, p. 621; and *Chuan Pu Andrew Wang and Others v. Office of the Federal Prosecutor*, Swiss Supreme Court, First Public Law Chamber, Decision of 3 May 2004, No. 1A.3/2004; partly published as BGE 130 II 217, para. 5.3.

¹⁷ 92 ILR, pp. 199, 201.

¹⁸ See *East Timor v. Netherlands* 87 ILR, pp. 73, 74.

¹⁹ See below, p. 401.

²⁰ Note the reference to the ‘relativism inherent in the constitutive theory of recognition’ with regard to the situation where some states recognised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the continuator of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and others did not: see *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 241, 244, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh.

²¹ Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, pp. 24, 55, 76–7.

²² See e.g. H. Waldock, ‘General Course on Public International Law’, **106 HR**, 1962, p. 154. See also Mugerwa, ‘Subjects’, pp. 266–90.

²³ 92 ILR, pp. 206, 208.

²⁴ *DUSPIL*, 1976, pp. 19–20.

²⁵ 102 HC Deb., col. 977, Written Answer, 23 October 1986. See also 169 HC Deb., cols. 449–50, Written Answer, 19 March 1990. As to French practice, see e.g. *Journal Officiel*, Débats Parl., AN, 1988, p. 2324.

²⁶ See above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 313.

²⁷ See above, [Chapter 6](#), pp. 312 ff.

²⁸ UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, pp. 559–60. On 31 December 1991, the European Community issued a statement noting that Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan had given assurances that the requirements in the Guidelines would be fulfilled. Accordingly, the member states of the Community declared that they were willing to proceed with the recognition of these states, *ibid.*, p. 561. On 15 January 1992, a statement was issued noting that Kyrgyzstan and Tadzhikistan had accepted the requirements in the Guidelines and that they too would be recognised, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 637.

²⁹ UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, pp. 560–1.

³⁰ See the announcement by President Bush on 25 December 1991, 2(4 & 5) *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, 1992, p. 12, as cited in Henkin *et al.*, *International Law*, pp. 252–3. See also, as to the importance of democratic considerations, S. D. Murphy, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments’, **48** *ICLQ*, 1999, p. 545.

³¹ See above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 210.

³² See S/2007/168 and S/2007/168/Add.1.

³³ One month after the declaration of independence, twenty-eight states had recognised the independence of Kosovo, including sixteen of the twenty-seven EU member states and six of the UN Security Council’s fifteen members: see ‘Kosovo’s First Month’, International Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 47, 18 March 2008, p. 3. As of the time of writing, Kosovo is recognised by 114 states; see www.mfa-ks.net/en/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-s-kosovs/483 and see above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 215.

³⁴ Note, however, the EU mediated normalisation agreements signed by Serbia and Kosovo particularly with regard to ethnic Serbs in Kosovo: see e.g. statements by EU High Representative/Vice-President Mogherini made on 25 August 2015 and 27 January 2016, www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/belgrade-and-pristina-interpret-new-agreement-differently/ and https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/2966/statement-by-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-following-the-meeting-of-the-eu-facilitated-dialogue_en.

³⁵ See e.g. Chen, *Recognition*, pp. 172 ff. See also the views of the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission as to the date of succession of the former Yugoslav republics, Opinion No. 11, 96 ILR, p. 719. Note that retroactivity of recognition is regarded by Oppenheim as a rule of convenience rather than of principle: see *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 161.

³⁶ See e.g. I. Brownlie, ‘Recognition in Theory and Practice’, **53** *BYIL*, 1982, p. 197; C. Warbrick, ‘The New British Policy on Recognition of Governments’, **30** *ICLQ*, 1981, p. 568; M. J. Peterson, ‘Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished’, **77** *AJIL*, 1983, p. 31; M. J. Peterson, *Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice*, London, 1997; N. Ando, ‘The Recognition of Governments Reconsidered’, **28** *Japanese Annual of International Law*, 1985, p. 29; C. Symmons, ‘United Kingdom Abolition of the Doctrine of Recognition: A Rose by Another Name’, *Public Law*, 1981, p.

248; S. Talmon, 'Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice', **63** *BYIL*, 1992, p. 231; S. Talmon, *Recognition of Governments in International Law*, Oxford, 1998; B. R. Roth, *Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law*, Oxford, 1999; *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 150; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 415; and Galloway, *Recognising Foreign Governments*.

³⁷ See above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 181.

³⁸ See further below, p. 391.

³⁹ See the Morrison statement, 485 HC Deb., cols. 2410–11, 21 March 1951.

⁴⁰ 799 HC Deb., col. 23, 6 April 1970. See also Foreign Office statements, 204 HL Deb., col. 755, 4 July 1957 and 742 HC Deb., cols. 6–7, Written Answer, 27 February 1967.

⁴¹ See e.g. D. Greig, 'The Carl-Zeiss Case and the Position of an Unrecognised Government in English Law', **83** *LQR*, 1967, pp. 96, 128–30; and *Re Al-Fin Corp.'s Patent* [1970] Ch. 160; 52 ILR, p. 68.

⁴² 1 RIAA, p. 369 (1923); 2 AD, p. 34.

⁴³ 1 RIAA, p. 380; 2 AD, p. 37.

⁴⁴ See e.g. Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **II**, p. 168.

⁴⁵ See e.g. Mugerwa, 'Subjects', p. 271; and 2 *AJIL*, 1908, Supp., p. 229.

⁴⁶ See e.g. G. H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1940, vol. **I**, pp. 181 ff. See also 17 *AJIL*, 1923, Supp., p. 118; O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 137–9; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **II**, p. 69.

⁴⁷ See e.g. 25 *AJIL*, 1931, Supp., p. 203; P. Jessup, 'The Estrada Doctrine', **25** *AJIL*, 1931, p. 719; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **II**, p. 85. See also Talmon, 'Recognition', p. 263; Chen, *Recognition*, p. 116; O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 134–5; and C. Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, Paris, 1977, vol. **III**, p. 555.

⁴⁸ See e.g. Peterson, 'Recognition', p. 42; and C. Rousseau, 'Chroniques des Faits Internationaux', 93 *RGDIP*, 1989, p. 923.

⁴⁹ Warbrick, 'New British Policy', p. 584.

⁵⁰ E.g. the democratic requirement noted by President Wilson, President Rutherford Hayes' popular support condition and Secretary of State Seward's criterion of ability to honour international obligations: see statement by US Department of State, *DUSPIL*, 1977, pp. 19, 20. See also *Third US Restatement*, para. 203, note 1. The Organization of American States adopted a resolution in 1965 recommending that states contemplating recognition of a new government should take into account whether that government proposes to hold elections within a reasonable time: 5 ILM, 1966, p. 155.

⁵¹ *DUSPIL*, 1977, p. 20. See also *DUSPIL*, 1981–88, vol. I, 1993, p. 295. Note that Deputy Secretary of State Christopher stated in 1977 that unscheduled changes of government were not uncommon in this day and age and that 'withholding diplomatic relations from these regimes after they have obtained effective control penalises us', *DUSPIL*, 1977, p. 18. See also, as regards Afghanistan and the continuation of diplomatic relations, 72 *AJIL*, 1978, p. 879. Cf. the special circumstances of the recognition of the government of China, *DUSPIL*, 1978, pp. 71–3 and *ibid.*, 1979, pp. 142 ff. But cf. Peterson, 'Recognition'.

⁵² See 408 HL Deb., cols. 1121–2, 28 April 1980. See also Symmons, 'UK Abolition', p. 249.

⁵³ See 11 *Revue Belge de Droit International*, 1973, p. 351.

⁵⁴ See 69 *RGDIP*, 1965, p. 1089. See also 83 *RGDIP*, 1979, p. 808; G. Charpentier, 'Pratique Française du Droit International', *AFDI*, 1981, p. 911; and Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, p. 555.

⁵⁵ See J. G. Starke, 'The New Australian Policy of Recognition of Foreign Governments', 62 *Australian Law Journal*, 1988, p. 390.

⁵⁶ See 27 *Canadian YIL*, 1989, p. 387. See also *Re Chateau-Gai Wines Ltd and Attorney-General for Canada* [1970] Ex CR 366; 55 ILR, p. 38.

⁵⁷ See e.g. the Netherlands, 22 *Netherlands YIL*, 1991, p. 237; and New Zealand, *Attorney-General for Fiji v. Robt Jones House Ltd* [1989] 2 NZLR 69, 70–1; 80 ILR, p. 1. The EU has stated that ‘it does not recognise governments, and even less political personalities, but states, according to the most common international practice’, *Bulletin of the European Union*, 1999–7/8, p. 60 and UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 424.

⁵⁸ 408 HL Deb., cols. 1121–2, 28 April 1980. This has been reaffirmed on a number of occasions: see e.g. UKMIL, 69 *BYIL*, 1998, p. 477 and UKMIL, 72 *BYIL*, 2001, p. 577.

⁵⁹ See *Gur Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa* [1987] 1 QB 599; 75 ILR, p. 675.

⁶⁰ See, as regards the different approaches adopted to the Cambodian and Ugandan experiences, Symmons, ‘UK Abolition’, p. 250; and UKMIL, 50 *BYIL*, 1979, p. 296. See, as to recognition of belligerency and insurgency, e.g. O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 148–53; Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, p. 270; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 161 ff.

⁶¹ UKMIL, 82 *BYIL*, 2011, p. 737–8. See also Security Council resolution 1962 (2010).

⁶² UKMIL, 82 *BYIL*, 2011, p. 742. This followed the meeting on 15 July 2011 of the Libya Contact Group underlining that the parties would deal only with the National Transitional Council as the ‘legitimate governing authority’ in Libya: www.mfa.gov.tr/fourth-meeting-of-the-libya-contact-group-chair-s-statement-15-july-2011-istanbul.en.mfa.

⁶³ [2011] EWHC 2274 (Comm), para. 23. See also *Mohamed v. Breish* [2020] EWCA Civ 637, para. 31, concluding, in referring to subsequent communications from the FCO, that the UK had recognised the Government of National Accord (which essentially succeeded the National Transitional Council) as the legitimate executive authority in Libya.

⁶⁴ 113 *AJIL*, 2019, p. 601.

⁶⁵ See www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-leaders-recognise-guaido-in-venezuela/. The Organization of American States and a number of other states took the same position, *ibid.*, and 113 *AJIL*, 2019, p. 604. See also for estimates of over fifty states, <https://share.america.gov/support-for-venezuelas-juan-guaido-grows-infographic/>.

⁶⁶ See www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-recognises-juan-guaido-as-interim-president-of-venezuela. See also *Deutsche Bank v. Bank of England* [2020] EWHC 1721, where the High Court in a case concerning which of the opposing leaders was entitled to the ownership of gold held in Venezuela's name in London, held that the UK recognition of Juan Guaidó as the interim President of Venezuela and thus as head of state was conclusive for the purpose of determining the issues in the proceedings. However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court in *Banco Central de Venezuela v. Deutsche Bank* [2020] EWCA Civ 1249, holding that the relevant statement by the UK Foreign Secretary was ambiguous in allowing for the possibility that the rival President (Maduro) exercised effective control in Venezuela and was recognised implicitly as *de facto* President, not least because of the UK government's unequivocal dealings with him as head of state, paras. 123–6.

⁶⁷ It is possible for one state or states to recognise the legitimacy or legality of other situations, beyond that of recognition of states and governments. Such recognition is often a significant political tool and one which in certain circumstances may stake out a claim in the legal field internationally, as well as having domestic consequences. For example, on 25 March 2019, the US issued a Presidential proclamation recognising Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, an area of Syria captured in 1967 and occupied by Israel since then, **113 AJIL**, 2019, p. 613. While this recognition is internally operative within the US and significant politically, the international legal status of the area remains unchanged; see also the regret expressed by the majority of the members of the Security Council, www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13753.doc.htm, 27 March 2019 and Security Council resolution 497 (1981). Of more complexity was the recognition by the US on 6 December 2017 of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, **112 AJIL**, 2018, p. 306. While West Jerusalem was recognised as part of Israel, East Jerusalem is regarded as occupied by Israel since 1967, despite the extension of Israel's laws to that area in 1967. It is to be noted that the US recognition did not specify the borders of Jerusalem and that the denomination of capitals is an attribute of sovereign independence. See further as to the complicated history of Jerusalem, the Application of Palestine instituting proceedings before the ICJ against the US for its relocation of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, 28 September 2018 and *The Jerusalem Question and its Resolution: Selected Documents* (ed. R. Lapidoth and M. Hirsch), Leiden, 1994.

⁶⁸ See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 154. See also *Mohamed v. Breish* [2020] EWCA Civ 637, para. 45; and *Banco Central de Venezuela v. Deutsche Bank* [2020]

EWCA Civ 1249, paras. 77 ff.

⁶⁹ See e.g. O’Connell, *International Law*, p. 161. See also the Morrison statement, above, **note 39**.

⁷⁰ See below, pp. 397 and 403.

⁷¹ See below, p. 400.

⁷² See e.g. *Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Ltd (No. 2)* [1939] 1 Ch 182; 9 AD, p. 94.

⁷³ See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 143 ff.

⁷⁴ See e.g. J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–70*, Princeton, 1977, pp. 127–9; and D. Ijalaye, ‘Was “Biafra” at Any Time a State in International Law?’, **65 AJIL**, 1971, p. 51. See also Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, pp. 7–8.

⁷⁵ See e.g. R. Müllerson, *International Law, Rights and Politics*, London, 1994, p. 130; and R. Rich, ‘Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’, **4 EJIL**, 1993, p. 36.

⁷⁶ See above, p. 383.

⁷⁷ 92 ILR, pp. 179, 181. Note that the President of Croatia on 15 January 1992 announced that Croatia would abide by the necessary conditions and on 8 May 1992 its Constitution was amended. The amended Constitution was considered by the Arbitration Commission on 4 July 1992, which concluded that the requirements of general international law with regard to the protection of minorities had been satisfied, *ibid.*, p. 209. Note, however, the critical views of the UN Human Rights Committee with regard to the distinctions made in the Croatian Constitution between ethnic Croats and other citizens: see CCPR/C/79/Add.15, p. 3. Croatia became a member of the UN on 22 May 1992. See also M. Weller, ‘The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, **86 AJIL**, 1992, p. 569.

⁷⁸ See e.g. Weller, ‘International Response’. Cf. the views of the UK Minister of State at the Foreign Office, UKMIL, 63 BYIL, 1992, p. 645. Note that Bosnia became a member of the UN on 22 May 1992.

⁷⁹ See above, Chapter 5, p. 219.

⁸⁰ Similar comments would apply to the secession of Crimea and its subsequent annexation by Russia: see Chapter 9, p. 446. See also with regard to Palestine, above, Chapter 5, p. 215.

⁸¹ See e.g. with regard to the delays in recognising Macedonia, Henkin *et al.*, *International Law*, p. 253. Israel, of course, remained unrecognised by its Arab neighbours until long after its establishment in 1948. It was recognised in 1979 by Egypt and in 1995 by Jordan.

⁸² See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 169; Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, pp. 369–408; and Chen, *Recognition*, pp. 201–16. See also Talmon, 'Recognition', pp. 255 ff.; and M. Lachs, 'Recognition and Modern Methods of International Co-operation', 35 *BYIL*, 1959, p. 252.

⁸³ Note that article 7 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933 provides that 'the recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognising the new state.' See also R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford, 1963, pp. 140 ff.

⁸⁴ See e.g. UK and North Vietnam, Cmd 9763, p. 3, note 1, and Israel and Arab countries, International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965: see *Human Rights International Instruments*, UN, ST/HR/4/rev.4, 1982. Note that Egypt withdrew its declarations regarding non-recognition of Israel with regard to this Convention on 18 January 1980, *ibid.*, p. 86.

⁸⁵ See O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 154–5. Note that the UK stated that in the case of Namibia 'there was no formal recognition of statehood, but it was implicit in the establishment of diplomatic relations in March 1990', UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 642. Instructing an ambassador to make suitable, friendly contact with the new administration in question might also suffice: see UKMIL, 50 *BYIL*, 1979, p. 294.

⁸⁶ See e.g. *Pan American World Airways Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.* 13 ILM, 1974, pp. 1376, 1397.

⁸⁷ See *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 171, note 9.

⁸⁸ Discussions with an unrecognised entity conducted by consular officers will not of itself imply recognition: see e.g. Smith, *Great Britain*, vol. I, p. 79; and *Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corp.* [1953] AC 70, 88–9. The establishment of an office in the UK, for example, of an unrecognised entity is not as such prohibited, nor does it constitute recognition: see e.g. with regard to the PLO, 483 HL Deb., cols. 1248–52, 27 January 1987 and UKMIL, 58 *BYIL*, 1987, p. 531. Note that under section 1 of the Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act 1987, the permission of the Foreign Secretary is required if the premises in question are to be regarded as diplomatic or consular.

⁸⁹ See e.g. *China v. Merchants' Fire Assurance Corp. of New York* 30 F.2d 278 (1929); 5 AD, p. 42; and *Clerget v. Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord* 52 ILR, p. 310. See, with regard to the special position as between the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, *Re Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic* 78 ILR, p. 150. See also Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. II, pp. 567 ff.

⁹⁰ See e.g. with regard to Formosa/Taiwan, 6 ICLQ, 1957, p. 507 and with regard to Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, 957 HC Deb., col. 247, Written Answer, 8 November 1978.

⁹¹ See e.g. UKMIL, 49 *BYIL*, 1978, p. 339; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. II, pp. 563 ff. See also *Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Singapore Airlines Ltd* [2004] 1 SLR 570; [2004] SGCA 3, para. 35; 133 ILR, pp. 371, 383.

⁹² See the Memorandum on the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations, S/1466, 1950 and 4 *International Organisation*, 1950, pp. 356, 359.

⁹³ See e.g. Q. Wright, 'Some Thoughts about Recognition', 44 *AJIL*, 1950, p. 548. See also, with regard to the Ukraine and Byelorussia, members of the UN prior to the demise of the Soviet Union of which they were constituent republics, UKMIL, 55 *BYIL*, 1978, p. 339.

⁹⁴ See 223 HC Deb., col. 241, Written Answer, 22 April 1993 and UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 601. Note that a similar view was taken with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, p. 559.

⁹⁵ See *Admissions (Conditions of Membership of the United Nations)*, ICJ Reports, 1948, pp. 57 ff.; 15 AD, p. 333.

⁹⁶ See e.g. *US v. Pink* 315 US 203, 229 (1942); Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. II, pp. 120 ff.; 10 AD, p. 48; and A. Kiss, *Répertoire de la Pratique Française en Matière de Droit International Public*, Paris, 1962–72, vol. III, pp. 40 ff.

⁹⁷ See e.g. Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, chapter 19. See also the Treaty of Berlin 1878 concerning Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and Romania and the provisions dealing with freedom of religion, articles V, XXVII, XXXV and XLIII.

⁹⁸ See further above, p. 383, with regard to the approach of the European Community to the emergence of new states in Eastern Europe and out of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This constituted a coordinated stand with regard to criteria for recognition by the Community and its member states rather than collective recognition as such.

⁹⁹ See e.g. Higgins, *Development*; Dugard, *Recognition*; Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, p. 400; Chen, *Recognition*, p. 211; and *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 177 ff.

¹⁰⁰ See further above, p. 378.

¹⁰¹ See Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, p. 349.

¹⁰² Withdrawal of *de facto* recognition does not always entail withdrawal of *de jure* recognition: see, with regard to Latvia, *Re Feivel Pikelný's Estate*, 32 *BYIL*, 1955–56, p. 288.

¹⁰³ See 975 HC Deb., col. 723, 6 December 1979; and C. Warbrick, 'Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition', 30 *ICLQ*, 1981, p. 234. See also *AFDI*, 1980, p. 888.

¹⁰⁴ See above, p. 389.

¹⁰⁵ 424 HL Deb., col. 551, 15 October 1981.

¹⁰⁶ See *Azazh Kebbede v. Italian Government* 9 AD, p. 93.

¹⁰⁷ US reply brief in the Court of Appeals in *Goldwater v. Carter* 444 US 996 (1979), quoted in *DUSPIL*, 1979, pp. 143–4 (emphasis in the original).

¹⁰⁸ Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. 96–8 Stat. 22 USC 3301–3316, s. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Also of interest is the UK attitude to the ‘republic of Somaliland’. This territory is part of Somalia, but proclaimed independence in 1991. It is totally unrecognised by any state, but the UK maintains ‘continuing contacts’ with it and works ‘very closely’ with it: see 677 HL Deb., col. 418, 16 January 2006 and 683 HL Deb., col. 212, 14 June 2006. See also M. Schoiswohl, *Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’*, Leiden, 2004. In 2012, a UK Foreign Office Minister noted that Somaliland was ‘quasi-independent’ and ‘autonomous’, but that any question of recognition was for the people of Somaliland and a matter on which the African Union would have to lead: HC 1318, 5 January 2012 and UKMIL, 83 *BYIL*, 2012, pp. 360–2.

¹¹⁰ See e.g. Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, pp. 416–20; and Oppenheim’s *International Law*, pp. 183 ff. See also R. Langer, *Seizure of Territory*, Princeton, 1947; Hackworth, *Digest*, vol. I, p. 334; I. Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Oxford, 1963, chapter 25; Dugard, *Recognition*, pp. 24 ff., 81 ff.; and Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 120 ff. See also S. Talmon, *La Non Reconnaissance Collective des États Illégaux*, Paris, 2007; and M. M. Dahir, *Legal Implications on Non-Recognition of Somaliland: Possibilities and Barriers to Foreign Investment in Unrecognised De Facto State*, Lambert, 2015.

¹¹¹ See e.g. Oppenheim’s *International Law*, pp. 183–4; and *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 46–7; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 36–7.

¹¹² LNOJ, Sp. Supp. No. 101, p. 8. This principle was reiterated in a number of declarations subsequently: see e.g. 34 *AJIL*, 1940, Supp., p. 197. See also O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 143–6.

¹¹³ O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 143–6.

114 See also article 11 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933; article 17 of the OAS Charter 1948; and article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Note also article 5(3) of the Consensus Definition of Aggression 1974, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 3314 (XXIX).

115 See also Security Council resolutions 476 (1980) and 478 (1980) declaring purported changes in the status of Jerusalem by Israel to be null and void, and resolution 491 (1981) stating that Israel's extension of its laws, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan Heights was without international legal effect.

116 Security Council resolution 216 (1965). See also Security Council resolutions 217 (1965), 277 (1970) and 288 (1970).

117 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 221 (1961), 232 (1966) and 253 (1968). See also M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa*, Oxford, 1986, p. 160; R. Zacklin, *The United Nations and Rhodesia*, Oxford, 1974; and J. Nkala, *The United Nations, International Law and the Rhodesian Crisis*, Oxford, 1985.

118 See e.g. General Assembly resolution 31/6A and the Security Council statements of 21 September 1979 and 15 December 1981; and Shaw, *Title to Territory*, p. 149. See also J. Dugard, *International Law, A South African Perspective*, Kenwyn, 1994, chapter 5.

119 See above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 212. See also *Cyprus v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras. 60–1; 120 ILR, p. 10.

120 See below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1110.

121 36 ILM, 1997, pp. 396, 422.

122 ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 54, 56; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 44, 46. Non-member states of the UN were similarly obliged, *ibid.* The non-recognition obligation did not extend, however, to certain acts of a humanitarian nature the effect of which could only be ignored to the detriment of the inhabitants of the territory: *ibid.*, p. 56 and *Cyprus v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras. 90–8; 120 ILR, p. 10. See also above, [Chapter 5](#), pp. 204 ff.

123 See e.g. Talmon, ‘Recognition’, pp. 275 ff.; Greig, ‘Carl-Zeiss Case’; and J. G. Merrills, ‘Recognition and Construction’, **20** *ICLQ*, 1971, p. 476.

124 *Ukraine v. Law Debenture Trust* [2018] EWCA Civ 2026, paras. 54, 63.

125 *Ibid.*, para. 73.

126 See e.g. *Halsbury’s Laws of England*, 4th ed., London, 1977, vol. XVIII, p. 735.

127 *The Annette* [1919] P 105; 1 AD, p. 43.

128 *City of Berne v. Bank of England* (1804) 9 Ves. Jun. 347.

129 [1921] 1 KB 456; 1 AD, p. 47.

130 [1921] 3 KB 532; 1 AD, p. 49.

131 See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 161; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. II, pp. 728–45.

132 [1939] 1 Ch 182; 9 AD, p. 94.

133 [1939] AC 256; 9 AD, p. 60.

134 See e.g. Lord Atkin: [1939] AC 256, 264–5.

135 See e.g. Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, pp. 288–94.

136 [1953] AC 11; 19 ILR, p. 72.

137 Lord Reid: [1953] AC 11, 44–5; 19 ILR, pp. 81, 83.

138 [1953] AC 70; 19 ILR, pp. 85, 93, 110. See also F. A. Mann, ‘Recognition of Sovereignty’, **16** *MLR*, 1953, p. 226.

139 [1953] AC 70, 90; 19 ILR, pp. 110, 113.

140 [1967] AC 853; 43 ILR, p. 42. See also Greig, ‘Carl-Zeiss Case’.

141 [1966] 1 Ch. 596; 43 ILR, p. 25.

142 [1971] P 188; [1970] 3 All ER 572; 52 ILR, p. 15.

143 [1978] QB 205; 73 ILR, p. 9. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘Legal Acts of an Unrecognised Entity’, **94 LQR**, 1978, p. 500.

144 [1978] QB 205, 218; 73 ILR, pp. 9, 15. See also Steyn J, *Gur Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa Ltd* [1986] 3 WLR 583, 589, 592; 75 ILR, p. 675.

145 See further *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 56; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 46; and *Cyprus v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras. 90–8; 120 ILR, p. 10.

146 108 ILR, p. 510, at 534.

147 Such as in *Adams v. Adams* [1970] 3 All ER 572; [1971] P 188; 52 ILR 15 in view of the relationship between the UK and Southern Rhodesia.

148 [2002] 1 FLR 956. This contradicted the earlier case of *B v. B* [2000] FLR 707, where a divorce obtained in the unrecognised ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ was not recognised. See also *Parent and Others v. Singapore Airlines Ltd and Civil Aeronautics Administration* 133 ILR, p. 264. See also *Kibris Turk Hava Yollarai and CTA Holidays v. Secretary of State for Transport* [2009] EWHC 1918 (Admin), paras. 87 ff. and the Decision of the Court of Appeal in this case [2010] EWCA Civ 1093, paras. 75 ff. limiting the *Namibia* exception to ‘private rights, acts of everyday occurrence, routine acts of administration, day to day activities having legal consequences, or matters of that kind’, para. 79.

149 See *North Cyprus Tourism Centre Ltd v. Transport for London* [2005] EWHC 1698 (Admin), para. 50.

150 [2019] UKSC 51, paras. 56 ff. (*per* Lord Lloyd-Jones). Note that the first instance decision in *R v. Zardad*, Case No. T2203 7676, High Court, Judgment of 7 April 2004, was

reaffirmed, according to which the words ‘perons acting in a public capacity’ could cover those acting for an entity exercising *de facto* effective control over an area of a country, *ibid.*, para. 63.

¹⁵¹ See e.g. *Re Al-Fin Corp.’s Patent* [1970] Ch. 160; 52 ILR, p. 68; *Reel v. Holder* [1981] 1 WLR 1226; 74 ILR, p. 105; and *Caglar v. Billingham* 108 ILR, p. 510 at 528, 530 and 539, where the statutory term ‘foreign state’ was held to mean a state recognised by the UK.

¹⁵² This legislation was adopted essentially to deal with the situation following *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No. 3)* [1991] 2 WLR, whereby the legal personality of a company not incorporated in a territory recognised as a state would not be recognised in English law. See UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, pp. 565–8. See also the Decision of the Special Commissioners in *Caglar v. Billingham* 108 ILR, p. 510 at 530, where it was emphasised that the intention of the legislation was not to affect at all the government’s policy on recognition, but to sever the connection with public international law and deal with issues of private international law.

¹⁵³ See 409 HL Deb., cols. 1097–8; and Symmons, ‘UK Abolition’, pp. 254–60.

¹⁵⁴ [1987] 1 QB 599; 75 ILR, p. 675.

¹⁵⁵ [1987] 1 QB 599, 623; 75 ILR, p. 696.

¹⁵⁶ [1987] 1 QB 599, 624. See also Nourse LJ, *ibid.*, pp. 624–66; 75 ILR, pp. 696–9.

¹⁵⁷ [1987] 1 QB 599, 618–19; 75 ILR, p. 690.

¹⁵⁸ [1966] 1 Ch. 596; 43 ILR, p. 25.

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. *The Arantzazu Mendi* [1939] AC 256, 264; 9 AD, p. 60; and *Gur Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa* [1987] 1 QB 599, 625; 75 ILR, p. 675. See also *Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake and Carey (Suisse) SA* [1993] QB 54, 65–6; 94 ILR, p. 620; and *British Arab Commercial Bank v. The National Transitional Council of the State of Libya* [2011] EWHC 2274, para. 25. See also *Mohamed v. Breish* [2020] EWCA Civ 637.

160 See e.g. F. A. Mann, ‘The Judicial Recognition of an Unrecognised State’, **36 ICLQ**, 1987, p. 349; and A. Beck, ‘A South African Homeland Appears in the English Court: Legitimation of the Illegitimate?’, **36 ICLQ**, 1987, p. 350.

161 [1993] QB 54; 94 ILR, p. 608.

162 [1993] QB 54, 68; 94 ILR, p. 622.

163 [1993] QB 54, 65; 94 ILR, p. 619. This was reaffirmed in *Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co. Ltd v. Barclays Bank* [1998] 2 All ER 821; 114 ILR, p. 466. See also K. Reece Thomas, ‘Non-recognition, Personality and Capacity: The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine Authority in English Law’, **29 Anglo-American Law Review**, 2000, p. 228.

164 [2002] 2 AC 883, para. 359.

165 See *Bouhadi v. Breish* [2016] EWHC 602 (Comm), paras. 34 ff.

166 *Ibid.*; and see *The Arantzazu Mendi* [1939] AC 256, 264; *Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co.* [1999] CLC 31, p. 67; and *Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. (Nos. 4 and 5)* [2002] 2 AC 883, para. 358.

167 *Bouhadi v. Breish* [2016] EWHC 602 (Comm), para. 43.

168 [2012] EWHC 2837 (Admin), paras. 122 ff.

169 *Ibid.*, para. 131. This applies to both *de facto* and *de jure* recognition, *ibid.*, paras. 54–5, citing *The Arantzazu Mendi* [1939] AC 256, 264. But see *R (Akarcay) v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police* [2017] EWHC 159 (Admin), where it was concluded that the provision of assistance and evidence by the police in connection with the prosecution of the claimant in Northern Cyprus did not amount to recognition by the UK of the regime in that area. See also *Local Authority B v. X* [2020] EWFC 37.

170 [2020] EWCA Civ 637, paras. 1, 39. The basis of the one voice principle lies in the constitutional separation of powers, *ibid.*, para. 57. See also *Deutsche Bank v. Bank of England* [2020] EWHC 1721, paras. 9, 42, 44.

¹⁷¹ [2020] EWCA Civ 637, para. 43. See also *Deutsche Bank v. Bank of England* [2020] EWHC 1721, para. 44, noting that the ‘one voice’ doctrine ‘requires the courts of this country to accept a statement of recognition as conclusive because it is the prerogative of the the Crown, acting through HMG, to make statements of recognition’; and *Banco Central de Venezuela v. Deutsche Bank* [2020] EWCA Civ 1249, paras. 91 ff., noting in particular that while a statement as to recognition by the executive was conclusive for what it says, it was for the court to determine what it means, paras. 106–7, and in the light of any clarification requested by the court and the relevant background and the public stance taken by the executive and its conduct, para. 110.

¹⁷² See e.g. *Vietnam v. Pfizer* 556 F.2d 892 (1977); 94 ILR, p. 199. See also *Guaranty Trust Co. v. US* 304 US 126, 137 (1938); *National City Bank of NY v. China* 348 US 356, 358–9 (1955); 22 ILR, p. 210; and *Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.* 246 US 297, 302–3 (1918). See also C. A. Bradley, *International Law in the US Legal System*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015, pp. 22 ff.

¹⁷³ See *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino* 376 US 398, 412 (1964); 35 ILR, p. 2; and *National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co.* 733 F.Supp. 800 (1990); 94 ILR, p. 209.

¹⁷⁴ See above, p. 397, regarding Taiwan after 1 January 1979. See also *Wulfsohn v. Russia* 234 NY 372 (1924); 2 AD, p. 39.

¹⁷⁵ 544 F.Supp. 858, 863–4 (1982); 94 ILR, pp. 202, 208–9.

¹⁷⁶ *American Insurance Association v. Garamendi* 539 US 396, 424 (2003) (quoting *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council* 530 US 363, 381 (2000)).

¹⁷⁷ 576 US 1059 (2015), pp. 11 ff.

¹⁷⁸ [1967] AC 853, 954; 43 ILR, pp. 23, 66.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g. *Texas v. White* 74 US 700 (1868).

¹⁸⁰ *Sokoloff v. National City Bank of NY* 239 NY 158 (1924); 2 AD, p. 44.

¹⁸¹ 262 NY 220 (1933); 7 AD, pp. 22, 26.

182 [1921] 1 KB 456; 1 AD, p. 47; above, p. 403.

183 145 F.2d 431 (1944); 12 AD, p. 29.

184 213 NYS (2d) 417 (1961); 32 ILR, p. 65.

185 358 F.Supp. 747 (1972); 61 ILR, p. 143.

186 358 F.Supp. 747, 757 (1972); 61 ILR, p. 154. See also *Germany v. Elicofon* 14 ILM, 1976, p. 806, following the US recognition of the GDR in which KZW was permitted to intervene in the litigation in progress. See also *Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair* 544 F.Supp. 858 (1982).

187 917 F.2d 278 (1990); 108 ILR, p. 488.

188 1988 *Iranian Assets Litig. Rep.* 15, 313. See also 82 *AJIL*, 1988, p. 591.

189 860 F.2d 551 (1988); 87 ILR, p. 583.

190 860 F.2d 551, 554 (1988).

191 See e.g. *Panama v. Republic National Bank of New York* 681 F.Supp. 1066 (1988); 86 ILR, p. 1; and *Panama v. Citizens & Southern International Bank* 682 F.Supp. 1144 (1988); 86 ILR, p. 10. See also T. Fountain, 'Out from the Precarious Orbit of Politics: Reconsidering Recognition and the Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue in US Courts', 29 *Va. JIL*, 1989, p. 473.

192 262 NY 220 (1933); 7 AD, p. 22.

193 145 F.2d 431 (1944); 12 AD, p. 29.

194 See e.g. *Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corp.* [1953] AC 70; 19 ILR, p. 85.

195 See e.g. *Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Russia* 21 F.2d 396 (1927); 4 AD, p. 58.

196 See e.g. *US v. Pink* 315 US 203 (1942); 10 AD, p. 48; and *US v. Belmont* 301 US 324 (1937); 8 AD, p. 34.

9

Territory

The Concept of Territory in International Law

International law is based on the concept of the state. The state in its turn lies upon the foundation of sovereignty, which expresses internally the supremacy of the governmental institutions and externally the supremacy of the state as a legal person.¹

But sovereignty itself, with its retinue of legal rights and duties, is founded upon the fact of territory. Without territory a legal person cannot be a state.² It is undoubtedly the basic characteristic of a state and the one most widely accepted and understood. There are currently some 200 distinct territorial units, each one subject to a different territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction.

Since such fundamental legal concepts as sovereignty and jurisdiction can only be comprehended in relation to territory, it follows that the legal nature of territory becomes a vital part in any study of international law. Indeed, the principle whereby a state is deemed to exercise exclusive power over its territory can be regarded as a fundamental axiom of classical international law.³ The development of international law upon the basis of the exclusive authority of the state within an accepted territorial framework meant that

territory became ‘perhaps the fundamental concept of international law’.⁴ Most nations indeed developed through a close relationship with the land they inhabited.⁵

The central role of territory in the scheme of international law may be seen by noting the development of legal rules protecting its inviolability. The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states is well founded as one of the linchpins of the international system, as is the norm prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of other states.⁶ A number of factors, however, have tended to reduce the territorial exclusivity of the state in international law. Technological and economic changes have had an impact as interdependence becomes more evident and the rise of such transnational concerns as human rights and self-determination have tended to impinge upon this exclusivity.⁷ The growth of international organisations is another relevant factor, as is the development of the ‘common heritage’ concept in the context of the law of the sea and air law.⁸ Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the effects upon international law doctrine today of such trends.⁹ Territorial sovereignty remains as a key concept in international law.

Since the law reflects political conditions and evolves, in most cases, in harmony with reality, international law has had to develop a series of rules governing the transfer and control of territory. Such rules, by the very nature of international society, have often (although not always) had the effect of legitimising the results of the exercise of power. The lack of a strong, central authority in international law has emphasised, even more than municipal legal structures, the way that law must come to terms with power and force.

The rules laid down by municipal legislation and judicial decisions regarding the transfer and control of land within a particular state are usually highly detailed, for they deal with one of the basic resources and wealth-creating factors of the nation. Land law has often reflected the power balance within a society, with feudal arrangements being succeeded by free market contracts and latterly the introduction of comprehensive provisions elaborating the rights and duties of landlords and their tenants, and the development of more sophisticated conveyancing techniques. A number of legal interests are capable of existing over land and the possibility exists of dividing ownership into different segments.¹⁰ The treatment of territory in international law has not reached this sophisticated stage for a number of reasons, in particular the horizontal system of territorial sovereignty that subsists internationally as distinct from the vertical order of land law that persists in most municipal systems. There is thus a critical difference in the consequences that result from a change in the legal ownership of land in international law and in municipal law.

In international law a change in ownership of a particular territory involves also a change in sovereignty, in the legal authority governing the area. This means that the nationality of the inhabitants is altered, as is the legal system under which they live, work and conduct their relations, whereas in municipal law no such changes are involved in an alteration of legal ownership. Accordingly, international law must deal also with all the various effects of a change in territorial sovereignty and not confine its attentions to the mere mechanism of acquisition or loss of territory.¹¹

Territorial Sovereignty

Judge Huber noted in the *Island of Palmas* case¹² that:

sovereignty in relation to a portion of the surface of the globe is the legal condition necessary for the inclusion of such portion in the territory of any particular state.

Briefly defined territorial sovereignty in terms of the existence of rights over territory rather than the independence of the state itself or the relation of persons to persons. It was a way of contrasting ‘the fullest rights over territory known to the law’ with certain minor territorial rights, such as leases and servitudes.¹³ Territorial sovereignty has a positive and a negative aspect. The former relates to the exclusivity of the competence of the state regarding its own territory,¹⁴ while the latter refers to the obligation to protect the rights of other states.¹⁵

The international rules regarding territorial sovereignty are rooted in the Roman law provisions governing ownership and possession, and the classification of the different methods of acquiring territory is a direct descendant of the Roman rules dealing with property.¹⁶ This has resulted in some confusion. Law, being so attached to contemporary life, cannot be easily transposed into a different cultural milieu.¹⁷ And, as shall be noted, the Roman method of categorising the different methods of acquiring territory faces difficulties when applied in international law.

The essence of territorial sovereignty is contained in the notion of title. This term relates to both the factual and legal conditions under which territory is

deemed to belong to one particular authority or another. In other words, it refers to the existence of those facts required under international law to entail the legal consequences of a change in the juridical status of a particular territory.¹⁸ As the International Court noted in the *Burkina Faso/Mali* case,¹⁹ the word ‘title’ comprehends both any evidence which may establish the existence of a right and the actual source of that right.²⁰

One interesting characteristic that should be noted and which again points to the difference between the treatment of territory under international law and municipal law is that title to territory in international law is more often than not relative rather than absolute.²¹ Thus, a court, in deciding to which of the contending states a parcel of land legally belongs, will consider all the relevant arguments and will award the land to the state which relatively speaking puts forward the better (or best) legal case.²² Title to land in municipal law is much more often the case of deciding in uncertain or contentious circumstances which party complies with the legal requirements as to ownership and possession, and in that sense title is absolute. It is not normally a question of examining the facts to see which claimant can under the law put forward a better claim to title. Further, not all rights or links will amount to territorial sovereignty. Personal ties of allegiance may exist, but these may not necessarily lead to a finding of sovereignty.²³ The special characteristics of the territory need to be taken into account, as does the particular structure of the sovereignty in question.²⁴

Disputes as to territory in international law may be divided into different categories. The contention may be over the status of the country itself, that is, all the territory comprised in a particular state, as for example Arab claims

against Israel at one time and claims formerly pursued by Morocco against Mauritania.²⁵ Or the dispute may refer to a certain area on the borders of two or more states, as for example Somali claims against the north-east of Kenya and south-east of Ethiopia.²⁶ Similarly, claims to territory may be based on a number of different grounds, ranging from the traditional method of occupation or prescription to the newer concepts such as self-determination, with various political and legal factors, for example, geographical contiguity, historical demands and economic elements, possibly being relevant. These issues will be noted during the course of this chapter.

Apart from territory actually under the sovereignty of a state, international law also recognises territory over which there is no sovereign. Such territory is known as *terra nullius*. In addition, there is a category of territory called *res communis* which is (in contrast to *terra nullius*) generally not capable of being reduced to sovereign control. The prime instance of this is the high seas, which belong to no one and may be used by all. Another example would be outer space. The concept of common heritage of mankind has also been raised and will be examined in this chapter.

The Acquisition of Additional Territory²⁷

The classical technique of categorising the various modes of acquisition of territory is based on Roman law and is not adequate.²⁸ Many of the leading cases do not specify a particular category or mode, but tend to adopt an overall approach. Five modes of acquisition are usually detailed: occupation of *terra nullius*, prescription, cession, accretion and subjugation (or conquest); and these are further divided into original and derivative modes.²⁹

However, the fundamental principle applicable to the establishment of boundaries between sovereign states is consent.³⁰

Boundary Treaties and Boundary Awards

Boundary treaties, whereby either additional territory is acquired or lost or uncertain boundaries are clarified by agreement between the states concerned, constitute a root of title in themselves. They constitute a special kind of treaty in that they establish an objective territorial regime valid *erga omnes*.³¹ Such a regime will not only create rights binding also upon third states, but will exist outside the particular boundary treaty and thus will continue even if the treaty in question itself ceases to apply.³² The reason for this exceptional approach is to be found in the need for the stability of boundaries.³³ Further, the establishment or confirmation of a particular boundary line by way of referring in a treaty to an earlier document (which may or may not be binding of itself) laying down a line is also possible and as such invests the line in question with undoubted validity.³⁴ Indeed, this earlier document may also be a map upon which a line has been drawn.

Accordingly, many boundary disputes in fact revolve around the question of treaty interpretation. It is accepted that a treaty should be interpreted in the light of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, ‘in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.³⁵ Essentially, the aim is to find the ‘common will’ of the parties, a concept which includes consideration of the subsequent conduct of the parties.³⁶ Since many of the boundary treaties that need to be interpreted long pre-date

the coming into force of the Vienna Convention,³⁷ the problem of the applicability of its provisions has arisen. Courts have taken the view that the Convention in this respect at least represents customary international law, thus apparently obviating the problem.³⁸

More generally, the difficulty in seeking to interpret both general concepts and geographical locations used in early treaties in the light of modern scientific knowledge has posed difficulties. In *Botswana v. Namibia*, the Court, faced with the problem of identifying the ‘main channel’ of the River Chobe in the light of an 1890 treaty, emphasised that ‘the present-day state of scientific knowledge’ could be used in order to illuminate terms of that treaty.³⁹ In the *Eritrea–Ethiopia* case, the Boundary Commission referred to the principle of contemporaneity, by which it meant that a treaty should be interpreted by reference to the circumstances prevailing when the treaty was concluded. In particular, the determination of a geographical name (whether of a place or of a river) depended upon the contemporary understanding of the location to which that name related at the time of the treaty. However, in seeking to understand what that was, reference to subsequent practice and to the objects of the treaty was often required.⁴⁰ In interpreting a boundary treaty, in particular in seeking to resolve ambiguities, the subsequent practice of the parties will be relevant. Even where such subsequent practice cannot in the circumstances constitute an authoritative interpretation of the treaty, it may be deemed to ‘be useful’ in the process of specifying the frontier in question.⁴¹ However, where the boundary line as specified in the pertinent instrument is clear, it cannot be changed by a court in the process of interpreting delimitation provisions.⁴²

Like boundary treaties, boundary awards may also constitute roots or sources of legal title to territory.⁴³ A decision by the International Court or arbitral tribunal allocating title to a particular territory or determining the boundary line as between two states will constitute establishment or confirmation of title that will be binding upon the parties themselves and for all practical purposes upon all states in the absence of maintained protest.⁴⁴ It is also possible that boundary allocation decisions that do not constitute international judicial or arbitral awards may be binding, providing that it can be shown that the parties consented to the initial decision.⁴⁵

Accretion⁴⁶

This describes the geographical process by which new land is formed and becomes attached to existing land, as for example the creation of islands in a river mouth or the change in direction of a boundary river leaving dry land where it had formerly flowed. Where new land comes into being within the territory of a state, it forms part of the territory of the state and there is no problem. When, for example, an island emerged in the Pacific after an under-sea volcano erupted in January 1986, the UK government noted that: ‘We understand the island emerged within the territorial sea of the Japanese island of Iwo Jima. We take it therefore to be Japanese territory.’⁴⁷

As regards a change in the course of a river forming a boundary, a different situation is created depending on whether it is imperceptible and slight or a violent shift (*avulsion*). In the latter case, the general rule is that the boundary stays at the same point along the original river bed.⁴⁸ However, where a gradual move has taken place the boundary may be shifted.⁴⁹ If the river is

navigable, the boundary will be the middle of the navigable channel, whatever slight alterations have occurred, while if the river is not navigable the boundary will continue to be the middle of the river itself. This aspect of acquiring territory is relatively unimportant in international law, but these rules have been applied in a number of cases involving disputes between particular states of the United States of America.⁵⁰

Cession⁵¹

This involves the peaceful transfer of territory from one sovereign to another (with the intention that sovereignty should pass) and has often taken place within the framework of a peace treaty following a war. Indeed, the orderly transference of sovereignty by agreement from a colonial or administering power to representatives of the indigenous population could be seen as a form of cession.

Cession has the effect of replacing one sovereign by another⁵² over a particular piece of territory, so the acquiring state cannot possess more rights over the land than its predecessor had. This is an important point, so that where a third state has certain rights, for example, of passage over the territory, the new sovereign must respect them. It is expressed in the land law phrase that the burden of obligations runs with the land, not the owner. In other words, the rights of the territorial sovereign are derived from a previous sovereign, who could not, therefore, dispose of more than he had.

This contrasts with, for example, accretion, which is treated as an original title, there having been no previous legal sovereign over the land.

The *Island of Palmas* case⁵³ emphasised this point. It concerned a dispute between the United States and the Netherlands. The claims of the United States were based on an 1898 treaty with Spain, which involved the cession of the island. It was emphasised by the arbitrator and accepted by the parties that Spain could not thereby convey to the Americans greater rights than it itself possessed.

The basis of cession lies in the intention of the relevant parties to transfer sovereignty over the territory in question.⁵⁴ Without this it cannot legally operate. Whether an actual delivery of the property is also required for a valid cession is less certain. It will depend on the circumstances of the case. For example, Austria ceded Venice to France in 1866, and that state within a few weeks ceded the territory to Italy. The cession to the Italian state through France was nonetheless valid.⁵⁵ In the *Iloilo* case,⁵⁶ it was held that the cession of the Philippines to the United States took place, on the facts of the case, upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris of 1898, even though American troops had taken possession of the town of Iloilo two months prior to this.

Although instances of cession usually occur in an agreement following the conclusion of hostilities,⁵⁷ it can be accomplished in other circumstances, such as the purchase of Alaska by the United States in 1867 from Russia or the sale by Denmark of territories in the West Indies in 1916 to the United States. It may also appear in exchanges of territories or pure gifts of territory.⁵⁸

Conquest and the Use of Force

How far a title based on force can be regarded as a valid, legal right recognisable by other states and enforceable within the international system is a crucial question. Ethical considerations are relevant and the principle that an illegal act cannot give birth to a right in law is well established in municipal law and is an essential component of an orderly society.

However, international law sometimes has to modify its reactions to the consequences of successful violations of its rules to take into account the exigencies of reality. The international community has accepted the results of illegal aggression in many cases by virtue of recognition.

Conquest, the act of defeating an opponent and occupying all or part of its territory, does not of itself constitute a basis of title to the land.⁵⁹ It does give the victor certain rights under international law as regards the territory, the rights of belligerent occupation,⁶⁰ but the territory remains subject to the legal title of the ousted sovereign.⁶¹ Sovereignty as such does not merely pass by conquest to the occupying forces, although complex situations may arise where the legal status of the territory occupied is, in fact, in dispute prior to the conquest.⁶²

Conquest, of course, may result from a legal or an illegal use of force. By the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, war was outlawed as an instrument of national policy, and by article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter all member states must refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. However, force will be legitimate when exercised in self-defence.⁶³ Whatever the circumstances, it is not the successful use of violence that in international law constituted the valid

method of acquiring territory. Under the classical rules, formal annexation of territory following upon an act of conquest would operate to pass title. It was a legal fiction employed to mask the conquest and transform it into a valid method of obtaining land under international law.⁶⁴ However, it is doubtful whether an annexation proclaimed while war is still in progress would have operated to pass a good title to territory. Only after a war is concluded could the juridical status of the disputed territory be finally determined. This follows from the rule that has developed to the effect that the control over the relevant territory by the state purporting to annex must be effective and that there must be no reasonable chance of the former sovereign regaining the land.

These points were emphasised by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal after the Second World War, in discussing the various purported German annexations of 1939 and 1940. The Tribunal firmly declared that annexations taking place before the conclusion of a war were ineffective and invalid in international law.⁶⁵ Intention to annex was a crucial aspect of the equation so that, for example, the conquest of Germany by the Allies in 1945 did not give rise to an implied annexation by virtue of the legislative control actually exercised (as it could have done) because the Allies had specifically ruled out such a course in a joint declaration.⁶⁶ It is, however, clear today that the acquisition of territory by force alone is illegal under international law. This may be stated in view of article 2(4) of the UN Charter and other practice. Security Council resolution 242, for example, emphasised the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’, while the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law adopted by the UN General Assembly provides that:

the territory of a state shall not be the object of acquisition by another state resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognised as legal.⁶⁷

In Security Council resolution 662 (1990), adopted unanimously, the Council decided that the declared Iraqi annexation of Kuwait ‘under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity and is considered null and void’. All states and institutions were called upon not to recognise the annexation and to refrain from actions which might be interpreted as indirect recognition.⁶⁸

Acquisition of territory following an armed conflict would require further action of an international nature in addition to domestic legislation to annex. Such further necessary action would be in the form either of a treaty of cession by the former sovereign or of international recognition.⁶⁹

The Exercise of Effective Control

It is customary in the literature to treat the modes of occupation and prescription as separate categories. However, there are several crucial factors that link the concepts, so that the acquisition of territory by virtue of these methods, based as they are upon the exercise of effective control, is best examined within the same broad framework. The traditional definition of these two modes will be noted first.

Occupation is a method of acquiring territory which belongs to no one (*terra nullius*) and which may be acquired by a state in certain situations. The occupation must be by a state and not by private individuals, it must be effective and it must be intended as a claim of sovereignty over the area. The high seas cannot be occupied in this manner for they are *res communis*, but vacant land may be subjected to the sovereignty of a claimant state. It relates primarily to uninhabited territories and islands, but may also apply to certain inhabited lands.

The issue was raised in the *Western Sahara* case before the International Court of Justice.⁷⁰ The question was asked as to whether the territory in question had been *terra nullius* at the time of colonisation. It was emphasised by the Court that the concept of *terra nullius* was a legal term of art used in connection with the mode of acquisition of territory known as ‘occupation’.⁷¹ The latter mode was defined legally as an original means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory otherwise than by cession or succession.⁷² In an important statement, the Court unambiguously asserted that the state practice of the relevant period (i.e. the period of colonisation) indicated that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organisation were not regarded as *terrae nullius*.⁷³ Further, international case-law has recognised that sovereign title may be suspended for a period of time in circumstances that do not lead to the status of *terra nullius*. Such indeterminacy could be resolved by the relevant parties at a relevant time.⁷⁴

In fact, the majority of territories brought under European control were regarded as acquired by means of cessions, especially in Asia and Africa.⁷⁵

This raised the question of the status of the ceding parties for, with very few exceptions, these territories were not regarded in nineteenth-century international law as states.⁷⁶ However, practice demonstrates that the indigenous entities were regarded as having the capacity in international law to cede all or part of their territory by way of signed agreements with the colonial powers. This appears clearly from *Cameroon v. Nigeria*,⁷⁷ where the International Court of Justice declared that in sub-Saharan Africa in particular ‘treaties termed “treaties of protection” were entered into not with states, but rather with important indigenous rulers exercising local rule over identifiable areas of territory’ and reaffirmed the view expressed in the *Western Sahara* opinion that ‘agreements concluded with local rulers . . . were regarded as derivative roots of title’.⁷⁸ It should be noted that personality and title are two different concepts in international law. The fact that a tribe or people possessed sufficient personality to preclude acquisition of its territory by European powers by virtue of occupation of *terra nullius* and thus necessitated a process of cession (or, much more rarely, conquest) for such an end to be achieved is not the same as saying that such a tribe was sovereign or a state as that term was recognised under the international law of the time, just as the existence of links between groups and a ruler did not necessarily amount to ties of territorial sovereignty. Accordingly, international law, for a period, was prepared to accept an intermediate stage between statehood and a situation of *terra nullius*, this stage providing that a socially or politically organised entity could enter into an agreement which could form the basis of a derivative title to territorial sovereignty, such title being recognised forthwith through the application of intertemporal law, for, as the Court underlined in *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ‘the principle of intertemporal law

requires that the legal consequences of the treaties concluded at that time . . . be given effect today'.⁷⁹

However, there were instances of asserted title by occupation, for example Australia,⁸⁰ and many sparsely inhabited islands.

Occupation, both in the normal sense of the word and in its legal meaning, was often preceded by discovery, that is the realisation of the existence of a particular piece of land.⁸¹ But mere realisation or sighting was never considered (except for periods in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and this is not undisputed) as sufficient to constitute title to territory. Something more was required and this took the form of a symbolic act of taking possession, whether it be by the raising of flags or by solemn proclamations or by more sophisticated ritual expressions. As time passed, the conditions changed and the arbitrator in the *Island of Palmas* case pointed to the modern effect of discovery as merely giving an inchoate title which had to be completed within a reasonable time by the effective occupation of the relevant region. Discovery only put other states on notice that the claimant state had a prior interest in the territory, which, to become legally meaningful, had to be supplemented by effective occupation within a certain period.⁸²

Prescription⁸³ is a mode of establishing title to territory which is not *terra nullius* and which has been obtained either unlawfully or in circumstances wherein the legality of the acquisition cannot be demonstrated. It is the legitimisation of a doubtful title by the passage of time and the presumed acquiescence of the former sovereign, and it reflects the need for stability felt within the international system by recognising that territory in the possession

of a state for a long period of time and uncontested cannot be taken away from that state without serious consequences for the international order. It is the legitimisation of a fact. If it were not for some such doctrine, the title of many states to their territory would be jeopardised.⁸⁴ The International Court in *Botswana v. Namibia*, while making no determination of its own, noted that the two parties were agreed that acquisitive prescription was recognised in international law and further agreed on the criteria to be satisfied for the establishment of such a title, viz. the possession must be *à titre de souverain*, peaceful and uninterrupted, public and endure for a certain length of time. The Court did not contradict this position.⁸⁵

Prescription differs from occupation in that it relates to territory which has previously been under the sovereignty of a state. In spite of this, both concepts are similar in that they may require evidence of sovereign acts by a state over a period of time. And although distinct in theory, in practice these concepts are often indistinct since sovereignty over an area may lapse and give rise to doubts whether an abandonment has taken place,⁸⁶ rendering the territory *terra nullius*.

In fact, most cases do not fall into such clear theoretical categories as occupation or prescription. Particular modes of acquisition that can be unambiguously related to the classic definitions tend not to be specified. Most cases involve contesting claims by states, where both (or possibly all) the parties have performed some sovereign acts. As in the instance of occupation, so prescription too requires that the possession forming the basis of the title must be by virtue of the authority of the state or *à titre de souverain*, and not a manifestation of purely individual effort unrelated to the

state's sovereign claims. And this possession must be public so that all interested states can be made aware of it.

This latter requirement also flows logically from the necessity for the possession to be peaceful and uninterrupted, and reflects the vital point that prescription rests upon the implied consent of the former sovereign to the new state of affairs. This means that protests by the dispossessed sovereign may completely block any prescriptive claim.⁸⁷

In the *Chamizal* arbitration⁸⁸ between the United States and Mexico, the Rio Grande River forming the border between the parties changed course and the United States claimed the ground between the old and the new river beds partly on the basis of peaceful and uninterrupted possession. This claim was dismissed in view of the constant protests by Mexico and in the light of a Convention signed by both parties that there existed a dispute as to the boundary which had to be resolved. The fact that Mexico did not go to war over the issue was not of itself sufficient to make the possession of the tract of land by the United States peaceful.

Thus, acquiescence in the case of prescription, whether express or implied from all the relevant circumstances, is essential, whereas in the case of occupation it is merely an evidential point reinforcing the existence of an effective occupation, but not constituting the essence of the legal claim.

Precisely what form the protest is to take is open to question, but resort to force is not acceptable in modern international law, especially since the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact and article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.⁸⁹ The

bringing of a matter before the United Nations or the International Court of Justice will be conclusive as to the existence of the dispute and thus of the reality of the protests, but diplomatic protests will probably be sufficient. This, however, is not accepted by all academic writers, and it may well be that in serious disputes further steps should be taken such as severing diplomatic relations or proposing arbitration or judicial settlement.⁹⁰ What is clear is that anything less than sustained and credible protests may well risk the title of the dispossessed party.

The requirement of a 'reasonable period' of possession is similarly imprecise and it is not possible to point to any defined length of time.⁹¹ It will depend, as so much else, upon all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the territory and the absence or presence of any competing claims.

In the *Minquiers and Ecrehos* case,⁹² concerning disputed sovereignty over a group of islets and rocks in the English Channel, claimed by both France and the United Kingdom, the International Court of Justice exhaustively examined the history of the region since 1066. However, its decision was based primarily on relatively recent acts relating to the exercise of jurisdiction and local administration, as well as the nature of legislative enactments referable to the territory in question. And upon these grounds, British sovereignty was upheld. The sovereign acts of the United Kingdom relating to the islets far outweighed any such activities by the French authorities and accordingly the claims of the latter were dismissed.

As in other cases, judgment was given not on the basis of clearly defined categories of occupation or prescription, but rather in the light of the balance

of competing state activities.

De Visscher has attempted to render the theoretical classifications more consonant with the practical realities by the introduction of the concept of historical consolidation.⁹³ This idea is founded on proven long use, which reflects a complex of interests and relations resulting in the acquisition of territory (including parts of the sea). Such a grouping of interests and relations is considered by the courts in reaching a decision as of more importance than the mere passage of time, and historical consolidation may apply to *terra nullius* as well as to territories previously occupied. Thus, it can be distinguished from prescription. It differs from occupation in that the concept has relevance to the acquisition of parts of the sea, as well as of land. And it may be brought into existence not only by acquiescence and consent, but also by the absence of protest over a reasonable period by relevant states.⁹⁴

However, de Visscher's discussion, based on the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case,⁹⁵ does fail to note the important distinction between the acquisition of territory in accordance with the rules of international law, and the acquisition of territory as a permitted exception to the generally accepted legal principles. The passage in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case relied upon⁹⁶ is really concerned with general acquiescence with regard to a maritime area, while the criticism has been made⁹⁷ that de Visscher has over-emphasised the aspect of 'complex of interests and relations which *in themselves* have the effect of attaching a territory or an expanse of sea to a given state'.⁹⁸ Effectiveness, therefore, rather than consolidation would be the appropriate term. Both occupation and prescription rely primarily upon effective

possession and control. The element of time is here also relevant as it affects the effectiveness of control.

Intertemporal Law⁹⁹

One question that arises is the problem of changing conditions related to particular principles of international law, in other words the relevant time period at which to ascertain the legal rights and obligations in question. This can cause considerable difficulties since a territorial title may be valid under, for example, sixteenth-century legal doctrines, but ineffective under nineteenth-century developments. The general rule in such circumstances is that in a dispute the claim or situation in question (or relevant treaty, for example)¹⁰⁰ has to be examined according to the conditions and rules in existence at the time it was made and not at a later date. This meant, for example, that in the *Island of Palmas* case,¹⁰¹ the Spanish claim to title by discovery, which the United States declared it had inherited, had to be tested in the light of international legal principles in the sixteenth century when the discovery was made. This aspect of the principle is predicated upon a presumption of, and need for, stability.¹⁰²

But it was also noted in this case that while the creation of particular rights was dependent upon the international law of the time, the continued existence of such rights depended upon their according with the evolving conditions of a developing legal system, although this stringent test would not be utilised in the case of territories with an 'established order of things'.¹⁰³ This proviso has in practice been carefully and flexibly interpreted within the context of all the relevant rules relating to the acquisition of territory, including recognition

and acquiescence.¹⁰⁴ However, the Court in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case¹⁰⁵ declared that the phrase ‘disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece’ contained in a Greek reservation to the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact had to be interpreted ‘in accordance with the rules of international law as they exist today, and not as they existed in 1931’. The evolution of international law concerning the continental shelf, therefore, had to be considered, so that the territorial status of Greece was taken to include its continental shelf, although that concept was completely unknown in the 1920s. How far this aspect of the principle of international law may be extended is highly controversial. The better view is to see it as one element in the bundle of factors relevant to the determination of effective control, but one that must be applied with care.¹⁰⁶

Critical Date

In certain situations there may exist a determining moment at which it might be inferred that the rights of the parties have crystallised so that acts after that date cannot alter the legal position.¹⁰⁷ Such a moment might be the date of a particular treaty where its provisions are at issue¹⁰⁸ or the date of occupation of territory.¹⁰⁹ It is not correct that there will or should always be such a critical date in territorial disputes, but, where there is, acts undertaken after that date will not be taken into consideration, unless such acts are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for the purpose of improving the legal position of the party relying on them.¹¹⁰

The concept of a critical date is of especial relevance with regard to the doctrine of *uti possidetis*, which posits that a new state has the boundaries of

the predecessor entity, so that the moment of independence itself is invariably the critical date.¹¹¹ This does not preclude the possibility that the relevant territorial situation or rights had crystallised at an earlier time, in the sense of having become established and not altered subsequently.¹¹² Where there is more than one state involved, then the date of later independence¹¹³ or possibly the dates of the independence of the respective states,¹¹⁴ may be taken depending on the circumstances.¹¹⁵ Further, it is possible for there to be different critical dates for different circumstances (for example, land and maritime disputes within the same case).¹¹⁶ However, the date of independence may simply mark the date of succession to boundaries which have been established with binding force by earlier instruments.¹¹⁷

The moment of independence may not be ‘critical’ for these purposes for several possible reasons. There may be a dispute between the parties as to whether the date of independence or the date of the last exercise of jurisdiction for administrative organisational purposes by the former sovereign is the more appropriate date¹¹⁸ or the *uti possidetis* line may in some circumstances only be determined upon a consideration of materials appearing later than the date of independence,¹¹⁹ or such a ‘critical date’ may have been moved to a later date than that of independence by a subsequent treaty¹²⁰ or by an adjudication award.¹²¹ The importance of the critical date concept, thus, is relative and depends entirely upon the circumstances of the case.¹²²

Sovereign Activities (*Effectivités*)

The exercise of effective authority, therefore, is the crucial element. As Huber argued, ‘the actual continuous and peaceful display of state functions is in case of dispute the sound and natural criterion of territorial sovereignty’.¹²³

However, control, although needing to be effective, does not necessarily have to amount to possession and settlement of all of the territory claimed.

Precisely what acts of sovereignty are necessary to found title will depend in each instance upon all the relevant circumstances of the case, including the nature of the territory involved, the amount of opposition (if any) that such acts on the part of the claimant state have aroused, and international reaction.

Indeed, in international law many titles will be deemed to exist not as absolute but as relative concepts. The state succeeding in its claim for sovereignty over *terra nullius* over the claims of other states will in most cases have proved not an absolute title, but one relatively better than that maintained by competing states and one that may take into account issues such as geography and international responses.¹²⁴ The Court noted in the *Eastern Greenland* case that: ‘It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other state could not make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries.’¹²⁵ However, the arbitral tribunal in *Eritrea–Yemen* emphasised that the issue did not turn solely upon relativity since ‘there must be some absolute minimum requirement’ for the acquisition of territorial sovereignty.¹²⁶

In the *Island of Palmas* arbitration,¹²⁷ the dispute concerned sovereignty over a particular island in the Pacific. The United States declared that, since by a treaty of 1898 Spain had ceded to it all Spanish rights possessed in that region and since that included the island discovered by Spain, the United States therefore had a good title. The Netherlands, on the other hand, claimed the territory on the basis of the exercise of various rights of sovereignty over it since the seventeenth century. The arbitrator, Max Huber, in a judgment which discussed the whole nature of territorial sovereignty, dismissed the American claims derived from the Spanish discovery as not effective to found title.¹²⁸ Huber declared that the Netherlands possessed sovereignty on the basis of ‘the actual continuous and peaceful display of state functions’ evidenced by various administrative acts performed over the centuries.¹²⁹ It was also emphasised that manifestations of territorial sovereignty may assume different forms, according to conditions of time and place. Indeed, ‘the intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of the right necessarily differ according as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved’. Additionally, geographical factors were relevant.¹³⁰

The *Clipperton Island* arbitration¹³¹ concerned a dispute between France and Mexico over an uninhabited island. The arbitrator emphasised that the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession was a necessary condition of occupation, but noted that such taking of possession may be undertaken in different ways depending upon the nature of the territory concerned. In this case, a proclamation of sovereignty by a French naval officer later published in Honolulu was deemed sufficient to create a valid title. Relevant to this decision was the weakness of the Mexican claims to the guano-rich island, as well as the uninhabited and inhospitable nature of the territory.

These two cases, together with the *Eastern Greenland* case,¹³² reveal that the effectiveness of the occupation may indeed be relative and may in certain rare circumstances be little more than symbolic.¹³³ In the *Eastern Greenland* case before the Permanent Court of International Justice, both Norway and Denmark claimed sovereignty over Eastern Greenland. Denmark had colonies in other parts of Greenland and had granted concessions in the uninhabited Eastern sector. In addition, it proclaimed that all treaties and legislation regarding Greenland covered the territory as a whole, as for example its establishment of the width of the territorial sea, and it sought to have its title to all of the territory recognised by other states. The Court felt that these acts were sufficient upon which to base a good title and were superior to various Norwegian actions such as the wintering of expeditions and the erection of a wireless station in Eastern Greenland, against which Denmark had protested. It is also to be noted that it was not until 1931 that Norway actually claimed the territory.

Such activity in establishing a claim to territory must be performed by the state in the exercise of sovereign powers (*à titre de souverain*)¹³⁴ or by individuals whose actions are subsequently ratified by their state,¹³⁵ or by corporations or companies permitted by the state to engage in such operations and thus performed on behalf of the sovereign.¹³⁶ Otherwise, any acts undertaken are of no legal consequence.¹³⁷ Another relevant factor, although one of uncertain strength, is the requirement of the intention by the state in performing various activities to assert claim in its sovereign capacity. In other words, the facts are created pursuant to the will of the state to acquire sovereignty. This point was stressed in the *Eastern Greenland* case,¹³⁸ but appears not to have been considered as of first importance in the *Island of*

Palmas case¹³⁹ or in the *Minquiers and Ecrehos* case,¹⁴⁰ where concern centred upon the nature and extent of the actual actions carried out by the contending states. Whatever the precise role of this subjective element, some connection between the actions undertaken and the assertion of sovereignty is necessary.

Account will also be taken of the nature of the exercise of the sovereignty in question, so that in the *Rann of Kutch* case, it was noted that:

the rights and duties which by law and custom are inherent in and characteristic of sovereignty present considerable variations in different circumstances according to time and place, and in the context of various political systems.¹⁴¹

Similarly, the Court was willing to take into account the special characteristics of the Moroccan state at the relevant time in the *Western Sahara* case¹⁴² in the context of the display of sovereign authority, but it was the exercise of sovereignty which constituted the crucial factor. While international law does appear to accept a notion of geographical or natural unity of particular areas, whereby sovereignty exercised over a certain area will raise the presumption of title with regard to an outlying portion of the territory comprised within the claimed unity,¹⁴³ it is important not to overstate this. It operates to raise a presumption and no more and that within the wider concept of display of effective sovereignty which need not apply equally to all parts of the territory.¹⁴⁴ Neither geographical unity nor contiguity are as such sources of title with regard to all areas contained within

the area in question, nor is the proximity of islands to the mainland determinative as such of the question of legal title.¹⁴⁵ The Tribunal in the *Eritrea–Yemen* case felt able to consider separately the legal situation with regard to sub-groups existing within such natural unities,¹⁴⁶ as did the Boundary Commission in the *Eritrea–Ethiopia* case.¹⁴⁷ However, the significance in law of state activities or *effectivités* will depend upon the existence or not of a legal title to the territory. Where there is such a valid legal title, this will have pre-eminence and *effectivités* may play a confirmatory role. However, where the *effectivités* are in contradiction to the title, the latter will have pre-eminence. In the absence of any legal title, then *effectivités* must invariably be taken into consideration, while where the legal title is not capable of exactly defining the relevant territorial limits, *effectivités* then play an essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice.¹⁴⁸ Accordingly, examples of state practice may confirm or complete but not contradict legal title established, for example, by boundary treaties.¹⁴⁹ In the absence of any clear legal title to any area, state practice comes into its own as a law-establishing mechanism. But its importance is always contextual in that it relates to the nature of the territory and the nature of competing state claims.¹⁵⁰ Relative state practice would include legislative acts or acts of administrative control, acts relating to the application and enforcement of criminal or civil law, acts regulating immigration, acts regulating fishing and other economic activities, naval patrols, and search and rescue operations,¹⁵¹ as well as the conduct of inquiries.¹⁵² It is not, however, simply a question of adding together the numbers of such acts, but of examining each one in terms of what may exactly be inferred from it particularly with regard to the assertion of the public power of the state to the

exclusion of the public power of other states. It is quality and not quantity which is likely to determine title in such circumstances.¹⁵³

The Role of Subsequent Conduct: Recognition, Acquiescence and Estoppel

Subsequent conduct may be relevant in a number of ways: first, as a method of determining the true interpretation of the relevant boundary instrument in the sense of the intention of the parties;¹⁵⁴ secondly, as a method of resolving an uncertain disposition or situation, for example, whether a particular area did or did not fall within the colonial territory in question for purposes of determining the *uti possidetis* line;¹⁵⁵ or, thirdly, as a method of modifying such an instrument or pre-existing arrangement. The *Eritrea–Ethiopia* Boundary Commission explained the general principle that ‘the effect of subsequent conduct may be so clear in relation to matters that appear to be the subject of a given treaty that the application of an otherwise pertinent treaty provision may be varied, or may even cease to control the situation, regardless of its original meaning’.¹⁵⁶ The various manifestations of the subsequent conduct of relevant parties have a common foundation in that they all rest to a stronger or weaker extent upon the notion of consent.¹⁵⁷ They reflect expressly or impliedly the presumed will of a state, which in turn may in some situations prove of great importance in the acquisition of title to territory. However, there are significant theoretical differences between the three concepts (recognition, acquiescence and estoppel), even if in practice the dividing lines are often blurred. In any event, they flow to some extent from the fundamental principles of good faith and equity.

Recognition is a positive act by a state accepting a particular situation and, even though it may be implied from all the relevant circumstances, it is nevertheless an affirmation of the existence of a specific factual state of affairs,¹⁵⁸ even if that accepted situation is inconsistent with the term in a treaty.¹⁵⁹ Acquiescence, on the other hand, occurs in circumstances where a protest is called for and does not happen¹⁶⁰ or does not happen in time in the circumstances.¹⁶¹ In other words, a situation arises which would seem to require a response denoting disagreement and, since this does not transpire, the state making no objection is understood to have accepted the new situation.¹⁶² The idea of estoppel in general is that a party which has made or consented to a particular statement upon which another party relies in subsequent activity to its detriment or the other's benefit cannot thereupon change its position.¹⁶³ This rests also upon the notion of preclusion.¹⁶⁴

While, of course, the consent of a ceding state to the cession is essential, the attitude adopted by other states is purely peripheral and will not affect the legality of the transaction. Similarly, in cases of the acquisition of title over *terra nullius*, the acquiescence of other states is not strictly relevant although of useful evidential effect.¹⁶⁵ However, where two or more states have asserted competing claims, the role of consent by third parties is much enhanced. In the *Eastern Greenland* case,¹⁶⁶ the Court noted that Denmark was entitled to rely upon treaties made with other states (apart from Norway) in so far as these were evidence of recognition of Danish sovereignty over all of Greenland.

Recognition and acquiescence are also important in cases of acquisition of control contrary to the will of the former sovereign. Where the possession of

the territory is accompanied by emphatic protests on the part of the former sovereign, no title by prescription can arise, for such title is founded upon the acquiescence of the dispossessed state, and in such circumstances consent by third states is of little consequence. However, over a period of time recognition may ultimately validate a defective title, although much will depend upon the circumstances, including the attitude of the former sovereign. Where the territory involved is part of the high seas (i.e. *res communis*), acquiescence by the generality of states may affect the subjection of any part of it to another's sovereignty, particularly by raising an estoppel.¹⁶⁷

Acquiescence and recognition¹⁶⁸ are also relevant where the prescriptive title is based on what is called immemorial possession, that is, the origin of the particular situation is shrouded in doubt and may have been lawful or unlawful, but is deemed to be lawful in the light of general acquiescence by the international community or particular acquiescence by a relevant other state. Accordingly, acquiescence may constitute evidence reinforcing a title based upon effective possession and control, rendering it definitive.¹⁶⁹ In such cases, failure to protest would be particularly significant.¹⁷⁰

Estoppel is a legal technique whereby states deemed to have consented to a state of affairs cannot afterwards alter their position.¹⁷¹ It has been noted that a party relying on estoppel must show, among other things, that it has taken distinct actions in reliance upon the other party's statement.¹⁷² Although it cannot found title by itself, it is of evidential and often of practical importance. Estoppel may arise either by means of a prior recognition or acquiescence, but the nature of the consenting state's interest is vital. Where,

for example, two states put forward conflicting claims to territory, any acceptance by one of the other's position will serve as a bar to a renewal of contradictory assertions. This was illustrated in the *Eastern Greenland* case,¹⁷³ where the Court regarded the Norwegian acceptance of treaties with Denmark, which incorporated Danish claims to all of Greenland, as preventing Norway from contesting Danish sovereignty over the area.

The leading case on estoppel is the *Temple of Preah Vihear*,¹⁷⁴ which concerned a border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. The frontier was the subject of a treaty in 1904 between Thailand and France (as sovereign over French Indo-China, which included Cambodia) that provided for a delimitation commission. The border was duly surveyed, but was ambiguous as to the siting of the Preah Vihear temple area. Thailand called for a map from the French authorities and this placed the area within Cambodia. The Thai government accepted the map and asked for further copies.¹⁷⁵ A number of other incidents took place, including a visit by a Thai prince to the temple area for an official reception with the French flag clearly flying there, which convinced the International Court that Thailand had tacitly accepted French sovereignty over the disputed area.¹⁷⁶ In other words, Thailand was estopped by its conduct from claiming that it contested the frontier in the temple area. However, it is to be noted that estoppel in that case was one element in a complexity of relevant principles which included prescription and treaty interpretation. The case also seemed to show that in situations of uncertainty and ambiguity, the doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel come into their own,¹⁷⁷ but it would not appear correct to refer to estoppel as a rule of substantive law.¹⁷⁸ The extent to which silence as such may create an estoppel is unclear and much will depend upon the surrounding

circumstances, in particular the notoriety of the situation, the length of silence maintained in the light of that notoriety and the type of conduct that would be seen as reasonable in the international community in order to safeguard a legal interest.¹⁷⁹ The existence of an estoppel should not, however, be lightly assumed.¹⁸⁰ The Arbitral Tribunal in the *Mauritius v. United Kingdom* arbitration case concerning the Chagos Marine Protected Area¹⁸¹ summarised current jurisprudence as follows:

estoppel may be invoked where (a) a State has made clear and consistent representations, by word, conduct, or silence; (b) such representations were made through an agent authorized to speak for the State with respect to the matter in question; (c) the State invoking estoppel was induced by such representations to act to its detriment, to suffer a prejudice, or to convey a benefit upon the representing State; and (d) such reliance was legitimate, as the representation was one on which that State was entitled to rely.

Subsequent conduct itself would in the material sense include the examples of the exercise of sovereign activity, various diplomatic and similar exchanges and records, and maps. So far as the status of maps is concerned, this will depend upon the facts of their production as an item of evidence. It was noted in the *Burkina Faso/Mali* case that ‘maps are only extrinsic evidence of varying reliability or unreliability which may be used, along with

other evidence of a circumstantial kind, to establish or reconstitute the real facts'.¹⁸² In such circumstances, courts have often exhibited a degree of caution, taking into account, for example, that some maps may be politically self-serving and that topographic knowledge at the time the map is made may be unreliable.¹⁸³ However, maps annexed to treaties illustrating the boundary so delimited will be accepted as authoritative.¹⁸⁴ Where there is a conflict between the text of an instrument and an annexed map, all the relevant circumstances will need to be considered in order to arrive at a correct understanding of the intentions of the authors of the relevant delimitation instrument.¹⁸⁵ Beyond this, it is possible that cartographic material, prepared in order to help draft a delimitation instrument, may itself be used as assistance in seeking to determine the intentions of the parties where the text itself is ambiguous, while more generally the effect of a map will in other circumstances vary according to a number of factors ranging from its provenance and cartographic quality to its consistency with other maps and the use made of it by the parties.¹⁸⁶

One argument has been that peaceful possession coupled with acts of administration may in the absence of protest found the basis of title by way of 'historical consolidation'.¹⁸⁷ However, the International Court has emphasised that this doctrine is 'highly controversial and cannot replace the established modes of acquisition of title under international law'. It was also noted that a period of such activity of some twenty years was 'far too short, even according to the theory relied on it'.¹⁸⁸

Conclusions

It will be clear from the above that apart from the modes of acquisition that rely purely on the consent of the state and the consequences of sovereignty (cession or accretion), the method of acquiring additional territory is by the sovereign exercise of effective control. Both occupation and prescription are primarily based upon effective possession and, although the time element is a factor in prescription, this in fact is really concerned with the effectiveness of control.

The principle of effective control applies in different ways to different situations, but its essence is that ‘the continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty . . . is as good as title’.¹⁸⁹ Such control has to be deliberate sovereign action, but what will amount to effectiveness is relative and will depend upon, for example, the geographical nature of the region, the existence or not of competing claims and other relevant factors, such as international reaction.¹⁹⁰ It will not be necessary for such control to be equally effective throughout the region.¹⁹¹ The doctrine of effectiveness has displaced earlier doctrines relating to discovery and symbolic annexation as in themselves sufficient to generate title.¹⁹² Effectiveness has also a temporal as well as a spatial dimension as the doctrine of intertemporal law has emphasised, while clearly the public or open nature of the control is essential. The acquiescence of a party directly involved is also a very important factor in providing evidence of the effectiveness of control. Where a dispossessed sovereign disputes the control exercised by a new sovereign, title can hardly pass. Effectiveness is related to the international system as a whole, so that mere possession by force is not the sole determinant of title. This factor also emphasises and justifies the role played by recognition.

Bilateral recognition is important as evidence of effective control and should be regarded as part of that principle. International recognition, however, involves not only a means of creating rules of international law in terms of practice and consent of states, but may validate situations of dubious origin. A series of recognitions may possibly validate an unlawful acquisition of territory and could similarly prevent effective control from ever hardening into title.¹⁹³ The significance of UN recognition is self-evident, so that the UN Security Council itself could adopt a binding resolution ending a territorial dispute by determining the boundary in question.¹⁹⁴

Sovereign territory may not only be acquired; it may also be lost in ways that essentially mirror the modes of acquisition. Territory may be lost by express declaration or conduct such as a treaty of cession or acceptance of secession; by loss of territory by erosion or natural geographic activity or by acquiescence through prescription. Further, territory may be abandoned, but in order for this to operate both the physical act of abandonment and the intention to surrender title are required.¹⁹⁵

Territorial Integrity, Self-Determination and Sundry Claims

There are a number of other concepts which may be of some relevance in territorial situations ranging from self-determination to historical and geographical claims. These may not necessarily be legal principles as such, but rather purely political or moral expressions. Although they may be extremely persuasive within the international political order, they would not necessarily be juridically effective. One of the core principles of the

international system is the need for stability and finality in boundary questions and much flows from this.¹⁹⁶ Case-law has long maintained this principle.¹⁹⁷ Reflective of this concept is the principle of territorial integrity.

The principle of the territorial integrity of states is well established and constitutes a foundational principle of international law.¹⁹⁸ It is protected by a series of consequential rules prohibiting interference within the domestic jurisdiction of states as, for example, article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and forbidding the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states, particularly article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This principle has been particularly emphasised by Developing Countries and also by other regions.¹⁹⁹ The International Court recently noted: ‘Once a dispute regarding territorial sovereignty has been resolved and uncertainty removed, each party must fulfil in good faith the obligation which all states have to respect the territorial integrity of all other states.’²⁰⁰

However, it does not apply where the territorial dispute centres upon uncertain frontier demarcations. In addition, the principle appears to conflict on the face of it with another principle of international law, that of the self-determination of peoples.²⁰¹

This principle, noted in the UN Charter and emphasised in the 1960 Colonial Declaration, the 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, can be regarded as a rule of international law in the light of, *inter alia*, the number and character of UN declarations and resolutions and actual state practice in the process of decolonisation. However, it has been interpreted as referring only to the

inhabitants of non-independent territories.²⁰² Practice has not supported its application as a principle conferring the right to secede upon identifiable groups within already independent states.²⁰³ The Canadian Supreme Court in *Re Secession of Quebec* declared that ‘international law expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states’,²⁰⁴ and that the right to unilateral secession ‘arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances’.²⁰⁵ The only arguable exception to this rule that the right to external self-determination applies only to colonial situations (and arguably situations of occupation) might be where the group in question is subject to ‘extreme and unremitting persecution’ coupled with the ‘lack of any reasonable prospect for reasonable challenge’,²⁰⁶ but even this is controversial, not least in view of definitional difficulties.²⁰⁷ The situation of secession is probably best dealt with in international law within the framework of a process of claim, effective control and international recognition. The International Court made the point in the *Kosovo* Advisory Opinion that Security Council resolutions criticising declarations of independence in Rhodesia, Turkish North Cyprus and Republika Srpska were so acting not because of the unilateral nature of these declarations, but because they were or would have been associated with the unlawful use of force or some other egregious violations of the rules of international law. Accordingly, no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence could be inferred from the practice of the Security Council.²⁰⁸ Thus, there is no international law right of secession held by groups within independent states. Similarly, there is no international law duty upon such

groups not to secede. It is a matter for the relevant domestic law in the absence of egregious violations of international law.

Crimea's claimed secession from Ukraine in March 2014 has to be seen in the first place as contrary to the applicable domestic law, which does not permit regions to secede in the absence of an all-Ukrainian referendum (article 73 of the Ukrainian constitution). The secession was not contrary to international law as such. However, Russia's threat or use of force in the process of taking control of Crimea may be seen as, at the least, intervention in the internal affairs of another state and at most an act of aggression.²⁰⁹ The context of this situation also includes the violation of treaties to which Russia is a party which guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.²¹⁰ The decision by Russia to annex Crimea on 18 March 2014²¹¹ was contrary to international law, being in violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.²¹² These factors mitigate the disinterest of international law with regard to the actual declaration of secession and position it as an aggravating factor in violations of international law.

However, in certain situations there may be a pertinent Security Council decision which calls upon particular groups seeking to secede from a specific independent state to respect the national unity and territorial integrity of that state. In such a case, it may be argued there does exist an international legal duty not to secede.²¹³ This would be subject to any agreement to the contrary by the parties in question, for example, the agreed independence of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011.

Accordingly, the principle of self-determination as generally accepted fits in with the concept of territorial integrity,²¹⁴ as it cannot apply once a colony or trust territory attains sovereignty and independence, except, arguably, in extreme circumstances. Probably the most prominent exponent of the relevance of self-determination to post-independence situations has been Somalia with its claims to those parts of Ethiopia and Kenya populated by Somali tribes, but that country received very little support for its demands.²¹⁵

Self-determination cannot be used to further larger territorial claims in defiance of internationally accepted boundaries of sovereign states, but it may be of some use in resolving cases of disputed frontier lines on the basis of the wishes of the inhabitants. In addition, one may point to the need to take account of the interests of the local population where the determination of the boundary has resulted in a shift in the line, at least in the view of one of the parties.²¹⁶ Geographical claims have been raised throughout history.²¹⁷ France long maintained that its natural frontier in the east was the west bank of the Rhine, and the European powers in establishing their presence upon African coastal areas often claimed extensive hinterland territories. Much utilised also was the doctrine of contiguity, whereby areas were claimed on the basis of the occupation of territories of which they formed a geographical continuation. However, such claims, although relevant in discussing the effectivity and limits of occupation, are not able in themselves to found title, and whether or not such claims will be taken into account at all will depend upon the nature of the territory and the strength of competing claims.²¹⁸ A rather special case is that of islands close to the coast of the mainland. The Tribunal in *Eritrea–Yemen* stated that: ‘There is a strong presumption that

islands within the twelve-mile coastal belt will belong to the coastal state', to be rebutted only by evidence of a superior title.²¹⁹

Of some similarity are claims based upon historical grounds.²²⁰ This was one of the grounds upon which Iraq sought to justify its invasion and annexation of the neighbouring state of Kuwait in August 1990,²²¹ although the response of the United Nations demonstrated that such arguments were unacceptable to the world community as a whole.²²² Morocco too has made extensive claims to Mauritania, Western Sahara and parts of Algeria as territories historically belonging to the old Moroccan empire.²²³ But such arguments are essentially political and are of but little legal relevance. The International Court of Justice in the *Western Sahara* case²²⁴ of 1975 accepted the existence of historical legal ties between the tribes of that area and Morocco and Mauritania, but declared that they were not of such a nature as to override the right of the inhabitants of the colony to self-determination and independence.²²⁵

The Doctrine of *Uti Possidetis*²²⁶

The influence of the principle of territorial integrity may be seen in the Latin American idea of *uti possidetis*, whereby the administrative divisions of the Spanish empire in South America were deemed to constitute the boundaries for the newly independent successor states, thus theoretically excluding any gaps in sovereignty which might precipitate hostilities and encourage foreign intervention.²²⁷ It is more accurately reflected in the practice of African states, explicitly stated in a resolution of the Organisation of African Unity in 1964, which declared that colonial frontiers existing as at the date of independence constituted a tangible reality and that all member states pledged themselves to respect such borders.²²⁸

Practice in Africa has reinforced the approach of emphasising the territorial integrity of the colonially defined territory; witness the widespread disapproval of the attempted creation of secessionist states whether in the former Belgian Congo, Nigeria or Sudan. Efforts to prevent the partition of the South African controlled territory of Namibia into separate Bantustans as a possible prelude to a dissolution of the unity of the territory are a further manifestation of this.²²⁹

The question of *uti possidetis* was discussed by a Chamber of the International Court in the *Burkina Faso/Mali* case,²³⁰ where the *compromis* (or special agreement) by which the parties submitted the case to the Court specified that the settlement of the dispute should be based upon respect for the principle of the ‘intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonisation’.²³¹

It was noted, however, that the principle had in fact developed into a general concept of contemporary customary international law and was unaffected by the emergence of the right of peoples to self-determination.²³² In the African context particularly, the obvious purpose of the principle was ‘to prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power’.²³³ The application of the principle has the effect of freezing the territorial title existing at the moment of independence to produce what the Chamber described as the ‘photograph of the territory’ at the critical date.²³⁴

the principle of respect for boundaries in the Cairo Resolution places the boundaries existing at the time of independence in a ‘holding pattern’, particularly to avoid armed conflict over territorial claims, until a satisfactory and peaceful solution is found by the Parties to a territorial dispute in conformity with international law, or until such time as closer integration and unity is achieved among African States in general, or between the neighbouring countries in particular, in keeping with the Pan-African vision. As such, it implies a prohibition of the use of force in the settlement of boundary disputes and an obligation to refrain from acts of seizure of a portion of the territory of another African State.

See, as to the notion of critical date, above, p. 432. The Chamber, however, went further than emphasising the application of the principle to Africa. It declared that the principle applied generally and was logically connected with the phenomenon of independence wherever it occurred in order to protect the independence and stability of new states.²³⁵ *Uti possidetis* was defined as follows:

The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries might be no more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same sovereign. In that case, the application of the principle of *uti possidetis* resulted in administrative boundaries being transformed into international frontiers in the full sense of the term.²³⁶

The term ‘jus’ in this principle refers not to international law as such, but rather to the constitutional or administrative law of the previous sovereign.²³⁷ The International Court has also emphasised that ‘the *uti possidetis juris* principle requires not only that reliance be placed on existing legal titles, but also that account be taken of the manner in which those titles were interpreted and applied by the competent public authorities of the colonial Power’.²³⁸ However, the doctrine of *uti possidetis* is dependent upon there being a clear boundary delimitation prior to independence. The doctrine cannot create a

boundary where there was none (or an ambiguous one) at the relevant time.²³⁹

The application of this principle beyond the purely colonial context was underlined particularly with regard to the former Soviet Union²⁴⁰ and the former Yugoslavia. In the latter case, the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission established by the European Community and accepted by the states of the former Yugoslavia made several relevant comments. In Opinion No. 2, the Arbitration Commission declared that ‘whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (*uti possidetis juris*) except where the states concerned agree otherwise’.²⁴¹ In Opinion No. 3, the Arbitration Commission emphasised that, except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries²⁴² became frontiers protected by international law. This conclusion, it was stated, derived from the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and from the principle of *uti possidetis*.²⁴³ It is thus arguable that, at the least, a presumption exists that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, internally defined units within a pre-existing sovereign state will come to independence within the spatial framework of that territorially defined unit.²⁴⁴

Beyond *Uti Possidetis*

The principle of *uti possidetis* is not able to resolve all territorial or boundary problems.²⁴⁵ Where there is a relevant applicable treaty, then this will dispose of the matter completely.²⁴⁶ Indeed, once defined in a treaty, an international frontier achieves permanence so that even if the treaty itself were to cease to be in force, the continuance of the boundary would be unaffected and may

only be changed with the consent of the states directly concerned.²⁴⁷ On the other hand, where the line which is being transformed into an international boundary by virtue of the principle cannot be conclusively identified by recourse to authoritative material, then the principle of *uti possidetis* must allow for the application of other principles and rules. Essentially, these other principles focus upon the notion of *effectivités* or effective control.

The issue was extensively analysed by the International Court in the *Burkina Faso/Mali* case²⁴⁸ and later in the *El Salvador/Honduras* case.²⁴⁹ The Court noted the possible relevance of colonial *effectivités*, immediate post-colonial *effectivités* and more recent *effectivités*. Each of these might be relevant in the context of seeking to determine the *uti possidetis* pre-independence line. In the case of colonial *effectivités* (i.e. the conduct of the colonial administrators as proof of the effective exercise of territorial jurisdiction in the area during the colonial period), the Court in the former case distinguished between certain situations. Where the act concerned corresponded to the title comprised in the *uti possidetis juris*, then the *effectivités* simply confirmed the exercise of the right derived from a legal title. Where the act did not correspond with the law as described (i.e. the territory subject to the dispute was effectively administered by a state other than the one possessing the legal title), preference would be given to the holder of the title. In other words, where there was a clear *uti possidetis* line, this would prevail over inconsistent practice. Where, however, there was no clear legal title, then the *effectivités* ‘play an essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice’.²⁵⁰ It would then become a matter for evaluation by the Court with regard to each piece of practice adduced. This approach was reaffirmed in the *Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute* case with regard to the grant of

particular lands to individuals or to Indian communities or records of such grants.²⁵¹ Where the colonial *effectivités* were insufficient to establish the position of the relevant administrative line, the principle of *uti possidetis* could not operate.²⁵² The Court also noted in the *Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute* case that it could have regard in certain instances to documentary evidence of post-independence *effectivités* when it considered that they afforded indications with regard to the *uti possidetis* line, provided that there was a relationship between the *effectivités* concerned and the determination of the boundary in question.²⁵³ Such post-independence practice could be examined not only in relation to the identification of the *uti possidetis* line, but also in the context of seeking to establish whether any acquiescence could be demonstrated both as to where the line was and as to whether any changes in that line could be proved to have taken place.²⁵⁴ This post-independence practice could even be very recent practice and was not confined to immediate post-independence practice.

Where the *uti possidetis* line could be determined neither by authoritative decisions by the appropriate authorities at the relevant time nor by subsequent practice with regard to a particular area, recourse to equity²⁵⁵ might be necessary. What this might involve would depend upon the circumstances. In the *Burkina Faso/Mali* case, it meant that a particular frontier pool would be equally divided between the parties;²⁵⁶ in the *Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute* case, it meant that resort could be had to an unratified delimitation of 1869.²⁵⁷ It was also noted that the suitability of topographical features in providing an identifiable and convenient boundary was a material aspect.²⁵⁸

International Boundary Rivers²⁵⁹

Special rules have evolved in international law with regard to boundary rivers. In general, where there is a navigable channel, the boundary will follow the middle line of that channel (the *thalweg* principle).²⁶⁰ Where there is no such channel or where the parties so choose, the boundary line will, in general, be the middle line of the river itself or of its principal arm.²⁶¹ These respective boundary lines would continue as median lines (and so would shift also) if the river itself changed course as a result of gradual accretion on one bank or degradation of the other bank. Where, however, the river changed course suddenly and left its original bed for a new channel, the international boundary would continue to be the middle of the deserted river bed.²⁶² It is possible for the boundary to follow one of the banks of the river, thus putting it entirely within the territory of one of the states concerned where this has been expressly agreed, but this is unusual.²⁶³

‘The Common Heritage of Mankind’

The proclamation of certain areas as the common heritage of mankind has raised the question as to whether a new form of territorial regime has been, or is, in process of being created.²⁶⁴ In 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor in which it was noted that the area in question and its resources were the common heritage of mankind. This was reiterated in articles 136 and 137 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, in which it was provided that no sovereign or other rights would be recognised with regard to the area (except in the case

of minerals recovered in accordance with the Convention) and that exploitation could only take place in accordance with the rules and structures established by the Convention.²⁶⁵ Article 11 of the 1979 Moon Treaty emphasises that the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind, and thus incapable of national appropriation and subject to a particular regime of exploitation.²⁶⁶ As is noted in the next section, attempts were being made to establish a common heritage regime over the Antarctic. There are certain common characteristics relating to the concept. Like *res communis*, the areas in question are incapable of national appropriation. Sovereignty is not an applicable principle and the areas in question would not be 'owned', nor would any jurisdictional rights exist outside the framework of the appropriate common heritage regime institutional arrangements. However, while a *res communis* regime permits freedom of access, exploration and exploitation, a common heritage regime as envisaged in the examples noted above would strictly regulate exploration and exploitation, would establish management mechanisms and would employ the criterion of equity in distributing the benefits of such activity.

It is too early to predict the success or failure of this concept. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention entered into force in 1994, while the Moon Treaty has the bare minimum number of ratifications and its exploitation provisions are not yet operative. As a legal concept within the framework of the specific treaties concerned, it provides an interesting contrast to traditional *jus communis* rules, although the extent of the management structures required to operate the regime may pose considerable problems.²⁶⁷

The Polar Regions²⁶⁸

The Arctic region is of increasing strategic and commercial importance, constituting as it does a vast expanse of inhospitable territory between North America and Russia. It consists to a large extent of ice packs beneath which submarines may operate. However, with global warming transit is now becoming possible, while access to, and exploitation of, natural resources such as oil and gas are now viable.

Denmark possesses Greenland and its associated islands within the region,²⁶⁹ while Norway has asserted sovereign rights over Spitzbergen and other islands. The Norwegian title is based on occupation and long exploitation of mineral resources and its sovereignty was recognised by nine nations in 1920, although the Soviet Union had protested.²⁷⁰

More controversial are the respective claims made by Canada²⁷¹ and the former Soviet Union.²⁷² Use has been made of the concept of contiguity to assert claims over areas forming geographical units with those already occupied, in the form of the so-called sector principle. This is based on meridians of longitude as they converge at the North Pole and as they are placed on the coastlines of the particular nations, thus producing a series of triangular sectors with the coasts of the Arctic states as their baselines.

The other Arctic states of Norway, Finland, Denmark and the United States have abstained from such assertions.²⁷³ Accordingly, it is exceedingly doubtful whether the sector principle can be regarded as other than a political proposition.²⁷⁴ Part of the problem is that such a large part of this region consists of moving packs of ice. The former Soviet Union made some claims

to relatively immovable ice formations as being subject to its national sovereignty,²⁷⁵ but the overall opinion remains that these are to be treated as part of the high seas open to all.²⁷⁶ The United States and Canada both claim ‘pie-shaped’ sectors in the Beaufort Sea, Canada and Denmark (Greenland) have a dispute with regard to boundaries in the Lincoln Sea, and Norway and Russia disagree over the boundary between their continental shelves in the Barents Sea.²⁷⁷

Occupation of the land areas of the Arctic region may be effected by states by relatively little activity in view of the decision in the *Eastern Greenland* case²⁷⁸ and the nature of the territory involved. The fact that climate change is now melting Arctic ice on a permanent basis is leading to the possibility of Arctic navigation as well as the exploitation of natural resources there, destabilising the current situation. In the light of this, the five Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark on behalf of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Norway, Russia and the United States) together with China, the European Union, Iceland, Japan and South Korea [signed](#) on 3 October 2018 the [Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean](#).²⁷⁹

Claims have been made by seven nations (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom) to the Antarctic region, which is an ice-covered landmass in the form of an island.²⁸⁰ Such claims have been based on a variety of grounds, ranging from mere discovery to the sector principle employed by the South American states, and most of these are of rather dubious quality. Significantly, the United States has refused to recognise any claims at all to Antarctica, and, although the

American Admiral Byrd discovered and claimed Marie Byrd Land for his country, the United States refrained from adopting the claim.²⁸¹ Several states have recognised the territorial aspirations of one another in the area, but one should note that the British, Chilean and Argentinian claims overlap.²⁸²

However, in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty was signed by all states concerned with territorial claims or scientific exploration in the region.²⁸³ Its major effect, apart from the demilitarisation of Antarctica, is to suspend, although not to eliminate, territorial claims during the life of the treaty. Article IV(2) declares that:

no acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present treaty is in force.

Since the treaty does not provide for termination, an ongoing regime has been created which, because of its inclusion of all interested parties, appears to have established an international regime binding on all.²⁸⁴ Subsequent meetings of the parties have resulted in a number of recommendations, including proposals for the protection of flora and fauna in the region, and other environmental preservation measures.²⁸⁵

Of the current parties to the treaty, twelve were original signatories, while a further forty-two have acceded to the treaty. Twenty-nine states have consultative status, while a further twenty-five have non-consultative status.²⁸⁶ Full participation in the work of the consultative meetings of the parties is reserved to the original parties to the treaty and those contracting parties which demonstrate substantial scientific research activity in the area. Antarctic Treaty consultative meetings take place annually.²⁸⁷

The issue of a mineral resources regime has been under discussion since 1979 by the consultative parties and a series of special meetings on the subject held.²⁸⁸ This resulted in the signing in June 1988 of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Minerals Resource Activities.²⁸⁹ The Convention provided for three stages of mineral activity, being defined as prospecting, exploration and development. Four institutions were to be established, once the treaty came into force (following sixteen ratifications or accessions, including the United States, the former Soviet Union and claimant states). The Commission was to consist of the consultative parties, any other party to the Convention engaged in substantive and relevant research in the area and any other party sponsoring mineral resource activity. A Scientific, Technical and Environmental Advisory Committee consisting of all parties to the Convention was to be established, as were Regulatory Committees, in order to regulate exploration and development activity in a specific area. Such committees would consist of ten members of the Commission, including the relevant claimant and additional claimants up to a maximum of four, the United States, the former Soviet Union and representation of developing countries. A system for Special Meetings of Parties, consisting of all parties to the Convention, was also provided for. Several countries signed the

Convention.²⁹⁰ However, opposition to the Convention began to grow. The signing of the 1988 Convention on mineral resource activities stimulated opposition and in resolution 43/83, adopted by the General Assembly that year, ‘deep regret’ was expressed that such a convention should have been signed despite earlier resolutions calling for a moratorium on negotiations to create a minerals regime in the Antarctic. France and Australia proposed at the October 1989 meeting of the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty that all mining be banned in the area, which should be designated a global ‘wilderness reserve’.²⁹¹

At a meeting of the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty in April 1991, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was adopted, article 7 of which prohibited any activity relating to mineral resources other than scientific research. This prohibition is to continue unless there is in force a binding legal regime on Antarctic mineral resource activities that includes an agreed means of determining whether and, if so, under which conditions any such activities would be acceptable. A review conference with regard to the operation of the Protocol may be held after it has been in force for fifty years if so requested.²⁹² In addition, a Committee for Environmental Protection was established.²⁹³ This effectively marked the end of the limited mining approach, which had led to the signing of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities in 1988. The Protocol came into force in 1998 and may be seen as establishing a comprehensive integrated environmental regime for the area.²⁹⁴

Leases and Servitudes²⁹⁵

Various legal rights exercisable by states over the territory of other states, which fall short of absolute sovereignty, may exist. Such rights are attached to the land and so may be enforced even though the ownership of the particular territory subject to the rights has passed to another sovereign. They are in legal terminology formulated as rights *in rem*. They constitute treaty-based regimes, dependent upon the terms of the particular treaty. Thus, for example, the applicable law would be specified in such treaty.²⁹⁶

Leases of land rose into prominence in the nineteenth century as a way of obtaining control of usually strategic points without the necessity of actually annexing the territory. Leases were used extensively in the Far East, as for example Britain's rights over the New Territories amalgamated with Hong Kong,²⁹⁷ and sovereignty was regarded as having passed to the lessee for the duration of the lease, upon which event it would revert to the original sovereign who made the grant. This form of words, however, disguised the reality that ultimate sovereignty lay with the lessor.

An exception to this usual construction of a lease in international law as limited to a defined period occurred with regard to the Panama Canal, with the strip of land through which it was constructed being leased to the United States in 1903 'in perpetuity'. However, by the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, sovereignty over the Canal Zone was transferred to Panama. The United States had certain operating and defensive rights until the treaty ended in 1999.²⁹⁸ Another such example is Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, which has been leased to the United States by virtue of treaties signed in 1903 and in 1934. Under the latter treaty, the lease continues until either the United States abandons the base or both states otherwise agree.²⁹⁹ Russia has concluded a

number of lease arrangements with former Soviet republics, now independent states.³⁰⁰

A servitude exists where the territory of one state is under a particular restriction in the interests of the territory of another state. Such limitations are bound to the land as rights *in rem* and thus restrict the sovereignty of the state concerned, even if there is a change in control of the relevant territory, for instance upon merger with another state or upon decolonisation.³⁰¹

Examples of servitudes would include the right to use ports or rivers in, or a right of way across, the territory so bound, or alternatively an obligation not to fortify particular towns or areas in the territory.³⁰²

Servitudes may exist for the benefit of the international community or a large number of states. To give an example, in the *Aaland Islands* case in 1920, a Commission of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League of Nations declared that Finland since its independence in 1918 had succeeded to Russia's obligations under the 1856 treaty not to fortify the islands. And since Sweden was an interested state in that the islands are situated near Stockholm, it could enforce the obligation although not a party to the 1856 treaty. This was because the treaty provisions had established a special international regime with obligations enforceable by interested states and binding upon any state in possession of the islands.³⁰³ Further, the Tribunal in *Eritrea–Yemen* noted that the traditional open fishing regime in the southern Red Sea together with the common use of the islands in the area by the populations of both coasts was capable of creating historic rights accruing to the two states in dispute in the form of an international servitude.³⁰⁴ The

award in this case emphasised that the findings of sovereignty over various islands in the Red Sea entailed ‘the perpetuation of the traditional fishing regime in the region’.³⁰⁵

The situation of the creation of an international status by treaty, which is to be binding upon all and not merely upon the parties to the treaty, is a complex one and it is not always clear when it is to be presumed. However, rights attached to territory for the benefit of the world community were created with regard to the Suez and Panama Canals. Article 1 of the Constantinople Convention of 1888³⁰⁶ declared that ‘the Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war without distinction of flag’ and this international status was in no way affected by the Egyptian nationalisation of the Canal Company in 1956. Egypt stressed in 1957 that it was willing to respect and implement the terms of the Convention, although in fact it consistently denied use of the canal to Israeli ships and vessels bound for its shores or carrying its goods.³⁰⁷ The canal was reopened in 1975 following the disengagement agreement with Israel, after a gap of eight years.³⁰⁸ Under article 5 of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, it was provided that ships of Israel and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel were to enjoy ‘the right of free passage through the Suez Canal . . . on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations’.

In the *SS Wimbledon* case,³⁰⁹ the Permanent Court of International Justice declared that the effect of article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles 1919 maintaining that the Kiel Canal was to be open to all the ships of all countries at peace with Germany was to convert the canal from an internal to an

international waterway ‘intended to provide under treaty guarantee easier access to the Baltic for the benefit of all nations of the world’.

Some of the problems relating to the existence of servitudes have arisen by virtue of the *North Atlantic Coast Fisheries* arbitration.³¹⁰ This followed a treaty signed in 1818 between the United Kingdom and the United States, awarding the inhabitants of the latter country ‘forever . . . the liberty to take fish of every kind’ from the southern coast of Newfoundland. The argument arose as to Britain’s capacity under the treaty to issue fishing regulations binding American nationals. The Arbitral Tribunal decided that the relevant provision of the treaty did not create a servitude, partly because such a concept was unknown by American and British statesmen at the relevant time (i.e. 1818). However, the terms of the award do leave open the possibility of the existence of servitudes, especially since the Tribunal did draw a distinction between economic rights (as in the case) and a grant of sovereign rights which could amount to a servitude in international law.³¹¹

A slightly different situation was faced by the Arbitral Tribunal in the *Mauritius v. United Kingdom* arbitration concerning the Chagos Marine Protected Area.³¹² The Tribunal noted that the United Kingdom had in the Lancaster House Agreement leading to the independence of Mauritius entered into a number of undertakings as a *quid pro quo* for the acceptance of the latter of the detachment of Chagos Archipelago from the territory.³¹³ As part of these undertakings, the United Kingdom agreed to grant Mauritius a ‘reversionary interest’ in the Archipelago and return it once it was no longer needed for defence purposes.³¹⁴ The Tribunal held that once Mauritius had become independent, the arrangement was transformed from one within the

domain of British constitutional law alone to an international agreement, binding in international law.³¹⁵ Mauritius' 'reversionary' sovereignty thus gave that state 'an interest in significant decisions that bear upon its [the Marine Protected Area] possible future use'.³¹⁶

The Law of Outer Space³¹⁷

There were a variety of theories prior to the First World War with regard to the status of the airspace above states and territorial waters,³¹⁸ but the outbreak of that conflict, with its recognition of the security implications of use of the air, changed this and the approach that then prevailed, with little dissension, was based upon the extension of state sovereignty upwards into airspace. This was acceptable both from the defence point of view and in the light of evolving state practice regulating flights over national territory.³¹⁹ It was reflected in the 1919 Paris Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, which recognised the full sovereignty of states over the airspace above their land and territorial sea.³²⁰ Accordingly, the international law rules protecting sovereignty of states apply to the airspace as they do to the land below. As the International Court noted in *Nicaragua v. United States*: ‘The principle of respect for territorial sovereignty is also directly infringed by the unauthorised overflight of a state’s territory by aircraft belonging to or under the control of the government of another state.’³²¹ The Court noted in *Benin v. Niger* that ‘a boundary represents the line of separation between areas of state sovereignty, not only on the earth’s surface but also in the subsoil and in the superjacent column of air’.³²²

There is no right of innocent passage through the airspace of a state.³²³ Aircraft may only traverse the airspace of states with the agreement of those states, and where that has not been obtained an illegal intrusion will be involved which will justify interception, though not (save in very exceptional cases) actual attack.³²⁴ However, the principle of the complete sovereignty of

the subjacent state is qualified not only by the various multilateral and bilateral conventions which permit airliners to cross and land in the territories of the contracting states under recognised conditions and in the light of the accepted regulations, but also by the development of the law of outer space.

Ever since the Soviet Union launched the first earth satellite in 1957, space exploration has developed at an ever-increasing rate.³²⁵ Satellites now control communications, navigation and observation networks, both civil and military, while landings have been made on the moon and information-seeking space probes dispatched to survey planets like Mars, Venus and Saturn. The research material gathered upon such diverse matters as earth resources, ionospheric activities, solar radiation, cosmic rays and the general structure of space and planet formations has stimulated further efforts to understand the nature of space and the cosmos.³²⁶ This immense increase in available information has also led to the development of the law of outer space, formulating generally accepted principles to regulate the interests of the various states involved as well as taking into account the concern of the international community as a whole.

The Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space

It soon became apparent that the *usque ad coelum* rule, providing for state sovereignty over territorial airspace to an unrestricted extent, was not viable where space exploration was concerned. To obtain the individual consents of countries to the passage of satellites and other vehicles orbiting more than 100 miles above their surface would prove cumbersome in the extreme and in practice states have acquiesced in such traversing. This means that the

sovereignty of states over their airspace is limited in height at most to the point where the airspace meets space itself. Precisely where this boundary lies is difficult to say and will depend upon technological and other factors, but figures between 50 and 100 miles have been put forward.³²⁷

As conventional aircraft are developed to attain greater heights, so states will wish to see their sovereignty extend to those heights and, as well as genuine uncertainty, this fear of surrendering what may prove to be in the future valuable sovereign rights has prevented any agreement on the delimitation of this particular frontier.³²⁸

The Legal Regime of Outer Space

Beyond the point separating air from space, states have agreed to apply the international law principles of *res communis*, so that no portion of outer space may be appropriated to the sovereignty of individual states. This was made clear in a number of General Assembly resolutions following the advent of the satellite era in the late 1950s. For instance, UN General Assembly resolution 1962 (XVII), adopted in 1963 and entitled the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, lays down a series of applicable legal principles which include the provisions that outer space and celestial bodies were free for exploration and use by all states on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and that outer space and celestial bodies were not subject to national appropriation by any means.³²⁹ In addition, the Declaration on International Co-operation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space adopted in resolution 51/126, 1996, called for further international

cooperation, with particular attention being given to the benefit for and the interests of developing countries and countries with incipient space programmes stemming from such international cooperation conducted with countries with more advanced space capabilities.³³⁰ Such resolutions constituted in many cases and in the circumstances expressions of state practice and *opinio juris* and were thus part of customary law.³³¹

The legal regime of outer space was clarified by the signature in 1967 of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) and currently has 110 parties.³³² This reiterates that outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by any means (article II) and emphasises that the exploration and use of outer space must be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries (article I). The Treaty does not establish as such a precise boundary between airspace and outer space, but it provides the framework for the international law of outer space.³³³

Military Uses of Outer Space

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty provides that states parties to the Treaty agree:

not to place in orbit around the earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station

such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

There are, however, disagreements as to the meaning of this provision.³³⁴

The article bans only nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction from outer space, the celestial bodies and from orbit around the earth, but article I does emphasise that the exploration and use of outer space ‘shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries’ and it has been argued that this can be interpreted to mean that any military activity in space contravenes the Treaty.³³⁵

Under article IV, the moon and other celestial bodies must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, although the use of military personnel for scientific and other peaceful purposes is not prohibited. On the other hand, the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies *is* forbidden. There are minimalist and maximalist interpretations as to how these provisions are to be understood. The former, for example, would argue that only aggressive military activity is banned, while the latter would prohibit all military behaviour.³³⁶ The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water prohibited all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground. Originally signed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, it now has 124 parties.³³⁷ Also relevant is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968, in which the nuclear weapons states parties undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive

devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Non-nuclear-weapon states parties undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons nor to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept safeguards as negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency.³³⁸ The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 1977 is also to be noted in this context, defining environmental modification techniques as changing, through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes, the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydro-sphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space. This would encompass changes in weather or climate patterns, in ocean currents, or in the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere, or an upset in the ecological balance of a region.

Article 3 of the Moon Treaty 1979 reaffirms article IV of the 1963 agreement, but the increasing capacity of states to send vehicles and equipment to the moon and the increasing competitiveness between such states has increased concern over its possible militarisation.³³⁹

Concern, however, currently revolves around the increasing number of satellites orbiting the earth, with functions including navigational and observational missions,³⁴⁰ and the evolution of small satellites in low orbits. Further, the development of anti-satellite weapons by the major powers is a major source of destabilisation. The United States, Russia, China and India

are all believed to have tested anti-satellite missiles,³⁴¹ while in July 2020, Russia was alleged to have launched an anti-satellite missile from a satellite already in space.³⁴² Specific legal regulation is lagging, although attacking the satellite of another state may well constitute an armed attack in the context of the law governing the use of force, discussed in Chapter 19, and more generally, activities in outer space are governed by the rules of international law, including the UN Charter and international humanitarian law.³⁴³

The Question of Responsibility

Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty provides for international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, require authorisation and continuing supervision by the appropriate state party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organisation, responsibility for compliance with the Treaty is to be borne both by the international organisation and by the states parties to the Treaty participating in such organisation.³⁴⁴

Under article VIII, states retain jurisdiction and control over personnel and vehicles launched by them into space and under article VII they remain

responsible for any damage caused to other parties to the Treaty by their space objects.³⁴⁵

This aspect of space law was further developed by the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects signed in 1972, article XII of which provides for the payment of compensation in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity for any damage caused by space objects. Article II provides for absolute liability to pay such compensation for damage caused by a space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight, whereas article III provides for fault liability for damage caused elsewhere or to persons or property on board a space object.³⁴⁶ This Convention was invoked by Canada in 1979 following the damage allegedly caused by Soviet Cosmos 954.³⁴⁷ In 2007, the UN General Assembly endorsed the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines as guidelines for the mission, planning, design, manufacture and operational phases of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the aim of limiting space debris.³⁴⁸

As a reinforcement to this evolving system of state responsibility, the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space was opened for signature in 1975, coming into force in 1976. This laid down a series of stipulations for the registration of information regarding space objects, such as, for example, their purpose, location and parameters, with the UN Secretary-General.³⁴⁹ In 1992, the UN General Assembly adopted Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space.³⁵⁰ Under these Principles, the launching state is, prior to the launch, to ensure that a thorough and comprehensive safety assessment is conducted and made

publicly available. Where a space object appears to malfunction with a risk of re-entry of radioactive materials to the earth, the launching state is to inform states concerned and the UN Secretary-General and respond promptly to requests for further information or consultations sought by other states. Principle 8 provides that states shall bear international responsibility for national activities involving the use of nuclear power sources in outer space, whether such activities are carried out by governmental agencies or by non-governmental agencies. Principle 9 provides that each state which launches or procures the launching of a space object and each state from whose territory or facility a space object is launched shall be internationally liable for damage caused by such space object or its component parts.

Assistance

The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space was signed in 1968 and sets out the legal framework for the provision of emergency assistance to astronauts. It provides for immediate notification of the launching authority or, if that is not immediately possible, a public announcement regarding space personnel in distress as well as the immediate provision of assistance. It also covers search and rescue operations, as well as a guarantee of prompt return. The Convention also provides for recovery of space objects.³⁵¹

The Moon Treaty

In 1979, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies was adopted.³⁵² As noted above, this provides for the

demilitarisation of the moon and other celestial bodies, and establishes the principle in article 3 that the exploration and the use of the moon shall be the province of all mankind and should be carried out for the benefit of all.

Article 11 emphasises that the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind and are not subject to national appropriation by any means. That important article emphasises that no private rights of ownership over the moon or any part of it or its natural resources in place may be created, although all states parties have the right to exploration and use of the moon. The states parties also agreed under article 11(5) and (7) to establish an international regime to govern the exploitation of the resources of the moon, when this becomes feasible.³⁵³ The main purposes of the international regime to be established are to include:

- a.** the orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the moon;
- b.** the rational management of those resources;
- c.** the expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources; and
- d.** an equitable sharing by all states parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given special consideration.

Several points are worth noting. First, the proposed international regime is only to be established when exploitation becomes feasible. Secondly, it appears that until the regime is set up, there is a moratorium on exploitation, although not on ‘exploration and use’, as recognised by articles 11(4) and VI(2). This would permit the collection of samples and their removal from

the moon for scientific purposes. Thirdly, it is to be noted that private ownership rights of minerals or natural resources not in place are permissible under the Treaty.³⁵⁴

However, the Moon Treaty currently has only eighteen parties and these do not include the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, India, Japan or France. Accordingly, its value is to that extent diminished.³⁵⁵ Further, it is difficult to see that this treaty can be taken as reflecting customary international law in view of the attitude adopted by the leading space powers.³⁵⁶ This has led to uncertainties in the relevant law at a time that the technology to explore and exploit has accelerated.

The Future

An issue of especial concern relates to plans for the increasing commercialisation of activities, including the mining of natural resources, on the moon and in outer space,³⁵⁷ which do not appear to be consistent with the Moon Treaty or with the concept of the Global Commons.³⁵⁸ At the least, there is confusion as to the legal position.³⁵⁹ Further, there is the question of the legal regulation of non-state private activities such as space tourism and the use of private corporations in the process of accessing and exploiting outer space.³⁶⁰ For example, NASA has opened the International Space Station to commercial opportunities and private astronauts,³⁶¹ while private corporations are now conducting an increasing number of launches into space.³⁶² The range of private or public-private space activities is rapidly expanding³⁶³ and such activities require consideration of the integration of

international and national space law, as well as clarification and development of the former.³⁶⁴

Suggestions for Further Reading

J. Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006

S. Hobe, *Space Law: A Handbook*, Oxford, 2019

R. Y. Jennings, *The Acquisition of Territory in International Law*, Manchester, 1963

V. Prescott and G. Triggs, *International Frontiers and Boundaries*, Leiden, 2008

Research Handbook on Territorial Disputes in International Law (ed. M. Kohen and M. Hébié), Cheltenham, 2018

Territoriality and International Law (ed. M. Kohen), Cheltenham, 2016

M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa*, Oxford, 1986

¹ See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, chapter 5; V. Prescott and G. Triggs, *International Frontiers and Boundaries*, Leiden, 2008; J. Castellino and S. Allen, *Title to Territory in International Law: A Temporal Analysis*, Aldershot, 2002; *Research Handbook on Territorial Disputes in International Law* (ed. M. Kohen and M. Hébié), Cheltenham, 2018; Issue on 'The Changing Nature of Territoriality in International Law', *47 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law*, 2016; G. Distefano, *L'Ordre International entre Légalité et Effectivité: Le Titre Juridique dans le Contentieux Territorial*, Paris, 2002; R. Y. Jennings, *The Acquisition of Territory in International Law*, Manchester, 1963; *Title to Territory* (ed. M. Shaw), Dartmouth, 2005; *Territoriality and International Law* (ed. M. Kohen), Cheltenham, 2016; M. Hébié, *Souveraineté Territoriale par Traité*, Geneva, 2015; Société Française pour le Droit International, *Droit des Frontières Internationales: The Law of International Borders*, Paris, 2016; J. H. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, Leiden, 1970, vol. **III**, pp. 297 ff.; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, pp. 515 ff., 590 ff.; P.-M. Dupuy and Y. Kerbrat, *Doit International Public*, Paris, 14th ed., 2018, pp. 56 ff.; M. N. Shaw, 'Territory in

International Law', **13** *Netherlands YIL*, 1982, p. 61; N. Hill, *Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations*, London, 1945; J. Gottman, *The Significance of Territory*, Charlottesville, 1973; S. Akweenda, *International Law and the Protection of Namibia's Territorial Integrity*, The Hague, 1997; S. P. Sharma, *Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law*, The Hague, 1997; W. Schoenborn, 'La Nature Juridique du Territoire', **30** *HR*, 1929, p. 85; C. R. Rossi, *Sovereignty and Territorial Temptation: The Grotian Tendency*, Cambridge, 2017; and K. H. Kaikobad, *Interpretation and Revision of International Boundary Decisions*, Cambridge, 2007.

² See Oppenheim's *International Law*, p. 563.

³ See L. Delbez, 'Du Territoire dans ses Rapports avec l'État', **39** *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1932, p. 46. See also Hill, *Claims to Territory*, p. 3.

⁴ D. P. O'Connell, *International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1970, vol. I, p. 403. See also Jennings, *Acquisition*, p. 87; and Judge Huber, *Island of Palmas*, 2 *RIAA*, pp. 829, 838 (1928).

⁵ See generally Gottman, *Significance*.

⁶ See e.g. articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter; the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law adopted by the UN General Assembly, resolution 2625 (XXV); and article 1 of the 1974 Consensus Definition of Aggression adopted by the General Assembly, resolution 3314 (XXIX).

⁷ See e.g. R. Falk, 'A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals', **84** *Yale Law Journal*, 1975, pp. 969, 973, 1020. See also H. Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights*, London, 1950; and C. W. Jenks, *The Common Law of Mankind*, London, 1958.

⁸ See e.g. the Treaty on Outer Space 1967 and the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. See also Shaw, 'Territory', pp. 65–6; and below, p. 462.

⁹ See e.g. *Asylum*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 266, 275; 17 *ILR*, pp. 280, 283. The International Court emphasised in *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 51, the 'central importance in international law and relations of state sovereignty over territory and of the stability and certainty of that sovereignty'. See also S. Huh, 'Title to Territory in the Post-

Colonial Era: Original Title and *Terra Nullius* in the ICJ Judgments on Cases Concerning *Ligitan/Sipadan* (2002) and *Pedra Branca* (2008)', **26 EJIL**, 2015, p. 709.

¹⁰ See e.g. R. Megarry and H. W. R. Wade, *The Law of Real Property*, 5th ed., London, 1984.

¹¹ See below, [Chapter 16](#), dealing with the problems of state succession.

¹² 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 838 (1928); 4 AD, pp. 103, 104. See also the Report of the Commission of Jurists in *Aaland Islands*, LNOJ, Supp. No. 3, p. 6.

¹³ J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 6th ed., Oxford, 1963, p. 162.

¹⁴ See Judge Huber, *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 838 (1928); 4 AD, pp. 103, 104.

¹⁵ 2 RIAA, p. 839. See also Shaw, 'Territory', pp. 73 ff.; and S. Bastid, 'Les Problèmes Territoriaux dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale', **107 HR**, 1962, pp. 360, 367.

¹⁶ See e.g. Schoenborn, 'Nature Juridique', p. 96. See also O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 403–4. Note in particular the Roman law distinction between *imperium* and *dominium*: Shaw, 'Territory', p. 74.

¹⁷ See, as regards the theories concerning the relationship between states and territory, Shaw, 'Territory', pp. 75–9.

¹⁸ See e.g. Jennings, *Acquisition*, p. 4. See also *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, p. 204.

¹⁹ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 564; 80 ILR, pp. 440, 459.

²⁰ This was reaffirmed in *Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute) (Nicaragua Intervening)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 388; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 301.

²¹ See e.g. *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, p. 46; 6 AD, p. 95.

²² See *Minquiers and Ecrehos*, ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 47, 52; 20 ILR, p. 94. The Court noted in *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 150, that the passing of

sovereignty may be by way of agreement between states, either in the form of a treaty or tacitly arising from the conduct of the parties. The emphasis was to be placed on the intention of the parties.

²³ *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 48, 64, 68; 59 ILR, p. 14. See also *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, para. 86. But see as to the confirmatory value of such ties, *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 38–9. Note that there is a critical difference between territorial sovereignty on the one hand and the regular rights of property on the other, *ibid.*, pp. 56–7, 80.

²⁴ See e.g. *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 41–3; 59 ILR, p. 14; *Rann of Kutch* 50 ILR, p. 2; the *Dubai/Sharjah Award*, 91 ILR, pp. 543, 587; and *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 116.

²⁵ See below, p. 448.

²⁶ See below, p. 447.

²⁷ See as to the question of how a new state acquires title to its territory, Jennings, *Acquisition*, pp. 36 ff.; J. G. Starke, ‘The Acquisition of Title to Territory by Newly Emerged States’, 41 *BYIL*, 1965–66, p. 411; J. Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006; and M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 168–73.

²⁸ See O’Connell, *International Law*, p. 405.

²⁹ See *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 677.

³⁰ *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, para. 334.

³¹ See *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, p. 48.

³² See *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 37; 100 ILR, p. 1.

³³ *Ibid.*; and *Temple of Preah Vihear*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 6, 34; 33 ILR, p. 48. See also *Bangladesh v. India*, Award of 7 July 2014, para. 216, noting that ‘maritime delimitations,

like land boundaries, must be stable and definitive to ensure a peaceful relationship between the states concerned in the long term’.

³⁴ See *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 23; 33 ILR, p. 48. See also *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 340–1.

³⁵ *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, pp. 21–2.

³⁶ See *Argentina/Chile Frontier Award (La Palena)* 38 ILR, pp. 10, 89; and *Eritrea/Ethiopia*, Decision of 13 April 2002, 130 ILR, pp. 1, 34. See also, with regard to acquiescence, below, p. 437.

³⁷ See article 4 providing that the Convention applies only to treaties concluded after the coming into force of the Convention itself (27 January 1980).

³⁸ See e.g. *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 21–2; *Beagle Channel* 52 ILR, pp. 93, 124; and *Botswana v. Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 1045, 1059–60. But cf. the Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, *ibid.*, p. 1118. See also D. W. Greig, *Intertemporality and the Law of Treaties*, London, 2001, pp. 108 ff.

³⁹ ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 1045, 1060. But see here the Declaration of Judge Higgins noting that the task of the Court was to ‘decide what general idea the parties had in mind, and then make reality of that general idea through the use of contemporary knowledge’ rather than to decide *in abstracto* ‘by a mechanistic appreciation of relevant indicia’, *ibid.*, p. 1114. See also the *Argentina/Chile Award (Laguna del Desierto)* 113 ILR, pp. 1, 76. In *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, the Court, in seeking to determine the location of the mouth of the River Ebeji, emphasised that ‘the Court must seek to ascertain the intention of the parties at the time’, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 346.

⁴⁰ Decision of 13 April 2002, 130 ILR, pp. 1, 34.

⁴¹ *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 345.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 370.

⁴³ See e.g. Verzijl, *International Law*, pp. 378–81.

⁴⁴ See e.g. *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute) (Nicaragua Intervening)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 401; 97 ILR, p. 112.

⁴⁵ See e.g. *Dubai/Sharjah* 91 ILR, pp. 543, 577 (where the Court of Arbitration termed such procedures ‘administrative decisions’, *ibid.*) and *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 75 ff.

⁴⁶ See e.g. C. C. Hyde, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Boston, 1947, vol. I, pp. 355–6; O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 428–30; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 696–8.

⁴⁷ 478 HL Deb., col. 1005, Written Answer, 17 July 1986. See also A. J. Day, *Border and Territorial Disputes*, 2nd ed., London, 1987, p. 277, regarding a new island appearing after a cyclone in 1970 on a river boundary between India and Bangladesh. Title is disputed. See also *Georgia v. South Carolina* 111 L.Ed.2d 309; 91 ILR, p. 439.

⁴⁸ See e.g. *Georgia v. South Carolina* 111 L.Ed.2d 309, 334; 91 ILR, pp. 439, 458. See also *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute) (Nicaragua Intervening)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 546.

⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 546.

⁵⁰ See e.g. *The Anna* 5 C.Rob. 373 (1805); *Arkansas v. Tennessee* 246 US 158 (1918); *Louisiana v. Mississippi* 282 US 458 (1940); *Georgia v. South Carolina* 111 L.Ed.2d 309; 91 ILR, p. 439; and the *Chamizal* arbitration, 5 *AJIL*, 1911, p. 782. See also E. Lauterpacht, ‘River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt-Al-Arab Frontier’, 9 *ICLQ*, 1960, pp. 208, 216; L. J. Bouchez, ‘The Fixing of Boundaries in International Boundary Rivers’, 12 *ICLQ*, 1963, p. 789; S. McCaffrey, *The Law of International Watercourses*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2019; J. Moussa, ‘Implications of the Indus Water *Kishenganga* Arbitration for the International Law of Watercourses and the Environment’, 64 *ICLQ*, 2015, p. 697; *Indus Water Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India)* (Partial Award), Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2013; and *Botswana v. Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1999, p. 1045.

⁵¹ See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 679–86; and O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 436–40.

⁵² See *Christian v. The Queen* [2006] UKPC 47, para. 11; 130 ILR 696, 700, 711, where the Privy Council noted that cession ‘contemplates a transfer of sovereignty by one sovereign power to another’.

⁵³ 2 RIAA, p. 829 (1928); 4 AD, p. 103.

⁵⁴ Sovereignty over the territorial sea contiguous to and the airspace above the territory concerned would pass with the land territory: see *Grisbadarna*, 11 RIAA, p. 147 (1909); and *Beagle Channel*, HMSO, 1977; 52 ILR, p. 93. This suggests the corollary that a cession of the territorial sea or airspace would include the relevant land territory: see *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 680.

⁵⁵ See *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 681. Note also that in 1859 Austria ceded Lombardy to France, which then ceded it to Sardinia without having taken possession: see O’Connell, *International Law*, p. 438. Cf. *The Fama* 5 C Rob 106, 115 (1804).

⁵⁶ 4 RIAA, p. 158 (1925); 3 AD, p. 336.

⁵⁷ Note now that article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 provides that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the UN Charter. However, prior treaties of cession are subject to the rule of intertemporal law: see below, p. 428.

⁵⁸ See, for further examples, *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 681–2.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 699. See also S. Korman, *The Right of Conquest*, Oxford, 1996.

⁶⁰ See e.g. M. S. McDougal and F. P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order*, New Haven, 1961, pp. 733–6, 739–44; and J. Stone, *Legal Controls of International Conflict*, London, 1959, pp. 744–51. See also E. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2012; and Y. Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2019.

⁶¹ See generally *The Arab–Israeli Conflict* (ed. J. N. Moore), Princeton, 4 vols., 1974–89.

⁶² But cf. Y. Blum, ‘The Missing Reversioner’, in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 287.

⁶³ See article 51 of the UN Charter and below, [Chapter 19](#).

⁶⁴ See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 699. See also O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 431–6.

⁶⁵ O'Connell, *International Law*, p. 436. See also e.g. *Re Goering* 13 AD, p. 203 (1946).

⁶⁶ Cmd 6648 (1945). See also *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 699–700.

⁶⁷ See also article 5(3) of the Consensus Definition of Aggression adopted in 1974 by the UN General Assembly. Similarly, by article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, a treaty providing for the transfer of territory may be void for duress.

⁶⁸ See *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents* (ed. E. Lauterpacht, C. Greenwood, M. Weller and D. Bethlehem), Cambridge, 1991, p. 90.

⁶⁹ See e.g. Security Council resolution 497 (1981), condemning Israel's decision to extend its laws, jurisdiction and administration to the occupied Golan Heights. Note the US recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 25 March 2019, **113 AJIL**, 2019, p. 613. The UN has also condemned Israel's policy of establishing settlements in the occupied territories: see e.g. Security Council resolution 465 (1980). See further below, [Chapter 20](#), with regard to self-determination and the use of force.

⁷⁰ ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12; 59 ILR, p. 14. See also M. N. Shaw, 'The Western Sahara Case', **49 BYIL**, 1978, pp. 119, 127–34.

⁷¹ ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 39; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 56.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.* This ran counter to some writers of the period: see e.g. M. F. Lindley, *The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law*, London, 1926, pp. 11–20; J. Westlake, *Chapters on the Principles of International Law*, London, 1894, pp. 141–2; Jennings, *Acquisition*, p. 20; and *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 687, footnote 4.

⁷⁴ See *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 51. See also N. S. M. Antunes, ‘The *Eritrea–Yemen* Arbitration: First Stage – the Law of Title to Territory Re-averred’, **48** *ICLQ*, 1999, p. 362; and A. Yannis, ‘The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and Its Implications in International Politics’, **13** *EJIL*, 2002, p. 1037.

⁷⁵ See Shaw, *Title to Territory*, chapter 1; and C. H. Alexandrowicz, *The European–African Confrontation*, Leiden, 1973.

⁷⁶ See e.g. Hébié, *Souveraineté Territoriale*; and M. N. Shaw, ‘Acquisition of Territory in Nineteenth Century Africa: Some Thoughts’, in *Common Values in International Law: Essays in Honour of Christian Tomuschat* (ed. P.-M. Dupuy, B. Fassbender, M. N. Shaw and K. P. Sommermann), Kehl, 2006, p. 1029.

⁷⁷ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 404–5.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, citing ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 39. See also *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 858–9 (1928).

⁷⁹ ICJ Reports, 2002, para. 205. See also *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 845 (1928); *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, p. 46; *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 37; and R. Higgins, ‘Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem’, **46** *ICLQ*, 1997, p. 501.

⁸⁰ See e.g. J. Rudnicki, ‘The Doctrine of Occupation and the Founding of Australia’, **23** *Fundamina*, 2017, p. 81; and N. L. Wallace-Bruce, ‘Two Hundred Years on: A Reexamination of the Acquisition of Australia’, **19** *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 1989, p. 87. See also *Cooper v. Stuart*, 14 App. Cas. 286 (1889); and *Coe v. Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland* (1979) 53 ALR 403.

⁸¹ See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 689–90; and F. A. F. Von der Heydte, ‘Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law’, **29** *AJIL*, 1935, p. 448. See also A. S. Keller, O. J. Lissitzyn and F. J. Mann, *Creation of Rights of Sovereignty Through Symbolic Acts, 1400–1800*, New York, 1938; and H. Hu, ‘The Doctrine of Occupation: An Analysis of its Invalidity under the Framework of International Legal Positivism’, **15** *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2016, p. 75.

⁸² 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 846 (1928); 4 AD, pp. 103, 108.

⁸³ See generally e.g. D. H. Johnson, ‘Acquisitive Prescription in International Law’, 27 *BYIL*, 1950, p. 332; and H. Post, ‘International Law Between Dominium and Imperium’, in *Reflections on Principles and Practice of International Law* (ed. T. D. Gill and W. P. Heere), The Hague, 2000, p. 147. See also J. Wouters and S. Verhoeven, ‘Prescription’, *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2008.

⁸⁴ As noted in *Grisbadarna*, ‘it is a settled principle of the law of nations that a state of things which actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as little as possible’, J. B. Scott, *Hague Court Reports*, New York, 1916, vol. I, pp. 121, 130.

⁸⁵ ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 1045, 1101 ff.

⁸⁶ For abandonment of territory, the fact of the loss plus the intention to abandon is required. This is very rare: see e.g. the *Delagoa Bay* case, C. Parry, *British Digest of International Law*, Cambridge, 1965, vol. V, p. 535; and *Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands)*, ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 209; 27 ILR, p. 62.

⁸⁷ See Johnson, ‘Acquisitive Prescription’, pp. 343–8.

⁸⁸ 5 *AJIL*, 1911, p. 782. See also *Minquiers and Ecrehos*, ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 47, 106–8; 20 ILR, pp. 94, 142–4.

⁸⁹ See above, p. 424, and below, [Chapter 19](#).

⁹⁰ See e.g. Johnson, ‘Acquisitive Prescription’, pp. 353–4; and I. MacGibbon, ‘Some Observations on the Part of Protest in International Law’, 30 *BYIL*, 1953, p. 293.

⁹¹ In the *British Guiana and Venezuela Boundary* case, the parties agreed to adopt a fifty-year adverse holding rule, UNRIAA, vol. XXVIII, p. 331.

⁹² ICJ Reports, 1953, p. 47; 20 ILR, p. 94.

⁹³ C. de Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law*, 3rd ed., Princeton, 1960, p. 209. See below, p. 442.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 138; 18 ILR, pp. 86, 100.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ See Jennings, *Acquisition*, pp. 25–6. See also D. H. Johnson, ‘Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law’, *Cambridge Law Journal*, 1955, pp. 215, 223.

⁹⁸ De Visscher, *Theory and Reality*, p. 209, emphasis added.

⁹⁹ See e.g. *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 38–9; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 55. See also Shaw, ‘*Western Sahara Case*’, pp. 152–3; Jennings, *Acquisition*, pp. 28–31; T. O. Elias, ‘The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law’, 74 *AJIL*, 1980, p. 285; *Brownlie’s Principles*, pp. 124–5; *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 1281–2; G. Fitzmaurice, *The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice*, Cambridge, 1986, vol. I, p. 135; and H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989 (Part One)’, 60 *BYIL*, 1989, pp. 4, 128. See also Higgins, ‘Time and the Law’, p. 501; and Greig, *Intertemporality*.

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. *Right of Passage*, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 6, 37; 31 ILR, pp. 23, 50 and above, p. 428.

¹⁰¹ 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 845 (1928); 4 AD, p. 103.

¹⁰² See e.g. *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 46, 115; *Eritrea/Ethiopia*, 2002, 130 ILR, pp. 1, 34; and *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 404–5.

¹⁰³ 2 RIAA, pp. 839–45. See P. Jessup, ‘The Palmas Island Arbitration’, 22 *AJIL*, 1928, p. 735. See also M. Sørensen, ‘Le Problème Dit du Droit Intertemporal dans l’Ordre International’, in *Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International*, Basle, 1973, pp. 4 ff., and subsequent discussions, *ibid.*, pp. 50 ff.; and the Resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit International, *Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International*, 1975, pp. 536 ff.

¹⁰⁴ Note that the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law provides that the concept of non-acquisition of territory by force was not to be affected *inter alia* by any

international agreement made prior to the Charter and valid under international law.

105 ICJ Reports, 1978, pp. 3, 33–4; 60 ILR, pp. 562, 592. See Elias, ‘Intertemporal Law’, pp. 296 ff. See also the Indian argument regarding the invalidity of Portugal’s title to Goa, SCOR, S/PV-987, 11, 18 December 1961.

106 See, as to time and the interpretation of treaties, above, p. 428.

107 L. F. E. Goldie, ‘The Critical Date’, 12 *ICLQ*, 1963, p. 1251. See also G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4: Points of Substance, Part II’, 32 *BYIL*, 1955–6, p. 20; Y. Blum, *Historic Titles in International Law*, The Hague, 1965, pp. 208–22; and *Brownlie’s Principles*, p. 219. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: The Principle of *Uti Possidetis Juris* Today’, 67 *BYIL*, 1996, pp. 75, 130; and M. N. Shaw, ‘Title, Control and Closure? The Experience of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission’, 56 *ICLQ*, 2007, pp. 755, 760 ff.

108 See e.g. *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, p. 845 (1928).

109 See e.g. *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, p. 45.

110 See *Indonesia/Malaysia*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 682; *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 697–8; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 652, 653, 657. See also *Argentina/Chile* 38 ILR, pp. 10, 79–80; and *Malaysia v. Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 27–8.

111 *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 568; 80 ILR, p. 440. See also *Burkina Faso/Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 44, 79. This may be reinforced by the terms of the *compromis* itself. For example, in *Eritrea/Ethiopia*, the parties referred specifically to the principle of respect for borders existing at the moment of independence, 130 ILR, pp. 1, 43, and see further below, p. 448.

112 *Eritrea/Ethiopia* 130 ILR, pp. 1, 102–3.

113 *Ibid.*, p. 43.

114 See *Benin v. Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 90, 120. See also the views of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia in Opinion No. 11 as to the varying dates of succession (and independence) of the successor states of the Former Yugoslavia: see 96 ILR, pp. 719, 722.

115 See *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 570; 80 ILR, p. 440; and *Dubai/Sharjah* 91 ILR, pp. 590–4 for examples of where the concept was held to be of little or no practical value.

116 See e.g. *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 697 ff.

117 As in *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 6; 100 ILR, p. 1.

118 See *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 570; 80 ILR, p. 440.

119 See *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 56 ff.; 97 ILR, p. 112.

120 See *Beagle Channel*, 21 RIAA, pp. 55, 82–3 (2006); 52 ILR, p. 93.

121 *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 401; 97 ILR, p. 112. See also *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 570; 80 ILR, p. 440; and the Separate Opinion of Judge Ajibola, *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 91; 100 ILR, p. 1.

122 See e.g. *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 570; 80 ILR, p. 440, for an example where the concept was held to be of little or no practical value. A similar view was taken in *Dubai/Sharjah* 91 ILR, pp. 590–4 and the *Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 32.

123 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 840 (1928). The Tribunal in *Eritrea–Yemen* noted: ‘The modern international law of the acquisition (or attribution) of territory generally requires that there be: an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis’, 114 ILR, pp. 1, 69. See also R. O’Keefe, ‘Legal Title versus *Effectivités*’, 13 *International Community Law Review*, 2011, p. 147; and M. G. Kohen, ‘Titles and *Effectivités* in Territorial Disputes’ in Kohen and Hébié, *Territorial Disputes*, p. 145.

¹²⁴ See *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 840 (1928); 4 AD, p. 103. See also *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, p. 46; 6 AD, p. 95; *Clipperton Island*, 26 AJIL, 1932, p. 390; 6 AD, p. 105; and *Minquiers and Ecrehos*, ICJ Reports, 1953, p. 47; 20 ILR, p. 94.

¹²⁵ PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 45–6. See also *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 100; and *Indonesia/Malaysia*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 682. Note also *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 35–7. See also Huh, ‘Title to Territory’, p. 709.

¹²⁶ 114 ILR, pp. 1, 118. Other obvious factors in such situations would include consideration of the geographical position, *ibid.*, p. 119.

¹²⁷ 2 RIAA, p. 829 (1928).

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 846.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 867–71.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 840. See also, in this context, the American claim to the Howland, Baker and Jarvis Islands in the Pacific Ocean, where it was argued that the administration of the islands as part of the US Wildlife Refuge System constituted sufficient occupation: *DUSPIL*, 1975, pp. 92–4.

¹³¹ 26 AJIL, 1932, p. 390; 6 AD, p. 105.

¹³² PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, p. 46; 6 AD, p. 95.

¹³³ See also *Indonesia/Malaysia*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 629, 682; and *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 712, noting that sovereignty over minor maritime features may be established ‘on the basis of a relatively modest display of state powers in terms of quality and quantity’.

¹³⁴ That is, those made as a ‘public claim of right or assertion of sovereignty . . . as well as legislative acts’, *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 69. See also *Minquiers and Ecrehos*, ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 47, 65, 69; 20 ILR, p. 94. Such acts need to relate clearly to the territory

in question: *Indonesia/Malaysia*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 682–3. See also *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 713–22; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 655.

135 The Court has emphasised that ‘activities by private persons cannot be seen as *effectivités* if they do not take place on the basis of official regulations or under governmental authority’: *Indonesia/Malaysia*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 683.

136 *Botswana v. Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 1045, 1105.

137 See Judge McNair, *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 184; 18 ILR, pp. 86, 113; and A. D. McNair, *International Law Opinions*, Cambridge, 1956, vol. I, p. 21. See also O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 417–19.

138 PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, p. 46; 6 AD, p. 95. See also *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, paras. 341 ff.

139 2 RIAA, p. 829 (1928); 4 AD, p. 103.

140 ICJ Reports, 1953, p. 47; 20 ILR, p. 94.

141 Annex I, 7 ILM, 1968, pp. 633, 674; 50 ILR, p. 2.

142 ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 43–4; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 60. See also *Dubai/Sharjah* 91 ILR, pp. 543, 585–90.

143 *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 120 ff.; and see Fitzmaurice, *Law and Procedure*, vol. I, pp. 312 ff.

144 See *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, p. 840 (1928).

145 See *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 708–9.

146 114 ILR, pp. 1, 120 ff.

147 *Eritrea/Ethiopia* 130 ILR, pp. 1, 84 ff.

¹⁴⁸ *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 586–7; 80 ILR, p. 440, and *El Salvador/Honduras* where the Chamber also noted that these principles applied to both colonial and post-colonial *effectivités*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 398; 97 ILR, p. 266. See also *Benin v. Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 120, 127, 149; *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 703; and *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, paras. 262, 340.

¹⁴⁹ See also *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 353–5.

¹⁵⁰ See also the general statement of principle in *Eritrea/Ethiopia* 130 ILR, pp. 1, 42. As to the role of equity in territorial disputes, see above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 89.

¹⁵¹ *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 655.

¹⁵² *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 83.

¹⁵³ See e.g. *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, paras. 342 ff.

¹⁵⁴ See article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. See also *Argentina/Chile* 38 ILR, pp. 10, 89.

¹⁵⁵ See *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 401, 558 ff.

¹⁵⁶ 130 ILR, p. 35. See also Shaw, ‘Title, Control and Closure?’, pp. 776 ff.; and K. Parlett, ‘State Conduct in Territorial Disputes beyond *Effectivités*: Recognition, Acquiescence, Renunciation and Estoppel’ in Kohen and Hébié, *Territorial Disputes*, p. 169. See also J. Wass, ‘Jurisdiction by Estoppel and Acquiescence in International Courts and Tribunals’, 86 *BYIL*, 2015, p.155.

¹⁵⁷ Consent, of course, is the basis of cession: see *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, para. 334; and above, p. 423.

¹⁵⁸ See e.g. *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, pp. 46, 51–2; 6 AD, pp. 95, 100; and *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 49–57; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 66. See also G. Schwarzenberger, ‘Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge’, 51 *AJIL*, 1957, p. 308.

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. *Taba* 80 ILR, pp. 224, 297–8, 306.

¹⁶⁰ See I. MacGibbon, ‘The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law’, **31 BYIL**, 1954, p. 143. See also *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 50–1 and the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Simma and Abraham, *ibid.*, pp. 116 ff.; and *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 556 ff., declaring that ‘acquiescence is equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent’, citing *The Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary (Canada/US)*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 305.

¹⁶¹ See *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 577; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 493; and *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 84.

¹⁶² See e.g. *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 35; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 34, where the Court noted: ‘If a serious dispute had indeed existed regarding frontiers, eleven years after the conclusion of the 1955 Treaty, one would expect it to have been reflected in the 1966 Treaty.’ See also *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 82 ff.; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia (Merits)*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 658–9.

¹⁶³ See *Temple of Preah Vihear*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 6, 29 ff.; 33 ILR, p. 48; *Cameroon v. Nigeria (Preliminary Objections)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 303; and *Eritrea/Ethiopia* 130 ILR, pp. 68 ff.

¹⁶⁴ See e.g. *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 305; 71 ILR, p. 74. The Court in *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 81–2, emphasised that a party relying on an estoppel must show, among other things, that ‘it has taken distinct acts in reliance on the other party’s statement’. See also *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 557 ff. In *Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar)*, ITLOS, Judgment of 14 March 2012, p. 142, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea noted that ‘in international law, a situation of estoppel exists when a state by its conduct, has created the appearance of a particular situation and another state, relying on such conduct in good faith, has acted or abstained from an action to its detriment. The effect of the notion of estoppel is that a state is precluded, by its conduct, from asserting that it did not agree to, or recognise, a certain situation.’ See also the *Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary (Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire)*, ITLOS Reports, 2017, paras. 242 ff.

¹⁶⁵ Note that the Tribunal in *Eritrea–Yemen* emphasized: ‘Repute is also an important ingredient for the consolidation of title’, 114 ILR, pp. 1, 136.

¹⁶⁶ PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, pp. 46, 51–2; 6 AD, pp. 95, 100.

¹⁶⁷ See *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86. The Court referred to the evidence of third parties which, while not amounting to clear recognition of claims, might afford a measure of support to such claims: *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 660.

¹⁶⁸ Note also the role of recognition in the context of new states and territory, above, p. 420, note 27.

¹⁶⁹ See *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 579; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 495. The Court e.g. in *Indonesia/Malaysia* felt that it ‘cannot disregard’ the failure of Indonesia or its predecessor, the Netherlands, to protest at the construction of lighthouses and other administrative activities on territory claimed to be Indonesian and noted that ‘such behaviour is unusual’: ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 685.

¹⁷⁰ *Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 265–6.

¹⁷¹ See e.g. D. W. Bowett, ‘Estoppel Before International Tribunals and its Relation to Acquiescence’, 33 *BYIL*, 1957, p. 176; Thirlway, ‘Law and Procedure’, p. 29; A. Martin, *L’Estoppel en Droit International Public*, Paris, 1979; C. Dominicé, ‘A Propos du Principe de l’Estoppel en Droit des Gens’, in *Recueil d’ Études de Droit International en Hommage à Paul Guggenheim*, Geneva, 1968, p. 327; and I. Sinclair, ‘Estoppel and Acquiescence’, in *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice* (ed. A. V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice), Cambridge, 1996, p. 104.

¹⁷² *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 81.

¹⁷³ PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, pp. 46, 68; 6 AD, pp. 95, 102.

¹⁷⁴ ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 6; 33 ILR, p. 48. See D. H. Johnson, ‘The Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear’, 11 *ICLQ*, 1962, p. 1183; and J. P. Cot, ‘Cour Internationale de Justice: Affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar’, *AFDI*, 1962, p. 217.

¹⁷⁵ ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 6, 23; 33 ILR, pp. 48, 62.

¹⁷⁶ ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 30–2; 33 ILR, p. 68.

¹⁷⁷ See also *Award of the King of Spain*, ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 192; 30 ILR, p. 457.

¹⁷⁸ See e.g. Jennings, *Acquisition*, pp. 47–51.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g. *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 139; 18 ILR, pp. 86, 101; *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 26; *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 308; 71 ILR, pp. 74, 135; and *ELSI*, ICJ Reports, 1989, pp. 15, 44; 84 ILR, pp. 311, 350. See also M. Koskeniemi, ‘L’Affaire du Passage par le Great Belt’, *AFDI*, 1992, p. 905.

¹⁸⁰ In *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections), the Court emphasized: ‘An estoppel would only arise if by its acts or declarations Cameroon had consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary dispute submitted to the Court by bilateral avenues alone. It would further be necessary that, by relying on such an attitude, Nigeria had changed its position to its own detriment or had suffered some prejudice’, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 303. See also *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 81; and *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, para. 158. Note that in the latter case, Bolivia raised an argument based on legitimate expectations, a doctrine found in awards concerning disputes between a foreign investor and the host state, but the Court found that it did not follow that there existed a principle giving rise to an obligation on the basis of what could be considered to be a legitimate expectation in general international law, *ibid.*, para. 162.

¹⁸¹ Award of 18 March 2015, para. 438.

¹⁸² ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 582; 80 ILR, p. 440. Note that the Court in *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 94–5 observed that a map may give a good indication of the official position of the party concerned, particularly where it is an admission against interest. See also *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 661–2; and *Burkina Faso/Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 44, 76 ff.

¹⁸³ See *Eritrea/Ethiopia* 130 ILR, pp. 38 ff. See also *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 94 ff.

184 114 ILR, pp. 1, 94 ff.; and *Eritrea/Ethiopia* 130 ILR, pp. 39, 45 ff. Note that a treaty provision may provide for an avowedly incorrect geographical feature on an annexed map as part of the boundary line: see *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, p. 372.

185 ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 383–4. See also p. 385.

186 *Ibid.*, pp. 366 ff. See also *Eritrea/Ethiopia* 130 ILR, pp. 39 ff. Also relevant would be the size of the map and the amount of detail it showed as regards the disputed territory in question, *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 702.

187 See e.g. *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 138; and De Visscher, *Theory and Reality*, p. 209.

188 *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, p. 352. But see the comments of the International Court on ‘convergent evolution’ of the parties regarding title, *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 96 and note the reference to the presumption in favour of maintaining sovereignty in the hands of the initial holder in the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Simma and Abraham, pp. 12, 116, 119. See also above, p. 428.

189 Judge Huber, *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 839 (1928); 4 AD, p. 103.

190 See further above, p. 434.

191 See above, p. 435.

192 See in this context article 35 of the General Act of the Congress of Berlin 1885, in which the parties recognised the obligation to ‘ensure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coast of the African continent’.

193 See e.g. Security Council resolution 216 (1965) concerning Rhodesia; General Assembly resolution 31/6A and Security Council Statements of 21 September 1979 and 15 December 1981 concerning the South African Bantustans; Security Council resolution 541 (1983) with regard to the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’; and Security Council resolution 662 (1990) concerning the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.

194 See particularly Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in which the international boundary between Kuwait and Iraq was deemed to be that agreed by both parties in ‘Minutes’ agreed in 1963. This boundary was then formally guaranteed by the Council in Section A, para. 4 of this resolution. See e.g. M. H. Mendelson and S. C. Hulton, ‘The Iraq–Kuwait Boundary’, *64 BYIL*, 1993, p. 135. See also Security Council resolution 833 (1993) and S/26006.

195 See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 716–18; and G. Marston, ‘The British Acquisition of the Nicobar Islands, 1869’, *69 BYIL*, 1998, p. 245. See also e.g. *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, p. 47; 6 AD, p. 95; and *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 49, 74, 80, 82, 96.

196 See K. H. Kaikobad, ‘Some Observations on the Doctrine of the Continuity and Finality of Boundaries’, *54 BYIL*, 1983, p. 119; and Shaw, ‘Heritage of States’, pp. 75, 81. See also *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 51.

197 See e.g. *Temple of Preah Vihear*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 6, 34; 33 ILR, p. 48; *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 37; 100 ILR, p. 1; *Beagle Channel*, 21 RIAA, pp. 55, 88 (2006); 52 ILR, p. 93; and *Dubai/Sharjah* 91 ILR, pp. 543, 578.

198 See Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 on *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 437.

199 See generally Shaw, *Title to Territory*, chapter 5. But see, as regards Europe, Principle III of the Helsinki Final Act, 14 ILM, 1975, p. 1292, and the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union adopted by the European Community and its member states on 16 December 1991, 92 ILR, p. 173.

200 *Request for Interpretation of Temple Judgment*, ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 281, 317.

201 See *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 565; 80 ILR, p. 469. See further above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 228.

202 As to the application of the principle to Gibraltar, see UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 443.

²⁰³ See J. Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’, 69 *BYIL*, 1998, p. 85; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 584; *Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned* (ed. A. Bayefsky), The Hague, 2000; K. Del Mar, ‘The Myth of Remedial Secession’, in *Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law* (ed. D. French), Cambridge, 2013, p. 79; *Secession: International Law Perspectives* (ed. M. Kohen), Cambridge, 2006; *The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession* (ed. A. Pavković and P. Radan), Farnham, 2011; *Self-Determination and Secession in International Law* (ed. C. Walter, A. von Ungern-Sternberg and K. Abushov), Oxford, 2014; and J. Dugard, *The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo*, The Hague, 2013. See also above, Chapter 5, p. 218. Self-determination does have a continuing application in terms of human rights situations within the territorial framework of independent states (i.e. internal self-determination), *ibid.*

²⁰⁴ (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, 436; 115 ILR, p. 536. See also *Prime Minister of Spain v. Parliament of Catalonia*, STC 114/2017, ILDC 2814 (ES 2017), Spanish Constitutional Court, Judgment of 17 October 2017.

²⁰⁵ (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, 438.

²⁰⁶ A. Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples*, Cambridge, 1995, p. 120. See also T. Musgrave, *Self-Determination and National Minorities*, Oxford, 1997, pp. 188 ff.; J. Castellino, *International Law and Self-Determination*, The Hague, 2000; and K. Knop, *Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law*, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 65 ff. See also Judge Wildhaber’s Concurring Opinion (joined by Judge Ryssdal) in *Loizidou v. Turkey*, Judgment of 18 December 1996, 108 ILR, pp. 443, 470–3. See also Kohen, *Secession*. See also e.g. the Written Statement of the Russian Federation in the Kosovo case, www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=1, pp. 39–40, underlining that, ‘outside the colonial context, international law allows for secession of a part of a state against the latter’s will only as a matter of self-determination of peoples, and only in extreme circumstances, when the people concerned is continuously subjected to most severe forms of oppression that endangers the very existence of the people’.

²⁰⁷ The Court in *Re Secession of Quebec*, citing Cassese, *Self-Determination*, suggested that the right to external self-determination (i.e. secession) might apply to cases of foreign

occupation and as a last resort where a people's right to internal self-determination (i.e. right to public participation, etc.) was blocked: (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, pp. 438 ff. See also J. Dugard, 'The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo', 357 HR, 2013, p. 9.

²⁰⁸ ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 437–8.

²⁰⁹ See www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275. See also T. D. Grant, *Aggression against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility and International Law*, New York, 2015; but note V. Tolstykh, 'Reunification of Crimea with Russia: A Russian Perspective', 13 *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2014, p. 879; and A. Pronin, 'Republic of Crimea: A Two-Day State', 3 *Russian Law Journal*, 2015, p. 133. The International Court stated in the *Kosovo* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 437, that unilateral and non-consensual declarations of independence, while not as such illegal, may be contrary to international law where 'connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (*jus cogens*)'.

²¹⁰ See the Budapest Memorandum 1994, A/49/765: S/1994/1399, and the 1997 Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet with Ukraine, terminated by Russia on 1 April 2014, www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/russia-ukraine-legislature-adopts-law-on-dissolution-of-black-sea-fleet-treaties/. See also the UN Charter and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act 1976, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26630062.

²¹¹ See also the Russian war with Georgia in 2008 following the latter's attack upon secessionist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (in the territory of Georgia) backed by Russia and Russia's support of the self-proclaimed independence of the entities; see the EU commission Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009.

²¹² See e.g. Security Council resolutions 1766 (2007), 1801 (2008) and 1853 (2008) with regard to Somalia; and resolutions 1756 (2007), 1794 (2007) and 1804 (2008) with regard to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

²¹³ See e.g. Security Council resolutions 1766 (2007), 1801 (2008) and 1853 (2008) with regard to Somalia; and resolutions 1756 (2007), 1794 (2007) and 1804 (2008) with regard to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

²¹⁴ This analysis is supported by *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 554; 80 ILR, p. 459. See also the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, para. 160: ‘Both state practice and *opinio juris* at the relevant time confirm the customary law character of the right to territorial integrity of a non-self-governing territory as a corollary of the right to self-determination’; and R. Mc Corquodale, J. Robinson and N. Peart, ‘Territorial Integrity and Consent in the Chagos Advisory Opinion’, 69 *ICLQ*, 2020, p. 221.

²¹⁵ Shaw, *Title to Territory*, chapter 5. See also the Moroccan approach, *ibid.*

²¹⁶ See, with regard to the preservation of acquired rights, *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 400; 97 ILR, p. 112. See also *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 370, 373–4. In particular, the Court stated in relation to the Bakassi peninsula and Lake Chad regions which contain Nigerian populations that ‘the implementation of the present judgment will afford the parties a beneficial opportunity to co-operate in the interests of the population concerned, in order notably to enable it to continue to have access to educational and health services comparable to those it currently enjoys’, *ibid.*, p. 452. The Court also referred to the commitment of the Cameroon Agent made during the Oral Pleadings to protect Nigerians living in the areas recognised as belonging to Cameroon, *ibid.*, p. 452 and para. V(C) of the Dispositif.

²¹⁷ Shaw, *Title to Territory*, p. 195; Jennings, *Acquisition*, p. 74; and Hill, *Claims to Territory*, pp. 77–80.

²¹⁸ See *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, p. 46; 6 AD, p. 95; and *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 42–3; 59 ILR, pp. 14, 59. See generally B. Feinsein, ‘Boundaries and Security in International Law and Practice’, 3 *Finnish YIL*, 1992, p. 135. Note that in *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, para. 482, the Tribunal noted that it ‘does not consider that the contention that natural features generally determine the course of the boundary to be of any probative value’.

²¹⁹ 114 ILR, pp. 1, 124, 125. But see *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, para. 161, where the Court noted that ‘proximity [of islands to the mainland] as such is not necessarily determinative of legal title’.

²²⁰ See e.g. Shaw, *Title to Territory*, pp. 193–4; Jennings, *Acquisition*, pp. 76–8; and Hill, *Claims to Territory*, pp. 81–91.

²²¹ See *Keesing's Record of World Events*, p. 37635 (1990). Note that Iraq made a similar claim to Kuwait in the early 1960s, although not then taking military action: see Jennings, *Acquisition*, p. 77, note 2.

²²² See e.g. Security Council resolution 662 (1990); Lauterpacht *et al.*, *Kuwait Crisis*, p. 90.

²²³ Shaw, *Title to Territory*, pp. 193–4. Note also the claims advanced by Indonesia to West Irian, *ibid.*, p. 22.

²²⁴ ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12; 59 ILR, p. 14.

²²⁵ See also *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 37 ff. The Tribunal also discounted the notion of reversion of title, *ibid.*, pp. 40, 115.

²²⁶ See e.g. D. M. Ahmed, *Boundaries and Secession in Africa and International Law: Challenging Uti Possidetis*, Cambridge, 2015; G. Oduntan, *International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa*, London, 2015; A. Beaudoin, *Uti Possidetis et Sécession*, Paris, 2011; H. Ghebrewebet, *Identifying Units of Statehood and Determining International Boundaries*, Frankfurt am Main, 2006; A. O. Cukwurah, *The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law*, Manchester, 1967, p. 114; P. De La Pradelle, *La Frontière*, Paris, 1928, pp. 86–7; D. Bardonnet, 'Les Frontières Terrestres et la Relativité de leur Tracé', **153** HR, 1976 V, p. 9; Shaw, 'Heritage of States', p. 75; M. Kohen, *Possession Contestée et Souveraineté Territoriale*, Geneva, 1997, chapter 6; M. Kohen, 'Uti Possidetis, Prescription et Pratique Subséquent à un Traité dans l'Affaire de l'Ile de Kasikili/Sedudu devant la Cour Internationale de Justice', **43** German YIL, 2000, p. 253; G. Nesi, *L'Uti Possidetis Iuris nel Diritto Internazionale*, Padua, 1996; S. Lalonde, *Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World*, Ithaca, 2002; L. Sánchez Rodríguez, 'L'Uti Possidetis et les Effectivités dans les Contentieux Territoriaux et Frontaliers', **263** HR, 1997, p. 149; J. M. Sorel and R. Mehdi, 'L'Uti Possidetis Entre la Consécration Juridique et la Pratique: Essai de Réactualisation', *AFDI*, 1994, p. 11; *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 669–70; T. Bartoš, 'Uti Possidetis. Quo Vadis?', **18** Australian YIL, 1997, p. 37; 'L'Applicabilité de l'Uti Possidetis Juris dans les Situations de Sécession ou de Dissolution d'États', *Colloque*, RBDI, 1998, p. 5; *Démembrements d'États et Délimitations Territoriales* (ed. O. Corten), Brussels, 1999; A. Peters, 'The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris: How Relevant is it for Issues of Secession?', in Walter *et al.*, *Self-*

Determination, p. 95; and G. Nesi, 'Boundaries' in Kohen and Hébié, *Territorial Disputes*, pp. 193, 206 ff.

²²⁷ See the *Colombia–Venezuela* Arbitral Award, 1 RIAA, pp. 223, 228 (1922); 1 AD, p. 84; *Beagle Channel*, HMSO, 1977; 52 ILR, p. 93; and *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute) (Nicaragua Intervening)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 544; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 299–300.

²²⁸ AHG/Res.16(1). See Security Council resolution 1234 (1999) which refers directly to OAU resolution 16(1) and see also article 4(i) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 2002, and the preamble to the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation adopted by the Southern African Development Community in 2001: see further below, [Chapter 17](#), p. 893. See Shaw, *Title to Territory*, pp. 185–7. See also the Separate Opinion by Judge Ajibola in *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 83 ff.; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 81 ff.

²²⁹ Shaw, *Title to Territory*, chapter 5. The principle has also been noted in Asian practice: see e.g. *Temple of Preah Vihear*, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 6; 33 ILR, p. 48; and *Rann of Kutch* 7 ILM, 1968, p. 633; 50 ILR, p. 2.

²³⁰ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 554; 80 ILR, p. 459.

²³¹ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 557; 80 ILR, p. 462.

²³² ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 565; 80 ILR, p. 469.

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 568; 80 ILR, p. 473. Judge Yusuf in his Separate Opinion in *Burkina Faso/Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 44, 134, 138–9, put it as follows:

the principle of respect for boundaries in the
Cairo Resolution places the boundaries existing
at the time of independence in a 'holding
pattern', particularly to avoid armed conflict

over territorial claims, until a satisfactory and peaceful solution is found by the Parties to a territorial dispute in conformity with international law, or until such time as closer integration and unity is achieved among African States in general, or between the neighbouring countries in particular, in keeping with the Pan-African vision. As such, it implies a prohibition of the use of force in the settlement of boundary disputes and an obligation to refrain from acts of seizure of a portion of the territory of another African State.

See, as to the notion of critical date, above, p. 432.

²³⁵ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 565; 80 ILR, p. 470.

²³⁶ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 566; 80 ILR, p. 459. This was reaffirmed by the Court in *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute) (Nicaragua Intervening)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 386–7; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 299–300. The Court in the latter case went on to note that ‘*uti possidetis juris* is essentially a retrospective principle, investing as international boundaries administrative limits intended originally for quite other purposes’, *ibid.*, p. 388; 79 ILR, p. 301. See M. N. Shaw, ‘Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute’, 42 *ICLQ*, 1993, p. 929. See also *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 706 ff.; and *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, paras. 256 ff.

²³⁷ *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 559. See also *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 651.

²³⁸ *Benin v. Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 90, 148; and *Burkina Faso/Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 44, 75.

²³⁹ See e.g. *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 651.

²⁴⁰ See e.g. R. Yakemtchouk, 'Les Conflits de Territoires and de Frontières dans les États de l'Ex-URSS', *AFDI*, 1993, p. 401. See also, with regard to the application of *uti possidetis* to the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, J. Malenovsky, 'Problèmes Juridiques Liés à la Partition de la Tchécoslovaquie', *AFDI*, 1993, p. 328.

²⁴¹ 92 ILR, p. 168. See also A. Pellet, 'Note sur la Commission d'Arbitrage de la Conférence Européenne pour la Paix en Yougoslavie', *AFDI*, 1991, p. 329; and A. Pellet, 'Activité de la Commission d'Arbitrage de la Conférence Européenne pour la Paix en Yougoslavie', *AFDI*, 1992, p. 220.

²⁴² The Arbitration Commission was here dealing specifically with the internal boundaries between Serbia and Croatia and Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

²⁴³ 92 ILR, p. 171. The Arbitration Commission specifically cited here the views of the International Court in *Burkina Faso/Mali*: see above, p. 449. Note also that the Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated in January 1992 that 'the borders of Croatia will become the frontiers of independent Croatia, so there is no doubt about that particular issue. That has been agreed amongst the Twelve, that will be our attitude towards those borders. They will just be changed from being republican borders to international frontiers', UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 719.

²⁴⁴ See e.g. M. N. Shaw, 'Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries', 3 *EJIL*, 1997, pp. 477, 504; but cf. S. Ratner, 'Drawing a Better Line: *Uti Possidetis* and the Borders of New States', 90 *AJIL*, 1996, pp. 590, 613 ff.; and M. Craven, 'The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia', 65 *BYIL*, 1995, pp. 333, 385 ff.

²⁴⁵ See generally Kaikobad, *Interpretation and Revision*; M. Kohen, 'La Relation Titres/Effectivités dans le Contentieux Territorial à la Lumière de la Jurisprudence Récente', 108 *RGDIP*, 2004, p. 561; M. Mendelson, 'The Cameroon–Nigeria Case in the International Court of Justice: Some Territorial Sovereignty and Boundary Delimitation Issues', 75 *BYIL*, 2004, p. 223; B. H. Oxman, 'The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea', 100 *AJIL*, 2006, p. 830; and S. R. Ratner, 'Land Feuds and Their Solutions: Finding International Law Beyond the Tribunal Chamber', 100 *AJIL*, 2006, p. 808. Note that the International Court has emphasised that the principle of *uti possidetis* applies to territorial as well as boundary problems: see *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 387; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 300; and to maritime disputes, see *Territorial and Maritime Dispute*

(*Nicaragua v. Honduras*) (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 707, 729. See further here M. N. Shaw, 'International Law: A System of Relationships', 3 *Collected Courses of the Xiamen Academy*, 2010, pp. 239, 299 ff.; M. Kohen, 'L'uti possidetis et les delimitations maritimes', in *Liber Amicorum Jean-Pierre Cot*, Brussels, 2009, p. 155; S. Lalonde, 'The Role of the *Uti Possidetis* Principle in the Resolution of Maritime Boundary Disputes', in *Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility* (ed. C. Chinkin and F. Baetens), Cambridge, 2015, p. 248; and Y. Tanaka, 'Reflections on Maritime Delimitation in the Nicaragua/Honduras Case', 68 *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, 2008, pp. 903, 907–9.

²⁴⁶ See *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 38–40; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 37–9. See also *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 663. Note that by virtue of article 11 of the Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978, a succession of states does not as such affect a boundary established by a treaty or obligations or rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 provides that the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* does not apply to boundary treaties: see below, [Chapter 15](#), p. 829.

²⁴⁷ ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 37; 100 ILR, p. 36.

²⁴⁸ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 554; 80 ILR, p. 440.

²⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 351; 97 ILR, p. 266. See also Shaw, 'Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute'.

²⁵⁰ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 586–7; 80 ILR, pp. 440, 490–1.

²⁵¹ ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 389; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 302.

²⁵² See e.g. *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 710–11.

²⁵³ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 399; 97 ILR, p. 266.

²⁵⁴ See e.g. ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 408, 485, 514, 525, 563, 565; 97 ILR, pp. 321, 401, 430, 441, 479, 481. See also *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 711 ff. Such post-colonial *effectivités* could show

whether either of the contending states had displayed sufficient evidence of sovereign authority in order to establish legal title, *ibid.*

²⁵⁵ I.e. equity *infra legem* or within the context of existing legal principles.

²⁵⁶ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 633; 80 ILR, pp. 440, 535.

²⁵⁷ ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 514–15; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 430–1.

²⁵⁸ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 396; 97 ILR, p. 309.

²⁵⁹ See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 664–6; S. W. Boggs, *International Boundaries*, New York, 1940; Prescott and Triggs, *International Frontiers*, chapter 7; Bouchez, 'International Boundary Rivers', p. 789; A. Patry, 'Le Régime des Cours d'Eau Internationaux', 1 *Canadian YIL*, 1963, p. 172; R. Baxter, *The Law of International Waterways*, Harvard, 1964; Verzijl, *International Law*, vol. III, pp. 537 ff.; H. Dipla, 'Les Règles de Droit International en Matière de Délimitation Fluviale: Remise en Question?', 89 *RGDIP*, 1985, p. 589; H. Ruiz Fabri, 'Règles Coutumières Générales et Droit International Fluvial', *AFDI*, 1990, p. 818; F. Schroeter, 'Les Systèmes de Délimitation dans les Fleuves Internationaux', *AFDI*, 1992, p. 948; and L. Caflisch, 'Règles Générales du Droit des Cours d'Eaux Internationaux', 219 *HR*, 1989, p. 75. See also I. E. Kornfeld, *Transboundary Water Disputes*, Cambridge, 2019.

²⁶⁰ See e.g. the *Botswana v. Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 1062, 1060–1, where the Court stated that “the thalweg” has variously been taken to mean “the most suitable channel for navigation” on the river, the line “determined by the line of deepest soundings”, or “the median line of the main channel followed by boatmen travelling downstream”. Treaties or conventions which define boundaries in watercourses nowadays usually refer to the thalweg as the boundary when the watercourse is navigable and to the median line between the two banks when it is not, although it cannot be said that practice has been fully consistent’; and *Benin v. Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 90, 126, 149. See also *New Jersey v. Delaware* 291 US 361 (1934); and the *Argentina/Chile Award (Laguna del Desierto)* 113 ILR, pp. 1, 209. See, as to the use of the thalweg principle with regard to wadis (dried river beds), Mendelson and Hulton, 'Iraq–Kuwait Boundary', pp. 160 ff. See also the discussion as to the international boundaries in various rivers, *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 27 June 2017.

²⁶¹ See e.g. *Argentina/Chile Frontier Award (La Palena)* 38 ILR, pp. 10, 93. See also article 2A(1) of Annex I(a) of the Israel–Jordan Treaty of Peace 1994.

²⁶² See e.g. *Chamizal*, 11 RIAA, p. 320.

²⁶³ See e.g. the Iran–Iraq agreements of 1937 and 1975. Note e.g. that the Costa Rica–Nicaragua Treaty of Limits fixed the San Juan river boundary at one point along the right bank of that river: see *Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 229; ICJ Reports, 2015, paras. 59, 71. See Lauterpacht, ‘River Boundaries’, p. 208; K. H. Kaikobad, *The Shatt-al-Arab Boundary Question*, Oxford, 1980; and K. H. Kaikobad, ‘The Shatt-al-Arab River Boundary: A Legal Reappraisal’, 56 *BYIL*, 1985, p. 49. See, as to the question of equitable sharing of international watercourses, McCaffrey, *Law of International Watercourses*; *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 54; 116 ILR, p. 1; the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997; and the Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, *Botswana v. Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 1045, 1148 ff. See also P. Wouters, ‘The Legal Response to International Water Conflicts: The UN Watercourses Convention and Beyond’, 42 *German YIL*, 1999, p. 293. Note that in March 2003, the establishment of a Water Cooperation Facility to mediate in disputes between countries sharing a single river basin was announced: see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2872427.stm>.

²⁶⁴ See e.g. K. Baslar, *The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law*, The Hague, 1998; A. Cassese, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005, pp. 92 ff.; B. Larschan and B. C. Brennan, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law’, 21 *Columbia Journal of International Law*, 1983, p. 305; R. Wolfrum, ‘The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind’, 43 *ZaöRV*, 1983, p. 312; S. Gorove, ‘The Concept of “Common Heritage of Mankind”’, 9 *San Diego Law Review*, 1972, p. 390; and C. Joyner, ‘Legal Implications of the Common Heritage of Mankind’, 35 *ICLQ*, 1986, p. 190. See also R. Wolfrum, ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’, *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2009; M. C. W. Pinto, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: Then and Now’, 361 *HR*, 2013, p. 9.

²⁶⁵ See further below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 540.

²⁶⁶ See further below, p. 469.

²⁶⁷ Questions have arisen as to whether the global climate could be regarded as part of the common heritage of mankind. However, international environmental treaties have not used such terminology, but have rather used the phrase ‘common concern of mankind’, which is weaker and more ambiguous: see e.g. the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992. See A. Boyle, ‘International Law and the Protection of the Global Atmosphere’, in *International Law and Global Climate Change* (ed. D. Freestone and R. Churchill), London, 1991, chapter 1; and P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, *International Law and the Environment*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2009, p. 197. See also below, [Chapter 14](#).

²⁶⁸ See e.g. D. R. Rothwell, *The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law*, Cambridge, 1996; *International Polar Law* (ed. D. R. Rothwell and A. D. Hemmings), Cheltenham, 2018; T. W. Balch, ‘The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations’, 4 *AJIL*, 1910, p. 265; *The Arctic in International Law and Policy* (ed. K. Schönfeldt), Oxford, 2017; *International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean* (ed. S. Lalonde and T. L. McDorman), Leiden, 2015; M. Byers, *International Law and the Arctic*, Cambridge, 2013; D. Pharand, *Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law*, Cambridge, 1988; G. Triggs, *International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica*, Sydney, 1986; *The Antarctic Treaty Regime* (ed. G. Triggs), Cambridge, 1987; and M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1051–61. See also W. Lakhtine, ‘Rights Over the Arctic’, 24 *AJIL*, 1930, p. 703; M. W. Mouton, ‘The International Regime of the Polar Regions’, 101 *HR*, 1960, p. 169; F. Auburn, *Antarctic Law and Politics*, Bloomington, 1982; *International Law for Antarctica* (ed. F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi), 2nd ed., The Hague, 1997; A. D. Watts, *International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System*, Cambridge, 1992; E. J. Sahurie, *The International Law of Antarctica*, Dordrecht, 1992; C. Joyner, *Antarctica and the Law of the Sea*, The Hague, 1992; *The Antarctic Legal Regime* (ed. C. Joyner and S. Chopra), Dordrecht, 1988; *The Antarctic Environment and International Law* (ed. P. Sands, J. Verhoeven and M. Bruce), London, 1992; and E. Franckx, *Maritime Claims in the Arctic*, The Hague, 1993. See also J. Barrett, ‘Securing the Polar Regions Through International Law’, in *Security and International Law* (ed. M. E. Footer, J. Schmidt, N. D. White and L. Davies-Bright), Oxford, 2016; D. R. Rothwell, ‘Polar Territorial and Maritime Sovereignty in the Twenty-First Century’, in *Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility* (ed. C. Chinkin and F. Baetens), Cambridge, 2015, p. 110; and *Challenges of the Changing Arctic: Continental Shelf, Navigation, and Fisheries* (ed. M. H. Nordquist, J. N. Moore and R. Long), The Hague, 2016.

²⁶⁹ See G. H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1940, vol. I.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 465 ff. See also O’Connell, *International Law*, p. 499.

²⁷¹ Hackworth, *Digest*, vol. I, p. 463. But note Canadian government statements denying that the sector principle applies to the ice: see e.g. 9 ILM, 1970, pp. 607, 613. See also I. Head, ‘Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions’, 9 *McGill Law Journal*, 1962–63, p. 200.

²⁷² Hackworth, *Digest*, vol. I, p. 461. Such claims have been maintained by Russia: see e.g. UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, CLCS/93, 18 April 2016, paras. 62 ff.; and see below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 500.

²⁷³ Note also that parts of Sweden, Finland and Iceland’s continental shelf lie within the Arctic Circle: see M. Byers, ‘Arctic Region’, *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2010.

²⁷⁴ See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 693.

²⁷⁵ See e.g. Lakhtine, ‘Rights over the Arctic’, p. 461.

²⁷⁶ See e.g. Balch, ‘Arctic and Antarctic Regions’, pp. 265–6.

²⁷⁷ See e.g. Byers, ‘Arctic Region’.

²⁷⁸ PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, p. 46; 6 AD, p. 95.

²⁷⁹ See e.g. V. J. Schatz, A. Proelss and N. Liu, ‘The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: A Critical Analysis’, 34 *International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, 2019, p. 195. Note also China’s Arctic Policy, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm, in which China describes itself as a ‘Near-Arctic State’ and an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs.

²⁸⁰ See e.g. O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 450–3; Mouton, ‘International Regime’; G. Triggs, ‘Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica – Part I’, **13 Melbourne University Law Review**, 1981, p. 123; and Triggs, *International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica*. See also UKMIL, 54 *BYIL*, 1983, pp. 488 ff. See also S. Vöneky and S. Addison-Agyei, ‘Antarctica’, *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2011.

²⁸¹ See Hackworth, *Digest*, vol. **I**, p. 457. See also *DUSPIL*, 1975, pp. 107–11; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **II**, pp. 250–4, 1254–6, 1262.

²⁸² See e.g. Cmd 5900.

²⁸³ See *Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System*, US Department of State, 9th ed., 2002, www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/antarctic/.

²⁸⁴ Note that the Federal Fiscal Court of Germany stated in the *Antarctica Legal Status* case that Antarctica was not part of the sovereign territory of any state, 108 ILR, p. 654. See, as to the UK view that the British Antarctic Territory is the oldest territorial claim to a part of the continent, although most of it was counter-claimed by either Chile or Argentina, UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 603. Nevertheless, it was accepted that the effect of the Antarctic Treaty was to set aside disputes over territorial sovereignty, *ibid*.

²⁸⁵ See e.g. the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. See also M. Howard, ‘The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A Five Year Review’, **38 ICLQ**, 1989, p. 104. See also www.ats.aq/e/key-documents.html.

²⁸⁶ See www.ats.aq/devAS/Info/AdvancedReports?rpt=pty.

²⁸⁷ The most recent being in July 2019: see www.ats.aq/devAS/Meetings?lang=e.

²⁸⁸ See e.g. *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, p. 32834; and 21(9) *UN Chronicle*, 1984, p. 45.

²⁸⁹ See e.g. C. Joyner, ‘The Antarctic Minerals Negotiating Process’, **81 AJIL**, 1987, p. 888.

290 See e.g. the Antarctic Minerals Act 1989, which provided for a UK licensing system for exploration and exploitation activities in Antarctica.

291 See *Keesing's Record of World Events*, p. 36989 (1989).

292 Article 25.

293 *Guardian*, 30 April 1991, p. 20. See also C. Redgwell, 'Environmental Protection in Antarctica: The 1991 Protocol', **43 ICLQ**, 1994, p. 599.

294 See e.g. D. R. Rothwell, 'Polar Environmental Protection and International Law: The 1991 Antarctic Protocol', **11 EJIL**, 2000, p. 591. Four of the annexes (on environmental impact assessment, conservation of flora and fauna, waste disposal and marine pollution) to the Protocol came into force in 1998 and the fifth (on the Antarctic protected area system) in 2002. A Malaysian initiative at the UN to consider making Antarctica a 'common heritage of mankind' appears to have foundered: see e.g. Redgwell, 'Environmental Protection', and General Assembly resolutions 38/77 and 39/152, and A/39/583.

295 See e.g. M. J. Strauss, *Territorial Leasing in Diplomacy and International Law*, The Hague, 2015; *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 670 ff.; H. Reid, *International Servitudes*, Chicago, 1932; and F. A. Vali, *Servitudes in International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1958. See also Parry, *British Digest*, vol. **IIB**, 1967, pp. 373 ff.; and article 12, Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978.

296 See e.g. Y. Ronen, 'Leases', *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2008.

297 See 50 BFSP, 1860, p. 10 and 90 BFSP, 1898, p. 17. See now 23 ILM, 1984, pp. 1366 ff. for the UK–China agreement on Hong Kong. See also Cmnd 9543 (1985) and the 1985 Hong Kong Act, providing for the termination of British sovereignty and jurisdiction over the territory as from 1 July 1997.

298 See e.g. 72 *AJIL*, 1978, p. 225. This superseded treaties of 1901, 1903, 1936 and 1955 governing the Canal. See also A. Rubin, 'The Panama Canal Treaties', *YBWA*, 1981, p. 181.

299 Article III; see also Ronen, ‘Leases’.

300 *Ibid.*

301 See *Right of Passage*, ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 6; 31 ILR, p. 23. See also S. Marchisio, ‘Servitudes’, *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2011.

302 See e.g. J. B. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 6th ed., Oxford, 1963, p. 191.

303 LNOJ, Sp. Supp. No. 3, 1920, pp. 3, 16–19.

304 114 ILR, pp. 1, 40–1. See also below, [Chapter 10](#), pp. 482 ff. on historic waters.

305 *Ibid.*, p. 137.

306 See e.g. O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 582–7.

307 See Security Council Doc. S/3818, 51 *AJIL*, 1957, p. 673.

308 See *DUSPIL*, 1974, pp. 352–4, 760.

309 PCIJ, Series A, No. 1, 1923, p. 24; 2 AD, p. 99. See generally Baxter, *Law of International Waterways*.

310 11 RIAA, p. 167 (1910).

311 See, as to landlocked states, below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 521.

312 Award of 18 March 2015.

313 *Ibid.*, para. 421.

314 *Ibid.*, paras. 224, 228, 291.

315 *Ibid.*, paras. 425, 428.

316 *Ibid.*, paras. 521 ff. See also the *Chagos Advisory Opinion*, ICJ Reports, 2019.

317 See e.g. *Handbook of Space Law* (ed. F. von der Dunk with F. Tronchetti), Cheltenham, 2015; S. Hobe, *Space Law: A Handbook*, Oxford, 2019; M. Craven, ‘“Other Spaces”: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space’, **30** *EJIL*, 2019, p. 547; C. Q. Christol, *The Modern International Law of Outer Space*, New York, 1982; C. Q. Christol, *Space Law*, Deventer, 1991; *Space Law* (ed. P. S. Dempsey), Oxford, 2004; F. Lyall and P. B. Larsen, *Space Law*, Aldershot, 2009; D.-E. Rociu, *Space Law Treaties and Principles*, 2013; J. E. S. Fawcett, *Outer Space*, Oxford, 1984; S. Gorove, ‘International Space Law in Perspective’, **181** *HR*, 1983, p. 349; S. Gorove, *Developments in Space Law*, Dordrecht, 1991; M. Marcoff, *Traité de Droit International Public de l’Espace*, Fribourg, 1973; M. Marcoff, ‘Sources du Droit International de l’Espace’, **168** *HR*, p. 9; N. Matte, *Aerospace Law*, Montreal, 1969; *Le Droit de l’Espace* (ed. J. Dutheil de la Rochère), Paris, 1988; P. M. Martin, *Droit International des Activités Spatiales*, Masson, 1992; B. Cheng, ‘The 1967 Space Treaty’, *Journal de Droit International*, 1968, p. 532; B. Cheng, ‘The Moon Treaty’, **33** *Current Legal Problems*, 1980, p. 213, B. Cheng, ‘The Legal Status of Outer Space’, *Journal of Space Law*, 1983, p. 89, B. Cheng, ‘The UN and the Development of International Law Relating to Outer Space’, in *Thesaurus Acroasium*, vol. **16**, Thessaloniki, 1990, p. 49; B. Cheng, *Studies in International Space Law*, Oxford, 1997. See also D. S. Sachdeva, *Outer Space: Law, Policy and Governance*, New Delhi, 2013; T. L. Masson-Zwaan and S. Hobe, *The Law of Outer Space*, The Hague, 2010; *Oppenheim’s International Law*, chapter 7; P. Daillier et al., *Droit International Public*, p. 1254; R. G. Steinhardt, ‘Outer Space’, in *United Nations Legal Order* (ed. O. Schachter and C. C. Joyner), Cambridge, 1995, vol. **II**, p. 753; *Manual on Space Law* (ed. N. Jasentulajana and R. Lee), New York, 4 vols., 1979; *Space Law – Basic Documents* (ed. K. H. Böckstiegel and M. Berkö), Dordrecht, 1991; *Outlook on Space Law* (ed. S. G. Lafferanderie and D. Crowther), The Hague, 1997; G. H. Reynolds and R. P. Merges, *Outer Space*, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO, 1997; UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, www.unoosa.org/; and United Nations, *International Space Law: United Nations Instruments*, New York, 2017.

318 See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 650–1; and N. Matte, *Treatise on Air–Aeronautical Law*, Montreal, 1981, chapters 4 and 5.

319 Matte, *Treatise*, pp. 91–6.

320 Article 1. Each party also undertook to accord in peacetime freedom of innocent passage to the private aircraft of other parties so long as they complied with the rules made by or under the authority of the Convention. Articles 5–10 provided that the nationality of aircraft would be based upon registration and that registration would take place in the state of which their owners were nationals. An International Commission for Air Navigation was established. See also the 1928 American Convention on Commercial Aviation.

321 ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 128; 76 ILR, p. 1.

322 ICJ Reports, 2005, p. 142.

323 See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 652. It should, however, be noted that articles 38 and 39 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 provide for a right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone for aircraft as well as ships. Note also that under article 53 of this Convention, aircraft have a right of overflight with regard to designated air routes above archipelagic waters.

324 See also *Pan Am Airways v. The Queen* (1981) 2 SCR 565; 90 ILR, p. 213, with regard to the exercise of sovereignty over the airspace above the high seas.

325 Note the role played by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space established in 1958 and consisting currently of sixty-nine states. The Committee has a Legal Sub-Committee and a Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee: see, in particular, Christol, *Modern International Law*, pp. 13–20; and www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/aboutus/index.html.

326 See e.g. Fawcett, *Outer Space*, chapter 7.

327 The UK has noted e.g. that, ‘for practical purposes the limit [between airspace and outer space] is considered to be as high as any aircraft can fly’, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 520.

328 See generally Christol, *Modern International Law*, chapter 10; and see also e.g. UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 689. A variety of suggestions have been put forward regarding the method of delimitation, ranging from the properties of the atmosphere to the lowest

possible orbit of satellites. They appear to fall within either a spatial or a functional category: see *ibid.*, and UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/7/Add.1, 21 January 1977. Some states have argued for a 110-km boundary: see e.g. Soviet Union, 21(4) *UN Chronicle*, 1984, p. 37; others feel it is premature to establish such a fixed delimitation: e.g. US and UK, *ibid.* See also 216 HL Deb., col. 975, 1958–9; and D. Goedhuis, ‘The Problems of the Frontiers of Outer Space and Airspace’, 174 *HR*, 1982, p. 367. The *Oslo Manual* notes that outer space ‘begins at the lowest possible point of the orbital perigee of artificial satellites’, *Oslo Manual on Select Topics of the Law of Armed Conflict* (ed. Y. Dinstein and A. W. Dahl), Switzerland, 2020, p. 1 (Rule 1). See also the discussions in the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/AC.105/1203, paras. 83 ff. (2019).

329 See also General Assembly resolutions 1721 (XVI) and 1884 (XVIII).

330 See also ‘The Space Millennium: The Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development’ adopted by the Third UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III), Vienna, 1999.

331 See above, [Chapter 3](#); and B. Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?’, 5 *IJIL*, 1965, p. 23.

332 See http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space.

333 See e.g. Christol, *Modern International Law*, chapter 2. See also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 828.

334 The issue became particularly controversial in the light of the US Strategic Defence Initiative (‘Star Wars’), which aimed to develop a range of anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons based in space. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space considered the issue, although without the participation of the US, which objected to the matter being considered: see e.g. 21(6) *UN Chronicle*, 1984, p. 18.

335 See e.g. Marcoff, *Traité*, pp. 361 ff.

336 See e.g. Christol, *Modern International Law*, pp. 25–6. See also D. Goedhuis, ‘Legal Issues Involved in the Potential Military Uses of Space Stations’, in *Liber Amicorum for Rt Hon. Richard Wilberforce* (ed. M. Bos and I. Brownlie), Oxford, 1987, p. 23; and Gorove, *Developments*, part VI.

³³⁷ See <https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801313d9>.

³³⁸ See also the international Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 2002, which seeks to reduce ballistic missile proliferation. The Code is an agreement between states on how they should conduct trade; it does not call for the destruction of missiles as such, but there are no legal obligations or inspection systems, www.hcoc.at/. The Code supplements the Missile Technology Control Regime which is an export control regime, operating as an informal political understanding among thirty-five member states formed by the G-7 industrialised countries in 1987, seeking to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, see <https://mtcr.info/>. Note also the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972, from which the US withdrew in 2002 and the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement 2010; see F. Tronchetti, 'Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space', in *Handbook of Space Law*, pp. 331, 347–9, 360–3. See also www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements.

³³⁹ See e.g. Tronchetti, 'Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space', in *Handbook of Space Law*, p. 331. Countries that have sent space vehicles to the moon include primarily the US, Russia and China; see www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/which-countries-moon/.

³⁴⁰ See e.g. www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database, giving a number of 2,666, of which half are from the US and the others from a wide range of countries and international organisations; see www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=&t=country.

³⁴¹ See e.g. www.thespacereview.com/article/3927/1; www.space.com/russia-anti-satellite-missile-test-2020.html; https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf; and <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/15/india-s-asat-test-incomplete-success-pub-78884>, respectively. Note also the creation of US Space Force as a branch of the Armed Forces in the Department of the Air Force on 20 December 2019 with responsibilities to develop 'military space professionals, acquiring military space systems, maturing the military doctrine for space power, and organising space forces to present to our Combatant Commands'; see www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/About-Space-Force.

³⁴² See <https://spaceflightnow.com/2020/07/23/u-s-officials-say-russia-tested-a-new-anti-satellite-weapon/>.

³⁴³ See e.g. US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, Washington, DC, 2016, para. 14.10.2.2; and *Oslo Manual* p. 3 (Rule 3). See also D. Stephens and C. Steer, ‘Conflicts in Space: International Humanitarian Law and Its Application to Space Warfare’, *XL McGill Annals of Air and Space Law*, 2015, p. 1, RUMLAE Research Paper No. 16-18, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2722315>.

³⁴⁴ See e.g. B. Cheng, ‘Article VI of the 1967 Treaty Revisited’, *1 Journal of Space Law*, 1998, p. 7. This is particularly important now in view of the rapidly increasing role played in outer space by non-governmental private bodies, see e.g. F. von der Dunk, ‘Legal Aspects of Private Manned Spaceflight’, in *Handbook of Space Law*, chapter 12.

³⁴⁵ See further Cheng, *Studies in Space Law*, chapters 17 and 18.

³⁴⁶ See e.g. the Exchange of Notes between the UK and Chinese governments with regard to liability for damages arising during the launch phase of the Asiasat Satellite in 1990 in accordance with, *inter alia*, the 1967 and 1972 Conventions: UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 689.

³⁴⁷ The claim was for \$6,401,174.70. See 18 ILM, 1979, pp. 899 ff. See also Christol, *Modern International Law*, pp. 59 ff.; and C. Q. Christol, ‘International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects’, *74 AJIL*, 1980, p. 346. B. Cheng has drawn attention to difficulties concerning the notion of damage here as including environmental damage: see International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-ninth Conference, London, 2000, p. 581. Note also that under article III of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, all states parties to the Treaty agree to carry on activities ‘in accordance with international law’, which clearly includes rules relating to state responsibility. See also Gorove, *Developments*, part V; B. Hurwitz, *State Liability for Outer Space Activities in Accordance with the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects*, Dordrecht, 1992; and J. A. Dennerley, ‘State Liability for Space Object Collisions: The Proper Interpretation of “Fault” for the Purposes of International Space Law’, *29 EJIL*, 2018, p. 281.

³⁴⁸ GA resolution 62/217. The Guidelines were produced by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/62/20, A/AC.105/890, para. 99 and A/AC.105/848, annex II.

349 The International Law Association adopted in 1994 the Buenos Aires International Instrument on the Protection of the Environment from Damage Caused by Space Debris. This provides that each state or international organisation party to the Instrument that launches or procures the launching of a space object is internationally liable for damage arising therefrom to another state, persons or objects, or international organisation party to the Instrument as a consequence of space debris produced by any such object: see Report of the Sixty-sixth Conference at Buenos Aires, London, 1994, p. 7.

350 Resolution 47/68.

351 The UK Outer Space Act 1986 e.g. provides a framework for private sector space enterprises by creating a licensing system for outer space activities and by establishing a system for indemnification for damage suffered by third parties or elsewhere. The Act also establishes a statutory register of the launch of space objects. Note also that the US has signed a number of agreements with other states providing for assistance abroad in the event of an emergency landing of the space shuttle. These agreements also provide for US liability to compensate for damage and loss caused as a result of an emergency landing, in accordance with the 1972 Treaty: see *Cumulative DUSPIL* 1981–88, vol. II, p. 2269. In 1988, an Agreement on Space Stations was signed between the US, the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency, Japan and Canada. This provides, *inter alia*, for registration of flight elements as space objects under the Registration of Objects Convention of 1975, each state retaining jurisdiction over the elements it so registers and personnel in or on the space station who are its nationals. There is also an interesting provision (article 22) permitting the US to exercise criminal jurisdiction over misconduct committed by a non-US national in or on a non-US element of the manned base or attached to the manned base, which endangers the safety of the manned base or the crew members thereon. Before proceeding to trial with such a prosecution, the US shall consult with the partner state whose nationality the alleged perpetrator holds, and shall either have received the agreement of that partner to the prosecution or failed to have received an assurance that the partner state intends to prosecute.

352 This came into force in July 1984: see C. Q. Christol, ‘The Moon Treaty Enters into Force’, **79 AJIL**, 1985, p. 163.

353 See e.g. Cheng, ‘Moon Treaty’, pp. 231–2; and Christol, *Modern International Law*, chapters 7 and 8. See also R. Lee, *Law and Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals*

in Outer Space, Heidelberg, 2012.

³⁵⁴ See below, [Chapter 10](#), p. 540, regarding the ‘common heritage’ regime envisaged for the deep seabed under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.

³⁵⁵ See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXIV-2&chapter=24&clang=en.

³⁵⁶ The US has taken this position, see e.g. *DUSPIL*, 2017, p. 536.

³⁵⁷ See e.g. the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 2015, the Luxembourg Loi sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace, No. 674 du 28 juillet 2017 and the UAE Federal Law No. 12 of 2019 on the Regulation of the Space Sector. Note also the US Presidential Executive Order on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, 6 April 2020, www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-encouraging-international-support-recovery-use-space-resources/. This has been followed by the publication of the ‘Artemis Accords’, www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/index.html, regarding which the US seeks international support for the exploitation and use of space resources. The European Space Agency is also formulating plans, reportedly, for the mining of natural resources on the moon, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/22/europe/mining-on-moon-trnd/index.html>, as are other countries; see e.g. K. Vazhapully, ‘Space Law at the Crossroads: Contextualizing the Artemis Accords and the Space Resources Executive Order’, *Opinio Juris*, 22 July 2020. See also the Vancouver Recommendations on Space Mining, produced by the Outer Space Institute, 20 April 2020, [www.outerspaceinstitute.ca/docs/Vancouver Recommendations on Space Mining.pdf](http://www.outerspaceinstitute.ca/docs/Vancouver_Recommendations_on_Space_Mining.pdf).

³⁵⁸ See e.g. Vazhapully, ‘Space Law’; www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/04/07/russia-compares-trumps-space-mining-order-to-colonialism-a69901 and https://in.reuters.com/article/space-exploration-moon-mining-russia/kremlin-says-u-s-moon-mining-proposals-need-thorough-legal-analysis-idINKBN22I22Z?fbclid=IwAR0BxYimlqYLkFWkk625Jh927t08uKoOsi_vDophYEJXsKTKWTvBxnOs23g.

³⁵⁹ See e.g. the debates in the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2018, A/AC.105/1177 and A/AC.105/1203, 2019, paras. 239 ff.

360 See e.g. *Commercial Uses of Space and Space Tourism: Legal and Policy Aspects* (ed. J. Wouters, P. De Man and R. Hansen), Cheltenham, 2017; Jinyuan Su, 'Legality of Unilateral Exploitation of Space Resources Under International Law', **66** *ICLQ*, 2017, p. 991; S. Hobe, 'Legal Aspects of Space Tourism', **86** *Nebraska Law Review*, 2009, p. 439; and Y. Failat, 'Space Tourism: A Synopsis on its Legal Challenges', **1** *Irish Law Journal*, 2012, p. 120. Note that in 2011, the Permanent Court of Arbitration adopted Optional Rules for the Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities: see http://pca-cpa.org/shownews.asp?ac=view&pag_id=1261&nws_id=323. See also www.space.com/topics/space-tourism.

361 See www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-opens-international-space-station-to-new-commercial-opportunities-private.

362 See e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-52855029.

363 Note e.g. activities including international crew transport to the space station by SpaceX and Boeing corporations [Axiom Space's commercial module](http://www.axiomspace.com) on the space station; see www.space.com/nasa-monopoly-low-earth-orbit-commercialization.html.

364 See e.g. the US Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act 2004 and National and Commercial Space Programs, US Code Title 51, 2010. See also the UK Outer Space Act 1986 and the Space Industry Act 2018. Note I. Marboe, 'National Space Law', in *Space Handbook*, [chapter 3](#).

10

The Law of the Sea

The seas have historically performed two important functions: first, as a medium of communication; and, secondly, as a vast reservoir of resources, both living and non-living. Both of these functions have stimulated the development of legal rules.¹ The fundamental principle governing the law of the sea is that ‘the land dominates the sea’ so that the land territorial situation constitutes the starting point for the determination of the maritime rights of a coastal state.²

The seas were at one time thought capable of subjection to national sovereignties. The Portuguese in particular in the seventeenth century proclaimed huge tracts of the high seas as part of their territorial domain, but these claims stimulated a response by Grotius who elaborated the doctrine of the open seas, whereby the oceans as *res communis* international law were to be accessible to all nations, but incapable of appropriation.³ This view prevailed, partly because it accorded with the interests of the North European states, which demanded freedom of the seas for the purposes of exploration and expanding commercial intercourse with the East.

The freedom of the high seas rapidly became a basic principle of international law, but not all the seas were so characterised. It was permissible for a coastal state to appropriate a maritime belt around its coastline as territorial waters,

or territorial sea, and treat it as an indivisible part of its domain. Much of the history of the law of the sea has centred on the extent of the territorial sea or the precise location of the dividing line between it and the high seas and other recognised zones. The original stipulation linked the width of the territorial sea to the ability of the coastal state to dominate it by military means from the confines of its own shore. But the present century has witnessed continual pressure by states to enlarge the maritime belt and thus subject more of the oceans to their exclusive jurisdiction.

Beyond the territorial sea, other jurisdictional zones have been in process of development. Coastal states may now exercise particular jurisdictional functions in the contiguous zone, and the trend of international law today is moving rapidly in favour of even larger zones in which the coastal state may enjoy certain rights to the exclusion of other nations, such as fishery zones, continental shelves and, more recently, exclusive economic zones. However, in each case, whether a state is entitled to a territorial sea, continental shelf or exclusive economic zone is a question to be decided by the law of the sea.⁴

This gradual shift in the law of the sea towards the enlargement of the territorial sea (the accepted maximum limit is now a width of 12 nautical miles in contrast to 3 nautical miles some sixty years ago), coupled with the continual assertion of jurisdictional rights over portions of what were regarded as high seas, reflects a basic change in emphasis in the attitude of states to the sea.

The predominance of the concept of the freedom of the high seas has been modified by the realisation of resources present in the seas and seabed

beyond the territorial seas. Parallel with the developing tendency to assert ever greater claims over the high seas, however, has been the move towards proclaiming a 'common heritage of mankind' regime over the seabed of the high seas. The law relating to the seas, therefore, has been in a state of flux for several decades as the conflicting principles have manifested themselves.

A series of conferences have been held, which led to the four 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea and then to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.⁵ The 1958 Convention on the High Seas was stated in its preamble to be 'generally declaratory of established principles of international law', while the other three 1958 instruments can be generally accepted as containing both reiterations of existing rules and new rules.

The pressures leading to the Law of the Sea Conference, which lasted between 1974 and 1982 and involved a very wide range of states and international organisations, included a variety of economic, political and strategic factors. Many Developing Countries wished to develop the exclusive economic zone idea, by which coastal states would have extensive rights over a 200-mile zone beyond the territorial sea, and were keen to establish international control over the deep seabed, so as to prevent the technologically advanced states from being able to extract minerals from this vital and vast source freely and without political constraint. Western states were desirous of protecting their navigation routes by opposing any weakening of the freedom of passage through international straits particularly, and wished to protect their economic interests through free exploitation of the resources of the high seas and the deep seabed. Other states and groups of states sought protection of their particular interests.⁶

Examples here would include the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, archipelagic states and coastal states. The effect of this kaleidoscopic range of interests was very marked and led to the ‘package deal’ concept of the final draft. According to this approach, for example, the Developing Countries accepted passage through straits and enhanced continental shelf rights beyond the 200-mile limit from the coasts in return for the internationalisation of deep sea mining.⁷

The 1982 Convention contains 320 articles and 9 Annexes. It was adopted by 130 votes to 4, with 17 abstentions. The Convention entered into force on 16 November 1994, twelve months after the required sixty ratifications. In order primarily to meet Western concerns with regard to the International Seabed Area (Part XI of the Convention), an Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 Convention was adopted on 29 July 1994.⁸

Many of the provisions in the 1982 Convention repeat principles enshrined in the earlier instruments and others have since become customary rules, but many new rules were proposed. Accordingly, a complicated series of relationships between the various states exists in this field, based on customary rules and treaty rules.⁹ All states are *prima facie* bound by the accepted customary rules, while only the parties to the five treaties involved will be bound by the new rules contained therein, and since one must envisage some states not adhering to the 1982 Conventions, the 1958 rules will continue to be of importance.¹⁰ During the twelve-year period between the signing of the Convention and its coming into force, the influence of its provisions was clear in the process of law creation by state practice.¹¹

The Territorial Sea

Internal Waters¹²

Internal waters are deemed to be such parts of the seas as do not form part of the high seas or the territorial sea or the contiguous or exclusive economic zones, and are accordingly classed as appertaining to the land territory of the coastal state. Internal waters, whether harbours, lakes or rivers, are such waters as are to be found on the landward side of the baselines from which the width of the territorial and other zones is measured,¹³ and are assimilated with the sovereign territory of the state.¹⁴ They differ from the territorial sea primarily in that there does not exist any right of innocent passage from which the shipping of other states may benefit. There is an exception to this rule where the straight baselines enclose as internal waters what had been territorial waters.¹⁵

In general, a coastal state may exercise its jurisdiction over foreign ships within its internal waters to enforce its laws, although the judicial authorities of the flag state (i.e. the state whose flag the particular ship flies) may also act where crimes have occurred on board ship. This concurrent jurisdiction may be seen in two cases.

In *R v. Anderson*,¹⁶ in 1868, the Court of Criminal Appeal in the United Kingdom declared that an American national who had committed manslaughter on board a British vessel in French internal waters was subject to the jurisdiction of the British courts, even though he was also within the sovereignty of French justice (and American justice by reason of his nationality), and thus could be correctly convicted under English law. The US

Supreme Court held in the *Wildenhus* case¹⁷ that the American courts had jurisdiction to try a crew member of a Belgian vessel for the murder of another Belgian national when the ship was docked in the port of Jersey City in New York.¹⁸

A merchant ship in a foreign port or in foreign internal waters is automatically subject to the local jurisdiction (unless there is an express agreement to the contrary), although where purely disciplinary issues related to the ship's crew are involved, which do not concern the maintenance of peace within the territory of the coastal state, then such matters would by courtesy be left to the authorities of the flag state to regulate.¹⁹ Although some writers have pointed to theoretical differences between the common law and French approaches, in practice the same fundamental proposition applies.²⁰

However, a completely different situation operates where the foreign vessel involved is a warship. In such cases, the authorisation of the captain or of the flag state is necessary before the coastal state may exercise its jurisdiction over the ship and its crew. This is due to the status of the warship as a direct arm of the sovereign of the flag state.²¹

Baselines²²

The width of the territorial sea is defined from the low-water mark around the coasts of the state. This is the traditional principle under customary international law and was reiterated in article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 and article 5 of the 1982 Convention, and the low-water line along the coast is defined ‘as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal state’.²³

In the majority of cases, it will not be very difficult to locate the low-water line which is to act as the baseline for measuring the width of the territorial sea.²⁴ By virtue of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the low-water line of a low-tide elevation²⁵ may now be used as a baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea if it is situated wholly or partly within the territorial sea measured from the mainland or an island. However, a low-tide elevation wholly situated beyond the territorial sea will generate no territorial sea of its own.²⁶ When a low-tide elevation is situated in the overlapping area of the territorial sea of two states, both are in principle entitled to use this as part of the relevant low-water line in measuring their respective territorial sea.²⁷ However, the International Court has taken the view that low-tide elevations may not be appropriated as part of the territory of the state concerned, unless within the territorial sea and thus part of the sovereignty of the coastal state over those waters, and thus cannot be fully assimilated with islands.²⁸ A low-tide elevation with a lighthouse or similar installation built upon it may be used for the purpose of drawing a straight baseline.²⁹

Sometimes, however, the geography of the state's coasts will be such as to cause certain problems: for instance, where the coastline is deeply indented or there are numerous islands running parallel to the coasts, or where there exist bays cutting into the coastlines. Special rules have evolved to deal with this issue, which is of importance to coastal states, particularly where foreign vessels regularly fish close to the limits of the territorial sea. A more rational method of drawing baselines might have the effect of enclosing larger areas of the sea within the state's internal waters, and thus extend the boundaries of the territorial sea further than the traditional method might envisage.

This point was raised in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case,³⁰ before the International Court of Justice. The case concerned a Norwegian decree delimiting its territorial sea along some 1,000 miles of its coastline. However, instead of measuring the territorial sea from the low-water line, the Norwegians constructed a series of straight baselines linking the outermost parts of the land running along the *skjaergaard* (or fringe of islands and rocks) which parallels the Norwegian coastline. This had the effect of enclosing within its territorial limits parts of what would normally have been the high seas if the traditional method had been utilised. As a result, certain disputes involving British fishing boats arose, and the United Kingdom challenged the legality of the Norwegian method of baselines under international law. The Court held that it was the outer line of the *skjaergaard* that was relevant in establishing the baselines, and not the low-water line of the mainland. This was dictated by geographic realities. The Court noted that the normal method of drawing baselines that are parallel to the coast (the *tracé parallèle*) was not applicable in this case because it would necessitate

complex geometrical constructions in view of the extreme indentations of the coastline and the existence of the series of islands fringing the coasts.³¹

Since the usual methods did not apply, and taking into account the principle that the territorial sea must follow the general direction of the coasts, the concept of straight baselines drawn from the outer rocks could be considered.³² The Court also made the point that the Norwegian system had been applied consistently over many years and had met no objections from other states, and that the United Kingdom had not protested until many years after it had first been introduced.³³ In other words, the method of straight baselines operated by Norway:

had been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the attitude of governments bears witness to the fact that they did not consider it to be contrary to international law.³⁴

Thus, although noting that Norwegian rights had been established through actual practice coupled with acquiescence, the Court regarded the straight baseline system itself as a valid principle of international law in view of the special geographic conditions of the area. The Court provided criteria for determining the acceptability of any such delimitations. The drawing of the baselines had not to depart from the general direction of the coast, in view of the close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land domain; the baselines had to be drawn so that the sea area lying within them had to be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal

waters, and it was permissible to consider in the process ‘certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are evidenced by long usage’.³⁵

These principles emerging from the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case were accepted by states as part of international law within a comparatively short period.

Article 7 of the 1982 Convention states that the straight baseline system could be used in cases of deeply indented coastlines or where there exist a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity (*skjaergaard*) provided that the line does not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast and that there are sufficiently close links between the sea areas within the lines and the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. In addition, particular regional economic interests of long standing may be considered where necessary.³⁶

A number of states now use the system, including, it should be mentioned, the United Kingdom as regards areas on the west coast of Scotland.³⁷

However, there is evidence that, perhaps in view of the broad criteria laid down, many states have used this system in circumstances that are not strictly justifiable in law.³⁸ However, the Court made it clear in *Qatar v. Bahrain* that

the method of straight baselines, which is an exception to the normal rules for the determination of baselines, may only be applied

if a number of conditions are met. This method must be applied restrictively. Such conditions are primarily that either the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or that there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.³⁹

Further, the Court emphasised that the fact that a state considers itself a multiple-island state or a *de facto* archipelago does not allow it to deviate from the normal rules for the determination of baselines unless the relevant conditions are met.⁴⁰

Where the result of the straight baseline method is to enclose as internal waters areas previously regarded as part of the territorial sea or high seas, a right of innocent passage shall be deemed to exist in such waters by virtue of article 5(2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958.⁴¹

Bays⁴²

Problems also arise as to the approach to be adopted with regard to bays, in particular whether the waters of wide-mouthed bays ought to be treated as other areas of the sea adjacent to the coast, so that the baseline of the territorial sea would be measured from the low-water mark of the coast of the bay, or whether the device of the straight baseline could be used to ‘close off’ the mouth of the bay of any width and the territorial limit measured from that line.

It was long accepted that a straight closing line could be used across the mouths of bays, but there was considerable disagreement as to the permitted width of the bay beyond which this would not operate.⁴³ The point was settled in article 7 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea. This declared that:⁴⁴

if the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters.

If the distance between the low-water marks exceeds 24 miles, a straight baseline of 24 miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.

This provision, however, does not apply to historic bays. These are bays the waters of which are treated by the coastal state as internal in view of historic rights supported by general acquiescence rather than any specific principle of international law.⁴⁵ A number of states have claimed historic bays: for example, Canada with regard to Hudson Bay (although the United States has opposed this)⁴⁶ and certain American states as regards the Gulf of Fonseca.⁴⁷ The question of this Gulf came before the International Court in *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute)*

(Nicaragua Intervening).⁴⁸ The Court noted that the states concerned and commentators were agreed that the Gulf was a historic bay, but this was defined in terms of the particular historical situation of that Gulf, especially as it constituted a pluri-state bay, for which there were no agreed and codified general rules of the kind well established for single-state bays.⁴⁹ In the light of the particular historical circumstances and taking particular note of the 1917 decision, the Court found that the Gulf, beyond a long-accepted 3-mile maritime belt for the coastal states, constituted historic waters subject to the co-ownership or a condominium of the three coastal states.⁵⁰ The Court continued by noting that the vessels of other states would enjoy a right of innocent passage in the waters beyond the coastal belt in order to ensure access to any one of the three coastal states.⁵¹ Having decided that the three states enjoyed a condominium within the Gulf, the Court concluded that there was a tripartite presence at the closing line of the Gulf.⁵²

The US Supreme Court has taken the view that where waters are outside the statutory limits for inland waters, the exercise of sovereignty required to establish title to a historic bay amounted to the exclusion of all foreign vessels and navigation from the area claimed. The continuous authority exercised in this fashion had to be coupled with the acquiescence of states. This was the approach in the *United States v. Alaska* case⁵³ concerning the waters of Cook Inlet. The Supreme Court held that Alaska had not satisfied the terms and that the Inlet had not been regarded as a historic bay under Soviet, American or Alaskan sovereignty. Accordingly, it was the federal state and not Alaska which was entitled to the subsurface of Cook Inlet.⁵⁴

In response to the Libyan claim to the Gulf of Sirte (Sidra) as a historic bay and the consequent drawing of a closing line of nearly 300 miles in length in 1973, several states immediately protested, including the United States and the states of the European Community.⁵⁵ The United States in a note to Libya in 1974 referred to ‘the international law standards of past open, notorious and effective exercise of authority, and the acquiescence of foreign nations’⁵⁶ and has on several occasions sent naval and air forces into the Gulf in order to maintain its opposition to the Libyan claim and to assert that the waters of the Gulf constitute high seas.⁵⁷ Little evidence appears, in fact, to support the Libyan contention.

The question of historic waters was examined by the Tribunal in the *Philippines v. China* arbitration on the South China Sea,⁵⁸ where it was underlined that what was required was ‘the continuous exercise of the claimed right by the state asserting the claim and acquiescence on the part of other affected states’. The Tribunal particularly noted that:⁵⁹

historic rights are, in most instances, exceptional rights. They accord a right that a state would not otherwise hold, were it not for the operation of the historical process giving rise to the right and the acquiescence of other states in the process. It follows from this, however, that the exercise of freedoms permitted under international law cannot give rise to a historic right; it involves nothing that would call for the acquiescence of other states

and can only represent the use of what international law already freely permits.

Islands⁶⁰

As far as islands are concerned, the general provisions noted above regarding the measurement of the territorial sea apply. Islands are defined in article 121(1) of the 1982 Convention as consisting of ‘a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide’,⁶¹ and they can generate a territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf where relevant.⁶² Where there exists a chain of islands which are less than 24 miles apart, a continuous band of territorial sea may be generated.⁶³ However, article 121(3) of the 1982 Convention provides that ‘rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf’, although they can generate a territorial sea.⁶⁴ Low-tide elevations do not generate territorial seas of their own when situated outside the territorial sea of the mainland or an island by virtue of article 13(2) of the 1982 Convention, while artificial islands would generate only a 500-metre safety zone under article 60(5) of the Convention. Article 121(3) begs a series of questions, such as the precise dividing line between rocks and islands and as to the actual meaning of an ‘economic life of their own’, and a number of states have made controversial claims.⁶⁵ Whether this provision over and above its appearance in the Law of the Sea Convention is a rule of customary law is unclear.⁶⁶ The question of the relationship between islands and low-tide elevations was discussed in the *Philippines v. China* arbitration concerning the South China Sea,⁶⁷ where the

Tribunal underlined that articles 121(3) and 13 needed to be interpreted together. It was particularly noted that a low-tide elevation could not be legally transformed into an island through human efforts and a rock could not be transformed into a fully entitled island through land reclamation. The status of a feature has to be assessed on the basis of its natural condition. The Tribunal concluded that substantial human modifications such as the construction of large installations like desalination plants and airstrips would not suffice to change the original characterisation of the maritime feature from a low-tide elevation into an island in law.

Archipelagic States⁶⁸

Problems have arisen as a result of efforts by states comprising a number of islands to draw straight baselines around the outer limits of their islands, thus ‘boxing in’ the whole territory. Indonesia in particular has resorted to this method, against the protests of a number of states since it tends to reduce previously considered areas of the high seas extensively used as shipping lanes to the sovereignty of the archipelago state concerned.⁶⁹

There has been a great deal of controversy as to which international law principles apply in the case of archipelagos and the subject was not expressly dealt with in the 1958 Geneva Convention.⁷⁰ Article 46(a) defines an archipelagic state as ‘a state constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands’, while article 46(b) defines archipelagos as ‘a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such’. This raises questions as to whether states that objectively fall within the definition are therefore automatically to be regarded as archipelagic states. The list of states that have not declared that they constitute archipelagic states, although they would appear to conform with the definition, would include the United Kingdom and Japan.⁷¹ Bahrain contended in *Qatar v. Bahrain* that it constituted a ‘*de facto* archipelago or multiple island state’ and that it could declare itself an archipelagic state under the Law of the Sea Convention 1982, enabling it to take advantage of the straight baselines rule contained in

article 47. The Court, however, noted that such a claim did not fall within Bahrain's formal submissions and thus it did not need to take a position on the issue.⁷² Article 47 provides that an archipelagic state may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago, which would then serve as the relevant baselines for other purposes. There are a number of conditions before this may be done, however, and article 47 provides as follows:

1. An archipelagic state may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and in areas in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
4. Such baselines shall not be drawn from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest island.

5. The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an archipelagic state in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or the exclusive economic zone the territorial sea of another state.

6. If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state lies between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring state, existing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter state has traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated by agreement between those states shall continue and be respected.

7. For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to land under paragraph 1, land areas may include waters lying within the fringing reefs of islands and atolls, including that part of a steep-sided oceanic plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of limestone islands and drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the plateau.

8. The baselines drawn in accordance with this article shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position.

Alternatively, lists of geographic co-ordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted.

9. The archipelagic states shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

All the waters within such baselines are archipelagic waters⁷³ over which the state has sovereignty,⁷⁴ but existing agreements, traditional fishing rights and existing submarine cables must be respected.⁷⁵ In addition, ships of all states shall enjoy the rights of innocent passage through archipelagic waters⁷⁶ and

all the ships and aircraft are to enjoy a right of archipelagic sea lanes passage through such lanes and air routes designated by the archipelagic state for 'continuous and expeditious passage'.⁷⁷

In response to a reported closure in 1988 of the Straits of Sunda and Lombok by Indonesia, the United States stressed that the archipelagic provisions of the 1982 Convention reflected customary international law and that those straits were subject to the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage. Accordingly, it was pointed out that any interference with such passage would violate international law.⁷⁸

The Width of the Territorial Sea⁷⁹

There has historically been considerable disagreement as to how far the territorial sea may extend from the baselines. Originally, the ‘cannon-shot’ rule defined the width required in terms of the range of shore-based artillery, but at the turn of the nineteenth century, this was transmuted into the 3-mile rule. This was especially supported by the United States and the United Kingdom, and any detraction had to be justified by virtue of historic rights and general acquiescence as, for example, the Scandinavian claim to 4 miles.⁸⁰

However, the issue was much confused by the claims of many coastal states to exercise certain jurisdictional rights for particular purposes: for example, fisheries, customs and immigration controls. It was not until after the First World War that a clear distinction was made between claims to enlarge the width of the territorial sea and claims over particular zones.

Recently, the 3-mile rule has been discarded as a rule of general application to be superseded by contending assertions. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea did not include an article on the subject because of disagreements among the states, while the 1960 Geneva Conference failed to accept a United States–Canadian proposal for a 6-mile territorial sea coupled with an exclusive fisheries zone for a further 6 miles by only one vote.⁸¹

Article 3 of the 1982 Convention, however, notes that all states have the right to establish the breadth of the territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12

nautical miles from the baselines. This clearly accords with the evolving practice of states.⁸² The United Kingdom adopted a 12-mile limit in the Territorial Sea Act 1987, for instance, as did the United States by virtue of Proclamation No. 5928 in December 1988.⁸³

The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea⁸⁴

The territorial sea appertains to the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state and thus belongs to it automatically. For example, all newly independent states (with a coast) come to independence with an entitlement to a territorial sea.⁸⁵ There have been a number of theories as to the precise legal character of the territorial sea of the coastal state, ranging from treating the territorial sea as part of the *res communis*, but subject to certain rights exercisable by the coastal state, to regarding the territorial sea as part of the coastal state's territorial domain subject to a right of innocent passage by foreign vessels.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the coastal state enjoys sovereign rights over its maritime belt and extensive jurisdictional control, having regard to the relevant rules of international law. The fundamental restriction upon the sovereignty of the coastal state is the right of other nations to innocent passage through the territorial sea, and this distinguishes the territorial sea from the internal waters of the state, which are fully within the unrestricted jurisdiction of the coastal nation.

Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 1958⁸⁷ provide that the coastal state's sovereignty extends over its territorial sea and to the airspace and seabed and subsoil thereof, subject to the provisions of the Convention and of international law. The territorial sea forms an undeniable part of the land territory to which it is bound, so that a cession of land will automatically include any band of territorial waters.⁸⁸

The coastal state may, if it so desires, exclude foreign nationals and vessels from fishing within its territorial sea and (subject to agreements to the contrary) from coastal trading (known as cabotage), and reserve these activities for its own citizens.

Similarly, the coastal state has extensive powers of control relating to, among others, security and customs matters. It should be noted, however, that how far a state chooses to exercise the jurisdiction and sovereignty to which it may lay claim under the principles of international law will depend upon the terms of its own municipal legislation, and some states will not wish to take advantage of the full extent of the powers permitted them within the international legal system.⁸⁹

The Right of Innocent Passage

The right of foreign merchant ships (as distinct from warships) to pass unhindered through the territorial sea of a coast has long been an accepted principle in customary international law, the sovereignty of the coast state notwithstanding. However, the precise extent of the doctrine is blurred and open to contrary interpretation, particularly with regard to the requirement that the passage must be ‘innocent’.⁹⁰ Article 17 of the 1982 Convention lays down the following principle: ‘ships of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea’.

The doctrine was elaborated in article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 1958, which emphasised that the coastal state must not hamper innocent passage and must publicise any dangers to navigation in the territorial sea of

which it is aware. Passage is defined as navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of crossing that sea without entering internal waters or of proceeding to or from that sea without entering internal waters or of proceeding to or from internal waters. It may include temporary stoppages, but only if they are incidental to ordinary navigation or necessitated by distress or *force majeure*.⁹¹

The coastal state may not impose charges for such passage unless they are in payment for specific services,⁹² and ships engaged in passage are required to comply with the coastal state's regulations covering, for example, navigation in so far as they are consistent with international law.⁹³

Passage ceases to be innocent under article 14(4) of the 1958 Convention where it is 'prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state' and in the case of foreign fishing vessels when they do not observe such laws and regulations as the coastal state may make and publish to prevent these ships from fishing in the territorial sea. In addition, submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag.

Where passage is not innocent, the coastal state may take steps to prevent it in its territorial sea and, where ships are proceeding to internal waters, it may act to forestall any breach of the conditions to which admission of such ships to internal waters is subject. Coastal states have the power temporarily to suspend innocent passage of foreign vessels where it is essential for security reasons, provided such suspension has been published and provided it does not cover international straits.

Article 19(2) of the 1982 Convention has developed the notion of innocent passage contained in article 14(4) of the 1958 Convention by the provision of examples of prejudicial passage such as: the threat or use of force; weapons practice; spying; propaganda; breach of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations; wilful and serious pollution; fishing; research or survey activities and interference with coastal communications or other facilities. In addition, a wide-ranging clause includes ‘any activity not having a direct bearing on passage’. This would appear to have altered the burden of proof from the coastal state to the other party with regard to innocent passage, as well as being somewhat difficult to define. By virtue of article 24 of the 1982 Convention, coastal states must not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships, either by imposing requirements upon them which would have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right or by discrimination. Article 17 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 1958 provided that foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage were to comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state, in particular those relating to transport and navigation. This was developed in article 21(1) of the 1982 Convention, which expressly provided that the coastal state could adopt laws and regulations concerning innocent passage with regard to:

- (a)** the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;
- (b)** the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations;
- (c)** the protection of cables and pipelines;
- (d)** the conservation of the living resources of the sea;

- (e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal state;
- (f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal state and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof;
- (g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
- (h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal state.

Breach of such laws and regulations will render the offender liable to prosecution, but will not make the passage non-innocent as such, unless article 19 has been infringed.⁹⁴

One major controversy of considerable importance revolves around the issue of whether the passage of warships in peacetime is or is not innocent.⁹⁵ The question was further complicated by the omission of an article on the problem in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, and the discussion of innocent passage in a series of articles headed 'Rules applicable to all ships'. This has led some writers to assert that this includes warships by inference, but other authorities maintain that such an important issue could not be resolved purely by omission and inference, especially in view of the reservations by many states to the Convention rejecting the principle of innocent passage for warships and in the light of comments in the various preparatory materials to the 1958 Geneva Convention.⁹⁶

It was primarily the Western states, with their preponderant naval power, that historically maintained the existence of a right of innocent passage for

warships, to the opposition of the then communist and ‘Third World’ nations. However, having regard to the rapid growth in their naval capacity and the ending of the Cold War, Soviet attitudes underwent a change.⁹⁷

In September 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint ‘Uniform Interpretation of the Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage’.⁹⁸ This reaffirmed that the relevant rules of international law were stated in the 1982 Convention. It then provided that:

All ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament or means of propulsion, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in accordance with international law, for which neither prior notification nor authorisation is required.

The statement noted that where a ship in passage through the territorial sea was not engaged in any of the activities laid down in article 19(2), it was ‘in innocent passage’ since that provision was exhaustive. Ships in passage were under an obligation to comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state adopted in conformity with articles 21, 22, 23 and 25 of the 1982 Convention, provided such laws and regulations did not have the effect of denying or impairing the exercise of the right of innocent passage.

This important statement underlines the view that the list of activities laid down in article 19(2) is exhaustive so that a ship passing through the territorial sea not engaging in any of these activities is in innocent passage. It

also lends considerable weight to the view that warships have indeed a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea and one that does not necessitate prior notification or authorisation.⁹⁹

Jurisdiction over Foreign Ships¹⁰⁰

Where foreign ships are in passage through the territorial sea, the coastal state may only exercise its criminal jurisdiction as regards the arrest of any person or the investigation of any matter connected with a crime committed on board ship in defined situations. These are enumerated in article 27(1) of the 1982 Convention, reaffirming article 19(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, as follows:

(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state; or (b) if the crime is of a kind likely to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; or (c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the country of the flag state; or (d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.¹⁰¹

However, if the ship is passing through the territorial sea having left the internal waters of the coastal state, then the coastal state may act in any

manner prescribed by its laws as regards arrest or investigation on board ship and is not restricted by the terms of article 27(1). But the authorities of the coastal state cannot act where the crime was committed before the ship entered the territorial sea, providing the ship is not entering or has not entered internal waters.

Under article 28 of the 1982 Convention, the coastal state should not stop or divert a foreign ship passing through its territorial sea for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a person on board ship, nor levy execution against or arrest the ship, unless obligations are involved which were assumed by the ship itself in the course of, or for the purpose of, its voyage through waters of the coastal state, or unless the ship is passing through the territorial sea on its way from internal waters. The above rules do not, however, prejudice the right of a state to levy execution against or to arrest, for the purpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying in the territorial sea or passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters.¹⁰²

Warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes are immune from the jurisdiction of the coastal state, although they may be required to leave the territorial sea immediately for breach of rules governing passage and the flag state will bear international responsibility in cases of loss or damage suffered as a result.¹⁰³

International Straits¹⁰⁴

Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea declares that:

there shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.

This provision should be read in conjunction with the decision in the *Corfu Channel* case.¹⁰⁵ In this case, British warships passing through the straits were fired upon by Albanian guns. Several months later, an augmented force of cruisers and destroyers sailed through the North Corfu Channel and two of them were badly damaged after striking mines. This impelled the British authorities to sweep the Channel three weeks later, and to clear it of some twenty mines of German manufacture. The Court, in a much-quoted passage, emphasised that:

states in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorisation of a coastal state, provided that the passage is innocent.¹⁰⁶

It was also noted that the minesweeping operation was in no way ‘innocent’ and was indeed a violation of Albania’s sovereignty, although the earlier passages by British naval vessels were legal.¹⁰⁷

The 1982 Convention established a new regime for straits used for international navigation. The principle is reaffirmed that the legal status of the waters of the straits in question is unaffected by the provisions dealing with passage.¹⁰⁸

A new right of transit passage is posited with regard to straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.¹⁰⁹ It involves the exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait and does not preclude passage through the strait to enter or leave a state bordering that strait.¹¹⁰ States bordering the straits in question are not to hamper or suspend transit passage.¹¹¹

There are three exceptions to the right: under article 36 where a route exists through the strait through the high seas or economic zone of similar navigational convenience; under article 38(1) in the case of a strait formed by an island of a state bordering the strait and its mainland, where there exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or economic zone of similar navigational convenience; and under article 45 where straits connect an area of the high seas or economic zone with the territorial sea of a third state. Ships and aircraft in transit must observe the relevant international regulations and refrain from all activities other than those incidental to their

normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit, unless rendered necessary by *force majeure* or by distress.¹¹² Thus, although there is no formal requirement for ‘innocent’ transit passage, the effect of articles 38 and 39 would appear to be to render transit passage subject to the same constraints. Under article 45, the regime of innocent passage will apply with regard to straits used for international navigation excluded from the transit passage provisions by article 38(1) and to international straits between a part of the high seas or economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign state. In such cases, there shall be no suspension of the right to innocent passage.¹¹³ The regime of transit passage specifically allows for the passage of aircraft and probably for underwater submarines, while there are fewer constraints on conduct during passage and less power for the coastal state to control passage than in the case of innocent passage.¹¹⁴ Transit passage cannot be suspended for security or indeed any other reasons.¹¹⁵

It is unclear whether the right of transit passage has passed into customary law. Practice is as yet ambiguous.¹¹⁶ Some states have provided explicitly for rights of passage through international straits. When the United Kingdom extended its territorial sea in 1987 to 12 miles, one of the consequences was that the high sea corridor through the Straits of Dover disappeared. The following year, an agreement was signed with France which related to the delimitation of the territorial sea in the Straits of Dover and a joint declaration was issued in which both governments recognised:

rights of unimpeded transit passage for
merchant vessels, state vessels and, in
particular, warships following their normal

mode of navigation, as well as the right of overflight for aircraft, in the Straits of Dover. It is understood that, in accordance with the principles governing this regime under the rules of international law, such passage will be exercised in a continuous and expeditious manner.¹¹⁷

A number of straits are subject to special regimes, which are unaffected by the above provisions.¹¹⁸ One important example is the Montreux Convention of 1936 governing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. This provides for complete freedom of transit or navigation for merchant vessels during peacetime and for freedom of transit during daylight hours for some warships giving prior notification to Turkey.¹¹⁹

The Contiguous Zone¹²⁰

Historically, some states have claimed to exercise certain rights over particular zones of the high seas. This has involved some diminution of the principle of the freedom of the high seas as the jurisdiction of the coastal state has been extended into areas of the high seas contiguous to the territorial sea, albeit for defined purposes only. Such restricted jurisdiction zones have been established or asserted for a number of reasons: for instance, to prevent infringement of customs, immigration or sanitary laws of the coastal state, or to conserve fishing stocks in a particular area, or to enable the coastal state to have exclusive or principal rights to the resources of the proclaimed zone.

In each case, they enable the coastal state to protect what it regards as its vital or important interests without having to extend the boundaries of its territorial sea further into the high seas. It is thus a compromise between the interests of the coastal state and the interests of other maritime nations seeking to maintain the status of the high seas, and it marks a balance of competing claims. The extension of rights beyond the territorial sea has, however, been seen not only in the context of preventing the infringement of particular domestic laws, but also increasingly as a method of maintaining and developing the economic interests of the coastal state regarding maritime resources. The idea of a contiguous zone (i.e. a zone bordering upon the territorial sea) was virtually formulated as an authoritative and consistent doctrine in the 1930s by the French writer Gidel,¹²¹ and it appeared in the Convention on the Territorial Sea. Article 24 declared that:

In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to:

- (a)** Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
- (b)** Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.

Thus, such contiguous zones were clearly differentiated from claims to full sovereignty as parts of the territorial sea, by being referred to as part of the high seas over which the coastal state may exercise particular rights. Unlike the territorial sea, which is automatically attached to the land territory of the state, contiguous zones have to be specifically claimed.

While sanitary and immigration laws are relatively recent additions to the rights enforceable over zones of the high seas and may be regarded as stemming by analogy from customs regulations, in practice they are really only justifiable since the 1958 Convention. On the other hand, customs zones have a long history and are recognised in customary international law as well. Many states, including the United Kingdom and the United States, have enacted legislation to enforce customs regulations over many years, outside their territorial waters and within certain areas, in order to suppress smuggling which appeared to thrive when faced only with territorial limits of 3 or 4 miles.¹²²

Contiguous zones, however, were limited to a maximum of 12 miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. So if the coastal state

already claimed a territorial sea of 12 miles, the question of contiguous zones would not arise.

This limitation, plus the restriction of jurisdiction to customs, sanitary and immigration matters, is the reason for the decline in the relevance of contiguous zones in international affairs in recent years. Under article 33 of the 1982 Convention, however, a coastal state may claim a contiguous zone (for the same purpose as the 1958 provisions) up to 24 nautical miles from the baselines. In view of the accepted 12-mile territorial sea limit, such an extension was required in order to preserve the concept. One crucial difference is that while under the 1958 system the contiguous zone was part of the high seas, under the 1982 Convention it would form part of the exclusive economic zone complex.¹²³ This will clearly have an impact upon the nature of the zone.

The Exclusive Economic Zone¹²⁴

This zone has developed out of earlier, more tentative claims, particularly relating to fishing zones,¹²⁵ and as a result of developments in the negotiating processes leading to the 1982 Convention.¹²⁶ It marks a compromise between those states seeking a 200-mile territorial sea and those wishing a more restricted system of coastal state power.

One of the major reasons for the call for a 200-mile exclusive economic zone has been the controversy over fishing zones. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea did not reach agreement on the creation of fishing zones and article 24 of the Convention does not give exclusive fishing rights in the contiguous zone. However, increasing numbers of states have claimed fishing zones of widely varying widths. The European Fisheries Convention 1964, which was implemented in the United Kingdom by the Fishing Limits Act 1964, provided that the coastal state has the exclusive right to fish and exclusive jurisdiction in matters of fisheries in a 6-mile belt from the baseline of the territorial sea; while within the belt between 6 and 12 miles from the baseline, other parties to the Convention have the right to fish, provided they had habitually fished in that belt between January 1953 and December 1962. This was an attempt to reconcile the interests of the coastal state with those of other states who could prove customary fishing operations in the relevant area. In view of the practice of many states in accepting at one time or another a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone, either for themselves or for some other states, it seems clear that there has already emerged an international rule to that effect. Indeed, the International Court in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction*

(*United Kingdom v. Iceland*) cases¹²⁷ stated that the concept of the fishing zone, the area in which a state may claim exclusive jurisdiction independently of its territorial sea for this purpose, had crystallised as customary law in recent years and especially since the 1960 Geneva Conference, and that ‘the extension of that fishing zone up to a twelve mile limit from the baselines appears now to be generally accepted’. That much is clear, but the question was whether international law recognised such a zone in excess of 12 miles.

In 1972, concerned at the proposals regarding the long-term effects of the depletion of fishing stocks around her coasts, Iceland proclaimed unilaterally a 50-mile exclusive fishing zone. The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany referred the issue to the International Court of Justice and specifically requested the Court to decide whether or not Iceland’s claim was contrary to international law.

The Court did not answer that question, but rather held that Iceland’s fishing regulations extending the zone were not binding upon the United Kingdom and West Germany, since they had in no way acquiesced in them. However, by implication the Court based its judgment on the fact that there did not exist any rule of international law permitting the establishment of a 50-mile fishing zone. Similarly, it appeared that there was no rule prohibiting claims beyond 12 miles and that the validity of such claims would depend upon all relevant facts of the case and the degree of recognition by other states.

The Court emphasised instead the notion of preferential rights, which it regarded as a principle of customary international law. Such rights arose where the coastal state was ‘in a situation of special dependence on coastal

fisheries'.¹²⁸ However, this concept was overtaken by developments at the UN Conference and the 1982 Convention. Article 55 of the 1982 Convention provides that the exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established under the Convention.

Under article 56(1), the coastal state in the economic zone has, *inter alia*:

- (a) sovereign rights¹²⁹ for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living¹³⁰ or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
- (b) jurisdiction with regard to (i) the architecture and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;¹³¹ (ii) marine scientific research;¹³² (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment.¹³³

Article 56(2) provides that: 'In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other states and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.' This provision was discussed by the Tribunal in the *Mauritius v. United Kingdom* arbitration concerning the Chagos Marine Protected Area,¹³⁴ where it was found that the term 'due regard' meant no more than that the United Kingdom should have 'such regard for the rights of Mauritius as is called for by the circumstances and by the nature of those rights'. However, in the circumstances of the case,

the Tribunal found a violation of article 56(2) (and article 2(3)) in that ‘the United Kingdom failed properly to balance its own rights and interests with Mauritius’ rights arising from the Lancaster House Undertakings. Not only did the United Kingdom proceed on the flawed basis that Mauritius had no fishing rights in the territorial sea of the Chagos Archipelago, it presumed to conclude – without ever confirming with Mauritius – that the MPA [Marine Protected Area] was in Mauritius’ interest’.¹³⁵ In its Advisory Opinion, given on 2 April 2015, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea held that the primary responsibility to take the necessary measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing within its economic zone lay with the coastal state, but that flag states were also under an obligation to take the necessary measures to ensure that their nationals and vessels flying their flag were not engaged in such fishing.¹³⁶ The Tribunal also found that in the absence of specific rules in the Convention, the general rules on state responsibility would apply. Thus, while flag state liability would not as such be engaged as a result of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (since this was not attributable to the flag state under the general rules of state responsibility), such responsibility would arise when the flag state failed to comply with its due diligence obligations to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that vessels flying its flag did not engage in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the economic zone of member states, irrespective of the frequency of such acts.¹³⁷

Article 55 provides that the zone starts from the outer limit of the territorial sea, but by article 57 shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

Accordingly, in reality, the zone itself would be no more than 188 nautical

miles where the territorial sea was 12 nautical miles, but rather more where the territorial sea of the coastal state was less than 12 miles. Where the relevant waters between neighbouring states are less than 400 miles, delimitation becomes necessary.¹³⁸ Islands generate economic zones, unless they consist of no more than rocks which cannot sustain human habitation.¹³⁹

Article 58 lays down the rights and duties of other states in the exclusive economic zone. These are basically the high seas freedom of navigation, overflight and laying of submarine cables and pipelines. It is also provided that in exercising their rights and performing their duties, states should have due regard to the rights, duties and laws of the coastal state. In cases of conflict over the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the zone, the resolution is to be on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.¹⁴⁰ Article 60(2) provides that in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has jurisdiction to apply customs laws and regulations in respect of artificial islands, installations and structures. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea took the view in *M/V Saiga (No. 2)* (Admissibility and Merits) that a coastal state was not competent to apply its customs laws in respect of other parts of the economic zone.¹⁴¹ Accordingly, by applying its customs laws to a customs radius which included parts of the economic zone, Guinea had acted contrary to the Law of the Sea Convention.¹⁴²

A wide variety of states have in the last two decades claimed exclusive economic zones of 200 miles.¹⁴³ A number of states that have not made such a claim have proclaimed fishing zones.¹⁴⁴ It would appear that such is the number and distribution of states claiming economic zones, that the existence

of the exclusive economic zone as a rule of customary law is firmly established. This is underlined by the comment of the International Court of Justice in the *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf* case¹⁴⁵ that ‘the institution of the exclusive economic zone . . . is shown by the practice of states to have become a part of customary law’.¹⁴⁶

In addition to such zones, some other zones have been announced by states over areas of the seas. Canada has, for example, claimed a 100-mile-wide zone along her Arctic coastline as a special, pollution-free zone.¹⁴⁷ Certain states have also asserted rights over what have been termed security or neutrality zones,¹⁴⁸ but these have never been particularly well received and are rare.

In an unusual arrangement, pursuant to a US–USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement of 1 June 1990, it was provided that each party would exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction derived from the exclusive economic zone jurisdiction of the other party in a ‘special area’ on the other party’s side of the maritime boundary in order to ensure that all areas within 200 miles of either party’s coast would fall within the resource jurisdiction of one party or the other. It would appear that jurisdiction over three special areas within the Soviet Union’s 200-mile economic zone and one special area within the United States’ 200-mile economic zone were so transferred.¹⁴⁹

The Continental Shelf¹⁵⁰

The continental shelf is a geological expression referring to the ledges that project from the continental landmass into the seas and which are covered with only a relatively shallow layer of water (some 150–200 metres) and which eventually fall away into the ocean depths (some thousands of metres deep). These ledges or shelves take up some 7 to 8 per cent of the total area of ocean and their extent varies considerably from place to place. Off the western coast of the United States, for instance, it is less than 5 miles wide, while, on the other hand, the whole of the underwater area of the North Sea and Persian Gulf consists of shelf.

The vital fact about the continental shelves is that they are rich in oil and gas resources and quite often are host to extensive fishing grounds. This stimulated a round of appropriations by coastal states in the years following the Second World War, which gradually altered the legal status of the continental shelf from being part of the high seas and available for exploitation by all states until its current recognition as exclusive to the coastal state.

The first move in this direction, and the one that led to a series of similar and more extensive claims, was the Truman Proclamation of 1945.¹⁵¹ This pointed to the technological capacity to exploit the riches of the shelf and the need to establish a recognised jurisdiction over such resources, and declared that the coastal state was entitled to such jurisdiction for a number of reasons: first, because utilisation or conservation of the resources of the subsoil and

seabed of the continental shelf depended upon cooperation from the shore; secondly, because the shelf itself could be regarded as an extension of the land mass of the coastal state, and its resources were often merely an extension into the sea of deposits lying within the territory; and, finally, because the coastal state, for reasons of security, was profoundly interested in activities off its shores which would be necessary to utilise the resources of the shelf.

Accordingly, the US government proclaimed that it regarded the ‘natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control’. However, this would in no way affect the status of the waters above the continental shelf as high seas.

This proclamation precipitated a whole series of claims by states to their continental shelves, some in similar terms to the US assertions, and others in substantially wider terms. Argentina and El Salvador, for example, claimed not only the shelf, but also the waters above and the airspace. Chile and Peru, having no continental shelf to speak of, claimed sovereignty over the seabed, subsoil and waters around their coasts to a limit of 200 miles, although this occasioned vigorous protests by many states.¹⁵² The problems were discussed over many years, leading to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.¹⁵³

In the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases,¹⁵⁴ the Court noted that:

the rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist *ipso facto and ab initio*, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short there is here an inherent right.

The development of the concept of the exclusive economic zone has to some extent confused the issue, since under article 56 of the 1982 Convention the coastal state has sovereign rights over all the natural resources of its exclusive economic zone, including the seabed resources.¹⁵⁵ Accordingly, states possess two sources of rights with regard to the seabed,¹⁵⁶ although claims with regard to the economic zone, in contrast to the continental shelf, need to be specifically made. It is also possible, as will be seen, that the geographical extent of the shelf may be different from that of the 200-mile economic zone.

Definition

Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf defined the shelf in terms of its exploitability rather than relying upon the accepted geological definition, noting that the expression referred to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the territorial sea to a depth of 200 metres or ‘beyond that limit to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas’.

This provision caused problems, since developing technology rapidly reached a position to extract resources to a much greater depth than 200 metres, and this meant that the outer limits of the shelf, subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal state, were consequently very unclear. Article 1 was, however, regarded as reflecting customary law by the Court in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases.¹⁵⁷ It is also important to note that the basis of title to continental shelf is now accepted as the geographical criterion, and not reliance upon, for example, occupation or effective control. The Court emphasised this and declared that:

The submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the territory over which the coastal state already has dominion in the sense that although covered with water, they are a prolongation or continuation of that territory, an extension of it under the sea.¹⁵⁸

This approach has, however, been somewhat modified. Article 76(1) of the 1982 Convention provides as to the outer limit of the continental shelf that:

The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from

which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of continental margin does not extend up to that distance.¹⁵⁹

Thus, an arbitrary, legal and non-geographical definition is provided. Where the continental margin actually extends beyond 200 miles, geographical factors are to be taken into account in establishing the limit, which in any event shall not exceed either 350 miles from the baselines or 100 miles from the 2,500-metre isobath.¹⁶⁰ Where the shelf does not extend as far as 200 miles from the coast, natural prolongation is complemented as a guiding principle by that of distance.¹⁶¹ Not surprisingly, this complex formulation has caused difficulty¹⁶² and, in an attempt to provide a mechanism to resolve problems, the Convention established a Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, consisting of twenty-one experts elected by the states parties. Article 4 of Annex II to the Convention provides that a coastal state intending to establish the outer limits to its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is obliged to submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible, but in any case within ten years of the entry into force of the Convention for that state. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of these recommendations are final and binding.¹⁶³ The first submission to the Commission was made by the Russian Federation on 21 December 2001.¹⁶⁴ In support of this claim, Russian explorers planted the national flag on the seabed below the North Pole on 2 August 2007, arguing that parts of underwater mountains underneath the Pole were extensions of the Eurasian continent.¹⁶⁵ A joint submission in respect of the area of the

Celtic Sea and the Bay of Biscay was made by France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom on 19 May 2006,¹⁶⁶ while on 21 April 2008, the Commission confirmed Australia's continental shelf claim made in 2004.¹⁶⁷

In the preliminary objections judgment of the *Nicaragua v. Colombia* case concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles beyond the Nicaraguan coast,¹⁶⁸ the International Court dismissed the objection to the admissibility of the request made on the ground that the Commission had not yet ascertained that the conditions for determining the extension of the outer edge of Nicaragua's continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile line had been satisfied and, consequently, had not made a recommendation. The Court distinguished between the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf and its delimitation and held that the latter could be accomplished independently of a recommendation of the Commission so that the latter could not be seen as a prerequisite to requesting the Court to settle a delimitation dispute with another state.¹⁶⁹

Islands generate continental shelves, unless they consist of no more than rocks which cannot sustain human habitation.¹⁷⁰

The Rights and Duties of the Coastal State¹⁷¹

The coastal state may exercise ‘sovereign rights’ over the continental shelf for the purposes of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources under article 77 of the 1982 Convention. Such rights are exclusive in that no other state may undertake such activities without the express consent of the coastal state. These sovereign rights (and thus not territorial title as such, since the Convention does not talk in terms of ‘sovereignty’) do not depend upon occupation or express proclamation.¹⁷² The Truman concept of resources, which referred only to mineral resources, has been extended to include organisms belonging to the sedentary species.¹⁷³ However, this vague description did lead to disputes between France and Brazil over lobster, and between the United States and Japan over the Alaskan King Crab in the early 1960s.¹⁷⁴ The sovereign rights recognised as part of the continental shelf regime specifically relate to natural resources, so that, for example, wrecks lying on the shelf are not included.¹⁷⁵ The Convention expressly states that the rights of the coastal state do not affect the status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above the waters.¹⁷⁶ This is stressed in succeeding articles which note that, subject to its right to take reasonable measures for exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf, the coastal state may not impede the laying or maintenance of cables or pipelines on the shelf. In addition, such exploration and exploitation must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea.¹⁷⁷

The coastal state may, under article 80 of the 1982 Convention,¹⁷⁸ construct and maintain installations and other devices necessary for exploration on the continental shelf and is entitled to establish safety zones around such installations to a limit of 500 metres, which must be respected by ships of all nationalities. Within such zones, the state may take such measures as are necessary for their protection. But although under the jurisdiction of the coastal state, these installations are not to be considered as islands. This means that they have no territorial sea of their own and their presence in no way affects the delimitation of the territorial waters of the coastal state. Such provisions are, of course, extremely important when considering the status of oil rigs situated, for example, in the North Sea. To treat them as islands for legal purposes would cause difficulties.¹⁷⁹

Where the continental shelf of a state extends beyond 200 miles, article 82 of the 1982 Convention provides that the coastal state must make payments or contributions in kind in respect of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit. The payments are to be made annually after the first five years of production at the site in question on a sliding scale up to the twelfth year, after which they are to remain at 7 per cent. These payments and contributions are to be made to the International Seabed Authority, which shall distribute them among states parties on the basis of 'equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing states particularly the least developed and the landlocked among them'.¹⁸⁰

Maritime Delimitation¹⁸¹

While delimitation is in principle an aspect of territorial sovereignty, where other states are involved, agreement is required. However valid in domestic law, unilateral delimitations will not be binding upon third states.¹⁸² The International Court noted in *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* that the establishment of a permanent maritime boundary was ‘a matter of grave importance and agreement is not easily to be presumed’.¹⁸³ It was also pointed out that the principle of *uti possidetis* applied in principle to maritime spaces.¹⁸⁴

In so far as the delimitation of the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is concerned,¹⁸⁵ article 15 of the 1982 Convention, following basically article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 1958, provides that where no agreement has been reached, neither state may extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point on the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.¹⁸⁶ However, particular geographical circumstances may make it difficult to establish clear baselines and this may make it therefore impossible to draw an equidistance line.¹⁸⁷ In such an exceptional case, the Court would consider alternative lines drawn by the states, for example bisector lines.¹⁸⁸ The Court in *Romania v. Ukraine* held that the identification of the base points, which constituted the first stage of the delimitation process, was based upon the physical reality at the time of the delimitation and that this ‘geographical reality covers not only the physical elements

produced by geodynamics and the movements of the sea, but also any other material factors that are present'.¹⁸⁹

The provision as to the median line, however, does not apply where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial sea of the two states in a different way. The Court in *Qatar v. Bahrain* noted that article 15 was to be regarded as having a customary law character¹⁹⁰ and may be referred to as the 'equidistance/special circumstances' principle. The Court went on to declare: 'The most logical and widely practised approach is first to draw provisionally an equidistance line and then to consider whether that line must be adjusted in the light of the existence of special circumstances.'¹⁹¹

This was underlined in the Arbitral Award in *Guyana v. Suriname*, which emphasised that article 15 placed 'primacy on the median line as the delimitation line between the territorial seas of opposite or adjacent states'.¹⁹² The Tribunal noted that international courts were not constrained by a finite list of special circumstances, but needed to assess on a case-by-case basis with reference to international case-law and state practice.¹⁹³ Navigational interests, for example, could constitute such special circumstances.¹⁹⁴ The Tribunal also held that a 3-mile territorial sea delimitation line did not automatically extend outwards in situations where the territorial sea was extended to 12 miles, but rather that a principled method had to be found that took into account any special circumstances, including historical arrangements made.¹⁹⁵ The approach in *Qatar v. Bahrain* and in *Guyana v. Suriname* was reaffirmed in *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation),¹⁹⁶ where it was held that the combined effect of the concavity of the relevant

part of Nicaragua's coast and the convexity of the relevant part of Costa Rica's coast were of limited significance and did not amount to a special circumstance. However, the high instability and narrowness of the sandspit at the mouth of the San Juan River did constitute a special circumstance requiring a base line extending from a fixed point at sea to the point on the low-water mark, while the instability of the sandbar existing as a small enclave within Costa Rica was also a special circumstance and would not be taken into account in the delimitation of the territorial sea between the parties in the area in question.¹⁹⁷

Separate from the question of the delimitation of the territorial sea, but increasingly convergent with it, is the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf and of the exclusive economic zone between opposite or adjacent states. The starting point of any delimitation of these areas is the entitlement of the state to a given maritime area. Such entitlement in the case of the continental shelf was originally founded upon the concept of natural prolongation of the land territory into the sea,¹⁹⁸ but with the emergence of the exclusive economic zone a new approach was introduced based upon distance from the coast.¹⁹⁹ The two concepts in fact became close.

Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention 1958 declared that in the absence of agreement and unless another boundary line was justified by special circumstances, the continental shelf boundary should be determined 'by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured', that is to say by the introduction of the equidistance or median

line which would operate in relation to the sinuosities of the particular coastlines.

This provision was considered in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases²⁰⁰ between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side and Holland and Denmark on the other. The problem was that the application of the equidistance principle of article 6 would give Germany only a small share of the North Sea continental shelf, in view of its concave northern shoreline between Holland and Denmark. The question arose as to whether the article was binding upon the Federal Republic of Germany at all, since it had not ratified the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.

The Court held that the principles enumerated in article 6 did not constitute rules of international customary law and therefore Germany was not bound by them.²⁰¹ The Court declared that the relevant rule was that:

delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the others.²⁰²

The Court, therefore, took the view that delimitation was based upon a consideration and weighing of relevant factors in order to produce an equitable result. Included among the range of factors was the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality between the lengths of the coastline and the extent of the continental shelf.²⁰³ In the *Anglo-French Continental Shelf* case,²⁰⁴ both states were parties to the 1958 Convention, so that article 6 applied.²⁰⁵ It was held that article 6 contained one overall rule, ‘a combined equidistance–special circumstances rule’, which in effect:

gives particular expression to a general norm
that, failing agreement, the boundary between
states abutting on the same continental shelf is
to be determined on equitable principles.²⁰⁶

The choice of method of delimitation, whether equidistance or any other method, depended upon the pertinent circumstances of the case. The fundamental norm under both customary law and the 1958 Convention was that the delimitation had to be in accordance with equitable principles.²⁰⁷ The Court took into account ‘special circumstances’ in relation to the situation of the Channel Islands which justified a delimitation other than the median line proposed by the United Kingdom.²⁰⁸ In addition, the situation of the Scilly Isles was considered and they were given only ‘half-effect’ in the delimitation in the Atlantic area since

what equity calls for is an appropriate
abatement of the disproportionate effects of a

considerable projection on the Atlantic
continental shelf of a somewhat attenuated
projection of the coast of the United
Kingdom.²⁰⁹

In the *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf* case,²¹⁰ the Court, deciding on the basis of custom as neither state was a party to the 1958 Convention, emphasised that ‘the satisfaction of equitable principles is, in the delimitation process, of cardinal importance’. The concept of natural prolongation was of some importance depending upon the circumstances, but not on the same plane as the satisfaction of equitable principles.²¹¹ The Court also employed the ‘half-effect’ principle for the Kerkennah Islands,²¹² and emphasised that each continental shelf dispute had to be considered on its own merits having regard to its peculiar circumstances, while no attempt should be made to ‘overconceptualise the application of the principles and rules relating to the continental shelf’.²¹³ The view of the Court that ‘the principles are subordinate to the goal’ and that ‘[t]he principles to be indicated . . . have to be selected according to their appropriateness for reaching an equitable result’²¹⁴ led to criticism that the carefully drawn restriction on equity in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases²¹⁵ had been overturned and the element of predictability minimised. The dangers of an equitable solution based upon subjective assessments of the facts, regardless of the law of delimitation, were pointed out by Judge Gros in his Dissenting Opinion.²¹⁶

The Court in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases²¹⁷ in general discussed the relevance of the use of equitable principles in the context of the difficulty of applying the equidistance rule in specific geographical situations where

inequity might result. In such a case, recourse may be had to equitable principles, provided a reasonable result was reached.

In the *Anglo-French Continental Shelf* case,²¹⁸ it was emphasised that:

the appropriateness of the equidistance method
or any other method for the purpose of
effecting an equitable delimitation is a function
or reflection of the geographical and other
relevant circumstances of each particular case.

The methodological aspect here is particularly important, based as it is upon the requisite geographical framework.

Article 83 of the 1982 Convention provides simply that delimitation ‘shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable solution’. This was emphasised by the Court in the *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf* case, where it was stated that the ‘principles and rules applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf areas are those which are appropriate to bring about an equitable result’.²¹⁹ In the *Gulf of Maine* case,²²⁰ which dealt with the delimitation of both the continental shelf and fisheries zones of Canada and the United States,²²¹ the ICJ Chamber produced two principles reflecting what general international law prescribes in every maritime delimitation. First, there could be no unilateral delimitations. Delimitations had to be sought and effected by agreement between the parties or, if necessary, with the aid of third parties. Secondly, it held that ‘delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable criteria

and by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable result'.²²² The Court took as its starting point the criterion of the equal division of the areas of convergence and overlapping of the maritime projections of the coastlines of the states concerned, a criterion regarded as intrinsically equitable. This, however, had to be combined with the appropriate auxiliary criteria in the light of the relevant circumstances of the area itself. As regards the practical methods necessary to give effect to the above criteria, like the criteria themselves these had to be based upon geography and the suitability for the delimitation of both the seabed and the superjacent waters. Thus, it was concluded, geometrical methods would serve.²²³ It will be noted that the basic rule for delimitation of the continental shelf is the same as that for the exclusive economic zone,²²⁴ but the same boundary need not necessarily result.²²⁵ The Chamber in the *Gulf of Maine* case indeed strongly emphasised 'the unprecedented aspect of the case which lends it its special character', in that a single line delimiting both the shelf and fisheries zone was called for by the parties.

Criteria found equitable with regard to a continental shelf delimitation need not necessarily possess the same properties with regard to a dual delimitation.²²⁶ The above principles were reflected in the arbitral award in the *Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation* case in 1985.²²⁷ The Tribunal emphasised that the aim of any delimitation process was to achieve an equitable solution having regard to the relevant circumstances.²²⁸ In the instant case, the concepts of natural prolongation and economic factors were in the circumstances of little assistance.²²⁹ In *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf*,²³⁰ the International Court, in deciding the case according to customary

law since Libya was not a party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, emphasised the distance criterion. This arose because of the relevance of the economic zone concept, which was now held to be part of customary law, and the fact that an economic zone could not exist without rights over the seabed and subsoil similar to those enjoyed over a continental shelf. Thus, the 200-mile limit of the zone had to be taken into account with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf.²³¹ The fact that the law now permitted a state to claim a shelf of up to 200 miles from its coast, irrespective of geological characteristics, also meant that there was no reason to ascribe any role to geological or geographical factors within that distance.²³²

Since the basis of title to the shelf up to the 200-mile limit is recognised as the distance criterion, the Court felt that the drawing of a median line between opposite states was the most judicious manner of proceeding with a view to the eventual achievement of an equitable result. This provisional step had to be tested in the light of equitable principles in the context of the relevant circumstances.²³³ The Court also followed the example of the *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf* case²³⁴ in examining the role of proportionality and in treating it as a test of the equitableness of any line.

However, the Court did consider the comparability of coastal lengths in the case as part of the process of reaching an equitable boundary, and used the disparity of coastal lengths of the parties as a reason for adjusting the median line so as to attribute a larger shelf area to Libya.²³⁵ The general geographical context in which the islands of Malta exist as a relatively small feature in a semi-enclosed sea was also taken into account in this context.²³⁶

The Court in its analysis also referred to a variety of well-known examples of equitable principles, including abstention from refashioning nature, non-encroachment by one party on areas appertaining to the other, respect due to all relevant circumstances and the notions that equity did not necessarily mean equality and that there could be no question of distributive justice.²³⁷

The Court, however, rejected Libya's argument that a state with a greater landmass would have a greater claim to the shelf and dismissed Malta's view that the relative economic position of the two states was of relevance.²³⁸

In conclusion, the Court reiterated in the operative provisions of its judgment the following circumstances and factors that needed to be taken into account in the case:

- (1) the general configuration of the coasts to the parties, their oppositeness, and their relationship to each other within the general context;
- (2) the disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts of the parties and the distance between them;
- (3) the need to avoid in the delimitation any excessive disproportion between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal state and the length of the relevant part of its coast, measured in the general direction of the coastlines.²³⁹

In the *St Pierre and Miquelon (Canada v. France)* case,²⁴⁰ the Court of Arbitration emphasised that the delimitation process commenced with the identification of the geographical context of the dispute in question and indeed pointed out that geographical features were at the heart of delimitation.²⁴¹ The identification of the relevant coastlines in each particular

case, however, generates specific problems. Accordingly, the way in which the geographical situation is described may suggest particular solutions, so that the seemingly objective process of geographical identification may indeed constitute a crucial element in the adoption of any particular juridical answer. In the *St Pierre and Miquelon (Canada v. France)* case, the Court divided the area into two zones, the southern and western zones. In the latter case, any seaward extension of the islands beyond their territorial sea would cause some degree of encroachment and cut-off to the seaward projection towards the south from points located on the southern shore of Newfoundland. The Court felt here that any enclaving of the islands within their territorial sea would be inequitable and the solution proposed was to grant the islands an additional 12 miles from the limits of the territorial sea as an exclusive economic zone.²⁴² In the case of the southern zone, where the islands had a coastal opening seawards unobstructed by any opposite or laterally aligned Canadian coast, the Court held that France was entitled to an outer limit of 200 nautical miles, provided that such a projection was not allowed to encroach upon or cut off a parallel frontal projection of the adjacent segments of the Newfoundland southern coast. In order to achieve this, the Court emphasised the importance of the breadth of the coastal opening of the islands towards the south, thus resulting in a 200-mile, but narrow, corridor southwards from the islands as their economic zone.²⁴³ Having decided upon the basis of geographical considerations, the Court felt it necessary to assure itself that the delimitation proposed was not 'radically inequitable'.²⁴⁴ This it was able to do on the basis of facts submitted by the parties. The Court also considered the criterion of proportionality and satisfied itself that there was no disproportion in the areas appertaining to each of the parties.²⁴⁵

In the *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)* case,²⁴⁶ the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf between the islands of Greenland and Jan Mayen was governed in the circumstances by article 6 of the 1958 Convention, accepted as substantially identical to customary law in requiring an equitable delimitation.²⁴⁷ The International Court noted that since a delimitation between opposite coasts was in question, one needed to begin by taking provisionally the median line and then inquiring whether ‘special circumstances’²⁴⁸ required another boundary line.²⁴⁹ In particular, one needed to take into account the disparity between the respective coastal lengths of the relevant area and, since in this case that of Greenland was more than nine times that of Jan Mayen, an unqualified use of equidistance would produce a manifestly disproportionate result.²⁵⁰ In addition, the question of equitable access to fish stocks for vulnerable fishing communities needed to be considered. Since the principal resource in the area was capelin, which was centred on the southern part of the area of overlapping claims, the adoption of a median line would mean that Denmark could not be assured of equitable access to the capelin. This was a further reason for adjusting the median line towards the Norwegian island of Jan Mayen.²⁵¹ However, there was no need to consider the presence of ice as this did not materially affect access to fishery resources,²⁵² nor the limited population of Jan Mayen, socio-economic factors or security matters in the circumstances.²⁵³

In discussing the variety of applicable principles, a distinction has traditionally been drawn between opposite and adjacent states for the purposes of delimitation. In the former case, the Court has noted that there is less difficulty in applying the equidistance method than in the latter, since the

distorting effect of an individual geographical feature in the case of adjacent states is more likely to result in an inequitable delimitation. Accordingly, greater weight is to be placed upon equidistance in a delimitation of the shelf between opposite states in the context of equitable considerations,²⁵⁴ than in the case of adjacent states where the range of applicable equitable principles may be more extensive and the relative importance of each particular principle less clear. Article 83 of the 1982 Convention, however, makes no distinction between delimitations on the basis of whether the states are in an opposite or adjacent relationship. The same need to achieve an equitable solution on the basis of international law is all that is apparent and recent moves to a presumption in favour of equidistance in the case of opposite coasts may well apply also to adjacent states.

The weight to be given to the criterion of proportionality between the length of the coastline and the area of continental shelf has also been the subject of some consideration and opinions have varied. It is a factor that must be cautiously applied.²⁵⁵

Article 74 of the 1982 Convention provides that delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is to be effected by agreement on the basis of international law,²⁵⁶ ‘in order to achieve an equitable solution’. Since this phrase is identical to the provision on delimitation of the continental shelf,²⁵⁷ it is not surprising that cases have arisen in which states have sought a single maritime boundary, applying both to the continental shelf and the economic zone.²⁵⁸

In the *Gulf of Maine* case,²⁵⁹ the Chamber of the International Court took the view that the criteria for a single maritime boundary²⁶⁰ were those that would apply to both the continental shelf and economic zones (in this case a fisheries zone) and not criteria that relate to only one of these areas.²⁶¹ Nevertheless, the overall requirement for the establishment of such a boundary is the need to achieve an equitable solution and this brings into consideration a range of factors that may or may not be deemed relevant or decisive by the Court. It is in the elucidation of such factors that difficulties have been encountered and it would be over-optimistic to assert that the situation is clear, although very recent cases have moved towards a degree of predictability. In the *Gulf of Maine* case, the Court emphasised that the relevant criteria had to be essentially determined ‘in relation to what may be properly called the geographical features of the area’, but what these are is subject to some controversy and did not appear to cover scientific and other facts relating to fish stocks, oil exploration, scientific research or common defence arrangements.²⁶² In the *Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation* case,²⁶³ the Tribunal was called upon to draw a single line dividing the territorial sea, economic zone and continental shelf of the two states concerned. In the case of the latter two zones, the Tribunal noted that the use of the equidistance method was unsatisfactory since it exaggerated the importance of insignificant coastal features. Rather one had to consider the whole coastline of West Africa.²⁶⁴ The Tribunal also considered that the evidence with regard to the geological and geomorphological features of the continental shelf was unsatisfactory,²⁶⁵ while general economic factors were rejected as being unjust and inequitable, since they were based upon an evaluation of data that was constantly changing.²⁶⁶ The question of a single maritime boundary arose again in the *St Pierre and Miquelon (Canada v.*

France) case,²⁶⁷ where the Tribunal was asked to establish a single delimitation as between the parties governing all rights and jurisdiction that the parties may exercise under international law in these maritime areas. In such cases, the Tribunal, following the *Gulf of Maine* decision, took the view that in a single or all-purpose delimitation, article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, which governed the delimitation of the continental shelf, did not have mandatory force as regards the establishment of that single maritime line.²⁶⁸

However, where there did not exist a special agreement between the parties asking the Court to determine a single maritime boundary applicable both to the continental shelf and the economic zone, the Court declared in the *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)* case²⁶⁹ that the two strands of the applicable law had to be examined separately. These strands related to the effect of article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 upon the continental shelf and the rules of customary international law with regard to the fishery zone.²⁷⁰

More recent cases have seen further moves towards clarity and simplicity. In *Eritrea–Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation)*, the Tribunal noted that it was a generally accepted view that between coasts that are opposite to each other, the median or equidistance line normally provided an equitable boundary in accordance with the requirements of the 1982 Convention.²⁷¹ It also reaffirmed earlier case-law to the effect that proportionality was not an independent mode or principle of delimitation, but a test of the equitableness of a delimitation arrived at by other means.²⁷² The Tribunal also considered the role of mid-sea islands in a delimitation between opposite states and

noted that to give them full effect would produce a disproportionate effect.²⁷³ Indeed, no effect was given to some of the islands in question.²⁷⁴

In *Qatar v. Bahrain*, the Court emphasised the close relationship between continental shelf and economic zone delimitations²⁷⁵ and held that the appropriate methodology was first to provisionally draw an equidistance line and then to consider whether circumstances existed which must lead to an adjustment of that line.²⁷⁶ Further, it was noted that ‘the equidistance/special circumstances’ rule, applicable to territorial sea delimitation, and the ‘equidistance/relevant circumstances’ rule as developed since 1958 in case-law and practice regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone were ‘closely related’.²⁷⁷ The Court did not consider the existence of pearling banks to be a circumstance justifying a shift in the equidistance line,²⁷⁸ nor was the disparity in length of the coastal fronts of the states.²⁷⁹ It was also considered that for reasons of equity in order to avoid disproportion, no effect could be given to Fasht al Jarim, a remote projection of Bahrain’s coastline in the Gulf area, which constituted a maritime feature located well out to sea and most of which was below water at high tide.²⁸⁰

This approach was reaffirmed by the Court in *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, where it was noted that ‘the applicable criteria, principles and rules of delimitation’ concerning a line ‘covering several zones of coincident jurisdiction’ could be expressed in ‘the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method’. This method, ‘which is very similar to the equidistance/special circumstances method’ concerning territorial sea delimitation, ‘involves first drawing an equidistance line, then considering whether there are factors

calling for the adjustment or shifting of that line in order to achieve an “equitable result””.²⁸¹ Such a line had to be constructed on the basis of the relevant coastlines of the states in question and excluded taking into account the coastlines of third states and the coastlines of the parties not facing each other.²⁸² Further, the Court emphasised that ‘equity is not a method of delimitation, but solely an aim that should be borne in mind in effecting the delimitation’,²⁸³ thus putting an end to a certain trend in previous decades to put the whole emphasis in delimitation upon an equitable solution, leaving substantially open the question of what factors to take into account and how to rank them. The geographical configuration of the maritime area in question was an important element in this case and the Court stressed that while certain geographical peculiarities of maritime areas could be taken into account, this would be solely as relevant circumstances for the purpose, if necessary, of shifting the provisional delimitation line. In the present case, the Court did not consider the configuration of the coastline a relevant circumstance justifying altering the equidistance line.²⁸⁴ Similarly, the Court did not feel it necessary to take into account the existence of Bioko, an island off the coast of Cameroon but belonging to a third state, Equatorial Guinea, nor was it concluded that there existed ‘a substantial difference in the lengths of the parties’ respective coastlines’ so as to make it a factor to be considered in order to adjust the provisional delimitation line.²⁸⁵

In the *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago* Arbitral Award of 11 April 2006, it was noted that equitable considerations *per se* constituted an imprecise concept in the light of the need for stability and certainty in the outcome of the legal process and it was emphasised that the search for predictable, objectively determined criteria for delimitation underlined that the role of

equity lies within and not beyond the law.²⁸⁶ The process of achieving an equitable result was constrained by legal principle, as both equity and stability were integral parts of the delimitation process.²⁸⁷ The International Court noted in *Romania v. Ukraine* that the role of relevant coasts could have two different though closely related legal aspects in relation to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. First, it was necessary to identify the relevant coasts in order to determine what constitutes in the specific context of a case the overlapping claims to these zones. Secondly, the relevant coasts need to be ascertained in order to check, in the third and final stage of the delimitation process, whether any disproportionality exists in the ratios of the coastal length of each state.²⁸⁸ The test of disproportionality was not in itself a method of delimitation. It was rather a means of checking whether the delimitation line arrived at by other means needed adjustment because of a significant disproportionality in the ratios between the maritime areas which would fall to one party or other by virtue of the delimitation line arrived at by other means, and the lengths of their respective coasts.²⁸⁹

In *Peru v. Chile*, the International Court underlined that articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the 1982 Convention reflected customary international law and laid out authoritatively the three-stage test involved in maritime delimitation. First, a provisional equidistance line was constructed unless there were compelling reasons preventing that. Secondly, it would be considered whether there were relevant circumstances which may call for an adjustment of that line in order to achieve an equitable result. Thirdly, the Court would conduct a disproportionality test in which it would assess whether the effect of the line, as adjusted, was such that the parties' respective shares of the

relevant area were markedly disproportionate to the lengths of their relevant coasts.²⁹⁰ The delimitation would begin at the low-water mark unless the parties had agreed otherwise.²⁹¹

Conclusion

Accordingly, there is now a substantial convergence of applicable principles concerning maritime delimitation, whether derived from customary law or treaty. In all cases, whether the delimitation is of the territorial sea, continental shelf or economic zone (or of the latter two together), the appropriate methodology to be applied is to draw a provisional equidistance line as the starting position and then see whether any relevant or special circumstances exist which may warrant a change in that line in order to achieve an equitable result. The presumption in favour of that line is to be welcomed as a principle of value and clarity.

As to the meaning of special or relevant circumstances, or the criteria that need to be taken into account, case-law provides a range of clear indications. Equity is not a method of delimitation and nature cannot be totally refashioned, but some modification of the provisional equidistance line may be justified for the purpose of, for example, ‘abating the effects of an incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result’.²⁹² The following principles may be noted. First, the delimitation should avoid the encroachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other or its equivalent in respect of the economic zone and should avoid to the extent possible the interruption of the maritime projection of the relevant coastlines.²⁹³ Secondly, the configuration of the

coast may be relevant where the drawing of an equidistance line may unduly prejudice a state whose coast is particularly concave or convex within the relevant area of the delimitation when compared with that of its neighbours. But the threshold for this is relatively high.²⁹⁴ Thirdly, a ‘substantial difference in the lengths of the parties’ respective coastlines is likely to be a factor to be taken into consideration’ in mitigation of an equidistance line so as to avoid a disproportionate and inequitable result.²⁹⁵ Fourthly, the presence of islands or other similar maritime features may be relevant to the equities of the situation and may justify a modification of the provisional equidistance line.²⁹⁶ Fifthly, security considerations may be taken into account, but the precise effects of this are unclear. Sixthly, resource-related criteria, such as the distribution of fish stocks, have been treated cautiously and have not generally been accepted as a relevant circumstance.²⁹⁷ Finally, the prior conduct of the parties may well be relevant, for example, where there is sufficient practice to show that a provisional boundary has been agreed. In the *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf* case, the Court held that a line close to the coast which neither party had crossed when granting offshore oil and gas concessions and which thus constituted a *modus vivendi* was highly relevant,²⁹⁸ although in *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, the Court emphasised that only if such concessions were based on express or tacit agreement between the parties could they be taken into account for the purposes of a delimitation.²⁹⁹ This view was endorsed and perhaps extended in *Peru v. Chile*, where the International Court accepted that a maritime boundary could come into being by way of a ‘tacit agreement’, having regard to relevant fishing practices and the law of the sea in the pertinent period.³⁰⁰ In all cases, the aim is to produce an equitable delimitation, not an equal apportionment of maritime areas.³⁰¹ However, alongside the need for an equitable result as required by the

Convention, additional objectives to be achieved in the process were ‘transparency and the predictability of the delimitation process’.³⁰²

Landlocked States³⁰³

Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958 provided that ‘in order to enjoy freedom of the seas on equal terms with coastal states, states having no sea coast should have free access to the sea’.³⁰⁴ Article 125 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is formulated as follows:

1. Land-locked states shall have the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in this Convention including those relating to the freedom of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-locked states shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit states by all means of transport.
2. The terms and modalities for exercising freedom of transit shall be agreed between the land-locked states and the transit state concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements.
3. Transit states, in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their territory, shall have the right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in this Part for land-locked states shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests.

It will thus be seen that there is no absolute right of transit, but rather that transit depends upon arrangements to be made between the land-locked and transit states. Nevertheless, the affirmation of a right of access to the sea coast is an important step in assisting landlocked states. Articles 127 to 130 of the 1982 Convention set out a variety of terms for the operation of transit

arrangements, while article 131 provides that ships flying the flag of landlocked states shall enjoy treatment equal to that accorded to other foreign ships in maritime ports. Ships of all states, whether coastal states or landlocked states, have the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea and freedom of navigation in the waters beyond the territorial sea.³⁰⁵

It is also to be noted that landlocked states have the right to participate upon an equitable basis in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the economic zones of coastal states of the same subregion or region, taking into account relevant economic and geographical factors.³⁰⁶ Geographically disadvantaged states have the same right.³⁰⁷ The terms and modalities of such participation are to be established by the states concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements, taking into account a range of factors, including the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or fishing industries of the coastal state and the nutritional needs of the respective states.³⁰⁸

With regard to provisions concerning the international seabed regime, article 148 of the 1982 Convention provides that the effective participation of developing states in the International Seabed Area shall be promoted, having due regard to their special interests and needs, and in particular to the special need of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged among them to overcome obstacles arising from their disadvantaged location, including remoteness from the Area and difficulty of access to and from it.³⁰⁹

The High Seas³¹⁰

The closed seas concept proclaimed by Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and supported by the Papal Bulls of 1493 and 1506 dividing the seas of the world between the two powers, was replaced by the notion of the open seas and the concomitant freedom of the high seas during the eighteenth century.

The essence of the freedom of the high seas is that no state may acquire sovereignty over parts of them.³¹¹ This is the general rule, but it is subject to the operation of the doctrines of recognition, acquiescence and prescription, where, by long usage accepted by other nations, certain areas of the high seas bounding on the territorial waters of coastal states may be rendered subject to that state's sovereignty. This was emphasised in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case.³¹²

The high seas were defined in article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958 as all parts of the sea that were not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state. This reflected customary international law, although as a result of developments the definition in article 86 of the 1982 Convention includes: all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.

Article 87 of the 1982 Convention (developing article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas) provides that the high seas are open to all

states and that the freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down in the Convention and by other rules of international law. It includes, *inter alia*, the freedoms of navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines,³¹³ the construction of artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law,³¹⁴ fishing and the conduct of scientific research.³¹⁵ Such freedoms are to be exercised with due regard for the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under the Convention regarding activities in the International Seabed Area.³¹⁶

Australia and New Zealand alleged before the International Court, in the *Nuclear Tests* case,³¹⁷ that French nuclear testing in the Pacific infringed the principle of the freedom of the seas, but this point was not decided by the Court. The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons on the high seas as well as on land, but France was not a party to the treaty, and it appears not to constitute a customary rule binding all states, irrespective of the treaty.³¹⁸ Nevertheless, article 88 of the 1982 Convention provides that the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.

Principles that are generally acknowledged to come within article 2 include the freedom to conduct naval exercises on the high seas and the freedom to carry out research studies.

The freedom of navigation³¹⁹ is a traditional and well-recognised facet of the doctrine of the high seas, as is the freedom of fishing.³²⁰ This was reinforced by the declaration by the Court in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland)* cases³²¹ that Iceland's unilateral extension of its fishing zones

from 12 to 50 miles constituted a violation of article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, which is, as the preamble states, ‘generally declaratory of established principles of international law’. The freedom of the high seas applies not only to coastal states, but also to states that are landlocked.³²² In *Croatia v. Slovenia*,³²³ the Arbitral Tribunal was faced with determining Slovenia’s junction to the high seas in the Northern Adriatic Sea under the terms of the arbitration agreement requiring the same and concluded that the junction in question was an area in which ships and aircraft enjoy essentially the same rights of access to and from Slovenia as they enjoy on the high seas and that in the junction area, there would be freedom of communication for the purposes of free access to and from Slovenia, consisting of the freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines.

The question of freedom of navigation on the high seas in times of armed conflict was raised during the Iran–Iraq War, which during its latter stages involved attacks upon civilian shipping by both belligerents. Rather than rely on the classical and somewhat out-of-date rules of the laws of war at sea,³²⁴ the United Kingdom in particular analysed the issue in terms of the UN Charter. The following statement was made:³²⁵

The UK upholds the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and condemns all violations of the law of armed conflicts including attacks on merchant shipping. Under article 51 of the UN Charter, a state actively engaged in armed conflict (as in the case of Iran and Iraq) is entitled in exercise of its

inherent right of self-defence to stop and search a foreign merchant ship on the high seas if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for use in the conflict. This is an exceptional right: if the suspicion proves to be unfounded and if the ship has not committed acts calculated to give rise to suspicion, then the ship's owners have a good claim for compensation for loss caused by the delay. This right would not, however, extend to the imposition of a maritime blockade or other forms of economic warfare.

Jurisdiction on the High Seas³²⁶

The foundation of the maintenance of order on the high seas has rested upon the concept of the nationality of the ship, and the consequent jurisdiction of the flag state over the ship. It is, basically, the flag state that will enforce the rules and regulations not only of its own municipal law, but of international law as well. A ship without a flag will be deprived of many of the benefits and rights available under the legal regime of the high seas.

Each state is required to elaborate the conditions necessary for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory and for the right to fly its flag.³²⁷ The nationality of the ship will depend upon the flag it flies, but article 91 of the 1982 Convention also stipulates that there must be a 'genuine link' between the state and the ship.³²⁸ This provision, which

reflects ‘a well-established rule of general international law’,³²⁹ was intended to check the use of flags of convenience operated by states such as Liberia and Panama, which would grant their nationality to ships requesting such because of low taxation and the lack of application of most wage and social security agreements. This enabled the ships to operate at very low costs indeed. However, what precisely the ‘genuine link’ consists of and how one may regulate any abuse of the provisions of article 5 are unresolved questions. Some countries, for example the United States, maintain that the requirement of a ‘genuine link’ really only amounts to a duty to exercise jurisdiction over the ship in an efficacious manner, and is not a precondition for the grant, or the acceptance by other states of the grant, of nationality.³³⁰

An opportunity did arise in 1960 to discuss the meaning of the provision in the *IMCO* case.³³¹ The International Court was called upon to define the ‘largest ship-owning nations’ for the purposes of the constitution of a committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation. It was held that the term referred only to registered tonnage so as to enable Liberia and Panama to be elected to the committee. Unfortunately, the opportunity was not taken of considering the problems of flags of convenience or the meaning of the ‘genuine link’ in the light of the true ownership of the ships involved, and so the doubts and ambiguities remain.

The UN Conference on Conditions of Registration of Ships, held under the auspices of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, convened in July 1984 and an agreement was signed in 1986. It attempts to deal with the flags of convenience issue, bearing in mind that nearly one-third of the world’s merchant fleet by early 1985 flew such flags. It specifies that flag states

should provide in their laws and regulations for the ownership of ships flying their flags and that those should include appropriate provision for participation by nationals as owners of such ships, and that such provisions should be sufficient to permit the flag state to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag.³³²

The issue of the genuine link arose in the context of the Iran–Iraq War and in particular Iranian attacks upon Kuwaiti shipping. This prompted Kuwait to ask the United Kingdom and the United States to reflag Kuwaiti tankers. The United States agreed in early 1987 to reflag eleven such tankers under the US flag and to protect them as it did other US-flagged ships in the Gulf.³³³ The United Kingdom also agreed to reflag some Kuwaiti tankers, arguing that only satisfaction of Department of Trade and Industry requirements was necessary.³³⁴ Both states argued that the genuine link requirement was satisfied and, in view of the ambiguity of state practice as to the definition of genuine link in such instances, it is hard to argue that the United States and United Kingdom acted unlawfully. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in *M/V Saiga (No. 2)* has underlined that determination of the criteria and establishment of the procedures for granting and withdrawing nationality to ships are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state, although disputes concerning such matters may be subject to the dispute settlement procedures of the 1982 Convention. The question of the nationality of a ship was a question of fact to be determined on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties.³³⁵ The conduct of the flag state, ‘at all times material to the dispute’, was an important consideration in determining the nationality or registration of a ship.³³⁶ The Tribunal has also confirmed that the requirement of a genuine link was in order to secure effective

implementation of the duties of the flag state and not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag state may be challenged by other states.³³⁷

Ships are required to sail under the flag of one state only and are subject to its exclusive jurisdiction (save in exceptional cases). Where a ship does sail under the flags of more than one state, according to convenience, it may be treated as a ship without nationality and will not be able to claim any of the nationalities concerned.³³⁸ A ship that is stateless, and does not fly a flag, may be boarded and seized on the high seas. This point was accepted by the Privy Council in the case of *Naim Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine*,³³⁹ which concerned the seizure by the British Navy of a stateless ship attempting to convey immigrants into Palestine.

The basic principle relating to jurisdiction on the high seas is that the flag state alone may exercise such rights over the ship.³⁴⁰ This was elaborated in the *Lotus* case,³⁴¹ where it was held that ‘vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the state whose flag they fly’.³⁴² This exclusivity is without exception regarding warships and ships owned or operated by a state where they are used only on governmental non-commercial service. Such ships have, according to articles 95 and 96 of the 1982 Convention, ‘complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state’.³⁴³

Exceptions to the Exclusivity of Flag-State Jurisdiction

However, this basic principle is subject to exceptions regarding other vessels, and the concept of the freedom of the high seas is similarly limited by the existence of a series of exceptions.

Right of Visit³⁴⁴

Since the law of the sea depends to such an extent upon the nationality of the ship, it is well recognised in customary international law that warships have a right of approach to ascertain the nationality of ships. However, this right of approach to identify vessels does not incorporate the right to board or visit ships. This may only be undertaken, in the absence of hostilities between the flag states of the warship and a merchant vessel and in the absence of special treaty provisions to the contrary, where the ship is engaged in piracy or the slave trade, or, though flying a foreign flag or no flag at all, is in reality of the same nationality as the warship or of no nationality. But the warship has to operate carefully in such circumstances, since it may be liable to pay compensation for any loss or damage sustained if its suspicions are unfounded and the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them. Thus, international law has settled for a narrow exposition of the right of approach, in spite of earlier tendencies to expand this right, and the above provisions were incorporated into article 22 of the High Seas Convention. Article 110 of the 1982 Convention added to this list a right of visit where the ship is engaged in unauthorised broadcasting and the flag state of the warship has under article 109 of the Convention jurisdiction to prosecute the offender.

Piracy³⁴⁵

Piracy, one of the earliest of universal crimes,³⁴⁶ constitutes the most formidable of the exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state and to the principle of the freedom of the high seas. Piracy is strictly defined in international law and was declared in article 101 of the 1982 Convention to consist of any of the following acts:

(a) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or private aircraft and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; (b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).³⁴⁷

The essence of piracy under international law is that it must be committed for private ends. In other words, any hijacking or takeover for political reasons is automatically excluded from the definition of piracy. Similarly, any acts committed on the ship by the crew and aimed at the ship itself or property or persons on the ship do not fall within this category.

Any and every state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft whether on the high seas or on any other place outside the jurisdiction of states and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. In addition, the courts of the state carrying out the seizure have jurisdiction in international law to impose penalties, and may decide what action to take regarding the ship or aircraft and property, subject to the rights of third parties that have acted in good faith.³⁴⁸ Whether domestic jurisdiction in fact exists is a matter for the particular legal system. The fact that every state may as a matter of international law arrest and try persons accused of piracy makes that crime quite exceptional in international law, where so much emphasis is placed upon the sovereignty and jurisdiction of each particular state within its own territory. The first multilateral treaty concerning the regional implementation of the Convention's provisions on piracy was the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia in 2005, which calls for the establishment of an information-sharing centre in Singapore and extends the regulation of piracy beyond the high seas to events taking place in internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters.³⁴⁹ The growth of piracy off the coast of Somalia has occasioned considerable international activity and the UN Security Council has adopted a number of critical resolutions. In resolution 1816 (2008), states were authorised to enter the territorial waters of Somalia in pursuit of pirates in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of that state. In resolution 1976 (2011), states were urged to criminalise piracy under their domestic law, while in resolution 2020 (2011), states were additionally encouraged to establish anti-piracy courts.³⁵⁰ By virtue of bilateral arrangements, Kenya agreed to prosecute suspected pirates and established a special court so to do.³⁵¹ In addition, various counter-piracy operations have been established under the

auspices of particular international organisations, such as NATO's Operation Ocean Shield³⁵² and the European Union's Operation Atalanta, established in 2008.³⁵³

The Slave Trade³⁵⁴

Although piracy may be suppressed by all states, most offences on the high seas can only be punished in accordance with regulations prescribed by the municipal legislation of states, even where international law requires such rules to be established. Article 99 of the 1982 Convention provides that every state shall take effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorised to fly its flag and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever its flag, shall *ipso facto* be free.³⁵⁵ Under article 110, warships may board foreign merchant ships where they are reasonably suspected of engaging in the slave trade; offenders must be handed over to the flag state for trial.³⁵⁶

Unauthorised Broadcasting³⁵⁷

Under article 109 of the 1982 Convention, all states are to cooperate in the suppression of unauthorised broadcasting from the high seas. This is defined to mean transmission of sound or TV from a ship or installation on the high seas intended for reception by the general public, contrary to international regulations, but excluding the transmission of distress calls. Any person engaged in such broadcasting may be prosecuted by the flag state of the ship, the state of registry of the installation, the state of which the person is a

national, any state where the transmission can be received or any state where authorised radio communication is suffering interference.

Any of the above states having jurisdiction may arrest any person or ship engaging in unauthorised broadcasting on the high seas and seize the broadcasting apparatus.³⁵⁸

Hot Pursuit³⁵⁹

The right of hot pursuit of a foreign ship is a principle designed to ensure that a vessel which has infringed the rules of a coastal state cannot escape punishment by fleeing to the high seas. In reality, it means that in certain defined circumstances a coastal state may extend its jurisdiction onto the high seas in order to pursue and seize a ship which is suspected of infringing its laws. The right, which has been developing in one form or another since the nineteenth century,³⁶⁰ was comprehensively elaborated in article 111 of the 1982 Convention, building upon article 23 of the High Seas Convention 1958.

It notes that such pursuit may commence when the authorities of the coastal state have good reason to believe that the foreign ship has violated its laws. The pursuit must start while the ship, or one of its boats, is within the internal waters, territorial sea or contiguous zone of the coastal state and may only continue outside the territorial sea or contiguous zone if it is uninterrupted. However, if the pursuit commences while the foreign ship is in the contiguous zone, then it may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established. The right

may similarly commence from the archipelagic waters. In addition, the right will apply *mutatis mutandis* to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf (including safety zones around continental shelf installations) of the relevant rules and regulations applicable to such areas.

Hot pursuit only begins when the pursuing ship has satisfied itself that the ship pursued or one of its boats is within the limits of the territorial sea or, as the case may be, in the contiguous zone or economic zone or on the continental shelf. It is essential that prior to the chase a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance enabling it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship and pursuit may only be exercised by warships or military aircraft or by specially authorised government ships or planes. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued has entered the territorial waters of its own or a third state. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has emphasised that the conditions laid down in article 111 are cumulative, each one of them having to be satisfied in order for the pursuit to be lawful.³⁶¹ In stopping and arresting a ship in such circumstances, the use of force must be avoided if at all possible and, where it is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.³⁶²

Collisions

Where ships are involved in collisions on the high seas, article 11 of the High Seas Convention declares, overruling the decision in the *Lotus* case,³⁶³ that penal or disciplinary proceedings may only be taken against the master or other persons in the service of the ship by the authorities of either the flag state or the state of which the particular person is a national. It also provides

that no arrest or detention of the ship, even for investigation purposes, can be ordered by other than the authorities of the flag state. This was reaffirmed in article 97 of the 1982 Convention.

Treaty Rights and Agreements³⁶⁴

In many cases, states may by treaty permit one another's warships to exercise certain powers of visit and search as regards vessels flying the flags of the signatories to the treaty.³⁶⁵ For example, most of the agreements in the nineteenth century relating to the suppression of the slave trade provided that warships of the parties to the agreements could search and sometimes detain vessels suspected of being involved in the trade, where such vessels were flying the flags of the treaty states. The Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables of 1884 gave the warships of contracting states the right to stop and ascertain the nationality of merchant ships that were suspected of infringing the terms of the Convention, and other agreements dealing with matters as diverse as arms trading and liquor smuggling contained like powers. Until recently, the primary focus of such activities in fact concerned drug trafficking.³⁶⁶ However, the question of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is today of great importance.³⁶⁷ This issue has been tackled by a mix of international treaties, bilateral treaties, international cooperation and Security Council action. Building on the Security Council statement in 1992 identifying the proliferation of WMD as a threat to international peace and security,³⁶⁸ the United States announced the Proliferation Security Initiative in May 2003. A statement of Interdiction Principles agreed by participants in the initiative in September 2003 provided for the undertaking of effective measures to interdict the transfer or transport

of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Such measures were to include the boarding and search of any vessel flying the flag of one of the participants, with their consent, in internal waters, territorial seas or beyond the territorial seas, where such vessel is reasonably suspected of carrying WMD materials to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern.³⁶⁹ In addition, the United States has signed a number of bilateral WMD interdiction agreements, providing for consensual boarding of vessels.³⁷⁰

In a further development, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) required all states, *inter alia*, to prohibit and criminalise the transfer of WMD and delivery systems to non-state actors, although there is no direct reference to interdiction.³⁷¹ In addition, a Protocol adopted in 2005 to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation provides essentially for the criminalisation of knowingly transporting WMD and related materials by sea and provides for enforcement by interdiction on the high seas.³⁷²

Interception to prevent smuggling of human beings and general issues of migration, especially across the Mediterranean, have in recent years become major problems with both security and human rights implications. Under the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, states are to cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea, in accordance with the international law of the sea, and a state may request the assistance of the flag state where it has reasonable grounds for suspecting that migrant smuggling is taking place.

The flag state may authorise that state to board and search the offending vessel and if evidence is found that the vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, to take appropriate measures with regard to the vessel and persons and cargo on board, as authorised by the flag state.³⁷³ In a number of cases, control of smuggling of migrants across the sea is dealt with by bilateral agreements, for example the Italy–Libya agreement of 2008 (and additional protocol of 2009), under which maritime patrols were undertaken in Libyan and international waters in order to conduct surveillance and search and rescue operations. Italy has also signed a cooperation and migrant control agreement with Tunisia in 2011.³⁷⁴ However, in *Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy*, the European Court of Human Rights found that a violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights had occurred as there was a risk of the migrants, being returned to Libya, suffering ill-treatment there.³⁷⁵

The UN Security Council in resolution 2240 (2015) condemned all acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking involving Libya and called on all states to assist that country to prevent, investigate and prosecute such acts. The resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and thus binding, called upon member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, that are engaged in the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, to inspect, as permitted under international law, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, any unflagged vessels that they have reasonable grounds to believe have been, are being, or imminently will be used by organised criminal enterprises for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, including inflatable boats, rafts and dinghies and further called upon such states to inspect, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, vessels that they have reasonable

grounds to believe have been, are being, or imminently will be used by organised criminal enterprises for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya. The resolution, however, went further than these provisions, which rely upon the consent of the flag state, by authorising such states for a period of one year to inspect on the high seas vessels that they have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for these purposes, provided only that ‘good faith efforts to obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag state’ have been made prior to using the authority given in the resolution.³⁷⁶

Pollution³⁷⁷

Article 24 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas called on states to draw up regulations to prevent the pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil or the dumping of radioactive waste, while article 1 of the Convention on the Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, of the same year, declared that all states had the duty to adopt, or cooperate with other states in adopting, such measures as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Although these provisions have not proved an unqualified success, they have been reinforced by an interlocking series of additional agreements covering the environmental protection of the seas.

The International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, signed in 1969 and in force as of June 1975, provides that the parties to the Convention may take such measures on the high seas:

as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.

This provision came as a result of the *Torrey Canyon* incident in 1967,³⁷⁸ in which a Liberian tanker foundered off the Cornish coast, spilling massive quantities of oil and polluting large stretches of the UK and French coastlines. As a last resort to prevent further pollution, British aircraft bombed the tanker and set it ablaze. The Convention on Intervention on the High Seas provided for action to be taken to end threats to the coasts of states, while the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, also signed in 1969 and which came into effect in June 1975, stipulated that the owners of ships causing oil pollution damage were to be liable to pay compensation.

The latter agreement was supplemented in 1971 by the Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage which sought to provide for compensation in circumstances not covered by the 1969 Convention and aid shipowners in their additional financial obligations.

These agreements are only a small part of the web of treaties covering the preservation of the sea environment. Other examples include: the 1954

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, with its series of amendments designed to ban offensive discharges; the 1972 Oslo Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft and the subsequent London Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea later the same year; the 1973 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships; and the 1974 Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources.³⁷⁹

Under the 1982 Convention, nearly fifty articles are devoted to the protection of the marine environment. Flag states still retain the competence to legislate for their ships, but certain minimum standards are imposed upon them.³⁸⁰ It is also provided that states are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment and are liable in accordance with international law. States must also ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief regarding damage caused by pollution of the marine environment by persons under their jurisdiction.³⁸¹

States are under a basic obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.³⁸² Article 194 of the 1982 Convention also provides that:

1. States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with

their capabilities, and they shall endeavour to harmonise their policies in this connection.

2. States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.

3. The measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine environment. These measures shall include, *inter alia*, those designed to minimise to the fullest possible extent:

(a) the release of toxic, harmful, or noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere or by dumping;

(b) pollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, preventing intentional and unintentional discharges, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of vessels;

(c) pollution from installations and devices used in exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices;

(d) pollution from other installations and devices operating in the marine environment, in particular for preventing accidents and dealing with

emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices.

4. In taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine environment, states shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other states in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity with this Convention.³⁸³

Straddling Stocks³⁸⁴

The freedom to fish on the high seas is one of the fundamental freedoms of the high seas, but it is not total or absolute.³⁸⁵ The development of exclusive economic zones has meant that the area of high seas has shrunk appreciably, so that the bulk of fish stocks are now to be found within the economic zones of coastal states. In addition, the interests of such coastal states have extended to impinge more clearly upon the regulation of the high seas.

Article 56(1) of the 1982 Convention provides that coastal states have sovereign rights over their economic zones for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the fish stocks of the zones concerned. Such rights are accompanied by duties as to conservation and management measures in order to ensure that the fish stocks in exclusive economic zones are not endangered by over-exploitation and that such stocks are maintained at, or restored to, levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield.³⁸⁶ Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states, these states shall seek either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional

organisations to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks.³⁸⁷ Article 116(b) of the 1982 Convention states that the freedom to fish on the high seas is subject to the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal states as detailed above, while the 1982 Convention lays down a general obligation upon states to cooperate in taking such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas and a variety of criteria are laid down for the purpose of determining the allowable catch and establishing other conservation measures.³⁸⁸

A particular problem is raised with regard to straddling stocks, that is stocks of fish that straddle both exclusive economic zones and high seas, for, if the latter were not in some way regulated, fishery stocks regularly present in the exclusive economic zone could be depleted by virtue of unrestricted fishing of those stocks while they were present on the high seas. Article 63(2) of the 1982 Convention stipulates that where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone (i.e. the high seas), the coastal state and the states fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organisations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area.

The provisions in the 1982 Convention, however, were not deemed to be fully comprehensive³⁸⁹ and, as problems of straddling stocks grew more apparent,³⁹⁰ a Straddling Stocks Conference was set up in 1993 and produced an agreement two years later. The Agreement emphasises the need to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species and

calls in particular for the application of the precautionary approach.³⁹¹ Coastal states and states fishing on the high seas shall pursue cooperation in relation to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organisations and shall enter into consultations in good faith and without delay at the request of any interested state with a view to establishing appropriate arrangements to ensure conservation and management of the stocks.³⁹² Much emphasis is placed upon subregional and regional organisations and article 10 provides that in fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through such organisations or arrangements, states shall *inter alia* agree on measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks and agree as appropriate upon participatory rights such as allocations of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort. In particular, the establishment of cooperative mechanisms for effective monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement, decision-making procedures facilitating the adoption of such measures of conservation and management, and the promotion of the peaceful settlement of disputes are called for. The focus in terms of implementation is upon the flag state. Article 18 provides that flag states shall take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that their vessels comply with subregional and regional conservation and management measures, while article 19 provides that flag states must enforce such measures irrespective of where violations occur and investigate immediately any alleged violation. Article 21 deals specifically with subregional and regional cooperation in enforcement and provides that in any area of the high seas covered by such an organisation or arrangement, a state party which is also a member or participant in such an organisation or arrangement may board and inspect fishing vessels flying the flag of another state party to the Agreement. This applies whether that state

party is or is not a member of or a participant in such a subregional or regional organisation or arrangement. The boarding and visiting powers are for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conservation and management measures established by the organisation or arrangement. Where, following a boarding and inspection, there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel has engaged in activities contrary to the relevant conservation and management measures, the inspecting state shall secure evidence and promptly notify the flag state. The flag state must respond within three working days and either fulfil its investigation and enforcement obligations under article 19 or authorise the inspecting state to investigate. In the latter case, the flag state must then take enforcement action or authorise the inspecting state to take such action. Where there are clear grounds for believing that the vessel has committed a serious violation and the flag state has failed to respond or take action as required, the inspectors may remain on board and secure evidence and may require the master to bring the vessel into the nearest appropriate port.³⁹³ Article 23 provides that a port state has the right and duty to take measures in accordance with international law to promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional and global conservation and management measures.³⁹⁴

One of the major regional organisations existing in this area is the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), which came into being following the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention 1978. The organisation has established a Fisheries Commission with responsibility for conservation measures in the area covered by this Convention. The European Community is a party to the Convention, although it has objected on occasions to NAFO's total catch quotas and the share-out of such quotas among states

parties. In particular, a dispute developed with regard to the share-out of Greenland halibut, following upon a decision by NAFO to reduce the EC share of this fishery in 1995.³⁹⁵ The Community formally objected to this decision using NAFO procedures and established its own halibut quota, which was in excess of the NAFO quota. In May 1994, Canada had amended its Coastal Fisheries Protection Act 1985 in order to enable it to take action to prevent further destruction of straddling stocks and by virtue of which any vessel from any nation fishing at variance with good conservation rules could be rendered subject to Canadian action. In early 1995, regulations were issued in order to protect Greenland halibut outside Canada's 200-mile limit from overfishing. On 9 March 1995, Canadian officers boarded a Spanish vessel fishing on the high seas on the Grand Banks some 245 miles off the Canadian coast. The captain was arrested and the vessel seized and towed to a Canadian harbour. Spain commenced an application before the International Court, but this failed on jurisdictional grounds.³⁹⁶ In April 1995, an agreement between the Community and Canada was reached, under which the Community obtained an increased quota for Greenland halibut and Canada stayed charges against the vessel and agreed to repeal the provisions of the regulation banning Spanish and Portuguese vessels from fishing in the NAFO regulatory area. Improved control and enforcement procedures were also agreed.³⁹⁷ Problems have also arisen in other areas: for example, the 'Donut Hole', a part of the high seas in the Bering Sea surrounded by the exclusive economic zones of Russia and the United States,³⁹⁸ and the 'Peanut Hole', a part of the high seas in the Sea of Okhotsk surrounded by Russia's economic zone. In 2001, the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean was signed. This agreement establishes a Commission to

determine, *inter alia*, the total allowable catch within the area and to adopt standards for fishing operations.³⁹⁹

The International Seabed⁴⁰⁰

Introduction

In recent years, the degree of wealth contained beneath the high seas has become more and more apparent. It is estimated that some 175 billion dry tonnes of mineable manganese nodules are in existence, scattered over some 15 per cent of the seabed. This far exceeds the land-based reserves of the metals involved (primarily manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt).⁴⁰¹ While this source of mineral wealth is of great potential importance to the developed nations possessing or soon to possess the technical capacity to mine such nodules, it poses severe problems for developing states, particularly those who are dependent upon the export earnings of a few categories of minerals. The Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), for example, accounts for over one-third of total cobalt production, while Gabon and India each account for around 8 per cent of total manganese production.⁴⁰² By the early 1990s, there appeared to be six major deep sea mining consortia with the participation of numerous American, Japanese, Canadian, British, Belgian, German, Dutch and French companies.⁴⁰³ The technology to mine is at an advanced stage and some basic investment has been made, although it is unlikely that there will be considerable mining activity for several years to come.

In 1969, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2574 (XXIV) calling for a moratorium on deep seabed activities and a year later a Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof,

beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction ('the Area') was adopted. This provided that the Area and its resources were the 'common heritage of mankind' and could not be appropriated, and that no rights at all could be acquired over it except in conformity with an international regime to be established to govern its exploration and exploitation.

The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Part XI)

Under the Convention, the Area⁴⁰⁴ and its resources are deemed to be the common heritage of mankind and no sovereign or other rights may be recognised. Minerals recovered from the Area in accordance with the Convention are alienable, however.⁴⁰⁵ Activities in the Area are to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole by or on behalf of the International Seabed Authority (the Authority) established under the Convention.⁴⁰⁶ The Authority is to provide for the equitable sharing of such benefits.⁴⁰⁷ Activities in the Area are to be carried out under article 153 by the Enterprise (i.e. the organ of the Authority established as its operating arm) and by states parties or state enterprises, or persons possessing the nationality of states parties or effectively controlled by them, acting in association with the Authority. The latter ‘qualified applicants’ will be required to submit formal written plans of work to be approved by the Council after review by the Legal and Technical Commission.⁴⁰⁸

This plan of work is to specify two sites of equal estimated commercial value. The Authority may then approve a plan of work relating to one of these sites and designate the other as a ‘reserved site’ which may only be exploited by the Authority, via the Enterprise or in association with developing states.⁴⁰⁹

Resolution I of the Conference established a Preparatory Commission to make arrangements for the operation of the Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.⁴¹⁰

Resolution II of the Conference made special provision for eight ‘pioneer investors’, four from France, Japan, India and the Soviet Union and four from Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, and possibly others from developing states, to be given pioneer status. Each investor must have invested at least \$30 million in preparation for seabed mining, at least 10 per cent of which must be invested in a specific site. Sponsoring states must provide certification that this has happened.⁴¹¹ Such pioneer investors are to be able to carry out exploration activities pending entry into force of the Convention, with priority over the other applicants (apart from the Enterprise) in the allocation of exploitation contracts.⁴¹² India, France, Japan and the Soviet Union were registered as pioneer investors in 1987 on behalf of various consortia.⁴¹³ China was registered as a pioneer investor in March 1991,⁴¹⁴ while the multinational Interoceanmetal Joint Organization was registered as a pioneer investor in August that year.⁴¹⁵ Several sites have been earmarked for the Authority, all on the Clarion–Clipperton Ridge in the North-Eastern Equatorial Pacific.

The regime for the deep seabed, however, was opposed by the United States in particular and, as a consequence, it voted against the adoption of the 1982 Convention. The United Kingdom also declared that it would not sign the Convention until a satisfactory regime for deep seabed mining was established.⁴¹⁶ Concern was particularly expressed regarding the failure to provide assured access to seabed minerals, lack of a proportionate voice in decision-making for countries most affected, and the problems that would be caused by not permitting the free play of market forces in the development of seabed resources.⁴¹⁷

The Reciprocating States Regime

As a result of developments in the Conference on the Law of the Sea, many states began to enact domestic legislation with the aim of establishing an interim framework for exploration and exploitation of the seabed pending an acceptable international solution. The UK Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981, for example, provided for the granting of exploration licences (but not in respect of a period before 1 July 1981) and exploitation licences (but not for a period before 1 January 1988).⁴¹⁸

A 1982 Agreement⁴¹⁹ called for consultations to avoid overlapping claims under national legislation and for arbitration to resolve any dispute.⁴²⁰ The Preparatory Commission, however, adopted a declaration in 1985 stating that any claim, agreement or action regarding the Area and its resources undertaken outside the Commission itself, which was incompatible with the 1982 Convention and its related resolutions, ‘shall not be recognised’.⁴²¹

The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the Seabed Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea⁴²²

Attempts to ensure the universality of the 1982 Convention system and thus prevent the development of conflicting deep seabed regimes began in earnest in 1990 in consultations sponsored by the UN Secretary-General, with more flexibility being shown by states.⁴²³ Eventually, the 1994 Agreement emerged. The states parties undertake in article 1 to implement Part XI of the 1982 Convention in accordance with the Agreement. By article 2, the Agreement and Part XI are to be interpreted and applied together as a single

instrument and, in the event of any inconsistency, the provisions in the former document are to prevail. States can only express their consent to become bound by the Agreement if they at the same time or previously express their consent to be bound by the Convention. Thus, conflicting systems operating with regard to the seabed became impossible. The Agreement also provides in article 7 for provisional application if it had not come into force on 16 November 1994 (the date on which the Convention came into force).⁴²⁴ The Agreement was thus able to be provisionally applied by states that had consented to its adoption in the General Assembly, unless they had otherwise notified the depositary (the UN Secretary-General) in writing; by states and entities signing the agreement, unless they had otherwise notified the depositary in writing; by states and entities which had consented to its provisional application by so notifying the depositary in writing; and by states which had acceded to the Agreement.

The Annex to the Agreement addresses a number of issues raised by developed states. In particular, it is provided that all organs and bodies established under the Convention and Agreement are to be cost-effective and based upon an evolutionary approach taking into account the functional needs of such organs or bodies; a variety of institutional arrangements are detailed with regard to the work of the International Seabed Authority (section 1); the work of the Enterprise is to be carried out initially by the Secretariat of the Authority and the Enterprise shall conduct its initial deep seabed mining operations through joint ventures that accord with sound commercial principles (section 2); decision-making in the Assembly and Council of the Authority is to comply with a series of specific rules⁴²⁵ (section 3); the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council may conduct a review at

any time of matters referred to in article 155(1) of the Convention, notwithstanding the provisions of that article as a whole (section 4); and transfer of technology to the Enterprise and developing states is to be sought on fair and reasonable commercial terms on the open market or through joint-venture arrangements (section 5).⁴²⁶

The International Seabed Authority⁴²⁷

The Authority is the autonomous organisation which the states parties to the 1982 Convention have agreed is to organise and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering its resources.⁴²⁸ It became fully operational in June 1996. The principal organs of the Authority are the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat. Also to be noted are the Legal and Technical Commission and the Finance Committee. The Assembly is composed of all members of the Authority, i.e. all states parties to the Convention.⁴²⁹ The Assembly is the supreme organ of the Authority with powers to elect, *inter alia*, the Council, Secretary-General and the members of the Governing Boards of the Enterprise and its Director-General, to establish subsidiary organs and to assess the contributions of members to the administrative budget. It has the power to establish the general policy of the Authority.⁴³⁰ The Council consists of thirty-six members elected by the Assembly in accordance with certain criteria.⁴³¹ The Council is the executive organ of the Authority and has the power to establish the specific policies to be pursued by the Authority.⁴³² The Council has two organs: an Economic Planning Commission and a Legal and Technical Commission.⁴³³ The organ of the Authority actually carrying out activities in the Area is the Enterprise.⁴³⁴

Settlement of Disputes⁴³⁵

The 1982 Convention contains detailed and complex provisions regarding the resolution of law of the sea disputes. Part XV, section 1 lays down the general provisions. Article 279 expresses the fundamental obligation to settle disputes peacefully in accordance with article 2(3) of the UN Charter and using the means indicated in article 33 of the same,⁴³⁶ but the parties are able to choose methods other than those specified in the Convention.⁴³⁷ States of the European Union, for example, have agreed to submit fisheries disputes among member states to the European Court of Justice under the Treaty of Rome 1957.

Article 283 of the Convention provides that where a dispute arises, the parties are to proceed ‘expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means’ and article 284 states that the parties may resort if they wish to conciliation procedures, in which case a conciliation commission will be established, whose report will be non-binding.⁴³⁸ Where no settlement is reached by means freely chosen by the parties, the compulsory procedures laid down in Part XV, section 2 become operative.⁴³⁹ Upon signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention, or at any time thereafter, a state may choose one of the following means of dispute settlement: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,⁴⁴⁰ the International Court of Justice,⁴⁴¹ an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII⁴⁴² or a special arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII for specific disputes.⁴⁴³

There are some exceptions to the obligation to submit a dispute to one of these mechanisms in the absence of a freely chosen resolution process by the parties. Article 297(1) provides that disputes concerning the exercise by a coastal state of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone may only be subject to the compulsory settlement procedure in particular cases.⁴⁴⁴ Article 297(2) provides that while disputes concerning marine scientific research shall be settled in accordance with section 2 of the Convention, the coastal state is not obliged to accept the submission to such compulsory settlement of any dispute arising out of the exercise by the coastal state of a right or discretion to regulate, authorise and conduct marine scientific research in its economic zone or on its continental shelf or a decision to order suspension or cessation of such research.⁴⁴⁵ Article 297(3) provides similarly that while generally disputes with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with section 2, the coastal state shall not be obliged to accept the submission to compulsory settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with regard to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other states, and the terms and conditions established in its conservation and management laws and regulations.⁴⁴⁶ There are also three situations with regard to which states may opt out of the compulsory settlement procedures.⁴⁴⁷

The Convention also provides for a Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,⁴⁴⁸ which under article 187 shall have jurisdiction with regard to matters concerning the Deep Seabed and the International Seabed Authority. By article 188, inter-state disputes

concerning the exploitation of the international seabed are to be submitted only to the Seabed Disputes Chamber.

One problem that has arisen has been where a dispute arises under one or more conventions including the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and the impact that this may have upon dispute settlement. In the *Southern Bluefin Tuna* case between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and Japan on the other,⁴⁴⁹ the Arbitral Tribunal had to consider the effect of the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, the binding settlement procedures of which require the consent of all parties to the dispute. However, these states were also parties to the 1982 Convention, the provisions of which concerning highly migratory fish stocks (which included the southern bluefin tuna) referred to compulsory arbitration.⁴⁵⁰ The parties were unable to agree within the Commission established by the 1993 Convention and the applicants invoked the compulsory arbitration provisions of the 1982 Convention. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea indicated provisional measures⁴⁵¹ and the matter went to arbitration. Japan argued that the dispute was one under the 1993 Convention so that its consensual settlement procedures were applicable⁴⁵² and not the compulsory procedures under the 1982 Convention. The Tribunal held that the dispute was one common to both Conventions and that there was only one dispute. Article 281(1) of the 1982 Convention provides essentially for the priority of procedures agreed to by the parties, so that the 1982 Convention's provisions would only apply where no settlement had been reached using the other means agreed by the parties and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure. Since article 16 of the 1993 Convention fell within the category of procedures agreed by the parties and thus within article

281(1), the intent and thus the consequence of article 16 was to remove proceedings under that provision from the reach of the compulsory procedures of the 1982 Convention.⁴⁵³ Accordingly, the extent to which the compulsory procedures of the 1982 Convention apply depends on the circumstances and, in particular, the existence and nature of any other agreement between the parties relating to peaceful settlement.⁴⁵⁴

Outside the framework of the 1982 Convention, states may adopt a variety of means of resolving disputes, ranging from negotiations, inquiries,⁴⁵⁵ conciliation⁴⁵⁶ and arbitration⁴⁵⁷ to submission to the International Court of Justice.⁴⁵⁸

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea⁴⁵⁹

The Tribunal was established as one of the dispute settlement mechanisms under Part XV of the Law of the Sea Convention. The Statute of the Tribunal⁴⁶⁰ provides that it shall be composed of twenty-one independent members enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of recognised competence in the field of the law of the sea, while the representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution are to be assured.⁴⁶¹ Judges are elected for nine-year terms by the states parties to the Convention.⁴⁶² The Statute also allows for the appointment of ad hoc judges. Article 17 provides that where the Tribunal includes a member of the nationality of one of the parties to the dispute, any other party may choose a person to participate as a member of the Tribunal. Where in a dispute neither or none of the parties have a judge of the same nationality, they may choose a person to participate as a member of the Tribunal.⁴⁶³ The Tribunal may also, at the request of a party or of its own motion, decide to select no fewer than two scientific or technical experts to sit with it, but without the right to vote.⁴⁶⁴

The Tribunal, based in Hamburg, is open to states parties to the Convention⁴⁶⁵ and to entities other than states parties in accordance with Part XI of the Convention, concerning the International Seabed Area, thereby including the International Seabed Authority, state enterprises and natural and juridical persons in certain circumstances,⁴⁶⁶ or in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case.⁴⁶⁷ The jurisdiction of the

Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in accordance with the Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.⁴⁶⁸ The provisions of the Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention constitute the applicable law of the Tribunal.⁴⁶⁹ The Tribunal is also empowered under article 138 of the Rules of the Tribunal 2009 to give an advisory opinion on a legal question where this is provided for by an ‘international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention’. Its first Advisory Opinion was given on 2 April 2015 at the request of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, a West African regional fisheries organisation, concerning the obligations of the flag state in cases where illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities were conducted within the Exclusive Economic Zone of third party States.⁴⁷⁰ Under article 15(1) of its Statute, the Tribunal may form special chambers, composed of three or more of its elected members, as it considers necessary for dealing with particular categories of disputes. Under article 15(2), where the parties so request, the Tribunal must form such a chamber for dealing with a particular dispute and the composition of such a chamber will be determined by the Tribunal with the approval of the parties.⁴⁷¹

Pursuant to Part XI, section 5 of the Convention and article 14 of the Statute, a Seabed Disputes Chamber of the Tribunal has been formed with jurisdiction to hear disputes regarding activities in the international seabed area. The Chamber is composed of eleven judges representing the principal legal systems of the world and with equitable geographical distribution.⁴⁷² Ad hoc chambers consisting of three judges may be established if a party to a dispute so requests. The composition is determined by the Seabed Disputes Chamber

with the approval of the parties to the dispute.⁴⁷³ The Chamber shall apply the provisions of the Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention,⁴⁷⁴ together with the rules, regulation and procedures of the International Seabed Authority adopted in accordance with the Convention and the terms of contracts concerning activities in the International Seabed Area in matters relating to those contracts.⁴⁷⁵ The Seabed Disputes Chamber has jurisdiction to give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council of the International Seabed Authority on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities and such opinions shall be given as a matter of urgency.⁴⁷⁶ In addition, the Tribunal may create such chambers of three or more persons as it considers necessary⁴⁷⁷ and a five-person Chamber of Summary Procedure.⁴⁷⁸

The Tribunal⁴⁷⁹ and the Seabed Disputes Chamber have the power to prescribe provisional measures in accordance with article 290 of the Convention.⁴⁸⁰ Article 290 provides, *inter alia*, that if a dispute has been duly submitted to the Tribunal, which considers that *prima facie* it has jurisdiction, any provisional measures considered appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment pending the final decision may be prescribed.⁴⁸¹ Such provisional measures may not be prescribed unless there is ‘a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to the rights of the parties in dispute’⁴⁸² and these measures may be modified or revoked as soon as the circumstances justifying them have changed or ceased to exist. Further, the Tribunal or, with regard to activities in the International Seabed Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures if it considers that *prima facie* the tribunal which is to

be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures. The Convention also makes it clear that provisional measures are binding, requiring the parties to the dispute to comply promptly with any provisional measures prescribed under article 290.⁴⁸³ The *Southern Bluefin Tuna* case⁴⁸⁴ was the first case applying article 290(5) of the Law of the Sea Convention regarding the grant of provisional measures pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which the dispute had been submitted. The Tribunal thus had to satisfy itself that *prima facie* the arbitral tribunal would have jurisdiction.⁴⁸⁵ This the Tribunal was able to do and the measures it prescribed included setting limits on the annual catches of the fish in question.⁴⁸⁶ Thereafter, the matter went to arbitration.⁴⁸⁷

Where a party does not appear before the Tribunal, the other party may request that the Tribunal continue the hearings and reach a decision.⁴⁸⁸ Before so doing, the Tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.⁴⁸⁹ A party may present a counter-claim in its counter-memorial, provided that it is directly concerned with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.⁴⁹⁰ The Statute provides also for third-party intervention, where a state party considers that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in any dispute. It is for the Tribunal to decide on this request and, if such a request is granted, the decision of the Tribunal in the dispute shall be binding upon the intervening state party in so far as it relates to matters in respect of which that state party intervened.⁴⁹¹ This is different from the equivalent provision

relating to the International Court of Justice and thus should avoid the anomalous position of the non-party intervener.⁴⁹² There is, however, a right to intervene in cases where the interpretation or application of the Convention is in question.⁴⁹³ Decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding as between the parties to the dispute.⁴⁹⁴

The Tribunal has heard a number of cases since its first case in 1997. Most of these cases have concerned article 292 of the Convention, which provides that where a state party has detained a vessel flying the flag of another state party and has not complied with the prompt release requirement upon payment of a reasonable bond or other financial security, the question of release from detention may be submitted to the Tribunal.⁴⁹⁵ In *Camouco*,⁴⁹⁶ for example, the Tribunal discussed the scope of the article and held that it would not be logical to read into it the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. Article 292 provided for an independent remedy and no limitation should be read into it that would have the effect of defeating its very object and purpose.⁴⁹⁷ The Tribunal found a violation of article 292 in the case of the *Volga*, where it was held that the bond set for the release of the vessel in question, while reasonable in terms of the financial condition, was not reasonable in that the non-financial conditions set down by the Respondent with regard to the vessel carrying a vessel monitoring system (VMS) and the submission of information about the owner of the ship could not be considered as components of the bond or other financial security for the purposes of article 292 of the Convention. It was also held that the circumstances of the seizure of the vessel were not relevant to a consideration of a breach of article 292, while the proceeds of the catch were irrelevant to the bond issue.⁴⁹⁸ In *Hoshinmaru (Japan v. Russia)*, the Tribunal held that it

was not reasonable that a bond should be set on the basis of the maximum penalties applicable to the owner and the Master, nor was it reasonable that the bond should be calculated on the basis of the confiscation of the vessel, given the circumstances of the case. In setting a reasonable bond for the release of the vessel, the Tribunal stated that the amount of the bond should be proportionate to the gravity of the alleged offences.⁴⁹⁹

The *Mox* case⁵⁰⁰ was a case where the parties (Ireland and the United Kingdom) appeared before the Tribunal at the provisional measures stage under article 290(5), while later moving to an arbitral tribunal for the merits. The Tribunal prescribed provisional measures requiring the parties to exchange information regarding the possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the Mox nuclear plant, to monitor the risks or the effects of the operation of the plant and to devise, as appropriate, measures to prevent any pollution of the marine environment which might result from the operation of the plant. In so doing, the Tribunal specifically mentioned statements made by the United Kingdom concerning, *inter alia*, transportation of radioactive material, which the Tribunal characterised as ‘assurances’ and which it placed ‘on record’.⁵⁰¹

The *M/V Saiga (No. 2)* (*Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea*) case⁵⁰² was one of the more important decisions made by the Tribunal.⁵⁰³ Issues addressed included the impermissibility of extending customs jurisdiction into the exclusive economic zone, the failure to comply with the rules underpinning the right of hot pursuit under article 111 of the Law of the Sea Convention, the use of force, and admissibility issues such as the registration of the vessel and the need for a ‘genuine link’.⁵⁰⁴

The Tribunal's judgment in the application for prompt release in the *Grand Prince (Belize v. France)* case⁵⁰⁵ focused on jurisdiction and, in particular, whether the requirements under article 91 of the Law of the Sea Convention regarding nationality of ships had been fulfilled.⁵⁰⁶ The Tribunal emphasised that, like the International Court, it had to satisfy itself that it had jurisdiction to hear the application and thus possessed the right to deal with all aspects of jurisdiction, whether or not they had been expressly raised by the parties.⁵⁰⁷ The Tribunal concluded that the documentary evidence submitted by the applicant failed to establish that it was the flag state of the vessel when the application was made, so that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.⁵⁰⁸

The Tribunal is now beginning to hear substantive cases concerning maritime delimitation. The first one was the complicated and wide-ranging *Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar)* case, in which the Tribunal essentially followed the approach taken by the International Court to delimitation.⁵⁰⁹ It also addressed particular issues, noting that the territorial sea would prevail over the exclusive economic zone⁵¹⁰ and that a state may exercise rights in an area of overlap that do not impede the exercise of rights by the other state.⁵¹¹ Further, the Tribunal noted that the delimitation method to be employed for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles should not differ from that within 200 nautical miles. Accordingly, the equidistance/relevant circumstances method continues to apply for the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, since sovereignty over the land territory is the basis for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state with regard to both the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.⁵¹² The Tribunal has also decided the *Maritime Delimitation*

(*Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire*) case⁵¹³ and a Special Chamber is, at the time of writing, considering the *Maritime Delimitation (Mauritius/Maldives)* case.⁵¹⁴

Suggestions for Further Reading

D. Anderson, *Modern Law of the Sea: Selected Essays*, The Hague, 2014

R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, *The Law of the Sea*, 3rd ed., Manchester, 1999

The Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea (ed. D. R. Rothwell, A. G. Oude Elferink, K. N. Scott and T. Stephens), Oxford, 2015

D. R. Rothwell and T. Stephens, *The International Law of the Sea*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016

Y. Tanaka, *The International Law of the Sea*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2019

¹ See e.g. D. R. Rothwell and T. Stephens, *The International Law of the Sea*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016; Y. Tanaka, *The International Law of the Sea*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2019; *The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law* (gen. ed. D. J. Attard; ed. M. Fitzmaurice and N. A. Martinez Gutierrez), Oxford, 3 vols., 2014–16; *The Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea* (ed. D. R. Rothwell, A. G. Oude Elferink, K. N. Scott and T. Stephens), Oxford, 2015; *UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982* (ed. M. Nordquist et al.), The Hague, 6 vols., 1985–2003; D. Anderson, *Modern Law of the Sea: Selected Essays*, The Hague, 2014; *Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes* (ed. T. M. Ndiaye and R. Wolfrum), The Hague, 2007; *Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects* (ed. D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong), Oxford, 2006; *Oppenheim’s International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, chapter 6; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 1273; T. Treves, ‘Codification du Droit International et Pratique des États dans le Droit de la Mer’, 223 *HR*, 1990 IV, p. 9; R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, *The Law of the Sea*, 3rd ed., Manchester, 1999; R. J. Dupuy and D. Vignes, *Traité du Nouveau Droit de la Mer*, Brussels, 1985; *Le Nouveau Droit International de la Mer* (ed. D. Bardonnet and M. Virally), Paris, 1983; D. P. O’Connell, *The International Law of the Sea*, Oxford, 2 vols., 1982–84; *New Directions in the Law of the Sea* (ed. R. Churchill, M. Nordquist and S. H. Lay), New York, 1973–77, vols. I–VI; *ibid.* (ed. M. Nordquist and K. Simmons), 1980–81, vols. VII–XI; and S. Oda,

The Law of the Sea in Our Time, Leiden, 2 vols., 1977. See also the series *Limits in the Seas*, published by the Geographer of the US State Department.

² See e.g. *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 97; *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 51; and *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 695–6, 699.

³ *Mare Liberum*, 1609. See also O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, pp. 9 ff. The closed seas approach was put by e.g. J. Selden, *Mare Clausum*, 1635.

⁴ *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute) (Nicaragua Intervening)*, ICJ Reports, 1990, pp. 92, 126; 97 ILR, p. 214.

⁵ The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone came into force in 1964; the 1958 Convention on the High Seas came into force in 1962; the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources came into force in 1966; and the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf came into force in 1964.

⁶ See Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 15 ff.

⁷ See e.g. H. Caminos and M. R. Molitor, ‘Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal’, 79 *AJIL*, 1985, p. 871.

⁸ See further below, p. 540.

⁹ See *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 39; *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 1; 55 ILR, p. 238; and *Anglo-French Continental Shelf*, Cmnd 7438, 1978; 54 ILR, p. 6. See also above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 65.

¹⁰ Note that by article 311(1) of the 1982 Convention, the provisions of this Convention will prevail as between the states parties over the 1958 Conventions.

¹¹ See e.g. J. R. Stevenson and B. H. Oxman, ‘The Future of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 88 *AJIL*, 1994, p. 488. See also *Law of the Sea: UNCLOS as a Living Treaty* (ed. J. Barrett and R. Barnes), London, 2016.

¹² See e.g. Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 2; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 3(2); E. D. Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, Aldershot, 1994, vol. I, chapter 5; O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 9; V. D. Degan, ‘Internal Waters’, *Netherlands YIL*, 1986, p. 1; and Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 3.

¹³ Article 5(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and article 8(1) of the 1982 Convention. Note the exception in the latter provision with regard to archipelagic states, below, p. 484. See also *R v. Farnquist* (1981) 54 CCC (2d) 417; 94 ILR, p. 238.

¹⁴ Article 2(1) of the 1982 Convention. This is a pre-existing rule of customary international law, see *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 111; and *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, para. 867.

¹⁵ Article 5(2) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and article 8(2) of the 1982 Convention. See below, p. 478.

¹⁶ 1 Cox’s Criminal Cases 198.

¹⁷ 120 US 1 (1887). See also *Armament Dieppe SA v. US* 399 F.2d 794 (1968).

¹⁸ See the Madrid incident, where US officials asserted the right to interview a potential defector from a Soviet ship in New Orleans, 80 *AJIL*, 1986, p. 622.

¹⁹ 120 US 1 at 20. See also e.g. *NNB v. Ocean Trade Co.* 87 ILR, p. 96, where the Court of Appeal of The Hague held that a coastal state had jurisdiction over a foreign vessel where the vessel was within the territory of the coastal state and a dispute arose affecting not only the internal order of the ship, but also the legal order of the coastal state concerned. The dispute concerned a strike on board ship taken on the advice of the International Transport Workers’ Federation.

²⁰ See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 65 ff. See also J. L. Lenoir, ‘Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreign Merchant Ships’, 10 *Tulane Law Review*, 1935, p. 13. See, with regard to the right of access to ports and other internal waters, A. V. Lowe, ‘The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law’, 14 *San Diego Law Review*, 1977, p. 597;

and O'Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **II**, chapter 22. See also the Dangerous Vessels Act 1985.

²¹ See *Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon* 7 Cranch 116 (1812); and article 32, Law of the Sea Convention 1982. Note 930 HC Deb., col. 450, Written Answers, 29 April 1977. See also *Ara Libertad (Argentina v. Ghana)*, where the ITLOS in a preliminary measures application ordered the release of an Argentinian warship held in a Ghanaian port, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 2012.

²² See e.g. Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 3; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 2; W. M. Reisman and G. S. Westerman, *Straight Baselines in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation*, New York, 1992; J. A. Roach and R. W. Smith, *United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims*, 2nd ed., The Hague, 1996; and L. Sohn, 'Base-line Considerations', in *International Maritime Boundaries* (ed. J. I. Charney and L. M. Alexander), Dordrecht, 1993, vol. **I**, p. 153.

²³ See *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 97; and *Eritrea–Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation)* 119 ILR, pp. 417, 458. See also Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 2; O'Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **I**, chapter 5; Oppenheim's *International Law*, p. 607; and M. Mendelson, 'The Curious Case of *Qatar v. Bahrain* in the International Court of Justice', 72 *BYIL*, 2001, p. 183.

²⁴ See *Dubai/Sharjah*, 91 ILR, pp. 543, 660–3, where the Arbitral Tribunal took into account the outermost permanent harbour works of the two states as part of the coast for the purpose of drawing the baselines.

²⁵ See article 11(1), Convention on the Territorial Sea 1958 and article 13(1), Law of the Sea Convention 1982. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide, but submerged at high tide. See e.g. G. Marston, 'Low-Tide Elevations and Straight Baselines', 46 *BYIL*, 1972–73, p. 405; and D. Bowett, 'Islands, Rocks, Reefs and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations', in Charney and Alexander, *International Maritime Boundaries*, vol. **I**, p. 131. See further below, p. 483 on the relationship between low-tide elevations and islands.

²⁶ Article 13(2) of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982. Further, low-tide elevations situated within 12 miles of another such elevation but beyond the territorial sea of the state may not themselves be used for the determination of the breadth of the territorial sea, the

so-called ‘leap-frogging method’, *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 102. See also *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 703, but see *Eritrea–Yemen* 114 ILR, pp. 1, 138.

²⁷ *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 101.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 40, 102; and *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 703. See also *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 641, noting that low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated; and *South China Seas (Philippines v. China)*, Arbitral Award of 12 July 2016, para. 309, affirming that low-tide elevations do not form part of the land territory of a state in the legal sense. The Tribunal in the latter case also made the point that subsequent human modifications of low-tide elevations would not be taken into account in ascertaining the status of the feature: *ibid.*, para. 306. See generally on this arbitration, Chinese Society of International Law, ‘The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study’, 17 *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2018, p. 207.

²⁹ See article 7(4) of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982. See also article 47(4) with regard to archipelagic baselines.

³⁰ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86.

³¹ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 128; 18 ILR, p. 91. Note also the Court’s mention of the *courbe tangente* method of drawing arcs of circles from points along the low-water line, *ibid.*

³² ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 129; 18 ILR, p. 92. Other states had already used such a system: see e.g. H. Waldock, ‘The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case’, 28 *BYIL*, 1951, pp. 114, 148.

³³ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 138; 18 ILR, p. 101. Cf. Judge McNair, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 171–80; 18 ILR, p. 123.

³⁴ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 139; 18 ILR, p. 102.

³⁵ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 133; 18 ILR, p. 95.

³⁶ See also article 4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 1958. Note that straight baselines may not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or

similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them: see article 4(3), 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and article 7(4), 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. See also *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 100–1, 102.

³⁷ Territorial Waters Order in Council, 1964, article 3, s. 1, 1965, Part III, s. 2, p. 6452A. See also the Territorial Sea (Limits) Order 1989 regarding the Straits of Dover. See generally, as regards state practice, Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 38–41, who note that some fifty-five to sixty-five states have used straight baselines; and M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, vol. IV, pp. 21–35.

³⁸ See Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 39. See also the objection of the EU to the use by Iran and Thailand of straight baselines along practically their entire coastlines, UKMIL, 69 *BYIL*, 1998, pp. 540–2, and US objections to the use of straight baselines by Thailand, *DUSPIL*, 2000, p. 703.

³⁹ ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 103.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* The Court rejected Bahrain’s claim that certain maritime features east of its main islands constituted a fringe of islands: *ibid.*

⁴¹ See also article 8(2) of the 1982 Convention.

⁴² See e.g. Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, p. 28; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 41 ff.; and O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, p. 209. See also G. Westerman, *The Juridical Bay*, Oxford, 1987.

⁴³ See e.g. *North Atlantic Coast Fisheries*, 11 RIAA, p. 167 (1910); and *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86, to the effect that no general rules of international law had been uniformly accepted.

⁴⁴ See also article 10 of the 1982 Convention. Note that there is no need to publish such lines on maps as a condition of legality, *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, para. 878. Where a bay within a single state becomes a bay with two or more states bordering it, then these provisions do not apply and in the absence of a formal division or establishment of a condominium, the delimitation will be made on the basis of *uti possidetis*, involving a consideration of *effectivités* at the date of independence, *ibid.*, paras. 887–8. As to the principle of *uti possidetis*, see above, [Chapter 9](#), p. 448.

⁴⁵ See *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 74; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 67.

⁴⁶ See Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. IV, pp. 250–7.

⁴⁷ See *El Salvador v. Nicaragua* 11 AJIL, 1917, p. 674.

⁴⁸ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 351; 97 ILR, p. 266.

⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 589; 97 ILR, p. 505. But cf. the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 745; 97 ILR, p. 661.

⁵⁰ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 601; 97 ILR, p. 517. See also generally C. Symmons, *Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re-appraisal*, The Hague, 2007.

⁵¹ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 605; 97 ILR, p. 521.

⁵² ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 608–9; 97 ILR, pp. 524–5. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (*El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening*)’, Judgment of 11 September 1992’, 42 ICLQ, 1993, p. 929; and A. Gioia, ‘The Law of Multinational Bays and the Case of the Gulf of Fonseca’, *Netherlands YIL*, 1993, p. 81.

⁵³ 422 US 184 (1975). See also L. J. Bouchez, *The Regime of Bays in International Law*, Leiden, 1963; and *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 74; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 67.

⁵⁴ See also *US v. California* 381 US 139 (1965); *US v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case)* 394 US 11 (1969); *US v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case)* 471 US 375 (1985); and *US v. Louisiana (Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case)* 470 US 93 (1985).

⁵⁵ See Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 45; and UKMIL, 57 BYIL, 1986, pp. 579–80. See also F. Francioni, ‘The Gulf of Sidra Incident (*United States v. Libya*) and International Law’, 5 *Italian Yearbook of International Law*, 1980–81, p. 85.

⁵⁶ See 68 *AJIL*, 1974, p. 510. See also *Cumulative DUSPIL*, 1981–88, Washington, DC, 1994, vol. **II**, p. 1810.

⁵⁷ See e.g. UKMIL, 57 *BYIL*, 1986, pp. 581–2.

⁵⁸ Award of 12 July 2016, paras. 265 ff. See also Study by the Secretariat, *Memorandum on the Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays*, A/CN.4/143, International Law Commission, 1962.

⁵⁹ Award, para. 268. The Tribunal dismissed the historic claim of China to the South China Sea: *ibid.*, paras. 270, 277–8, 631. The Tribunal pointed out that the question of historic rights over waters was distinct from that concerning historic rights over land: *ibid.*, para. 272.

⁶⁰ See e.g. H. W. Jayewardene, *The Regime of Islands in International Law*, Dordrecht, 1990; D. W. Bowett, *The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law*, New York, 1979; C. Symmons, *The Maritime Zone of Islands in International Law*, The Hague, 1979; J. Simonides, ‘The Legal Status of Islands in the New Law of the Sea’, 65 *Revue de Droit International*, 1987, p. 161; and R. O’Keefe, ‘Palm-Fringed Benefits: Island Dependencies in the New Law of the Sea’, 45 *ICLQ*, 1996, p. 408.

⁶¹ See also Article 10(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea. The Court noted in *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 645 that the key was whether the island was naturally formed and not its geological composition.

⁶² Article 121(2) of the 1982 Convention. See also *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation* (Denmark v. Norway), ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 37, 64–5; 99 ILR, pp. 395, 432–3; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 641, 644–5, 699, 713. Cf. *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Maritime Delimitation), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 139, 191. Article 10(2) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea referred only to the territorial sea of islands.

⁶³ See *Eritrea–Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation)* 119 ILR, pp. 417, 463.

⁶⁴ See the *Jan Mayen* report, 20 ILM, 1981, pp. 797, 803; 62 ILR, pp. 108, 114, and the Declaration by Judge Evensen in *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation* (Denmark v. Norway),

ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 37, 84–5; 99 ILR, pp. 395, 452–3. Note, as regards Rockall and the conflicting UK, Irish, Danish and Icelandic views, Symmons, *Maritime Zone*, pp. 117–18, 126; E. D. Brown, ‘Rockall and the Limits of National Jurisdiction of the United Kingdom’, 2 *Marine Policy*, 1978, pp. 181–211, 275–303; and O’Keefe, ‘Palm-Fringed Benefits’. See also 878 HC Deb., col. 82, Written Answers, and *The Times*, 8 May 1985, p. 6 (Danish claims) and *The Guardian*, 1 May 1985, p. 30 (Icelandic claims). UK sovereignty over the uninhabited island of Rockall was proclaimed in 1955 and confirmed by the Island of Rockall Act 1972, UKMIL, 68 *BYIL*, 1997, p. 589. The UK Minister of State declared that the 12-mile territorial sea around Rockall was consistent with the terms of the 1982 Convention and that there was no reason to believe that this was not accepted by the international community, apart from the Republic of Ireland, UKMIL, 60 *BYIL*, 1989, p. 666. The UK claim to a 200-mile fishing zone around Rockall made in the Fishery Limits Act 1976 was withdrawn in 1997 consequent upon accession to the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 and the 12-mile territorial sea confirmed: see UKMIL, 68 *BYIL*, 1997, pp. 599–600; UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 601.

⁶⁵ See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 163–4; and J. I. Charney, ‘Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation’, 93 *AJIL*, 1999, p. 873.

⁶⁶ Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 164.

⁶⁷ Award of 12 July 2016, PCA Case No. 2013–19, paras. 508 ff.

⁶⁸ See e.g. Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 3(5); Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 8; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 6; O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 6; Bowett, *Legal Regime*, chapter 4; C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘The Problem of Archipelagos in the International Law of the Sea’, 23 *ICLQ*, 1974, p. 539; and D. P. O’Connell, ‘Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International Law’, 45 *BYIL*, 1971, p. 1.

⁶⁹ O’Connell, ‘Mid-Ocean Archipelagos’, pp. 23–4, 45–7, 51; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. IV, p. 284. See also the Indonesian Act No. 4 of 18 February 1960 Concerning Indonesian Waters, extracted in Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. II, p. 98; the Philippines Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines, Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961, and the Philippines Declaration with respect to the 1982 Convention: *ibid.*, pp. 100–1 (with objections from the Soviet Union and Australia: *ibid.*, pp. 101–2). See, as to the US objection to the Philippines Declaration, *Cumulative DUSPIL*, 1981–88, vol. II, p. 1066,

and to claims relating to the Faroes, Galapagos, Portugal and Sudan, Roach and Smith, *US Responses*, pp. 112 ff.

⁷⁰ But see, as regards ‘coastal archipelagos’, article 4 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea.

⁷¹ See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 121.

⁷² ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 96–7.

⁷³ Article 50 provides that within its archipelagic waters, the archipelagic state may draw closing lines for the delimitation of internal waters.

⁷⁴ Article 49.

⁷⁵ Article 51.

⁷⁶ Article 52.

⁷⁷ Article 53. For examples of state practice, see Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 125 ff.

⁷⁸ 83 *AJIL*, 1989, pp. 559–61. See also *Cumulative DUSPIL*, 1981–88, vol. **II**, p. 2060.

⁷⁹ See e.g. Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 73 ff.; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 71 ff.; and O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **I**, chapter 4. See also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 611.

⁸⁰ See e.g. H. S. K. Kent, ‘Historical Origins of the Three-mile Limit’, 48 *AJIL*, 1954, p. 537; and *The Anna* (1805) 165 ER 809. See also *US v. Kessler* 1 Baldwin’s C C Rep. 15 (1829).

⁸¹ See O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **I**, pp. 163–4.

⁸² See www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-maritime-limits-and-law-of-the-sea#maritime-limits with regard to the UK, UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. See also www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/claims.htm.

⁸³ As to delimitation of the territorial sea, see below, p. 507.

⁸⁴ See Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 3; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 3; O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 3. See also Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 4.

⁸⁵ *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 729. See also *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 111.

⁸⁶ O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, pp. 60–7.

⁸⁷ See also article 2 of the 1982 Convention.

⁸⁸ See *Grisbadarna*, 11 RIAA, p. 147 (1909); and *Beagle Channel*, HMSO, 1977; 52 ILR, p. 93. See also Judge McNair, *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 160; 18 ILR, pp. 86, 113.

⁸⁹ See also *R v. Keyn* (1876) 2 Ex.D. 63 and the consequential Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878.

⁹⁰ See Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 3(3); Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 230 ff.; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 82 ff.; and O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 7. See also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 615.

⁹¹ See article 18 of the 1982 Convention. Passage includes crossing the territorial sea in order to call at roadsteads or port facilities outside internal waters: article 18(1); and see *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 12, 111; 76 ILR, p. 1.

⁹² Article 26 of the 1982 Convention.

⁹³ See article 21(4) of the 1982 Convention.

⁹⁴ Under article 22 of the 1982 Convention, the coastal state may establish designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in its territorial sea. See UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 688 for details of traffic separation schemes around the UK.

⁹⁵ See e.g. O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **I**, pp. 274–97. See also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 618.

⁹⁶ O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **I**, pp. 290–2.

⁹⁷ See also Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 54–6. The issue was left open at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and does not therefore appear in the 1982 Convention. Note, however, that Western and communist states both proposed including a reference to warships in early sessions of the Conference: see UNCLOS III, Official Records, vol. **III**, pp. 183, 203, 192, 196. See also article 29(2) of the 1975 Informal Single Negotiating Text. The right of warships to innocent passage was maintained by the US following an incident during which four US warships sailed through Soviet territorial waters off the Crimean coast: see *The Times*, 19 March 1986, p. 5.

⁹⁸ See 84 *AJIL*, 1990, p. 239.

⁹⁹ See also *Cumulative DUSPIL*, 1981–88, vol. **II**, pp. 1844 ff.; and UKMIL, 65 *BYIL*, 1994, pp. 642–7. See also *Cumulative DUSPIL*, 1981–88, vol. **II**, p. 1854 with regard to the claim by some states that the passage of nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying nuclear substances through territorial waters requires prior authorisation or prior consent. See also UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, pp. 632–3 with regard to UK views on claims concerning prior authorisation or consent with regard to the passage of ships carrying hazardous wastes. Note as to divergent state practice here, Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, p. 110.

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **I**, chapters 23 and 24. See also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 620; and Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 237 ff. Note that these rules are applicable to foreign ships and government commercial ships.

¹⁰¹ The latter phrase was added by article 27(1) of the 1982 Convention.

¹⁰² See also article 20 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

103 Articles 29–32 of the 1982 Convention. See also articles 21–23 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; and *Ara Libertad (Argentina v. Ghana)* (Provisional Measures), ITLOS, Order of 15 December 2012, para. 95.

104 See e.g. D. Caron, *Navigating Straits*, The Hague, 2014; H. Caminos and V. P. Cogliati-Bantz, *The Legal Regime of Straits: Contemporary Challenges and Solutions*, Cambridge, 2014; Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 11; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 3(4); Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 5; O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 8; R. Lapidoth, *Les Détroits en Droit International*, Paris, 1972; T. L. Koh, *Straits in International Navigation*, London, 1982; J. N. Moore, ‘The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’, **74 AJIL**, 1980, p. 77; W. M. Reisman, ‘The Regime of Straits and National Security’, *ibid.*, p. 48; H. Caminos, ‘Le Régime des Détroits dans la Convention des Nations Unies de 1982 sur le Droit de la Mer’, **205 HR**, 1987 V, p. 9; S. N. Nandan and D. H. Anderson, ‘Straits Used for International Navigation: A Commentary on Part III of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982’, **60 BYIL**, 1989, p. 159; *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 633; and B. B. Jia, *The Regime of Straits in International Law*, Oxford, 1998.

105 ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4; 16 AD, p. 155.

106 *Ibid.*, p. 28; 16 AD, p. 161. The Court emphasised that the decisive criterion regarding the definition of ‘strait’ was the geographical situation of the strait as connecting two parts of the high seas, coupled with the fact that it was actually used for international navigation: *ibid.* Note that article 16(4) added to the customary rights the right of innocent passage from the high seas to the territorial sea of a state. This was of particular importance to the question of access through the straits of Tiran to the Israeli port of Eilat: see further below, **note 119**.

107 *Ibid.*, pp. 30–1, 33; 16 AD, pp. 163, 166. Note the final settlement of the case, UKMIL, **63 BYIL**, 1992, p. 781.

108 Articles 34 and 35.

109 Article 37. See also R. P. Anand, ‘Transit Passage and Overflight in International Straits’, **26 IJIL**, 1986, p. 72; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 636.

110 Article 38.

111 Article 44.

112 Article 39. Under articles 41 and 42, the coastal state may designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes through international straits.

113 Article 45(2).

114 See articles 38–42. See also, as to the differences between the regimes of innocent passage through the territorial sea, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, Nandan and Anderson, ‘Straits’, p. 169.

115 Article 44.

116 See Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 113, but cf. O. Schachter, ‘International Law in Theory and Practice’, **178 HR**, 1982, pp. 9, 281. See also Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, p. 129.

117 Cmnd 557. See also 38 *ICLQ*, 1989, pp. 416–17 and *AFDI*, 1988, p. 727.

118 Article 35(c).

119 See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 114 ff. See also UKMIL, 57 *BYIL*, 1986, p. 581; and F. A. Vali, *The Turkish Straits and NATO*, Stanford, 1972. Note that the dispute as to the status of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba between Israel and its Arab neighbours was specifically dealt with in the treaties of peace. Article 5(2) of the Israel–Egypt Treaty of Peace 1979 and article 14(3) of the Israel–Jordan Treaty of Peace 1994 both affirm that the Strait and Gulf are international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. As to the US–USSR Agreement on the Bering Straits Region, see 28 *ILM*, 1989, p. 1429. See also, as to the Great Belt dispute between Finland and Denmark, M. Koskenniemi, ‘L’Affaire du Passage par le Grand-Belt’, *AFDI*, 1992, p. 905. See, as to other particular straits: e.g. Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 102–4; S. C. Truver, *Gibraltar and the Mediterranean*, Alphen, 1982; M. A. Morris, *The Strait of Magellan*, Dordrecht, 1989; G.

Alexander, *The Baltic Straits*, Alphen, 1982; and M. Leiffer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*, Alphen, 1978.

¹²⁰ See Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 4(2); Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 3(VI); A. V. Lowe, 'The Development of the Concept of the Contiguous Zone', 52 *BYIL*, 1981, p. 109; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 7; and O'Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. II, chapter 27. See also S. Oda, 'The Concept of the Contiguous Zone', *ICLQ*, 1962, p. 131; and *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 625.

¹²¹ A. Gidel, 'La Mer Territoriale et la Zone Contigue', 48 *HR*, 1934, pp. 137, 241.

¹²² E.g. the British Hovering Acts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See O'Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. II, pp. 1034–8, and the similar US legislation, *ibid.*, pp. 1038 ff.

¹²³ See article 55, which states that the exclusive economic zone is 'an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial seas'. See also www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/claims.htm.

¹²⁴ See e.g. *The Exclusive Economic Zone and the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, 1982–2000* (ed. E. Franckx and P. Gautier), Brussels, 2003; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 4(3); Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 4; Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapters 10, 11; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 9; D. J. Attard, *The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law*, Oxford, 1986; O'Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 15; *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 782; and Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 1175. See also F. Orrego Vicuña, 'La Zone Economique Exclusive', 199 *HR*, 1986 IV, p. 9; F. Orrego Vicuña, *The Exclusive Economic Zone, Regime and Legal Nature under International Law*, Cambridge, 1989; B. Kwiatowska, *The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea*, Dordrecht, 1989; R. W. Smith, *Exclusive Economic Zone Claims: An Analysis and Primary Documents*, Dordrecht, 1986; and F. Rigaldies, 'La Zone Economique Exclusive dans la Pratique des États', *Canadian YIL*, 1997, p. 3.

¹²⁵ O'Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 14.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 559 ff.

¹²⁷ ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 8, 175; 55 ILR, p. 238.

¹²⁸ ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 23–9; 55 ILR, p. 258.

¹²⁹ In *South China Seas (Philippines v. China)*, Arbitral Award of 12 July 2016, para. 243, the Tribunal emphasised: ‘The notion of *sovereign* rights over living and non-living resources is generally incompatible with another state having historic rights to the same resources, in particular if such historic rights are considered exclusive’ (emphasis in the original). It was also held that Mischief Reef was a low-tide elevation and within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and that, therefore, China’s construction of an artificial island on the reef, including three airstrips, violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines: paras. 290, 378, 381, 399, 632–3, 1203(B)(7) and (14).

¹³⁰ See also articles 61–69. Note that in *M/V Virginia G (Panama v. Guinea-Bissau)*, Judgment of 14 April 2014, para. 217, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea held that ‘the regulation by a coastal state of bunkering of foreign vessels fishing in its exclusive economic zone is among those measures which the coastal state may take in its exclusive economic zone to conserve and manage its living resources under article 56 of the Convention, read together with article 62, paragraph 4, of the Convention’ and noted that ‘[t]his view is confirmed by state practice which has developed after the adoption of the Convention’.

¹³¹ See also article 60.

¹³² See further Part XIII of the Convention; and see Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 15.

¹³³ See further Part XII of the Convention; and see Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 14.

¹³⁴ Award of 18 March 2015, paras. 518 ff. at 519.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 535.

¹³⁶ Award, paras. 106, 110, 124,
www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/advisory_opinion_published/20

[15 21-advop-E.pdf](#). See below, p. 549.

137 *Ibid.*, para. 150. See also *Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia)*, Arbitral Award of 14 August 2015, pp. 69 ff. concerning the rights of the coastal state to enforce its law regarding non-living resources in the economic zone. An Award on Compensation was made on 10 July 2017, see 57 *ILM*, 2018, p. 553.

138 See further below, p. 506.

139 Article 121(3). See also *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 97; and above, p. 484.

140 Article 59.

141 120 ILR, pp. 143, 190.

142 *Ibid.*, p. 192.

143 See www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/claims.htm. No state has appeared to claim an economic zone of a different width. See also the US Declaration of an exclusive economic zone in March 1983, which did not, however, assert a right of jurisdiction over marine scientific research over the zone: 22 *ILM*, 1983, pp. 461 ff. On 22 September 1992, eight North Sea littoral states and the European Commission adopted a Ministerial Declaration on the Coordinated Extension of Jurisdiction in the North Sea in which it was agreed that these states would establish exclusive economic zones if they had not already done so: UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 755.

144 See www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claims.pdf.

145 ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 13; 81 ILR, p. 238.

146 ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 33; 81 ILR, p. 265. See also *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 74; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 67.

¹⁴⁷ See O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **II**, pp. 1022–5. See also the Canadian Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act 1970. The US has objected to this jurisdiction: see e.g. *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, pp. 23961, 24129. The Canadian claim was reiterated in September 1985, *ibid.*, p. 33984.

¹⁴⁸ O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **I**, p. 578, note 95 regarding North Korea’s proclamation of a 50-mile security zone in 1977. See also *Cumulative DUSPIL*, 1981–88, vol. **II**, pp. 1750 ff. detailing US practice objecting to peacetime security or military zones. Note also the establishment of the ‘exclusion zone’ around the Falkland Islands in 1982: see 22 HC Deb., cols. 296–7, 28 April 1982. See e.g. R. P. Barston and P. W. Birnie, ‘The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas Conflict. A Question of Zones’, 7 *Marine Policy*, 1983, p. 14.

¹⁴⁹ 84 *AJIL*, 1990, pp. 885–7.

¹⁵⁰ See e.g. Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 5; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 4(4); O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. **I**, chapter 13; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 8; Z. J. Slouka, *International Custom and the Continental Shelf*, The Hague, 1968; C. Vallée, *Le Plateau Continental dans le Droit International Positif*, Paris, 1971; V. Marotta Rangel, ‘Le Plateau Continental dans la Convention de 1982 sur le Droit de la Mer’, 194 *HR*, 1985 V, p. 269; and H. Lauterpacht, ‘Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas’, 27 *BYIL*, 1950, p. 376. See also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 764.

¹⁵¹ Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **IV**, p. 756.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 794–9; and see also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 768–9. However, in *Peru v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2014, pp. 3, 65, the Court noted that the claims of Chile (which was a party to the 1982 Convention) were for a 12-mile territorial sea plus 200-mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and further declared: ‘Peru claims a 200-nautical-mile “maritime domain”. Peru’s Agent formally declared on behalf of his Government that “[t]he term ‘maritime domain’ used in [Peru’s] Constitution is applied in a manner consistent with the maritime zones set out in the 1982 Convention”. The Court takes note of this declaration which expresses a formal undertaking by Peru.’ Peru was not a party to the 1982 Convention.

¹⁵³ Note that in *Abu Dhabi*, the arbitrator declared that the doctrine of the continental shelf in 1951 was not yet a rule of international law: 18 ILR, p. 144. See also to the same effect (with regard to 1949), *Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland* 5 DLR (46), p. 385; 86 ILR, p. 593 per Supreme Court of Canada (1984).

¹⁵⁴ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 22. See also *Romania v. Ukraine*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 61, 89.

¹⁵⁵ See above, p. 496.

¹⁵⁶ Note that the International Court in *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 13, 33; 81 ILR, pp. 238, 265 stated that the two concepts were ‘linked together in modern law’.

¹⁵⁷ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 39.

¹⁵⁸ ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 31; 41 ILR, p. 60.

¹⁵⁹ See article 76(3) for a definition of the continental margin. See also B. M. Magnusson, *The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles*, The Hague, 2015; J. Mossop, *The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities*, Oxford, 2016; D. N. Hutchinson, ‘The Seaward Limit to Continental Shelf’, 56 *BYIL*, 1985, p. 133; and Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, p. 140.

¹⁶⁰ Article 76(4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9). See also Annex II to the Final Act concerning the special situation for a state where the average distance at which the 200-metre isobath occurs is not more than 20 nautical miles and the greater proportion of the sedimentary rock of the continental margin lies beneath the rise.

¹⁶¹ See *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 13, 33–4; 81 ILR, pp. 238, 265–6. See also *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 61; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 54; and *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 277; 71 ILR, pp. 57, 104.

¹⁶² See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 149. There are particular problems, for instance, with regard to the meaning of the terms ‘oceanic ridges’, ‘submarine ridges’ and ‘submarine elevations’ appearing in article 76(3) and (6).

¹⁶³ Article 76(8). See also e.g. O. Jensen, *The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf*, The Hague, 2014; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 142 ff.; and www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm.

¹⁶⁴ See UN Press Release, SEA/1729, 21 December 2001.

¹⁶⁵ See ASIL Insight, vol. **11**, issue 27, 8 November 2007.

¹⁶⁶ See e.g. UKMIL, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, pp. 767–8; and H. Llewellyn, ‘The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Joint Submission by France, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom’, 56 *ICLQ*, 2007, p. 677.

¹⁶⁷ See UN Press Release, SEA/1899, 21 April 2008. As of 1 May 2020, eighty-five submissions had been made and thirty-five recommendations adopted: see www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. Note that on 11 March 2016 the Commission accepted the recommendation concerning Argentina’s submission, making the point that in accordance with article 46 and Annex I of the Rules of Procedure 2008, the Commission was unable to consider and qualify those parts of the submission which were subject to dispute and noting that the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) were the subject of a sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the UK: see www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/2016_03_11_COM_SUMRE_C_ARG.pdf.

¹⁶⁸ ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 100, 134 ff.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹⁷⁰ Article 121(3). See also *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 97, and above, p. 484.

¹⁷¹ See Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 4(4) (4.7); *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 773; and Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 151.

¹⁷² See also article 2 of the Continental Shelf Convention 1958.

¹⁷³ See article 77(4) of the 1982 Convention and article 2(4) of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.

¹⁷⁴ See e.g. O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, pp. 501–2.

¹⁷⁵ See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 152; S. Dromgoole, *Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law*, Cambridge, 2013; E. Boesten, *Archaeological and/or Historical Valuable Shipwrecks in International Waters*, The Hague, 2002; and C. Forrest, ‘An International Perspective on Sunken State Vessels as Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 34 *Ocean Development and International Law*, 2003, p. 41. See also articles 149 (protection of cultural objects found in the International Seabed Area) and 303 (wrecks and the rights of coastal states in the contiguous zone).

¹⁷⁶ Article 78 of the 1982 Convention and article 3 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. Note that the reference to ‘high seas’ in the latter is omitted in the former for reasons related to the new concept of the exclusive economic zone.

¹⁷⁷ Articles 78 and 79 of the 1982 Convention and articles 4 and 5 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.

¹⁷⁸ Applying *mutatis mutandis* article 60, which deals with the construction of artificial islands, installations and structures in the exclusive economic zone. See also article 5 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention.

¹⁷⁹ See also N. Papadakis, *The International Legal Regime of Artificial Islands*, Leiden, 1977.

¹⁸⁰ Note also that by article 82(3) a developing state which is a net importer of the mineral resource in question is exempt from such payments and contributions.

¹⁸¹ See e.g. S. Fietta and R. Cleverly, *A Practitioner’s Guide to Maritime Boundary Delimitation*, Oxford, 2016; *Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Case Law* (ed. A. G. Oude Elferink *et al.*), Cambridge, 2018; M. Lando, *Maritime Delimitation as a Judicial Process*, Cambridge, 2019; T. Cottier, *Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law*, Cambridge, 2015; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 6; Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law*

of the Sea, chapter 16; *UN Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries*, New York, 2000; N. Antunes, *Towards the Conceptualisation of Maritime Delimitation*, The Hague, 2003; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 10; E. D. Brown, *Sea-Bed Energy and Mineral Resources and the Law of the Sea*, London, 1984–86, vols. **I**, **III**; M. D. Evans, *Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation*, Oxford, 1989; and P. Weil, *The Law of Maritime Delimitation – Reflections*, Cambridge, 1989. See also *International Maritime Boundaries* (ed. J. I. Charney and L. M. Alexander), Washington, DC, vols. **I–III**, 1993–98, *ibid.* (ed. J. I. Charney and R. W. Smith), vol. **IV**, 2002, *ibid.* (ed. D. A. Colson and R. W. Smith), The Hague, vol. **V**, 2005, *ibid.* (ed. D. A. Colson and R. W. Smith), vol. **VI**, 2011, *ibid.* (ed. C. Lathrop), vol. **VII**, 2016; M. Kamga, *Délimitation Maritime sur la Côte Atlantique Africaine*, Brussels, 2006; *Maritime Delimitation* (ed. R. Lagoni and D. Vignes), Leiden, 2006; Y. Tanaka, *Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation*, Oxford, 2006; D. A. Colson, ‘The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf between Neighbouring States’, **97 AJIL**, 2003, p. 91; V. D. Degan, ‘Consolidation of Legal Principles on Maritime Delimitation’, **6 Chinese YIL**, 2007, p. 601; L. D. M. Nelson, ‘The Roles of Equity in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries’, **84 AJIL**, 1990, p. 837; J. I. Charney, ‘Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law’, **88 AJIL**, 1994, p. 227; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 776.

¹⁸² See *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 132. The International Court noted in *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 299; 77 ILR, pp. 57, 126, that ‘no maritime delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those states. Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party possessing the necessary competence.’

¹⁸³ *Merits*, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 735.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 707; and see above, p. 448. Note that in *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, para. 878, it was noted that *uti possidetis* will apply where a single state bay which has become a multistate bay in the absence of a formal division or establishment of a condominium.

¹⁸⁵ See Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 182 ff.

¹⁸⁶ See also *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 94. The International Court in *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 740–1, noted that ‘the methods governing territorial sea delimitations have needed to be, and are, more clearly articulated in international law than those used for the other, more functional maritime areas’.

¹⁸⁷ See *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 742 ff. The Court in *Qatar v. Bahrain* noted that an equidistance line could only be drawn where the baselines were known: ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 94.

¹⁸⁸ *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 746.

¹⁸⁹ ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 61, 106. See also *Bangladesh v. India*, Award of 7 July 2014, para. 214. Note that in *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (Maritime Delimitation)*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 139, 173, 177, the International Court held that where the great instability of the coastline (such as erosion from the sea) prevented the identification of a suitable fixed starting-point of the maritime delimitation, it would be preferable to select a fixed point at sea and connect it to the starting-point on the coast by a mobile line.

¹⁹⁰ See also e.g. *Dubai/Sharjah* 91 ILR, pp. 543, 663.

¹⁹¹ ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 94. See also *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 740.

¹⁹² Arbitral Award of 17 September 2007, para. 296. See also UKMIL, 77 BYIL, 2006, p. 764.

¹⁹³ Arbitral Award of 17 September 2007, paras. 302–3. See also *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 38, 61–4.

¹⁹⁴ Arbitral Award of 17 September 2007, para. 306.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 311 ff.

¹⁹⁶ ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 139, 177 ff. See also *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 740.

¹⁹⁷ See also *Bay of Bengal*, ITLOS, Judgment of 14 March 2012, paras.146 ff.

¹⁹⁸ *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 22.

¹⁹⁹ See *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, Award of 11 April 2006, para. 224.

²⁰⁰ ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3; 41 ILR, p. 29.

²⁰¹ See above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 71.

²⁰² ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 53; 41 ILR, pp. 29, 83.

²⁰³ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 52; 41 ILR, pp. 29, 82.

²⁰⁴ Cmnd 7438 (1978); 54 ILR, p. 6. See also D. W. Bowett, ‘The Arbitration between the United Kingdom and France Concerning the Continental Shelf Boundary in the English Channel of South-Western Approaches’, **49 BYIL**, 1978, p. 1.

²⁰⁵ Although subject to a French reservation regarding the Bay of Granville to which the UK had objected: Cmnd 7438, p. 50; 54 ILR, p. 57.

²⁰⁶ Cmnd 7438, p. 48; 54 ILR, p. 55.

²⁰⁷ Cmnd 7438, pp. 59–60; 54 ILR, p. 66.

²⁰⁸ Cmnd 7438, p. 94; 54 ILR, p. 101. This arose because of the presence of the British islands close to the French coast, which if given full effect would substantially reduce the French continental shelf. This was *prima facie* a circumstance creative of inequity: *ibid.*

²⁰⁹ Cmnd 7438, pp. 116–17; 54 ILR, p. 123.

²¹⁰ ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 18; 67 ILR, p. 4. See also L. L. Herman, ‘The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away’, **33 ICLQ**, 1984, p. 825.

²¹¹ ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 47; 67 ILR, p. 40. See also ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 60; 67 ILR, p. 53.

²¹² ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 89; 67 ILR, p. 82. This was specified in far less constrained terms than in *Anglo-French Continental Shelf*, Cmnd 7438, pp. 116–17; 54 ILR, p. 123. See e.g. Judge Gros’ Dissenting Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 150; 67 ILR, p. 143. Note that the issue of the maritime zone of islands is raised following the agreement in November 2019 between Turkey and Libya establishing the boundary between their respective zones in the Mediterranean, which leaves the maritime entitlements of Cyprus and Greek islands such as Crete and Rhodes uncertain, see e.g. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-libya/turkey-signs-maritime-boundaries-deal-with-libya-amid-exploration-row-idUKKBN1Y21VM> and <https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2020/03/the-intricacies-of-maritime-boundary-delimitation-germanys-one-sided-response-to-the-turkey-libya-mou-on-delimitation-of-the-maritime-jurisdiction-areas-in-the-mediterranean/>.

²¹³ ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 92; 67 ILR, p. 85.

²¹⁴ ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 59; 67 ILR, p. 52.

²¹⁵ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 49–50.

²¹⁶ ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 153; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 146.

²¹⁷ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 35–6.

²¹⁸ Cmnd 7438, p. 59; 54 ILR, p. 66.

²¹⁹ ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 49.

²²⁰ ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 246; 71 ILR, p. 74. See also J. Schneider, ‘The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result’, 79 *AJIL*, 1985, p. 539.

²²¹ A ‘single maritime boundary’ was requested by the parties: ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 253; 71 ILR, p. 80.

²²² ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 299–300; 71 ILR, pp. 126–7. This was regarded as the fundamental norm of customary international law governing maritime delimitation: ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 300.

²²³ ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 328–9; 71 ILR, p. 155. Note that the Chamber gave ‘half-effect’ to Seal Island for reasons of equity: ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 337; 71 ILR, p. 164.

²²⁴ Article 74 of the 1982 Convention.

²²⁵ See e.g. the Australia–Papua New Guinea Maritime Boundaries Treaty 1978, cited in Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 160.

²²⁶ ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 326; 71 ILR, p. 153.

²²⁷ See 25 ILM, 1986, p. 251; 77 ILR, p. 636. The Tribunal consisted of Judge Lachs, President, and Judges Mbaye and Bedjaoui.

²²⁸ 25 ILM, 1986, p. 289; 77 ILR, pp. 675–6.

²²⁹ 25 ILM, 1986, pp. 300–2; 77 ILR, p. 686. It should be noted that the delimitation concerned a single line delimiting the territorial waters, continental shelves and economic zones of the respective countries.

²³⁰ ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 13; 81 ILR, p. 239.

²³¹ The Court emphasised that this did not mean that the concept of the continental shelf had been absorbed by that of the economic zone, but that greater importance had to be attributed to elements, such as distance from the coast, which are common to both: ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 33; 81 ILR, p. 265.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 47; 81 ILR, p. 279.

²³⁴ See above, p. 510.

235 ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 48–50; 81 ILR, p. 280.

236 ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 52; 81 ILR, p. 284.

237 ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 39–40; 81 ILR, p. 271.

238 ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 40–1; 81 ILR, p. 272. The Court also noted that an equitable boundary between the parties had in the light of the general geographical situation to be south of a notional median line between Libya and Sicily: ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 51; 81 ILR, p. 283.

239 ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 56–8; 81 ILR, p. 288.

240 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1145; 95 ILR, p. 645.

241 31 ILM, 1992, pp. 1160–1; 95 ILR, pp. 660–3.

242 31 ILM, 1992, pp. 1169–70; 95 ILR, p. 671.

243 31 ILM, 1992, pp. 1170–1; 95 ILR, pp. 671–3.

244 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1173; 95 ILR, p. 675. The phrase comes from *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 342; 71 ILR, pp. 74, 169, where it was defined as ‘likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the parties concerned’.

245 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1176; 95 ILR, p. 678.

246 ICJ Reports, 1993, p. 37; 99 ILR, p. 395.

247 ICJ Reports, 1993, p. 58; 99 ILR, p. 426. But see the Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 102–14; 99 ILR, pp. 470–82.

248 The Court noted that the category of ‘special circumstances’ incorporated in article 6 was essentially the same as the category of ‘relevant circumstances’ developed in customary international law since both were designed to achieve an equitable solution: ICJ

Reports, 1993, p. 62; 99 ILR, p. 430. Special circumstances were deemed to be those that ‘might modify the result produced by an unqualified application of the equidistance principle’, while relevant circumstances could be described as ‘a fact necessary to be taken into account in the delimitation process’, *ibid*.

²⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 59–61; 99 ILR, pp. 427–9.

²⁵⁰ ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 65–9; 99 ILR, pp. 433–7.

²⁵¹ ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 70–2; 99 ILR, pp. 438–40. But see the Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 118–20; 99 ILR, pp. 486–8.

²⁵² ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 72–3; 99 ILR, pp. 440–1.

²⁵³ ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 73–5; 99 ILR, pp. 441–3. But see the Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 114–17; 99 ILR, pp. 482–5. Note also the discussion of equity in such situations in the Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 211 ff.; 99 ILR, pp. 579 ff.

²⁵⁴ See *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 36–7; *Anglo-French Continental Shelf*, Cmnd 7438, pp. 58–9; 54 ILR, p. 65; *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 88; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 81; *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 325; 71 ILR, p. 74; and *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)*, ICJ Reports, 1993, p. 37; 99 ILR, p. 395. See also article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention 1958.

²⁵⁵ The Court in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases, in discussing this issue, called for a reasonable degree of proportionality, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 52, while in the *Anglo-French Continental Shelf* case the Tribunal emphasised that it was disproportion rather than proportionality that was relevant in the context of the equities, Cmnd 7438, pp. 60–1; 54 ILR, pp. 6, 67. But cf. *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 75; 67 ILR, pp. 4, 75. See also *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 48–50; 81 ILR, p. 280.

²⁵⁶ As referred to in article 38 of the ICJ Statute.

²⁵⁷ Article 83. Note that the International Court declared that ‘the identity of the language which is employed, even though limited of course to the determination of the relevant principles and rules of international law, is particularly significant’: *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 295; 71 ILR, pp. 74, 122. The Court declared in *Jan Mayen Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 37, 59; 99 ILR, pp. 395, 427, that the statement in article 74(1) and the corresponding provision in article 83(1) with regard to the aim of any delimitation process being an equitable solution, ‘reflects the requirements of customary law as regards the delimitation both of continental shelf and of exclusive economic zones’. The Tribunal in *Eritrea–Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation)* stated in relation to articles 74 and 83 that these provisions resulted from a last-minute endeavour at the conference to get agreement on a very controversial matter and so ‘were consciously designed to decide as little as possible’, 119 ILR, pp. 417, 454.

²⁵⁸ Note the obligation contained in both article 74(3) and 83(3) that pending agreement, the states concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, ‘shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final agreement’: see e.g. British Institute of International and Comparative Law, *Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in respect of Undelimited Maritime Areas*, London, 2016.

²⁵⁹ ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 246; 71 ILR, p. 74.

²⁶⁰ The Court has emphasised that the notion of a single maritime line stems from state practice and not from treaty law, thus underlining its position in customary law: see *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 93; *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 440–1; *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, Award of 11 April 2006, para. 235; and *Guyana v. Suriname*, Arbitral Award of 17 September 2007, para. 334.

²⁶¹ *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 326; 71 ILR, p. 153.

²⁶² ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 278; 71 ILR, p. 105.

²⁶³ 77 ILR, p. 635.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 679–81.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 685–7.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 688–9.

²⁶⁷ 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1145; 95 ILR, p. 645. See also M. D. Evans, ‘Less Than an Ocean Apart: The St Pierre and Miquelon and Jan Mayen Islands and the Delimitation of Maritime Zones’, 43 *ICLQ*, 1994, p. 678; K. Highet, ‘Delimitation of the Maritime Areas Between Canada and France’, 87 *AJIL*, 1993, p. 452; and H. Ruiz Fabri, ‘Sur la Délimitation des Espaces Maritimes entre le Canada et la France’, 97 *RGDIP*, 1993, p. 67.

²⁶⁸ 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1163; 95 ILR, p. 663.

²⁶⁹ ICJ Reports, 1993, p. 37; 99 ILR, p. 395. See also M. D. Evans, ‘Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (*Denmark v. Norway*)’, 43 *ICLQ*, 1994, p. 697.

²⁷⁰ But see the Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, who took the view that the regime of the continental shelf was independent of the concept of the exclusive economic zone and that the request to draw a single maritime boundary was misconceived: ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 96–7; 99 ILR, pp. 464–5.

²⁷¹ 119 ILR, pp. 417, 457.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 465. See also *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 52; and *Anglo-French Continental Shelf*, Cmnd 7438; 54 ILR, p. 6.

²⁷³ 119 ILR, p. 454.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 461. Note that the Tribunal rejected the enclaving of some islands as had occurred in the *Anglo-French Continental Shelf* case: *ibid.*, p. 463.

²⁷⁵ ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 110.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114. This was in view of the recognition that Bahrain had sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, a factor which mitigated any serious disparity.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

²⁸¹ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 441.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 442.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 443.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 443–5.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 446. See also, as to the relevance of oil practice by the parties, *ibid.*, pp. 447–8; and *Eritrea–Yemen (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation)* 119 ILR, pp. 417, 443 ff.

²⁸⁶ Award of 11 April 2006, para. 230. See also B. Kwiatkowska, ‘The 2006 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Delimitation (Jurisdiction and Merits) Award’, in Ndiaye and Wolfrum, *Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes*, p. 917.

²⁸⁷ Award of 11 April 2006, paras. 243, 244. See also *Bangladesh v. India*, Award of 7 July 2014, para. 216, noting further in para. 217 that ‘neither the prospect of climate change nor its possible effects can jeopardize the large number of settled maritime boundaries throughout the world’.

²⁸⁸ ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 61, 89.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 99–100. See also *Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar)*, ITLOS, Judgment of 14 March 2012, paras. 225 ff. See also below p. 554.

²⁹⁰ ICJ Reports, 2014, pp. 3, 65. See also *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 695–6; and *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, Award of 11 April 2006, paras. 242, 317. This approach was also approved in *Guyana v. Suriname*, Arbitral Award

of 17 September 2007, paras. 340–1. See also *Bangladesh v. India*, Award of 7 July 2014, paras. 340 ff.; *Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar)*, ITLOS, Judgment of 14 March 2012, paras. 238 ff.; *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, paras. 999 ff.; *Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire*, ITLOS, Judgment of 23 September 2017, paras. 289 ff.; and *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (Compensation)*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 139, 177.

²⁹¹ ICJ Reports, 2014, pp. 3, 66.

²⁹² *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 50. See also *Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire*, ITLOS, Judgment of 23 September 2017, para. 452, underlining that maritime delimitation is not a means for distributing justice. In *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 342, the International Court held that resource-related considerations may be taken into account only where the delimitation was likely to entail ‘catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned’. See also *Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire*, ITLOS, Judgment of 23 September 2017, paras. 452–3.

²⁹³ *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, Award of 11 April 2006, para. 232.

²⁹⁴ *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 445–6.

²⁹⁵ See e.g. *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 446–7; and *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, Award of 11 April 2006, para. 240. See also *Peru v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2014, pp. 3, 65.

²⁹⁶ See e.g. *Anglo-French Continental Shelf* 54 ILR, p. 6; and *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 114 ff.

²⁹⁷ *Gulf of Maine*, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 246, 342; and *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, Award of 11 April 2006, paras. 228, 241.

²⁹⁸ ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 71, 84, 80–6.

²⁹⁹ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 447–8. See also *Guyana v. Suriname*, Arbitral Award of 17 September 2007, paras. 378 ff.; and *Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire*, ITLOS, Judgment of 23 September 2017, para. 477.

³⁰⁰ *Peru v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2014, pp. 3, 38–9, 41–2.

301 *Ibid.*, p. 69. See also *Romania v. Ukraine*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 61, 100.

302 *Bangladesh v. India*, Award of 7 July 2014, para. 339.

303 See e.g. Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 9; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 12; S. C. Vasciannie, *Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States in the International Law of the Sea*, Oxford, 1990; J. Symonides, 'Geographically Disadvantaged States in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea', **208 HR**, 1988, p. 283; M. I. Glassner, *Bibliography on Land-Locked States*, 4th ed., The Hague, 1995; and Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 18.

304 See also the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States 1965.

305 See e.g. article 14(1) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 1958; articles 2(1) and 4 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958; and articles 17, 38(1), 52(1), 53(2), 58(1), 87 and 90 of the 1982 Convention.

306 Article 69(1) of the 1982 Convention.

307 Article 70(1). Geographically disadvantaged states are defined in article 70(2) as 'coastal states, including states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose geographical situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of other states in the subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes of their populations or parts thereof, and coastal states which can claim no exclusive economic zone of their own'.

308 See articles 69(2) and 70(2). Note also articles 69(4) and 70(5) restricting such rights of participation of developed landlocked states to developed coastal states of the same subregion or region. By article 71, the provisions of articles 69 and 70 do not apply in the case of a coastal state whose economy is overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of its exclusive economic zone.

309 See also articles 152, 160 and 161.

310 See e.g. Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 7; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 5(2); Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 11;

and *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 710 ff.

311 See article 89 of the 1982 Convention. See also article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention.

312 ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86. See above, p. 478.

313 Subject to Part VI of the Convention, dealing with the continental shelf.

314 *Ibid.*

315 *Ibid.*, and Part XIII, dealing with marine scientific research.

316 See below, p. 540.

317 ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 457; 57 ILR, pp. 350, 605. See also the Order of the ICJ of 22 September 1995 in the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*, ICJ Reports, 1995, p. 288, where the Court refused to accede to a request by New Zealand to re-examine the 1974 judgment in view of the resumption by France of underground nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

318 Note, however, the development of regional agreements prohibiting nuclear weapons: see the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1967, which extends the nuclear weapons ban to the territorial sea, airspace and any other space over which a state party exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation; the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone 1985; the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Treaty 1996; and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 1995.

319 See *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 22; 16 AD, p. 155; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 111–12; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 445. See also *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, p. 25; and *M/V Norstar (Panama v. Italy)* (Merits), ITLOS, Judgment of 10 April 2019, para. 216, noting that freedom of navigation would be illusory if a ship could be subject to the jurisdiction of other states on the high seas. It was also noted that bunkering on the high seas fell within the freedom of navigation, *ibid.*, para. 219.

320 See *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 116, 183; 18 ILR, pp. 86, 131. See also below, p. 536.

321 ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 3.

322 See above, p. 521.

323 Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, paras. 1016 ff., 1081, 1123 ff.

324 See e.g. Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 157 ff.; and Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 17.

325 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1987–8, HC, Paper 179–II, p. 120; and UKMIL, 59 *BYIL*, 1988, p. 581.

326 See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 731.

327 Article 5 of the 1958 High Seas Convention and article 91 of the 1982 Convention.

328 Article 5 of the High Seas Convention 1958 had added to this the requirement that ‘in particular the state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag’. This requirement appears in article 94 of the 1982 Convention.

329 See the 1999 Decision of the ITLOS in *M/V Saiga (No. 2)*, 120 ILR, pp. 143, 175.

330 See Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 213 ff.

331 ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 150; 30 ILR, p. 426.

332 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 33952.

333 See 26 ILM, 1987, pp. 1429–30, 1435–40, 1450–2. See also 37 *ICLQ*, 1988, pp. 424–45; and M. H. Nordquist and M. G. Wachenfeld, ‘Legal Aspects of Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers and Laying of Mines in the Persian Gulf’, 31 *German YIL*, 1988, p. 138.

334 See e.g. 119 HC Deb., col. 645, 17 July 1987.

335 120 ILR, pp. 143, 175–6. See also the decision by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in *Grand Prince (Belize v. France)*, 2001, paras. 81 ff., 125 ILR, pp. 272, 297 ff.

336 *M/V Saiga* 120 ILR, pp. 143, 176; and *Grand Prince (Belize v. France)*, 2001, para. 89, 125 ILR, pp. 272, 299.

337 *M/V Saiga* 120 ILR, pp. 143, 179.

338 Article 6 of the 1958 Convention and article 92 of the 1982 Convention.

339 [1948] AC 351; 13 AD, p. 51. See also e.g. *US v. Dominguez* 604 F.2d 304 (1979); *US v. Cortes* 588 F.2d 106 (1979); *US v. Monroy* 614 F.2d 61 (1980); and *US v. Marino-Garcia* 679 F.2d 1373 (1982). In the latter case, the Court referred to stateless vessels as ‘international pariahs’, *ibid.*, p. 1383.

340 See article 6 of the 1958 Convention and article 92 of the 1982 Convention.

341 PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 25; 4 AD, p. 153. See also *Sellers v. Maritime Safety Inspector* [1999] 2 NZLR 44, 46–8; 120 ILR, p. 585.

342 Note that duties of the flag state are laid down in articles 94, 97, 98, 99, 113 and 115 of the 1982 Convention.

343 See articles 8 and 9 of the High Seas Convention 1958. Note that in *Enrica Lexie (Italy v. India)*, ITLOS, Award of 2 May 2020, para. 1094 (the *dispositif*), the Tribunal held that two Italian marines based on a commercial oil tanker, accused of killing two Indian fishermen, were immune from the jurisdiction of India, who was obliged to cease to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over them.

344 See e.g. E. Papastavridis, *The Interception of Vessels on the High Seas*, Oxford, 2013.

345 See e.g. Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 171 ff.; Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 11(2); *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 746;

Modern Piracy: Legal Challenges and Responses (ed. D. Guilfoyle), Cheltenham, 2013; and D. Guilfoyle, *Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea*, Cambridge, 2012. See also W. M. Reisman and B. T. Tennis, 'Combating Piracy in East Africa', *35 Yale Journal of International Law*, 2009, p. 14; and House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report, *Piracy off the Coast of Somalia*, January 2012, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/1318/1318.pdf>.

³⁴⁶ See e.g. *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 37 (Separate Opinion of President Guillaume) and 81 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal); K. Randall, 'Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law', *66 Texas Law Review*, 1988, pp. 785, 791; and *US v. Brig Malek Adhel* 43 US (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844), where the Court referred to a pirate as 'hostis humani generis'. See further on universal jurisdiction, below, [Chapter 11](#).

³⁴⁷ See also article 15 of the High Seas Convention 1958. Note that article 105 of the 1982 Convention deals with the seizure of pirate boats or aircraft, while article 106 provides for compensation in the case of seizure without adequate grounds: see *Athens Maritime Enterprises Corp. v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association* [1983] 1 All ER 590; 78 ILR, p. 563. See also Security Council resolution 2020 (2011); and *US v. Ali Mohamed Ali*, US Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit, Judgment of 11 June 2013.

³⁴⁸ See article 19 of the 1958 Convention and article 105 of the 1982 Convention. See also the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 and Protocol 1989; and the IMO Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 2009. Note that on 18 April 2008, a French court charged six Somalis with piracy following the release of hostages taken from a French yacht that they had allegedly seized in the Gulf of Aden. The Somalis were apprehended by French forces and removed to France with the permission of the President of Somalia: see www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15976883.

³⁴⁹ See 44 ILM, 2005, p. 829. See also the work of the IMO, including the Djibouti Code on the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 2009, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Default.aspx.

³⁵⁰ See also the Security Council Presidential Statement of 19 November 2012, S/PRST/2012/24; and Secretary-General Reports, S/2012/783 and S/2012/50 on anti-piracy

courts.

³⁵¹ See Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 456 ff.

³⁵² See www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm. Established in 2009.

³⁵³ See http://eeas.europa.eu/piracy/containing_piracy_en.htm. Note also the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia established in 2009 pursuant to Security Council resolution 1851 (2008).

³⁵⁴ See e.g. Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, p. 309. See also Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, p. 166; and J. S. Martinez, *The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law*, Oxford, 2012.

³⁵⁵ See also article 13 of the High Seas Convention 1958.

³⁵⁶ See also article 22 of the High Seas Convention 1958. Several international treaties exist with the aim of suppressing the slave trade and some provide for reciprocal rights of visits and search on the high seas: see e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 171–2. Note also that under article 108 of the 1982 Convention all states are to cooperate in the suppression of the illicit drug trade.

³⁵⁷ See e.g. Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, p. 200; Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, p. 175; J. C. Woodliffe, ‘The Demise of Unauthorised Broadcasting from Ships in International Waters’, *1 Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law*, 1986, p. 402; and Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, p. 312.

³⁵⁸ See also article 110 of the 1982 Convention. In addition, see the European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasting transmitted from Stations outside National Territories.

³⁵⁹ See e.g. Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 168 ff.; Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, p. 448; N. Poulantzas, *The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law*, 2nd ed., The Hague, 2002; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 739. See also W. C. Gilmore, ‘Hot Pursuit: The Case of *R v. Mills and Others*’, *44 ICLQ*, 1995, p. 949; and A. G. Oude Elferink, ‘The Russian Federation and the Arctic Sunrise Case: Hot Pursuit and Other Issues Under the LOSC’, *92 International Law Studies*, US Naval War College, 2016, p. 381.

360 See e.g. *I'm Alone*, 3 RIAA, p. 1609 (1935); 7 AD, p. 203.

361 *M/V Saiga (No. 2)*, ITLOS, Judgment of 1 July 1999, para. 146; 120 ILR, pp. 143, 194.

362 *Ibid.*, p. 196. See also *I'm Alone*, 3 RIAA, p. 1609 (1935); 7 AD, p. 203; and *Red Crusader* 35 ILR, p. 485. Note that article 22(1)(f) of the Straddling Stocks Convention 1995 provides that an inspecting state shall avoid the use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety of the inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their duties. In addition, the force used must not exceed that reasonably required in the circumstances. See also article 9 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 2005.

363 PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 25; 4 AD, p. 153.

364 See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 218 ff.; and Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 207 ff.

365 This falls within article 110, which notes: 'Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty . . .'

366 See the UK–US Agreement on Vessels Trafficking in Drugs 1981; and *US v. Biermann*, 83 *AJIL*, 1989, p. 99; 84 ILR, p. 206. See also e.g. the Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988; and the Council of Europe Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea 1995. But see as to enforcement of the Straddling Stocks Convention, below, p. 536.

367 See e.g. M. Byers, 'Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative', 98 *AJIL*, 2004, p. 526; D. Joyner, 'The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counter-proliferation and International Law', 30 *Yale JIL*, 2005, p. 507; D. Guilfoyle, 'Interdicting Vessels to Enforce the Common Interest: Maritime Countermeasures and the Use of Force', 56 *ICLQ*, 2007, p. 69; and D. Guilfoyle, 'Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction', 12 *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 2007, p. 1. See also the statement of the UK Foreign Office Minister of 25 April 2006, UKMIL, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, pp. 773–4.

368 S/23500, 31 January 1992.

369 Participants include the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Turkey: see Guilfoyle, ‘Maritime Interdiction’, p. 12.

370 Including with Liberia, Panama, Croatia, Cyprus and Belize: see Guilfoyle, ‘Maritime Interdiction’, p. 22.

371 See below, Chapters 19, p. 1025 and 21, pp. 1074 and 1099.

372 Guilfoyle, ‘Maritime Interdiction’, pp. 28 ff. Note also Security Council resolution 2146 (2014) authorising all states to inspect on the high seas vessels designated by the Committee established under resolution 1970 (2011) as suspected in the illegal smuggling of crude oil from Libya and to ‘use all measures commensurate to the specific situation’ to carry out such inspections and return the oil to Libya.

373 In force since 28 January 2004. Note also the CARICOM Maritime and Airspace Security Cooperation Agreement 2008, which permits an intercepting state to request the flag state to authorise the boarding, search and detention of a vessel claiming the latter’s nationality and suspected of, *inter alia*, smuggling. See also Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, pp. 210 ff.

374 See Papastavridis, *Interception of Vessels*, pp. 283 ff.

375 Judgment of 23 February 2012.

376 See also Security Council resolutions 2312 (2016), 2380 (2017) and 2437 (2018) *inter alia* renewing the authorisations.

377 See Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 8; Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 15; Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 15; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 15; and O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. II, chapter 25. See also below, Chapter 14.

378 6 ILM, 1967, p. 480. See also the *Amoco Cadiz* incident in 1978, e.g. Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 241; and the *Aegean Sea* and *Braer* incidents in 1992–93, e.g. G.

Plant, ““Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas”: Lord Donaldson’s Inquiry, UK Government’s Response and International Law’, 44 *ICLQ*, 1995, p. 939.

379 Also a variety of regional and bilateral agreements have been signed: Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, pp. 263–4.

380 See article 211. See also generally articles 192–237, covering, *inter alia*, global and regional cooperation, technical assistance, monitoring and environmental assessment, and the development of the enforcement of international and domestic law preventing pollution.

381 Article 235.

382 Article 192. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea held that article 192 imposed an obligation on states to protect and preserve the marine environment: see *M/V Louisa (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Spain)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 23 December 2010, para. 76; and *Maritime Boundary Dispute (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 25 April 2015, para. 69.

383 See *Mauritius v. UK*, Award of 15 March 2015, paras. 537 ff., where it was noted that article 194(4) required ‘a balancing act between competing rights, based upon an evaluation of the extent of the interference, the availability of alternatives, and the importance of the rights and policies at issue’. See also the *Mox* case, ITLOS, Provisional Measures Order of 3 December 2001; the OSPAR Award of 2 July 2003; the Arbitral Tribunal’s suspension of proceedings, Order No. 3 of 24 June 2003 and Order No. 4 of 14 November 2003; 126 ILR, pp. 257 ff., 310 ff. See also the Decision of the ECJ of 30 May 2006, *Commission v. Ireland*, Case No. C-459/03, 45 ILM, 2006, p. 1074, where the Court found that by instituting proceedings against the UK under the Law of the Sea Convention dispute settlement mechanisms, Ireland had breached its obligations under articles 10 and 292 of the European Community Treaty and articles 192 and 193 of the European Atomic Energy Treaty.

384 See e.g. Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 7(4.1); Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 13(III), especially p. 340; Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, p. 226; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 305; F. Orrego Vicuña, *The Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries*, Cambridge, 1999; W. T. Burke, *The New International Law of Fisheries*, Oxford, 1994; A. Serdy, *The New Entrants Problem in International Fisheries Law*, Cambridge, 2016; R. Rayfuse, *Non Flag-State*

Enforcement on the High Seas Fisheries, The Hague, 2013; H. Gherari, 'L'Accord de 4 août 1995 sur les Stocks Chevauchants et les Stocks de Poisson Grands Migrateurs', **100 RGDIP**, 1996, p. 367; B. Kwiatowska, 'Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 Miles in the Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice', **22 Ocean Development and International Law**, 1991, p. 167; E. Miles and W. T. Burke, 'Pressures on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks', **20 Ocean Development and International Law**, 1989, p. 352; E. Meltzer, 'Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries', **25 Ocean Development and International Law**, 1994, p. 256; P. G. G. Davies and C. Redgwell, 'The International Legal Regulation of Straddling Fish Stocks', **67 BYIL**, 1996, p. 199; D. H. Anderson, 'The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995: An Initial Assessment', **45 ICLQ**, 1996, p. 463; and D. Freestone and Z. Makuch, 'The New International Environmental Law of Fisheries: The 1995 United Nations Straddling Stocks Agreement', **7 Yearbook of International Environmental Law**, 1996, p. 3.

385 See article 2 of the High Seas Convention 1958; articles 1 and 6 of the Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 1958; and article 116 of the 1982 Convention. In particular, the freedom to fish is subject to a state's treaty obligations, to the interests and rights of coastal states and to the requirements of conservation. See generally on international fisheries law, <http://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-2/fisheries/state-of-fisheries-worldwide/> and above, p. 497, with regard to the *Fisheries Jurisdiction* case.

386 Article 61. See also article 62.

387 Article 63(1). This is without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part of the 1982 Convention.

388 See articles 117–20. A series of provisions in the 1982 Convention apply with regard to particular species: e.g. article 64 concerning highly migratory species (such as tuna); article 65 concerning marine mammals (such as whales, for which see also the work of the International Whaling Commission, <http://iwc.int>); article 66 concerning anadromous species (such as salmon); article 67 concerning catadromous species (such as eels); and article 68 concerning sedentary species (which are regarded as part of the natural resources of a coastal state's continental shelf: see article 77(4)). As to whaling, see the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946; and *Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v.*

Japan: *New Zealand Intervening*), ICJ Reports, 2014, p. 226. See also M. Fitzmaurice, *Whaling in International Law*, Cambridge, 2015; and *Whaling in the Antarctic: Significance and Implications of the ICJ Judgment* (ed. M. Fitzmaurice and D. Tamada), The Hague, 2016.

389 See e.g. Burke, *New International Law of Fisheries*, pp. 348 ff.; and B. Kwiatowska, ‘The High Seas Fisheries Regime: At a Point of No Return?’, *8 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, 1993, p. 327.

390 E.g. with regard to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, the Bering Sea, the Barents Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and off Patagonia and the Falklands, see Anderson, ‘Straddling Stocks Agreement’, p. 463.

391 See articles 5 and 6 of the Straddling Stocks Agreement. See also, with regard to this approach, below, [Chapter 14](#), p. 758. See generally on the agreement which came into force on 11 December 2001, www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm.

392 Article 8. Note that by article 1(3) the Agreement ‘applies *mutatis mutandis* to other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas’. This was intended to refer to Taiwan: see e.g. Orrego Vicuña, *High Seas Fisheries*, p. 139; and Anderson, ‘Straddling Stocks Agreement’, p. 468.

393 See also article 22.

394 Note that by article 17(3) the fishing entities referred to in article 1(3) may be requested to cooperate with the organisations or arrangements in question. See also General Assembly resolution 69/109.

395 See e.g. P. G. G. Davies, ‘The EC/Canadian Fisheries Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic’, *44 ICLQ*, 1995, p. 927.

396 ICJ Reports, 1998, p. 432.

397 See European Commission Press Release, WE/15/95, 20 April 1995.

398 See the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea 1994.

399 Note also the existence of other agreements with regard to specific species of fish: e.g. the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna 1966; the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 1993; and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Agreement 1993.

400 See e.g. Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 5(3); Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 6; O’Connell, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, chapter 12; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 12; B. Buzan, *Seabed Politics*, New York, 1976; T. G. Kronmiller, *The Lawfulness of Deep Seabed Mining*, New York, 2 vols., 1980; Brown, *Sea-Bed Energy*; A. M. Post, *Deepsea Mining and the Law of the Sea*, The Hague, 1983; A. D. Henchoz, *Règlementations Nationales et Internationales de l’Exploration et de l’Exploitation des Grands Fonds Marins*, Zurich, 1992; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 812.

401 See e.g. *Seabed Mineral Resource Development*, UN Dep’t of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1980, ST/ESA/107, pp. 1–2.

402 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

403 *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12.

404 Defined in article 1 as the ‘seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond national jurisdiction’. This would start at the outer edge of the continental margin or at least at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines.

405 Articles 136 and 137.

406 See below, p. 544. Note that certain activities in the Area do not need the consent of the Authority, e.g. pipeline and cable laying and scientific research not concerning seabed resources: see articles 112, 143 and 256.

407 Article 140. See also article 150.

408 See also Annex III, articles 3 and 4. Highly controversial requirements for transfer of technology are also included, *ibid.*, article 5.

409 *Ibid.*, articles 8 and 9. The production policies of the Authority are detailed in article 151 of the Convention.

410 21(4) *UN Chronicle*, 1984, pp. 44 ff. See also 25 ILM, 1986, p. 1329 and 26 ILM, 1987, p. 1725.

411 See Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 230.

412 See 21(4) *UN Chronicle*, 1984, pp. 45–7.

413 See LOS/PCN/97–99 (1987). See also the Understanding of 5 September 1986 making various changes to the rules regarding pioneer operations, including extending the deadline by which the \$30 million investment had to be made and establishing a Group of Technical Experts: LOS/PCN/L.41/Rev.1. See also Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, pp. 448–54. An Understanding of 30 August 1990 dealt with training costs, transfer of technology, expenditure on exploration and the development of a mine site for the Authority, *ibid.*, pp. 454–5, while an Understanding of 22 February 1991 dealt with the avoidance of overlapping claims signed by China on the one hand and seven potential pioneer investor states on the other (Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and the US), *ibid.*, p. 455.

414 Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, p. 455.

415 *Ibid.*, p. 456. This organisation consisted of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Russian Federation and Cuba. The International Seabed Authority has entered into fifteen-year contracts for exploration for polymetallic nodules and polymetallic sulphides with sixteen contractors: see <https://isa.org.jm/blocks/contractors-overview>.

416 See e.g. *The Times*, 16 February 1984, p. 4; and 33 HC Deb., col. 404, 2 December 1982.

417 See e.g. the US delegate, *UN Chronicle*, June 1982, p. 16.

418 The Act also provided for a Deep Sea Mining Levy to be paid by the holder of an exploitation licence into a Deep Sea Mining Fund and for mutual recognition of licences. A number of countries adopted similar, unilateral legislation, e.g. the US in 1980, 19 ILM, 1980, p. 1003; 20 ILM, 1981, p. 1228; and 21 ILM, 1982, p. 867; West Germany, 20 ILM, 1981, p. 393; and 21 ILM, 1982, p. 832; the Soviet Union, 21 ILM, 1982, p. 551; France, 21 ILM, 1982, p. 808; and Japan, 22 ILM, 1983, p. 102: see Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, pp. 456 ff.

419 The 1982 Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Seabed (France, Federal Republic of Germany, the UK, the US), 21 ILM, 1982, p. 950.

420 See also the Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, the UK, the US), 23 ILM, 1984, p. 1354.

421 See *Law of the Sea Bulletin*, no. 6, October 1985, p. 85. But see the 1987 Agreement on the Resolution of Practical Problems, 26 ILM, 1987, p. 1502. This was an attempt by the states involved to prevent overlapping claims.

422 33 ILM, 1994, p. 1309. See also B. H. Oxman, 'The 1994 Agreement and the Convention', 88 *AJIL*, 1994, p. 687; L. B. Sohn, 'International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement', *ibid.*, p. 696; J. I. Charney, 'US Provisional Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement', *ibid.*, p. 705; D. H. Anderson, 'Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', 43 *ICLQ*, 1994, p. 886; and Report of the UN Secretary-General, A/50/713, 1 November 1995.

423 See e.g. D. H. Anderson, 'Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', 42 *ICLQ*, 1993, p. 654; and Brown, *International Law of the Sea*, vol. I, p. 462.

424 The Agreement came into force on 28 July 1996, being thirty days after the date on which forty states had established their consent to be bound under procedures detailed in articles 4 and 5.

⁴²⁵ Note especially the increase in the role of the Council vis-à-vis the Assembly with regard to general policy matters. Note also that the Agreement guarantees a seat on the Council for the state ‘on the date of entry into force of the Convention having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product’, i.e. the US (section 3, para. 15a), and establishes groups of states on the Council of states with particular interests (section 3, paras. 10, 15).

⁴²⁶ Thus, the provisions in the Convention on the mandatory transfer of technology are not to apply (section 5, para. 2). Note also that provisions in the Convention regarding production ceilings and limitations, participation in commodity agreements, etc. are not to apply (section 6, para. 7).

⁴²⁷ See J.-P. Lévy, *International Seabed Authority: 20 Years/ Les vingt ans de l’Autorité internationale des fonds marins*, Kingston, 2014. Details of the Authority may be found at www.isa.org.jm/.

⁴²⁸ Article 157.

⁴²⁹ As at July 2020 there were 168 parties, see https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=en. This includes the EU. See also article 159(1).

⁴³⁰ Article 160. However, the effect of the 1994 Agreement on Implementation has been to reduce the power of the Assembly in favour of the Council by providing in Annex, section 3 that decisions of the Assembly in areas for which the Council also has competence or on any administrative, budgetary or financial matter be based upon the recommendations of the Council, and if these recommendations are not accepted, the matter has to be returned to the Council. Further, this section also provides that, as a general rule, decision-making in the organs of the Authority should be by consensus.

⁴³¹ Article 161(1) provides for members to be elected in the following order: (a) four members from among those states parties which, during the last five years for which statistics are available, have either consumed more than 2 per cent of total world consumption or have had net imports of more than 2 per cent of total world imports of the commodities produced from the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, and in any case one state from the Eastern European (Socialist) region, as well as the largest

consumer; (b) four members from among the eight states parties which have the largest investments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area, either directly or through their nationals, including at least one state from the Eastern European (Socialist) region; (c) four members from among states parties which, on the basis of production in areas under their jurisdiction, are major net exporters of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, including at least two developing states whose exports of such minerals have a substantial bearing upon their economies; (d) six members from among developing states parties, representing special interests. The special interests to be represented shall include those of states with large populations, states which are landlocked or geographically disadvantaged, states which are major importers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, states which are potential producers of such minerals, and least developed states; (e) eighteen members elected according to the principle of ensuring an equitable geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole, provided that each geographical region shall have at least one member elected under this subparagraph. For this purpose, the geographical regions shall be Africa, Asia, Eastern European (Socialist), Latin America and Western European and Others.

⁴³² Article 162. In some cases, Council decisions have to be adopted by consensus and in others by two-thirds majority vote: see article 161.

⁴³³ Articles 163–165. As to the secretariat, see articles 166–169 and www.isa.org.jm/secretariat.

⁴³⁴ See article 170 and Annex IV. See e.g. the proposal in 2013 from Nautilus Minerals Inc. of Canada to enter into negotiations to form a joint venture with the Enterprise for the purpose of developing eight of the reserved area blocks in the Clarion Clipperton Zone, www.isa.org.jm/news/nautilus-minerals-propose-joint-venture-enterprise; and see also the paper prepared by the Secretariat, Doc No. ISBA/19/C/6 (4 April 2013); and M. W. Lodge, ‘The Deep Seabed’, in *Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea*, pp. 226, 238.

⁴³⁵ See e.g. Tanaka, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 13; Rothwell and Stephens, *International Law of the Sea*, chapter 18; N. Klein, *Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea*, Cambridge, 2005; J. G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, 5th ed., Cambridge, 2011, chapter 8; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 19; J. Collier and A. V. Lowe, *The Settlement of Disputes in International Law*, Oxford, 1999, chapter 5; A. E. Boyle, ‘Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction’, 46 *ICLQ*, 1997, p. 37; R.

Ranjeva, ‘Le Règlement des Différends’, in Dupuy and Vignes, *Traité du Nouveau Droit*, p. 1105; J. P. Quéneudec, ‘Le Choix des Procédures de Règlement des Différends selon la Convention des NU sur le Droit de la Mer’, in *Mélanges Virally*, Paris, 1991, p. 383; and A. O. Adede, *The System for the Settlement of Disputes Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, Dordrecht, 1987. See also B. H. Oxman, ‘Courts and Tribunals: The ICJ, ITLOS and Arbitral Tribunals’, in *Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea*, p. 394; and *The Development of the Law of the Sea Convention: The Rule of International Courts and Tribunals* (ed. O. Jensen), Cheltenham, 2020.

436 See further below, Chapter 17.

437 Article 280.

438 See Annex V, section 1.

439 See articles 286 and 287.

440 Annex VI.

441 See below, Chapter 18.

442 This procedure covers both disputes concerning states and those concerning international organisations, such as the EU. A five-person tribunal is chosen by the parties from a panel to which each state party may make up to four nominations. Annex VII arbitrations have included *Australia and New Zealand v. Japan (Southern Bluefin Tuna)*, ITLOS, Award of 4 August 2000, 119 ILR, p. 508; *Ireland v. UK (Mox)* 126 ILR, pp. 257 ff., 310 ff.; *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, Award of 11 April 2006; and *Guyana v. Suriname*, Arbitral Award of 17 September 2007. Recent examples of Annex VII arbitrations include *Bangladesh v. India*, Award of 7 July 2014; *Mauritius v. UK*, Award of 18 March 2015; *Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia)*, Arbitral Award of 14 August 2015; and *South China Seas (Philippines v. China)*, Award of 12 July 2016. These cases may be found on the Permanent Court of Arbitration website, www.pca-cpa.org.

443 I.e. relating to fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research or navigation, including pollution from vessels and by dumping: see article 1, Annex VIII. The nomination process is slightly different from Annex VII situations.

444 That is, with regard to an allegation that a coastal state has acted in contravention of the provisions of the Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in regard to other internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article 58; or when it is alleged that a state in exercising these freedoms, rights or uses has acted in contravention of the Convention or of laws or regulations adopted by the coastal state in conformity with the Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention; or when it is alleged that a coastal state has acted in contravention of specified international rules and standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment which are applicable to the coastal state and which have been established by the Convention or through a competent international organisation or diplomatic conference in accordance with the Convention.

445 In such a case, the dispute is to be submitted to the compulsory conciliation provisions under Annex V, section 2, provided that the conciliation commission shall not call in question the exercise by the coastal state of its discretion to designate specific areas as referred to in article 246, para. 6, or of its discretion to withhold consent in accordance with article 246, para. 5.

446 In such a case, the dispute in certain cases is to be submitted to the compulsory conciliation provisions under Annex V, section 2: see further article 297(3)(b).

447 Disputes concerning delimitation and claims to historic waters; disputes concerning military and law enforcement activities; and disputes in respect of which the Security Council is exercising its functions: see article 298(1).

448 See Annex VI, section 4.

449 119 ILR, p. 508.

450 See Part XV and Annex VII.

451 117 ILR, p. 148. The International Tribunal called for arbitration and stated that the latter tribunal would *prima facie* have jurisdiction.

452 See article 16 of the 1993 Convention.

⁴⁵³ See 119 ILR, pp. 549–52.

⁴⁵⁴ See also B. Oxman, ‘Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction’, 95 *AJIL*, 2001, p. 277. Note that the Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex VII of the Convention in the *Mox* case, between Ireland and the UK, suspended hearings on 13 June 2003 due to uncertainty as to whether relevant provisions of the Convention fell within the competence of the European Community or member states: see Order No. 3 of 24 June 2003 and Order No. 4 of 14 November 2003, 126 ILR, pp. 257 ff., 310 ff. See also the Decision of the ECJ of 30 May 2006, *Commission v. Ireland*, Case No. C-459/03.

⁴⁵⁵ E.g. the *Red Crusader* incident, 35 ILR, p. 485. See further on these mechanisms, below, [Chapters 17](#) and [18](#).

⁴⁵⁶ E.g. the *Jan Mayen Island Continental Shelf* dispute, 20 ILM, 1981, p. 797; 62 ILR, p. 108.

⁴⁵⁷ E.g. *Anglo-French Continental Shelf*, Cmnd 7438; 54 ILR, p. 6.

⁴⁵⁸ E.g. *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 84; *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 16; 41 ILR, p. 29; and others referred to in this chapter.

⁴⁵⁹ See e.g. M. G. García-Revilla, *The Contentious and Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea*, The Hague, 2015; P. C. Rao and P. Gautier, *The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Law, Practice and Procedure*, Cheltenham, 2018; P. C. Rao and R. Khan, *The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Law and Practice*, The Hague, 2001; P. C. Rao and P. Gautier, *Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Commentary*, The Hague, 2006; M. M. Marsit, *Le Tribunal du Droit de la Mer*, Paris, 1999; A. E. Boyle, ‘The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Settlement of Disputes’, in *The Changing World of International Law in the 21st Century* (ed. J. Norton, M. Andenas and M. Footer), The Hague, 1998; D. Anderson, ‘The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’, in *Remedies in International Law* (ed. M. D. Evans and S. V. Konstanidis), Oxford, 1998, p. 71; Collier and Lowe, *Settlement of Disputes*, chapter 5; Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, chapter 19; Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, chapter 8; and G. Eiriksson,

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The Hague, 2000. See also www.itlos.org.

460 Annex VI of the Convention.

461 Article 2 of the Statute. A quorum of eleven judges is required to constitute the Tribunal: article 13.

462 Article 5.

463 See also articles 8, 9 and 18–22 of the Rules of the Tribunal 1997 (as amended in March and September 2001). Note, in particular, that under article 22 of the Rules, a non-state entity may choose an ad hoc judge in certain circumstances.

464 Article 289 of the Convention and article 15 of the Rules.

465 Article 292(1) of the Convention and article 20(1) of the Statute. This would include the EU: see article 1(2) of the Convention.

466 See in particular articles 153 and 187 of the Convention. See also A. Serdy, ‘Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a Fishing Entity’, 75 *BYIL*, 2004, p. 183.

467 Article 20(2) of the Statute. Note that in *M/V Louisa (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Spain)*, Judgment of 28 May 2013, paras. 81–2, the Tribunal declared that where states parties have made declarations of differing scope under article 287 of the Convention, its jurisdiction would exist only to the extent to which the substance of the declarations of the two parties to a dispute coincided.

468 Article 21. Where the parties to a treaty in force covering law of the sea matters so agree, any disputes concerning the interpretation or application of such treaty may be submitted to the Tribunal: article 22.

469 Article 293 of the Convention and article 23 of the Statute.

470 See the Convention on the Determination of the Minimal Conditions for Access and Exploitation of Marine Resources within the Maritime Areas under Jurisdiction of the

Member States of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 2012, which authorised this; and see also the Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015.

⁴⁷¹ See e.g. *Maritime Delimitation (Ghana v. Côte D'Ivoire)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 25 April 2015, where such a special chamber was established as requested by the parties.

⁴⁷² See article 35. The Chamber shall be open to the states parties, the International Seabed Authority and the other entities referred to in Part XI, section 5 of the Convention. Ad hoc judges may be chosen: see articles 23–5 of the Rules.

⁴⁷³ Articles 187 and 188 of the Convention and article 36 of the Statute. See also article 27 of the Rules.

⁴⁷⁴ Article 293 of the Convention.

⁴⁷⁵ Article 38 of the Statute. The decisions of the Seabed Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of the states parties in the same manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of the state party in whose territory the enforcement is sought: article 39. Articles 115–23 of the Rules deal with procedural issues in contentious cases before the Chamber.

⁴⁷⁶ See articles 159(10) and 191. See also articles 130–7 of the Rules. The Seabed Disputes Chamber gave its first Advisory Opinion on 1 February 2011 at the request of the Council of the International Seabed Authority concerning the legal responsibilities and obligations of States Parties to the Convention with respect to the sponsorship of activities in the International Seabed Area: see ITLOS Reports 2011, p. 10. See also D. Freestone, 'Advisory Opinion of the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on "Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area"', *105 AJIL*, 2011, p. 755.

⁴⁷⁷ See article 15(1). A Chamber for Fisheries Disputes (1997), a Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes (1997) and a Chamber for Maritime Delimitation Disputes (2007) have been formed under this provision. Under article 15(2), the Tribunal may form a chamber for dealing with a specific dispute if the parties so wish and a Chamber was formed in December 2000 to deal with the *Swordfish Stocks* dispute between Chile and the European Community. See also articles 29 and 30 and 107–109 of the Rules.

⁴⁷⁸ Article 15(3). This may hear cases on an accelerated procedure basis and provisional measures applications when the full Tribunal is not sitting: see article 25(2). See also article 28 of the Rules.

⁴⁷⁹ See also the Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice, 31 October 1997, and articles 40–2 of the Rules.

⁴⁸⁰ Article 25(1) of the Statute. See also articles 89–95 of the Rules. See e.g. S. Rosenne, *Provisional Measures in International Law: The International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea*, The Hague, 2004.

⁴⁸¹ See e.g. *Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia)*, ITLOS, Order of 22 November 2013, calling for the release of the vessel and persons aboard upon the posting of a bond.

⁴⁸² See *M/V Louisa (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Spain)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 23 December 2010, para. 72; and *Maritime Delimitation (Ghana v. Côte D'Ivoire)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 25 April 2015, para. 41.

⁴⁸³ Article 290(5) provides that pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted under the Law of the Sea Convention Dispute Resolution section (Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions), any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, the Tribunal or, with regard to activities in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures if it considers that *prima facie* the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures: see e.g. *Enrica Lexie (Italy v. India)* (Provisional Measures), ITLOS, Order of 24 August 2015, granted pending the establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal to hear the case, and see also the Order for Provisional Measures, 29 April 2016, PCA Case No. 2015-28, granted by the Tribunal; *Ara Libertad (Argentina v. Ghana)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 15 December 2012, pp. 332, 343; *Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v. Russia)* (Provisional Measures), ITLOS, Order of 25 May 2019, para. 36; and *MT San Padre Pio (Switzerland v. Nigeria)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 6 July 2019, para. 45. See also article 290(6) of the Convention. Article 95(1) of the Rules declares that each party is required to submit to the Tribunal a report and information on compliance with any provisional measures

prescribed: D. Guilfoyle and C. A. Miles, ‘Provisional Measures and the MV Arctic Sunrise’, **108 AJIL**, 2014, p. 271.

484 Case Nos. 3 and 4, Order of 27 August 1999. See 117 ILR, p. 148.

485 See the Order, paras. 40 ff.; 117 ILR, pp. 148, 160. See also above, p. 547.

486 See e.g. R. Churchill, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases’, **49 ICLQ**, 2000, p. 979; B. Kwiatkowska, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases’, **15 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law**, 2000, p. 1; and 94 *AJIL*, 2000, p. 150.

487 119 ILR, p. 508. See e.g. A. E. Boyle, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration’, **50 ICLQ**, 2001, p. 447.

488 See generally Part III of the Rules concerning the procedure of the Tribunal. As to preliminary proceedings and preliminary objections, see article 294 of the Convention and articles 96 and 97 of the Rules.

489 Article 28. See e.g. *Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia)*, upon the non-appearance of Russia, ITLOS, Order of 22 November 2013.

490 See article 98 of the Rules.

491 Article 31. See also articles 99–104 of the Rules.

492 See below, [Chapter 18](#), p. 963.

493 Article 32.

494 Article 33. In the case of a dispute as to the meaning or scope of the decision, the Tribunal shall construe it upon the request of any party. See also articles 126–9 of the Rules.

495 See e.g. Y. Tanaka, ‘Prompt Release in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Some Reflections on the Itlos Jurisprudence’, **51 NILR**, 2004, p. 237; and D. R. Rothwell and T. Stephens, ‘Illegal Southern Ocean Fishing and Prompt Release: Balancing

Coastal and Flag State Rights and Interests’, 53 *ICLQ*, 2004, p. 171. See also e.g. *Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia)*, ITLOS, Order of 22 November 2013.

⁴⁹⁶ Case No. 5, ITLOS, Judgment of 7 February 2000. See 125 ILR, p. 164.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 57, 58.

⁴⁹⁸ 126 ILR, p. 433. See also as to prompt release issues, *Juno Trader* 128 ILR, p. 267.

⁴⁹⁹ ITLOS, Judgment of 6 August 2007.

⁵⁰⁰ Case No. 10, Order of 3 December 2001. See 126 ILR, pp. 257 ff., 310 ff.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 78–80.

⁵⁰² Case No. 2, Judgment of 1 July 1999. See 120 ILR, p. 143.

⁵⁰³ See e.g. B. H. Oxman and V. Bantz, ‘The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) (St Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea)’, 94 *AJIL*, 2000, p. 40; and L. de la Fayette, ‘The M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case’, 49 *ICLQ*, 2000, p. 467.

⁵⁰⁴ See above, p. 525.

⁵⁰⁵ Case No. 8, Judgment of 20 April 2001. See 125 ILR, p. 272.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 62 ff.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 79.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 93.

⁵⁰⁹ ITLOS, Judgment of 14 March 2012. See also above, p. 439, **note 164**.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 169.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 471 ff.

512 *Ibid.*, para. 455. As of July 2020, the Tribunal has dealt with or is dealing with twenty-nine cases: www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/.

513 ITLOS, Judgment of 23 September 2017. See above, p. 520, **note 292**.

514 ITLOS, submitted on 24 September 2019, www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_293_en.pdf. The Special Chamber found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, in its decision of 28 January 2021.

11

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction concerns the power of the state under international law to regulate or otherwise impact upon people, property and circumstances and reflects the basic principles of state sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs.¹ Jurisdiction is a central feature of state sovereignty, for it is an exercise of authority which may alter or create or terminate legal relationships and obligations. It may be achieved by means of legislative, executive or judicial action. In each case, the recognised authorities of the state as determined by the legal system of that state perform certain functions permitted them which affect the life around them in various ways. In the United Kingdom, Parliament passes binding statutes, the courts make binding decisions and the administrative machinery of government has the power and jurisdiction (or legal authority) to enforce the rules of law. It is particularly necessary to distinguish between the capacity to make law, whether by legislative or executive or judicial action (prescriptive jurisdiction or the jurisdiction to prescribe), and the capacity to ensure compliance with such law, whether by executive action or through the courts (enforcement jurisdiction or the jurisdiction to enforce). Jurisdiction, although primarily territorial, may be based on other grounds, for example nationality, while enforcement is restricted by territorial factors.

To give an instance, if a man kills somebody in Britain and then manages to reach the Netherlands, the British courts have jurisdiction to try him, but they cannot enforce it by sending officers to the Netherlands to apprehend him. They must apply to the Dutch authorities for his arrest and dispatch to Britain. If, on the other hand, the murderer remains in Britain, he may be arrested and tried there, even if it becomes apparent that he is a German national. Thus, while prescriptive jurisdiction (or the competence to make law) may be exercised as regards events happening within the territorial limits irrespective of whether or not the actors are nationals, and may be founded on nationality as in the case of a British subject suspected of murder committed abroad who may be tried for the offence in the United Kingdom (if he is found in the United Kingdom, of course), enforcement jurisdiction is another matter entirely and is essentially restricted to the presence of the suspect in the territorial limits.²

However, there are circumstances in which it may be possible to apprehend a suspected murderer, but the jurisdictional basis is lacking. For example, if a Frenchman has committed a murder in Germany he cannot be tried for it in Britain, notwithstanding his presence in the country, although, of course, both France and Germany may apply for his extradition and return to their respective countries from Britain.

Thus, while jurisdiction is closely linked with territory it is not exclusively so tied. Many states have jurisdiction to try offences that have taken place outside their territory, and in addition certain persons, property and situations are immune from the territorial jurisdiction in spite of being situated or taking place there. Diplomats, for example, have extensive immunity from the laws

of the country in which they are working³ and various sovereign acts by states may not be questioned or overturned in the courts of a foreign country.⁴

The whole question of jurisdiction is complex, not least because of the relevance also of constitutional issues and conflict of laws rules. International law tries to set down rules dealing with the limits of a state's exercise of governmental functions while conflict of laws (or private international law) will attempt to regulate in a case involving a foreign element whether the particular country has jurisdiction to determine the question, and, secondly, if it has, then the rules of which country will be applied in resolving the dispute. The fact that international law permits the exercise of jurisdiction in any particular case is only the first stage. The state in question must also have adopted the domestic measures required actually to exercise such jurisdiction in the relevant circumstances.

The grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction are not identical in the cases of international law and conflict of laws rules. In the latter case, specific subjects may well be regulated in terms of domicile or residence (for instance, as regards the recognition of foreign marriages or divorces), but such grounds would not found jurisdiction where international law matters were concerned.⁵ Although it is by no means impossible or in all cases difficult to keep apart the categories of international law and conflict of laws, nevertheless the often different definitions of jurisdiction involved are a confusing factor.

One should also be aware of the existence of disputes as to jurisdictional competence within the area of constitutional matters. These problems arise in

federal court structures, as in the United States, where conflicts as to the extent of authority of particular courts may arise.

While the relative exercise of powers by the legislative, executive and judicial organs of government is a matter for the municipal legal and political system, the extraterritorial application of jurisdiction will depend upon the rules of international law, and in this chapter we shall examine briefly the most important of these rules.

The Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction⁶

It follows from the nature of the sovereignty of states that while a state is supreme internally, that is within its own territorial frontiers, it must not intervene in the domestic affairs of another nation. This duty of non-intervention within the domestic jurisdiction of states provides for the shielding of certain state activities from the regulation of international law. State functions which are regarded as beyond the reach of international legal control and within the exclusive sphere of state management include the setting of conditions for the grant of nationality and the elaboration of the circumstances in which aliens may enter the country.

However, the influence of international law is beginning to make itself felt in areas hitherto regarded as subject to the state's exclusive jurisdiction. For example, the treatment by a country of its own nationals is now viewed in the context of international human rights regulations, although in practice the effect of this has often been disappointing.⁷

Domestic jurisdiction is a relative concept, in that changing principles of international law have had the effect of limiting and reducing its extent⁸ and in that matters of internal regulation may well have international repercussions and thus fall within the ambit of international law. This latter point has been emphasised by the International Court of Justice. In the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case,⁹ it was stressed that:

Although it is true that the act of delimitation [of territorial waters] is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal state is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other states depends upon international law.¹⁰

The principle was also noted in the *Nottebohm* case,¹¹ where the Court remarked that while a state may formulate such rules as it wished regarding the acquisition of nationality, the exercise of diplomatic protection upon the basis of nationality was within the purview of international law. In addition, no state may plead its municipal laws as a justification for the breach of an obligation of international law.¹²

Accordingly, the dividing line between issues firmly within domestic jurisdiction on the one hand, and issues susceptible to international legal regulation on the other, is by no means as inflexible as at first may appear. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter declares that:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.

This paragraph, intended as a practical restatement and reinforcement of domestic jurisdiction, has constantly been reinterpreted in the decades since it was first enunciated. It has certainly not prevented the United Nations from discussing or adopting resolutions relating to the internal policies of member states and the result of over fifty years of practice has been the further restriction and erosion of domestic jurisdiction.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, the European colonial powers fought a losing battle against the UN debate and adoption of resolutions concerning the issues of self-determination and independence for their colonies. The involvement of the United Nations in human rights matters is constantly deepening and, until their disappearance, South Africa's domestic policies of apartheid were continually criticised and condemned. The expanding scope of UN concern has succeeded in further limiting the extent of the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction.¹³ Nevertheless, the concept does retain validity in recognising the basic fact that state sovereignty within its own territorial limits is the undeniable foundation of international law as it has evolved, and of the world political and legal system.¹⁴

Legislative, Executive and Judicial Jurisdiction

Legislative jurisdiction¹⁵ refers to the supremacy of the constitutionally recognised organs of the state to make binding laws within its territory. Such acts of legislation may extend abroad in certain circumstances.¹⁶ The state has legislative exclusivity in many areas. For example, a state lays down the procedural techniques to be adopted by its various organs, such as courts, but

can in no way seek to alter the way in which foreign courts operate. This is so even though an English court might refuse to recognise a judgment of a foreign court on the grounds of manifest bias. An English law cannot then be passed purporting to alter the procedural conditions under which the foreign courts operate.

International law accepts that a state may levy taxes against persons not within the territory of that state, so long as there is some kind of real link between the state and the proposed taxpayer, whether it be, for example, nationality or domicile.¹⁷ A state may nationalise foreign-owned property situated within its borders,¹⁸ but it cannot purport to take over foreign-owned property situated abroad. It will be obvious that such a regulation could not be enforced abroad, but the reference here is to the prescriptive jurisdiction, or capacity to pass valid laws.

The question of how far a court will enforce foreign legislation is a complicated one within, basically, the field of conflict of laws, but in practice it is rare for one state to enforce the penal or tax laws of another state.¹⁹

Although legislative supremacy within a state cannot be denied, it may be challenged. A state that adopts laws that are contrary to the provisions of international law, for example as regards the treatment of aliens or foreign property within the country, will render itself liable for a breach of international law on the international scene, and will no doubt find itself faced with protests and other action by the foreign state concerned. It is also possible that a state which abuses the rights it possesses to legislate for its nationals abroad may be guilty of a breach of international law.²⁰

Executive jurisdiction relates to the capacity of the state to act within the borders of another state.²¹ Since states are independent of one another and possess territorial sovereignty,²² it follows that generally state officials may not carry out their functions on foreign soil (in the absence of express consent by the host state)²³ and may not enforce the laws of their state upon foreign territory. It is also contrary to international law for state agents to apprehend persons or property abroad.²⁴ Similarly, the unauthorised entry into a state of military forces of another state is clearly an offence under international law.

Judicial jurisdiction²⁵ concerns the power of the courts of a particular country to try cases in which a foreign factor is present. There are a number of grounds upon which the courts of a state may claim to exercise such jurisdiction. In criminal matters these range from the territorial principle to the universality principle and in civil matters from the mere presence of the defendant in the country to the nationality and domicile principles. It is judicial jurisdiction which forms the most discussed aspect of jurisdiction and criminal questions are the most important manifestation of this.

Civil Jurisdiction²⁶

Although jurisdiction in civil matters is enforced in the last resort by the application of the sanctions of criminal law, there are a number of differences between civil and criminal issues in this context.

In general, it is fair to say that the exercise of civil jurisdiction has been claimed by states upon far wider grounds than has been the case in criminal matters, and the resultant reaction by other states much more muted.²⁷ This is

partly due to the fact that public opinion is far more easily roused where a person is tried abroad for criminal offences than if a person is involved in a civil case. In common law countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the usual basis for jurisdiction in civil cases remains service of a writ upon the defendant within the country, even if the presence of the defendant is purely temporary and coincidental.²⁸ In continental European countries, on the other hand, the usual ground for jurisdiction is the habitual residence or domicile of the defendant in the particular state.²⁹ Many countries, for instance the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, will allow their courts to exercise jurisdiction where the defendant in any action possesses assets in the state, while in matrimonial cases the commonly accepted ground for the exercise of jurisdiction is the domicile or residence of the party bringing the action.³⁰

In view of, for example, the rarity of diplomatic protests and the relative absence of state discussions, some writers have concluded that customary international law does not prescribe any particular regulations as regards the restriction of courts' jurisdiction in civil matters.³¹ The exercise of civil jurisdiction where there is a foreign element thus falls primarily within domestic law and the conflict of laws' rules (or private international law).³²

Criminal Jurisdiction³³

International law permits states to exercise jurisdiction (whether by way of legislation, judicial activity or enforcement) upon a number of grounds.³⁴ There is no obligation to exercise jurisdiction on all, or any particular one, of these grounds. This would be a matter for the domestic system to decide. The

importance of these jurisdictional principles is that they are accepted by the international community as being consistent with international law.

Conversely, attempts to exercise jurisdiction upon another ground would run the risk of not being accepted by another state.

The Territorial Principle

The territorial basis for the exercise of jurisdiction reflects one aspect of the sovereignty exercisable by a state in its territorial home, and is the indispensable foundation for the application of the series of legal rights that a state possesses.³⁵ That a country should be able to legislate with regard to activities within its territory and to prosecute for offences committed upon its soil is a logical manifestation of a world order of independent states and is entirely understandable since the authorities of a state are responsible for the conduct of law and the maintenance of good order within that state. It is also highly convenient since in practice the witnesses to the crime will be situated in the country and more often than not the alleged offender will be there too.³⁶

Thus, all crimes alleged to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of a state may come before the municipal courts and the accused if convicted may be sentenced and punished. This is so even where the offenders are foreign citizens.³⁷ The converse of the concept of territorial jurisdiction is that the courts of one country do not, as a general principle, have jurisdiction with regard to events that have occurred or are occurring in the territory of another state.³⁸ Further, there is a presumption that legislation applies within the territory of the state concerned and not outside.³⁹ One state

cannot lay down criminal laws for another in the absence of consent, nor may it enforce its criminal legislation in the territory of another state in the absence of consent.⁴⁰

The principal ground for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is, therefore, territoriality,⁴¹ although it is not the only one. There are others, such as nationality, but the majority of criminal prosecutions take place in the territory where the crime has been committed. However, the territorial concept is more extensive than at first appears since it encompasses not only crimes committed wholly on the territory of a state, but also crimes in which only part of the offence has occurred in the state: one example being where a person fires a weapon across a frontier killing somebody in the neighbouring state. Both the state where the gun was fired and the state where the injury actually took place have jurisdiction to try the offender, the former under the subjective territorial principle of territoriality and the latter under the objective territorial principle. Of course, which of the states will in the event exercise its jurisdiction will depend upon where the offender is situated, but the point remains that both the state where the offence was commenced and the state where the offence was concluded may validly try the offender.⁴² For example, the Scottish Solicitor General made it clear that Scottish courts had jurisdiction with regard to the alleged bombers of the airplane which exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie as the locus of the offences.⁴³ Such a situation would also apply in cases of offences against immigration regulations and in cases of conspiracy where activities have occurred in each of two, or more, countries.⁴⁴ Accordingly, courts are likely to look at all the circumstances in order to determine in which jurisdiction the substantial or more significant part of the crime in question was committed.⁴⁵

The nature of territorial sovereignty in relation to criminal acts was examined in the *Lotus* case.⁴⁶ The relevant facts may be summarised as follows. The French steamer, the *Lotus*, was involved in a collision on the high seas with the *Boz-Kourt*, a Turkish collier. The latter vessel sank and eight sailors and passengers died as a result. Because of this the Turkish authorities arrested the French officer of the watch (at the time of the incident) when the *Lotus* reached a Turkish port. The French officer was charged with manslaughter and France protested strongly against this action, alleging that Turkey did not have the jurisdiction to try the offence. The case came before the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was called upon to decide whether there existed an international rule prohibiting the Turkish exercise of jurisdiction.

Given that the basis of international law is the existence of sovereign states, the Court regarded it as axiomatic that restrictions upon the independence of states could not be presumed.⁴⁷ However, a state was not able to exercise its power outside its frontiers in the absence of a permissive rule of international law. But, continued the Court, this did not mean that ‘international law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law’. In this respect, states had a wide measure of discretion limited only in certain instances by prohibitive rules.⁴⁸ Because of this, countries had adopted a number of different rules extending their jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits so that ‘the territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty’.⁴⁹ The Court rejected the French claim that the flag state had exclusive jurisdiction over the ship on the high seas, saying that no rule to that effect

had emerged in international law, and stated that the damage to the Turkish vessel was equivalent to affecting Turkish territory so as to enable that country to exercise jurisdiction on the objective territorial principle, unrestricted by any rule of international law prohibiting this.⁵⁰

The general pronouncements by the Court leading to the dismissal of the French contentions have been criticised by writers for a number of years, particularly with regard to its philosophical approach in treating states as possessing very wide powers of jurisdiction which could only be restricted by proof of a rule of international law prohibiting the action concerned.⁵¹ It is argued today that the emphasis lies the other way around, not least due to the rise of international human rights law.⁵² It should also be noted that the *Lotus* principle as regards collisions at sea has been overturned by article 11(1) of the High Seas Convention 1958, which emphasised that only the flag state or the state of which the alleged offender was a national has jurisdiction over sailors regarding incidents occurring on the high seas. The territorial principle covers crimes committed not only upon the land territory of the state, but also upon the territorial sea and in certain cases upon the contiguous and other zones and on the high seas where the state is the flag state of the vessel.⁵³

As modern communications develop, so states evolve new methods of dealing with new problems. In the case of the Channel Tunnel, for example, providing a land link between the United Kingdom and France, these countries entered into an agreement whereby each state was permitted to exercise jurisdiction within the territory of the other. The Protocol concerning Frontier Controls and Policing, Co-operation in Criminal Justice, Public Safety and Mutual Assistance relating to the Channel Fixed Link was signed

on 25 November 1991.⁵⁴ Under this Protocol, French and UK frontier control officers are empowered to work in specified parts of one another's territory. These areas are termed 'control zones' and are located at Cheriton, Coquelles, on board through trains and at international railway stations. The frontier control laws and regulations of one state thus apply and may be enforced in the other. In particular, the officers of the adjoining state shall in their exercise of national powers be permitted in the control zone in the host state to detain or arrest persons in accordance with the frontier control laws and regulations of the adjoining state. Article 38(2) of the Protocol provides that within the Fixed Link (i.e. the Tunnel), each state shall have jurisdiction and shall apply their own law when it cannot be ascertained with certainty where an offence has been committed or when an offence committed in the territory of one state is related to an offence committed on the territory of the other state or when an offence has begun in or has been continued in its own territory.⁵⁵ However, it is also provided that the state which first receives the person suspected of having committed such an offence shall have priority in exercising jurisdiction.

Another example of such cross-state territorial jurisdictional arrangements was found in the Israel–Jordan Treaty of Peace 1994. Annex I(b) and (c) of the Treaty, relating to the Naharayim/Baqura Area and the Zofar/Al-Ghamr Area respectively, which provided for a special regime on a twenty-five-year renewable basis. Although each area itself was recognised as under Jordan's sovereignty, with Israeli private land ownership rights and property interests, Jordan undertook to grant unimpeded entry to, exit from, land usage and movement within the area to landowners and to their invitees or employees and not to apply its customs or immigration legislation to such persons. In

particular, Jordan undertook to permit with minimum formality the entry of uniformed Israeli police officers for the purpose of investigating crime or dealing with other incidents solely involving the landowners, their invitees or employees. Jordan undertook also not to apply its criminal laws to activities in the area involving only Israeli nationals, while Israeli laws applying to the extraterritorial activities of Israelis would be applied to Israelis and their activities in the area. Israel could also take measures in the area to enforce such laws. This arrangement came to an end in November 2019 as Jordan refused to renew the lease.⁵⁶

Thus although jurisdiction is primarily and predominantly territorial, it is not inevitably and exclusively so and states are free to consent to arrangements whereby jurisdiction is exercised outside the national territory and whereby jurisdiction by other states is exercised within the national territory.⁵⁷

A rather more unusual situation developed with regard to persons detained by the United States in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, situated in a part of the island of Cuba leased to the United States pursuant to agreements made in 1903 and 1934. Following the conflict in Afghanistan in 2001 and thereafter, persons were taken to and held in Guantanamo Bay, which the United States initially argued lay outside federal jurisdiction, being under US control, but not sovereignty.⁵⁸ The Supreme Court, however, in *Rasul v. Bush* held that District Courts did have jurisdiction to hear petitions challenging the legality of detention of foreign nationals who had been detained abroad in connection with an armed conflict and held at Guantanamo Bay.⁵⁹

The Nationality Principle⁶⁰

Since every state possesses sovereignty and jurisdictional powers and since every state must consist of a collection of individual human beings, it is essential that a link between the two be legally established. That link connecting the state and the people it includes in its territory is provided by the concept of nationality.⁶¹

By virtue of nationality, a person becomes entitled to a series of rights ranging from obtaining a valid passport enabling travel abroad to being able to vote. In addition, nationals may be able to undertake various jobs (for example, in the diplomatic service) that a non-national may be barred from. Nationals are also entitled to the protection of their state and to various benefits prescribed under international law. On the other hand, states may not mistreat the nationals of other states nor, ordinarily, conscript them into their armed forces, nor prosecute them for crimes committed outside the territory of the particular state.

The concept of nationality is important since it determines the benefits to which persons may be entitled and the obligations (such as conscription) which they must perform. The problem is that there is no coherent, accepted definition of nationality in international law and only conflicting descriptions under the different municipal laws of states. Not only that, but the rights and duties attendant upon nationality vary from state to state.

Generally, international law leaves the conditions for the grant of nationality to the domestic jurisdiction of states.⁶²

This was the central point in the *Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco* case.⁶³ This concerned a dispute between Britain and France over French nationality decrees which had the effect of giving French nationality to the children of certain British subjects. The Court, which had been requested to give an advisory opinion by the Council of the League of Nations, declared that:

The question of whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question, it depends upon the development of international relations. Thus, in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of this court, in principle within this reserved domain.⁶⁴

However, although states may prescribe the conditions for the grant of nationality, international law is relevant, especially where other states are involved. As was emphasised in article 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws:

it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other states in so far as it is

consistent with international conventions,
international custom and the principles of law
generally recognised with regard to nationality.

The International Court of Justice noted in the *Nottebohm* case⁶⁵ that,
according to state practice, nationality was:

a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence,
interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties.

It was a legal manifestation of the link between the person and the state
granting nationality and a recognition that the person was more closely
connected with that state than with any other.⁶⁶

Since the concept of nationality provides the link between the individual and
the benefits of international law, it is worth pointing to some of the basic
ideas associated with the concept, particularly with regard to its acquisition.⁶⁷

In general, the two most important principles upon which nationality is
founded in states are first by descent from parents who are nationals (*jus
sanguinis*) and second by virtue of being born within the territory of the state
(*jus soli*).

It is commonly accepted that a child born of nationals of a particular state
should be granted the nationality of that state by reason of descent. This idea

is particularly utilised in continental European countries, for example, France, Germany and Switzerland, where the child will receive the nationality of his father, although many municipal systems do provide that an illegitimate child will take the nationality of his mother. On the other hand, in common law countries such as Britain and the United States the doctrine of the *jus sanguinis* is more restricted, so that where a father has become a national by descent it does not always follow that that fact alone will be sufficient to make the child a national.

The common law countries have tended to adopt the *jus soli* rule, whereby any child born within the territorial limits of the state automatically becomes a national thereof.⁶⁸ The British Nationality Act of 1948, for example, declared that ‘every person born within the United Kingdom and Colonies . . . shall be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by birth’.⁶⁹ There is an exception to this, however, which applies to virtually every country applying the *jus soli* rule, and that is with regard to persons entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of the state. In other words, the children of diplomatic personnel born within the country do not automatically acquire its nationality.⁷⁰ Precisely how far this exception extends varies from state to state. Some countries provide that this rule applies also to the children of enemy alien fathers⁷¹ born in areas under enemy occupation.⁷²

Nationality may also be acquired by the wives of nationals, although here again the position varies from state to state. Some states provide for the automatic acquisition of the husband’s nationality, others for the conditional acquisition of nationality and others merely state that the marriage has no effect as regards nationality. Problems were also caused in the past by the fact

that many countries stipulated that a woman marrying a foreigner would thereby lose her nationality.

The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women 1957 provides that contracting states accept that the marriage of one of their nationals to an alien shall not automatically affect the wife's nationality, although a wife may acquire her husband's nationality by special procedures should she so wish.

It should be noted also that article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 provides that states parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their nationality and that in particular neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. It is also provided that women shall have equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children. As far as children themselves are concerned, article 24(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 stipulated that every child has the right to acquire a nationality, while this is reaffirmed in article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.

Nationality may be obtained by an alien by virtue of a naturalisation process usually involving a minimum period of residence, but the conditions under which this takes place vary considerably from country to country.⁷³

Civil jurisdiction, especially as regards matters of personal status, in a number of countries depends upon the nationality of the parties involved. So

that, for example, the appropriate matrimonial law in any dispute for a Frenchman anywhere would be French law. However, common law countries tend to base the choice of law in such circumstances upon the law of the state where the individual involved has his permanent home (domicile).

Many countries, particularly those with a legal system based upon the continental European model, claim jurisdiction over crimes committed by their nationals, notwithstanding that the offence may have occurred in the territory of another state.⁷⁴ Common law countries tend, however, to restrict the crimes over which they will exercise jurisdiction over their nationals abroad to very serious ones.⁷⁵ In the United Kingdom, this has been generally limited to treason, murder and bigamy committed by British nationals abroad.⁷⁶ Under section 21 of the Antarctic Act 1994, when a British national does or omits to do anything in Antarctica which would have constituted an offence if committed in the United Kingdom, then such person will be deemed to have committed an offence and be liable to be prosecuted and punished if convicted. In addition, the War Crimes Act 1991 provides for jurisdiction against a person who was on 8 March 1990 or subsequently became a British citizen or resident in the United Kingdom. Proceedings for murder, manslaughter or culpable homicide may be brought against that person in the United Kingdom, irrespective of his nationality at the time of the alleged offence, if the offence was committed during the Second World War in a place that was part of Germany or under German occupation and constituted a violation of the laws and customs of war.⁷⁷ Further, the common law countries have never protested against the extensive use of the nationality principle to found jurisdiction in criminal matters by other states.

It should be finally noted that by virtue of article 91 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, ships have the nationality of the state whose flag they are entitled to fly. Each state is entitled to fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory and for the right to fly its flag. However, there must be a genuine link between the state and the ship.⁷⁸ By article 17 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944, aircraft have the nationality of the state in which they are registered, although the conditions for registration are a matter for domestic law.⁷⁹

The Passive Personality Principle⁸⁰

Under this principle, a state may claim jurisdiction to try an individual for offences committed abroad which have affected or will affect nationals of the state.

The leading case on this particular principle is the *Cutting* case in 1886⁸¹ which concerned the publication in Texas of a statement defamatory of a Mexican by an American citizen. Cutting was arrested while in Mexico and convicted of the offence (a crime under Mexican law), with Mexico maintaining its right to jurisdiction upon the basis of the passive personality principle. The United States strongly protested against this, but there was an inconclusive end to the incident, the charges being withdrawn by the injured party.⁸²

A strong attack on this principle was made by Judge Moore, in a Dissenting Opinion in the *Lotus* case,⁸³ since the Turkish criminal code provided for

jurisdiction where harm resulted to a Turkish national. However, the Court did not resolve the issue and concentrated upon the objective territorial jurisdiction principle.⁸⁴

The overall opinion has been that the passive personality principle is rather a dubious ground upon which to base claims to jurisdiction under international law and it has been strenuously opposed by the United States⁸⁵ and the United Kingdom, although a number of states apply it.

However, article 9 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979, in detailing the jurisdictional bases that could be established with regard to the offence, included the national state of a hostage ‘if that state considers it appropriate’.⁸⁶ The possibility of using the passive personality concept was taken up by the United States in 1984 in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act⁸⁷ *inter alia* implementing the Convention and in the provision extending the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States to include ‘[a]ny place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offence by or against a national of the United States’.⁸⁸ In 1986, following the *Achille Lauro* incident,⁸⁹ the United States adopted the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act,⁹⁰ inserting into the criminal code a new section which provided for US jurisdiction over homicide and physical violence outside the United States where a US national is the victim. The section is less sweeping than it appears, since the written certification of the Attorney General is required, before a prosecution may commence by the United States, to the effect that the offence was intended to coerce, intimidate or retaliate against a government or a civilian population.

In *United States v. Yunis* (No. 2),⁹¹ the issue concerned the apprehension of a Lebanese citizen by US agents in international waters and his prosecution in the United States for alleged involvement in the hijacking of a Jordanian airliner. The only connection between the hijacking and the United States was the fact that several American nationals were on that flight. The Court accepted that both the universality principle⁹² and the passive personality principle provided an appropriate basis for jurisdiction in the case. It was stated that although the latter principle was the most controversial of the jurisdictional principles in international law, ‘the international community recognises its legitimacy’.⁹³ It was pointed out that although the United States had historically opposed the passive personality principle, it had been accepted by the United States and the international community in recent years in the sphere of terrorist and other internationally condemned crimes.⁹⁴ Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in their Joint Separate Opinion in the *Congo v. Belgium (Arrest Warrant)* case noted that in this particular context, the passive personality principle ‘today meets with relatively little opposition’.⁹⁵

The Protective Principle⁹⁶

This principle provides that states may exercise jurisdiction over aliens who have committed an act abroad which is deemed prejudicial to the security of the particular state concerned. It is a well-established concept, although there are uncertainties as to how far it extends in practice and particularly which acts are included within its net.⁹⁷

The principle is justifiable on the basis of protection of a state's vital interests, since the alien might not be committing an offence under the law of the country where he is residing and extradition might be refused if it encompassed political offences. However, it is clear that it is a principle that can easily be abused, although usually centred upon immigration and various economic offences, since far from protecting important state functions it could easily be manipulated to subvert foreign governments. Nevertheless, it exists partly in view of the insufficiency of most municipal laws as far as offences against the security and integrity of foreign states are concerned.⁹⁸

This doctrine seems to have been applied in the British case of *Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions*,⁹⁹ involving the infamous pro-Nazi propagandist 'Lord Haw-Haw'. Joyce was born in America, but in 1933 fraudulently acquired a British passport by declaring that he had been born in Ireland. In 1939, he left Britain and started working for German radio. The following year, he claimed to have acquired German nationality. The case turned on whether the British court had jurisdiction to try him after the war, on a charge of treason. The House of Lords decided that jurisdiction did exist in this case. Joyce had held himself out to be a British subject and had availed himself of the protection (albeit fraudulently) of a British passport. Accordingly, he could be deemed to owe allegiance to the Crown, and be liable for a breach of that duty. The fact that the treason occurred outside the territory of the United Kingdom was of no consequence since states were not obliged to ignore the crime of treason committed against them outside their territory. Joyce was convicted and suffered the penalty for his actions.¹⁰⁰

The protective principle is often used in treaties providing for multiple jurisdictional grounds with regard to specific offences.¹⁰¹

The Universality Principle¹⁰²

Under this principle, each and every state has jurisdiction to try particular offences. The basis for this is that the crimes involved are regarded as particularly offensive to the international community as a whole. There are two categories that clearly belong to the sphere of universal jurisdiction, which has been defined as the competence of the state to prosecute alleged offenders and to punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place of commission of the crime and regardless of any link of active or passive nationality or other grounds of jurisdiction recognised by international law.¹⁰³ These are piracy¹⁰⁴ and war crimes. However, there are a growing number of other offences which by international treaty may be subject to the jurisdiction of contracting parties and which form a distinct category closely allied to, but conceptually distinct from, the concept of universal jurisdiction.

War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and Crimes against Humanity

In addition to piracy, war crimes are now accepted by most authorities as subject to universal jurisdiction, though of course the issues involved are extremely sensitive and highly political.¹⁰⁵ While there is little doubt about the legality and principles of the war crimes decisions emerging after the Second World War, a great deal of controversy arose over suggestions of war crimes with regard to American personnel connected with the Vietnam

War,¹⁰⁶ Pakistani soldiers involved in the Bangladesh War of 1971¹⁰⁷ and persons concerned with subsequent conflicts.

Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 1945 referred to crimes against peace, violations of the law and customs of war and crimes against humanity as offences within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there was to be individual responsibility.¹⁰⁸ This article can now be regarded as part of international law. In a resolution unanimously approved by the UN General Assembly in 1946, the principles of international law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal were expressly confirmed.¹⁰⁹ The General Assembly in 1968 adopted a Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, reinforcing the general conviction that war crimes form a distinct category under international law, susceptible to universal jurisdiction,¹¹⁰ while the four Geneva 'Red Cross' Conventions of 1949 also contain provisions for universal jurisdiction over grave breaches.¹¹¹ Such grave breaches include wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, unlawful deportation of protected persons and the taking of hostages. The list was extended in Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Conventions to include, for example, attacking civilian populations.¹¹²

Nuremberg practice demonstrates that crimes against peace consist of the commission by the authorities of a state of acts of aggression. In theory this is not controversial, but in practice serious problems are likely to arise within the framework of universal jurisdiction.¹¹³ However, whether this category can be expanded to include support for international terrorism is open to question. Crimes against humanity clearly cover genocide and related

activities. They differ from war crimes in applying beyond the context of an international armed conflict, but cover essentially the same substantive offences.¹¹⁴ The UN Secretary-General's Report on the Establishment of an International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia¹¹⁵ noted in the commentary to article 5 of what became the Statute of the Tribunal¹¹⁶ that 'crimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character' and that 'crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds'.¹¹⁷ The 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court provides that jurisdiction is limited to the 'most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole', being genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression,¹¹⁸ and that a person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 'shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment' in accordance with the Statute.¹¹⁹

The International Law Commission adopted a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1996.¹²⁰ Article 8 provides that each state party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the crimes laid down in the Draft, while article 9 provides that a state in whose territory an individual alleged to have committed a crime against the peace and security of mankind is present shall either extradite or prosecute that individual. The Commentary to this article declares that the national courts of states parties would be entitled to exercise the 'broadest possible jurisdiction' over the crimes 'under the principle of universal

jurisdiction'.¹²¹ The Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, for which there is individual responsibility, comprise aggression (article 16);¹²² genocide (article 17); crimes against humanity (article 18); crimes against UN and associated personnel (article 19); and war crimes (article 20).¹²³

The fact that a particular activity may be seen as an international crime does not of itself establish universal jurisdiction and state practice does not appear to have moved beyond war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity in terms of permitting the exercise of such jurisdiction. In particular, references made to, for example, apartheid, mercenaries and environmental offences in the 1991 Draft but omitted in the Draft Code adopted in 1996 must be taken as *de lege ferenda*.

In so far as universal jurisdiction as manifested in domestic courts is concerned, the starting point is the *Eichmann* case¹²⁴ decided by the District Court of Jerusalem and the Supreme Court of Israel in 1961. Eichmann was prosecuted and convicted under an Israeli law of 1951 for war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people and crimes against humanity. The District Court declared that far from limiting states' jurisdiction with regard to such crimes, international law was actually in need of the legislative and judicial organs of every state giving effect to its criminal interdictions and bringing the criminals to trial. The fact that the crimes were committed prior to the establishment of the state of Israel did not prevent the correct application of its powers pursuant to universal jurisdiction under international law. Israel's municipal law merely reflected the offences existing under international law.¹²⁵

It is a matter for domestic law whether the presence of the accused is required for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the particular domestic court. Different states adopt different approaches. The Belgian Court of Cassation took the view in its Decision of 12 February 2003 in *HSA and Others v. SA and Others* that the presence of the accused was not necessary.¹²⁶ But this was in the context of the Belgian Statute of 1993, as amended in 1999, which provided for a wide jurisdiction in the case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This Statute was amended on 23 April 2003 to provide that the alleged serious violation of international law in question shall be one committed against a person who at the time of the commission of the acts is a Belgian national or legally resident in Belgium for at least three years and that any prosecution, including a preliminary investigation phase, may only be undertaken at the request of the Federal Prosecutor. In addition, the Federal Prosecutor may decide not to proceed where it appears that in the interests of the proper administration of justice and in compliance with Belgium's international obligations, the case would be better placed before an international court or the court of the place where the acts were committed or the courts of the state of nationality of the alleged offender or the courts of the place where he may be found.¹²⁷ The Statute was further amended on 5 August 2003, requiring a foreigner wishing to submit an application to be resident in Belgium for a minimum of three years.¹²⁸ It appears that Belgium has in effect ceased to permit prosecutions under the universal jurisdiction model in the absence of the accused.¹²⁹ This is consistent with the approach of the Institut de Droit International, which has stated that 'the exercise of universal jurisdiction requires the presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the prosecuting state or on board a vessel flying its flag or an

aircraft which is registered under its laws or other lawful forms of control over the alleged offender'.¹³⁰

The Supreme Court of Spain decided on 25 February 2003 in the *Guatemalan Genocide* case that jurisdiction would cover only acts of genocide in which Spanish nationals were victims.¹³¹ However, this decision was overturned on 26 September 2005 by the Constitutional Court, which decided that the domestic jurisdiction provision with regard to crimes against humanity was not limited to cases involving Spanish nationals who were victims of genocide and that no tie to Spain was needed in order to initiate a complaint.¹³²

Treaties Providing for Jurisdiction

In addition to the accepted universal jurisdiction to apprehend and try pirates and war criminals, there are a number of treaties which provide for the suppression by the international community of various activities, ranging from the destruction of submarine cables to drug trafficking and slavery.¹³³ These treaties provide for the exercise of state jurisdiction, but not for universal jurisdiction. Some conventions establish what might be termed a quasi-universal jurisdiction in providing for the exercise of jurisdiction upon a variety of bases by as wide a group of states parties as possible coupled with an obligation for states parties to establish such jurisdiction in domestic law. In many instances, the offence involved will constitute *jus cogens*. The view is sometimes put forward that where a norm of *jus cogens* exists, particularly where the offence is regarded as especially serious, universal jurisdiction as such may be created.¹³⁴ More correct is the approach that in

such circumstances international law recognises that domestic legal orders may validly establish and exercise jurisdiction over the alleged offenders. Such circumstances thus include the presence of the accused in the state concerned and in this way may be differentiated from universal jurisdiction as such, where, for example, a pirate may be apprehended on the high seas and then prosecuted in the state. Therefore, the type of jurisdiction at issue in such circumstances cannot truly be described as universal, but rather as quasi-universal.¹³⁵ Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in their Joint Separate Opinion in *Congo v. Belgium* referred to this situation rather as an ‘obligatory territorial jurisdiction over persons’ or ‘the jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events’ rather than as true universal jurisdiction.¹³⁶ What is to be noted is that many of these treaties do not merely provide that a state may exercise the jurisdiction in question, but require the state party to the treaty to exercise that jurisdiction, for example the requirement in many of the treaties to be noted to either prosecute the alleged offender or extradite such person to a state that will prosecute.¹³⁷

There are a number of treaties that follow the quasi-universal model, that is providing for certain defined offences to be made criminal offences within the domestic orders of states parties; accepting an obligation to arrest alleged offenders found on the national territory; and then prosecuting those persons on the basis of a number of stated jurisdictional grounds, ranging from territoriality to nationality and passive personality grounds. Such treaties normally also provide for mutual assistance and for the offences in question to be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty concluded between states parties. The agreements in question include, for

example, the UN Torture Convention 1984¹³⁸ and treaties relating to hostage-taking, currency counterfeiting, hijacking and drug trafficking. Such treaties are then normally implemented nationally.¹³⁹

It is interesting to note that the International Law Commission's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court proposed that the court would have jurisdiction in certain conditions with regard to a range of 'treaty crimes',¹⁴⁰ but this suggestion was not found acceptable in later discussions and does not appear in the 1998 Rome Statute. It is helpful to look at some of these treaties. The Convention against Torture 1984 provides that each state party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under domestic criminal law¹⁴¹ and shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over torture offences where committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in the state concerned or when the alleged offender is a national or when the victim is a national if that state considers it appropriate.¹⁴² Further, each state party agrees to either extradite or prosecute alleged offenders,¹⁴³ while agreeing that the offences constitute extraditable offences within the context of extradition agreements concluded between states parties.¹⁴⁴ This Convention was the subject of consideration in *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)*, where the majority of the House of Lords held that torture committed outside the United Kingdom was not a crime punishable under UK law until the provisions of the Convention against Torture were implemented by section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.¹⁴⁵ Lord Millett, however, took the view that torture was a crime under customary international law with universal jurisdiction and that since customary international law was part of the common law,¹⁴⁶ English courts 'have and always have had extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in respect of

universal jurisdiction under customary international law’.¹⁴⁷ The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, was adopted in 1973 by the UN General Assembly and came into force in 1977. This stipulates that contracting states should make acts such as assaults upon the person, premises and transport of such persons a crime under their domestic law.¹⁴⁸ This, of course, would require little if any revision of existing penal statutes. Each state is to establish its jurisdiction over these crimes when committed in its territory or on board ships or aircraft registered in its territory, or when the alleged offender is a national or when the crimes have been committed against an internationally protected person functioning on behalf of that state.¹⁴⁹ A person is regarded as internationally protected where he is a head of state or government, or foreign minister abroad, or state representative or official of an international organisation.¹⁵⁰

The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979 came into force in 1983 and, like the Internationally Protected Persons Treaty, requires each state party to make the offence punishable under national law,¹⁵¹ and provides that states parties must either extradite or prosecute an alleged offender found on their territory and incorporate the offence of hostage-taking into existing and future extradition treaties. The grounds upon which a state party may exercise jurisdiction are laid down in article 5 and cover offences committed in its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that state; by any of its nationals, or, if that state considers it appropriate, by stateless persons having their habitual residence in its territory; in order to compel that state to do or abstain from doing any act; or with regard to a hostage who is a national of that state, if that state considers it appropriate.

The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 1994 provides that attacks upon UN or associated personnel or property be made a crime under national law by each state party¹⁵² and that jurisdiction should be established with regard to such offences when the crime is committed in the territory of that state or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that state or when the alleged offender is a national of that state. States parties may also establish their jurisdiction over any such crimes when committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the state concerned, or with regard to a national of that state, or in an attempt to compel that state to do or to abstain from doing any act.¹⁵³ In addition, the state in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall either prosecute or extradite such person.¹⁵⁴

As far as the hijacking of and other unlawful acts connected with aircraft is concerned, the leading treaties are the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963, the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971. The latter two instruments arose as a result of the wave of aircraft hijacking and attacks upon civilian planes that took place in the late 1960s, and tried to deal with the problem of how to apprehend and punish the perpetrators of such deeds.

The Tokyo Convention applies to both general offences and acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardise the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardise good order and discipline on board. It provides for the jurisdiction of the contracting state

over aircraft registered therein while the aircraft is in flight, or on the surface of the high seas or on any other area outside the territory of any state.

Contracting states are called upon to take the necessary measures to establish jurisdiction by municipal law over such aircraft in such circumstances. In addition, the Convention permits interference with an aircraft in flight in order to establish criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed on board in certain specific circumstances by contracting states not being the state of registration. The circumstances specified are where the offence has effect on the territory of such state; has been committed by or against a national or permanent resident of such state; is against the security of such state; consists of a breach of any rules or regulations relating to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such state or where the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such state under a multilateral international agreement.¹⁵⁵ No obligation to extradite is provided for.

The Hague Convention provides that any person who, on board an aircraft in flight, is involved in the unlawful seizure of that aircraft (or attempts the same), commits an offence which contracting states undertake to make punishable by severe penalties. Each contracting state is to take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence or related acts of violence when the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in that state, when the aircraft in question lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board or when the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without a crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business, or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence, in that state. The Convention also provides that contracting states in the territory of which an alleged offender is found must either extradite or

prosecute him. The Protocol to this Convention adopted in 2010 expands the scope of The Hague Convention to cover different forms of aircraft hijackings, including through modern technological means.

The Montreal Convention contains similar rules as to jurisdiction and extradition as the Hague Convention, but is aimed at controlling and punishing attacks and sabotage against civil aircraft in flight and on the ground rather than dealing with hijacking directly.¹⁵⁶ A Protocol to the Montreal Convention was signed in 1988. This provides for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation which cause or are likely to cause serious injury, and acts of violence which destroy or seriously damage the facilities of an airport serving international civil aviation or aircraft not in service located thereon or disrupt the service of the airport.¹⁵⁷ In 2010, the Beijing Convention updated the Montreal Convention and Protocol and criminalises the acts of using civil aircraft for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; of using civil aircraft to release or discharge any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon or similar substances to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; and of using any such weapon on board or against civil aircraft. Cyber attacks on air navigation facilities are likely to constitute an offence under this Convention. The Convention also expands the grounds of jurisdiction under the earlier instruments by requiring each state party to establish jurisdiction when the offence is committed by its national, and by enabling each state party to establish jurisdiction when the victim of the offence is its national.¹⁵⁸

The wide range of jurisdictional bases is to be noted, although universality as such is not included. Nevertheless, condemnation of this form of activity is widespread and it is likely that hijacking has become an international crime of virtually universal jurisdiction in practice.¹⁵⁹ Further, it is possible that international terrorism may in time be regarded as a crime of universal jurisdiction.¹⁶⁰

Of course, questions as to enforcement will arise where states fail either to respect their obligations under the above Conventions or, if they are not parties to them, to respect customary law on the reasonable assumption that state practice now recognises hijacking as an unlawful act.¹⁶¹ A number of possibilities exist, in addition to recourse to the United Nations and the relevant international air organisations.¹⁶² Like-minded states may seek to impose sanctions upon errant states. The 1978 Bonn Declaration, for example, agreed that ‘in cases where a country refuses the extradition or prosecution of, those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or does not return such aircraft’, action would be taken to cease all flights to and from that country and its airlines.¹⁶³ Bilateral arrangements may also be made, which provide for the return of, or prosecution of, hijackers.¹⁶⁴ States may also, of course, adopt legislation which enables them to prosecute alleged hijackers found in their territory,¹⁶⁵ or more generally seeks to combat terrorism. The 1984 US Act to Combat International Terrorism, for example, provides for rewards for information concerning a wide range of terrorist acts primarily (although not exclusively) within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.¹⁶⁶

Other acts of general self-help have also been resorted to. In 1973, for example, Israeli warplanes intercepted a civil aircraft in Lebanese airspace in an unsuccessful attempt to apprehend a guerrilla leader held responsible for the killing of civilians aboard hijacked aircraft. Israel was condemned for this by the UN Security Council¹⁶⁷ and the International Civil Aviation Organization.¹⁶⁸ On the night of 10–11 October 1985, an Egyptian civil aircraft carrying the hijackers of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* was intercepted over the Mediterranean Sea by US Navy fighters and compelled to land in Sicily. The United States justified its action generally by reference to the need to combat international terrorism, while the UK Foreign Secretary noted it was relevant to take into account the international agreements on hijacking and hostage-taking.¹⁶⁹ However, nothing in these Conventions, it is suggested, would appear to justify an interception of a civilian aircraft over the high seas or over any area other than the territory of the intercepting state and for specified reasons. The apprehension of terrorists is to be encouraged, but the means must be legitimate.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, there may be circumstances where an action taken by a state as a consequence of hostile hijacking or terrorist operations would be justifiable in the context of self-defence.¹⁷¹

Illegal Apprehension of Suspects and the Exercise of Jurisdiction¹⁷²

It would appear that unlawful apprehension of a suspect by state agents acting in the territory of another state is not a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction. Such apprehension would, of course, constitute a breach of international law and the norm of non-intervention involving state

responsibility,¹⁷³ unless the circumstances were such that the right of self-defence could be pleaded.¹⁷⁴ It could be argued that the seizure, being a violation of international law, would only be compounded by permitting the abducting state to exercise jurisdiction,¹⁷⁵ but international practice on the whole demonstrates otherwise.¹⁷⁶ In most cases, a distinction is clearly drawn between the apprehension and jurisdiction to prosecute and one should also distinguish situations where the apprehension has taken place on or over the high seas from cases where it has occurred without consent on the territory of another state. A further distinction that has been made relates to situations where the abduction has taken place from a state with which the apprehending state has an extradition treaty which governs the conditions under which movement of alleged offenders occurs between the two. A final distinction may be drawn as between cases depending upon the type of offences with which the offender is charged, so that the problem of the apprehension interfering with the prosecution may be seen as less crucial in cases where recognised international crimes are alleged.¹⁷⁷ Of course, any such apprehension would constitute a violation of the human rights of the person concerned, but whether that would impact upon the exercise of jurisdiction as such is the key issue here.

Variations in approaches are evident between states. The US Court of Appeals in *United States v. Toscanino*¹⁷⁸ held that the rule that jurisdiction was unaffected by an illegal apprehension¹⁷⁹ should not be applied where the presence of the defendant has been secured by force or fraud, but this approach has, it seems, been to a large extent eroded. In *United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler*,¹⁸⁰ it was noted that the rule in *Toscanino* was limited to cases of 'torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct'.¹⁸¹ The issue

came before the US Supreme Court in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*,¹⁸² in which the view was taken that the issue essentially revolved around a strict interpretation of the relevant extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States. The Court noted that where the terms of an extradition treaty in force between the states concerned prohibited abduction, then jurisdiction could not be exercised. Otherwise the rule in *Ker v. Illinois* would apply and the prosecution would proceed. This applied even though there were some differences between the cases, in that, unlike the situation in *Ker*, the US government had been involved in the abduction and the state from whose territory the apprehension took place had protested.¹⁸³

In the United Kingdom, the approach has appeared to alter somewhat. In *R v. Plymouth Justices, ex parte Driver*,¹⁸⁴ it was noted that once a person was in lawful custody within the jurisdiction, the court had no power to inquire into the circumstances in which he had been brought into the jurisdiction. However, in *R v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett*,¹⁸⁵ the House of Lords declared that where an extradition treaty existed with the relevant country under which the accused could have been returned, 'our courts will refuse to try him if he has been forcibly brought within our jurisdiction in disregard of those procedures by a process to which our own police, prosecuting or other executive authorities have been a knowing party'.¹⁸⁶ The approach in this case was extended in *R v. Latif* to cover entrapment.¹⁸⁷ However, where an accused was taking legal action to quash a decision to proceed with an extradition request, the fact that he had been lured into the jurisdiction was not sufficient to vitiate the proceedings since safeguards as to due process existed in the light of the Home Secretary's discretion and under the law of the state to whom he was to be extradited.¹⁸⁸

Further, in *Ex parte Westfallen*, the High Court took the view that where there had been no illegality, abuse of power or violation of international law or of the domestic law of the foreign states involved, the decisions under challenge could not be impugned nor the subsequent criminal proceedings be vitiated.¹⁸⁹

The US Alien Tort Statute¹⁹⁰

Under this Act, the First Congress established original district court jurisdiction over all causes where an alien sues for a tort ‘committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’.¹⁹¹ In *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*,¹⁹² the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted this provision to permit jurisdiction over a private tort action by a Paraguayan national against a Paraguayan police official for acts of torture perpetrated in that state, it being held that torture by a state official constituted a violation of international law. This amounted to an important move in the attempt to exercise jurisdiction in the realm of international human rights violations, although one clearly based upon a domestic statute permitting such court competence. The relevant issues in such actions would thus depend upon the definition of the ‘law of nations’ in particular cases.¹⁹³

In *Tel-Oren v. Libya*,¹⁹⁴ however, the Court dismissed an action under the same statute brought by survivors and representatives of persons murdered in an armed attack on an Israeli bus in 1978 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The three judges differed in their reasoning. Judge Edwards held that the law of nations did not impose liability on non-state entities like the PLO. Judge Bork, in a departure from the *Filartiga* principles, declared that

‘an explicit grant of a cause of action [had to exist] before a private individual [will] be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal’,¹⁹⁵ while Senior Judge Robb held that the case was rendered non-justiciable by the political question doctrine.

Further restrictions upon the *Filartiga* doctrine have also been manifested. It has, for example, been held that the Alien Tort Statute does not constitute an exception to the principle of sovereign immunity so that a foreign state could not be sued,¹⁹⁶ while it has also been held that US citizens could not sue for violations of the law of nations under the Act.¹⁹⁷

In *Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan*,¹⁹⁸ suit was brought against a variety of present and former US executive officials for violation, *inter alia*, of domestic and international law with regard to the US support of the ‘Contra’ guerrillas fighting against the Nicaraguan government. The Alien Tort Statute was cited, but the Court of Appeals noted that the Statute arguably only covered private, non-governmental acts that violated a treaty or customary international law and, relying on *Tel-Oren*, pointed out that customary international law did not cover private conduct ‘of this sort’.¹⁹⁹ Thus, the claim for damages could only be sustained to the extent that the defendants acted in an official capacity and, even if the Alien Tort Statute applied to official state acts, the doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity precluded the claim. In *Kadić v. Karadžić*,²⁰⁰ the US Court of Appeals emphasised the ‘liability of private persons for certain violations of customary international law and the availability of the Alien Tort Act to remedy such violations’.²⁰¹ In particular, it was noted that the proscription of genocide and war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law applied to both state

and non-state actors, although torture and summary execution (when not perpetrated in the course of genocide or war crimes) were proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or under colour of law.²⁰² Even in this case, it may be that all that was required was ‘the semblance of official authority’ rather than establishing statehood under the formal criteria of international law.²⁰³ The Court also held that the Torture Victim Protection Act 1992, which provides a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing by an individual ‘under actual or apparent authority, or colour of law, of any foreign nation’, was not itself a jurisdictional statute and depended upon the establishment of jurisdiction under either the Alien Tort Act or under the general federal question jurisdiction of section 1331.²⁰⁴

The Alien Tort Act was relied upon again in the *Amerada Hess* case which concerned the bombing of a ship in international waters by Argentina during the Falklands War and where it was claimed that the federal courts had jurisdiction under the Act. A divided Court of Appeals²⁰⁵ held that the Act provided, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not preclude,²⁰⁶ federal subject-matter jurisdiction over suits in tort by aliens against foreign sovereigns for violations of international law. However, the Supreme Court unanimously disagreed.²⁰⁷ It was noted that the Act did not expressly authorise suits against foreign states and that at the time the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was enacted, the 1789 Act had never provided the jurisdictional basis for a suit against a foreign state.²⁰⁸ Since the Congress had decided to deal comprehensively with sovereign immunity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, it appeared to follow that this Act alone provided the basis for federal jurisdiction over foreign states. This basis was thus exclusive. The Court did note, however, that the Alien Tort Statute was

unaffected by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in so far as non-state defendants were concerned.²⁰⁹ In *Alvarez-Machain v. United States*, the accused in the case noted above²¹⁰ commenced an action for compensation under the Act following his acquittal. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that the Act required that the international law principle violated should also constitute a norm of *jus cogens*. The Court also rejected the contention that the applicant could sue for the violation of Mexican sovereignty implicit in his abduction. However, it affirmed that the applicant's rights to freedom of movement, to remain in his country and to security of his person (which are part of the 'law of nations') were violated, while his detention was arbitrary since not pursuant to a Mexican warrant. Accordingly, compensation under the Act could be claimed.²¹¹

The Alien Tort Statute was further discussed by the Supreme Court in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, where it was held that the Statute was a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action and enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations thought to carry personal liability at the time, being offences against ambassadors, violation of safe conducts and piracy.²¹² The question was addressed again by the Supreme Court in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company*,²¹³ which raised the issue of the liability of non-US multinational corporations allegedly complicit in human rights violations committed outside the United States by a foreign state involving non-US citizens. However, the Court left this issue on one side and, relying upon its decision in *Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd*,²¹⁴ concluded that the principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality constrained the courts exercising their power under the Alien Tort Statute²¹⁵ and that this

could be displaced only where the claims ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . [and] . . . do so with sufficient force’. Mere corporate presence would not suffice.²¹⁶ Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not decide whether non-US corporations could or could not be sued for complicity in human rights violations committed outside the United States. This point, however, was revisited by the Supreme Court in *Jesner v. Arab Bank*,²¹⁷ where the decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was affirmed. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the decision of the District Court based on *Kiobel*, holding that the Alien Tort Statute did not permit claims against corporate entities (such as the Arab Bank),²¹⁸ where it had been alleged that the Bank had financed and facilitated terrorist activities. The Supreme Court held that aliens could not bring suit under the Alien Tort Statute against foreign corporations since the *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain* tests required that the alleged violation be of a ‘norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory’ and that allowing the case to proceed under the Statute would be a proper exercise of judicial discretion, in light of concerns over foreign affairs and separation of powers. It was held that international law had not developed to the extent that foreign corporations could be held liable for infringements of international human rights law by their agents.

In 2012, Canada adopted the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, which amended its State Immunity Act 1985, and allowed for victims of terrorism to sue offenders in a Canadian court, including foreign states listed by the Canadian government as supporters of terrorism. The Act created a new cause of action for damage or loss occurring anywhere in relation to a terrorist act where the action has a ‘real and substantial connection’ to Canada or the plaintiff is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident.²¹⁹

Extradition²²⁰

The practice of extradition enables one state to hand over to another state suspected or convicted criminals who have fled to the territory of the former. It is based upon bilateral treaty law and does not exist as an obligation upon states in customary law.²²¹ It is usual to derive from existing treaties on the subject certain general principles, for example that of double criminality, i.e. that the crime involved should be a crime in both states concerned,²²² and that of specialty, i.e. a person surrendered may be tried and punished only for the offence for which extradition had been sought and granted.²²³ In general, offences of a political character have been excluded,²²⁴ but this would not cover terrorist activities.²²⁵ As noted above, it is common for many treaties laying down multiple bases for the exercise of jurisdiction to insist that states parties in whose territory the alleged offender is present either prosecute or extradite such person.²²⁶ In addition, many treaties provide for the automatic inclusion within existing bilateral extradition treaties between states parties to such treaties of the offence concerned.²²⁷ Many states will not allow the extradition of nationals to another state,²²⁸ but this is usually in circumstances where the state concerned has wide powers to prosecute nationals for offences committed abroad. Further, the relevance of human rights law to the process should be noted in that extradition to a state that may torture or inhumanely treat the person concerned would, for example, violate the European Convention on Human Rights.²²⁹

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction²³⁰

Claims have arisen in the context of economic issues whereby some states, particularly the United States, seek to apply their laws outside their territory²³¹ in a manner which may precipitate conflicts with other states.²³² Where the claims are founded upon the territorial and nationality theories of jurisdiction, problems do not often arise, but claims made upon the basis of the so-called ‘effects’ doctrine have provoked considerable controversy. This goes beyond the objective territorial principle to a situation where the state assumes jurisdiction on the grounds that the behaviour of a party is producing ‘effects’ within its territory. This is so even though all the conduct complained of takes place in another state.²³³ The effects doctrine has been energetically maintained, particularly by the United States in the area of antitrust regulation.²³⁴ The classic statement of the American doctrine was made in *United States v. Aluminum Company of America*,²³⁵ in which the Court declared that:

any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.²³⁶

The doctrine was to some extent modified by the requirement of intention and the view that the effect should be substantial, but the wide-ranging nature

of the concept aroused considerable opposition outside the United States, as did American attempts to take evidence abroad under very broad pre-trial discovery provisions in US law²³⁷ and the possibility of treble damage awards.²³⁸ The US courts, perhaps in view of the growing opposition of foreign states, modified their approach in the *Timberlane Lumber Company v. Bank of America (I)*²³⁹ and *Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corporation*²⁴⁰ cases. It was stated that in addition to the effects test, of the earlier cases, the courts had to take into account a balancing test, ‘a jurisdictional rule of reason’, involving a consideration of other nations’ interests and the full nature of the relationship between the actors concerned and the United States.²⁴¹ A series of factors that needed to be considered in the process of balancing was put forward in the latter case.²⁴² The view taken by the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law,²⁴³ it should be noted, is that a state may exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, when the effect or intended effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. It is noted that the principle of reasonableness calls for limiting the exercise of jurisdiction so as to minimise conflict with the jurisdiction of other states, particularly the state where the act takes place.²⁴⁴ However, the assumption by the courts of a basically diplomatic function, that is, weighing and considering the interests of foreign states, stimulated criticism.²⁴⁵

The US courts modified their approach. In *Laker Airways v. Sabena*,²⁴⁶ the Court held, *inter alia*, that once US antitrust law was declared applicable, it could not be qualified or ignored by virtue of comity. The judicial interest balancing under the *Timberlane* precedent should not be engaged in since the courts on both sides of the Atlantic were obliged to follow the directions of the executive. Accordingly, the reconciliation of conflicting interests was to

be undertaken only by diplomatic negotiations. Quite how such basic and crucial differences of opinion over the effects doctrine can be resolved is open to question and international fora have been suggested as the most appropriate way forward.²⁴⁷

In the *Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California* case before the US Supreme Court,²⁴⁸ Judge Souter writing for the majority stated that it was well established that the relevant US legislation (the Sherman Act) ‘applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States’.²⁴⁹ It was felt that a person subject to regulation by two states (here the United Kingdom with regard to the London reinsurance market and the United States) could comply with the laws of both and there was no need in this case to address other considerations concerning international comity.²⁵⁰ The Dissenting Opinion in this case took the view that such exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was subject to the test of reasonableness,²⁵¹ a view that the majority did not embrace.

Foreign states had started reacting to the effects doctrine by the end of the 1970s and early 1980s by enacting blocking legislation. Under the UK Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, for example, the Secretary of State in dealing with extraterritorial actions by a foreign state may prohibit the production of documents or information to the latter’s courts or authorities. In addition, a UK national or resident may sue in an English court for recovery of multiple damages paid under the judgment of a foreign court.²⁵²

The Protection of Trading Interests Act was used in connection with the action by the liquidator of Laker Airways to sue various major airlines, the

Midland Bank and McDonnell Douglas in the United States for conspiracy to violate the US antitrust laws. Two of the airlines, British Airways and British Caledonian, sought to prevent this suit in the United States by bringing an action to restrain the liquidator in the United Kingdom. Thus, the effects doctrine was not actually in issue in the case, which centred upon the application of the US antitrust law in connection with alleged conspiratorial activities in the United States. The UK government, holding the view that the Bermuda II agreement regulating transatlantic airline activity²⁵³ prohibited antitrust actions against UK airlines, issued instructions under the 1980 Act forbidding compliance with any requirement imposed pursuant to US antitrust measures, including the provision of information.²⁵⁴ The Court of Appeal felt that the order and directions required them in essence to prevent the *Laker* action in the United States,²⁵⁵ but the House of Lords disagreed.²⁵⁶ It was held that the order and directions did not affect the appellant's right to pursue the claim in the United States because the 1980 Act was concerned with 'requirements' and 'prohibitions' imposed by a foreign court,²⁵⁷ so that the respondents would not be prohibited by the direction from paying damages on a 'judgment' given against them in the United States.²⁵⁸ In fact, the Court refused to restrain the US action.

The Court also refused to grant judicial review of the order and directions, since the appellant had failed to show that no reasonable minister would have issued such order and directions, this being the requisite test in ministerial decisions concerning international relations.²⁵⁹ The case, however, did not really turn on the 1980 Act, but it was the first time the issue had come before the courts.²⁶⁰

The dispute over extraterritoriality between the United States and many other states has been apparent across a range of situations since the freezing of Iranian assets and the Siberian pipeline episode. The operation of the Western supervision of technological exports to the communist bloc through COCOM was also affected, while that system still existed, since the United States sought to exercise jurisdiction with regard to exports from third states to communist states.²⁶¹ The adoption of legislation in the United States imposing sanctions on Cuba, Iran and Libya has also stimulated opposition in view of the extraterritorial reach of such measures. The extension of sanctions against Cuba in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, for example, prohibited the granting of licences under the US Cuban Assets Control Regulations for certain transactions between US-owned or controlled firms in the United Kingdom and Cuba, and this led to the adoption of an order under the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 by the UK government.²⁶² The adoption of the Helms-Burton legislation in March 1996, amending the 1992 Act by further tightening sanctions against Cuba, provided *inter alia* for the institution of legal proceedings before the US courts against foreign persons or companies deemed to be ‘trafficking’ in property expropriated by Cuba from American nationals.²⁶³ In addition, the legislation enables the United States to deny entry into the country of senior executives (and their spouses and minors) of companies deemed by the US State Department to be so ‘trafficking’. This legislation, together with the adoption of the D’Amato Act in mid-1996,²⁶⁴ led to protests from many states, including the United Kingdom and Canada.²⁶⁵ The Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States, ‘directed’ by the OAS General Assembly ‘to examine and decide upon the validity under international law’ of the Helms-Burton legislation,²⁶⁶ unanimously concluded that:

the exercise of such jurisdiction over acts of 'trafficking in confiscated property' does not conform with the norms established by international law for the exercise of jurisdiction in each of the following respects:

a) A prescribing state does not have the rights to exercise jurisdiction over acts of 'trafficking' abroad by aliens unless specific conditions are fulfilled which do not appear to be satisfied in this situation.

b) A prescribing state does not have the rights to exercise jurisdiction over acts of 'trafficking' abroad by aliens under circumstances where neither the alien nor the conduct in question has any connection with its territory and where no apparent connection exists between such acts and the protection of its essential sovereign interests.²⁶⁷

The European Community, in particular, took a strong stance on the US approach. It declared in a letter to the Congressional Committee considering changes in the US export control legislation in March 1984 that:

US claims to jurisdiction over European subsidiaries of US companies and over goods and technology of US origin located outside the US are contrary to the principles of international law and can only lead to clashes of both a political and legal nature. These

subsidiaries, goods and technology must be subject to the laws of the country where they are located.²⁶⁸

There was an attempt to solve such extraterritoriality conflicts in the Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition Laws signed by the European Commission on 23 September 1991 with the United States.²⁶⁹ This called, *inter alia*, for notification and coordination of such activities, with emphasis placed upon the application of comity. However, the European Court of Justice held that the Commission had acted *ultra vires* in concluding such an agreement.²⁷⁰ The Agreement was re-introduced in the Decision of the Council and the Commission of 10 April 1995, which rectified certain competence problems arising as a result of the decision.²⁷¹ Nevertheless, it remains of uncertain value, not least because the question of private law suits in the United States is not dealt with. The root problems of conflict have not been eradicated at all.

The adoption in 1992 of US legislation amending the Cuban Assets Control Regime stimulated a *démarche* from the European Community protesting against the extraterritorial application of US law,²⁷² as did the adoption of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996.²⁷³ However, the EU–US Memorandum of Understanding of 1997 provided for the continued suspension by the United States of Title III so long as the European Union continued efforts to promote democracy in Cuba.²⁷⁴

However, the European Community itself has wrestled with the question of exercising jurisdiction over corporations not based in the Community in the

field of competition law.²⁷⁵ In *ICI v. Commission*,²⁷⁶ the European Court of Justice established jurisdiction with regard to a series of restrictive agreements to fix the price of dyestuffs on the ground that the defendant undertakings had corporate subsidiaries that were based within the Community, and declined to follow the Advocate General's suggestion²⁷⁷ that jurisdiction should be founded upon direct and immediate, reasonably foreseeable and substantial effect.

The *Wood Pulp* case²⁷⁸ concerned a number of non-EC companies and an association of US companies alleged to have entered into a price-fixing arrangement. The European Commission had levied fines on the jurisdictional basis that the effects of the price agreements and practices were direct, substantial and intended within the European Community.²⁷⁹ An action was then commenced before the European Court for annulment of the Commission's decision under article 173 of the EEC Treaty. Advocate General Darmon argued that international law permitted a state (and therefore the Community) to apply its competition laws to acts done by foreigners abroad if those acts had direct, substantial and foreseeable effects within the state concerned.²⁸⁰

The Court, however, took the view that the companies concerned had acted within the Community and were therefore subject to EC law. It was noted that where producers from third states sell directly to purchasers within the Community and engage in price competition in order to win orders from those customers, that constitutes competition within the Community, and, where such producers sell at prices that are actually coordinated, that restricts competition within the Community within the meaning of article 85 of the

EEC Treaty. It was stressed that the decisive factor was the place where the price-fixing agreement was actually implemented, not where the agreement was formulated.²⁸¹ In other words, the Court founded its jurisdiction upon an interpretation of the territoriality principle, if somewhat stretched. It did not take the opportunity presented to it by the opinion of the Advocate General of accepting the effects principle of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the case does appear to suggest that price-fixing arrangements intended to have an effect within the Community that are implemented there would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Community, irrespective of the nationality of the companies concerned and of the place where the agreement was reached.²⁸² Extraterritorial rights and obligations may also arise under specific treaties. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its Advisory Opinion on the *Environment and Human Rights*,²⁸³ concluded that in relation to large-scale transboundary infrastructure projects states parties to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under certain circumstances and so be responsible for the human rights of the people in the territory in question.

Suggestions for Further Reading

M. Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction in International Law', **46** *BYIL*, 1972–73, p. 145

F. A. Mann, 'The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law Revisited After Twenty Years', **186** *HR*, 1984, p. 9

L. Reydam, *Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives*, Oxford, 2002

C. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015

Y. Shany, *Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between National and International Courts*, Oxford, 2007

¹ See e.g. C. E. Amerasinghe, *Jurisdiction of International Tribunals*, The Hague, 2003; *Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under International Law* (ed. S. Macedo), Philadelphia, 2004; C. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015; L. Reydam, *Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives*, Oxford, 2002; *La Saisine des Jurisdictions Internationales* (ed. H. Ruiz Fabri and J.-M. Sorel), Paris, 2006; Y. Shany, *The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals*, Oxford, 2003; Y. Shany, *Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between National and International Courts*, Oxford, 2007; A. Mills, 'Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law', **84 BYIL**, 2014, p. 187; M. Hirst, *Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law*, Oxford, 2003; M. Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction in International Law', **46 BYIL**, 1972–73, p. 145; F. A. Mann, 'The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law', **111 HR**, 1964, p. 1; F. A. Mann, 'The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law Revisited After Twenty Years', **186 HR**, 1984, p. 9; D. W. Bowett, 'Jurisdiction: Changing Problems of Authority over Activities and Resources', **53 BYIL**, 1982, p. 1; R. Y. Jennings, 'Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws', **33 BYIL**, 1957, p. 146; *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, pp. 456 ff.; *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, chapter 21; O. Schachter, *International Law in Theory and Practice*, Dordrecht, 1991, chapter 12; and R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, chapter 4. See also The American Law Institute, *Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, St Paul, 1987, vol. **I**, part IV; and The American Law Institute, *Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, St Paul, 2018, Part IV.

² Reference has also been made to the jurisdiction to adjudicate, whereby persons or things are rendered subject to the process of a state's court system: see *Fourth US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, Part IV, chapter 2.

³ See below, [Chapter 12](#), p. 651.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 602.

⁵ See generally G. C. Cheshire, P. M. North and J. Fawcett, *Private International Law*, 15th ed., Oxford, 2017. See also as to the relationship between public and private international law, A. Mills, *The Confluence of Public and Private International Law*, Cambridge, 2009. Questions may also arise as to the conditions required for leave for service abroad: see e.g. *Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others* 100 ILR, p. 465.

⁶ See e.g. M. S. Rajan, *United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction*, 2nd ed., London, 1961; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., 2009, p. 483; and see further above, [Chapter 4](#).

⁷ See above, [Chapter 6](#).

⁸ Whether a matter is or is not within the domestic jurisdiction of states is itself a question for international law: see *Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923, pp. 7, 23–4; 2 AD, pp. 349, 352.

⁹ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86.

¹⁰ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 132; 18 ILR, p. 95.

¹¹ ICJ Reports, 1955, pp. 4, 20–1; 22 ILR, pp. 349, 357.

¹² See above, [Chapter 4](#), pp. 114 ff.

¹³ See e.g. R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford, 1963. See also the view of the British Foreign Secretary on 27 January 1993 that article 2(7) was ‘increasingly eroded as humanitarian concerns prevail over the respect for each nation’s right to manage or mismanage its affairs and its subjects’, UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 599.

¹⁴ Note also the importance of the doctrine of the exhaustion of domestic remedies: see above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 247.

¹⁵ See e.g. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 179 ff.

¹⁶ See further below, p. 570.

¹⁷ Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', pp. 179–80.

¹⁸ See below, [Chapter 13](#), p. 720.

¹⁹ See e.g. Cheshire *et al.*, *Private International Law*, chapter 8. English courts in general will not enforce the penal laws of foreign states. It will be for the court to decide what a foreign penal law is. See also *Huntington v. Attrill* [1893] AC 150; and Marshall CJ, *The Antelope* 10 Wheat. 123 (1825). As far as tax laws are concerned, see *Government of India v. Taylor* [1955] AC 491; 22 ILR, p. 286. See in addition *Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz* [1982] 3 All ER 432; 78 ILR, p. 608, particularly Lord Denning, and *ibid.* [1983] 3 All ER 93 (House of Lords); 78 ILR, p. 631. See also *Williams & Humbert v. W & H Trade Marks* [1985] 2 All ER 619; [1986] 1 All ER 129 (House of Lords); 75 ILR, p. 269; and *Re State of Norway's Application* [1986] 3 WLR 452; [1989] 1 All ER 745, 760–2 (House of Lords).

²⁰ See Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction', pp. 36–62.

²¹ See Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', p. 147.

²² See e.g. *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 18; 4 AD, p. 153; and *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 838 (1928); 4 AD, p. 103.

²³ This cannot, of course, be taken too far. An official would still be entitled, for example, to sign a contract: see Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', p. 147.

²⁴ See as to the *Eichmann* case, below, p. 127.

²⁵ See e.g. Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', pp. 152 ff.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 170 ff.; Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction', pp. 49–51; and *Brownlie's Principles*, p. 471. See also Bowett, 'Jurisdiction', pp. 1–4.

²⁷ See e.g. Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', pp. 152 ff.

²⁸ See e.g. *Maharanee of Baroda v. Wildenstein* [1972] 2 All ER 689. See also the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. In certain cases a writ may be served outside the

jurisdiction: see e.g. *Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex* [1987] AC 460; and see also R. Fentiman, *International Commercial Litigation*, Oxford, 2010, chapters 8, 9 and 12.

²⁹ See e.g. EC Regulation 44/2001, article 12 and Fentiman, *International Commercial Litigation*, chapters 8 and 9.

³⁰ See e.g. the 1970 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations.

³¹ See e.g. Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', p. 177. Cf. Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction', pp. 49–51; and see Bowett, 'Jurisdiction', pp. 3–4. See also with regard to the US Alien Tort Statute, below, p. 587.

³² See further below p. 587 as to the US Alien Torts Statute and p. 592 as to extraterritorial jurisdiction.

³³ See e.g. Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', pp. 152 ff.; Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction', pp. 82 ff.; and D. P. O'Connell, *International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1970, vol. II, pp. 823–31. See also B. H. Oxman, 'Jurisdiction of States', in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2007.

³⁴ It was noted in the *Wood Pulp* case that 'the two undisputed bases on which state jurisdiction is founded in international law are territoriality and nationality': [1998] 4 CMLR 901 at 920; 96 ILR, p. 148.

³⁵ See Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, chapter 3. See also Lord Macmillan, *Compañía Naviera Vascongado v. Cristina SS* [1938] AC 485, 496–7; 9 AD, pp. 250, 259. Note Bowett's view that the 'dynamism and adaptability of the principle in recent years has been quite remarkable', 'Jurisdiction', p. 5; and Marshall CJ in *Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon* 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812) to the effect that '[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute'. Donaldson LJ also pointed to the general presumption in favour of the territoriality of jurisdiction, in *R v. West Yorkshire Coroner, ex parte Smith* [1983] QB 335, 358; 78 ILR, p. 550. See also, for the view that the concept of jurisdiction is essentially or primarily territorial: *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 179; *Banković v. Belgium*, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 December 2001, paras. 63, 67, 71; 123 ILR, pp. 110, 111, 113; *Al-Skeini v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 July 2011, paras. 130 ff.; and *N.D. and N.T. v. Spain*, ECtHR, Judgment of 3 October 2017, para. 51.

The matter was also considered by the House of Lords in *Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2007] UKHL 26, para. 109, per Lord Brown; 133 ILR, p. 736.

³⁶ See e.g. the Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume in *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 36; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 92.

³⁷ See e.g. *Holmes v. Bangladesh Biman Corp.* [1989] 1 AC 1112, 1137; 87 ILR, pp. 365, 380–1, per Lord Griffiths; and Lord Browne-Wilkinson in *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)* [2000] 1 AC 147, 188; 119 ILR, p. 139.

³⁸ See e.g. *Kaunda v. President of South Africa*, CCT 23/04, [2004] ZACC 5 (4 August 2004); and *R v. Cooke* [1998] 2 SCR 597.

³⁹ See as to the UK, e.g. F. Bennion, *Statutory Interpretation*, 4th ed., London, 2002, p. 282; *Clark (Inspector of Taxes) v. Oceanic Contractors Inc.* [1983] 2 AC 130, 145, per Lord Scarman; *Al Sabah v. Grupo Torras SA* [2005] UKPC 1; [2005] 2 AC 333, para. 13, per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe for the Privy Council; *Lawson v. Serco Ltd* [2006] UKHL 3; [2006] ICR 250, para. 6, per Lord Hoffmann; *Agassi v. Robinson (Inspector of Taxes)* [2006] UKHL 23; [2006] 1 WLR 1380, paras. 16, 20, per Lord Scott of Foscote and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe; and *Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2007] UKHL 26, paras. 11 ff., per Lord Bingham. But note that in *Masri v. Consolidated Contractors* [2008] EWCA Civ 303, para. 31, it was said that, ‘nowadays the presumption has little force and it is simply a matter of construction’. See also *Société Eram Shipping Co. Ltd v. Cie Internationale de Navigation* [2004] 1 AC 260, para. 54 (per Lord Hoffmann); and *Office of Fair Trading v. Lloyds TSB Bank plc* [2007] UKHL 48. However, the presumption was reaffirmed in *Perry v. SOCA* [2012] UKSC 35, paras. 15 ff., 94. See also *Morrison v. National Australia Bank* 561 US 247 (2010); *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.*, Slip Opinion, pp. 4 ff., 569 US 108 (2013); and *RJR Nabisco v. European Community* 579 US ____ (2016). See also Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 68 ff.

⁴⁰ See e.g. the Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 36; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 92. However, in a situation of belligerent occupation, the occupier may exercise certain criminal enforcement powers with regard to the local population: see the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons, articles 64–78.

⁴¹ See the statement by a Home Office Minister, noting: ‘As a general rule, our courts have jurisdiction to try offences that are committed within this country’s territory only. This is because generally speaking the Government believes that trials are best conducted in the jurisdiction in which they occurred not least because there are very real difficulties associated with the obtaining of evidence necessary to effectively prosecute here offences that are committed in foreign jurisdictions. The Government have no plans to depart from this general rule’, 445 HC Deb., col. 1419, Written Answer, 2 May 2006, UKMIL, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, p. 756. See also *Fourth US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, § 408.

⁴² See e.g. *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, pp. 23, 30; 4 AD, pp. 153, 159, and Judge Moore, *ibid.*, p. 73; the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 *AJIL*, 1935, Supp., p. 480 (article 3); and Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 152–3. See Lord Wilberforce, *DPP v. Doot* [1973] AC 807, 817; 57 ILR, pp. 117, 119; and *R v. Berry* [1984] 3 All ER 1008. See also *Strassheim v. Dailey* 221 US 280 (1911); *US v. Columba-Colella* 604 F.2d 356 (1979); and *US v. Perez-Herrera* 610 F.2d 289 (1980).

⁴³ Before the International Court in oral pleadings at the provisional measures phase of *Lockerbie*, CR 92/3, pp. 11–12, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 722. The trial of the two accused took place in the Netherlands, but in a facility that was deemed to be a Scottish court, with Scottish judges and lawyers and under Scots law: see e.g. A. Aust, ‘Lockerbie: The Other Case’, 49 *ICLQ*, 2000, p. 278; and, for the verdict, see 94 *AJIL*, 2000, p. 405.

⁴⁴ See e.g. *Board of Trade v. Owen* [1957] AC 602, 634; and *DPP v. Stonehouse* [1977] 2 All ER 909, 916; 73 ILR, p. 252. In *R v. Abu Hamza*, *The Times*, 30 November 2006, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) held that it was an offence for a person to incite a foreign national in England and Wales to commit murder abroad. See also the Home Secretary speaking as to the Criminal Justice Bill on 14 April 1993, and noting that the effect of the proposed legislation would be to ensure that where a fraud had a significant connection with the UK, British courts would have jurisdiction, whether or not the final element of the crime occurred within the country, UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, pp. 646–7. See G. Gilbert, ‘Crimes Sans Frontières: Jurisdictional Problems in English Law’, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, pp. 415, 430 ff. Note also Akehurst, who would restrict the operation of the doctrine so that jurisdiction could only be claimed by the state where the primary effect is felt: ‘Jurisdiction’, p. 154.

⁴⁵ See e.g. *La Forest J in Libman v. The Queen* (1985) 21 CCC (3d) 206; and Lord Griffiths in *Somchai Liangsiriprasert v. US* [1991] 1 AC 225; 85 ILR, p. 109. Note that the International Criminal Court has expressed the view in a preliminary ruling that it could well have jurisdiction with regard to alleged crimes committed with regard to the alleged deportation of members of the Rohingya people from Myanmar (not a party to the Rome State establishing the Court) to Bangladesh (which is) on the grounds that part of the crime took place on the territory of a state party, *Decision on the Prosecution's Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute*, Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Judgment of 6 September 2018.

⁴⁶ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927; 4 AD, p. 153. See e.g. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 30 ff.; Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction', pp. 33–6, 39, 92–3; J. W. Verzijl, *The Jurisprudence of the World Court*, Leiden, vol. I, 1965, pp. 73–98; and Schachter, 'International Law', p. 250. See also *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 478; and A. Hertogen, 'Letting Lotus Bloom', 26 *EJIL*, 2015, p. 901.

⁴⁷ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, pp. 18–19; 4 AD, p. 155. This was reaffirmed in *R v. Gul* [2013] UKSC 64, para. 57.

⁴⁸ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 19; 4 AD, p. 156.

⁴⁹ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 20.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24; 4 AD, p. 158.

⁵¹ See e.g. G. Fitzmaurice, 'The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law', 92 *HR*, 1957, pp. 1, 56–7; and H. Lauterpacht, *International Law: Collected Papers*, Cambridge, 1970, vol. I, pp. 488–9.

⁵² See e.g. *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries*, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 116; 18 ILR, p. 86; and *Nottebohm*, ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 4; 22 ILR, p. 349.

⁵³ See above, [Chapter 10](#).

⁵⁴ The Protocol was brought into force in the UK by the Channel Tunnel (International Arrangements) Order 1993: see e.g. UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 647. See also the Protocol

of 29 May 2000, UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 589, and *Eurotunnel*, Partial Award of 30 January 2007, 132 ILR, p. 1. Note in particular the Treaty concerning the Implementation of Frontier Controls at the Sea Ports on the Channel and North Sea (the ‘Le Touquet Agreement’) 2003, and the subsequent Agreement concerning the carrying of service weapons by UK Border Agency officers on French territory in application of the 2003 agreement, 2011, followed by the Joint Ministerial Declaration of 20 August 2015 permitting the UK to establish a control centre in the Calais area to help alleviate the migrant crisis, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/455162/Joint_declaration_20_August_2015.pdf.

⁵⁵ This is in addition to the normal territorial jurisdiction of the states within their own territory up to the frontier in the Tunnel under the sea: article 38(1).

⁵⁶ See www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50367864. See also the treaties of 1903 and 1977 between the US and Panama concerning jurisdictional rights over the Panama Canal Zone and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951 regulating the exercise of jurisdiction of NATO forces based in other NATO states. The Boundary Commission in *Eritrea–Ethiopia* noted that it was not unknown for states to locate a checkpoint or customs post in the territory of a neighbouring state: Decision of 13 April 2002; 130 ILR, pp. 1, 112. Similarly, in *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 66, the International Court noted that one state could place and operate a lighthouse in the territory of another with the latter’s consent.

⁵⁷ See *Fourth US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, § 432. Jurisdiction, and its concomitant international responsibility for acts done in the exercise of that jurisdiction, may also exist on the basis of the acts of officials committed abroad and on the basis of actual control of the territory in question in specific contexts. See e.g. *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995, p. 20; 103 ILR, p. 621; and *Chiragov v. Armenia* (Merits), ECtHR, Judgment of 16 June 2015, para. 168. For the European Convention on Human Rights, see above, [Chapter 6](#); and for international responsibility, see below, [Chapter 13](#).

⁵⁸ Relying upon *Johnson v. Eisenträger* 339 US 763 (1950).

⁵⁹ 542 US 466 (2004). Congress then passed the Detainee Treatment Act 2005, which denied jurisdiction concerning an application for habeas corpus with regard to an alien

detainee at Guantanamo Bay. In *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* 548 US 557, 576–7, the Court held this provision inapplicable to pending cases. The Military Commissions Act 2006 subsequently provided for denial of jurisdiction with regard to detained aliens determined to be an enemy combatant with effect from 11 September 2001, i.e. including applications pending at the time of the adoption of this Act. However, in *Boumediene v. Bush*, US Supreme Court, Slip Opinion of 12 June 2008, 553 US 723 (2008), it was held that the doctrine of habeas corpus did apply, thus permitting applications by detained enemy combatants to the federal courts challenging their detention. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, while noting that, ‘[i]n considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political branches’, declared that, ‘[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.’ *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 70.

⁶⁰ *The Changing Role of Nationality under International Law* (ed. S. Forlati and A. Annoni), London, 2013; Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 104 ff.; Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 156–7; Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 *AJIL*, 1935, Supp., pp. 519 ff.; M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1967, vol. **VIII**, pp. 1–22, 64–101, 105–13, 119–87; R. Donner, *The Regulation of Nationality in International Law*, 2nd ed., New York, 1995; D. Campbell and J. Fisher, *International Immigration and Nationality Law*, The Hague, 1993; M. J. Verwilghen, ‘Conflits de Nationalité, Plurinationalité et Apatridie’, **277 HR**, 1999, p. 9; J. F. Rezek, ‘Le Droit International de la Nationalité’, **198 HR**, 1986 III, p. 333; H. Silving, ‘Nationality in Comparative Law’, **5 American Journal of Comparative Law**, 1956, p. 410; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, pp. 546 ff.; and below, Chapter 13, p. 703.

⁶¹ Note that several instruments provide for a right to a nationality: see e.g. the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989; and the European Convention on Nationality 1997. See also A. Grossman, ‘Nationality and the Unrecognised State’, **50 ICLQ**, 2001, p. 849.

⁶² See also *Fourth Restatement of US Foreign Relations Law*, § 410, comment (b) and reporters’ note 2. Note that nationality may be supplemented as a ground for jurisdiction by associated principles such as residence or by assertion of claims of nationality: see e.g. UK Terrorism Act 2000, UK International Criminal Court Act 2001, s. 51; and see *Joyce v. DPP* [1946] AC 347; 15 AD, p. 91; and below, p. 572.

⁶³ PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923; 2 AD, p. 349.

⁶⁴ PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923, p. 24.

⁶⁵ ICJ Reports, 1955, pp. 4, 23; 22 ILR, pp. 349, 360. See also below, p. 707.

⁶⁶ See below, Chapter 13, p. 708 as to dual nationality and state responsibility for injuries to aliens.

⁶⁷ See e.g. *Nationality and Statelessness under International Law* (ed. A. Edwards and L. Van Waas), Cambridge, 2014; P. Weiss, *Nationality and Statelessness in International Law*, 2nd ed., Germantown, 1979; and H. F. Van Panhuys, *The Role of Nationality in International Law*, Leiden, 1959. See also *Pham v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2015] UKSC 19.

⁶⁸ See e.g. *US v. Wong Kim Ark* 169 US 649 (1898).

⁶⁹ But see now the British Nationality Act 1981.

⁷⁰ See e.g. *Re Thenault* 47 F.Supp. 952 (1942) and article 12, Convention on Conflict of Nationality Law 1930. See also article II, Optional Protocol on Acquisition of Nationality (UN Conference on Diplomatic Law) 1961.

⁷¹ But see *Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbour* 3 Peters 99 (1830), US Supreme Court.

⁷² Note the various problems associated with possible extensions of the *jus soli* rule, e.g. regarding births on ships: see *Lam Mow v. Nagle* 24 F.2d 316 (1928); 4 AD, pp. 295, 296.

⁷³ See e.g. Weiss, *Nationality*, p. 101.

⁷⁴ See e.g. Gilbert, 'Crimes', p. 417. See also *Re Gutierrez* 24 ILR, p. 265; *Public Prosecutor v. Antoni* 32 ILR, p. 140; and *Serre et Régnier*, *Recueil Dalloz Sirey* (jurisprudence), 1991, p. 395.

⁷⁵ See the statement by a Home Office Minister, noting: 'We have exceptionally, however, assumed extra-territorial jurisdiction over some serious crime, such as murder, where the

factors in favour of the ability to prosecute here outweigh those against’, 445 HC Deb., col. 1419, Written Answer, 2 May 2006, UKMIL, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, p. 756. Note, however, the comment by Lord Rodger that ‘there can be no objection in principle to Parliament legislating for British citizens outside the United Kingdom, provided that the particular legislation does not offend against the sovereignty of other states’: *Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2007] UKHL 26, para. 46; 133 ILR, p. 716.

⁷⁶ See e.g. the Official Secrets Acts 1911 (s. 10), 1970 (s. 8) and 1989 (s. 15); the Offences against the Person Act 1861, ss. 9 and 57; the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s. 686(1) and *R v. Kelly* [1982] AC 665; 77 ILR, p. 284; and the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978, s. 4. See P. Arnell, ‘The Case for Nationality-Based Jurisdiction’, 50 *ICLQ*, 2001, p. 955. This has now been extended to cover various sexual offences committed abroad: see the Sexual Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement) Act 1996; the Sex Offenders Act 1997; and the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 72; and certain offences of bribery and corruption committed overseas by UK companies or nationals: see the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 12; the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Part 7; the Bribery Act 2010; the Criminal Finances Act 2017; and the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which gave effect to the EU’s Fourth Money Laundering Directive; and football hooliganism, Football Spectators Act 1988, s. 22. Under the Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence 2011, states parties are obliged to exercise jurisdiction *inter alia* over nationals committing murder and manslaughter not already under the jurisdiction of the national courts and sexual offences where the victim is 18 or over abroad. The UK Domestic Violence Bill to provide for this is under consideration. Note that in *Skiriotes v. Florida* 313 US 69, 73 (1941); 10 AD, pp. 258, 260, Hughes CJ declared that ‘the United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed’. See also *DUSPIL*, 1976, pp. 449–57, regarding legislation to subject US nationals and citizens to US district court jurisdiction for crimes committed outside the US, particularly regarding Antarctica.

⁷⁷ Note that under the International Criminal Court Act 2001, s. 51, the UK courts have jurisdiction over British nationals, residents and persons subject to UK service jurisdiction with regard to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed outside the UK. See also, with regard to the nationality of ships and aircraft, above, [Chapter 10](#), p. 526, and below, p. 581; and as to the nationality of corporations, below, [Chapter 13](#), pp. 709 ff. See further, as to the nationality of claims, below, [Chapter 13](#), p. 703.

⁷⁸ See also article 5 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958.

⁷⁹ See article 19.

⁸⁰ See e.g. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 110 ff.; Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', pp. 162–6; Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction', pp. 40–1; E. Beckett, 'The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners', 6 *BYIL*, 1925, p. 44; E. Beckett, 'Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners', 8 *BYIL*, 1927, p. 108; W. W. Bishop, 'General Course of Public International Law, 1965', 115 *HR*, 1965, pp. 151, 324; and Higgins, *Problems and Process*, p. 65. See also Eichmann, 36 *ILR*, pp. 5, 49–57, 304; and *Fourth Restatement of US Foreign Relations Law*, § 411, noting: 'International law recognises a state's jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to certain conduct outside its territory that harms its nationals.'

⁸¹ J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1906, vol. II, p. 228.

⁸² See *US Foreign Relations*, 1886, p. viii; 1887, p. 757; and 1888, vol. II, p. 1114.

⁸³ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, p. 92; 4 *AD*, p. 153.

⁸⁴ PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, pp. 22–3. See also O'Connell, *International Law*, vol. II, pp. 901–2; and Higgins, *Problems and Process*, pp. 65–6.

⁸⁵ See e.g. US protests to Greece, concerning the service of summonses by Greek Consuls in the US on US nationals involved in accidents with Greek nationals occurring in the US, *DUSPIL*, 1973, pp. 197–8; *DUSPIL*, 1975, pp. 339–40.

⁸⁶ See *Rees v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [1986] 2 All ER 321. See generally J. J. Lambert, *Terrorism and Hostages in International Law*, Cambridge, 1990. See also article 3(1)(c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons 1973 and article 5(1)(c) of the Convention against Torture 1984.

⁸⁷ See new § 1203 of the Criminal Code, 18 USC para. 1203, Pub. L. No. 98–473, ch. 19, para. 2002(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 2186.

⁸⁸ Pub. L. No. 98–473, para. 1210, 98 Stat. at 2164. Note also article 689(1) of the French Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1975.

⁸⁹ See below, p. 585.

⁹⁰ Pub. L. No. 99–399, tit. XII, para. 1202(a), 100 Stat. 853, 896. See e.g. C. Blakesley, ‘Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Jurisdiction’, in *Legal Responses to International Terrorism* (ed. M. C. Bassiouni), Charlottesville, 1988. See also article 689 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure 1975.

⁹¹ 681 F.Supp. 896 (1988); 82 ILR, p. 344. See also *US v. Yunis* (No. 3) 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (1991); 88 ILR, pp. 176, 181.

⁹² See below, p. 574.

⁹³ 681 F.Supp. 896, 901; 82 ILR, p. 349.

⁹⁴ 681 F.Supp. 896, 902; 82 ILR, p. 350. The *Fourth US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, § 412, comment (a) notes that ‘states increasingly have exercised this form of prescriptive jurisdiction, particularly with regard to terrorist offences’. See also *US v. Benitez* 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (1984), cert. denied, 471 US 1137; 105 S.Ct. 2679 (1985).

⁹⁵ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 63, 76–7; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 118, 132.

⁹⁶ See e.g. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 114 ff.; Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 157–9; Harvard Research, pp. 543–63; and M. Sahovic and W. W. Bishop, ‘The Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and Places’, in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, pp. 311, 362–5. See also M. S. McDougal, H. Lasswell and V. Vlasic, *Law and Public Order in Space*, New Haven, 1963, pp. 699–701.

⁹⁷ See e.g. *Re Urios* 1 AD, p. 107 and article 694(1) of the French Code of Criminal Procedure.

⁹⁸ See e.g. *Rocha v. US* 288 F.2d 545 (1961); 32 ILR, p. 112; *US v. Pizzarusso* 388 F.2d 8 (1968); and *US v. Rodriguez* 182 F.Supp. 479 (1960). See also *Italian South Tyrol Terrorism* 71 ILR, p. 242.

⁹⁹ [1946] AC 347; 15 AD, p. 91.

¹⁰⁰ See, with regard to US practice, *Rocha v. US* 288 F.2d 545 (1961); *US v. Pizzarusso* 388 F.2d 8 (1968); and *US v. Layton* 509 F.Supp. 212 (1981). Note that the *Fourth US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, § 412, comment (b) states: ‘There is general agreement that the prescriptive jurisdiction based on the protective principle includes conduct such as espionage, certain acts of terrorism, murder of government officials, counterfeiting of the state’s seal or currency, falsification of official documents, perjury before consular officials, and conspiracy to violate immigration or customs laws.’ See also the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act 1986. The US has also asserted jurisdiction on the basis of the protective principle over aliens on the high seas: see the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 1986 and *US v. Gonzalez* 776 F.2d 931 (1985); and see also S. Murphy, ‘Extraterritorial Application of US Laws to Crimes on Foreign Vessels’, *97 AJIL*, 2003, p. 183.

¹⁰¹ See e.g. the Hostages Convention 1979; the aircraft hijacking conventions; and the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel Convention 1994: see below, pp. 579 ff.

¹⁰² See e.g. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 120 ff.; Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 160–6; Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 11–14; Harvard Research, pp. 563–92; Jennings, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, p. 156; Gilbert, ‘Crimes’, p. 423; *Universal Jurisdiction* (ed. S. Macedo), Pennsylvania, 2004; K. C. Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’, *66 Texas Law Review*, 1988, p. 785; M. C. Bassiouni, *Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law*, Dordrecht, 1992; Reydam, *Universal Jurisdiction*; European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, *Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review*, 2015; Redress Report on Legal Redress for Victims of International Crimes, March 2004; M. Inazumi, *Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law for Prosecuting Serious Crimes Under International Law*, Antwerp, 2005; R. O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’, *2 Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2004, p. 735; A. H. Butler, ‘The Doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction: A Review of the Literature’, *11 Criminal Law Forum*, 2001, p. 353; M. Henzelin, *Le Principe de l’Universalité en Droit Pénal International*, Brussels, 2000; L. Benvenides, ‘The Universal Jurisdiction Principle: Nature and Scope’, *1 Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional*, 2001, p. 58; A. R. Reeves, ‘Liability to International Prosecution: The Nature of Universal Jurisdiction’, *28 EJIL*, 2017, p. 1047; D. Hovell, ‘The Authority of Universal Jurisdiction’, *29 EJIL*, 2018,

p. 427; and M. Langer and M. Eason, 'The Quiet Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction', 30 *EJIL*, 2019, p. 779. See also the discussion by the judges in *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 37 (Judge Guillaume) and 65 (Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal); the *Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction*, Princeton, 2001; the Cairo Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Violations; Inazumi, *Universal Jurisdiction*, p. 5; and H. Kissinger, 'The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2001. Note that the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee has been studying the question of the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction since 2009: see e.g. resolutions 64/452 (2009); 68/117 (2013), 69/124 (2014) and 70/119 (2015). See in particular the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, A/69/174, 2014 and Report of the International Law Commission, 2018, A/73/10, Annex.

103 See the resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit International on 26 August 2005, para. 1. Note that the Institut adopted a resolution on 30 April 2015 in which it (cautiously) considered that 'universal civil jurisdiction is a means of avoiding the deprivation of victims of international crimes to obtain reparation of the harm suffered, in particular because the courts ordinarily having jurisdiction do not provide for an appropriate remedy', see *Nait-Liman v. Switzerland*, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 15 March 2018, para. 62 ff., holding that Switzerland's refusal to accept jurisdiction concerning the applicant's claim for redress for acts of torture did not violate the European Convention.

104 As to piracy, see above, [Chapter 7](#), p. 330 and [Chapter 10](#), p. 528.

105 See e.g. Akehurst, 'Jurisdiction', p. 160; A. Cowles, 'Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes', 33 *California Law Review*, 1945, p. 177; Brownlie's *Principles*, pp. 451 ff; Bowett, 'Jurisdiction', p. 12; Higgins, *Problems and Process*, p. 56; Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction', p. 93; and Bassiouni, *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 510. See also *Eichmann*, 36 ILR, pp. 5, 277; and the UN War Crimes Commission, 15 *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals*, 1949, p. 26. However, cf. the Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume in *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 42; 128 ILR, p. 98 (restricting universal jurisdiction to piracy) and the Joint Separate Opinion, *ibid.*, pp. 3, 78; 128 ILR, p. 134 (universal jurisdiction may possibly exist with regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on war crimes, etc.). See further above, [Chapter 7](#).

106 See e.g. *Calley v. Calloway* 382 F.Supp. 650 (1974), rev'd 519 F.2d 184 (1975), cert. denied 425 US 911 (1976).

107 Note that in March 2010, Bangladesh established an International Crimes Tribunal under 1973 and 2009 legislation to try people for alleged ‘international crimes’ (including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity) committed during the 1971 war of independence: see House of Commons Library, ‘Bangladesh: The International Crimes Tribunal’, 2012, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06318/>. One of the accused was executed in December 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25356034.

108 See also article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles 1919.

109 Resolution 95 (I). See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1950, vol. II, p. 195; 253 HL Deb., col. 831, 2 December 1963; the *British Manual of Military Law*, Part III, 1958, para. 637; *Brownlie’s Principles*, chapter 30; and P. Weiss, ‘Time Limits for the Prosecution of Crimes against International Law’, 53 *BYIL*, 1982, pp. 163, 188 ff.

110 See e.g. Weiss, ‘Time Limits’.

111 See article 49 of the First Geneva Convention; article 50 of the Second Geneva Convention; article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention; and article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See also e.g. G. I. A. D. Draper, *The Red Cross Conventions*, London, 1958, p. 105. Cf. Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction’, p. 12.

112 See further above, [Chapter 7](#), and below, [Chapter 20](#).

113 See e.g. *R v. Jones* [2006] UKHL 16; 132 ILR, p. 668; and see above, [Chapter 4](#), p. 127.

114 See e.g. L. C. Green, *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict*, 3rd ed., Manchester, 2008, chapter 18; E. Schwelb, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, 23 *BYIL*, 1946, p. 178. See also the Commentary to article 20 of the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court which refers to the concept as a term of art: Report of the International Law Commission, A/49/10, 1994, p. 75. The UN International Law Commission included the topic of Crimes against Humanity in its programme of work at its 66th session in July 2014 and appointed a Special Rapporteur: see his fourth report, A/CN.4/725, 18 February 2019.

115 S/25704, 1993, paras. 47–8.

116 Security Council resolution 827 (1993).

117 See article 3 of the ICTR Statute 1994, Security Council resolution 955 (1994). See also *Barbie* 100 ILR, p. 330; and *Touvier*, *ibid.*, p. 337.

118 Article 5.

119 Article 25.

120 Report of the International Law Commission, A/51/10, 1996, p. 9. This had been under consideration since 1982: see General Assembly resolution 36/106 of 10 December 1981. A Draft Code was formulated in 1954 by the ILC and submitted to the UN General Assembly: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1954, vol. II, p. 150. The General Assembly postponed consideration of it until a definition of aggression had been formulated, resolution 897 (IX). This was achieved in 1974: see resolution 3314 (XXIX). A Draft Code was provisionally adopted in 1991: see A/46/10 and 30 ILM, 1991, p. 1584.

121 Report of the International Law Commission, A/51/10, 1996, p. 51. This does not apply to the crime of aggression.

122 Article 8 provides that jurisdiction concerning individuals will rest with an international criminal court.

123 Additional crimes referred to in the 1991 Draft also included recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries; international terrorism; illicit traffic in narcotic drugs; and wilful and severe damage to the environment.

124 36 ILR, pp. 5, 277. See also *Barbie* 78 ILR, pp. 125, 136; and *Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky* 776 F.2d 571 (1985); 79 ILR, p. 534. See also *Keesing's Record of World Events*, p.36189 regarding the *Demjanjuk* case in Israel.

125 Note *Kouwenhoven* 181 ILR, p. 568, where the Dutch Court of Appeal convicted a Dutch national of complicity in war crimes pursuant to article 8 of the Wartime Offences Act 1952 which conferred on Dutch courts universal jurisdiction over war crimes. See also *The Public Prosecutor v. Heshamuddin Hesam*, Dutch Supreme Court, 2008, www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1020/Hesam/.

126 Relating to the indictment of defendants Ariel Sharon, Amos Yaron and others concerning events in the Shabra and Shatilla camps in Lebanon in 1982, No. P. 02.1139. F/1.

127 See article 16(2), 42 ILM, 2003, pp. 1258 ff.

128 *Moniteur Belge*, 7 August 2003, pp. 40506–15.

129 See e.g. Inazumi, *Universal Jurisdiction*, p. 97. See also S. Ratner, ‘Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem’, **97** *AJIL*, 2003, p. 888.

130 Resolution adopted on 26 August 2005, para. 3(b).

131 Judgment No. 327/2003. See also the same court’s decision a few months later in the *Peruvian Genocide* case, where it was held that Spanish courts could not exercise universal jurisdiction over claims of genocide and other serious crimes alleged to have been committed by Peruvian officials from 1986, Judgment No. 712/2003.

132 Judgment No. 237/2005. See e.g. N. Roht-Arriaza, ‘Guatemala Genocide Case. Judgment no. STC 237/2005’, **100** *AJIL*, 2006, p. 207. In 2009 and 2014, Spain adopted legislation restricting the future scope of universal jurisdiction to cases in which it must be established that the alleged perpetrators are present in Spain, that there are victims of Spanish nationality or that there is some relevant link with Spain and, in any event, that no other competent country or international court has initiated proceedings, including an effective investigation and, where appropriate, prosecution, of such crimes; see letter from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee on 22 September 2016, www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/71/universal_jurisdiction/spain_e.pdf. Note that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecution is required before an arrest warrant can be issued in the case of a private prosecution for war crimes, piracy and terrorism in the UK: see section 153 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.

133 See e.g. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 160–1; and Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 100 ff. See also C. McLachlan, *Foreign Relations Law*, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 207 ff.

134 See e.g. Millett LJ in *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)* [2000] 1 AC 147, 275; 119 ILR, p. 229. See also R. van Alebeek, ‘The Pinochet Case: International Human Rights Law on Trial’,

71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 29.

¹³⁵ The phrase ‘conditional universal jurisdiction’ has also been suggested: see A. Cassese, ‘When may Senior State Officials be Tried for International Crimes?’, 13 *EJIL*, 2002, pp. 853, 856.

¹³⁶ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 74–5; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 130–1. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, who uses the term ‘subsidiary universal jurisdiction’ to refer to the international conventions in question providing for the trial of offenders arrested on national territory and not extradited: *ibid.*, p. 40; 128 ILR, p. 96.

¹³⁷ See e.g. Mills, ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction’, pp. 209 ff.

¹³⁸ See further above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 283.

¹³⁹ See e.g. the UK Taking of Hostages Act 1982.

¹⁴⁰ That is those arising out of the Geneva Conventions 1949 and Additional Protocol I thereto; the Hague Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970; the Montreal Convention 1971; the Apartheid Convention 1973; the Internationally Protected Persons Convention 1973; the Hostages Convention 1979; the Torture Convention 1984; the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention and Protocol 1988; and the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988: see Report of the International Law Commission, A/49/10, 1994, pp. 141 ff.

¹⁴¹ Article 4.

¹⁴² Article 5.

¹⁴³ Article 7. See also K. Kittichaisaree, *The Obligations to Extradite or Prosecute*, Oxford, 2018.

¹⁴⁴ Article 8.

¹⁴⁵ [2000] 1 AC 147, 148, 159–60, 188–90, 202, 218–19, 233; 119 ILR, p. 135. Note that s. 134 provides that ‘a public official or person acting in an official capacity, *whatever his nationality*, commits the offence of torture if in the UK *or elsewhere* he intentionally

inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported performance of his official duties’ (emphases added). The first successful prosecution under this section was the *Zardad* case, in which an Afghan warlord was convicted in 2005: see report in UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under article 19 of the Convention, Fifth periodic report of States parties due in 2008, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 21 May 2012, CAT/C/GBR/5, pp. 44 ff. See also K. Grady, ‘International Crimes in the Courts of England and Wales’, *Criminal Law Review*, 2014, p. 693. Note that the prosecution of Colonel Kumar Lama under this section failed in 2016. He was acquitted of one charge of torture and a second charge was abandoned for lack of evidence; see e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-sussex-37290487. See also *R v. Reeves Taylor* [2019] UKSC 51, in which the UK Supreme Court considered the meaning of ‘person acting in an official capacity’ appearing in s. 134. See above [Chapter 4](#), p. 156.

146 See above, [Chapter 4](#), p. 126.

147 [2000] 1 AC 147, 276; 119 ILR, p. 135. See also e.g. R. O’Keefe, ‘Customary International Crimes in English Courts’, 72 *BYIL*, 2001, p. 293.

148 Article 2. See e.g. the UK Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978.

149 Article 3.

150 Article 1.

151 See e.g. the UK Taking of Hostages Act 1982.

152 Article 9.

153 Article 10.

154 Article 14.

155 Article 4. See S. Shuber, *Jurisdiction Over Crimes on Board Aircraft*, The Hague, 1973; N. D. Joyner, *Aerial Hijacking as an International Crime*, Dobbs Ferry, 1974; and E. McWhinney, *Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism*, 2nd ed., Dordrecht, 1987. See also the US Anti-Hijacking Act 1974.

156 Note that neither the Tokyo nor the Hague Conventions apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services: see articles 1(4) and 3(2) respectively.

157 Note the Hindawi episode, where the EC imposed sanctions upon Syria in a situation where it emerged during a court case in the UK that an attempt to smuggle a bomb onto an Israeli airliner in 1986 in London had been supported by Syrian intelligence: see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, pp. 34771–2, 34883–4 (1986).

158 This Convention and Protocol came into force on 1 July and 1 January 2018 respectively: see www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/lists/current%20lists%20of%20parties/allitems.aspx.

159 See *US v. Yunis (No. 2)* 681 F.Supp. 896, 900–1 (1988); 82 ILR, pp. 344, 348. See also *US v. Yunis (No. 3)* 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (1991); 88 ILR, pp. 176, 181.

160 Note that in *Flatow v. Iran*, the US District Court stated that ‘international terrorism is subject to universal jurisdiction’, 999 F.Supp. 1, 14 (1998); 121 ILR, p. 618. See also the Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 2006, which requires all states parties to make enforced disappearance a criminal offence and further defines the widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity. States parties must take the necessary measures to establish jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality, nationality or, where the state deems it appropriate, the passive personality principle and must then either prosecute or extradite. The offence of enforced disappearance is deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between states parties before the entry into force of the Convention and states parties undertake to include it as an extraditable offence in future treaties, while the offence is not to be regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition based on such an offence may not be refused on these grounds alone. Further, no person may be sent to a state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she may be the subject of an enforced disappearance.

161 See e.g. General Assembly resolution 2645 (XXV) and Security Council resolution 286 (1970).

162 See above, [Chapter 9](#), p. 463.

163 See UKMIL, 49 *BYIL*, 1978, p. 423. The states making the Declaration were the UK, France, the US, Canada, West Germany, Italy and Japan.

164 See e.g. the US–Cuban Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offences 1973.

165 See e.g. the US Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974; and the UK Civil Aviation Act 1982, s. 92 and the Aviation Security Act 1982.

166 See further, as to international terrorism, below, [Chapter 19](#), pp. 997 ff.

167 Resolution 337 (1973).

168 ICAO Doc. 9050-LC/169–1, p. 196 (1973).

169 See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 34078 (1985); and *The Times*, 6 February 1986, p. 4. In this context, one should also note the hijack of a TWA airliner in June 1985, the murder of a passenger and the prolonged detention in Lebanon of the remaining passengers and the crew: see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 34130. See also A. Cassese, *Violence and Law in the Modern Age*, Cambridge, 1988, chapter 4.

170 On 4 February 1986, the Israeli Air Force intercepted a Libyan civil aircraft en route from Libya to Syria in an attempt to capture terrorists, arguing that the aircraft in question was part of a terrorist operation, see *The Times*, 5 February 1986, p. 1.

171 See e.g. as to the 1976 Entebbe incident, below, [Chapter 19](#), p. 1004.

172 See e.g. F. Morgenstern, 'Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International Law', 29 *BYIL*, 1952, p. 256; P. O'Higgins, 'Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition', 36 *BYIL*, 1960, p. 279; A. Lowenfeld, 'US Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law', 83 *AJIL*, 1989, p. 880; A. Lowenfeld, 'US Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued', 84 *AJIL*, 1990, p. 444; A. Lowenfeld, 'Kidnapping by Government Order: A Follow-Up', 84 *AJIL*, 1990, p. 712; and A. Lowenfeld, 'Still More on Kidnapping', 85 *AJIL*, 1991, p. 655. See also F. A. Mann, 'Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law', in

International Law at a Time of Perplexity (ed. Y. Dinstein), Dordrecht, 1989, p. 407; and Higgins, *Problems and Process*, p. 69.

¹⁷³ See e.g. article 2(4) of the UN Charter and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 110; 76 ILR, p. 349. See further below, [Chapter 19](#).

¹⁷⁴ Note, in particular, the view of the Legal Adviser of the US Department of State to the effect that '[w]hile international law therefore permits extraterritorial "arrests" in situations which permit a valid claim of self-defence, decisions about any extraterritorial arrest entail grave potential implications for US personnel, for the United States, and for our relations with other states', **84 AJIL**, 1990, pp. 725, 727.

¹⁷⁵ See Mann, 'Doctrine of Jurisdiction', p. 415.

¹⁷⁶ See e.g. *Eichmann* 36 ILR, pp. 5, 277.

¹⁷⁷ See Higgins, *Problems and Process*, p. 69.

¹⁷⁸ 500 F.2d 267 (1974); 61 ILR, p. 190.

¹⁷⁹ See, in particular, *Ker v. Illinois* 119 US 436 (1886); and *Frisbie v. Collins* 342 US 519 (1952). These cases have given rise to the reference to the Ker–Frisbie doctrine.

¹⁸⁰ 510 F.2d 62 (1975); 61 ILR, p. 206. See also *US v. Lira* 515 F.2d 68 (1975); Lowenfeld, 'Kidnapping', p. 712; *Afouneh v. Attorney-General* 10 AD, p. 327; and *Re Argoud* 45 ILR, p. 90.

¹⁸¹ This approach was reaffirmed in *US v. Yunis* both by the District Court, 681 F.Supp. 909, 918–21 (1988) and by the Court of Appeals, 30 ILM, 1991, pp. 403, 408–9.

¹⁸² 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992); 95 ILR, p. 355. See also M. Halberstam, 'In Defence of the Supreme Court Decision in *Alvarez-Machain*', **86 AJIL**, 1992, p. 736; and M. J. Glennon, 'State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on *United States v. Alvarez-Machain*', *ibid.*, p. 746.

¹⁸³ 119 L.Ed.2d 451; 95 ILR, p. 363. See also the Dissenting Opinion, which took the view that the abduction had in fact violated both international law and the extradition treaty, 119

L.Ed.2d 456–79; 95 ILR, pp. 369–79. The accused was eventually acquitted and returned to Mexico: see *Alvarez-Machain v. US* 107 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1996). He also commenced an action for compensation. In that action the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that his abduction was a violation of the law of nations in that international human rights law had been breached: see *Alvarez-Machain v. US* (Compensation) 41 ILM, 2002, pp. 130, 133. See also *Ker v. Illinois* 119 US 436 (1886).

184 [1986] 1 QB 95; 77 ILR, p. 351. See also *Ex parte Susannah Scott* (1829) 9 B & C 446; *Sinclair v. HM Advocate* (1890) 17 R (J) 38; and *R v. Officer Commanding Depot Battalion RASC Colchester, ex parte Elliott* [1949] 1 All ER 373. Cf. *R v. Bow Street Magistrates, ex parte Mackerson* (1981) 75 Cr App R 24.

185 [1993] 3 WLR 90; 95 ILR, p. 380.

186 [1993] 3 WLR 105; 95 ILR, p. 393, per Lord Griffiths. See also per Lord Bridge: [1993] 3 WLR 110; 95 ILR, p. 399 and Lord Slynn: [1993] 3 WLR 125; 95 ILR, p. 416. The House of Lords was also influenced by the Decision of the South Africa Supreme Court in *State v. Ebrahim* 95 ILR, p. 417, where the conviction and sentence before a South African court of a person were set aside as a consequence of his illegal abduction by state officials from Swaziland. This view was based both on Roman-Dutch and South African common law and on international law.

187 [1996] 1 WLR 104, see Lord Steyn, at 112–13. See also *R v. Mullen* [1999] 2 Cr App R 143.

188 See *Re Schmidt* [1995] 1 AC 339; 111 ILR, p. 548 (House of Lords).

189 [1998] 1 WLR 652, 665–7. See also C. Warbrick, ‘Judicial Jurisdiction and Abuse of Process’, 49 *ICLQ*, 2000, p. 489.

190 28 USC, para. 1350 (1982), originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See also 28 USC, para. 1331; and above, [Chapter 4](#), p. 139. See C. A. Bradley, *International Law in the US Legal System*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015, chapter 7; Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 135 ff.; and E. A. Young, ‘Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute and Transnational Public Law Litigation After *Kiobel*’, 64 *Duke Law Journal*, 2015, p. 1023. See also S. Breyer, *The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global Realities*, New York, 2015, chapter 6.

191 Cassese notes that the extensive civil jurisdiction claimed under this Act has not been challenged by other states: ‘Senior State Officials’, p. 859.

192 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980); 77 ILR, p. 169. See also 577 F.Supp. 860 (1984); 77 ILR, p. 185, awarding punitive damages.

193 In establishing the content of the ‘law of nations’, the courts must interpret international law as it exists today: 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2nd Cir. 1980); 77 ILR, pp. 169, 175.

194 726 F.2d 774 (1984); 77 ILR, p. 204. See also ‘Agora’, **79 AJIL**, 1985, pp. 92 ff. for a discussion of the case.

195 726 F.2d 801; 77 ILR, p. 230.

196 *Siderman de Blake and Others v. Argentina and Others* 965 F.2d 699 (1992).

197 *Handel v. Artukovic* 601 F.Supp. 1421 (1985); 79 ILR, p. 397.

198 770 F.2d 202 (1985); 80 ILR, p. 586.

199 770 F.2d 206–7; 80 ILR, pp. 590–1.

200 34 ILM, 1995, p. 1592.

201 *Ibid.*, p. 1600.

202 *Ibid.*, pp. 1602–6.

203 *Ibid.*, p. 1607.

204 *Ibid.*, pp. 1607–8. See *Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority* 566 US 449 (2012), pp. 2–11, holding that the term ‘individual’ as used in this Act encompassed only natural persons so that no liability was imposed against organisations. Note, however, that since the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, an exception to immunity is created with regard to states, designated by

the Department of State as terrorist states, which committed a terrorist act, or provided material support and resources to an individual or entity which committed such an act, which resulted in the death or personal injury of a US citizen.

205 *Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentina* 830 F.2d 421 (1987); 79 ILR, p. 8.

206 See below, [Chapter 12](#), p. 604.

207 *Argentina v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.* 109 S.Ct. 683 (1989); 81 ILR, p. 658.

208 109 S.Ct. 689; 81 ILR, pp. 664–5.

209 109 S.Ct. 690. See also *Smith v. Libya* 101 F.3d 239 (1996); 113 ILR, p. 534.

210 See above, p. 586.

211 Compensation, 41 ILM, 2002, p. 130. See also the Decision of 3 June 2003.

212 542 US 692, 714 ff. (2004); and see above, [Chapter 4](#), p. 139. Note that in *Rasul v. Bush*, the Supreme Court held that it was immaterial that the petitioners invoking the Alien Tort Statute were being held in military custody in Guantanamo Bay, 542 US 466 (2004).

213 Slip Opinion, 569 US 108 (2013).

214 561 US 247 (2010).

215 Slip Opinion, pp. 6, 13, 569 US 108 (2013).

216 *Ibid.*, p. 14. Note also *Daimler AG v. Bauman* 571 US 117 (2014), where the US Supreme Court held that the paradigm all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction over a corporation were its place of incorporation and principal place of business. In this case, personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation was claimed on the basis of the California contacts of MBUSA, a Daimler subsidiary incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of jurisdiction in New Jersey. The Court concluded that Daimler was not amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by conduct of MB Argentina taking place entirely outside the US. It was also noted, in referring to the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act: ‘The Ninth Circuit, moreover, paid little heed to the

risks to international comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed. Other nations do not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case': *ibid.*, p. 23. The Court also declared that the *Kiobel* and *Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority* cases had rendered the plaintiff's claims under these Acts 'infirm': *ibid.*, p. 22.

²¹⁷ 584 US __ (2018).

²¹⁸ *Re Arab Bank* 808 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 2015). See also *Linde v. Arab Bank, plc*, 04-CV-2799 (2010); *Linde v. Arab Bank, plc* 384 F.Supp.2d 571 (2005); and *Almog v. Arab Bank, plc* 471 F.Supp.2d 257 (2007).

²¹⁹ See *Tracy v. Iran*, 2016 ONSC 3759 (Ontario Superior Court) and 2017 ONCA 549 (Ontario Court of Appeal), holding that under the Act Iran was not entitled to plead diplomatic immunity.

²²⁰ See e.g. S. Maffei, *Extradition Law and Practice*, Groningen, 2019; I. A. Shearer, *Extradition in International Law*, Leiden, 1971; M. C. Bassiouni, *International Extradition: US Law and Practice*, 6th ed., Oxford, 2014; C. Nicholls, C. Montgomery, J. B. Knowles, A. Doobay and M. Summers, *The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2013; E. Grange and R. Niblock, *Extradition Law: A Practitioner's Guide*, 2nd ed., London, 2015; A. Jones and A. Doobay, *Jones and Doobay on Extradition and Mutual Assistance*, London, 2004; G. Gilbert, *Aspects of Extradition Law*, Dordrecht, 1991; G. Gilbert, *Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition and Other Mechanisms*, The Hague, 1998; and *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 958. See also Study of the Secretariat on Succession of States in Respect of Bilateral Treaties, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1970, vol. II, pp. 102, 105.

²²¹ See e.g. the Joint Declaration of Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and Aguilar Maudsley, *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 24; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 507 and the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 38; 94 ILR, p. 521.

²²² But see now the House of Lords decisions in *Government of Denmark v. Nielsen* [1984] 2 All ER 81; 74 ILR, p. 458; and *US v. McCaffery* [1984] 2 All ER 570.

²²³ See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 961.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 962.

²²⁵ See e.g. the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977, article 1 of which provides a list of offences which are not to be regarded as political offences or inspired by political motives, an approach which is also adopted in article 11 of the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997. See also *McMullen* 74 *AJIL*, 1980, p. 434; *Eain*, *ibid.*, p. 435; *Re Piperno*, *ibid.*, p. 683; and *US v. Mackin* 668 F.2d 122 (1981); 79 *ILR*, p. 459. A revised directive on international extradition was issued by the US Department of State in 1981: see 76 *AJIL*, 1982, pp. 154–9. Note also the view of the British Home Secretary, *The Times*, 25 June 1985, p. 1, that the political offences ‘loophole’ as it applied to violent offences was not suitable to extradition arrangements between the democratic countries ‘sharing the same high regard for the fundamental principles of justice and operating similar independent judicial systems’. The UK law relating to extradition was consolidated in the Extradition Act 1989. Note in addition the Extradition Act 2003, providing *inter alia* for fast-track extradition procedures within the EU, extended by the UK in the Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 Territories) Order 2003 to the US despite an asymmetrical arrangement with the US under the UK–US Extradition Treaty 2003: see e.g. *Norris v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2006] *UWHC* 280 (Admin); and *Norris v. US* [2008] *UKHL* 16. See also *Government of Belgium v. Postlethwaite* [1987] 2 *All ER* 985; *R v. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department* [1988] 1 *WLR* 1204; and S. Baker *et al.*, ‘A Review of the United Kingdom’s Extradition Arrangements’, London, 2010, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117673/extradition-review.pdf.

²²⁶ See above, p. 579.

²²⁷ See e.g. article 8 of the Hague Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970; article 8 of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971; article 8 of the Internationally Protected Persons Convention 1973; and article 4 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977.

²²⁸ See e.g. article 3(1) of the French Extradition Law of 1927; and article 16 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.

²²⁹ See e.g. *Soering*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 161, 1989; 98 ILR, p. 270; and *Saadi v. Italy*, ECtHR, Judgment of 28 February 2008.

²³⁰ See e.g. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, chapter 4; *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction* (ed. A. V. Lowe), London, 1983; A. J. Colangelo, ‘What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?’, 99 *Cornell Law Review*, 2014, p. 1303; D. Rosenthal and W. Knighton, *National Laws and International Commerce*, London, 1982; K. M. Meessen, ‘Antitrust Jurisdiction under Customary International Law’, 78 *AJIL*, 1984, p. 783; A. V. Lowe, ‘Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980’, 75 *AJIL*, 1981, p. 257; Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 190 ff.; O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction’, p. 739; *Extraterritorial Application of Law and Responses Thereto* (ed. C. Olmstead), Oxford, 1984; B. Stern, ‘L’Extraterritorialité “Revisitée”: Où il est question des affaires Alvarez-Machain, Pâte de Bois et de quelques autres’, *AFDI*, 1992, p. 239; Higgins, *Problems and Process*, p. 73; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 466. See also P. Torremans, ‘Extraterritorial Application of EC and US Competition Law’, 21 *European Law Review*, 1996, p. 280.

²³¹ Note that there is a general presumption against the extraterritorial application of legislation: see e.g. the House of Lords decision in *Holmes v. Bangladesh Biman Corp.* [1989] 1 AC 1112, 1126; 87 ILR, pp. 365, 369, per Lord Bridge; *Air India v. Wiggins* [1980] 1 WLR 815, 819; 77 ILR, pp. 276, 279, per Lord Bridge; and *Perry v. SOCA* [2012] UKSC 35, paras. 15 ff., 94. See also the US Supreme Court decisions in *EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. and Aramco Services* 113 L.Ed.2d 274, 282 (1991); 90 ILR, pp. 617, 622; *Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd* 561 US 247, 255 (2010); *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum*, Slip Opinion, pp. 6, 13, 569 US 108 (2013); and *RJR Nabisco v. European Community* 579 US ____ (2016), affirming the presumption against extraterritoriality so that in the absence of clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic effect. See also Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 68 ff.

²³² The UK government has stated that it opposes all assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by other states on UK individuals and/or companies: see Ministerial Statement, 673 HL Deb., cols. 277–8, WA, 21 July 2005, UKMIL, 76 *BYIL*, 2006, p. 850.

²³³ The true ‘effects’ doctrine approach should be distinguished from other heads of jurisdiction such as the objective territorial principle, where part of the offence takes place

within the jurisdiction: see e.g. *US v. Noriega* 808 F.Supp. 791 (1992); 99 ILR, p. 143. In many cases, the disputes have centred upon nationality questions, the US regarding subsidiaries of US companies abroad as of US nationality even where such companies have been incorporated abroad, while the state of incorporation has regarded them as of its nationality and thus subject not to US law, but to its law: see e.g. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, p. 73.

²³⁴ See e.g. the US Sherman Antitrust Act 1896, 15 USC, paras. 1 ff. See also the controversies engendered by the US freezing of Iranian assets in 1979 and the embargo imposed under the Export Administration Act in 1981 and 1982 on equipment intended for use on the Siberian gas pipeline: R. Edwards, 'Extraterritorial Application of the US Iranian Assets Control Regulations', 75 *AJIL*, 1981, p. 870; J. Bridge, 'The Law and Politics of United States Foreign Policy Export Controls', 4 *Legal Studies*, 1984, p. 2; and A. V. Lowe, 'Public International Law and the Conflict of Laws', 33 *ICLQ*, 1984, p. 575.

²³⁵ 148 F.2d 416 (1945).

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 443. This approach was reaffirmed in a series of later cases: see e.g. *US v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.* 83 F.Supp. 284 (1949), *aff'd* 341 US 593 (1951); *US v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.* 133 F.Supp. 40 and 134 F.Supp. 710 (1963); 22 ILR, p. 168; and *US v. General Electric Co.* 82 F.Supp. 753 (1949); 115 F.Supp. 835 (1953). See also *Hazeltine Research Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp.* 239 F.Supp. 51 (1965), *aff'd* 395 US 100 (1969).

²³⁷ See e.g. the statement of the UK Attorney General that 'the wide investigating procedures under the United States antitrust legislation against persons outside the United States who are not United States citizens constitute an "extraterritorial" infringement of the proper jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United Kingdom', *Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.* [1978] 2 WLR 81; 73 ILR, p. 296. See also Lowe, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*, pp. 159–60, 165–71. But see *Société Internationale v. Rogers* 357 US 197 (1958); 26 ILR, p. 123; *US v. First National City Bank* 396 F.2d 897 (1968); 38 ILR, p. 112; *Re Westinghouse Electric Corp.* 563 F.2d 992 (1977); and *Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation* 480 F.Supp. 1138 (1979).

²³⁸ See e.g. Meessen, 'Antitrust Jurisdiction', p. 794.

²³⁹ 549 F.2d 597 (1976); 66 ILR, p. 270.

240 595 F.2d 1287 (1979); 66 ILR, p. 487.

241 See particularly K. Brewster, *Antitrust and American Business Abroad*, New York, 1958.

242 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (1979); 66 ILR, pp. 487, 496. See also *Timberlane* 549 F.2d 597, 614 (1976); 66 ILR, pp. 270, 285. The need for judicial restraint in applying the effects doctrine in the light of comity was emphasised by the State Department: see 74 *AJIL*, 1980, pp. 179–83. See also the US Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 1982, where jurisdiction was said to be dependent on ‘direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect’.

243 Paragraph 402, p. 239 and para. 403, p. 250.

244 See also the US Department of Justice, *Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations*, 1988, pp. 31–2. But see now the Supreme Court’s decision in *Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California* 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993), discussed below.

245 See e.g. H. Maier, ‘Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, 31 *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 1983, p. 579; H. Maier, ‘Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts or There and Back Again’, 25 *Va. JIL*, 1984, p. 7; W. Fugate, ‘Antitrust Aspect of the Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law’, *ibid.*, p. 49; and Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 21–2. See also Lowe, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*, pp. 58–62.

246 731 F.2d 909 (1984). However, cf. the continuation of the *Timberlane* litigation, *Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America (II)* 749 F.2d 1378 (1984), which reaffirms the approach of the first *Timberlane* case.

247 See e.g. Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction’, pp. 24–6; and Meessen, ‘Antitrust Jurisdiction’, pp. 808–10. See also Lowe, *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*, part 3.

248 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993). See e.g. A. F. Lowenfeld, ‘Conflict, Balancing of Interest, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections of the *Insurance Antitrust Case*’, 89 *AJIL*, 1995, p. 42; P. R. Trimble, ‘The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of *Restatement* Section 403’, *ibid.*, p. 53; and L. Kramer, ‘Extraterritorial Application of

American Law after the *Insurance Antitrust Case*: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble', *ibid.*, p. 750.

²⁴⁹ 113 S.Ct. 2891, 2909.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 2911.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 2921.

²⁵² See Lowe, 'Conflict of Laws', pp. 257–82; 50 *BYIL*, 1979, pp. 357–62 and 21 *ILM*, 1982, pp. 840–50. See also the Australian Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976, the Danish Limitation of Danish Shipowners' Freedom to Give Information to Authorities of Foreign Countries 1967 and the Finnish Law Prohibiting a Shipowner in Certain Cases to Produce Documents 1968. In some cases, courts have applied aspects of domestic law to achieve the same aim: see e.g. *Fruehauf* 5 *ILM*, 1966, p. 476. Several states have made diplomatic protests at extraterritorial jurisdictional claims: see e.g. *Report of the 51st Session of the International Law Association*, 1964, pp. 565 ff.

²⁵³ See *The Use of Airspace and Outer Space* (ed. Chia-Jui Cheng), The Hague, 1993, pp. 25 ff.

²⁵⁴ The Protection of Trading Interests (US Anti-trust Measures) Order 1983. Two directions were issued as well.

²⁵⁵ *British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd* [1983] 3 All ER 375; 74 *ILR*, p. 36.

²⁵⁶ [1984] 3 All ER 39; 74 *ILR*, p. 65. But see also *Midland Bank plc v. Laker Airways Ltd* [1986] 2 WLR 707; 118 *ILR*, p. 540.

²⁵⁷ Section 1(3).

²⁵⁸ [1984] 3 All ER 39, 55–6; 74 *ILR*, p. 84.

²⁵⁹ [1984] 3 All ER 39, 54–5; 74 *ILR*, p. 83. See also *Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp.* [1947] 2 All ER 680.

260 See also the statement by the Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry, listing the statutory instruments, orders and directions made under the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 220 HC Deb., cols. 768–70, Written Answers, 12 March 1993; UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, pp. 644–6.

261 See the US and UK agreement in 1984 to consult should problems appear to arise with regard to the application of US export controls to individuals or businesses in the UK, or if the UK were contemplating resorting to the Protection of Trading Interests Act in relation to such controls: 68 HC Deb., col. 332, Written Answer, 23 November 1984, and 88 HC Deb., col. 373, Written Answer, 6 December 1985. See also Current Legal Developments, 36 *ICLQ*, 1987, p. 398.

262 See UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 643. The proposed adoption of this legislation led to UK protests as well: see UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, pp. 726 ff.

263 This part of the legislation was suspended by the President for six months as from July 1996: see, as to the legislation, 35 *ILM*, 1996, p. 357.

264 Intended to impose sanctions on persons or entities participating in the development of the petroleum resources of Iran or Libya. As to the legislation concerning Iran and Libya, see 35 *ILM*, 1996, p. 1273.

265 Canada also announced that legislation would be introduced under the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 1985 to help protect Canadian companies against the US Act: see Canadian Foreign Affairs Ministry Press Release No. 115, 17 June 1996. Note that the UN General Assembly, in resolution 50/10 (1995), called upon the US to end its embargo against Cuba. See also A. F. Lowenfeld, ‘Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act’, 90 *AJIL*, 1996, p. 419; B. M. Clagett, ‘Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with International Law’, *ibid.*, p. 434; S. K. Alexander, ‘Trafficking in Confiscated Cuban Property’, 16 *Dickinson Journal of International Law*, 1998, p. 523; and A. V. Lowe, ‘US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts’, 46 *ICLQ*, 1997, p. 378. For a list of US federal statutes with extraterritorial reach, see S. C. Symeonides, ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2019: Thirty-Third Annual Survey’, 68 *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 2020, Section II.

266 OAS Doc. OEA/SER.P AG/doc.3375/96, 4 June 1996.

²⁶⁷ CJI/SO/II/doc.67/96 rev. 5, para. 9, 23 August 1996; 35 ILM, 1996, pp. 1329, 1334. It should be noted that under article 98 of the Charter of the OAS, Opinions of the Committee have no binding effect.

²⁶⁸ Cited in Current Legal Developments, 36 *ICLQ*, 1987, p. 399. See also UKMIL, 56 *BYIL*, 1985, pp. 480–1.

²⁶⁹ See 30 ILM, 1991, p. 1487. See also Torremans, ‘Extraterritorial’, pp. 289 ff.

²⁷⁰ *France v. Commission of the European Communities*, Case No. C-327/91, [1994] ECR I-3641.

²⁷¹ [1995] OJ L 95/45.

²⁷² See UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 725.

²⁷³ See e.g. European Commission Press Release WE 27/96, 18 July 1996 and 35 ILM, 1996, p. 397. See also Council Regulation No. 2271/96, 36 ILM, 1997, p. 127, and the Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 1996 (countering the Helms–Burton Act), *ibid.*, p. 111.

²⁷⁴ 36 ILM, 1997, p. 529. On 18 May 1998, the Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection was reached whereby the EU agreed to suspend action in the World Trade Organization against the extraterritorial aspects of Helms–Burton in exchange for an EU-wide exemption by the US from the extraterritorial elements of the Act: see UKMIL, 76 *BYIL*, 2006, pp. 850–1.

²⁷⁵ But not the UK: see e.g. *Attorney General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1982)* [1983] 3 WLR 72, where the Court of Appeal refused to extend the scope of local jurisdiction over foreign conspiracies based on the effects principle.

²⁷⁶ [1972] ECR 619; 48 ILR, p. 106.

²⁷⁷ [1972] ECR 619, 693–4.

²⁷⁸ *A. Ahlstrom Oy v. Commission* [1988] 4 CMLR 901; 96 ILR, p. 148.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 916.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 932.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 940–1. Note that the Court held that the association of US companies (KEA) was not subject to Community jurisdiction on the ground that it had not played a separate role in the implementation within the Community of the arrangements in dispute: *ibid.*, pp. 942–3.

²⁸² See e.g. D. Lange and J. B. Sandage, ‘The Wood Pulp Decision and its Implications for the Scope of EC Competition Law’, 26 *Common Market Law Review*, 1989, p. 137; and L. Collins, *European Community Law in the United Kingdom*, 4th ed., London, 1990, p. 7. See also S. Weatherill and P. Beaumont, *EU Law*, 3rd ed., London, 1999, chapter 22; and D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, *European Union Law: Text and Materials*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2014, p. 1013. Note the controversy over the EU decision to include emissions from foreign aviation within the European Emissions Trading System, which provoked opposition from a significant number of states, including the US, India, Russia and China: see e.g. paper presented by twenty-six states to the International Civil Aviation Authority, C-WP/13790 (2011). In *Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change*, Case No. C-366/10, Judgment of 21 December 2011, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ, on a reference for a preliminary ruling, rejected the claim that the decision violated the EU’s treaty obligations and amounted to an impermissible form of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction, and found no violation of international law. In November 2012, the European Commission decided to defer the extension of the scheme to extra-EU flights on the expectation that a global agreement on GHG mitigation from aviation would be reached. In the same month, the US adopted the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, prohibiting US carriers from participating in the EU Emission Trading Scheme. The scheme applies to intra-EU flights as from January 2013. EU Regulation 421/2014 amends Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the Community, in view of the implementation by 2020 of an international agreement applying a single global market-based measure to international aviation emissions. See e.g. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction*, pp. 94 ff.; and generally http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/documentation_en.htm.

²⁸³ 112 *AJIL*, 2018, p. 460.

12

Immunities from Jurisdiction

In the previous chapter, the circumstances in which a state may seek to exercise its jurisdiction in relation to civil and criminal matters were considered. In this chapter, the reverse side of this phenomenon will be examined, that is those cases in which jurisdiction cannot be exercised as it normally would because of special factors. In other words, the focus is upon immunity from jurisdiction and those instances where there exist express exceptions to the usual application of a state's legal powers. The concept of jurisdiction revolves around the principles of state sovereignty, equality and non-interference. Domestic jurisdiction as a notion attempts to define an area in which the actions of the organs of government and administration are supreme, free from international legal principles and interference. Indeed, most of the grounds for jurisdiction can be related to the requirement under international law to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other states.

Immunity from jurisdiction, whether as regards the state itself or as regards its diplomatic representatives, is grounded in this requirement. Although constituting a derogation from the host state's jurisdiction, in that, for example, the United Kingdom cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign ambassadors within its territory, it is to be construed nevertheless as an essential part of the recognition of the sovereignty of foreign states, as well as

an aspect of the legal equality of all states. Further, the law of immunity is essentially procedural in nature, being concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction and not as such the substantive question as to whether the particular conduct in question was or was not lawful.¹

Sovereign Immunity²

Sovereignty until comparatively recently was regarded as appertaining to a particular individual in a state and not as an abstract manifestation of the existence and power of the state.³ The sovereign was a definable person, to whom allegiance was due. As an integral part of this mystique, the sovereign could not be made subject to the judicial processes of his country.

Accordingly, it was only fitting that he could not be sued in foreign courts.

The idea of the personal sovereign would undoubtedly have been undermined had courts been able to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. This personalisation was gradually replaced by the abstract concept of state sovereignty, but the basic mystique remained. In addition, the independence and equality of states made it philosophically as well as practically difficult to permit municipal courts of one country to manifest their power over foreign sovereign states, without their consent.⁴ Until recently, the international law relating to sovereign (or state) immunity relied virtually exclusively upon domestic case-law and latterly legislation, although the European Convention on State Immunity 1972 was a notable exception. However, in 2004 the United Nations adopted the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.⁵

The classic case illustrating the relationship between territorial jurisdiction and sovereign immunity is *Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon*,⁶ decided by the US Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall declared that the jurisdiction of a state within its own territory was exclusive and absolute, but it did not encompass foreign sovereigns. He noted that the:

perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns . . . have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.⁷

Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated in *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)*:

It is a basic principle of international law that one sovereign state (the forum state) does not adjudicate on the conduct of a foreign state. The foreign state is entitled to procedural immunity from the processes of the forum state. This immunity extends to both criminal and civil liability.⁸

Lord Millett in *Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe* put the point as follows:

State immunity . . . is a creature of customary international law and derives from the equality of sovereign states. It is not a self-imposed restriction on the jurisdiction of its courts which the United Kingdom has chosen to adopt. It is a limitation imposed from without upon the sovereignty of the United Kingdom itself.⁹

Sovereign immunity is closely related to two other legal doctrines: non-justiciability and act of state. Reference has been made earlier to the interaction between the various principles,¹⁰ but it is worth noting here that the concepts of non-justiciability and act of state posit an area of international activity of states that is simply beyond the competence of the domestic tribunal in its assertion of jurisdiction, for example, that the courts would not adjudicate upon the transactions of foreign sovereign states.¹¹ On the other hand, the principle of jurisdictional immunity asserts that in particular situations a court is prevented from exercising the jurisdiction that it possesses. Thus, immunity from jurisdiction does not mean exemption from the legal system of the territorial state in question. The two concepts are distinct. In *International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC*,¹² it was declared that the two concepts were similar in that they reflect the need to respect the sovereignty of foreign states, but that they differed in that the former went to the jurisdiction of the court and was a principle of international law, whereas the latter constituted a prudential doctrine of domestic law having internal constitutional roots. Accordingly, the question of sovereign immunity is a procedural one and one to be taken as a preliminary issue,¹³ logically preceding the issue of act of state.¹⁴

In practice, however, the distinction is not always so evident and arguments presented before the court founded both upon non-justiciability and sovereign immunity are to be expected. It is also an interesting point to consider the extent to which the demise of the absolute immunity approach has affected the doctrine of non-justiciability.

As far as the act of state doctrine is concerned in particular in this context, some disquiet has been expressed by courts that the application of that principle may in certain circumstances have the effect of reintroducing the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. In *Letelier v. Chile*,¹⁵ for example, Chile argued that even if its officials had ordered the assassination of Letelier in the United States, such acts could not be the subject of discussion in the US courts as the orders had been given in Chile. This was not accepted by the Court since to do otherwise would mean emasculating the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by permitting a state to bring back the absolute immunity approach ‘under the guise of the act of state doctrine’.¹⁶ In somewhat different circumstances, Kerr LJ signalled his concern in *MacLaine Watson v. International Tin Council*¹⁷ that the doctrine of non-justiciability might be utilised to bypass the absence of sovereign immunity with regard to a state’s commercial activities.

Of course, once a court has determined that the relevant sovereign immunity legislation permits it to hear the case, it may still face the act of state argument. Such legislation implementing the restrictive immunity approach does not supplant the doctrine of act of state or non-justiciability,¹⁸ although by accepting that the situation is such that immunity does not apply the scope for the non-justiciability plea is clearly much reduced.¹⁹

Although questions of state or sovereign immunity arise most frequently in national courts, the rule of state immunity as such constitutes a rule of customary international law and indeed occupies an important place in international law and international relations, deriving as it does from the principle of sovereign equality of states.²⁰

The Absolute Immunity Approach

The relatively uncomplicated role of the sovereign and of government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries logically gave rise to the concept of absolute immunity, whereby the sovereign was completely immune from foreign jurisdiction in all cases regardless of circumstances. However, the unparalleled growth in the activities of the state, especially with regard to commercial matters, has led to problems and in most countries to a modification of the above rule. The number of governmental agencies and public corporations, nationalised industries and other state organs created a reaction against the concept of absolute immunity, partly because it would enable state enterprises to have an advantage over private companies. Accordingly, many states began to adhere to the doctrine of restrictive immunity, under which immunity was available as regards governmental activity, but not where the state was engaging in commercial activity. Governmental acts with regard to which immunity would be granted are termed acts *jure imperii*, while those relating to private or trade activity are termed acts *jure gestionis*. The leading practitioner of the absolute immunity approach has been the United Kingdom, and this position was established in a number of important cases.²¹

In the *Parlement Belge* case,²² the Court of Appeal emphasised that the principle to be deduced from all the relevant preceding cases was that every state

declines to exercise by means of its courts any
of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of

any sovereign or ambassador of any other state,
or over the public property of any state which is
destined to public use . . . though such
sovereign, ambassador or property be within its
jurisdiction.²³

The wide principle expressed in this case gave rise to the question as to what kind of legal interest it was necessary for the foreign sovereign to have in property so as to render it immune from the jurisdiction of the British courts. Commonly regarded as the most extreme expression of the absolute immunity doctrine is the case of the *Porto Alexandre*.²⁴ This concerned a Portuguese requisitioned vessel against which a writ was issued in an English court for non-payment of dues for services rendered by tugs near Liverpool. The vessel was exclusively engaged in private trading operations, but the Court felt itself constrained by the terms of the *Parlement Belge* principle to dismiss the case in view of the Portuguese government interest.

Differences of opinion as to the application of the immunity rules were revealed in the House of Lords in the *Cristina* case.²⁵ This followed a Spanish Republican government decree requisitioning ships registered in Bilbao which was issued while the *Cristina* was on the high seas. On its arrival in Cardiff the Republican authorities took possession of the ship, whereupon its owners proceeded to issue a writ claiming possession. The case turned on the argument to dismiss the case, by the Republican government, in view of its sovereign immunity. The majority of the House of Lords accepted this in view of the requisition decree taking over the ship.

However, two of the Lords criticised the *Porto Alexandre* decision and doubted whether immunity covered state trading vessels,²⁶ while Lord Atkin took more of a fundamentalist absolute approach.²⁷

In *Krajina v. Tass Agency*,²⁸ the Court of Appeal held that the Agency was a state organ of the Soviet Union and was thus entitled to immunity from local jurisdiction. This was followed in *Baccus SRL v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo*,²⁹ where the Court felt that the defendants, although a separate legal person under Spanish law, were in effect a department of state of the Spanish government. How the entity was actually constituted was regarded as an internal matter, and it was held entitled to immunity from suit. A different view from the majority was taken by Lord Justice Singleton who, in a Dissenting Opinion, condemned what he regarded as the extension of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to separate legal entities.³⁰

There is some limitation to the absolute immunity rule to the extent that a mere claim by a foreign sovereign to have an interest in the contested property would have to be substantiated before the English court would grant immunity. Since this involves some submission by the foreign sovereign to the local jurisdiction, immunity is not unqualifiedly absolute. Once the court is clear that the claim by the sovereign is not merely illusory or founded on a manifestly defective title, it will dismiss the case. This was brought out in *Juan Ysmael v. Indonesia*,³¹ in which the asserted interest in a vessel by the Indonesian government was regarded as manifestly defective so that the case was not dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity.³²

American cases, however, have shown a rather different approach, one that distinguishes between ownership on the one hand and possession and control on the other. In two cases particularly, immunity was refused where the vessels concerned, although owned by the states claiming immunity, were held subject to the jurisdiction since at the relevant time they were not in the possession or control of these states.³³

Since the courts will not try a case in which a foreign state is the defendant, it is necessary to decide what a foreign state is in each instance. Where doubts are raised as to the status of a foreign entity and whether or not it is to be regarded as a state for the purposes of the municipal courts, the executive certificate issued by the UK government will be decisive.

The case of *Duff Development Company Ltd v. Kelantan*³⁴ is a good example of this point. Kelantan was a Malay state under British protection. Both its internal and external policies were subject to British direction and it could in no way be described as politically independent. However, the UK government had issued an executive certificate to the effect that Kelantan was an independent state and that the Crown neither exercised nor claimed any rights of sovereignty or jurisdiction over it. The House of Lords, to whom the case had come, declared that once the Crown recognised a foreign ruler as sovereign, this bound the courts and no other evidence was admissible or needed. Accordingly, Kelantan was entitled to sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of the English courts.

The Restrictive Approach

A number of states in fact started adopting the restrictive approach to immunity, permitting the exercise of jurisdiction over non-sovereign acts, at a relatively early stage.³⁵ The Supreme Court of Austria in 1950, in a comprehensive survey of practice, concluded that in the light of the increased activity of states in the commercial field the classic doctrine of absolute immunity had lost its meaning and was no longer a rule of international law.³⁶ In 1952, in the Tate letter, the US Department of State declared that the increasing involvement of governments in commercial activities coupled with the changing views of foreign states to absolute immunity rendered a change necessary and that thereafter ‘the Department [will] follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity’.³⁷ This approach was also adopted by the courts, most particularly in *Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes*.³⁸ In this case, the Court, in the absence of a State Department ‘suggestion’ as to the immunity of the defendants, a branch of the Spanish Ministry of Commerce, affirmed jurisdiction since the chartering of a ship to transport wheat was not strictly a political or public act. The restrictive theory approach was endorsed by four Supreme Court Justices in *Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Cuba*.³⁹

As far as the United Kingdom was concerned, the adoption of the restrictive approach occurred rather later.⁴⁰ In the *Philippine Admiral* case,⁴¹ the vessel, which was owned by the Philippine government, had writs issued against it in Hong Kong by two shipping corporations. The Privy Council, hearing the case on appeal from the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, reviewed previous decisions on sovereign immunity and concluded that it would not follow the *Porto Alexandre* case.⁴² Lord Cross gave four reasons for not following the earlier case. First, that the Court of Appeal wrongly felt that they were bound

by the *Parlement Belge*⁴³ decision. Secondly, that the House of Lords in the *Cristina* case⁴⁴ had been divided on the issue of immunity for state-owned vessels engaged in commerce. Thirdly, that the trend of opinion was against the absolute immunity doctrine; and, fourthly, that it was ‘wrong’ to apply the doctrine since states could in the Western world be sued in their own courts on commercial contracts and there was no reason why foreign states should not be equally liable to be sued.⁴⁵ Thus, the Privy Council held that in cases where a state-owned merchant ship involved in ordinary trade was the object of a writ, it would not be entitled to sovereign immunity and the litigation would proceed.

In the case of *Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v. Government of Pakistan*,⁴⁶ a German-owned ship on charter to carry goods from Poland to Pakistan had been bombed in Karachi by Indian planes during the 1971 war. Since the agreement provided for disputes to be settled by arbitration in England, the matter came eventually before the English courts. The cargo had previously been consigned to a Pakistani corporation, and that corporation had been taken over by the Pakistani government. The shipowners sued the government for the sixty-seven-day delay in unloading that had resulted from the bombing. The government pleaded sovereign immunity and sought to have the action dismissed.

The Court of Appeal decided that since all the relevant events had taken place outside the jurisdiction and in view of the action being *in personam* against the foreign government rather than against the ship itself, the general principle of sovereign immunity would have to stand.

Lord Denning declared in this case that there were certain exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It did not apply where the action concerned land situated in the United Kingdom, trust funds lodged in the United Kingdom or debts incurred in the jurisdiction for services rendered to property in the United Kingdom, nor was there any immunity when a commercial transaction was entered into with a trader in the United Kingdom ‘and a dispute arises which is properly within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts’.⁴⁷

This unfortunate split approach – absolute immunity for actions *in personam* and restrictive immunity for actions *in rem* – did not, however, last long. In *Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria*,⁴⁸ all three judges of the Court of Appeal accepted the validity of the restrictive approach as being consonant with justice, comity and international practice.⁴⁹ The problem of precedent was resolved for two of the judges by declaring that international law knew no doctrine of *stare decisis*.⁵⁰ The clear acceptance of the restrictive theory of immunity in *Trendtex* was reaffirmed in later cases,⁵¹ particularly by the House of Lords in the *I° Congreso del Partido* case⁵² and in *Alcom Ltd v. Colombia*.⁵³

The majority of states now have tended to accept the restrictive immunity doctrine⁵⁴ and this has been reflected in domestic legislation.⁵⁵ In particular, the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976⁵⁶ provides in section 1605 for the grounds upon which a state may be subject to the jurisdiction (as general exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state), while the UK State Immunity Act 1978⁵⁷ similarly provides for a general rule of

immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts with a range of exceptions thereto.⁵⁸

The former Soviet Union and some other countries generally adhered to the absolute immunity theory, although in practice entered into many bilateral agreements permitting the exercise of jurisdiction in cases where a commercial contract had been signed on the territory of the other state party.⁵⁹ That the restrictive approach is now the dominant one in international law and practice was recognised by the International Court in *Germany v. Italy* (Merits).⁶⁰ However, not all states are willing to forego the absolute approach.⁶¹

Sovereign and Non-Sovereign Acts

With the acceptance of the restrictive theory, it becomes crucial to analyse the distinction between those acts that would benefit from immunity and those that would not. In the *Victory Transport* case,⁶² the Court declared that it would (in the absence of a State Department suggestion)⁶³ refuse to grant immunity, unless the activity in question fell within one of the categories of strictly political or public acts: viz. internal administrative acts, legislative acts, acts concerning the armed forces or diplomatic activity and public loans.

However, the basic approach of recent legislation⁶⁴ has been to proclaim a rule of immunity and then list the exceptions, so that the onus of proof falls on the other side of the line.⁶⁵ This approach is mirrored in article 5 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 2004, which notes that:⁶⁶

A state enjoys immunity in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state subject to the provisions of the present Convention.

In such circumstances, the way in which the ‘state’ is defined for sovereign immunity purposes becomes important. Article 2(1)(b) of the Convention declares that ‘state’ means: (i) the state and its various organs of government; (ii) constituent units of a federal state or political subdivisions of the state, which are entitled to perform acts in the exercise of sovereign authority, and are acting in that capacity; (iii) agencies or instrumentalities of the state or other entities, to the extent that they are entitled to perform and are actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the state; and (iv) representatives of the state acting in that capacity.⁶⁷

With the adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity, the appropriate test becomes whether the activity in question is of itself sovereign (*jure imperii*) or non-sovereign (*jure gestionis*). In determining this, the predominant approach has been to focus upon the nature of the transaction rather than its purpose.⁶⁸

However, it should be noted that article 2(2) of the Convention provides that:

In determining whether a contract or transaction is a ‘commercial transaction’ . . . reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its

purpose should also be taken into account if the parties to the contract or transaction have so agreed, or if, in the practice of the state of the forum, that purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the contract or transaction.

The reason for the modified ‘nature’ test was in order to provide an adequate safeguard and protection for developing countries, particularly as they attempt to promote national economic development. The ILC Commentary notes that a two-stage approach is posited, to be applied successively. First, reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction and, if it is established that it is non-commercial or governmental in nature, no further inquiry would be needed. If, however, the contract or transaction appeared to be commercial, then reference to its purpose should be made in order to determine whether the contract or transaction was truly sovereign or not. States should be given an opportunity to maintain that in their practice a particular contract or transaction should be treated as non-commercial since its purpose is clearly public and supported by reasons of state. Examples given include the procurement of medicaments to fight a spreading epidemic, and food supplies.⁶⁹ This approach, a modification of earlier drafts,⁷⁰ is not uncontroversial and some care is required. It would, for example, be unhelpful if the purpose criterion were to be adopted in a manner which would permit it to be used to effect a considerable retreat from the restrictive immunity approach. This is not to say, however, that no consideration whatsoever of the purpose of the transaction in question should be undertaken.

Lord Wilberforce in *I° Congreso del Partido*⁷¹ emphasised that in considering whether immunity should be recognised one had to consider the whole context in which the claim is made in order to identify the ‘relevant act’ which formed the basis of that claim. In particular, was it an act *jure gestionis*, or in other words ‘an act of a private law character such as a private citizen might have entered into’?⁷² This use of the private law/public law dichotomy, familiar to civil law systems, was particularly noticeable, although different states draw the distinction at different points.⁷³ It should also be noted, however, that this distinction is less familiar to common law systems. In addition, the issues ascribed to the governmental sphere as distinct from the private area rest the particular political concept proclaimed by the state in question, so that a clear and comprehensive international consensus regarding the line of distinction is unlikely.⁷⁴ The characterisation of an act as *jure gestionis* or *jure imperii* will also depend upon the perception of the issue at hand by the courts. Lord Wilberforce also noted that while the existence of a governmental purpose or motive could not convert what would otherwise be an act *jure gestionis* or an act of private law into one done *jure imperii*,⁷⁵ purpose may be relevant if throwing some light upon the nature of what was done.⁷⁶

The importance of the contextual approach at least as the starting point of the investigation was also emphasised by the Canadian Supreme Court in *United States v. Public Service Alliance of Canada and Others (Re Canada Labour Code)*.⁷⁷ It was noted that the contextual approach was the only reasonable basis for applying the restrictive immunity doctrine for the alternative was to attempt the impossible, ‘an antiseptic distillation of a “once-and-for-all” characterisation of the activity in question, entirely divorced from its

purpose'.⁷⁸ The issue was also considered by the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, in *Reid v. Nauru*,⁷⁹ which stated that in some situations the separation of act, motive and purpose might not be possible. The motive or purpose underlying particular conduct may constitute part of the definition of the act itself in some cases, while in others the nature or quality of the act performed might not be ascertainable without reference to the context within which it is carried out. The Court also made the point that a relevant factor was the perception held or policy adopted in each particular country as to the attributes of sovereignty itself.⁸⁰ The point that 'unless we can inquire into the purpose of such acts, we cannot determine their nature' was also made by the US Court of Appeals in *De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua and Others*.⁸¹

The particular issue raised in the *Congreso* case was whether immunity could be granted where, while the initial transaction was clearly commercial, the cause of the breach of the contract in question appeared to be an exercise of sovereign authority. In that case, two vessels operated by a Cuban state-owned shipping enterprise and delivering sugar to a Chilean company were ordered by the Cuban government to stay away from Chile after the Allende regime had been overthrown. The Cuban government pleaded sovereign immunity on the grounds that the breach of the contract was occasioned as a result of a foreign policy decision. The House of Lords did not accept this and argued that once a state had entered the trading field, it would require a high standard of proof of a sovereign act for immunity to be introduced. Lord Wilberforce emphasised that:

in order to withdraw its action from the sphere of acts done *jure gestionis*, a state must be able to point to some act clearly done *jure imperii*⁸²

and that the appropriate test was to be expressed as follows:

it is not just that the purpose or motive of the act is to serve the purposes of the state, but that the act is of its own character a governmental act, as opposed to an act which any private citizen can perform.⁸³

In the circumstances of the case, that test had not been satisfied. One of the two ships, the *Playa Larga*, had been owned at all relevant times by the Cuban government, but the second ship, the *Marble Islands*, was owned by a trading enterprise not entitled to immunity. When this ship was on the high seas, it was taken over by the Cuban government and ordered to proceed to North Vietnam, where its cargo was eventually donated to the people of that country. The Court was unanimous in rejecting the plea of immunity with regard to the *Playa Larga*, but was split over the second ship.

Two members of the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies, felt that the key element with regard to the *Marble Islands*, as distinct from the *Playa Larga*, where the government had acted as owner of the ship and not as governmental authority, was that the Republic of Cuba directed the disposal of the cargo in North Vietnam. This was not part of any commercial

arrangement which was conducted by the demise charterer, who was thus responsible for the civil wrongs committed. The acts of the government were outside this framework and accordingly purely governmental.⁸⁴

However, the majority held that the Cuban government had acted in the context of a private owner in discharging and disposing of the cargo in North Vietnam and had not regarded itself as acting in the exercise of sovereign powers. Everything had been done in purported reliance upon private law rights in that the demise charterers had sold the cargo to another Cuban state enterprise by ordinary private law sale and in purported reliance upon the bill of lading which permitted the sale in particular instances. It was the purchaser that donated the cargo to the Vietnamese people.⁸⁵

In many respects, nevertheless, the minority view is the more acceptable one, in that in reality it was the Cuban government's taking control of the ship and direction of it and its cargo that determined the issue and this was done as a deliberate matter of state policy. The fact that it was accomplished by the private law route rather than, for example, by direct governmental decree should not settle the issue conclusively. In fact, one thing that the case does show is how difficult it is in reality to distinguish public from private acts.⁸⁶

In *Littrell v. United States (No. 2)*,⁸⁷ Hoffmann LJ in the Court of Appeal emphasised that it would be facile in the case, which concerned medical treatment for a US serviceman on an American base in the United Kingdom, to regard the general military context as such as determinative. One needed to examine carefully all the relevant circumstances in order to decide whether a sovereign or a non-sovereign activity had been involved. Important factors to

be considered included where the activity actually took place, whom it involved and what kind of act itself was involved.⁸⁸ In *Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe*, the House of Lords dealt with a case concerning the activities of a US citizen and civilian teaching at a US military base in the United Kingdom who argued that a memorandum written by the defendant was libellous.⁸⁹ Relying upon Hoffmann LJ's approach, the House of Lords emphasised that the context in which the act concerned took place was the provision of education within a military base, an activity designed 'as part of the process of maintaining forces and associated civilians on the base by US personnel to serve the needs of the US military authorities'.⁹⁰ Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to immunity.

The problem of sovereign immunity with regard to foreign bases was also addressed by the Canadian Supreme Court in *United States v. Public Service Alliance of Canada and Others (Re Canada Labour Code)*.⁹¹ The Court emphasised that employment at the base was a multifaceted activity and could neither be labelled as such as sovereign or commercial in nature. One had to determine which aspects of the activity were relevant to the proceedings at hand and then to assess the impact of the proceedings on these attributes as a whole.⁹² The closer the activity in question was to undisputable sovereign acts, such as managing and operating an offshore military base, the more likely it would be that immunity would be recognised. In *Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company*,⁹³ Lord Goff, giving the leading judgment in the House of Lords, adopted Lord Wilberforce's statement of principle in *Congreso* and held that 'the ultimate test of what constitutes an act *jure imperii* is whether the act in question is of its own character a governmental act, as opposed to an act which any private

citizen can perform’.⁹⁴ Further, the Court held that the fact that an initial act was an act *jure imperii* did not determine as such the characterisation of subsequent acts.⁹⁵

As Lord Dyson MR noted in *Benkharbouche v. Embassy of the Republic of Sudan*,⁹⁶ the ‘distinction between sovereign acts and non-sovereign acts is easy to state but notoriously difficult to apply in practice’. This is so partly because of the evolution of international law and partly because of the evolution of domestic law in relation to changes in society concerning the protected areas of sovereign activity both at home and with regard to foreign states. Accordingly, a case-by-case analysis is required in order to deal with changing circumstances.⁹⁷

State Immunity and Violations of Human Rights⁹⁸

With the increasing attention devoted to the relationship between international human rights law and domestic systems, the question has arisen as to whether the application of sovereign immunity in civil suits against foreign states for violations of human rights law has been affected. In *Saudi Arabia v. Nelson*, the US Supreme Court noted that the only basis for jurisdiction over a foreign state was the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 and, unless a matter fell within one of the exceptions, the plea of immunity would succeed.⁹⁹ It was held that although the alleged wrongful arrest, imprisonment and torture by the Saudi government of Nelson would amount to abuse of the power of its police by that government, ‘a foreign state’s exercise of the power of its police has long been understood for the purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign’.¹⁰⁰ However, the

US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was amended in 1996 by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act which created an exception to immunity with regard to states, designated by the Department of State as terrorist states, which committed a terrorist act, including hostage-taking, or provided material support and resources to an individual or entity which committed such an act which resulted in the death or personal injury of a US citizen.¹⁰¹ In *Simpson v. Libya*, the US Court of Appeals held that the hostage exception to immunity applied where three conditions had been met: where the state in question had been designated as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’; where it had been provided with a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim; and where the claimant or victim was a citizen of the United States. The Court found it unnecessary for the plaintiff to have to show that the hostage-taker had issued a demand showing his intended purposes to a third party, since the definition of hostage-taking focused on the state of mind of the hostage-taker himself. Accordingly, third-party awareness of a hostage-taker’s intent was not a required element.¹⁰² This terrorist exception to immunity has been controversial. The International Court in *Germany v. Italy* (Merits)¹⁰³ took the view that ‘this amendment has no counterpart in the legislation of other States. None of the States which has enacted legislation on the subject of State immunity has made provision for the limitation of immunity on the grounds of the gravity of the acts alleged.’ Canada has adopted similar legislation,¹⁰⁴ but such practice is sparse, although the Italian Court of Cassation in *Flatow v. Iran*¹⁰⁵ did accept that this exception from immunity was legal. In *Kazemi v. Iran*,¹⁰⁶ the Canadian Supreme Court noted that the terrorism exception was to be distinguished from a claimed (but rejected) exception to immunity for allegations of torture, genocide and other grave crimes of international law.

In *Bouzari v. Iran*, the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario, Canada, noted, in the light of the Canadian State Immunity Act 1982, that ‘regardless of the state’s ultimate purpose, exercises of police, law enforcement and security powers are inherently exercises of governmental authority and sovereignty’¹⁰⁷ and concluded that an international custom existed to the effect that there was an ongoing rule providing state immunity for acts of torture committed outside the forum state.¹⁰⁸ The English Court of Appeal in *Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait*¹⁰⁹ held that the State Immunity Act provided for immunity for states apart from specific listed express exceptions, and there was no room for implied exceptions to the general rule even where the violation of a norm of *jus cogens* (such as the prohibition of torture) was involved. The Court rejected an argument that the term ‘immunity’ in domestic legislation meant immunity from sovereign acts that were in accordance with international law, thus excluding torture for which immunity could not be claimed.

A particular issue has been the relationship between sovereign immunity and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which enshrines the rights of due process and fair trial, including the right of access to a court. In *Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe*, the House of Lords held that recognition of sovereign immunity did not involve a violation of article 6 since it was argued that immunity derives from customary international law while the obligations under article 6 derived from a treaty freely entered into by the United Kingdom. Accordingly: ‘The United Kingdom cannot, by its own act of acceding to the Convention and without the consent of the United States, obtain a power of adjudication over the United States which international law

denies it.’¹¹⁰ The European Court of Human Rights in *Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom* analysed this issue, that is whether state immunity could exist with regard to civil proceedings for torture in the light of article 6 of the European Convention.¹¹¹ The Court noted that the grant of sovereign immunity to a state in civil proceedings pursued the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between states through the respect of another state’s sovereignty and that the European Convention on Human Rights should be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law, including that relating to the grant of state immunity.¹¹² The Court concluded that it could not discern in the relevant materials before it, ‘any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a state no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another state where acts of torture are alleged’¹¹³ and held that immunity thus still applied in such cases.¹¹⁴ The European Court reaffirmed this analysis in *Jones v. United Kingdom*.¹¹⁵

In *Jones v. Saudi Arabia*, the House of Lords, faced with claims that individuals had been systematically tortured while in official custody in Saudi Arabia, held that under Part 1 of the State Immunity Act 1978, an approach reflecting that adopted in international law (particularly in the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities), a foreign state was immune unless one of the exceptions provided for in the legislation applied. None of the exceptions mentioned injuries caused by torture abroad.¹¹⁶ Further, the fact that torture was prohibited by a *jus cogens* rule of international law did not suffice to remove the immunity granted by international law to a state nor to confer jurisdiction to hear civil claims in respect of torture committed outside the state where it was sought to exercise jurisdiction.¹¹⁷ Particular emphasis

was placed on the distinction between the prohibition of torture as a substantive rule of law and the existence of the rule of immunity which constitutes a procedural bar to the exercise of jurisdiction and does not contradict the prohibition.¹¹⁸ Lord Hoffmann underlined that as a matter of international practice, no procedural rule of international law had developed enabling states to assume civil jurisdiction over other states in cases in which torture was alleged.¹¹⁹ The issue was re-examined in *Benkharbouche v. Embassy of the Republic of Sudan*,¹²⁰ where the Court of Appeal agreed with the argument by Lord Millett in *Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe*¹²¹ that article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (concerning the rights of due process and fair trial)¹²² were not engaged where the grant of immunity was required by international law. In this case, the claimant was an embassy cook and thus fell within section 16(1)(a) of the State Immunity Act, which excluded the employment of the members of a diplomatic mission from the exception from immunity in the case of employment contracts in section 4 of the Act. In other words, immunity existed in this situation from the jurisdiction of the court.¹²³ Accordingly, section 16(1)(a) was incompatible with article 6 of the European Convention with regard to the case in question.¹²⁴

The matter then came before the Supreme Court,¹²⁵ where it was emphasised that the rule in customary international law was that a state was entitled to immunity only in respect of acts done in the exercise of sovereign authority. It was held that there was no principle of international law that deprived the courts of jurisdiction and that (contrary to the view of the Court of Appeal) article 6 was engaged and that the jurisdictional question raised in *Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe* did not arise.¹²⁶ The employment and alleged treatment of the

persons in question were not exercises of sovereign authority, thus the employers were not entitled to immunity here and in so far as sections 4(2)(b) and 16(1)(a) of the State Immunity Act conferred immunity they were incompatible with article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.¹²⁷

In the case of criminal proceedings, the situation is rather different. Part I of the State Immunity Act (the substantive part) does not apply to criminal proceedings, although Part III (concerning certain status issues) does. In *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)*,¹²⁸ the House of Lords held by six votes to one that General Pinochet was not entitled to immunity in extradition proceedings (which are criminal proceedings) with regard to charges of torture and conspiracy to torture where the alleged acts took place after the relevant states (Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom) had become parties to the Convention against Torture, although the decision focused on head of state immunity and the terms of the Convention.¹²⁹ The view that rules of *jus cogens* do not override jurisdictional immunities was underlined by the International Court in *Germany v. Italy (Merits)*.¹³⁰ The Court noted in particular that the rules of state immunity were procedural and concerned only the exercise of jurisdiction and did not affect the question whether or not the activity was unlawful.¹³¹

Commercial Acts

Of all state activities for which immunity is no longer to be obtained,¹³² that of commercial transactions is the primary example and the definition of such activity is crucial.¹³³

Section 3(3) of the State Immunity Act 1978 defines the term ‘commercial transaction’ to mean:

- (a)** any contract for the supply of goods or services;
- (b)** any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation; and
- (c)** any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, professional or other similar character) into which a state enters or in which it engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority.

Thus, a wide range of transactions are covered¹³⁴ and, as Lord Diplock pointed out,¹³⁵ the 1978 Act does not adopt the straightforward dichotomy between acts *jure imperii* and those *jure gestionis*. Any contract falling within section 3 would be subject to the exercise of jurisdiction and the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign acts in this context would not be relevant, except in so far as transactions falling within section 3(3)(c) were concerned, in the light of the use of the term ‘sovereign authority’. The Act contains no reference to the public/private question, but the *Congreso* case (dealing with the pre-Act law) would seem to permit examples from foreign jurisdictions to be drawn upon in order to determine the nature of ‘the exercise of sovereign authority’.

Section 3(1) of the State Immunity Act provides that a state is not immune as regards proceedings relating to:

- (a)** a commercial transaction entered into by the state; or

(b) an obligation of the state which by virtue of a contract (whether a commercial transaction or not) falls to be performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom.¹³⁶

The scope of section 3(1)(a) was discussed by the Court in *Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v. Commonwealth of Australia*.¹³⁷ This case arose out of the collapse of the International Tin Council in 1985. The ensuing litigation sought, by various routes, to ascertain whether the member states of the ITC (which was itself an international organisation with separate personality) could be held liable themselves for the debts of that organisation – a prospect vigorously opposed by the states concerned. The case in question concerned an attempt by the brokers and banks to hold the member states of the ITC liable in tort for losses caused by misrepresentation and fraudulent trading.

It was argued by the defendants that as far as section 3(1) was concerned, the activity in question had to be not only commercial within the Act's definition, but also undertaken 'otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority'. Evans J saw little difference in practice between the two terms in the context.¹³⁸ The defendants also argued that the term 'activity' meant something more than a single act or sequence of acts. Evans J did not accept this, but did emphasise that the activity in question had to be examined in context. It was held that both the trading and loan contracts under discussion in the case were commercial and that, if it could be demonstrated that the member states of the ITC had authorised them, such authorisation would amount to commercial activity within the meaning of section 3.¹³⁹ However, in practice the distinction between commercial activities undertaken by a

state and activities undertaken under the colour of sovereign authority may be a difficult one to draw. In *AIC Ltd v. Federal Government of Nigeria*, the High Court decided that proceedings to register a foreign judgment were not proceedings relating to a commercial transaction even if the foreign judgment concerned proceedings relating to such a transaction, so that the exception to immunity did not apply.¹⁴⁰ In response to defaults by some states during the international debt crisis of recent years, the phenomenon of investors purchasing discounted sovereign bonds and then seeking to recover the full amount by suing the state concerned has manifested itself. This raised sovereign immunity issues. In *NML Capital v. Argentina*,¹⁴¹ the UK Supreme Court held that proceedings to enforce a foreign judgment (in favour of such purchasers of sovereign bonds) would not fall within section 3(1) as there was no exception for foreign judgments. Thus, the general principle of immunity under the structure of the State Immunity Act applied.¹⁴² However, it was noted that section 31 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, allowing for the enforcement in the United Kingdom of a judgment given by a foreign court against another state, could constitute an alternative to the State Immunity Act regime, where the foreign court would have had jurisdiction in the matter if it had applied rules corresponding to the Act.

In *KJ International v. MV Oscar Jupiter*, the Supreme Court of South Africa held that a commercial transaction was not necessarily a transaction with a commercial purpose and that where a ship had been transferred by the Romanian government to one company which had then transferred it to another, the activities of the latter could not be seen as commercial transactions of the government. Accordingly, no loss of immunity would take place for this reason. However, the transfer of the ship by the Romanian

government to the Moldovan government to be operated by the latter for profit did constitute a commercial transaction, so that immunity was lost.¹⁴³ In *Svenska Petroleum v. Lithuania*, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the distinction between a commercial transaction and a transaction entered into by a state in the exercise of its sovereign authority drawn in section 3 of the State Immunity Act, which was virtually identical to article 2(1)(c) of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities which was accepted as reflecting the current international thinking on the topic,¹⁴⁴ was not an easy matter to determine.¹⁴⁵ It was held that section 3 was one of a group of sections dealing with the courts' adjudicative jurisdiction and that it was therefore natural to interpret the phrase in that context as being directed to the subject-matter of the proceedings themselves rather than the source of the legal relationship which had given rise to them.¹⁴⁶ Accordingly, the government of Lithuania was not immune from proceedings to enforce an arbitral award.

The scope of section 3(1)(b) was discussed by the Court of Appeal in *Maclaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry*,¹⁴⁷ which concerned the direct action by the brokers and banks against the member states of the ITC in respect of liability for the debts of the organisation on a contractual basis. It was held that the 'contract' referred to need not have been entered into by the state as such. That particular phrase was absent from section 3(1)(b). Accordingly, the member states would not have been able to benefit from immunity in the kind of secondary liability of a guarantee nature that the plaintiffs were *inter alia* basing their case upon.¹⁴⁸ This view was adopted in the tort action against the member states¹⁴⁹ in the more difficult context where the obligation in question was a tortious obligation on the part of the member states, that is the authorisation or procuring of a misrepresentation

inducing the creditors concerned to make a contract with another party (the ITC).¹⁵⁰

Section 1603(d) of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 defines ‘commercial activity’ as ‘a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act’. It is also noted that the commercial character of an activity is to be determined by reference to the nature of the activity rather than its purpose. The courts have held that the purchases of food were commercial activities,¹⁵¹ as were purchases of cement,¹⁵² the sending by a government ministry of artists to perform in the United States under a US impresario¹⁵³ and activities by state airlines.¹⁵⁴

The issuance of foreign governmental Treasury notes has also been held to constitute a commercial activity, but one which once validly statute-barred by passage of time cannot be revived or altered.¹⁵⁵

In *Callejo v. Bancomer*,¹⁵⁶ a case in which a Mexican bank refused to redeem a certificate of deposit, the District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the bank was an instrumentality of the Mexican government and thus benefited from sovereign immunity, although the Court of Appeals decided the issue on the basis that the act of state doctrine applied since an investigation of a sovereign act performed wholly within the foreign government’s territory would otherwise be required. In other cases, US courts have dealt with the actions of Mexican banks consequent upon Mexican exchange control regulations on the basis of sovereign immunity.¹⁵⁷ However, the Supreme Court in *Argentina v. Weltover Inc.*¹⁵⁸ held that the act of issuing government bonds was a commercial activity and the unilateral

rescheduling of payment of these bonds also constituted a commercial activity. The Court, noting that the term ‘commercial’ was largely undefined in the legislation, took the view that its definition related to the meaning it had under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and particularly as discussed in *Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Cuba*.¹⁵⁹ Accordingly, ‘when a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign’s actions are “commercial” within the meaning of the FSIA . . . the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motives behind them) are the *type* of actions by which a private party engages in “trade or traffic or commerce”’ (emphasis in the original). In this case, the bonds in question were debt instruments that could be held by private persons and were negotiable and could be traded on the international market.¹⁶⁰ This approach was followed in *Guevera v. Peru* by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that a foreign state’s offer of a reward in exchange for information concerning a fugitive fell within the ‘commercial activity’ exception to immunity.¹⁶¹

The purchase of military equipment by Haiti for use by its army¹⁶² and a military training agreement whereby a foreign soldier was in the United States were held not to be commercial activities.¹⁶³ It has also been decided that Somalia’s participation in an Agency for International Development programme constituted a public or governmental act,¹⁶⁴ while the publication of a libel in a journal distributed in the United States was not a commercial activity where the journal concerned constituted an official commentary of the Soviet government.¹⁶⁵ Section 1604(a)(4) also provides for an exception to immunity where ‘rights in immovable property situated in the United

States are in issue’ and the Supreme Court in *Permanent Mission of India to the United States v. City of New York* held that this provided jurisdiction over a suit brought by New York City to establish tax liens on real property owned by the governments of India and Mongolia.¹⁶⁶

Many cases before the US courts have, however, centred upon the jurisdictional requirements of section 1605(a), which states that a foreign state is not immune in any case in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a foreign state’s commercial activity elsewhere; or upon an act outside US territory in connection with a foreign state’s commercial activity elsewhere, when that act causes a direct effect in the United States.¹⁶⁷

In *Zedan v. Saudi Arabia*,¹⁶⁸ for example, the US Court of Appeals in discussing the scope of section 1605(a)(2) emphasised that the commercial activity in question taking place in the United States had to be substantial, so that a telephone call in the United States which initiated a sequence of events which resulted in the plaintiff working in Saudi Arabia was not sufficient. Additionally, where an act is performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of a foreign state elsewhere, this act must in itself be sufficient to form the basis of a cause of action,¹⁶⁹ while the direct effect in the US provision of an act abroad in connection with a foreign state’s commercial activity elsewhere was subject to a high threshold. As the Court noted,¹⁷⁰ in cases where this clause was held to have been satisfied, ‘something legally significant actually happened in the United States’.¹⁷¹ However, in *Argentina v. Weltover Inc.*,¹⁷² the Court rejected the suggestion

that section 1605(a)(2) contained any unexpressed requirement as to substantiality or foreseeability and supported the Court of Appeals' view that an effect was direct if it followed as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity.¹⁷³ In the case, it was sufficient that the respondents had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment and Argentina had made some interest payments into them prior to the rescheduling decision.

Article 10 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities provides that there is no immunity where a state engages in a 'commercial transaction' with a foreign natural or juridical person (but not another state) in a situation where by virtue of the rules of private international law a dispute comes before the courts of another state, unless the parties to the commercial transaction otherwise expressly agree. However, the immunity of a state is unaffected where a state enterprise or other entity established by a state which has an independent legal personality and is capable of suing or being sued and acquiring, owning or possessing and disposing of property, including property which that state has authorised it to operate or manage, is involved in a proceeding which relates to a commercial transaction in which that entity is engaged.

Article 2(1)(c) of the Convention provides that the term 'commercial transaction' means:

(i) any commercial contract or transaction for the sale of goods or the supply of services;

(ii) any contract for a loan or other transaction of a financial nature, including any obligation of guarantee or of indemnity in respect of any such loan or transaction;

(iii) any other contract or transaction of a commercial, industrial, trading or professional nature, but not including a contract of employment of persons.¹⁷⁴

Contracts of Employment

Article 11 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities provides that states can claim immunity in cases of disputes between an employee and a foreign state over employment contracts where the person in question has been exercising governmental functions. Section 4(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 provides that a state is not immune as regards proceedings relating to a contract of employment between the state and an individual where the contract was made in the United Kingdom or where the work is to be performed wholly or in part there.¹⁷⁵ The section does not apply if at the time of the proceedings the individual is a national of the state concerned¹⁷⁶ or at the time the contract was made the individual was neither a national nor habitual resident of the United Kingdom or the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing. However, these provisions do not apply with regard to members of a diplomatic mission or consular post under section 16(1)(a) of the Act, a fact that rendered section 4(1) significantly weaker.¹⁷⁷ There has been a number of cases concerning immunity and contracts of employment, particularly with regard to employment at foreign embassies. In *Sengupta v. India*, for example, a broad decision prior to the 1978 Act, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held on the basis of customary law that

immunity existed with regard to a contract of employment dispute since the workings of the mission in question constituted a form of sovereign activity.¹⁷⁸ The question was re-examined, however, by the Supreme Court in *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*,¹⁷⁹ in the context of the rights of due process and fair trial under article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court criticised the broad test adopted in *Sengupta* and concluded that the test of immunity with regard to embassy employees was whether or not their employment and/or treatment constituted exercises of sovereign authority or engaged the sovereign interests of their employees.¹⁸⁰

The position in other countries is varied. In *United States v. Public Service Alliance of Canada and Others (Re Canada Labour Code)*, for example, it was held that the conduct of labour relations at a foreign military base was not a commercial activity so that the United States was entitled to sovereign immunity in proceedings before a labour tribunal,¹⁸¹ while in *Norwegian Embassy v. Quattri*, for example, the Italian Court of Cassation referred to an international trend of restricting immunity with regard to employment contracts. The Court held that under customary international law immunity was available, but this was restricted to acts carried out in the exercise of the foreign state's public law functions. Accordingly, no immunity existed with regard to acts carried out by the foreign state in the capacity of a private individual under the internal law of the receiving state. An example of this would be employment disputes where the employees' duties were of a merely auxiliary nature and not intrinsic to the foreign public law entity.¹⁸² In *Barrandon v. United States*, the French Court of Cassation (1992) and

subsequently the Court of Appeal of Versailles (1995) held that immunity was a privilege not guaranteed by an international treaty to which France was a party and could only be invoked by a state which believed it was entitled to rely upon it. Immunity from jurisdiction was limited to acts of sovereign power (*puissance publique*) or acts performed in the interest of a public service. In the instant case, the plaintiff, a nurse and medical secretary at the US embassy, had performed functions clearly in the interest of a public service of the respondent state and immunity was therefore applicable.¹⁸³ However, on appeal the Court of Cassation (1998) reversed this decision and held that her tasks did not give her any special responsibility for the performance of the public service of the embassy, so that her dismissal was an ordinary act of administration so that immunity was not applicable.¹⁸⁴ Practice is far from consistent. Courts in a number of states have accepted immunity claims in such state immunity/employment situations,¹⁸⁵ while courts in others have rejected such claims.¹⁸⁶ In *United States v. Bachbat*,¹⁸⁷ the Israel National Labour Court held that the United States was entitled to foreign sovereign immunity in relation to a claim filed due to termination of an employment contract of an employee of its Consulate in Jerusalem. The Court held that immunity should be accorded because the former employee had performed functions that were directly and inextricably related to the exercise of US governmental authority and on the grounds that the nature of the claim made against the United States would require the Court to assess the reasons for the former employee's dismissal, which concerned national security.

The European Court of Human Rights has adopted a cautious approach, bearing in mind the importance of the right of access to a court under article 6

of the European Convention on Human Rights, noting that immunity depended upon the exercise of governmental functions, so that, for example, a switchboard operator in the Polish embassy in Vilnius, Lithuania,¹⁸⁸ and an accountant at the Kuwaiti embassy in Paris¹⁸⁹ could not be prevented from obtaining redress before the local courts on the grounds of immunity.¹⁹⁰

Other Non-Immunity Areas

Domestic and international instruments prohibit sovereign immunity in cases of tortious activity.¹⁹¹ Article 11 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972, for example, refers to ‘redress for injury to the person or damage to tangible property, if the facts which occasioned the injury or damage occurred in the territory of the state of the forum, and if the author of the injury or damage was present in that territory at the time when those facts occurred’.¹⁹²

Section 5 of the UK State Immunity Act provides that a state is not immune as regards proceedings in respect of death or personal injury, or damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or omission in the United Kingdom,¹⁹³ while section 1605(a)(5) of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, although basically similar, does include exceptions relating to the exercise of the state’s discretionary functions and to claims arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contractual rights. In *Letelier v. Chile*,¹⁹⁴ the Court rejected a claim that the torts exception in this legislation referred only to private acts and held that it could apply to political assassinations.¹⁹⁵ In *Natoniowski v. Germany*,¹⁹⁶ the Polish Supreme Court

expressed the view that this territorial tort exception to immunity constituted a principle of customary international law.

Sections 6 to 11 of the UK Act detail the remainder of the wide-ranging non-immunity areas and include proceedings relating to immovable property (section 6)¹⁹⁷ except with regard to proceedings concerning a state's title to or right to possession of property used for the purposes of a diplomatic mission;¹⁹⁸ patents, trademarks, designs, plant breeders' rights or copyrights (section 7); proceedings relating to a state's membership of a body corporate, an unincorporated body or partnership, with members other than states, which is incorporated or constituted under UK law or is controlled from or has its principal place of business in the United Kingdom (section 8); where a state has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration and with regard to proceedings in the UK courts relating to that arbitration (section 9);¹⁹⁹ Admiralty proceedings with regard to state-owned ships used or intended for use for commercial purposes (section 10); and proceedings relating to liability for various taxes, such as VAT (section 11). This, together with generally similar provisions in the legislation of other states,²⁰⁰ demonstrates how restricted the concept of sovereign acts is now becoming in practice in the context of sovereign immunity, although definitional problems remain.

The Personality Issue – Instrumentalities and Parts of the State²⁰¹

Whether the absolute or restrictive theory is applied, the crucial factor is to determine the entity entitled to immunity. If the entity, in very general terms, is not part of the apparatus of state, then no immunity can arise. Shaw LJ in *Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria*²⁰² cautioned against too facile an attribution of immunity particularly in the light of the growth of governmental functions, since its acceptance resulted in a significant disadvantage to the other party.

A department of government would, however, be entitled to immunity, even if it had a separate legal personality under its own law.²⁰³ The issue was discussed in detail in the *Trendtex* case. It was emphasised that recourse should be had to all the circumstances of the case. The fact of incorporation as a separate legal identity was noted in *Baccus SRL v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo*²⁰⁴ and both Donaldson J at first instance and Denning MR emphasised this.²⁰⁵ The question arises in analysing whether a body is a corporation or not, and indeed whether it is or is not an arm of government, as to which law is relevant. Each country may have its own rules governing incorporation, and similarly with regard to government departments. Should English law therefore merely accept the conclusions of the foreign law? The majority of the Court in *Baccus* was of the view that foreign law was decisive in questions relating to incorporation and whether corporateness was consistent with the recognition of immunity, and to a certain extent this was accepted in *Trendtex*. Shaw LJ declared that ‘the constitution and powers of Nigerian

corporation must be viewed in the light of the domestic law of Nigeria'.²⁰⁶ However, the status on the international scene of the entity in question must be decided, it was held, by the law of the country in which the issue as to its status has been raised. The Court had to determine whether the Nigerian Bank could constitute a government department as understood in English law.²⁰⁷ It was also noted that where a material difference existed between English law and the foreign law, this would be taken into account, but the Court was satisfied that this was not the case in *Trendtex*.

This position of pre-eminence for English law must not be understood to imply the application of decisions of English courts relating to immunities granted internally. These could be at best only rough guides to be utilised depending on the circumstances of each case. If the view taken by the foreign law was not conclusive, neither was the attitude adopted by the foreign government. It was a factor to be considered, again, but no more than that. In this, the Court followed *Krajina v. Tass Agency*.²⁰⁸ The point was also made that the evidence provided by Nigerian officials, including the High Commissioner, that the Bank was a government organ, was not conclusive. This was because the officials might very well be applying a test of governmental control which would not be decisive for the courts of this country.²⁰⁹

Of more importance was the legislative intention of the government in creating and regulating the entity and the degree of its control. Stephenson LJ in fact based his decision upon this point. An express provision in the creative legislation to the effect that the Bank was an arm of government was not necessary, but the Bank had to prove that the intention to make it an

organ of the Nigerian state was of necessity to be implied from the enabling Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958 and subsequent decrees. This the Bank had failed to do and Stephenson LJ accordingly allowed the appeal.²¹⁰ It could be argued that the judge was placing too much stress upon this aspect, particularly in the light of the overall approach of the Court in applying the functional rather than the personality test. In many ways, Stephenson LJ was also looking at the attributes of the Bank, but from a slightly different perspective. He examined the powers and duties of the entity and denied it immunity since the intention of the government to establish the Bank as an arm of itself could not be clearly demonstrated. The other judges were concerned with the functions of the Bank as implying governmental status *per se*.

The Court clearly accepted the functional test as the crucial guide to the determination of sovereign immunity. In this it was following the modern approach which has precipitated the change in emphasis from the personality of the entity for which immunity is claimed to the nature of the subject-matter. This functional test looks to the powers, duties and control of the entity within the framework of its constitution and activities.

In such difficult borderline decisions, the proposition put forward by Shaw LJ is to be welcomed. He noted that:

where the issue of status trembles on a fine edge, the absence of any positive indication that the body in question was intended to possess sovereign status and its attendant

privileges must perforce militate against the view that it enjoys that status or is entitled to those privileges.²¹¹

In *Czarnikow Ltd v. Rolimpex*,²¹² the House of Lords accepted as correct the findings of the arbitrators that although Rolimpex had been established by the Polish government and was controlled by it, it was not so closely connected with the government as to be an organ or department of the state. It had separate legal personality and had considerable freedom in day-to-day commercial activities.

Under section 14(1) of the State Immunity Act of 1978, a state is deemed to include the sovereign or other head of state in his public capacity,²¹³ the government and any department of that government, but not any entity ‘which is distinct from the executive organs of the government of the state and capable of suing or being sued’. This modifies the *Baccus* and *Trendtex* approaches to some extent. Such a separate entity would only be immune if the proceedings related to acts done ‘in the exercise of sovereign authority’ and the circumstances are such that a state would have been so immune.²¹⁴ In determining such a situation, all the relevant circumstances should be taken into consideration.²¹⁵ In *Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company*, the House of Lords, in discussing the position of the Iraqi Airways Company (IAC), analysed the relevant transactions as a whole, but felt able to separate out differing elements and treat them discretely. In brief, aircraft of the plaintiffs (KAC) had been seized by IAC consequent upon the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and pursuant to orders from the Iraqi government. Revolutionary Command Council²¹⁶ resolution 369 purported to dissolve

KAC and transfer all of its assets to IAC. From that point on, IAC treated the aircraft in question as part of its own fleet. The issue was whether the fact that the initial appropriation was by governmental action meant that the plea of immunity continued to be available to IAC. The House of Lords held that it was not. Once resolution 369 came into effect the situation changed and immunity was no longer applicable since the retention and use of the aircraft were not acts done in the exercise of sovereign authority. A characterisation of the appropriation of the property as a sovereign act could not be determinative of the characterisation of its subsequent retention and use.²¹⁷

The US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides in section 1603 that ‘foreign state’ includes a political subdivision of such a state and its agencies or instrumentalities. This is defined to mean any entity which is a separate legal person and which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof and which is neither a citizen of a state of the United States nor created under the laws of any third country.²¹⁸ This issue of personality has occasioned problems and some complex decisions.²¹⁹

In *First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba* (*Bancec*),²²⁰ for example, the Supreme Court suggested a presumption of separateness for state entities, under which their separate legal personalities were to be recognised unless applicable equitable principles mandated otherwise or the parent entity so completely dominated the subsidiary as to render it an agent of the parent.²²¹

The meaning of the term ‘government’ as it appears in section 14(1) of the State Immunity Act was discussed in *Propend Finance Property v. Sing*. The Court of Appeal held that it must be given a broad meaning and, in particular, that it should be construed in the light of the concept of sovereign authority. Accordingly, ‘government’ meant more than it would in other contexts in English law where it would mean simply the government of the United Kingdom. In particular, it would include the performance of police functions as part of governmental activity. Further, individual employees or officers of a foreign state were entitled to the same protection as that which envelops the state itself. The Court thus concluded that both the Australian Federal Police superintendent and Commissioner, the defendants in the case, were covered by state immunity.²²² The view that the agent of a foreign state would enjoy immunity in respect of his acts of a sovereign or governmental nature was reaffirmed in *Re P (No. 2)*. The Court accepted that the removal from the country of the family of a diplomat based in the United Kingdom and their return to the United States at the end of his mission was in compliance with a direct order from his government. This was held to constitute an act of a governmental nature and thus subject to state immunity.²²³ In *Jones v. Saudi Arabia*, the House of Lords, overturning the Court of Appeal decision to the contrary on this point, held that there was ‘a wealth of authority to show that . . . the foreign state is entitled to claim immunity for its servants as it could if sued itself. The foreign state’s right to immunity cannot be circumvented by suing its servants or agents.’²²⁴ Immunity would similarly exist where the foreign state had been indirectly impleaded. Impleading would occur where the claim requires the foreign state to adopt a position of either having to defend itself and forgo its immunity or have a judgment entered against it, so that it is bound by the judgment²²⁵ or more simply when a state ‘was named

as a party in proceedings’, while a state would be indirectly impleaded where ‘proceedings were brought in relation to property in its ownership, possession or control’.²²⁶

One particular issue that has caused controversy in the past relates to the status of component units of federal states.²²⁷ There have been cases asserting immunity²²⁸ and denying immunity²²⁹ in such circumstances. In *Mellenger v. New Brunswick Development Corporation*,²³⁰ Lord Denning emphasised that since under the Canadian Constitution:

Each provincial government, within its own sphere, retained its independence and autonomy directly under the Crown . . . It follows that the Province of New Brunswick is a sovereign state in its own right and entitled if it so wishes to claim sovereign immunity.

However, article 28 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972 provides that constituent states of a federal state do not enjoy immunity, although this general principle is subject to the proviso that federal states parties may declare by notification that their constituent states may invoke the benefits and carry out the obligations of the Convention.²³¹

The State Immunity Act follows this pattern in that component units of a federation are not entitled to immunity. However, section 14(5) provides that the Act may be made applicable to the ‘constituent territories of a federal state by specific Order in Council’.²³² Where no such order is made, any such

‘constituent territory’ would be entitled to immunity only if it conformed with section 14(2), being a separate entity acting in the exercise of sovereign authority and in circumstances in which the state would be immune.²³³ While the matter is thus determined in so far as the Act operates in the particular circumstances, section 16(4) states that Part I of the Act does not apply to criminal proceedings. In the case of *R (Alamieyeseigha) v. Crown Prosecution Service*, the Court did not accept that the state of Bayelsa, a constituent unit of the Nigerian Federation, and its Governor were entitled to state immunity with regard to criminal proceedings, a claim made on the basis of *Mellenger*.²³⁴ Key to the decision was the fact that Bayelsa state had no legal powers to conduct foreign relations on its own behalf, external affairs being exclusively reserved to the federal government under the Nigerian Constitution. As further and decisive evidence, the Court referred to the certificate from the UK Foreign Office to the effect that Bayelsa was a constituent territory of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.²³⁵ In *Pearl Petroleum Company Ltd v. The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq*,²³⁶ the High Court, faced with a claim from the respondent to be a ‘separate entity’ under the Act, found that it had in the circumstances, and in the light of the Iraqi Constitution, contracted ‘in the exercise of sovereign authority’, although immunity was lost due to submission to the jurisdiction under section 9 of the Act (agreement to arbitration).

Article 2(1)(b) of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, it should be noted, includes within its definition of state, ‘constituent units of a federal state’.²³⁷ The issue of the status of the European Community in this context was raised in the course of the ITC litigation as the EEC was a party to the sixth International Tin Agreement 1982, under which the ITC was

constituted. The Court of Appeal in *MacLaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry*²³⁸ held that the EEC's claim to sovereign immunity was untenable. It had been conceded that the EEC was not a state and thus could not rely on the State Immunity Act 1978, but it was argued that the Community was entitled to immunity analogous to sovereign immunity under the rules of common law. This approach was held by Kerr LJ to be 'entirely misconceived'.²³⁹ Although the EEC had personality in international law and was able to exercise powers and functions analogous to those of sovereign states, this did not lead on to immunity as such. This was because sovereign immunity was 'a derogation from the normal exercise of jurisdiction by the courts and should be accorded only in clear cases',²⁴⁰ while the concept itself was based upon the equality of states. The EEC Treaty 1957 and the Merger Treaty 1965 themselves made no claim for general immunity and nothing else existed upon which such a claim could be based.²⁴¹

The Personality Issue – Immunity for Senior Government Figures²⁴²

The question of immunity *ratione personae* arises particularly and most strongly, but not exclusively, in the case of heads of state. Such immunity issues may come into play either with regard to international tribunals or within domestic orders. Taking the first, it is clear that serving heads of state, and other governmental officials, may be rendered susceptible to the jurisdiction of international tribunals, depending, of course, upon the terms of the constitutions of such tribunals. The provisions of, for example, the Versailles Treaty 1919 (article 227); the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 1945 (article 7); the Statutes of the Yugoslav and Rwanda International Criminal Tribunals (articles 7 and 6 respectively); the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 (article 27); and the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 2002 (article 6(2)) all expressly state that individual criminal responsibility will exist irrespective of any official status, including that of head of state. This was reaffirmed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in its decision concerning the claim for immunity made by Charles Taylor.²⁴³ With regard to the International Criminal Court, the Appeals Chamber in its judgment in the *Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir* case,²⁴⁴ confirmed that Jordan had failed to comply with its obligations under the Rome Statute by not executing the Court's request for the arrest of Al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, while he was on Jordanian territory. The Court also held that there was no customary international law rule prescribing head of state immunity with regard to an international court

and that such immunity had never been recognised in international law as a bar to the jurisdiction of an international court.²⁴⁵

However, the situation of immunity before domestic courts is more complex.²⁴⁶ First, the question of the determination of the status of head of state before domestic courts is primarily a matter for the domestic order of the individual concerned. In *Philippines v. Marcos (No. 1)*,²⁴⁷ for example, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Marcoses, the deposed leader of the Philippines and his wife, were not entitled to claim sovereign immunity. In a further decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in *Re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe No. 770*²⁴⁸ that head of state immunity was primarily an attribute of state sovereignty, not an individual right, and that accordingly full effect should be given to the revocation by the Philippines government of the immunity of the Marcoses.²⁴⁹ Also relevant would be the attitude adopted by the executive in the state in which the case is being brought. In *United States v. Noriega*,²⁵⁰ the District Court noted that head of state immunity was grounded in customary international law, but in order to assert such immunity, a government official must be recognised as head of state and this had not happened with regard to General Noriega.²⁵¹ This was confirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which noted that the judiciary deferred to the executive in matters concerning jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities and, in the Noriega situation, the executive had demonstrated the view that he should not be granted head of state status. This was coupled with the fact that he had never served as constitutional ruler of Panama and that state had not sought immunity for him; further, the charges related to his private enrichment.²⁵² In *First*

American Corporation v. Al-Nahyan, the District Court noted that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not affect the right of the US government to file a Suggestion of Immunity asserting immunity with regard to a head of state and this would be binding on the courts.²⁵³ In *Samantar v. Yousuf*,²⁵⁴ the US Supreme Court held that a former Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Somalia was not entitled to claim immunity concerning civil claims for compensation for egregious acts (including rape, torture and extrajudicial killings) which he was alleged to have authorised while in office, on the grounds that the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not extend to claims made against individual foreign governmental officials. Such persons could not constitute ‘agencies or instrumentalities’. However, this would not prevent, for example, a US court from finding such immunity as a matter of common law incorporating customary international law, particularly when supported by State Department suggestions of immunity. A relevant factor may also be whether or not the activities complained of could be argued to be properly within normal governmental functions.

In the United Kingdom, while section 14(1) of the State Immunity Act provides that a state is deemed to include the sovereign or other head of state in his public capacity, section 20(1) of the Act with a certain lack of clarity provides that the nature and extent of immunity of such person is assimilated to that applying to the head of diplomatic mission under the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964, to which the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 is annexed. According to this instrument, the immunities of persons so entitled (including the head of mission) normally cease when the person concerned leaves the country save with regard to acts done in the

exercise of his or her functions.²⁵⁵ In *Prince Abdul Aziz v. Harb*,²⁵⁶ the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that a former head of state would have no immunity with regard to private acts and held that this rule applied whether the person had ceased to be head of state while alive or had ceased to hold this position as a result of death.

Secondly, international law has traditionally made a distinction between the official and private acts of a head of state.²⁵⁷ In the case of civil proceedings, this means that a head of state may be susceptible to the jurisdiction where the question concerns purely private acts as distinct from acts undertaken in exercise or ostensible exercise of public authority.²⁵⁸

Thirdly, serving heads of state benefit from absolute immunity from the exercise of the jurisdiction of a foreign domestic court or immunity *ratione personae*.²⁵⁹ This was reaffirmed in *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)*. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, for example, noted: 'This immunity enjoyed by a head of state in power and an ambassador in post is a complete immunity attaching to the person of the head of state or ambassador and rendering him immune from all actions or prosecutions whether or not they relate to matters done for the benefit of the state.'²⁶⁰ Lord Hope referred to the '*jus cogens* character of the immunity enjoyed by serving heads of state *ratione personae*'.²⁶¹ This approach affirming the immunity of a serving head of state is endorsed by the Decision of the French Cour de Cassation in the *Ghaddafi* case.²⁶² In *Tachiona v. United States*, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although deciding the issue as to the immunity of President Mugabe of Zimbabwe on the basis of diplomatic immunity, expressly doubted that the

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was meant to change the common law of head of state immunity,²⁶³ a proposition affirmed in earlier case-law.²⁶⁴

Fourthly, the immunity of a former head of state differs in that it moves from a status immunity (*ratione personae*) to a functional immunity (*ratione materiae*), so that immunity will only exist for official acts done while in office. The definition of official acts is somewhat unclear, but it is suggested that this would exclude acts done in clear violation of international law. It may be concluded at the least from the judgment in *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)* that the existence of the offence in question as a crime under international law by convention will, when coupled in some way by a universal or extraterritorial mechanism of enforcement, operate to exclude a plea of immunity *ratione materiae* at least in so far as states parties to the relevant treaty are concerned.²⁶⁵ This may be a cautious reading and the law in this area is likely to evolve further.

The question as to whether immunities *ratione personae* apply to other governmental persons has been controversial.²⁶⁶ The International Law Commission, for example, in its commentary on the Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities (which led to the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities) distinguished between the special position as regards immunities *ratione personae* of personal sovereigns (which would include heads of state) and diplomatic agents and that of other representatives of the government who would have only immunities *ratione materiae*.²⁶⁷ However, in its judgment in the *Congo v. Belgium* case, the International Court of Justice stated that: ‘in international law it is firmly established that . . . certain holders of high-ranking office in a state, such as the head of state, head of

government and minister for foreign affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other states, both civil and criminal.’²⁶⁸ The Court took the view that serving Foreign Ministers would benefit from immunity *ratione personae* on the basis that such immunities were in order to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their states.²⁶⁹ The extent of such immunities would be dependent upon the functions exercised, but they were such that ‘throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability’,²⁷⁰ irrespective of whether the acts in question have been performed in an official or a private capacity.²⁷¹ This absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts would also apply with regard to war crimes or crimes against humanity.²⁷² Immunities derived from customary international law would remain opposable to national courts even where such courts exercised jurisdiction under various international conventions requiring states parties to extend their criminal jurisdiction to cover the offences in question.²⁷³ The Court concluded by noting that after a person ceased to hold the office of Foreign Minister, the courts of other countries may prosecute with regard to acts committed before or after the period of office and also ‘in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity’.²⁷⁴ This appears to leave open the question of prosecution for acts performed in violation of international law (such as, for example, torture), unless these are deemed to fall within the category of private acts.

It is also uncertain as to how far the term used by the Court, ‘holders of high-ranking office in a state’, might extend and practice is unclear.²⁷⁵ The International Law Commission has been studying the question of the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction since 2007, and

the Commission has currently provisionally adopted all or parts of seven articles.²⁷⁶ Draft article 3 provides that heads of state, heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs would enjoy immunity *ratione personae* from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction. Draft article 4 notes that such persons would enjoy this immunity only during their term of office and such immunity would cover all acts performed, whether in a private or official capacity during or prior to their term of office. The cessation of immunity *ratione personae* would be without prejudice to the application of the rules of international law concerning immunity *ratione materiae*.²⁷⁷ Draft article 5 provides that state officials acting as such enjoy immunity *ratione materiae* from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction. Draft article 6 provides that state officials enjoy immunity *ratione materiae* only with regard to acts performed in an official capacity, which continues to subsist after the individual has ceased to be a state official, while individuals enjoying immunity *ratione personae* continue to enjoy immunity with regard to acts performed in an official capacity during his or her term of office. Draft article 2(e) provides that ‘state officials’ means ‘any individual who represents the state or who exercises state functions’, while article 2(f) defines an ‘act performed in an official capacity’ as ‘any act performed by a state official in the exercise of state authority’.²⁷⁸

In terms of the relationship between the immunity of the state and the immunity of state officials with regard to official acts, recent case-law suggests a convergence of the two. Lord Bingham noted in *Jones v. Saudi Arabia*²⁷⁹ that: ‘A state can only act through servants and agents; their official acts are the acts of the state; and the state’s immunity in respect of them is fundamental to the principle of state immunity.’ The European Court

of Human Rights pointed out:²⁸⁰ ‘Since an act cannot be carried out by a state itself but only by individuals acting on the state’s behalf, where immunity can be invoked by the state then the starting point must be that immunity . . . applies to the acts of state officials. If it were otherwise, state immunity could always be circumvented by suing named officials’; and concluded that the ‘weight of authority at international and national level therefore appears to support the proposition that state immunity in principle offers individual employees or officers of a foreign state protection in respect of acts undertaken on behalf of the state under the same cloak as protects the state itself’. This was approved by the Canadian Supreme Court in *Kazemi v. Iran*,²⁸¹ which concluded that public officials, being necessary instruments of the state, were included in the term ‘government’ as used in the State Immunity Act, when acting in their official capacity.

Waiver of Immunity

It is possible for a state to waive its immunity from the jurisdiction of the court. Express waiver of immunity from jurisdiction, however, which must be granted by an authorised representative of the state,²⁸² does not of itself mean waiver of immunity from execution.²⁸³ If a state waives immunity, it thus places itself on the same footing as any other person. A waiver of immunity does not confer jurisdiction where, in the case of another defendant, it would not exist. If, however, state immunity is the only bar to jurisdiction, an agreement to waive immunity is tantamount to a submission to the jurisdiction.²⁸⁴ In the case of implied waiver, some care is required. Section 2 of the State Immunity Act provides for loss of immunity upon submission to the jurisdiction, either by a prior written agreement²⁸⁵ or after the particular

dispute has arisen. A state is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction where the state has instituted proceedings or has intervened or taken any step in the proceedings.²⁸⁶ Article 8 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities is essentially to the same effect.²⁸⁷

If a state submits to proceedings, it is deemed to have submitted to any counter-claim arising out of the same legal relationship or facts as the claim.²⁸⁸ A provision in an agreement that it is to be governed by the law of the United Kingdom is not to be taken as a submission. By section 9 of the State Immunity Act, a state which has agreed in writing to submit a dispute to arbitration is not immune from proceedings in the courts which relate to the arbitration.²⁸⁹ In *Svenska Petroleum v. Lithuania*, the Court of Appeal held that a failure to challenge an award made without jurisdiction did not of itself amount to an agreement in writing on Lithuania's part to submit the dispute to arbitration.²⁹⁰ However, the Court noted that there was no basis for construing section 9 of the State Immunity Act (particularly when viewed in the context of the provisions of section 13 dealing with execution) as excluding proceedings relating to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. It was emphasised that arbitration was a consensual procedure and the principle underlying section 9 was that, if a state had agreed to submit to arbitration, it had thus rendered itself amenable to such process as might be necessary to render the arbitration effective.²⁹¹ A waiver of immunity by submission to the jurisdiction of the court must be irrevocable and extend to procedural steps properly taken and orders of an interim nature made by the court, in the conduct of the relevant proceedings, as well as to the final determination of the proceedings by the court and any appeal therefrom. Such submission could not be partial in relation to proceedings which a foreign

state has instituted or to which it has submitted, nor could it be temporary, and, once made, it will continue until the proceedings have concluded.²⁹²

The issue of waiver is also a key factor in many US cases. Section 1605(a)(1) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 provides that a foreign state is not immune where it has waived its immunity either expressly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect, except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.²⁹³ The Court of Appeals has held, however, that the implied waiver provision did not extend to conduct constituting a violation of *jus cogens*.²⁹⁴

Pre-Judgment Attachment²⁹⁵

Section 1610(d) of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 prohibits the attachment of the property of a foreign state before judgment unless that state has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to judgment and the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may be entered against the foreign state. A variety of cases in the United States has arisen over whether general waivers contained in treaty provisions may be interpreted as permitting pre-judgment attachment, in order to prevent the defendant from removing his assets from the jurisdiction. The courts generally require clear evidence of the intention to waive pre-judgment attachment, although that actual phrase need not necessarily be used.²⁹⁶

Under the UK State Immunity Act 1978, no relief may be given against a state by way of injunction or order for specific performance, recovery of land

or recovery of any property without the written consent of that state.²⁹⁷ The question has therefore arisen as to whether a *Mareva* injunction,²⁹⁸ ordering that assets remain within the jurisdiction pending the outcome of the case, may be obtained, particularly since this type of injunction is interlocutory and obtained without notice (*ex parte*). It is suggested that an application for a *Mareva* injunction may indeed be made without notice since immunity may not apply in the circumstances of the case. In applying for such an injunction, a plaintiff is under a duty to make full and frank disclosure and the standard of proof is that of a 'good and arguable case', explaining, for example, why it is contended that immunity would not be applicable. It is then for the defendant to seek to discharge the injunction by arguing that these criteria have not been met. The issue as to how the court should deal with such a situation was discussed in *A Company v. Republic of X*.²⁹⁹ Saville J noted that the issue of immunity had to be finally settled at the outset so that when a state sought to discharge a *Mareva* injunction on the grounds of immunity, the court could not allow the injunction to continue on the basis that the plaintiff has a good arguable case that immunity does not exist, for if immunity did exist 'then the court simply has no power to continue the injunction'. Accordingly, a delay between the granting of the injunction *ex parte* and the final determination by the court of the issue was probably unavoidable.³⁰⁰ The situation is generally the same in other countries.³⁰¹

Immunity from Execution³⁰²

Immunity from execution is to be distinguished from immunity from jurisdiction, particularly since it involves the question of the actual seizure of assets appertaining to a foreign state. As such, it poses a considerable challenge to relations between states and accordingly states have proved unwilling to restrict immunity from enforcement judgment in contradistinction to the situation concerning jurisdictional immunity. Consent to the exercise of jurisdiction does not imply consent to the execution or enforcement of any judgment obtained.³⁰³

Article 23 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972 prohibits any measures of execution or preventive measures against the property of a contracting state in the absence of written consent in any particular case. However, the European Convention provides for a system of mutual enforcement of final judgments rendered in accordance with its provisions³⁰⁴ and an Additional Protocol provides for proceedings to be taken before the European Tribunal of State Immunity, consisting basically of members of the European Court of Human Rights. Article 19 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities provides that no post-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment, arrest or execution, against property of a state may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another state unless, and except to the extent that, the state has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated by international agreement; an arbitration agreement or in a written contract; or by a declaration before the court or by a written communication after a dispute between the parties has

arisen; or where the state has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceeding; or where it has been established that the property is specifically in use or intended for use by the state for other than government non-commercial purposes³⁰⁵ and is in the territory of the state of the forum, provided that post-judgment measures of constraint may only be taken against property that has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed.

Section 13(2)(b) of the UK State Immunity Act provides, for instance, that ‘the property of a state shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement of a judgment or arbitral award or, in an action *in rem*, for its arrest, detention or sale’. Such immunity may be waived by written consent, but not by merely submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts.³⁰⁶ Section 13(4) provides that there is no immunity from execution in respect of property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes. In *SerVaas v. Rafidain Bank*,³⁰⁷ the UK Supreme Court held that the words ‘in use for commercial purposes’ had to be given their ordinary and natural meaning having regard to the context, going beyond being merely relating to a commercial transaction, so that, for example, it had to be shown that the bank account in question was earmarked by the state solely for use to settle liabilities incurred in commercial transactions.³⁰⁸ The issue arose in *LR Avionics v. Nigeria*,³⁰⁹ where the claimants sought to enforce an arbitral award and Nigerian court judgment and sought a charging order against property owned by Nigeria but leased to a company for the purpose of providing visa and passport services. Since Nigeria had agreed to the arbitration, the Court, under section 9 of the Act, held that the award could be registered for recognition and enforcement. The judgment of the Nigerian

Court was also registered as it was found that its purpose was the enforcement of the award. As to the interpretation of section 13(4), the Court reaffirmed the Supreme Court's approach in *SerVaas v. Rafidain Bank*³¹⁰ that what was critical was the use the property in question was being put to, not the nature or origin of the obligation which it was sought to enforce; or, in other words, 'the primary consideration must be the nature or character of the relevant activity, what is actually being done with (or in this case on) the property in question'. It was particularly noted that the Nigerian High Commissioner had produced a certificate stating that the property in question was 'in use for consular activities' and not for commercial purposes. This meant that the claimant had to provide evidence to the contrary. It was found that while the transaction with the company was commercial, the purpose was to provide consular services and this was not commercial within section 13(4). Accordingly, immunity from enforcement was reaffirmed. In other words, while an activity may be impressed with certain commercial characteristics, it is the purpose of the activity from the point of view of the person whose property it is sought to implead that will be the determining factor.

It is particularly to be noted that this latter stipulation is not to apply to a state's central bank or other monetary authority.³¹¹ Thus, a *Trendtex* type of situation could not arise again in the same form. It was emphasised in *AIC Ltd v. Federal Government of Nigeria* that this absolute immunity accorded to the property of a foreign state's central bank applied irrespective of the source of the funds in the account or the purpose for which the account was maintained,³¹² while in *AIG Capital Partners Inc. v. Kazakhstan*, it was noted that the term 'property' in the Act had to be given a broad meaning and

included all real and personal property, including any right or interest, whether legal, equitable or contractual. The property in question appertained to the central bank if held in its name, irrespective of the capacity in which the bank held it or the purpose for which it was held.³¹³

It is also interesting that the corresponding provision in the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 is more restrictive with regard to immunity from execution.³¹⁴ In *Rubin v. Iran*,³¹⁵ The US Supreme Court held that section 1610(g), which provides for attachment of certain property in aid of execution did not constitute a free-standing basis for attaching the property of a foreign state in the absence of a separate rescinding of immunity.

The principle that existence of immunity from jurisdiction does not automatically entail immunity from execution has been reaffirmed in the case-law on a number of occasions.³¹⁶ In 1977, the West German Federal Constitutional Court in the *Philippine Embassy* case³¹⁷ declared that:

forced execution of judgment by the state of the forum under a writ of execution against a foreign state which has been issued in respect of non-sovereign acts . . . of that state, or property of that state which is present or situated in the territory of the state of the forum, is inadmissible without the consent of the foreign state if . . . such property serves sovereign purposes of the foreign state.

In particular, it was noted that:

claims against a general current bank account of the embassy of a foreign state which exists in the state of the forum and the purpose of which is to cover the embassy's costs and expenses are not subject to forced execution by the state of the forum.³¹⁸

This was referred to approvingly by Lord Diplock in *Alcom Ltd v. Colombia*,³¹⁹ a case which similarly involved the attachment of a bank account of a diplomatic mission. The House of Lords unanimously accepted that the general rule in international law was not overturned in the State Immunity Act. In *Alcom*, described as involving a question of law of 'outstanding international importance',³²⁰ it was held that such a bank account would not fall within the section 13(4) exception relating to commercial purposes, unless it could be shown by the person seeking to attach the balance that 'the bank account was earmarked by the foreign state solely . . . for being drawn on to settle liabilities incurred in commercial transactions'.³²¹ The onus of proof lies upon the applicant. It is also to be noted that under section 13(5) of the Act, a certificate by a head of mission to the effect that property was not in use for commercial purposes was sufficient evidence of that fact, unless the contrary was proven.³²² The question of determining property used for commercial purposes is a significant and complex one that will invariably depend upon an analysis of various factors,

as seen in the light of the law of the forum state,³²³ for example the present and future use of the funds and their origin.³²⁴

In *Banamar v. Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria*,³²⁵ the Italian Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that customary international law forbids measures of execution against the property of foreign states located in the territory of the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction and used for sovereign purposes, and held that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce a judgment against a foreign state by ordering execution against bank accounts standing in the name of that state's embassy. This approach appears to have been modified in *Condor and Filvem v. Minister of Justice*³²⁶ before the Italian Constitutional Court in 1992. The Court held that it could no longer be affirmed that there existed an international customary rule forbidding absolutely coercive measures against the property of foreign states. In order for immunity against execution not to apply, it is necessary not only to demonstrate that the activity or transaction concerned was *jure gestionis*, but also to show that the property to which the request for execution refers is not destined to accomplish public functions (*jure imperii*) of the foreign state.³²⁷

However, the Spanish Constitutional Court in *Abbott v. South Africa* held that bank accounts held by foreign states used for the purposes of ordinary diplomatic or consular activity were immune from attachment or execution even where the funds were also used for commercial purposes,³²⁸ while the Austrian Supreme Court held in *Leasing West GmbH v. Algeria* that a general bank account of a foreign embassy allocated partly but not exclusively for diplomatic purposes was immune from enforcement proceedings without the

consent of the state concerned. Attachment could only take place if the account could be shown to be used exclusively for private purposes.³²⁹

The Burden and Standard of Proof

Since section 1 of the State Immunity Act stipulates that a state is immune from the jurisdiction of the UK courts except as provided in the following sections, it is clear that the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff to establish that an exception to immunity applies.³³⁰ However, the court is under a duty to ensure that effect is given to the immunity conferred by the State Immunity Act 1978 and of its own motion if necessary.³³¹

As far as the standard of proof is concerned, the Court of Appeal in *MacLaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry*³³² held that whenever a claim of immunity is made, the court must deal with it as a preliminary issue and on the normal test of balance of probabilities.³³³ It would be insufficient to apply the ‘good arguable case’ test usual in Order 11³³⁴ cases with regard to leave to serve.³³⁵ To have decided otherwise would have meant that the state might have lost its claim for immunity upon the more impressionistic ‘good arguable case’ basis, which in practice is decided upon affidavit evidence only, and would have been precluded from pursuing its claim at a later stage since that could well be construed as submission to the jurisdiction under section 2(3) of the State Immunity Act.

The question of service of process upon a foreign state arose in *Westminster City Council v. Government of Iran*,³³⁶ where Peter Gibson J held that, without prior service upon the Iranian government, the Court was unable to

deal with the substantive issue before it which concerned the attempt by Westminster City Council to recover from the Iranian government charges incurred by it in rendering the Iranian embassy safe after it had been stormed in the famous 1980 siege. In the absence of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Iran at that time and in the absence of Iranian consent, there appeared to be no way to satisfy the requirement in section 12 of the State Immunity Act that ‘any writ or other document required to be served for instituting proceedings against a state shall be served by being transmitted through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the state’. The question also arose in *Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company*.³³⁷ Since at the relevant time there was no British diplomatic presence in Baghdad, the necessary documents were lodged pursuant to Order 11, Rule 7 at the Central Office, whence they were sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and thence to the Iraqi Embassy in London with a request for transmission to Baghdad. The House of Lords held that since the writ was not forwarded to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baghdad, the writ was not served as required under section 12(1) of the 1978 Act.³³⁸

Diplomatic Law³³⁹

Rules regulating the various aspects of diplomatic relations constitute one of the earliest expressions of international law. Whenever in history there has been a group of independent states co-existing, special customs have developed on how the ambassadors and other special representatives of other states were to be treated.³⁴⁰

Diplomacy as a method of communication between various parties, including negotiations between recognised agents, is an ancient institution and international legal provisions governing its manifestations are the result of centuries of state practice. The special privileges and immunities related to diplomatic personnel of various kinds grew up partly as a consequence of sovereign immunity and the independence and equality of states, and partly as an essential requirement of an international system. States must negotiate and consult with one another and with international organisations and in order to do so need diplomatic staffs. Since these persons represent their states in various ways, they thus benefit from the legal principle of state sovereignty. This is also an issue of practical convenience.

Diplomatic relations have traditionally been conducted through the medium of ambassadors³⁴¹ and their staffs, but with the growth of trade and commercial intercourse the office of consul was established and expanded. The development of speedy communications stimulated the creation of special missions designed to be sent to particular areas for specific purposes, often with the head of state or government in charge. To some extent,

however, the establishment of telephone, telegraph, telex and fax services has lessened the importance of the traditional diplomatic personnel by strengthening the centralising process. Nevertheless, diplomats and consuls do retain some useful functions in the collection of information and pursuit of friendly relations, as well as providing a permanent presence in foreign states, with all that that implies for commercial and economic activities.³⁴²

The field of diplomatic immunities is one of the most accepted and uncontroversial of international law topics, as it is in the interest of all states ultimately to preserve an even tenor of diplomatic relations, although not all states act in accordance with this. As the International Court noted in the *US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran* case:³⁴³

the rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained regime, which on the one hand, lays down the receiving state's obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving state to counter any such abuse.³⁴⁴

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961

This treaty, which came into force in 1964,³⁴⁵ emphasises the functional necessity of diplomatic privileges and immunities for the efficient conduct of

international relations³⁴⁶ as well as pointing to the character of the diplomatic mission as representing its state.³⁴⁷ It both codified existing laws and established others.³⁴⁸ Questions not expressly regulated by the Convention continue to be governed by the rules of customary international law.³⁴⁹ The International Court has recently emphasised that the Convention continues to apply notwithstanding the existence of a state of armed conflict between the states concerned.³⁵⁰

There is no right as such under international law to diplomatic relations, and they exist by virtue of mutual consent.³⁵¹ If one state does not wish to enter into diplomatic relations, it is not legally compelled so to do. Accordingly, the Convention specifies in article 4 that the sending state must ensure that the consent (or *agrément*) of the receiving state has been given for the proposed head of its mission, and reasons for any refusal of consent do not have to be given.³⁵² Similarly, by article 9 the receiving state may at any time declare any member of the diplomatic mission *persona non grata* without having to explain its decision, and thus obtain the removal of that person.³⁵³ However, the principle of consent as the basis of diplomatic relations may be affected by other rules of international law. For example, the Security Council in resolution 748 (1992), which imposed sanctions upon Libya, decided that ‘all states shall: (a) significantly reduce the number and level of the staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain’.

The main functions of a diplomatic mission are specified in article 3 and revolve around the representation and protection of the interests and nationals of the sending state, as well as the promotion of information and friendly

relations. Article 41(1) also emphasises the duty of all persons enjoying privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state and the duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that state.

Article 13 provides that the head of the mission is deemed to have taken up his functions in the receiving state upon presentation of credentials. Heads of mission are divided into three classes by article 14, viz. ambassadors or nuncios accredited to heads of state and other heads of mission of equivalent rank; envoys, ministers and internuncios accredited to heads of state; and chargés d'affaires accredited to ministers of foreign affairs.³⁵⁴ It is customary for a named individual to be in charge of a diplomatic mission. When, in 1979, Libya designated its embassies as 'People's Bureaux' to be run by revolutionary committees, the United Kingdom insisted upon and obtained the nomination of a named person as the head of the mission.³⁵⁵

The Inviolability of the Premises of the Mission

In order to facilitate the operations of normal diplomatic activities, article 22 of the Convention specifically declares that the premises of the mission are inviolable and that agents of the receiving state are not to enter them without the consent of the mission. This appears to be an absolute rule³⁵⁶ and in the Sun Yat Sen incident in 1896, the Court refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus with regard to a Chinese refugee held against his will in the Chinese legation in London.³⁵⁷ Precisely what the legal position would be in the event of entry without express consent because, for example, of fire-fighting requirements or of danger to persons within that area, is rather uncertain under customary law, but under the Convention any justification pleaded by

virtue of implied consent would be regarded as at best highly controversial.³⁵⁸ The receiving state is under a special duty to protect the mission premises from intrusion or damage or ‘impairment of its dignity’.³⁵⁹ The US Supreme Court, for example, while making specific reference to article 22 of the Vienna Convention, emphasised in *Boos v. Barry* that: ‘The need to protect diplomats is grounded in our Nation’s important interest in international relations . . . Diplomatic personnel are essential to conduct the international affairs so crucial to the well-being of this Nation.’³⁶⁰ It was also noted that protecting foreign diplomats in the United States ensures that similar protection would be afforded to US diplomats abroad.³⁶¹ The Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia statute which made it unlawful to congregate within 500 feet of diplomatic premises and refuse to disperse after having been so ordered by the police, and stated that, ‘the “prohibited quantum of disturbance” is whether normal embassy activities have been or are about to be disrupted’.³⁶² By the same token, the premises of a mission must not be used in a way which is incompatible with the functions of the mission.³⁶³

In 1979, the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran, was taken over by several hundred demonstrators. Archives and documents were seized and fifty diplomatic and consular staff were held hostage. In 1980, the International Court declared that, under the 1961 Convention (and the 1963 Convention on Consular Relations):

Iran was placed under the most categorical obligations, as a receiving state, to take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the

United States Embassy and Consulates, their
staffs, their archives, their means of
communication and the free movement of the
members of their staffs.³⁶⁴

These were also obligations under general international law.³⁶⁵ The Court in particular stressed the seriousness of Iran's behaviour and the conflict between its conduct and its obligations under 'the whole corpus of the international rules of which diplomatic and consular law is comprised, rules the fundamental character of which the Court must here again strongly affirm'.³⁶⁶ In *Congo v. Uganda*, the International Court held that attacks on the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, the capital of Congo, and attacks on persons on the premises by Congolese armed forces constituted a violation of article 22.³⁶⁷ In addition, the Court emphasised that the Vienna Convention not only prohibits any infringements of the inviolability of the mission by the receiving state itself, but also puts the receiving state under an obligation to prevent others, such as armed militia groups, from doing so.³⁶⁸

On 8 May 1999, during the Kosovo campaign, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was bombed by the United States. The United States declared that it had been a mistake and apologised. In December 1999, the United States and China signed an Agreement providing for compensation to be paid by the former to the latter of \$28 million. At the same time, China agreed to pay \$2.87 million to the United States to settle claims arising out of rioting and attacks on the US Embassy in Beijing, the residence of the US consulate in Chengdu and the consulate in Guangzhou.³⁶⁹

On 17 April 1984, a peaceful demonstration took place outside the Libyan Embassy in London. Shots from the Embassy were fired that resulted in the death of a policewoman. After a siege, the Libyans inside left and the building was searched in the presence of a Saudi Arabian diplomat. Weapons and other relevant forensic evidence were found.³⁷⁰ The issue raised here, in the light of article 45(a) which provides that after a break in diplomatic relations, ‘the receiving state must . . . respect and protect the premises of the mission’, is whether that search was permissible. The UK view is that article 45(a) does not mean that the premises continue to be inviolable³⁷¹ and this would clearly appear to be correct. There is a distinction between inviolability under article 22 and respect and protection under article 45(a).

The suggestion has also been raised that the right of self-defence may also be applicable in this context. It was used to justify the search of personnel leaving the Libyan Embassy³⁷² and the possibility was noted that in certain limited circumstances it may be used to justify entry into an embassy.³⁷³

A rather different issue arises where mission premises have been abandoned. The United Kingdom enacted the Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act in 1987, under which states wishing to use land as diplomatic or consular premises are required to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State. Once such consent has been obtained (although this is not necessary in the case of land which had this status prior to the coming into force of the Act), it could be subsequently withdrawn.³⁷⁴ The Secretary of State has the power to require that the title to such land be vested in him where that land has been lying empty, or without diplomatic occupants, and could cause damage to pedestrians or neighbouring buildings because of neglect, providing that he is

satisfied that to do so is permissible under international law (section 2). By section 3 of the Act, the Secretary of State is able to sell the premises, deduct certain expenses and transfer the residue to the person divested of his interest.

This situation occurred with regard to the Cambodian Embassy in London, whose personnel closed the building after the Pol Pot takeover of Cambodia in 1975, handing the keys over to the Foreign Office.³⁷⁵ In 1979, the United Kingdom withdrew its recognition of the Cambodian government after the Vietnamese invasion and since that date had had no dealings with any authority as the government of that country. Squatters moved in shortly thereafter. These premises were made subject to section 2 of the Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act in 1988³⁷⁶ and the Secretary of State vested the land in himself. This was challenged by the squatters and in *R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Samuel*,³⁷⁷ Henry J held that the Secretary of State had acted correctly and in accordance with the duty imposed under article 45 of the Vienna Convention. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal,³⁷⁸ holding that the relevant section merely required that the Secretary of State be satisfied that international law permitted such action.³⁷⁹

In *Westminster City Council v. Government of Iran*,³⁸⁰ the issue concerned the payment of expenses arising out of repairs to the damaged and abandoned Iranian Embassy in London in 1980. The council sought to register a land charge, but the question of the immunity of the premises under article 22 of the Vienna Convention was raised. Although the Court felt that procedurally it was unable to proceed,³⁸¹ reference was made to the substantive issue and it was noted that the premises had ceased to be diplomatic premises in the

circumstances and thus the premises were not ‘used’ for the purpose of the mission as required by article 22, since that phrase connoted the present tense. The inviolability of diplomatic premises, however, must not be confused with extraterritoriality. Such premises do not constitute part of the territory of the sending state.³⁸²

Whether a right of diplomatic asylum exists within general international law is doubtful³⁸³ and in principle refugees are to be returned to the authorities of the receiving state in the absence of treaty or customary rules to the contrary. The International Court in the *Asylum* case between Colombia and Peru³⁸⁴ emphasised that a decision to grant asylum involves a derogation from the sovereignty of the receiving state ‘and constitutes an intervention in matters which are exclusively within the competence of that state. Such a derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognised unless its legal basis is established in each particular case.’ Where treaties exist regarding the grant of asylum, the question will arise as to the respective competences of the sending and receiving state or the state granting asylum and the territorial state. While the diplomats of the sending state may provisionally determine whether a refugee meets any condition laid down for the grant of asylum under an applicable treaty this would not bind the receiving state, for ‘the principles of international law do not recognise any rule of unilateral and definitive qualification by the state granting asylum’.³⁸⁵ It may be that in law a right of asylum will arise for ‘urgent and compelling reasons of humanity’,³⁸⁶ but the nature and scope of this is unclear.

The Diplomatic Bag

Article 27 provides that the receiving state shall permit and protect free communication on behalf of the mission for all official purposes. Article 27(2) states that the official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable and that official correspondence means all correspondence relating to the mission and its functions.³⁸⁷ The Supreme Court in *R (Bancoult No. 3) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*³⁸⁸ examined this provision (and article 24 stating the inviolability of mission archives and documents at any time and wherever they may be), noting that the inviolability of such documents would not extend to include the widespread dissemination of the contents.³⁸⁹

Article 27(3) and (4) deals with the diplomatic bag,³⁹⁰ and provides that it shall not be opened or detained³⁹¹ and that the packages constituting the diplomatic bag ‘must bear visible external marks of their character and may contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use’.³⁹² The need for a balance in this area is manifest. On the one hand, missions require a confidential means of communication, while on the other the need to guard against abuse is clear. Article 27, however, lays the emphasis upon the former.³⁹³ This is provided that article 27(4) is complied with. In the Dikko incident on 5 July 1984, a former Nigerian minister was kidnapped in London and placed in a crate to be flown to Nigeria. The crate was opened at Stansted Airport, although accompanied by a person claiming diplomatic status. The crate³⁹⁴ did not contain an official seal and was thus clearly not a diplomatic bag.³⁹⁵ When, in March 2000, diplomatic baggage destined for the British High Commission in Harare was detained and opened by the Zimbabwe authorities, the UK government protested vigorously and announced the withdrawal of its High Commissioner for consultations.³⁹⁶

In view of suspicions of abuse, the question has arisen as to whether electronic screening, not involving opening or detention, of the diplomatic bag is legitimate. The United Kingdom appears to take the view that electronic screening of this kind would be permissible, although it claims not to have carried out such activities, but other states do not accept this.³⁹⁷ It is to be noted that after the Libyan Embassy siege in April 1984, the diplomatic bags leaving the building were not searched.³⁹⁸ However, Libya had entered a reservation to the Vienna Convention, reserving its right to open a diplomatic bag in the presence of an official representative of the diplomatic mission concerned. In the absence of permission by the authorities of the sending state, the diplomatic bag was to be returned to its place of origin. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia made similar reservations which were not objected to.³⁹⁹ This is to be contrasted with a Bahraini reservation to article 27(3) which would have permitted the opening of diplomatic bags in certain circumstances.⁴⁰⁰ The Libyan reservation could have been relied upon by the United Kingdom in these conditions.

It is also interesting to note that after the Dikko incident, the UK Foreign Minister stated that the crates concerned were opened because of the suspicion of human contents. Whether the crates constituted diplomatic bags or not was a relevant consideration with regard to a right to search, but:

the advice given and the advice which would have been given had the crate constituted a diplomatic bag took fully into account the overriding duty to preserve and protect human life.⁴⁰¹

This appears to point to an implied exception to article 27(3) in the interests of humanity. It is to be welcomed, provided, of course, it is applied solely and strictly in these terms.

The issue of the diplomatic bag has been considered by the International Law Commission, in the context of article 27 and analogous provisions in the 1963 Consular Relations Convention, the 1969 Convention on Special Missions and the 1975 Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations. Article 28 of the Draft Articles on the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag, as finally adopted by the International Law Commission in 1989, provides that the diplomatic bag shall be inviolable wherever it may be. It is not to be opened or detained and ‘shall be exempt from examination directly or through electronic or other technical device’. However, in the case of the consular bag, it is noted that if the competent authorities of the receiving or transit state have serious reason to believe that the bag contains something other than official correspondence and documents or articles intended exclusively for official use, they may request that the bag be opened in their presence by an authorised representative of the sending state. If this request is refused by the authorities of the sending state, the bag is to be returned to its place of origin.⁴⁰² It was thought that this preserved existing law. Certainly, in so far as the consular bag is concerned, the provisions of article 35(3) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations are reproduced, but the stipulation of exemption from electronic or other technical examination does not appear in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the view of the Commission that this is mere clarification⁴⁰³ is controversial.⁴⁰⁴

As far as the diplomatic courier is concerned, that is, a person accompanying a diplomatic bag, the Draft Articles provide for a regime of privileges, immunities and inviolability that is akin to that governing diplomats. He is to enjoy personal inviolability and is not liable to any form of arrest or detention (draft article 10), his temporary accommodation is inviolable (draft article 17), and he will benefit from immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving or transit state in respect of all acts performed in the exercise of his functions (draft article 18). In general, his privileges and immunities last from the moment he enters the territory of the receiving or transit state until he leaves such state (draft article 21).⁴⁰⁵

Diplomatic Immunities – Property

Under article 22 of the Vienna Convention, the premises of the mission are inviolable⁴⁰⁶ and, together with their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport, are immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution. By article 23, a general exception from taxation in respect of the mission premises is posited. The Court in the *Philippine Embassy* case explained that, in the light of customary and treaty law, ‘property used by the sending state for the performance of its diplomatic functions in any event enjoys immunity even if it does not fall within the material or spatial scope’ of article 22.⁴⁰⁷ It should also be noted that the House of Lords in *Alcom Ltd v. Colombia*⁴⁰⁸ held that under the State Immunity Act 1978 a current account at a commercial bank in the name of a diplomatic mission would be immune unless the plaintiff could show that it had been earmarked by the foreign state solely for the settlement of liabilities incurred in commercial transactions. An account used to meet the day-to-day running expenses of a

diplomatic mission would therefore be immune.⁴⁰⁹ This approach was also based upon the obligation contained in article 25 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which provided that the receiving state ‘shall accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the mission’. The House of Lords noted that the negative formulation of this principle meant that neither the executive nor the legal branch of government in the receiving state must act in such manner as to obstruct the mission in carrying out its functions.⁴¹⁰

Section 16(1)(b) of the State Immunity Act provides, however, that the exemption from immunity in article 6 relating to proceedings involving immovable property in the United Kingdom did not extend to proceedings concerning ‘a state’s title to or its possession of property used for the purposes of a diplomatic mission’. It was held in *Intpro Properties (UK) Ltd v. Sauvel*⁴¹¹ by the Court of Appeal that the private residence of a diplomatic agent, even where used for embassy social functions from time to time, did not constitute use for the purposes of a diplomatic mission and that in any event the proceedings did not concern the French government’s title to or possession of the premises, but were merely for damages for breach of a covenant in a lease. Accordingly, there was no immunity under section 16.

It is to be noted that by article 24 of the Vienna Convention, the archives and documents of the mission are inviolable at any time and wherever they may be.⁴¹² Although ‘archives and documents’ are not defined in the Convention, article 1(1)(k) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides that the term ‘consular archives’ includes ‘all the papers, documents, correspondence, books, films, tapes and registers of the consular post

together with the ciphers and codes, the card-indexes and any article of furniture intended for their protection or safekeeping'. The term as used in the Diplomatic Relations Convention cannot be less than this.⁴¹³

The question of the scope of article 24 was discussed by the House of Lords in *Shearson Lehman v. Maclaine Watson (No. 2)*,⁴¹⁴ which concerned the intervention by the International Tin Council in a case on the grounds that certain documents it was proposed to adduce in evidence were inadmissible. This argument was made in the context of article 7 of the International Tin Council (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1972 which stipulates that the ITC should have the 'like inviolability of official archives as . . . is accorded in respect of the official archives of a diplomatic mission'. Lord Bridge interpreted the phrase 'archives and documents of the mission' in article 24 as referring to the archives and documents 'belonging to or held by the mission'.⁴¹⁵ Such protection was not confined to executive or judicial action by the host state, but would cover, for example, the situation where documents were put into circulation by virtue of theft or other improper means.⁴¹⁶ However, the Supreme Court took a different view in *R (Bancoult No. 3) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*,⁴¹⁷ which concerned a document purportedly recording a conversation at the US Embassy in London which had been subsequently leaked by Wikileaks. The Court held that in principle the inviolability of documents 'extends to making it impermissible to use such documents or copies in a domestic court of the host country . . . absent extraordinary circumstances' or express waiver by the mission state, provided that the document in question remains part of the mission archive and provided that 'its contents must not have become so

widely disseminated in the public domain as to destroy any confidentiality or inviolability that could sensibly attach to it’.

Diplomatic Immunities – Personal

The person of a diplomatic agent⁴¹⁸ is inviolable under article 29 of the Vienna Convention and he may not be detained or arrested.⁴¹⁹ This principle is the most fundamental rule of diplomatic law and is the oldest established rule of diplomatic law.⁴²⁰ In resolution 53/97 of January 1999, for example, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned acts of violence against diplomatic and consular missions and representatives,⁴²¹ while the Security Council issued a presidential statement, condemning the murder of nine Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan.⁴²² States recognise that the protection of diplomats is a mutual interest founded on functional requirements and reciprocity.⁴²³ The receiving state is under an obligation to ‘take all appropriate steps’ to prevent any attack on the person, freedom or dignity of diplomatic agents.⁴²⁴

After a period of kidnappings of diplomats, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents was adopted in 1973. This provides that states parties must make attacks upon such persons a crime in internal law with appropriate penalties and take such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over these crimes. States parties are obliged to extradite or prosecute offenders.⁴²⁵ The most blatant example of the breach of the obligation to protect diplomats was the holding of the US diplomats as hostages in Iran in 1979–80, where the International Court held that the

inaction of the Iranian government faced with the detention of US diplomatic and consular staff over an extended period constituted a 'clear and serious violation' of article 29.⁴²⁶ In *Congo v. Uganda*, the International Court held that the maltreatment by Congo forces of persons within the Ugandan Embassy constituted a violation of article 29 in so far as such persons were diplomats, while the maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats at the airport similarly breached the obligations laid down in article 29.⁴²⁷

However, in exceptional cases, a diplomat may be arrested or detained on the basis of self-defence or in the interests of protecting human life.⁴²⁸

Article 30(1) provides for the inviolability of the private residence⁴²⁹ of a diplomatic agent, while article 30(2) provides that his papers, correspondence and property⁴³⁰ are inviolable. Section 4 of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 provides that if in any proceedings any question arises whether or not any person is entitled to any privilege or immunity under the Act a certificate issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of State stating any fact relating to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.⁴³¹

As far as criminal jurisdiction is concerned, diplomatic agents enjoy complete immunity from the legal system of the receiving state,⁴³² although there is no immunity from the jurisdiction of the sending state.⁴³³ This provision noted in article 31(1) reflects the accepted position under customary law. The only remedy the host state has in the face of offences alleged to have been committed by a diplomat is to declare him *persona non grata* under article 9.⁴³⁴ Specific problems have arisen with regard to motoring offences.⁴³⁵

Article 31(1) also specifies that diplomats⁴³⁶ are immune from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the state in which they are serving, except in three cases:⁴³⁷ first, where the action relates to private immovable property situated within the host state (unless held for mission purposes);⁴³⁸ secondly, in litigation relating to succession matters in which the diplomat is involved as a private person (for example, as an executor or heir); and, finally, with regard to unofficial professional or commercial activity engaged in by the agent outside his official functions.⁴³⁹

In a document issued by the Foreign Office in 1987, entitled *Memorandum on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities in the United Kingdom*,⁴⁴⁰ it was noted that a serious view was taken of any reliance on diplomatic immunity from civil jurisdiction to evade a legal obligation and that such conduct could call into question the continued acceptability in the United Kingdom of a particular diplomat.⁴⁴¹ By article 31(2), a diplomat cannot be obliged to give evidence as a witness, while by article 31(3), no measures of execution may be taken against such a person except in the cases referred to in article 31(1) (a), (b) and (c) and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.

Diplomatic agents are generally exempt from the social security provisions in force in the receiving state,⁴⁴² from all dues and taxes, personal or real, regional or municipal except for indirect taxes,⁴⁴³ from personal and public services⁴⁴⁴ and from customs duties and inspection.⁴⁴⁵ The personal baggage of a diplomat is exempt from inspection unless there are serious grounds for presuming that it contains articles not covered by the specified exemptions in article 36(1). Inspections can only take place in the presence of the diplomat or his authorised representative.⁴⁴⁶

Article 37 provides that the members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household⁴⁴⁷ shall enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29 to 36 if not nationals of the receiving state.⁴⁴⁸ In UK practice, members of the family include spouses and minor children (i.e. under the age of 18); children over 18 not in permanent paid employment (such as students); persons fulfilling the social duties of hostess to the diplomatic agent; and the parent of a diplomat living with him and not engaged in paid permanent employment.⁴⁴⁹

Members of the administrative and technical staff (and their households), if not nationals or permanent residents of the receiving state, may similarly benefit from articles 29–35,⁴⁵⁰ except that the article 31(1) immunities do not extend beyond acts performed in the course of their duties, while members of the service staff, who are not nationals or permanent residents of the receiving state, benefit from immunity regarding acts performed in the course of official duties.⁴⁵¹

Immunities and privileges start from the moment the person enters the territory of the receiving state on proceeding to take up his post or, if already in the territory, from the moment of official notification under article 39.⁴⁵² In *R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Teja*,⁴⁵³ Lord Parker noted that it was fundamental to the claiming of diplomatic immunity that the diplomatic agent ‘should have been in some form accepted or received by this country’.⁴⁵⁴ This view was carefully interpreted by the Court of Appeal in *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bagga*⁴⁵⁵ in the light of the facts of the former case so that, as Parker LJ held, if a person already in the country is employed as a secretary, for example, at an embassy,

nothing more than notification is required before that person would be entitled to immunities. While it had been held in *R v. Lambeth Justices, ex parte Yusufu*⁴⁵⁶ that article 39, in the words of Watkins LJ, provided ‘at most some temporary immunity between entry and notification to a person who is without a diplomat’, the court in *Bagga* disagreed strongly.⁴⁵⁷ Immunity clearly did not depend upon notification and acceptance,⁴⁵⁸ but under article 39 commenced upon entry. Article 40 provides for immunity where the person is in the territory in transit between his home state and a third state to which he has been posted.⁴⁵⁹ Where, however, a diplomat is in a state which is neither the receiving state nor a state of transit between his state and the receiving state, there will be no immunity.⁴⁶⁰ Immunities and privileges normally cease when the person leaves the country or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so.⁴⁶¹ However, by article 39(2) there would be continuing immunity with regard to those acts that were performed in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission (the ‘residual immunity’).⁴⁶² It follows from this formulation that immunity would not continue for a person leaving the receiving state for any act which was performed outside the exercise of his functions as a member of a diplomatic mission even though he was immune from prosecution at the time. This was the view taken by the US Department of State with regard to an incident where the ambassador of Papua New Guinea was responsible for a serious automobile accident involving damage to five cars and injuries to two persons.⁴⁶³ The ambassador was withdrawn from the United States and assurances sought by Papua New Guinea that any criminal investigation of the incident or indictment of the former ambassador under US domestic law would be quashed were rejected. The United States refused to accept the view that international law precluded the prosecution of the former diplomat for

non-official acts committed during his period of accreditation.⁴⁶⁴ In *Propend Finance Property v. Sing*, the Court took a broad view of diplomatic functions, including within this term police liaison functions so that immunity continued under article 39(2).⁴⁶⁵

In the *Former Syrian Ambassador to the GDR* case, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that article 39(2) covered the situation where the ambassador in question was accused of complicity in murder by allowing explosives to be transferred from his embassy to a terrorist group. He was held to have acted in the exercise of his official functions. It was argued that diplomatic immunity from criminal proceedings knew of no exception for particularly serious crimes, the only resort being to declare him *persona non grata*.⁴⁶⁶ The Court, in perhaps a controversial statement, noted that article 39(2), while binding on the receiving state, was not binding on third states.⁴⁶⁷ Accordingly, the continuing immunity of the former ambassador to the German Democratic Republic under article 39(2) was not binding upon the Federal Republic of Germany.

Although a state under section 4 of the State Immunity Act 1978 is subject to the local jurisdiction with regard to contracts of employment made or wholly or partly to be performed in the United Kingdom, section 16(1)(a) provides that this is not to apply to proceedings concerning the employment of the members of a mission within the meaning of the Vienna Convention⁴⁶⁸ and this was reaffirmed in *Sengupta v. India*,⁴⁶⁹ a case concerning a clerk employed at the Indian High Commission in London. However, the Supreme Court in *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*⁴⁷⁰ concluded that the absolute exception contained in

section 16(1)(a) went beyond that required by international law and that, therefore, this section was incompatible with article 6 of the European Convention.⁴⁷¹

Waiver of Immunity

By article 32 of the 1961 Vienna Convention, the sending state may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and others possessing immunity under the Convention.⁴⁷² Such waiver must be express.⁴⁷³ Where a person with immunity initiates proceedings, he cannot claim immunity in respect of any counter-claim directly connected with the principal claim.⁴⁷⁴ Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings is not to be taken to imply waiver from immunity in respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a separate waiver is necessary.

In general, waiver of immunity has been unusual, especially in criminal cases.⁴⁷⁵ In a memorandum entitled *Department of State Guidance for Law Enforcement Officers With Regard to Personal Rights and Immunities of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Personnel*,⁴⁷⁶ the point is made that waiver of immunity does not ‘belong’ to the individual concerned, but is for the benefit of the sending state. While waiver of immunity in the face of criminal charges is not common, ‘it is routinely sought and occasionally granted’. However, Zambia speedily waived the immunity of an official at its London embassy suspected of drugs offences in 1985.⁴⁷⁷

In *Fayed v. Al-Tajir*,⁴⁷⁸ the Court of Appeal referred to an apparent waiver of immunity by an ambassador made in pleadings by way of defence. Kerr LJ

correctly noted that both under international and English law, immunity was the right of the sending state and that therefore ‘only the sovereign can waive the immunity of its diplomatic representatives. They cannot do so themselves.’⁴⁷⁹ It was also pointed out that the defendant’s defence filed in the proceedings brought against him was not an appropriate vehicle for waiver of immunity by a state.⁴⁸⁰ In *A Company v. Republic of X*,⁴⁸¹ Saville J noted that whether or not there was a power to waive article 22 immunities (and he was unconvinced that there existed such a power), no mere *inter partes* agreement could bind the state to such a waiver, but only an undertaking or consent given to the Court itself at the time when the Court is asked to exercise jurisdiction over or in respect of the subject-matter of the immunities. In view of the principle that immunities adhere to the state and not the individual concerned, such waiver must be express and performed clearly by the state as such.

Consular Privileges and Immunities: The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963⁴⁸²

Consuls represent their state in many administrative ways, for instance, by issuing visas and passports and generally promoting the commercial interests of their state. They have a particular role in assisting nationals in distress with regard to, for example, finding lawyers, visiting prisons and contacting local authorities, but they are unable to intervene in the judicial process or internal affairs of the receiving state or give legal advice or investigate a crime.⁴⁸³ They are based not only in the capitals of receiving states, but also in the more important provincial cities. However, their political functions are few and they are accordingly not permitted the same degree of immunity from

jurisdiction as diplomatic agents.⁴⁸⁴ Consuls must possess a commission from the sending state and the authorisation (*exequatur*) of a receiving state.⁴⁸⁵ They are entitled to the same exemption from taxes and customs duties as diplomats.

Article 31 emphasises that consular premises are inviolable and may not be entered by the authorities of the receiving state without consent.⁴⁸⁶ Like diplomatic premises, they must be protected against intrusion or impairment of dignity,⁴⁸⁷ and similar immunities exist with regard to archives and documents⁴⁸⁸ and exemptions from taxes.⁴⁸⁹ Article 35 provides for freedom of communication, emphasising the inviolability of the official correspondence of the consular post and establishing that the consular bag should be neither opened nor detained. However, in contrast to the situation with regard to the diplomatic bag,⁴⁹⁰ where the authorities of the receiving state have serious reason to believe that the bag contains other than official correspondence, documents or articles, they may request that the bag be opened and, if this is refused, the bag shall be returned to its place of origin.

Article 36(1) constitutes a critical provision and, as the International Court emphasised in the *LaGrand (Germany v. United States)* case, it ‘establishes an interrelated regime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection’.⁴⁹¹ Article 36(1)(a) provides that consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending state and to have access to them, while nationals shall have the same freedom of communication with and access to consular officers. In particular, article 36(1)(b) provides that if the national so requests, the authorities of the receiving state shall without delay inform the consular post of the sending

state of any arrest or detention. The authorities in question shall inform the national of the sending state without delay of his or her rights. Similarly, any communication from the detained national to the consular post must be forwarded without delay. The International Court held that article 36(1) created individual rights for the persons concerned which could be invoked by the state, which, by virtue of the Optional Protocol on Compulsory Settlement of Disputes attached to the Convention, may be brought before the Court.⁴⁹² The International Court has subsequently underlined that violations of individual rights under this provision may also violate the rights of the state itself, while such violations could also constitute violations of the individual.⁴⁹³

The Court held that the United States had breached its obligations under article 36(1)⁴⁹⁴ by not informing the LaGrand brothers of their rights under that provision ‘without delay’.⁴⁹⁵ The International Court reaffirmed its approach in *Avena (Mexico v. United States)*, brought by Mexico against the United States on substantially similar grounds to the *LaGrand* case.⁴⁹⁶ In *Jadhav (India v. Pakistan)*,⁴⁹⁷ the Court reaffirmed its previous case-law and held that article 36 did not exclude persons suspected of espionage from its scope. Accordingly, Pakistan had breached its obligations under the provision by denying Indian consular officers access to Mr Jadhav, contrary to their right to visit him, converse and correspond with him, and to arrange for his legal representation.⁴⁹⁸

Article 41 provides that consular officers may not be arrested or detained except in the case of a grave crime and following a decision by the competent judicial authority. If, however, criminal proceedings are instituted against a

consul, he must appear before the competent authorities. The proceedings are to be conducted in a manner that respects his official position and minimises the inconvenience to the exercise of consular functions. Under article 43 their immunity from jurisdiction is restricted in both criminal and civil matters to acts done in the official exercise of consular functions.⁴⁹⁹ In *Koeppel and Koeppel v. Nigeria*,⁵⁰⁰ for example, it was held that the provision of refuge by the Nigerian Consul-General to a Nigerian national was an act performed in the exercise of a consular function within the meaning of article 43 and thus attracted consular immunity.

The Convention on Special Missions 1969⁵⁰¹

In many cases, states will send out special or ad hoc missions to particular countries to deal with some defined issue in addition to relying upon the permanent staffs of the diplomatic and consular missions. In such circumstances, these missions, whether purely technical or politically important, may rely on certain immunities which are basically derived from the Vienna Conventions by analogy with appropriate modifications. By article 8, the sending state must let the host state know of the size and composition of the mission, while according to article 17 the mission must be sited in a place agreed by the states concerned or in the Foreign Ministry of the receiving state.

By article 31 members of special missions have no immunity with regard to claims arising from an accident caused by a vehicle, used outside the official functions of the person involved, and by article 27 only such freedom of movement and travel as is necessary for the performance of the functions of the special mission is permitted.

The question of special missions was discussed in the *Tabatabai* case before a series of German courts.⁵⁰² The Federal Supreme Court noted that the Convention had not yet come into force and that there were conflicting views as to the extent to which it reflected existing customary law. However, it was clear that there was a customary rule of international law which provided that an ad hoc envoy, charged with a special political mission by the sending state, may be granted immunity by individual agreement with the host state

for that mission and its associated status and that therefore such envoys could be placed on a par with members of the permanent missions of states.⁵⁰³ The concept of immunity protected not the diplomat as a person, but rather the mission to be carried out by that person on behalf of the sending state. The question thus turned on whether there had been a sufficiently specific special mission agreed upon by the states concerned, which the Court found in the circumstances.⁵⁰⁴ In *United States v. Sissoko*, the District Court held that the Convention on Special Missions, to which the United States was not a party, did not constitute customary international law and was thus not binding upon the Court.⁵⁰⁵ However, the Court does not seem to have examined the question of special mission immunity in customary international law. In a range of recent cases and practice, the US Executive and the Court have accepted that such immunity is indeed part of customary international law.⁵⁰⁶

The United Kingdom has signed but not ratified the Convention, so cases have similarly focused upon customary international law and its requirements. In *R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Teja*,⁵⁰⁷ an application for diplomatic immunity on the basis that the applicant was on a special mission to Switzerland and passing through England was rejected since it was fundamental that such diplomatic agent be in some form accepted or received by the state. It was found in *Khurts Bat v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*⁵⁰⁸ that: ‘The essential requirement for recognition of a Special Mission is that the receiving state consents to the mission, as a Special Mission’ and the Court assimilated the question of the executive certificate for such missions to the recognition of an ambassador or a member of the latter’s staff so that the terms of any such certificate would be conclusive. It was accepted by the parties that the government was bound

in customary international law to secure inviolability and immunity from criminal proceedings to a person accepted by the Foreign Office as a member of a special mission.⁵⁰⁹ Absent the consent of the executive, the appellant was not entitled to immunity. Following this case, the Foreign Secretary made a written statement on 4 March 2013 on special mission immunity in which a new pilot process was initiated by which the government's consent to a special mission could be addressed expressly before the mission arrived in the United Kingdom.⁵¹⁰ It was stated that: 'Embassies and High Commissions in London will be invited to inform the FCO of forthcoming visits in cases where they wish to seek the Government's express consent as a special mission. The FCO will respond with Government's consent or otherwise to the visit as a special mission. Any legal consequences would ultimately be a matter for the courts.'

In *The Freedom and Justice Party v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*,⁵¹¹ the Court found that no international court or tribunal had considered ruling on whether the immunity of members of a special mission was established in customary international law, but noted that in a number of recent cases such immunity had been recognised. The Court concluded that, 'the Convention on Special Missions in its entirety has not achieved the status of customary international law. However, it seems to us that the weight of authority and state practice now clearly supports the view that customary international law requires inviolability and immunity as required by Articles 29 and 31(1) of the Convention on Special Missions and that there was now 'an abundance of state practice which demonstrates the existence of rules of customary international law relating to the privileges and immunities of special missions and their members'.⁵¹² As far as the actual

extent of immunities of special missions is concerned, the dominant view appears to be that the Convention proposes a wider range of immunities than does customary international law, which focuses upon personal inviolability and immunity from criminal jurisdiction and (probably) such immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction as is necessary for the performance of the mission.⁵¹³

The Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character 1975⁵¹⁴

This treaty applies with regard to the representation of states in any international organisation of a universal character, irrespective of whether or not there are diplomatic relations between the sending and the host states.

There are many similarities between this Convention and the 1961 Vienna Convention. By article 30, for example, diplomatic staff enjoy complete immunity from criminal jurisdiction, and immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction in all cases, save for the same exceptions noted in article 31 of the 1961 Convention. Administrative, technical and service staff are in the same position as under the latter treaty (article 36 of the 1975 Convention).

The mission premises are inviolable and exempt from taxation by the host state, while its archives, documents and correspondence are equally inviolable.

The Convention has received an unenthusiastic welcome, primarily because of the high level of immunities it provides for on the basis of a controversial analogy with diplomatic agents of missions.⁵¹⁵ The range of immunities contrasts with the general situation under existing conventions such as the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946.⁵¹⁶

Suggestions for Further Reading

E. Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, 4th ed., Oxford, 2016

H. Fox and P. Webb, *The Law of State Immunity*, 3rd revised and updated ed., Oxford, 2015

L. T. Lee and J. Quigley, *Consular Law and Practice*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2008

Satow's Diplomatic Practice (ed. I. Roberts), 7th ed., Oxford, 2017

The Cambridge Handbook of Immunities and International Law (ed. T. Ruys, N. Angelet with L. Ferrol), Cambridge, 2019

The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (ed. R. O'Keefe and C. Tams), Oxford, 2013

A. Watts, 'The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of State, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers', **247 HR**, 1994 III, p. 13

X. Yang, *State Immunity in International Law*, Cambridge, 2012

¹ *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 25; and *Germany v. Italy* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 99, 124, 140. See also *Al-Adsani v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 21 November 2001, para. 48; *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2017] UKSC 62, paras. 16, 18 (noting that state immunity is procedural in the sense that it requires the court to dismiss the claim without determining merits, but leaves intact the claimant's legal rights and any relevant defences); and *Reyes v.*

Al-Malki [2017] UKSC 61, para. 7 (noting that diplomatic immunity was not an immunity from liability, but an immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving state).

² See generally e.g. H. Fox and P. Webb, *The Law of State Immunity*, 3rd revised and updated ed., Oxford, 2015; *The Cambridge Handbook of Immunities and International Law* (ed. T. Ruys, N. Angelet with L. Ferrol), Cambridge, 2019; X. Yang, *State Immunity in International Law*, Cambridge, 2012; A. Dickinson, R. Lindsay and J. P. Loonam, *State Immunity: Selected Materials and Commentary*, Oxford, 2004; M. T. Naini, *Immunité juridictionnelle des États*, Paris, 2016; I. Pingel-Lenuzza, *Les Immunités des États en Droit International*, Brussels, 1998; J. Bröhmer, *State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights*, The Hague, 1997; G. M. Badr, *State Immunity*, The Hague, 1984; S. Sucharitkul, *State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law*, Leiden, 1959; and Sucharitkul, 'Immunities of Foreign States before National Authorities', **149 HR**, 1976, p. 87; I. Sinclair, 'The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments', **167 HR**, 1980, p. 113; A. Aust, 'The Law of State Immunity', **53 ICLQ**, 2004, p. 255; UN Legislative Series, *Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property*, New York, 1982; 10 *Netherlands YIL*, 1979; J. Candrian, *L'Immunité des États face aux Droits de l'Homme et à la Protection des Biens Culturels*, Zurich, 2005; *Droit des Immunités et Exigencies du Procès Équitable* (ed. I. Pingel), Paris, 2004; H. Lauterpacht, 'The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States', **28 BYIL**, 1951, p. 220; R. Higgins, 'Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity', **29 NILR**, 1982, p. 265; R. Higgins, 'Equality of States and Immunity from Suit', **43 NYIL**, 2013, p. 129; J. Crawford, 'International Law of Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions', **54 BYIL**, 1983, p. 75; C. J. Lewis, *State and Diplomatic Immunity*, 3rd ed., London, 1990; C. H. Schreuer, *State Immunity: Some Recent Developments*, Cambridge, 1988; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 497; and *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, p. 341. See also the cases on sovereign immunity collected in ILR, vols. **63–5**; ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, 1982, p. 325 and Report of the Sixty-sixth Conference, 1994, p. 452; *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International*, vol. **64 I**, 1991, p. 84; Report of the International Law Commission, 1991, A/46/10, p. 8 and American Law Institute, *Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, St Paul, 2018, Part IV, chapter 5.

³ See A. Watts, 'The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of State, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers', **247 HR**, 1994 III, p. 13.

⁴ See also *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)* [2000] 1 AC 147, 201 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson) and 268–9 (per Lord Millett); 119 ILR, pp. 152, 221–3.

⁵ See e.g. *The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property* (ed. R. O’Keefe and C. Tams), Oxford, 2013; Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 9; E. Denza, ‘The 2005 UN Convention on State Immunity in Perspective’, 55 *ICLQ*, 2006, p. 395; R. Gardiner, ‘UN Convention on State Immunity: Form and Function’, 55 *ICLQ*, 2006, p. 407; G. Hafner and L. Lange, ‘La Convention des Nations Unies sur les Immunités Jurisdictionnelles des États et de Leurs Biens’, 50 *AFDI*, 2004, p. 45; and H. Fox, ‘In Defence of State Immunity: Why the UN Convention on State Immunity is Important’, 55 *ICLQ*, 2006, p. 399. This convention is not yet in force as at the date of writing. However, it is increasingly seen as reflecting principles of customary international law; see e.g. *Jones v. Saudi Arabia* [2007] 1 AC 270, 280, 289 and 293.

⁶ 7 Cranch 116 (1812).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 137. It therefore followed that ‘national ships of war entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction’. Such rules would not apply to private ships which are susceptible to foreign jurisdiction abroad. See also *Philippines v. Pimentel* 553 US 851 (2008), US Supreme Court, Slip Opinion of 12 June 2008, pp. 11–12.

⁸ [2000] 1 AC 147, 201; 119 ILR, p. 152.

⁹ [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 1588; 119 ILR, p. 367.

¹⁰ See above, [Chapter 4](#), p. 159.

¹¹ See e.g. *Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer (No. 3)* [1982] AC 888; 64 ILR, p. 332; *Buck v. Attorney-General* [1965] 1 Ch. 745; 42 ILR, p. 11; and Goff J, *I° Congreso del Partido* [1978] 1 QB 500, 527–8; 64 ILR, pp. 154, 178–9. See also Sinclair, ‘Sovereign Immunity’, p. 198. See further above, p. 162. Note also that ‘a claim to state immunity is essentially a public claim that demands open litigation’, *Harb v. King Fahd Abdul Aziz* [2005] EWCA Civ 632, para. 28, per Thorpe LJ.

¹² 649 F.2d 1354, 1359; 66 ILR, pp. 413, 418. Reaffirmed in *Asociacion de Reclamantes v. Mexico* 22 ILM, 1983, pp. 625, 641–2. See also *Ramirez v. Weinberger* 23 ILM, 1984, p. 1274; *Goldwater v. Carter* 444 US 996 (1979); and *Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria Azucarera Nacional SA* [1983] 2 LL. R 171; 64 ILR, p. 368. In *High Commissioner of Pakistan v. Jah* [2016] EWHC 1465 (Ch), para. 89, the Court emphasised that while sovereign immunity operates as a procedural bar, which the party entitled to invoke it may waive, act of state goes to the substantive adjudicative competence of the court and could not be waived.

¹³ This has been reaffirmed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 62, 88; 121 ILR, pp. 405, 432–3. Mance LJ stated in the Court of Appeal decision in *Jones v. Saudi Arabia* that ‘claims to state immunity should be resolved at an early stage in the proceedings’: [2004] EWCA Civ 1394, para. 10; 129 ILR, p. 653. See also *Al Attiya v. Al Thani* [2016] EWHC 212 (QB), para. 22; and *Philippines v. Pimentel* 553 US 851 (2008), US Supreme Court, Slip Opinion of 12 June 2008, p. 11, holding that consideration of the merits of the case where sovereign immunity was pleaded would itself constitute an infringement of sovereign immunity.

¹⁴ See e.g. *Siderman de Blake and Others v. Argentina and Others* 965 F.2d 699 (1992); 103 ILR, p. 454.

¹⁵ 488 F.Supp. 665 (1980); 63 ILR, p. 378. Note that the US Court of Appeals has held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 does not supersede the act of state doctrine: see *Helen Liu v. China* 29 ILM, 1990, p. 192.

¹⁶ 488 F.Supp. 665, 674.

¹⁷ [1988] 3 WLR 1169, 1188; 80 ILR, pp. 191, 209.

¹⁸ See *International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC* 649 F.2d 1354, 1359–60; 66 ILR, pp. 413, 418. See also *Helen Liu v. China* 29 ILM, 1990, pp. 192, 205.

¹⁹ See the interesting discussion of the relationship between non-justiciability and immunity by Evans J in *Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v. Commonwealth of*

Australia, 1989, transcript, pp. 59–60.

²⁰ *Germany v. Italy* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 99, 123. See also *Jones v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 January 2014, p. 49.

²¹ But note a series of early cases which are not nearly so clear in their adoption of a broad absolute immunity doctrine: see e.g. *The Prins Frederik* (1820) 2 Dod. 451; *Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover* (1848) 2 HLC 1; and *De Haber v. Queen of Portugal* (1851) 17 QB 171. See also Phillimore J in *The Charkieh* (1873) LR 4 A and E 59. See also Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, p. 26.

²² (1880) 5 PD 197.

²³ Brett LJ, *ibid.*, pp. 214–15. Note, of course, that the principle relates to public property destined for public, not private, use.

²⁴ [1920] P 30; 1 AD, p. 146. See e.g. Sinclair, ‘Sovereign Immunity’, p. 126. See also *The Jupiter* [1924] P 236; 3 AD, p. 136.

²⁵ [1938] AC 485; 9 AD, p. 250.

²⁶ See e.g. Lord Macmillan: [1938] AC 485, 498; 9 AD, p. 260.

²⁷ [1938] AC 485, p. 490. See also *Berizzi Bros Co. v. SS Pesaro* 271 US 562 (1926); 3 AD, p. 186; and *The Navemar* 303 US 68 (1938); 9 AD, p. 176.

²⁸ [1949] 2 All ER 274; 16 AD, p. 129. See also Cohen LJ: [1949] 2 All ER 274, 281.

²⁹ [1957] 1 QB 438; 23 ILR, p. 160.

³⁰ [1957] 1 QB 438, 461; 23 ILR, p. 169.

³¹ [1955] AC 72; 21 ILR, p. 95. See also *US and France v. Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie* [1952] AC 582; 19 ILR, p. 163.

³² See Higgins, ‘Unresolved Aspects’, p. 273, who raises the question as to whether this test would be rigorous in an era of restrictive immunity. See also R. Higgins, *Problems and*

Process, Oxford, 1994, chapter 5.

³³ *The Navemar* 303 US 68 (1938); 9 AD, p. 176; and *Mexico v. Hoffman* 324 US 30 (1945); 12 AD, p. 143.

³⁴ [1924] AC 797; 2 AD, p. 124. By s. 21 of the State Immunity Act 1978, an executive certificate is deemed to be conclusive as to e.g. statehood in this context or as to head of state: see *Sultan of Pahang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2011] EWCA Civ 616. See also *Trawnik v. Gordon Lennox* [1985] 2 All ER 368 as to the issue of a certificate under s. 21 on the status of the Commander of UK Forces in Berlin.

³⁵ See e.g. Belgium and Italy, Lauterpacht, ‘Problem’; Badr, *State Immunity*, chapter 2; Sinclair, ‘Sovereign Immunity’; and Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, p. 32. See also the Brussels Convention on the Immunity of State-owned Ships 1926, which assimilated the position of such ships engaged in trade to that of private ships regarding submission to the jurisdiction, and the 1958 Conventions on the Territorial Sea and on the High Seas. See now articles 31, 32, 95 and 96 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.

³⁶ *Dralle v. Czechoslovakia* 17 ILR, p. 155. This case was cited with approval by the West German Supreme Constitutional Court in *Empire of Iran* 45 ILR, p. 57; and by the US Court of Appeals in *Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes* 35 ILR, p. 110.

³⁷ 26 *Department of State Bulletin*, 984 (1952). See also C. A. Bradley, *International Law in the US Legal System*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015, chapter 8; and *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2017] UKSC 62, paras. 41 ff. for a valuable discussion of the case-law concerning the evolution of state immunity.

³⁸ 35 ILR, p. 110. See also e.g. *National City Bank of NY v. China* 348 US 356 (1955); 22 ILR, p. 210; and *Rich v. Naviera Vacuba* 32 ILR, p. 127.

³⁹ 66 ILR, pp. 212, 221, 224.

⁴⁰ See, for some early reconsiderations, Lord Denning in *Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad* [1958] AC 379, 422; 24 ILR, pp. 175, 190.

⁴¹ [1976] 2 WLR 214; 64 ILR, p. 90. Sinclair describes this as a ‘historic landmark’: ‘Sovereign Immunity’, p. 154. See also R. Higgins, ‘Recent Developments in the Law of Sovereign Immunity in the United Kingdom’, 71 *AJIL*, 1977, pp. 423, 424.

⁴² [1920] P 30; 1 AD, p. 146.

⁴³ (1880) 5 PD 197.

⁴⁴ [1938] AC 485; 9 AD, p. 250.

⁴⁵ [1976] 2 WLR 214, 232; 64 ILR, pp. 90, 108. Note that Lord Cross believed that the absolute theory still obtained with regard to actions *in personam*: [1976] 2 WLR 214, 233.

⁴⁶ [1975] 1 WLR 1485; 64 ILR, p. 81.

⁴⁷ [1975] 1 WLR 1485, 1490–1; 64 ILR, p. 84.

⁴⁸ [1977] 2 WLR 356; 64 ILR, p. 122.

⁴⁹ [1977] 2 WLR 356, 366–7 (Denning MR), 380 (Stephenson LJ), 385–6 (Shaw LJ).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 365–6, 380. But cf. Stephenson LJ, *ibid.*, p. 381. See further above, [Chapter 4](#), p. 125.

⁵¹ See e.g. *Hispano Americana Mercantil SA v. Central Bank of Nigeria* [1979] 2 LL. R 277; 64 ILR, p. 221.

⁵² [1981] 1 All ER 1092; 64 ILR, p. 307, a case concerned with the pre-1978 Act common law. See also *Planmount Ltd v. Zaire* [1981] 1 All ER 1110; 64 ILR, p. 268.

⁵³ [1984] 2 All ER 6; 74 ILR, p. 179. See also *Jones v. Saudi Arabia* [2006] UKHL 26, para. 8 (per Lord Bingham); 129 ILR, p. 716.

⁵⁴ See e.g. *Administration des Chemins de Fer du Gouvernement Iranien* 52 ILR, p. 315; and *Empire of Iran* 45 ILR, p. 57; see also Sinclair, ‘Sovereign Immunity’; Badr, *State Immunity*; and UN, *Materials*. Note also *Abbott v. South Africa* before the Spanish

Constitutional Court, 86 ILR, p. 512; *Manauta v. Embassy of Russian Federation* 113 ILR, p. 429 (Argentinian Supreme Court); *US v. Friedland* 182 DLR (4th) 614; 120 ILR, p. 417; and *CGM Industrial v. KPMG* 1998 (3) SA 738; 121 ILR, p. 472. See also Israel's Foreign States Immunity Law 2008, noted in *Germany v. Italy* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 99, 130; and see *US v. Andria Bachbat*, 8 January 2016, www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-court-recognizes-u-s-foreign-state-immunity-in-employment-suit/.

⁵⁵ See e.g. the Singapore State Immunity Act 1979; the Pakistan State Immunity Ordinance 1981; the South African Foreign States Immunities Act 1981; the Canadian State Immunity Act 1982; and the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985. See also article 5 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 2004. Note that this Convention, which is not in force as at the date of writing, does not apply to criminal proceedings.

⁵⁶ See e.g. Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 8; G. Delaume, 'Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976', **71 AJIL**, 1977, p. 399; Sinclair, 'Sovereign Immunity', pp. 243 ff.; and D. Weber, 'The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976', **3 Yale Studies in World Public Order**, 1976, p. 1. Note that in *Austria v. Altmann*, the US Supreme Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applied to acts which occurred prior to its enactment and even prior to the adoption by the US of the restrictive immunity approach in 1952: 541 US 677 (2004). See also *Argentina v. NML Capital* 573 US 134 (2014), pp. 5 ff. See also the discussion by the US Supreme Court in *Jam v. International Finance Corp.* 586 US (2019), concerning the immunities of international organisations, which by the International Organisations Immunities Act 1945 were the same as those enjoyed by foreign governments. However, under the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, there is no immunity for claims that are *inter alia* 'based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state', **28 USC § 1605(a)(2)**, see *Jam v. International Finance Corp.*, Civil Action No. 15-612 (JDB), District Court for the District of Columbia, Judgment of 14 February 2020.

⁵⁷ See e.g. Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 7; D. W. Bowett, 'The State Immunity Act 1978', **37 Cambridge Law Journal**, 1978, p. 193; R. C. A. White, 'The State Immunity Act 1978', **42 MLR**, 1979, p. 72; Sinclair, 'Sovereign Immunity', pp. 257 ff.; M. N. Shaw, 'The State Immunity Act 1978', *New Law Journal*, 23 November 1978, p. 1136; and Lord Lloyd-Jones, 'Forty Years On: State Immunity and the State Immunity Act 1978', **68 ICLQ**, 2019, p. 247.

⁵⁸ See also the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity. The Additional Protocol to the European Convention, which establishes a European Tribunal in matters of State Immunity to determine disputes under the Convention, came into force on 22 May 1985, to be composed initially of the same members as the ECtHR: see Council of Europe Press Release, C(85)39. See generally UN, *Materials*, Part I ‘National Legislation’; and Badr, *State Immunity*, chapter 3. See also the Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States, 22 ILM, 1983, p. 292. Note that the large number of cases precipitated by the 1979 Iran Hostages Crisis and the US freezing of assets were argued on the basis of the restrictive theory, before being terminated: see e.g. R. Edwards, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the US Iranian Assets Control Regulations’, 75 *AJIL*, 1981, p. 870. See also *Dames & Moore v. Regan* 101 S.Ct. 1972 (1981); 72 ILR, p. 270.

⁵⁹ See, for a number of examples, UN, *Materials*, pp. 134–50. See also M. M. Boguslavsky, ‘Foreign State Immunity: Soviet Doctrine and Practice’, 10 *Netherlands YIL*, 1979, p. 167. See, as to Philippines practice, *US v. Ruiz and De Guzman* 102 ILR, p. 122; *US v. Guinto, Valencia and Others*, *ibid.*, p. 132; and *Holy See v. Starbright Sales Enterprises*, *ibid.*, p. 163.

⁶⁰ ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 99, 124–5.

⁶¹ See e.g. China and Brazil, see *Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates* 147 ILR, p. 376.

⁶² 336 F.2d 354 (1964); 35 ILR, p. 110. See also P. Lalive, ‘L’Immunité de Jurisdiction des États et des Organisations Internationales’, 84 *HR*, 1953, p. 205; and Lauterpacht, ‘Problem’, pp. 237–9.

⁶³ Note that since the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the determination of such status is a judicial, not executive, act.

⁶⁴ See e.g. s. 1 of the State Immunity Act 1978; s. 1604 of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976; s. 3(1) of the Canadian State Immunity Act 1985; and s. 9 of the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985. See also *Saudi Arabia v. Nelson* 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993); 100 ILR, p. 544.

⁶⁵ See also article 15 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972. Article II of the Revised Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity adopted by the International

Law Association in 1994, Report of the Sixty-sixth Conference, 1994, p. 22, provides that: 'In principle, a foreign state shall be immune from the adjudicatory jurisdiction of a forum state for acts performed by it in the exercise of its sovereign authority, i.e. *jure imperii*. It shall not be immune in the circumstances provided in article III.'

⁶⁶ There is extensive state practice on whether immunity should be seen as a derogation from territorial sovereignty and thus to be justified in each particular case, or as a rule of international law as such, thus not requiring substantiation in each and every case: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1980, vol. **II**, part 2, pp. 142 ff.

⁶⁷ Note that the provision in point (iv) is somewhat confusing in the light of article 3, which states that the Convention is without prejudice to the privileges and immunities of diplomatic and consular missions, special missions and missions to international organisations, and the immunities granted to heads of state.

⁶⁸ See e.g. s. 1603(d) of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. The section-by-section analysis of the Act emphasises that 'the fact that goods or services to be procured through a contract are to be used for a public purpose is irrelevant; it is the initially commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is critical', reproduced in UN, *Materials*, pp. 103, 107. See also *Empire of Iran* 45 ILR, pp. 57, 80–1; *Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria* [1977] 2 WLR 356; 64 ILR, p. 122; *Non-resident Petitioner v. Central Bank of Nigeria* 16 ILM, 1977, p. 501 (a German case); *Planmount Ltd v. Zaire* [1981] 1 All ER 1110; 64 ILR, p. 268; and *Saudi Arabia v. Nelson* 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993); 100 ILR, p. 544 (US Supreme Court). See also article I of the Revised Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity adopted by the International Law Association in 1994, Report of the Sixty-sixth Conference, 1994, p. 23.

⁶⁹ Report of the International Law Commission, 1991, pp. 29–30.

⁷⁰ *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1983, vol. **II**, part 2.

⁷¹ [1983] 1 AC 244, 267; 64 ILR, pp. 307, 318.

⁷² [1983] 1 AC 244, 262; 64 ILR, p. 314.

⁷³ See e.g. Sinclair, 'Sovereign Immunity', pp. 210–13; and *Empire of Iran* 45 ILR, pp. 57, 80. See also article 7 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972.

⁷⁴ See e.g. Crawford, 'International Law', p. 88; and Lauterpacht, 'Problem', pp. 220, 224–6.

⁷⁵ [1983] 1 AC 244, 267; 64 ILR, p. 318.

⁷⁶ [1983] 1 AC 244, 272; 64 ILR, p. 323.

⁷⁷ (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 449; 94 ILR, p. 264.

⁷⁸ [1992] 91 DLR (4th) 463; 94 ILR, p. 278.

⁷⁹ [1993] 1 VR 251; 101 ILR, p. 193.

⁸⁰ [1993] 1 VR 253; 101 ILR, pp. 195–6.

⁸¹ 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (1985); 88 ILR, pp. 75, 85.

⁸² [1981] 1 All ER 1075; 64 ILR, p. 320.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, quoting the judge at first instance, [1978] 1 All ER 1169, 1192; 64 ILR, p. 179.

⁸⁴ [1981] 1 All ER 1077, 1081; 64 ILR, pp. 321, 327.

⁸⁵ [1981] 1 All ER 1079–80, 1082, 1083; 64 ILR, pp. 325, 328, 329.

⁸⁶ Note that if the State Immunity Act 1978 had been in force when the cause of action arose in this case, it is likely that the claim of immunity would have completely failed: see s. 10. See also *Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co.* [1995] 1 WLR 1147, where the House of Lords separated out a series of events and held that an initial sovereign act did not characterise the situation as a whole: see below, p. 615.

⁸⁷ [1995] 1 WLR 82, 95; 100 ILR, p. 438. Note that the case, as it concerned foreign armed forces in the UK, fell outside the State Immunity Act 1978 and was dealt with under common law.

⁸⁸ See also *Hicks v. US* 120 ILR, p. 606, where the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the primary purpose of recreation facilities at an airbase was to increase the effectiveness of the central military activity of that base, which was clearly a sovereign activity.

⁸⁹ Similarly a US citizen and civilian.

⁹⁰ [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 1577 (per Lord Hope, who stated that ‘the context is all important’, *ibid.*).

⁹¹ (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 449; 94 ILR, p. 264.

⁹² (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 466; 94 ILR, p. 281.

⁹³ [1995] 1 WLR 1147, 1160; 103 ILR, p. 340. For later proceedings in this case, see 116 ILR, p. 534 (High Court); [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 360; [2001] 2 WLR 1117 (Court of Appeal); and [2002] UKHL 19 (House of Lords).

⁹⁴ Note that in *Sengupta v. India* 64 ILR, pp. 325, 360, it was emphasised that in deciding whether immunity applied, one had to consider whether it was the kind of contract an individual might make, whether it involved the participation of both parties in the public functions of the state, the nature of the alleged breach and whether the investigation of the claim would involve an investigation into the public or sovereign acts of the foreign state.

⁹⁵ [1995] 1 WLR 1147, 1162–3. See further below, p. 621.

⁹⁶ [2015] EWCA Civ 33, para. 21.

⁹⁷ Note the issue raised as to the inviolability and immunity of documents and data, including the right to confidentiality of communications of Timor-Leste with legal advisers in *Timor-Leste v. Australia* before the ICJ: see Request for Provisional Measure, ICJ, Order of 3 March 2014, ICJ Reports, 2014, pp. 147, 152–3. The Court, while not dealing at that stage with the substantive determination of the claims, denied by Australia, did find that ‘at least some of the rights for which Timor-Leste seeks protection – namely, the right to conduct arbitration proceedings or negotiations without interference by Australia, including the right of confidentiality of and non-interference in its communications with its legal advisers – are plausible’, *ibid.*, p. 153. Such rights could be derived from the principle of

sovereign equality of states, *ibid.* The court held that *inter alia* Australia had ‘to keep under seal the seized documents and electronic data and any copies thereof until further decision of the Court’ and ‘shall not interfere in any way in communications between Timor-Leste and its legal advisers in connection with the pending *Arbitration under the Timor Sea Treaty of 20 May 2002* between Timor-Leste and Australia, with any future bilateral negotiations concerning maritime delimitation, or with any other related procedure between the two states, including the present case before the Court’, *ibid.*, p. 161.

⁹⁸ See e.g. L. McGregor, ‘State Immunity and Human Rights: Is There a Future After *Germany v Italy* ?’, **11** *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2013, p. 125; R. Pavoni, ‘How Broad is the Principle Upheld by the Italian Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 238?’, **14** *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2016, p. 573; A. Sanger, ‘State Immunity and the Right of Access to a Court under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, **65** *ICLQ*, 2016, p. 213; R. O’Keefe, ‘State Immunity and Human Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts and Minds’, **44** *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 2011, p. 999; Bröhmer, *State Immunity*; S. Marks, ‘Torture and the Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States’, *CLJ*, 1997, p. 8; R. van Alebeek, ‘The Pinochet Case’, **71** *BYIL*, 2000, pp. 49 ff.; R. van Alebeek, *Immunities of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law*, Oxford, 2008; K. Reece Thomas and J. Small, ‘Human Rights and State Immunity: Is There Immunity From Civil Liability for Torture?’, **50** *NILR*, 2003, p. 1; K. Parlett, ‘Immunity in Civil Proceedings for Torture: The Emerging Exception’, **2** *European Human Rights Law Review*, 2006, p. 49; H. Fox, ‘State Immunity and the International Crime of Torture’, **2** *European Human Rights Law Review*, 2006, p. 142; Redress, *Immunity v Accountability*, London, 2005; and L. Caplan, ‘State Immunity, Human Rights and *Jus Cogens*: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory’, **97** *AJIL*, 2003, p. 741.

⁹⁹ 123 L.Ed.2d 47, 61 (1993); 100 ILR, pp. 544, 553.

¹⁰⁰ 123 L.Ed.2d 47, 57. See also e.g. *Controller and Auditor General v. Sir Ronald Davidson* [1996] 2 NZLR 278; and *Princz v. Germany* 26 F.3d 1166 (DC Cir. 1994).

¹⁰¹ This provision is retroactive. See *Flatow v. Iran* 999 F.Supp. 1 (1998); 121 ILR, p. 618; and *Alejandro v. Cuba* 996 F.Supp. 1239 (1997); 121 ILR, p. 603. See also Bradley, *International Law in the US Legal System*, p. 250; and *Bank Markazi v. Peterson* 578 US ____ (2016). Note also the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, [28 USC § 1605B](#), which created, *inter alia*, a new exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, to the

effect that sovereign immunity is waived: ‘in any case in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for physical injury to person or property or death occurring in the United States and caused by – (1) an act of international terrorism in the United States; and (2) a tortious act or acts of the foreign state, or of any official, employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, regardless of where the tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred’. The first case under this legislation was *Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (03-MDL-1570(GBD))*, where the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in a judgment on 28 March 2018 denied Saudi Arabia’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit regarding its alleged involvement in the 11 September 2001 terror attacks.

¹⁰² 470 F.3d 356 (2006). See also *Schermerhorn v. Israel*, No. 17-7023, US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1 December 2017, where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit confirmed that the terrorism exception did not apply to states not designated as state sponsors of terrorism; and *Colvin and Others v. Syria*, US District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 16-1423 (ABJ), Judgment of 1 February 2019, granting plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.

¹⁰³ ICJ Reports, 2012, p. 138.

¹⁰⁴ Canada’s Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act 2012, which creates a cause of action in Canada for damage or loss which occurred anywhere in relation to a terrorist act, if certain conditions are met. If the plaintiff is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident, no further territorial link is required; if the plaintiff does not meet that test, there may still be jurisdiction if there is a ‘real and substantial connection’ to the country: see the Supreme Court of Canada in *Libman v. The Queen* [1985] 2 SCR 178. See also *See Tracy v. Iran*, 2016 ONSC 3759 (Ontario Superior Court) and 2017 ONCA 549 (Ontario Court of Appeal), The Act also amends the Canadian State Immunity Act to lift the immunity of a foreign state that has been listed by the Governor in Council as a sponsor of terrorism: see now s. 6(1) of the State Immunity Act 1985. To date, Iran and Syria have been so listed, see SOR/2012-170.

¹⁰⁵ 999 F.Supp. 1 (1998); 121 ILR 618.

¹⁰⁶ [2014] 3 SCR 176, 208, para. 44.

107 124 ILR, pp. 427, 435. But see now the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act 2012, above, note 104.

108 *Ibid.*, p. 443. The Court dismissed arguments that either the Convention against Torture or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposed an obligation on states to create a civil remedy with regard to acts of torture committed abroad, or that such an obligation existed as a rule of *jus cogens*: see pp. 441, 443.

109 (1996) 1 LL. R 104; 107 ILR, p. 536. But see Evans LJ in *Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait* 100 ILR, p. 465, which concerned leave to serve proceedings upon the government of Kuwait and in which it had been held that there was a good arguable case that, under the State Immunity Act, there was no immunity for a state in respect of alleged acts of torture.

110 [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 1588 (per Lord Millett); 119 ILR, p. 384.

111 Judgment of 21 November 2001; 123 ILR, p. 24.

112 *Ibid.*, paras. 54, 55.

113 *Ibid.*, para. 61.

114 *Ibid.*, para. 66. This decision was later affirmed in *Kalogeropoulou v. Greece and Germany*, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 December 2002; 129 ILR, p. 537.

115 Judgment of 14 January 2014, paras. 188 ff.

116 [2006] UKHL 26, para. 9 (per Lord Bingham); 129 ILR, p. 717.

117 *Ibid.*, paras. 24–8; 129 ILR, pp. 726–8.

118 See e.g. para. 24 (Lord Bingham) and para. 44 (Lord Hoffmann), 129 ILR, pp. 726, 732, both citing Fox, *State Immunity*, p. 525 to this effect, who further noted that the existence of immunity merely diverted any breach of the prohibition ‘to a different method of settlement’.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 45 ff.; 129 ILR, pp. 732 ff. Note that the controversial case of *Ferrini v. Germany* before the Italian Court of Cassation is to contrary effect, (2004) Cass sez un 5044/04: see P. De Sena and F. De Vittor, ‘State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the *Ferrini* Case’, 16 *EJIL*, 2005, p. 89; Fox, ‘State Immunity and the Crime of Torture’; and Lords Bingham and Hoffmann in *Jones v. Saudi Arabia* at paras. 22, 63 respectively. See now *Jones v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 January 2014. See also *Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands*, ECtHR, Decision of 11 June 2013, paras. 158, 164. Note that in *Oleynikov v. Russia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 March 2013, the ECtHR held that the granting of immunity in excess of the requirements of international law could violate the right of access to a court provided in article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

¹²⁰ [2015] EWCA Civ 33, para. 16. Lord Dyson MR particularly noted: ‘It is difficult to see how Article 6 can be engaged if international law denies to the Contracting State jurisdiction over a dispute. There can be no denial of justice for which the State is responsible if there is, as a matter of international law, no court capable of exercising jurisdiction’, *ibid.* See also *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61, para. 63.

¹²¹ [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 1588.

¹²² Note also the relevance of article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has the same meaning as article 6: see *Benkharbouche*, paras. 69 ff.

¹²³ See also Lord Dyson MR in *Benkharbouche*, *ibid.*, paras. 31 ff.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 53. A declaration of incompatibility under s. 4(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 was thus proposed: *ibid.*, para. 86(4). This leaves the matter to Parliament for decision as to whether action is required. Cf. *Ogelegbanwei v. President of Nigeria* [2016] EWHC 8 (QB).

¹²⁵ *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2017] UKSC 62, para. 37.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 75.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 76.

128 [2000] 1 AC 147; 119 ILR, p. 135.

129 See further below, pp. 638 ff. Note, however, that Lords Hope, Millett and Phillips held that there was no immunity for widespread and systematic acts of official torture: [2000] 1 AC 147, 246–8, 275–7, 288–92; 119 ILR, pp. 198–201, 228–31, 242–7.

130 ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 99, 140–2.

131 *Ibid.*, p. 140.

132 Except, of course, for those states still adhering to the absolute immunity approach, such as China, for example: see *Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates* 147 ILR, p. 376, a Decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in 2011.

133 In his discussion of the development of the restrictive theory of sovereign or state immunity in *Alcom Ltd v. Colombia* [1984] 2 All ER 6, 9; 74 ILR, pp. 180, 181, Lord Diplock noted that the critical distinction was between what a state did in the exercise of its sovereign authority and what it did in the course of commercial activities. The former enjoyed immunity, the latter did not. See also Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapters 12 and 13; and Schreuer, *State Immunity*, chapter 2.

134 Thus e.g. the defence of sovereign immunity was not available in an action relating to a contract for the repair of an ambassador's residence: *Planmount Ltd v. Zaire* [1981] 1 All ER 1110; 64 ILR, p. 268.

135 *Alcom Ltd v. Colombia* [1984] 2 All ER 6, 10; 74 ILR, p. 183.

136 Note that by s. 3(3), s. 3(1) does not apply to a contract of employment between a state and an individual.

137 1989, transcript, pp. 52 ff.

138 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

139 *Ibid.*, pp. 56–7.

¹⁴⁰ [2003] EWHC 1357; 129 ILR, p. 571. This was approved by the Court of Appeal in *Svenska Petroleum v. Lithuania* [2006] EWCA Civ 1529, para. 137.

¹⁴¹ [2011] 2 AC 495. See also *LR Avionics v. Nigeria* [2016] EWHC 1761 (Comm).

¹⁴² But see now *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2017] UKSC 62, paras. 30 ff.

¹⁴³ 131 ILR, p. 529.

¹⁴⁴ Citing Lord Bingham in *Jones v. Saudi Arabia* [2006] UKHL 26, para. 8; and see below, p. 634.

¹⁴⁵ [2006] EWCA Civ 1529, paras. 132–3.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 137.

¹⁴⁷ [1988] 3 WLR 1033; 80 ILR, p. 49.

¹⁴⁸ [1988] 3 WLR 1104–5 (Kerr LJ) and 1130 (Nourse LJ); 80 ILR, pp. 119, 148.

¹⁴⁹ *Australia and New Zealand Banking Group v. Commonwealth of Australia*, 1989, transcript, pp. 57–9.

¹⁵⁰ It should be noted that Evans J reached his decision on this point only with considerable hesitation and reluctance: *ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁵¹ See e.g. *Gemini Shipping v. Foreign Trade Organisation for Chemicals and Foodstuffs* 63 ILR, p. 569; and *ADM Milling Co. v. Bolivia* 63 ILR, p. 56. See also *Fourth Restatement of US Foreign Relations Law*, § 454.

¹⁵² *NAC v. Nigeria* 63 ILR, p. 137.

¹⁵³ *United Euram Co. v. Russia* 63 ILR, p. 228.

¹⁵⁴ *Argentine Airlines v. Ross* 63 ILR, p. 195.

¹⁵⁵ *Schmidt v. Polish People's Republic* 742 F.2d 67 (1984). See also *Jackson v. People's Republic of China* 596 F.Supp. 386 (1984); *Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algérienne* 605 F.2d 648 (1979); 63 ILR, p. 252; and *Corporacion Venezolana de Fomenta v. Vintero Sales* 629 F.2d 786 (1980); 63 ILR, p. 477.

¹⁵⁶ 764 F.2d 1101 (1985). See also *Chisholm v. Bank of Jamaica* 643 F.Supp. 1393 (1986); 121 ILR, p. 487. Note that in *Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson*, the US Supreme Court, in its Decision of 22 April 2003, held that in order to constitute an instrumentality under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the foreign state concerned must itself own a majority of a corporation's shares. Indirect subsidiaries would not benefit from immunity since such companies cannot come within the statutory language granting instrumentality status to an entity a 'majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof': see s. 1603(b)(2). Only direct ownership would satisfy the statutory requirement. The statutory reference to ownership of 'shares' showed that Congress intended coverage to turn on formal corporate ownership and a corporation and its shareholders were distinct entities. Further, instrumentality status was to be determined as at the time of the filing of the complaint: see Case No. 01-593, pp. 4-8.

¹⁵⁷ See e.g. *Braka v. Nacional Financiera*, No. 83-4161 (SDNY 9 July 1984); and *Frankel v. Banco Nacional de Mexico*, No. 82-6457 (SDNY 31 May 1983), cited in 80 *AJIL*, 1986, p. 172, note 5.

¹⁵⁸ 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992); 100 ILR, p. 509.

¹⁵⁹ 66 ILR, p. 212. Here, the plurality stated that a foreign state engaging in commercial activities was exercising only those powers that can be exercised by private citizens: 425 US 704.

¹⁶⁰ 119 L.Ed.2d 394, 405; 100 ILR, p. 515. Reaffirmed in *Saudi Arabia v. Nelson* 123 L.Ed.2d 47, 61 (1993); 100 ILR, pp. 545, 553.

¹⁶¹ DC Docket No. 04-23223-CV-MGC, Judgment of 1 November 2006.

¹⁶² *Aerotrade Inc. v. Haiti* 63 ILR, p. 41.

¹⁶³ *Castro v. Saudi Arabia* 63 ILR, p. 419.

164 *Transamerican Steamship Corp. v. Somalia* 590 F.Supp. 968 (1984) and 767 F.2d 998. This is based upon the legislative history of the 1976 Act: see the HR Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976).

165 *Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency* 443 F.Supp. 849 (1978); 63 ILR, p. 127. See also Schreuer, *State Immunity*, pp. 42–3, providing a list of criteria with respect to identifying commercial transactions.

166 127 S.Ct. 2352 (2007).

167 See e.g. *International Shoe Co. v. Washington* 326 US 310 (1945); *McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.* 355 US 220 (1957); *Libyan-American Oil Co. v. Libya* 482 F.Supp. 1175 (1980); 62 ILR, p. 220; *Perez and Others v. The Bahamas* 482 F.Supp. 1208 (1980); 63 ILR, p. 350; and *Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica* 614 F.2d 1247 (1980); 63 ILR, p. 370, *aff'd* 652 F.2d 186 (1982).

168 849 F.2d 1511 (1988).

169 *Ibid.* Note that the Supreme Court in *Saudi Arabia v. Nelson* 123 L.Ed.2d 47, 58–9; 100 ILR, pp. 545, 550–1, held that the phrase ‘based on’, appearing in the section, meant ‘those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case’.

170 849 F.2d 1515.

171 Referring to the cases of *Transamerican Steamship Corp. v. Somalia* 767 F.2d 998, 1004, where demand for payment in the US by an agency of the Somali government and actual bank transfers were held to be sufficient; and *Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nigeria* 647 F.2d 300, 312; 63 ILR, pp. 552, 563, where refusal to pay letters of credit issued by a US bank and payable in the US to financially injured claimants was held to suffice.

172 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992); 100 ILR, p. 509.

173 119 L.Ed.2d 407; 100 ILR, p. 517, citing 941 F.2d at 152.

174 See as to earlier drafts of this provision, Report of the International Law Commission, 1991, pp. 13, 69; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1986, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 8.

175 See e.g. Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 14; H. Fox, 'Employment Contracts as an Exception to State Immunity: Is All Public Service Immune?', **66 BYIL**, 1995, p. 97; and R. Garnett, 'State Immunity in Employment Matters', **46 ICLQ**, 1997, p. 81.

176 See e.g. *Egypt v. Gamal Eldin* [1996] 2 All ER 237.

177 See e.g. *Saudi Arabia v. Ahmed* [1996] 2 All ER 248; 104 ILR, p. 629.

178 64 ILR, p. 325. See also *Military Affairs Office of the Embassy of Kuwait v. Caramba-Coker*, EAT 1054/02/RN, Employment Appeals Tribunal (2003); and *Aziz v. Yemen* [2005] EWCA Civ 745.

179 [2017] UKSC 62, paras. 69 ff.

180 See also R. Garnett, 'State and Diplomatic Immunity and Employment Rights: European Law to the Rescue', **64 ICLQ**, 2015, p. 783.

181 (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 449; 94 ILR, p. 264.

182 114 ILR, p. 525. See also *Canada v. Cargnello* 114 ILR, p. 559. See also a number of German cases also holding that employment functions forming part of the core sphere of sovereign activity of the foreign states would attract immunity, otherwise not: *X v. Argentina* 114 ILR, p. 502; *French Consulate Disabled Employee* 114 ILR, p. 508; and *Muller v. US* 114 ILR, p. 513.

183 113 ILR, p. 464.

184 116 ILR, p. 622. The case was remitted to the Court of Appeal for decision.

185 See e.g. *Brazilian Embassy Employee* 116 ILR, p. 625 (Portuguese Supreme Court); and *Ramos v. US* 116 ILR, p. 634 (High Court of Lisbon).

¹⁸⁶ See e.g. *Landano v. US* 116 ILR, p. 636 (Labour Court of Geneva); *Nicoud v. US* 116 ILR, p. 650 (Labour Court of Geneva); *M v. Egypt* 116 ILR, p. 656 (Swiss Federal Tribunal); *R v. Iraq* 116 ILR, p. 664 (Swiss Federal Tribunal); *François v. State of Canada* 115 ILR, p. 418 (Labour Court of Brussels); *Morocco v. DR* 115 ILR, p. 421 (Labour Court of Brussels); *De Queiroz v. State of Portugal* 115 ILR, p. 430 (Labour Court of Brussels); *Zambian Embassy v. Sendanayake* 114 ILR, p. 532 (Italian Court of Cassation); and *Carbonar v. Magurno* 114 ILR, p. 534 (Italian Court of Cassation).

¹⁸⁷ NLC 1127-10-14, Judgment of 8 January 2016.

¹⁸⁸ *Cudak v. Lithuania*, ECtHR, Judgment of 23 March 2010.

¹⁸⁹ *Sabih El Leil v. France*, ECtHR, Judgment of 29 June 2011.

¹⁹⁰ Note that where a diplomat has left his or her post, the residual immunity under article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations with regard to acts performed in the exercise of functions as a member of the mission will not necessarily provide immunity with regard to claims by employees carrying out domestic duties: see *Wokuri v. Kassam* [2012] EWHC 105 (Ch), paras. 22 ff. See also *Tabion v. Mufti* 73 F.3d 535 (1996); *Baoanan v. Baja* 627 F.Supp.2d 155 (2009); and *Swarna v. Al-Awadi* 622 F.3d 123 (2010).

¹⁹¹ See e.g. Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 15; and Schreuer, *State Immunity*, chapter 3.

¹⁹² See also article 12 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities.

¹⁹³ See also s. 6 of the Canadian State Immunity Act 1982; s. 6 of the South African Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 1981; s. 7 of the Singapore State Immunity Act 1979; and s. 13 of the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985. See also article 12 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities.

¹⁹⁴ 488 F.Supp. 665 (1980); 63 ILR, p. 378.

¹⁹⁵ Note that the Greek Special Supreme Court in *Margellos v. Germany* held that in customary international law a foreign state continued to enjoy immunity in respect of a tort committed in another state in which its armed forces had participated: 129 ILR, p. 526. See

also article 31 of the European Convention on State Immunity. See also *Prefecture of Voiotia v. Germany (Distomo Massacre)* 129 ILR, p. 556. In *US v. Shochat*, CPA 7484/05, Judgment of 3 August 2010, the Supreme Court of Israel, deciding on the basis of customary international law as the Foreign State Immunity Act 2008 was not yet in force, held that the non-commercial torts exception to sovereign immunity applied to torts cases of bodily injuries. Additionally, the Court held *obiter* that the commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity could be applied to torts cases as long as the grounds for the torts lawsuit had a substantial connection to the commercial activity and did not result from the exercise of governmental authority.

196 *Polish Yearbook of International Law*, 2010, p. 299.

197 The winding-up of a company is not protected by immunity where the state is not directly impleaded: see s. 6(3) and *Re Rafidain* [1992] BCLC 301; 101 ILR, p. 332.

198 Section 16(1)(b).

199 Note that in *Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela* [2016] EWHC 153 (Comm), the Court held that Venezuela having agreed in writing to arbitration had lost its right to rely upon state immunity as a result of s. 9 and that an agreement in writing is formed when the unilateral offer by a state to arbitrate contained in a bilateral investment treaty is accepted by the investor when the latter starts arbitration proceedings against that state.

200 See e.g. s. 1605 of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 and ss. 10–21 of the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985. Note in particular the inclusion in the US legislation of an exception to immunity with regard to rights in property taken in violation of international law, s. 1605(a)(3), which does not appear in other domestic legislation. See e.g. *Venezuela v. Payne International Drilling*, US Supreme Court, Judgment of 1 May 2017, 581 US __ (2017).

201 See e.g. Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 10; and Schreuer, *State Immunity*, chapter 5. See also the *Fourth Restatement of US Foreign Relations Law*, §§ 451 and 452.

202 [1977] 2 WLR 356, 383; 64 ILR, pp. 122, 147.

203 *Baccus SRL v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo* [1957] 1 QB 438.

204 [1957] 1 QB 438, 467.

205 [1977] 2 WLR 356, 370; 64 ILR, p. 133.

206 [1977] 2 WLR 356, 385; 64 ILR, p. 149.

207 [1977] 2 WLR 356, 385; 64 ILR, p. 175.

208 [1949] 2 All ER 274.

209 [1977] 2 WLR 356, 370 and 374; 64 ILR, pp. 137, 139.

210 [1977] 2 WLR 356, 374–6. See also Shaw LJ, *ibid.*, p. 384; 64 ILR, p. 149.

211 *Ibid.*

212 [1979] AC 351, 364 (Lord Wilberforce) and 367 (Viscount Dilhorne).

213 See further below, p. 636.

214 Section 14(2).

215 See e.g. *Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe* [2000] 1 WLR 1573.

216 Essentially the Iraqi government.

217 [1995] 1 WLR 1147, 1163 (per Lord Goff). Cf. Lord Mustill at 1174 who argued that the context should be taken as a whole so that immunity continued. See also *Tsavliris v. Grain Board of Iraq* (2008) ICLC 592.

218 See e.g. *Gittler v. German Information Centre* 408 NYS 2d 600 (1978); 63 ILR, p. 170; *Carey v. National Oil Co.* 453 F.Supp. 1097 (1978); 63 ILR, p. 164; and *Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency* 443 F.Supp. 849 (1978); 63 ILR, p. 127. See also Sinclair, ‘Sovereign Immunity’, pp. 248–9, 258–9. Note, in addition, articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972.

²¹⁹ See also article 2(1)(b) of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, which defines ‘state’ very widely to include e.g. ‘representatives of the state acting in that capacity’.

²²⁰ 462 US 611 (1983); 80 ILR, p. 566.

²²¹ See also *Foremost-McKesson Inc. v. Iran* 905 F.2d 438 (1990).

²²² 111 ILR, pp. 611, 667–71.

²²³ [1998] 1 FLR 1027, 1034–5; 114 ILR, p. 485. See also J. C. Barker, ‘State Immunity, Diplomatic Immunity and Act of State: A Triple Protection Against Legal Action?’, 47 *ICLQ*, 1998, p. 950.

²²⁴ [2006] UKHL 26, para. 10 (per Lord Bingham); 129 ILR, p. 717. This applied to acts done to such persons as servants or agents, officials or functionaries of the state, *ibid.* See also Z. Douglas, ‘State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials’, 82 *BYIL*, 2011, p. 281.

²²⁵ See *Belhaj v. Straw* [2013] EWHC 4111 (QB); [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, paras. 33 ff.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 35 and [2017] UKSC 3, para. 15 (‘a state is (directly) impleaded by legal proceedings taken against it without its consent . . . In so far as the state is put in a position where it must either forego or appear to defend its property interest, this situation can readily be described as one of indirect pleading’, per Lord Mance) and see para. 18. See also *Al Attiya v. Al Thani* [2016] EWHC 212 (QB), paras. 12. ff.

²²⁷ See e.g. I. Bernier, *International Legal Aspects of Federalism*, London, 1973, pp. 121 ff.; and Sucharitkul, *State Immunities*, p. 106.

²²⁸ See e.g. *Feldman v. État de Bahia*, *Pasicrisie Belge*, 208, II, 55; *État de Céara v. Dorr and Others* 4 AD, p. 39; *État de Céara v. D’Archer de Montgascon* 6 AD, p. 162; and *Dumont v. État d’Amazonas* 15 AD, p. 140. See also *État de Hesse v. Jean Neger* 74 *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1970, p. 1108; and *Belhaj and Rahmatullah (No. 1) v. Ministry of Defence* [2017] UKSC 3, para. 29, where the Supreme Court held that the concept of indirect impleading did not extend to cover ‘any reputational or like

disadvantage that could result to foreign states or their officials from findings as between the appellants and respondents’.

²²⁹ See e.g. *Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo* 122 F.2d 355 (1941); 10 AD, p. 178.

²³⁰ [1971] 2 All ER 593, 595; 52 ILR, pp. 322, 324. See also *Swiss-Israel Trade Bank v. Salta* 55 ILR, p. 411.

²³¹ See e.g. I. Sinclair, ‘The European Convention on State Immunity’, 22 *ICLQ*, 1973, pp. 254, 279–80.

²³² An Order in Council has been made with regard to the constituent territories of Austria, SI 1979 No. 457, and Germany, SI 1993 No. 2809. The Act may also be extended to dependent territories: see e.g. the State Immunity (Overseas Territories) Order 1979, SI 1979 No. 458 and the State Immunity (Jersey) Order 1985, SI 1985 No. 1642.

²³³ See e.g. *BCCI v. Price Waterhouse* [1997] 4 All ER 108; 111 ILR, p. 604.

²³⁴ [2005] EWHC 2704 (Admin).

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 38 ff.

²³⁶ [2015] EWHC 3361 (Comm), paras. 36 ff.

²³⁷ See also the Report of the International Law Commission, 1991, p. 13. Note that article I of the Revised Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity adopted by the International Law Association in 1994 defines the term ‘foreign state’ to include the government of the state, any other state organs and agencies and instrumentalities of the state not possessing legal personality distinct from the state. No specific reference to units of federal states is made.

²³⁸ [1988] 3 WLR 1033; 80 ILR, p. 49.

²³⁹ [1988] 3 WLR 1107; 80 ILR, p. 122.

²⁴⁰ *Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes* 336 F.2d 354 (1964), cited with approval by Ackner LJ in *Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v.*

Industria Azucarera Nacional [1983] 2 LL. R 171, 193; and Lord Edmund-Davies in *I° Congreso del Partido* [1983] 1 AC 244, 276.

²⁴¹ [1988] 3 WLR 1033, 1108–12; 80 ILR, pp. 49, 123. Nourse and Ralph Gibson LLJ agreed with Kerr LJ completely on this issue, *ibid.*, pp. 1131, 1158; 80 ILR, pp. 150, 180.

²⁴² See e.g. J. Foakes, *The Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in International Law*, Oxford, 2014; Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 18; Douglas, ‘State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials’; A. Sanger, ‘Immunity of State Officials from the Criminal Jurisdiction of a Foreign State’, **62 ICLQ**, 2013, p. 193; R. Pedereti, *Immunity of Heads of State and State Officials for International Crimes*, The Hague, 2015; S. D. Murphy, ‘Immunity Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission’, **108 AJIL**, 2014, p. 41; D. Akande and S. Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes and Foreign Domestic Courts’, **21 EJIL**, 2011, p. 815; A. Orakhelashvili, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes and Foreign Domestic Courts’, **22 EJIL**, 2011, p. 849; Y. Simbeye, *Immunity and International Criminal Law*, Aldershot, 2004; and A. Borghi, *L’Immunité des Dirigeants Politiques en Droit International*, Geneva, 2003. See also the resolution on Immunity adopted by the Institut de Droit International at its Naples session in 2009 noting that no immunity from jurisdiction other than personal immunity in accordance with international law applies with regard to international crimes and that once the position or mission of such person has concluded, such personal immunity ceases, www.idi-il.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2009_naples_01_en.pdf. The International Law Commission began studying the ‘Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ in 2007, with seven reports to date, see A/CN.4/729 (2019).

²⁴³ Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004, 128 ILR, p. 239. However, this has become controversial particularly in Africa due perhaps to the investigations into and prosecutions of the heads of state of Sudan and Kenya by the International Criminal Court. The Assembly of the African Union has adopted resolutions asserting that the ICC Statute could not remove an immunity which international law grants to officials of states and that universal jurisdiction had to take account of immunities: see e.g. Assembly/AU/Dec.243(XIII) Rev.1; Assembly/AU/Dec.292(XV); Assembly/AU/Dec.335(XVI); Assembly/AU/Dec. 397 (XVIII), 2012; and Assembly/AU/Dec.547 (XXIV). See also Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions of the Assembly of the African Union on the International Criminal Court, EX.CL/952(XXVIII), 2016.

²⁴⁴ ICC No. 02/05-01/09 OA2, 6 May 2019.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 1.

²⁴⁶ See e.g. the observations submitted by the UK government to the ECtHR concerning *Association SOS Attentats v. France*, regarding the immunity of President Gaddafi of Libya in criminal and civil proceedings in France, UKMIL, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, pp. 735 ff.

²⁴⁷ 806 F.2d 344 (1986); 81 ILR, p. 581. See also e.g. *Re Honecker* 80 ILR, p. 365.

²⁴⁸ 817 F.2d 1108 (1987); 81 ILR, p. 599.

²⁴⁹ See also *Doe v. US* 860 F.2d 40 (1988); 121 ILR, p. 567.

²⁵⁰ 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1519 (1990); 99 ILR, pp. 143, 161.

²⁵¹ See also Watts, ‘Legal Position’, pp. 52 ff. See also H. Fox, ‘The Resolution of the Institute of International Law on the Immunities of Heads of State and Government’, 51 *ICLQ*, 2002, p. 119.

²⁵² 117 F.3d 1206 (1997); 121 ILR, p. 591. See also *Flatow v. Iran* 999 F.Supp. 1 (1998); 121 ILR, p. 618.

²⁵³ 948 F.Supp. 1107 (1996); 121 ILR, p. 577.

²⁵⁴ 130 S.Ct. 2278 (2010). See also Douglas, ‘State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials’, p. 281.

²⁵⁵ Article 39(2). See below, p. 668.

²⁵⁶ [2015] EWCA Civ 481, para. 39.

²⁵⁷ See e.g. Draft Articles with Commentary on Jurisdictional Immunities, ILC Report, 1991, A/46/10, pp. 12, 15, 18, 22.

²⁵⁸ See e.g. *Philippines v. Marcos* (No. 1) 806 F.2d 344 (1986); 81 ILR, p. 581; *Jimenez v. Aristeguieta* 33 ILR, p. 353; *Lafontant v. Aristide* 103 ILR, pp. 581, 585; and *Mobutu and Zaire v. Société Logrine* 113 ILR, p. 481. See also Watts, ‘Legal Position’, pp. 54 ff.

²⁵⁹ See e.g. Watts, ‘Legal Position’, p. 54. See also *Djibouti v. France*, ICJ Reports, 2008, paras. 170 ff. Note that draft articles 3 and 4 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, provisionally adopted by the drafting committee in 2013, state that heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers enjoy immunity *ratione personae* from foreign criminal jurisdiction and that such immunity lasts only during their term of office and covers all acts performed in a private or official capacity prior to or during their term of office: A/CN.4/L.814. See also *Al Saud v. Apex Global Management* [2013] EWCA Civ 642, para. 15, referencing *Mariam Aziz v. Aziz and the Sultan of Brunei* [2007] EWCA Civ 712, para. 56, following and applying *Mighell v. Sultan of Johore* [1894] 1 QB 149, 159. The extension of such immunity to family members of the household is ‘solely for the protection of the performance of his regal functions by the head of state himself’: *Al Saud v. Apex Global Management* [2013] EWCA Civ 642, paras. 18 ff.

²⁶⁰ [2000] 1 AC 147, 201–2; 119 ILR, p. 135.

²⁶¹ [2000] 1 AC 244. See also Lord Goff at 210, Lord Saville at 265 and Lord Millett at 269; *Harb v. King Fahd Abdul Aziz* [2005] EWCA Civ 632; and *Mariam Aziz v. Aziz and the Sultan of Brunei* [2007] EWCA Civ 712. See also the Decision of 12 February 2003 of the Belgian Court of Cassation in *HSA and Others v. SA and Others*, No. P. 02.1139. F/1, affirming the immunity of Prime Minister Sharon of Israel.

²⁶² Arrêt no. 1414, 14 March 2001, Cass. Crim. 1. See e.g. S. Zappalà, ‘Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The *Ghaddafi* Case Before the French Cour de Cassation’, 12 *EJIL*, 2001, p. 595. See also *Tatchell v. Mugabe*, Unreported Decision of the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court of 14 January 2004, affirming the absolute immunity of President Mugabe, the Head of State of Zimbabwe.

²⁶³ 386 F.3d 205 (2004).

²⁶⁴ See *Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin* 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004), noting also that the State Department’s suggestion as to immunity was conclusive.

²⁶⁵ [2000] 1 AC 147 at e.g. 204–5 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 246 (Lord Hope), 262 (Lord Hutton), 266–7 (Lord Saville), 277 (Lord Millett), 290 (Lord Phillips); 119 ILR, p. 135. Note that by virtue of s. 20 of the State Immunity Act cross-referring to the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 incorporating the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, the immunities of a head of state were assimilated to those of the head of a diplomatic mission. Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that once a diplomat’s functions have come to an end, immunity will only exist as regards acts performed ‘in the exercise of his functions’.

²⁶⁶ Note that as far as UK law is concerned, the provisions of s. 20(1) of the State Immunity Act do not apply so that the analogy with diplomatic agents is not relevant: see **previous footnote**. Note that s. 20(1) accords similar immunity, by extending the application of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964, to members of the family of the sovereign or other head of state forming part of his or her household and to the private servant of the sovereign or other head of state: see *Al Saud v. Apex Global Management* [2013] EWCA Civ 642.

²⁶⁷ See the Report of the International Law Commission, 1991, pp. 24–7. See also Watts, ‘Legal Position’, pp. 53, 102, who adopts a similar position. Lord Millett in *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3)* took the view that immunity *ratione personae* was ‘only narrowly available. It is confined to serving heads of state and heads of diplomatic missions, their families and servants. It is not available to serving heads of government who are not also heads of state . . .’: [2000] 1 AC 147 at 268; 119 ILR, p. 135.

²⁶⁸ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 20; 128 ILR, p. 76. See also A. Cassese, ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?’, 13 *EJIL*, 2002, p. 853. See also *Djibouti v. France*, ICJ Reports, 2008, paras. 181 ff.

²⁶⁹ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 21–2.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 24–5. See, as to such conventions, above, [Chapter 11](#), p. 579. See also the application brought by the government of the Republic of the Congo against France on 9 December 2002 to which France consented. The application was subsequently withdrawn by Congo, ICJ Press Release 201/36, 17 November 2010. Rwanda introduced an application against France on 18 April 2007 concerning international arrest warrants issued by the latter’s judicial authorities against three Rwandan officials on 20 November 2006 and a request sent to the UN Secretary-General that President Paul Kagame of Rwanda should stand trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). France has to date not given its consent to this application and there is no other jurisdictional basis.

²⁷⁴ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 25–6. But see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh.

²⁷⁵ See also *Application for Arrest Warrant Against General Shaul Mofaz*, Decision of the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court of 12 February 2004, where it was held that a serving Defence Minister of another state would benefit from immunities before the English court: 128 ILR, p. 709.

²⁷⁶ See e.g. A/62/10, para. 376; A/CN.4/596 and Corr. 1; A/65/10; A/CN.4/601; A/CN.4/646; A/CN.4/654; A/CN.4/661; A/CN.4/L.814; A/CN.4/686; A/CN.4/673; A/CN.4/722 and A/CN.4/729.

²⁷⁷ See A/CN.4/729, Annex I.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.* Draft article 7 provides that immunity *ratione materiae* does not apply to particular crimes under international law (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, apartheid, torture and enforced disappearance), *ibid.*

²⁷⁹ [2007] 1 AC 270, 290. See also *Belhaj v. Straw* [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, para. 36.

²⁸⁰ *Jones v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 January 2014, paras. 202, 204.

²⁸¹ [2014] 3 SCR 176, paras. 87, 90. The Court distinguished the *Samantar* case, where the US Supreme Court had held that officials were not included in the definition of ‘foreign state’ under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, on the ground of the wording of the US legislation: *ibid.*, para. 92. See also above, p. 638.

282 See e.g. *R v. Madan* [1961] QB 1, 7. Although this was a case on diplomatic immunity which preceded the 1964 Diplomatic Privileges Act incorporating the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, the Court of Appeal in *Aziz v. Yemen* [2005] EWCA Civ 745, para. 48, held the statement to be of general application, including with regard to a consideration of waiver of state immunity under the 1978 Act. See also Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 11.

283 See e.g. article 20 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities. See also the seventh report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, A/CN.4/729 (2019), Annex II, rapporteur's draft article 11 (not yet agreed by the Commission). Note, however, that the issue will turn upon the interpretation of the terms of the waiver: see *A Co. v. Republic of X* [1990] 2 LL. R 520; 87 ILR, p. 412. However, it is suggested that the principle that waiver of immunity from jurisdiction does not of itself constitute a waiver of immunity from the grant of relief by the courts is of the nature of a presumption, thus placing the burden of proof to the contrary upon the private party and having implications with regard to the standard of proof required. See also *Sabah Shipyard v. Pakistan* [2002] EWCA Civ 1643, paras. 18 ff.

284 *NML Capital v. Argentina* [2011] 2 AC 495, 518.

285 Overruling *Kahan v. Pakistan Federation* [1951] 2 KB 1003; 18 ILR, p. 210. Submission to the jurisdiction by means of a provision in a contract must be in clear, express language. The choice of UK law as the governing law of the contract did not amount to such a submission: see *Mills v. US* 120 ILR, p. 612.

286 But not where the intervention or step taken is only for the purpose of claiming immunity, or where the step taken by the state is in ignorance of facts entitling it to immunity if those facts could not reasonably have been ascertained and immunity is claimed as soon as reasonably practicable: s. 2(5). See also article 1 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972.

287 This provides that:

1. A state cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction in a proceeding before a court of another state if it has: (a) itself instituted the proceeding; or (b) intervened in the proceeding or taken any other step relating to the merits. However, if the state satisfies the court that it could not have acquired knowledge of facts on which a claim to immunity can

be based until after it took such a step, it can claim immunity based on those facts, provided it does so at the earliest possible moment. 2. A state shall not be considered to have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of another state if it intervenes in a proceeding or takes any other step for the sole purpose of: (a) invoking immunity; or (b) asserting a right or interest in property at issue in the proceeding. 3. The appearance of a representative of a state before a court of another state as a witness shall not be interpreted as consent by the former state to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court. 4. Failure on the part of a state to enter an appearance in a proceeding before a court of another state shall not be interpreted as consent by the former state to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court.

288 See also article 1 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972 and article 9 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities.

289 See also article 12 of the European Convention on State Immunity 1972 and article 17 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities. Note also *Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela* [2016] EWHC 153 (Comm).

290 [2006] EWCA Civ 1529, para. 113. See also *Donegal v. Zambia* [2007] EWHC 197 (Comm), holding that written submissions to the jurisdiction with regard to a compromise agreement amounted to a waiver of immunity.

291 [2006] EWCA Civ 1529, paras. 117, 123. See also *The Akademik Fyodorov* 131 ILR, p. 460; and *NML Capital v. Argentina* [2011] 2 AC 495.

292 *High Commissioner for Pakistan v. National Westminster Bank* [2015] EWHC 55 (Ch), para. 74.

293 See e.g. *Siderman de Blake and Others v. Argentina and Others* 965 F.2d 699 (1992); 103 ILR, p. 454. It should also be noted that a substantial number of bilateral treaties expressly waive immunity from jurisdiction. This is particularly the case where the states maintaining the absolute immunity approach are concerned: see e.g. UN, *Materials*, part III. See also *US v. Friedland* (1998) 40 OR (3d) 747; 120 ILR, p. 418. See also Bradley, *International Law in the US Legal System*, p. 243.

294 *Smith v. Libya* 101 F.3d 239 (1996); 113 ILR, p. 534. See also *Hirsch v. State of Israel* 962 F.Supp. 377 (1997); 113 ILR, p. 543.

²⁹⁵ See e.g. J. Crawford, 'Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity', 75 *AJIL*, 1981, pp. 820, 867 ff.; and Schreuer, *State Immunity*, p. 162. See also Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, pp. 499 ff.

²⁹⁶ See e.g. *Behring International Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force* 475 F.Supp. 383 (1979); 63 ILR, p. 261; *Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co.* 478 F.Supp. 724 (1979); 63 ILR, p. 305; *New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co.* 19 ILM, 1980, p. 1298; 63 ILR, p. 408; *Security Pacific National Bank v. Government of Iran* 513 F.Supp. 864 (1981); *Libra Bank Ltd v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica* 676 F.2d 47 (1982); 72 ILR, p. 119; *S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport* 706 F.2d 411 (1981); 107 ILR, p. 239; and *O'Connell Machinery v. MV Americana* 734 F.2d 115 (1984); 81 ILR, p. 539. See also article 23 of the European Convention on State Immunity prohibiting such action. Article 18 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities provides that 'no pre-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment or arrest, against property of a state may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another state unless and except to the extent that: (a) the state has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: (i) by international agreement; (ii) by an arbitration agreement or in a written contract; or (iii) by a declaration before the court or by a written communication after a dispute between the parties has arisen; or (b) the state has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceeding'.

²⁹⁷ Section 13(2).

²⁹⁸ See *Mareva Compania Naviera v. International Bulkcarriers* [1975] 2 LL. R 509. See also S. Gee, *Mareva Injunctions & Anton Piller Relief*, 2nd ed., London, 1990, especially at p. 22.

²⁹⁹ [1990] 2 LL. R 520; 87 ILR, p. 412.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 417, citing *Maclaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry* [1988] 3 WLR 1033 at 1103–4 and 1157–8.

³⁰¹ But see the case of *Condor and Filvem v. Minister of Justice* 101 ILR, p. 394 before the Italian Constitutional Court in 1992.

302 See e.g. Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, chapter 16; Schreuer, *State Immunity*, chapter 6; Sinclair, ‘Sovereign Immunity’, chapter 4; Crawford, ‘Execution of Judgments’; A. Reinisch, ‘European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures’, **17** *EJIL*, 2006, p. 803; H. Fox, ‘Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and Diplomatic Immunity’, **34** *ICLQ*, 1985, p. 115, and various articles in **10** *Netherlands YIL*, 1979.

303 See e.g. article 20 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities.

304 Article 20 of the European Convention on State Immunity.

305 Article 21 specifically excludes certain categories of property such as embassy bank accounts, the property of a central bank and military property from this definition.

306 Section 13(3). See also s. 14 of the South African Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 1981; s. 14 of the Pakistan State Immunity Ordinance 1981; s. 15 of the Singapore State Immunity Act 1979; and s. 31 of the Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985.

307 [2012] UKSC 40.

308 *Ibid.*, paras. 16, 17, 19.

309 [2016] EWHC 1761 (Comm), paras. 30, 38, 40.

310 [2012] UKSC 40, para. 15.

311 Section 14(4), which provides: ‘Property of a state’s central bank or other monetary authority shall not be regarded for the purposes of subsection (4) of section 13 above as in use or intended for use for commercial purposes; and where any such bank or authority is a separate entity subsections (1) to (3) of that section shall apply to it as if references to a state were references to the bank or authority.’ See *Koo Golden East v. Bank of Nova Scotia* [2008] QB 717. See also Fox, *State Immunity*, p. 393; and W. Blair, ‘The Legal Status of Central Bank Investments Under English Law’, *CLJ*, 1998, pp. 374, 380–1.

312 [2003] EWHC 1357, paras. 46 ff.; 129 ILR, p. 571.

313 [2005] EWHC 2239 (Comm), paras. 33 ff.; 129 ILR, p. 589.

314 Section 1610. Thus e.g. there would be no immunity with regard to property taken in violation of international law. See also *First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec)* 462 US 611 (1983); 80 ILR, p. 566; *Letelier v. Chile* 748 F.2d 790 (1984); and *Foxworth v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations* 796 F.Supp. 761 (1992); 99 ILR, p. 138. See also G. R. Delaume, 'The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Public Debt Litigation: Some Fifteen Years Later', **88 AJIL**, 1994, pp. 257, 266. Note that in 1988, the legislation was amended to include a provision that, with regard to measures of execution following confirmation of an arbitral award, all the commercial property of the award debtor was open to execution: new s. 1610(a)(6), *ibid.*

315 138 S.Ct. 816 (2018).

316 See e.g. *Abbott v. South Africa* 113 ILR, p. 411 (Spanish Constitutional Court); *Centre for Industrial Development v. Naidu* 115 ILR, p. 424; and *Flatow v. Iran* 999 F.Supp. 1 (1998); 121 ILR, p. 618. See also *The Akademik Fyodorov* 131 ILR, pp. 460, 485–6. Note that there is a similar exception to immunity from enforcement where the state has agreed to arbitration: see e.g. *Diag Human Se v. Czech Republic*, Case No. 14-7142, US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Judgment of 31 May 2016.

317 See UN, *Materials*, p. 297; 65 ILR, pp. 146, 150.

318 UN, *Materials*, pp. 300–1; 65 ILR, p. 164.

319 [1984] 2 All ER 6; 74 ILR, p. 180, overturning the Court of Appeal Decision, [1984] 1 All ER 1; 74 ILR, p. 170. See also C. Ryngaert, 'Embassy Bank Accounts and State Immunity from Execution', **26 LJIL**, 2013, p. 73.

320 [1984] 2 All ER 14; 74 ILR, p. 189. See also *SerVaas v. Rafidain* [2012] UKSC 40, paras. 18 ff.

321 [1984] 2 All ER 13; 74 ILR, p. 187. But cf. *Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania* 507 F.Supp. 311 (1980); 63 ILR, p. 524. But see the Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 1990 in *Z v. Geneva Supervisory Authority for the*

Enforcement of Debts and Bankruptcy 102 ILR, p. 205, holding that funds allocated for the diplomatic service of a foreign state were immune from attachment.

³²² Such certificate had been issued by the Colombian Ambassador. See the following section with regard to diplomatic immunities.

³²³ See the West German Federal Constitutional Court decision in *National Iranian Oil Co.* 22 ILM, 1983, p. 1279.

³²⁴ See e.g. *Eurodif Corp. v. Iran* 23 ILM, 1984, p. 1062.

³²⁵ 84 *AJIL*, 1990, p. 573; 87 ILR, p. 56. See also *Libya v. Rossbeton SRL* 87 ILR, p. 63.

³²⁶ 101 ILR, p. 394.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 401–2.

³²⁸ 113 ILR, pp. 411, 423–4.

³²⁹ 116 ILR, p. 526.

³³⁰ See e.g. Staughton J in *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry* [1987] BCLC 667; *Donegal v. Zambia* [2007] EWHC 197 (Comm), para. 428; and *LR Avionics v. Nigeria* [2016] EWHC 1761 (Comm). See also Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, p. 238.

³³¹ Mummery J stated: ‘The overriding duty of the court, of its own motion, is to satisfy itself that effect has been given to the immunity conferred by the State Immunity Act 1978. That duty binds all tribunals and courts, not just the court or tribunal which heard the original proceedings. If the tribunal in the original proceedings has not given effect to the immunity conferred by the Act, then it must be the duty of the appeal tribunal to give effect to it by correcting the error’: see *UAE v. Abdelghafar* [1995] ICR 65, 73–4; 104 ILR, pp. 647, 654–5. See also *Military Affairs Office of the Embassy of Kuwait v. Caramba-Coker*, Appeal No. EAT/1054/02/RN, Employment Appeal Tribunal (2003).

³³² [1988] 3 WLR 1033, 1103 and 1157; 80 ILR, pp. 49, 118, 179.

333 This would be done procedurally under Order 12, rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1991. See also *A Co. v. Republic of X* 87 ILR, pp. 412, 417.

334 Rules of the Supreme Court 1991.

335 See e.g. *Vitkovice Horni v. Korner* [1951] AC 869.

336 [1986] 3 All ER 284; 108 ILR, p. 557. See also Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, pp. 233 ff.

337 [1995] 1 WLR 1147; 103 ILR, p. 340.

338 [1995] 1 WLR 1156 (per Lord Goff). See also *AN International Bank plc v. Zambia* 118 ILR, p. 602.

339 See e.g. E. Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, 4th ed., Oxford, 2016; P. Behrens, *Modern Diplomatic Interference and the Law*, Oxford, 2016; *Diplomatic Law in a New Millenium* (ed. P. Behrens), Oxford, 2017; I. Aigbovbioven, *Role of Diplomatic and Consular Law in Transnational Economic Cooperation*, Lambert, 2016; M. Hardy, *Modern Diplomatic Law*, Manchester, 1968; Do Naslimento e Silva, *Diplomacy in International Law*, Leiden, 1973; L. S. Frey and M. L. Frey, *The History of Diplomatic Immunity*, Ohio, 1999; *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (ed. A. Cooper, J. Heine and R. Thakur), Oxford, 2013; *Satow's Diplomatic Practice* (ed. I. Roberts), 7th ed., Oxford, 2017; B. Sen, *A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice*, 3rd ed., The Hague, 1988; J. Brown, 'Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations', **37 ICLQ**, 1988, p. 53; Société Français de Droit International, *Aspects Récents du Droit des Relations Diplomatiques*, Paris, 1989; G. V. McClanahan, *Diplomatic Immunity*, London, 1989; B. S. Murty, *The International Law of Diplomacy*, Dordrecht, 1989; L. Dembinski, *The Modern Law of Diplomacy*, Dordrecht, 1990; J. Salmon, *Manuel de Droit Diplomatique*, Brussels, 1994; J. Salmon, 'Immunités et Actes de la Fonction', *AFDI*, 1992, p. 313; J. C. Barker, *The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities*, Aldershot, 1996, and Barker, *The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel*, Aldershot, 2006; C. E. Wilson, *Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities*, Tucson, 1967; M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1970, vol. **VII**; *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 1987, pp. 455 ff.; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *The Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges*, 1984 and the UK Government

Response to the Report, Cmnd 9497; and *Memorandum on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities in the United Kingdom*, UKMIL, **63 BYIL**, 1992, p. 688. See also R. Higgins, 'The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom Experience', **79 AJIL**, 1985, p. 641; Higgins, *Problems and Process*, p. 86; A. James, 'Diplomatic Relations and Contacts', **62 BYIL**, 1991, p. 347; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 821; and *Oppenheim's International Law*, chapters 10 and 11.

340 See e.g. G. Mattingley, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, London, 1955; and D. Elgavish, 'Did Diplomatic Immunity Exist in the Ancient Near East?', **2 Journal of the History of International Law**, 2000, p. 73. See also Watts, 'Legal Position'.

341 See, as to the powers of ambassadors, *First Fidelity Bank NA v. Government of Antigua and Barbuda Permanent Mission* 877 F.2d 189 (1989); 99 ILR, p. 125.

342 See generally Satow's *Diplomatic Practice*, chapter 1.

343 ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 3; 61 ILR, p. 504.

344 ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 40; 61 ILR, p. 566. See also, affirming that the rules of diplomatic law constitute a self-contained regime, the Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 10 June 1997, *Former Syrian Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic* 115 ILR, p. 597.

345 The importance of the Convention was stressed in *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 330–430; 61 ILR, p. 556. Many of its provisions are incorporated into English law by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964.

346 See *Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 292, 332. See also *767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire to the United Nations* 988 F.2d 295 (1993); 99 ILR, p. 194; *Benkharbouche v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2017] UKSC 62, para. 17; and *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61, paras. 33–4, noting that diplomatic immunity is an aspect of state immunity. For a discussion of the relationship of diplomatic and state immunity, see *ibid.*, paras. 26 ff.

347 See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1958, vol. **II**, pp. 94–5. The extraterritorial theory of diplomatic law, according to which missions constituted an extension of the territory of the

sending state, was of some historic interest but not of practical use, *ibid.* See also *Radwan v. Radwan* [1973] Fam. 24; 55 ILR, p. 579; and *McKeel v. Iran* 722 F.2d 582 (1983); 81 ILR, p. 543. Note that in *US v. Kostadinov* 734 F.2d 906, 908 (1984); 99 ILR, pp. 103, 107, the term ‘mission’ in the Convention was defined not as the premises occupied by diplomats, but as a group of people sent by one state to another.

348 See e.g. *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 24; 61 ILR, p. 550.

349 Preamble to the Convention.

350 *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 274. See also *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 40; and the decisions of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission on 19 December 2005 in *Partial Award, Diplomatic Claim, Ethiopia’s Claim 8*, para. 24 and *Partial Award, Diplomatic Claim, Eritrea’s Claim 20*, para. 20.

351 Article 2.

352 Note the refusal of the UK to accept Zimbabwe’s proposed ambassador with no reason being provided, *The Times*, 7 July 2016, p. 5. It was reported that this was due to that person’s alleged involvement in land seizures, *ibid.*

353 See e.g. the Ethiopian demand that Eritrea reduce its diplomatic staff at the commencement of the armed conflict between the states: see *Partial Award, Eritrea’s Claim 20*, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision of 19 December 2005, paras. 40 ff.

354 The rules as to heads of missions are a modern restatement of the rules established in 1815 by the European powers: see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, p. 91.

355 Comment by Sir Antony Acland, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. 20. See also *DUSPIL*, 1979, pp. 571–3.

356 See e.g. *767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire to the United Nations* 988 F.2d 295 (1993); 99 ILR, p. 194. See also Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 110 ff. See also *Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France) (Provisional Measures)*, ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 1148, 1167; and *Immunities and Criminal*

Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 292, 333.

³⁵⁷ A. D. McNair, *International Law Opinions*, Oxford, 1956, vol. I, p. 85. The issue was resolved by diplomatic means.

³⁵⁸ The original draft of the article would have permitted such emergency entry, but this was rejected: see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 118 ff. In 1973, an armed search of the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan took place and considerable quantities of arms were found. As a result, the Iraqi ambassador and an attaché were declared *personae non grata*, *ibid.*, p. 122. As to further examples, see *ibid.*, pp. 122–3. A search by US troops of the residence of the Nicaraguan ambassador in Panama in 1989 was condemned in a draft Security Council resolution by a large majority, but was vetoed by the US, *ibid.* Nevertheless, Denza concludes that: ‘In the last resort, however, it cannot be excluded that entry without the consent of the sending State may be justified in international law by the need to protect human life’, *ibid.*, p. 123. Note the incident at the Bahraini embassy in London, where apparently police forcibly entered the building to rescue and apprehend a protestor on the roof who was being assaulted, see M. Jackson, ‘Inviolability and the Protest at the Bahraini Embassy’, EJIL: Talk!, 9 August 2019, www.ejiltalk.org/inviolability-and-the-protest-at-the-bahraini-embassy/.

³⁵⁹ See e.g. the statement of US President Johnson after a series of demonstrations against the US Embassy in Moscow in 1964–65, 4 ILM, 1965, p. 698. Denza notes that service of process is prohibited by this provision whether it occurs within the premises of the mission or at the door, *Diplomatic Law*, p. 123. In *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2015] EWCA Civ 32, paras. 84, 94, it was held that while personal service at the mission was prohibited by article 22, ‘subject to the rules of the relevant court or tribunal, service within the jurisdiction can be effected by posting the documents to a mission and to the private residence of a diplomatic agent’. See also *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61, paras. 15ff.

³⁶⁰ 99 L.Ed.2d 333, 345–6 (1988); 121 ILR, p. 551.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

³⁶² 99 L.Ed.2d 351. See also *Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v. Magno* 112 ALR 529 (1992–93); 101 ILR, p. 202.

³⁶³ Article 41(3) of the Vienna Convention. Note that in *Canada v. Edelson* 131 ILR, p. 279, the Israeli Supreme Court held that a dispute over a lease granted to Canada, as represented by the Canadian Ambassador, raised issues of state immunity rather than diplomatic immunity. It was further held that there was no state immunity with regard to the lease of buildings for a residence for the Ambassador as leasing was a private law act.

³⁶⁴ *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 30–1; 61 ILR, p. 556. This the Iranians failed to do: ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 31–2. The Court emphasised that such obligations concerning the inviolability of the members of a diplomatic mission and of the premises, property and archives of the mission continued even in cases of armed conflict or breach of diplomatic relations: *ibid.*, p. 40. See also *DUSPIL*, 1979, pp. 577 ff.; K. Gryzbowski, ‘The Regime of Diplomacy and the Tehran Hostages’, 30 *ICLQ*, 1981, p. 42; and L. Gross, ‘The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran: Phase of Provisional Measures’, 74 *AJIL*, 1980, p. 395.

³⁶⁵ See e.g. *Belgium v. Nicod and Another* 82 ILR, p. 124.

³⁶⁶ *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 42; 61 ILR, p. 568. The Court particularly instanced articles 22, 25, 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 and analogous provisions in the 1963 Consular Relations Convention, *ibid.*

³⁶⁷ ICJ Reports, 2005, paras. 337–8, 340.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 342, citing *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 30–2. See also the condemnation by the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission of the entry, ransacking and seizure by Ethiopian security agents of the Eritrean Embassy residence, as well as vehicles and other property, without Eritrea’s consent: *Partial Award, Diplomatic Claim, Eritrea’s Claim 20*, para. 46.

³⁶⁹ See *DUSPIL*, 2000, pp. 421–8. In addition, the US had earlier made a number of *ex gratia* payments to the individuals injured and to the families of those killed in the Embassy bombing: *ibid.*, p. 428. See also Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 137–8. As to examples of other attacks upon embassies, see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 134 ff.

³⁷⁰ See Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. xxvi.

371 Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. 5.

372 *Ibid.*, p. 9. Such a search was declared essential for the protection of the police, *ibid.* Note the reference to self-defence is both to domestic and international law, *ibid.*

373 See the comments of the Legal Adviser to the FCO, Minutes of Evidence, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. 28. Of course, entry can be made into the building with the consent of the receiving state, as e.g. when Iran requested the UK to eject militants who had taken over their London embassy in 1980.

374 Section 1(3) provides that land ceases to be diplomatic or consular premises where a state ceases to use the land for the purposes of its mission or exclusively for the purposes of a consular post or the Secretary of State withdraws his acceptance or consent in relation to land, provided under s. 1(4) he is satisfied that to do so is permissible under international law: see as to the Assange incident, below, p. 658, **note 382**.

375 See C. Warbrick, 'Current Developments', **38 ICLQ**, 1989, p. 965.

376 See s. 2 of the Diplomatic and Consular Premises (Cambodia) Order, SI 1988 No. 30.

377 *The Times*, 10 September 1988.

378 *The Times*, 17 August 1989; 83 ILR, p. 232. Note that in *Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v. Tomlin*, *The Times*, 4 December 1990; [1990] 1 All ER 920, the Court of Appeal held that in this situation, the extended limitation period of thirty years under s. 15(1) of and Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980 was applicable and the squatters could not rely on twelve years' adverse possession.

379 Note that in the US, embassies temporarily abandoned due to broken relations may be sequestered and turned to other uses pending resumption of relations. This has been the case with regard to Iranian, Cambodian and Vietnamese properties that have been in the custody of the Office of Foreign Missions: see McClanahan, *Diplomatic Immunity*, pp. 53, 110. See also the US Foreign Missions Act 1982.

380 [1986] 3 All ER 284; 108 ILR, p. 557.

381 See above, p. 650.

382 See e.g. *Persinger v. Iran* 729 F.2d 835 (1984). See also *Swiss Federal Prosecutor v. Kruszyk* 102 ILR, p. 176. See also the taking of refuge in the Ecuadorean embassy in London by Wikileaks founder, Julian Assange, in June 2012 and the statement that the 1987 Act could perhaps be used by the UK government: www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/National/article1112899.ece; and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 115–16. Note the report of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention dated 22 January, A/HRC/WGAD/2015, and the reply of the Foreign Office dated 3 March 2016: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/511129/FOI_0158-16_Submissions_to_UN_WGAD.pdf. In April 2019, Ecuador gave permission for British police to remove Assange from the embassy. He was arrested and remains in custody pending the hearing of extradition charges, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/apr/11/julian-assange-arrested-at-ecuadorian-embassy-wikileaks.

383 For example, the UK Foreign Secretary noted on 16 August 2012 that the UK did not accept the principle of diplomatic asylum: www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-ecuadorian-government-s-decision-to-offer-political-asylum-to-julian-assange.

384 ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 266, 274–5.

385 *Ibid.*, p. 274.

386 *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 1084.

387 See e.g. *Fayed v. Al-Tajir* [1988] QB 712.

388 [2018] UKSC 3, para. 20 (per Lord Mance) and paras. 65 ff. (per Lord Sumption). See also below, p. 662.

389 Article 27 may also include the use of diplomatic couriers and messages in code and in cipher, although the consent of the receiving state is required for a wireless transmitter. There was a division of opinion at the Vienna Conference between the developed and

developing states over the latter issue. The former felt that the right to install and use a wireless did not require consent: see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 180 ff.

390 Defined in article 3(2) of the Draft Articles on the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag adopted by the International Law Commission in 1989 as ‘the packages containing official correspondence, and documents or articles intended exclusively for official use, whether accompanied by diplomatic courier or not, which are used for the official communication referred to in article 1 and which bear visible external marks of their character’ as a diplomatic bag: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1989, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 15.

391 Article 27(3). See Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 191 ff.

392 Article 27(4).

393 This marked a shift from earlier practice: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1989, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 15.

394 An accompanying crate contained persons allegedly part of the kidnapping operation.

395 See Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv. Note also the incident in 1964 when an Israeli was found bound and drugged in a crate marked ‘diplomatic mail’ at Rome Airport. As a result, the Italians declared one Egyptian official at the Embassy *persona non grata* and expelled two others, *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, p. 20580 (1964). In 1980, a crate bound for the Moroccan Embassy in London split open at Harwich to reveal \$500,000 worth of drugs: *The Times*, 13 June 1980. In July 1984, a lorry belonging to the USSR was opened for inspection by West German authorities on the grounds that a lorry itself could not be a bag. The crates inside the lorry were accepted as diplomatic bags and not opened: Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. xiii, note 48.

396 See UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, pp. 586–7.

397 See the Legal Adviser, FCO, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. 23. See also 985 HC Deb., col. 1219, 2 June 1980, and Cmnd 9497. See further *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1988, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 157; and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 200 ff.

398 Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. xxx.

399 See Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 193 ff. The UK did not object and regarded the reservations in fact as reflective of customary law prior to the Convention: Memorandum of the FCO, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. 4.

400 This was objected to, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. 4; and see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 193 ff.

401 See Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, p. 50.

402 Draft article 28(2). See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1989, vol. **II**, part 2, pp. 42–3. See also S. McCaffrey, ‘The Forty-First Session of the International Law Commission’, **83 AJIL**, 1989, p. 937.

403 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1989, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 43.

404 See e.g. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1980, vol. **II**, pp. 231 ff.; *ibid.*, 1981, vol. **II**, pp. 151 ff.; and *ibid.*, 1985, vol. **II**, part 2, pp. 30 ff. See also A/38/10 (1983) and the Memorandum by Sir Ian Sinclair, member of the ILC, dealing with the 1984 session on this issue, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report*, pp. 79 ff.

405 See e.g. McClanahan, *Diplomatic Immunity*, p. 64; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1985, vol. **II**, part 2, pp. 36 ff.

406 See *Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, para. 67, where the Court held that a sending state could not unilaterally impose its choice of mission premises over the receiving state’s objection. By article 30(1) of the Convention, the private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission.

407 See UN, *Materials*, pp. 297, 317; 65 ILR, pp. 146, 187.

408 [1984] 2 All ER 6; 74 ILR, p. 180.

409 See also *SerVaas v. Rafidain Bank* [2012] UKSC 40, para. 19.

410 [1984] 2 All ER 9; 74 ILR, p. 182. See also Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 128 ff., 170.

411 [1983] 2 All ER 495; 64 ILR, p. 384.

412 This goes beyond previous customary law: see e.g. *Rose v. R* [1947] 3 DLR 618. See also *Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding Inc.* 381 F.Supp. 382 (1974); *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 36; and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 156 ff. See also above, p. 658.

413 See e.g. Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, p. 160. In *R (Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2013] EWHC 1502 (Admin), para. 43, it was noted that the term ‘correspondence’ would cover modern forms of electronic communication.

414 [1988] 1 WLR 16; 77 ILR, p. 145.

415 [1988] 1 WLR 24; 77 ILR, p. 150.

416 [1988] 1 WLR 27; 77 ILR, p. 154. See also *Fayed v. Al-Tajir* [1987] 2 All ER 396; 86 ILR, p. 131.

417 [2018] UKSC 3, para. 20 (per Lord Mance) and paras. 65 ff. (per Lord Sumption).

418 Defined in article 1(e) as the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission. See above, p. 636, with regard to head of state immunities. See also e.g. *US v. Noriega* 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1523–5 (1990); 99 ILR, pp. 145, 165–7.

419 Note that by article 26 the receiving state is to ensure to all members of the mission freedom of movement and travel in its territory, subject to laws and regulations concerning prohibited zones or zones regulated for reasons of national security.

420 See Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 213 ff.

421 See also resolution 42/154 and Secretary-General’s Reports A/INF/52/6 and Add.1 and A/53/276 and Corr.1.

422 SC/6573 (15 September 1998). See also the statement of the UN Secretary-General, SG/SM/6704 (14 September 1998).

⁴²³ See e.g. the US Supreme Court in *Boos v. Barry* 99 L.Ed.2d 333, 346 (1988); 121 ILR, pp. 499, 556.

⁴²⁴ Note that in *Harb v. King Fahd Abdul Aziz* [2005] EWCA Civ 632, para. 40, the Court of Appeal held that article 29 was not breached by the court hearing an issue relating to sovereign immunity in open court where the sovereign in question wished a challenge to an application for maintenance to be held in private. In *Mariam Aziz v. Aziz and Sultan of Brunei* [2007] EWCA Civ 712, paras. 88 ff., it was held by the Court of Appeal that while under international law a state is obliged to take steps to prevent physical attacks on, or physical interference with, a foreign head of state in the jurisdiction, it was doubted whether the rule extended to preventing conduct by individuals which was simply offensive or insulting to a foreign head of state abroad.

⁴²⁵ See articles 2, 3, 6 and 7. Such crimes are by article 8 deemed to be extraditable offences in any extradition treaty between states parties. See *Duff v. R* [1979] 28 ALR 663; 73 ILR, p. 678.

⁴²⁶ ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 32, 35–7; 61 ILR, p. 530.

⁴²⁷ ICJ Reports, 2005, paras. 338–40. See also the Decision of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission on 19 December 2005 in *Partial Award, Diplomatic Claim, Ethiopia’s Claim 8*, that Eritrea was liable for violating article 29 by arresting and briefly detaining the Ethiopian Chargé d’Affaires in September 1998 and October 1999 without regard to his diplomatic immunity.

⁴²⁸ ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 40. See also Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, p. 223. Note that personal inviolability under article 29 prevents personal service of legal process upon a diplomatic agent: see e.g. *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2015] EWCA Civ 32, para. 84 and [2017] UKSC 61, paras. 13 ff. See also *Hellenic Lines Ltd v. Moore* 345 F.2d 978 (DC Cir. 1965).

⁴²⁹ As distinct from the premises of the mission. Such residence might be private leased or leased by the sending state for use as such residential premises and may indeed be temporary only. Temporary absence would not lead to a loss of immunity, but permanent absence would: see e.g. *Agbor v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner* [1969] 2 All ER 707; and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 225 ff. Section 9 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 makes it a

criminal offence knowingly to trespass on any premises which are the private residence of a diplomatic agent.

⁴³⁰ Except that this is limited by article 31(3): see below, p. 666. Lawful possession alone of property would be sufficient, it appears, to attract inviolability: see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, p. 230.

⁴³¹ See *Al Attiya v. Al Thani* [2016] EWHC 212 (QB), paras. 40 ff. However, it is a matter of law for the court to determine whether a particular person is entitled to immunity, *ibid.*, paras. 57–9.

⁴³² See e.g. *Dickinson v. Del Solar* [1930] 1 KB 376; 5 AD, p. 299; *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 37; 61 ILR, p. 530; and *Skeen v. Brazil* 566 F.Supp. 1414 (1983); 121 ILR, p. 481. See also Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 232 ff.

⁴³³ Article 31(4).

⁴³⁴ See e.g. the incident in Washington, DC in 1999, when an attaché of the Russian Embassy was declared *persona non grata* for suspected ‘bugging’ of the State Department, 94 *AJIL*, 2000, p. 534.

⁴³⁵ However, the US has tackled the problem of unpaid parking fines by adopting s. 574 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act 1994, under which 110 per cent of unpaid parking fines and penalties must be withheld from that state’s foreign aid. In addition, the State Department announced in December 1993 that registration renewal of vehicles with unpaid or unadjudicated parking tickets more than one year old would be withheld, thus rendering the use of such vehicles illegal in the US: see ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’, 88 *AJIL*, 1994, p. 312. It is also required under the US Diplomatic Relations Act 1978 that diplomatic missions, their members and families hold liability insurance and civil suits against insurers are permitted. Note that the UK has stated that persistent failure by diplomats to respect parking regulations and to pay fixed penalty parking notices ‘will call into question their continued acceptability as members of diplomatic missions in London’, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 700. See also Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 238–9; and UKMIL, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, pp. 741 ff. Note also the written statement by the Foreign Office Minister reporting on alleged offences in this context, where it was stated that eleven serious and significant offences allegedly committed by people entitled to diplomatic immunity had been committed during

2015: Written statement – HLWS106, www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Lords/2016-07-21/HLWS106/. See also www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-51629344.

436 Note that a diplomat who is a national or permanent resident of the receiving state will only enjoy immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions: article 38. See *Al-Juffali v. Estrada* [2016] EWCA Civ 176, paras. 58 ff. See also *Lutgarda Jimenez v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue* [2004] STC 371; and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 337 ff.

437 Article 31(1)(a), (b) and (c). Note that there is no immunity from the jurisdiction of the sending state: article 31(4).

438 See *Intpro Properties (UK) Ltd v. Sauvel* [1983] 2 All ER 495; 64 ILR, p. 384. In *Deputy Registrar* 94 ILR, pp. 308, 311, it was held that article 31(1)(a) was declaratory of customary international law. In *Hildebrand v. Champagne* 82 ILR, p. 121, it was held that this provision did not cover the situation where a claim was made for payment for charges under a lease. See also *Largueche v. Tancredi Feni* 101 ILR, p. 377; and *De Andrade v. De Andrade* 118 ILR, pp. 299, 306–7. Article 13 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities provides for an exception to state immunity for proceedings which relate to the determination of any right or interest of the state in, or its possession or use of, or any obligation of the state arising out of its interest in immovable property situated in the forum state.

439 See the thorough discussion in *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61, para. 19 ff.; and *Propend Finance Property v. Sing* 111 ILR, p. 611. Note that in *Reyes*, the Supreme Court did not decide the question as to whether an action instituted in the employment tribunal against a foreign diplomat in the UK by his former domestic servant brought to the UK related to a commercial activity outside his official functions within the meaning of article 31(1)(c), *ibid.*, para. 56. In *A Local Authority v. A.G. and Others* [2020] EWFC 18, the Court, in a childcare application, reaffirmed the immunity of the father, a serving diplomat, despite arguments that the Human Rights Act (incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights) might apply. See also *Portugal v. Goncalves* 82 ILR, p. 115. This exception does not include ordinary contracts incidental to life in the receiving state, such as a contract for domestic services: see *Tabion v. Mufti* 73 F.3d 535 (1996); and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 301 ff. See also *De Andrade v. De Andrade* 118 ILR, pp. 299, 306–7,

noting that the purchase by a diplomat of the home unit as an investment was not a commercial activity within the meaning of the provision.

⁴⁴⁰ See UKMIL, 58 *BYIL*, 1987, p. 549.

⁴⁴¹ Annex F, reproducing a memorandum dated February 1985, *ibid.*, p. 558. See Annex F of the 1992 Memorandum, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 698.

⁴⁴² Article 33.

⁴⁴³ Article 34 and see subsections (b) to (g) for certain other exceptions.

⁴⁴⁴ Article 35.

⁴⁴⁵ Article 36(1).

⁴⁴⁶ Article 36(2).

⁴⁴⁷ See Brown, ‘Diplomatic Immunity’, pp. 63–6; and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 319 ff.

⁴⁴⁸ The rationale behind this is to ensure the diplomat’s independence and ability to function free from harassment: see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, p. 320. Note the case of Harry Dunn, a young man killed by a motor car driven on the wrong side of the road by Ann Sacoolas, the wife of an American member of staff working at RAF Croughton in August 2019. According to arrangements agreed between the UK and US Governments in 1995, US staff at RAF Croughton and their families were accepted as part of the US embassy in the UK and staff and their families were entitled to immunity under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Under an exchange of notes in relation to the Croughton annexe, these arrangements waived immunity for employees, but the waiver did not cover spouses; see statement by the Foreign Secretary, 666 *House of Commons Hansard*, 21 October 2019, col. 760. The UK sought a waiver of immunity, but the US refused, *ibid.*, col. 761. It was argued that the 1995 agreement created an anomaly whereby spouses had greater immunity than the official concerned, and this anomaly was rectified in an agreement on 22 July 2020 extending the waiver arrangement to spouses, see e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-53500449. However, the existence of the anomaly has been contested in litigation (currently ongoing) by Dunn’s family; see the statement by a former Foreign Office minister stating that there was no intention to extend wider

immunity to spouses, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jun/22/anne-sacoolas-did-not-have-diplomatic-immunity-in-dunn-case-says-ex-minister and *R (Charles and Dunn) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2020] EWHC 1620 (Admin).

449 *Ibid.*, pp. 320 ff. Since the Civil Partnership Act 2004, household would include same-sex partners. See, for the slightly different US practice, *ibid.*, pp. 322–3. The term ‘spouse’ may be interpreted to include more than one wife in a polygamous marriage forming part of the household of the diplomat and may include a partner not being married to the diplomat: *ibid.*, p. 323.

450 The privileges specified in article 36(1) in relation to exemption from customs duties and taxes apply only to articles imported at the time of first installation.

451 Customary law prior to the Vienna Convention was most unclear on immunities of such junior diplomatic personnel and it was recognised that these provisions in article 37 constituted a development in such rules: see e.g. Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 334 ff.; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1958, vol. II, pp. 101–2. See also *S v. India* 82 ILR, p. 13; and *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61.

452 See also article 10, which provides that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receiving state shall be notified of the appointment of members of the mission, their arrival and their final departure or the termination of their functions with the mission. There are similar requirements with regard to family members and private servants. See also *Lutgarda Jimenez v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue* [2004] UK SPC 00419, Decision of 23 June 2004; and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 74 ff.

453 [1971] 2 QB 274; 52 ILR, p. 368.

454 [1971] 2 QB 282; 52 ILR, p. 373. But see *Al-Juffali v. Estrada* [2016] EWCA Civ 176, paras. 37–8.

455 [1991] 1 QB 485; 88 ILR, p. 404.

456 [1985] Crim LR 510; 88 ILR, p. 323.

457 [1991] 1 QB 485, 498; 88 ILR, pp. 404, 412. But see *Al-Juffali v. Estrada* [2016] EWCA Civ 176, para. 39.

⁴⁵⁸ [1991] 1 QB 499; 88 ILR, p. 413, ‘save possibly in the case of a head of mission or other person of diplomatic rank’, *ibid.* See also *Lutgarda Jimenez v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue* [2004] UK SPC 00419, Decision of 23 June 2004; and Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, p. 351.

⁴⁵⁹ See Brown, ‘Diplomatic Immunity’, p. 59; and *Bergman v. de Sieyès* 170 F.2d 360 (1948). See also *R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Teja* [1971] 2 QB 274; 52 ILR, p. 368. Note that such immunity only applies to members of his family if they were accompanying him or travelling separately to join him or return to their country: *Vafadar* 82 ILR, p. 97.

⁴⁶⁰ See e.g. *Public Prosecutor v. JBC* 94 ILR, p. 339.

⁴⁶¹ Article 39; and see *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61, paras. 18 ff.; and *Shaw v. Shaw* [1979] 3 All ER 1; 78 ILR, p. 483. Note also *US v. Devyani Khobragade*, US District Court, SDNY, Case No. 1:14-cr-00008-SAS (2014), where it was held that the question of immunity was to be decided on the date of the indictment of the diplomat concerned and not on the date of arrest or departure from the jurisdiction: see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, p. 352.

⁴⁶² *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61, para. 18.

⁴⁶³ See 81 *AJIL*, 1987, p. 937.

⁴⁶⁴ See *Tabatabai* 80 ILR, p. 388; *US v. Guinand* 688 F.Supp. 774 (1988); 99 ILR, p. 117; *Empson v. Smith* [1965] 2 All ER 881; 41 ILR, p. 407; and *Shaw v. Shaw* [1979] 3 All ER 1; 78 ILR, p. 483. See also Y. Dinstein, ‘Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction *Ratione Materiae*’, 15 *ICLQ*, 1966, p. 76.

⁴⁶⁵ 111 ILR, pp. 611, 659–61. See also *Re P (No. 2)* [1998] 1 FLR 1027; 114 ILR, p. 485.

⁴⁶⁶ 115 ILR, pp. 595, 607–8.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 610–12. See B. Fassbender, ‘S v. Berlin Court of Appeal and District Court of Berlin-Tiergarten’, 92 *AJIL*, 1998, pp. 74, 78.

⁴⁶⁸ Or to members of a consular post within the meaning of the 1963 Consular Relations Convention enacted by the Consular Relations Act of 1968.

⁴⁶⁹ 64 ILR, p. 352.

⁴⁷⁰ [2017] UKSC 62, para. 76. See also *Reyes v. Al-Malki* [2017] UKSC 61, para. 63. See further above, p. 627.

⁴⁷¹ Diplomatic agents are also granted exemptions from certain taxes and customs duties. However, this does not apply to indirect taxes normally incorporated in the price paid; taxes on private immovable property in the receiving state unless held on behalf of the sending state for purposes of the mission; various estate, succession or inheritance duties; taxes on private income having its source in the receiving state; charges for specific services; and various registration, court and record fees with regard to immovable property other than mission premises: see article 34 of the Vienna Convention. See also UK Memorandum, p. 693.

⁴⁷² See Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 273 ff.

⁴⁷³ See e.g. *Public Prosecutor v. Orhan Olmez* 87 ILR, p. 212.

⁴⁷⁴ See e.g. *High Commissioner for India v. Ghosh* [1960] 1 QB 134; 28 ILR, p. 150.

⁴⁷⁵ See McClanahan, *Diplomatic Immunity*, p. 137, citing in addition an incident where the husband of an official of the US Embassy in London was suspected of gross indecency with a minor, where immunity was not waived, but the person concerned was returned to the US. But see Denza, *Diplomatic Law*, pp. 284 ff., noting the examples of waivers of immunity.

⁴⁷⁶ Reproduced in 27 ILM, 1988, pp. 1617, 1633.

⁴⁷⁷ McClanahan, *Diplomatic Immunity*, pp. 156–7.

⁴⁷⁸ [1987] 2 All ER 396.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 408 (Mustill LJ) and 411–12 (Kerr LJ).

⁴⁸¹ [1990] 2 LL. R 520, 524; 87 ILR, pp. 412, 416, citing *Kahan v. Pakistan Federation* [1951] 2 KB 1003; 18 ILR, p. 210.

⁴⁸² See e.g. L. T. Lee and J. Quigley, *Consular Law and Practice*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2008; L. T. Lee, *Vienna Convention on Consular Relations*, Durham, 1966; M. A. Ahmad, *L’Institution Consulaire et le Droit International*, Paris, 1973; and *Satow’s Diplomatic Practice*, chapters 8–9. See also Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 843; *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 1142 ff.; and *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, pp. 474 ff. The International Court in the *Iranian Hostages* case stated that this Convention codified the law on consular relations: ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 24; 61 ILR, pp. 504, 550. See also the Consular Relations Act 1968.

⁴⁸³ See e.g. the UK Foreign Office leaflet entitled ‘British Consular Services Abroad’ quoted in UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 530; and see also *Ex parte Ferhut Butt* 116 ILR, pp. 607, 618.

⁴⁸⁴ See further above, p. 627, with regard to employment and sovereign immunity disputes, a number of which concerned consular activities.

⁴⁸⁵ Articles 10, 11 and 12.

⁴⁸⁶ However, article 31(2) provides: ‘The authorities of the receiving State shall not enter that part of the consular premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of the work of the consular post except with the consent of the head of the consular post or of his designee or of the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending State. The consent of the head of the consular post may, however, be assumed in case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action.’

⁴⁸⁷ But note Security Council resolution 1193 (1998) condemning the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan for the capture of the Iranian consulate-general. See also *R (B) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2004] EWCA Civ 1344; 131 ILR, p. 616; and the *Abu Omar*, Case No. 46340/2012, ILDC 1960 (IT 2012). The private residence of the consul is not so protected: *ibid.* Note the Khashoggi incident, where that person was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on 2 October 2018; see M. Milanovic, ‘The

Murder of Jamal Khashoggi: Immunities, Inviolability and the Human Right to Life – Parts I–V’, EJIL: Talk!, 16–18 April 2019; and Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions, A/HRC/41/36, 19 June 2019. Questions raised include whether under article 31(2) the Turkish authorities would have been justified in entering the consular premises and the ability of the authorities to investigate the events.

488 Article 33. The private documents of the consul are not so protected: *Abu Omar*, Case No. 46340/2012, ILDC 1960 (IT 2012).

489 Article 32.

490 See above, p. 658.

491 ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 492; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 31. See also *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 39; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 142.

492 ICJ Reports, 2001, p. 494; 134 ILR, p. 33.

493 *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 36; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 139.

494 ICJ Reports, 2001, p. 514; 134 ILR, p. 52. In an Advisory Opinion of 1 October 1999, the IACHR concluded that the duty to notify detained foreign nationals of the right to seek consular assistance under article 36(1) constituted part of the corpus of human rights: Series A 16, OC-16/99, 1999 and 94 *AJIL*, 2000, p. 555. See above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 322, **note 540**. Note that the International Court in the *LaGrand* case felt it unnecessary to deal with this argument: ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 494–5. As to the right of access to nationals, see also the Yugoslav incident of summer 2000, where the UK protested at the absence of information with regard to the arrest by Yugoslavia of British citizens seconded to the UN Mission in Kosovo: see UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 608.

495 The Court has noted that the obligation on the detaining authorities to provide the necessary information under article 36(1)(b) arises once it is realised that the detainee is a foreign national or when there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national: *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 43, 49; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 146, 153.

⁴⁹⁶ ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 12. A request by Mexico for an interpretation of this decision was refused by the International Court: ICJ Reports, 2009, p. 3. See as to the obligations of the US in the two cases as found by the International Court, below, [Chapter 18](#), p. 960. See also as to the response of the US courts to these cases, asserting that the ICJ decision was not directly enforceable domestic law: *Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon* 548 US 331 (2006); *Gandara v. Bennett* 528 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2008); *Mora v. New York* 524 F3d 183 (2nd Cir. 2008); and *Medellín v. Texas* 552 US 491 (2008). See also *Garcia v. Texas* 564 US (2011).

⁴⁹⁷ ICJ Reports, 2019, para. 73.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 119.

⁴⁹⁹ See e.g. *Princess Zizianoff v. Kahn and Bigelow* 4 AD, p. 384; and *Abu Omar*, Case No. 46340/2012, ILDC 1960 (IT 2012). See generally, as to consular functions, *DUSPIL*, 1979, pp. 655 ff. Note that waiver of consular immunities under article 45, in addition to being express, must also be in writing.

⁵⁰⁰ 704 F.Supp. 521 (1989); 99 ILR, p. 121.

⁵⁰¹ See e.g. Hardy, *Modern Diplomatic Law*, p. 89; *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 1125 ff.; and A. Sanger and M. Wood, 'The Immunities of Members of Special Missions' in *Cambridge Handbook of Immunities and International Law*, p. 452. The Convention came into force in June 1985.

⁵⁰² See 80 ILR, p. 388. See also K. Böckslaff and M. Koch, 'The Tabatabai Case: The Immunity of Special Envoys and the Limits of Judicial Review', 25 *German YIL*, 1982, p. 539. See also *Syrian National Immunity* 127 ILR, p. 88.

⁵⁰³ 80 ILR, pp. 388, 419.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

⁵⁰⁵ 999 F.Supp. 1469 (1997); 121 ILR, p. 600.

⁵⁰⁶ See e.g. *Kilroy v. Charles Windsor, Prince of Wales*, Civ. No. C-78-291 (ND, Ohio, 1978); 81 ILR, p. 605; *Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai* 568 F.Supp.2d 35 (DDC 2008); and the statement by the US State Department Legal Adviser, 2008, quoted in M. Wood, ‘The Immunity of Official Visitors’, **16** *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, 2012, pp. 35, 94.

⁵⁰⁷ [1971] 2 QB 274, 282.

⁵⁰⁸ [2011] EWHC 2029 (Admin), paras. 27, 37 ff.

⁵⁰⁹ See also *The Freedom and Justice Party v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2016] EWHC 2010 (Admin), para. 120.

⁵¹⁰ See <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130304/wmstext/130304m0001.htm>.

⁵¹¹ [2016] EWHC 2010 (Admin), paras. 104 ff. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, [2018] EWCA Civ 1719, paras. 112 ff.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, paras. 114, 154, 157, 163–5. The examples provided included *Re Bo Xilai* 128 ILR, 2005, p. 713 and unreported cases concerning Ehud Barak in 2009 and Mikhael Gorbachev in 2011: see Wood, ‘Immunity of Official Visitors’, pp. 88 ff. The Court relied upon this article. Wood concluded that in the UK there was ‘extensive practice of the executive and of the courts, based on and supporting the existence of rules of customary international law on the immunity and inviolability of official visitors, including persons on special missions. These customary rules form part of the law of England, and are applied directly by the courts’: *ibid.*, p. 94. See also A. M. El-Haj, ‘Special Missions’, in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2015.

⁵¹³ See *Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, p. 398; Fox and Webb, *State Immunity*, p. 567; and Foakes, *Position of Heads of State*, p. 134.

⁵¹⁴ See e.g. J. G. Fennessy, ‘The 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character’, **70** *AJIL*,

1976, p. 62.

515 It should be noted that among those states abstaining in the vote adopting the Convention were France, the US, Switzerland, Austria, Canada and the UK, all states that host the headquarters of important international organisations: see Fennessy, ‘1975 Vienna Convention’, p. 62.

516 See in particular article IV. See also, for a similar approach in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies 1947, article V. As to the immunities of international organisations, see below, Chapter 22. See, as to the privileges and immunities of foreign armed forces, including the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951, which provides for a system of concurrent jurisdiction, A. Sari, ‘The Immunities of Visiting Forces’, in *Cambridge Handbook of Immunities and International Law*, p. 559; S. Lazareff, *Status of Military Forces under Current International Law*, Leiden, 1971; and J. Woodliffe, *The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military Installations under Modern International Law*, Dordrecht, 1992.

13

State Responsibility

State responsibility is a fundamental principle of international law, arising out of the nature of the international legal system and the doctrines of state sovereignty and equality of states. It provides that whenever one state commits an internationally unlawful act against another state, international responsibility is established between the two. A breach of an international obligation gives rise to a requirement for reparation.¹

Accordingly, the focus is upon principles concerned with second-order issues, in other words the procedural and other consequences flowing from a breach of a substantive rule of international law.² Thus, for example, the absence of a court or tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve a particular dispute does not affect the existence or binding force of the obligation in question.³

This has led to a number of issues concerning the relationship between the rules of state responsibility and those relating to other areas of international law. The question as to the relationship between the rules of state responsibility and those relating to the law of treaties arose, for example, in the *Rainbow Warrior* arbitration between France and New Zealand in 1990.⁴ The arbitration followed the incident in 1985 in which French agents destroyed the vessel *Rainbow Warrior* in harbour in New Zealand. The UN Secretary-General was asked to mediate and his ruling in 1986⁵ provided

inter alia for French payment to New Zealand and for the transference of two French agents to a French base in the Pacific, where they were to stay for three years and not to leave without the mutual consent of both states.⁶ However, both the agents were repatriated to France before the expiry of the three years for various reasons, without the consent of New Zealand. The 1986 Agreement contained an arbitration clause and this was invoked by New Zealand. The argument put forward by New Zealand centred upon the breach of a treaty obligation by France, whereas that state argued that only the law of state responsibility was relevant and that concepts of *force majeure* and distress exonerated it from liability.

The arbitral tribunal decided that the law relating to treaties was relevant, but that the legal consequences of a breach of a treaty, including the determination of the circumstances that may exclude wrongfulness (and render the breach only apparent) and the appropriate remedies for breach, are subjects that belong to the customary law of state responsibility.⁷

It was noted that international law did not distinguish between contractual and tortious responsibility, so that any violation by a state of any obligation of whatever origin gives rise to state responsibility and consequently to the duty of reparation.⁸ In the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case, the International Court reaffirmed the point that:

A determination of whether a convention is or is not in force, and whether it has or has not been properly suspended or denounced, is to be made pursuant to the law of treaties. On the

other hand, an evaluation of the extent to which the suspension or denunciation of a convention, seen as incompatible with the law of treaties, involves the responsibility of the state which proceeded to it, is to be made under the law of state responsibility.⁹

The Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia also addressed the issue of the relationship between state responsibility and other branches of international law in Opinion No. 13, when asked a question as to whether any amounts due in respect of war damage might affect the distribution of assets and debts in the succession process affecting the successor states of the Former Yugoslavia. The Commission, in producing a negative answer, emphasised that the question of war damage was one that fell within the sphere of state responsibility, while the rules relating to state succession fell into a separate area of international law. Accordingly, the two issues had to be separately decided.¹⁰

Matters regarding the responsibility of states are necessarily serious and it is well established that a party asserting a fact must prove it.¹¹ The Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission has taken the position that ‘clear and convincing evidence’ would be required in order to support findings as to state responsibility,¹² while the International Court has held that claims against a state involving ‘charges of exceptional gravity’ must be proved by evidence that is ‘fully conclusive’.¹³

In addition to the wide range of state practice in this area, the International Law Commission worked extensively on this topic. In 1975, it took a decision for the draft articles on state responsibility to be divided into three parts: part I to deal with the origin of international responsibility; part II to deal with the content, forms and degrees of international responsibility; and part III to deal with the settlement of disputes and the implementation of international responsibility.¹⁴ Part I was provisionally adopted by the Commission in 1980¹⁵ and the Draft Articles were finally adopted on 9 August 2001.¹⁶ General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001 annexed the text of the articles and commended them to governments, an unusual procedure which must be seen as giving particular weight to the status of the articles.¹⁷

The Nature of State Responsibility

The essential characteristics of responsibility hinge upon certain basic factors: first, the existence of an international legal obligation in force as between two particular states; secondly, that there has occurred an act or omission which violates that obligation and which is imputable to the state responsible; and, finally, that loss or damage has resulted from the unlawful act or omission.¹⁸

These requirements have been made clear in a number of leading cases. In the *Spanish Zone of Morocco* claims,¹⁹ Judge Huber emphasised that:

responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character

involve international responsibility.
Responsibility results in the duty to make
reparation if the obligation in question is not
met.²⁰

And in the *Chorzów Factory* case,²¹ the Permanent Court of International
Justice said that:

it is a principle of international law, and even a
greater conception of law, that any breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation.

Article 1 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility reiterates the general rule, widely supported by practice,²² that
every internationally wrongful act of a state entails responsibility. Article 2
provides that there is an internationally wrongful act of a state when conduct
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the state under
international law and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
state.²³ This principle has been affirmed in the case-law.²⁴ It is international
law that determines what constitutes an internationally unlawful act,
irrespective of any provisions of municipal law.²⁵ Article 12 stipulates that
there is a breach of an international obligation²⁶ when an act of that state is
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of
its origin or character.²⁷ A breach that is of a continuing nature extends over
the entire period during which the act continues and remains not in

conformity with the international obligation in question,²⁸ while a breach that consists of a composite act will also extend over the entire period during which the act or omission continues and remains not in conformity with the international obligation.²⁹ A state assisting another state³⁰ to commit an internationally wrongful act will also be responsible if it so acted with knowledge of the circumstances and where it would be wrongful if committed by that state.³¹ State responsibility may co-exist with individual responsibility. The two are not mutually exclusive.³²

The Question of Fault³³

There are contending theories as to whether responsibility of the state for unlawful acts or omissions is strict or whether it is necessary to show some fault or intention on the part of the officials concerned. The principle of objective responsibility (the so-called 'risk' theory) maintains that the liability of the state is strict. Once an unlawful act has taken place, which has caused injury and which has been committed by an agent of the state, that state will be responsible in international law to the state suffering the damage irrespective of good or bad faith. To be contrasted with this approach is the subjective responsibility concept (the 'fault' theory), which emphasises that an element of intentional (*dolus*) or negligent (*culpa*) conduct on the part of the person concerned is necessary before his state can be rendered liable for any injury caused. The relevant cases and academic opinions are divided on this question, although the majority tends towards the strict liability, objective theory of responsibility.

In the *Neer* claim³⁴ in 1926, an American superintendent of a Mexican mine was shot. The United States, on behalf of his widow and daughter, claimed damages because of the lackadaisical manner in which the Mexican authorities pursued their investigations. The General Claims Commission dealing with the matter disallowed the claim, in applying the objective test.

In the *Caire* claim,³⁵ the French–Mexican Claims Commission had to consider the case of a French citizen shot by Mexican soldiers for failing to supply them with 5,000 Mexican dollars. Verzijl, the presiding commissioner, held that Mexico was responsible for the injury caused in accordance with the objective responsibility doctrine, that is ‘the responsibility for the acts of the officials or organs of a state, which may devolve upon it even in the absence of any “fault” of its own’.³⁶

A leading case adopting the subjective approach is the *Home Missionary Society* claim³⁷ in 1920 between Britain and the United States. In this case, the imposition of a ‘hut tax’ in the protectorate of Sierra Leone triggered off a local uprising in which Society property was damaged and missionaries killed. The Tribunal dismissed the claim of the Society (presented by the United States) and noted that it was established in international law that no government was responsible for the acts of rebels where it itself was guilty of no breach of good faith or negligence in suppressing the revolt. It should, therefore, be noted that the view expressed in this case is concerned with a specific area of the law, viz. the question of state responsibility for the acts of rebels. Whether one can analogise from this generally is open to doubt.

In the *Corfu Channel* case,³⁸ the International Court appeared to lean towards the fault theory³⁹ by saying that:

It cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a state over its territory and waters that that state necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neither involves *prima facie* responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.⁴⁰

On the other hand, the Court emphasised that the fact of exclusive territorial control had a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that state as to the events in question. Because of the difficulties of presenting direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility, the victim state should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.⁴¹

However, it must be pointed out that the Court was concerned with Albania's knowledge of the laying of mines, and the question of *prima facie* responsibility for *any* unlawful act committed within the territory of the state concerned, irrespective of attribution, raises different issues. It cannot be taken as proof of the acceptance of the fault theory. It may be concluded that doctrine and practice support the objective theory and that this is right, particularly in view of the proliferation of state organs and agencies.⁴² The

Commentary to the ILC Articles emphasised that the Articles did not take a definitive position on this controversy, but noted that standards as to objective or subjective approaches, fault, negligence or want of due diligence would vary from one context to another depending upon the terms of the primary obligation in question.⁴³

Attribution⁴⁴

Imposing upon the state absolute liability wherever an official is involved encourages that state to exercise greater control over its various departments and representatives. It also stimulates moves towards complying with objective standards of conduct in international relations.

State responsibility covers many fields. It includes unlawful acts or omissions directly committed by the state and directly affecting other states: for instance, the breach of a treaty, the violation of the territory of another state or damage to state property. An example of the latter heading is provided by the incident in 1955 when Bulgarian fighter planes shot down an Israeli civil aircraft of its state airline, El Al.⁴⁵ Another example of state responsibility is illustrated by *Nicaragua v. United States*,⁴⁶ where the International Court of Justice found that acts imputable to the United States included the laying of mines in Nicaraguan internal or territorial waters and certain attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and a naval base by its agents.⁴⁷ In the *Corfu Channel* case,⁴⁸ Albania was held responsible for the consequences of mine-laying in its territorial waters on the basis of knowledge possessed by that state as to the presence of such mines, even though there was no finding as to who had actually laid the mines. In the *Rainbow Warrior* incident,⁴⁹ the UN Secretary-General mediated a settlement in which New Zealand received *inter alia* a sum of \$7 million for the violation of its sovereignty which occurred when that vessel was destroyed by French agents in New Zealand.⁵⁰ The state may also incur responsibility with regard to the activity of its

officials in injuring a national of another state, and this activity need not be one authorised by the authorities of the state.⁵¹

The doctrine depends on the link that exists between the state and the person or persons actually committing the unlawful act or omission. The state as an abstract legal entity cannot, of course, in reality ‘act’ itself. It can only do so through authorised officials and representatives. The state is not responsible under international law for all acts performed by its nationals. Since the state is responsible only for acts of its servants that are imputable or attributable to it, it becomes necessary to examine the concept of attribution (also termed imputability). Attribution is the legal fiction which assimilates the actions or omissions of state officials to the state itself and which renders the state liable for damage resulting to the property or person of an alien.⁵²

Article 4 of the ILC Articles provides that the conduct of any state organ (including any person or entity having that status in accordance with the internal law of the state) shall be considered as an act of the state concerned under international law where the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other function, whatever position it holds in the organisation of the state and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the state. This approach reflects customary law. As the International Court noted in *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur*: ‘According to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of any organ of a state must be regarded as an act of that state.’⁵³ The International Court in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* regarded it as ‘one of the cornerstones of the law of state responsibility, that the conduct

of any state organ is to be considered an act of the state under international law, and therefore gives rise to the responsibility of the state if it constitutes a breach of an obligation of the state'. It was a rule of customary international law.⁵⁴ It would clearly cover units and sub-units within a state.⁵⁵

Article 5, in reaction to the proliferation of government agencies and parastatal entities, notes that the conduct of a person or of an entity not an organ of the state under article 4, but which is empowered by the law of that state to exercise elements of governmental authority, shall be considered an act of the state under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance. This provision is intended *inter alia* to cover the situation of privatised corporations which retain certain public or regulatory functions. Examples of the application of this article might include the conduct of private security firms authorised to act as prison guards or where private or state-owned airlines exercise certain immigration controls⁵⁶ or with regard to a railway company to which certain police powers have been granted.⁵⁷

Article 5 issues may also arise where an organ or an agent of a state are placed at the disposal of another international legal entity in a situation where both the state and the entity exercise elements of control over the organ or agent in question. This occurs most clearly where a military contingent is placed by a state at the disposal of the United Nations for peace-keeping purposes. Both the state and the United Nations will exercise a certain jurisdiction over the contingent. The question arose in *Behrami v. France* before the European Court of Human Rights as to whether troops from certain NATO states forming part of KFOR and concerned in the particular

instance with demining operations in the province of Kosovo could fall under the jurisdiction of the Court or whether the appropriate responsible organ was KFOR operating under the authority of the United Nations, a body not susceptible to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court held that the key question was whether the UN Security Council retained ultimate authority and control so that operational command only was delegated and that this was so in the light of resolution 1244. Accordingly, responsibility for the impugned action was attributable to the United Nations, so that jurisdiction did not exist with regard to the states concerned for the European Court.⁵⁸ However, in *Netherlands v. Nuhanović*,⁵⁹ the Supreme Court of the Netherlands held that the Netherlands bore responsibility for the conduct of the UN Dutch peace-keeping force in Srebrenica, Bosnia, in 1995 which was deemed to have resulted in the massacre of thousands of Moslems.⁶⁰

Article 6 provides that the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a state by another state shall be considered as an act of the former state under international law, if that organ was acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the former state. This would, for example, cover the UK Privy Council acting as the highest judicial body for certain Commonwealth countries.⁶¹

Ultra vires acts

An unlawful act may be imputed to the state even where it was beyond the legal capacity of the official involved, providing, as Verzijl noted in the *Caire* case,⁶² that the officials ‘have acted at least to all appearances as competent

officials or organs or they must have used powers or methods appropriate to their official capacity’.

This was reaffirmed in the *Mossé* case,⁶³ where it was noted that:

Even if it were admitted that . . . officials . . . had acted . . . outside the statutory limits of the competence of their service, it should not be deduced, without further ado, that the claim is not well founded. It would still be necessary to consider a question of law . . . namely whether in the international order the state should be acknowledged responsible for acts performed by officials within the apparent limits of their functions, in accordance with a line of conduct which was not entirely contrary to the instructions received.

In the *Youman* claim,⁶⁴ militia ordered to protect threatened American citizens in a Mexican town instead joined the riot, during which the Americans were killed. These unlawful acts by the militia were imputed to the state of Mexico, which was found responsible by the General Claims Commission. In the *Union Bridge Company* case,⁶⁵ a British official of the Cape Government Railway mistakenly appropriated neutral property during the Boer War. It was held that there was still liability despite the honest mistake and the lack of intention on the part of the authorities to appropriate the material in question. The key was that the action was within the general

scope of duty of the official. In the *Sandline* case, the Tribunal emphasized: ‘It is a clearly established principle of international law that acts of a state will be regarded as such even if they are *ultra vires* or unlawful under the internal law of the state . . . their [institutions, officials or employees of the state] acts or omissions when they purport to act in their capacity as organs of the state are regarded internationally as those of the state even though they contravene the internal law of the state.’⁶⁶

Article 7 of the ILC Articles provides that the conduct of an organ or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority shall be considered an act of the state under international law if acting in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.⁶⁷ This article appears to lay down an absolute rule of liability, one not limited by reference to the apparent exercise of authority and, in the context of the general acceptance of the objective theory of responsibility, is probably the correct approach.⁶⁸

Although private individuals are not regarded as state officials so that the state is not liable for their acts, the state may be responsible for failing to exercise the control necessary to prevent such acts. This was emphasised in the *Zafiro* case⁶⁹ between Britain and America in 1925. The Tribunal held the latter responsible for the damage caused by the civilian crew of a naval ship in the Philippines, since the naval officers had not adopted effective preventative measures.

State Control and Responsibility

Article 8 of the ILC Articles provides that the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered as an act of state under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that state in carrying out the conduct. The first proposition is uncontroversial, but difficulties have arisen in seeking to define the necessary direction or control required for the second proposition. The Commentary to the article emphasizes: ‘Such conduct will be attributable to the state only if it directed or controlled the specific operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of the operation.’⁷⁰ Recent case-law has addressed the issue.

In *Nicaragua v. United States*, the International Court declared that in order for the conduct of the *contra* guerrillas to have been attributable to the United States, who financed and equipped the force, ‘it would in principle have to be proved that that state had effective control of the military or paramilitary operation in the course of which the alleged violations were committed’.⁷¹ In other words, general overall control would have been insufficient to ground responsibility. However, in the *Tadić* case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia adopted a more flexible approach, noting that the degree of control might vary according to the circumstances and a high threshold might not always be required.⁷² In this case, of course, the issue was of individual criminal responsibility. Further, the situation might be different where the state deemed responsible was in clear and uncontested effective control of the territory where the violation occurred. The International Court of Justice in *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia* stated: ‘Physical control of a territory and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of state

liability for acts affecting other states.’⁷³ This was reaffirmed in *Loizidou v. Turkey*, where the European Court of Human Rights noted that, bearing in mind the object and purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights,

the responsibility of a contracting party may also arise when as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.⁷⁴

The International Court returned to the issue in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* case and reaffirmed its approach in *Nicaragua v. United States (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua)*.⁷⁵ It noted that the Appeal Chamber’s judgment in *Tadić* did not concern issues of state responsibility nor a question that was indispensable for the exercise of its jurisdiction. It held that the ‘overall control’ test was not appropriate for state responsibility and that the test under customary law was that reflected in article 8 whereby the state would be responsible for the acts of persons or groups (neither state organs nor equated with such organs) where an organ of the state gave the instructions or provided the direction pursuant to which the perpetrators of

the wrongful act acted or where it exercised effective control over the action during which the wrong was committed.⁷⁶

Article 9 of the ILC Articles provides that the conduct of a person or a group of persons shall be considered as an act of the state under international law if the person or group was in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority.⁷⁷

Mob Violence, Insurrections and Civil Wars

Where the governmental authorities have acted in good faith and without negligence, the general principle is one of non-liability for the actions of rioters or rebels causing loss or damage.⁷⁸ The state, however, is under a duty to show due diligence. Quite what is meant by this is difficult to quantify and more easily defined in the negative.⁷⁹ It should also be noted that special provisions apply to diplomatic and consular personnel.⁸⁰

Article 10 of the ILC Articles provides that where an insurrectional movement is successful either in becoming the new government of a state or in establishing a new state in part of the territory of the pre-existing state, it will be held responsible for its activities prior to its assumption of authority.⁸¹ The International Court of Justice addressed the latter issue (article 10(2), where the movement in question succeeds in establishing a new state) in *Croatia v. Serbia*,⁸² and concluded that even if article 10(2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility could be regarded as declaratory of customary international law at the relevant time, a matter left open, ‘that

article is concerned only with the attribution of acts to a new state; it does not create obligations binding upon either the new state or the movement that succeeded in establishing that new state. Nor does it affect the principle stated in article 13 of the said Articles that: “An act of a state does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the state is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs”.’ Accordingly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not bound by the obligations concerned (under the Genocide Convention) until it became a party to that Convention.

The issue of the responsibility of the authorities of a state for activities that occurred prior to its coming to power was raised before the Iran–US Claims Tribunal. In *Short v. Iran*,⁸³ the Tribunal noted that the international responsibility of a state can be engaged where the circumstances or events causing the departure of an alien are attributable to it, but that not all departures of aliens from a country in a period of political turmoil would as such be attributable to that state.⁸⁴ In the instant case, it was emphasised that at the relevant time the revolutionary movement had not yet been able to establish control over any part of Iranian territory and the government had demonstrated its loss of control. Additionally, the acts of supporters of a revolution cannot be attributed to the government following the success of the revolution, just as acts of supporters of an existing government are not attributable to the government. Accordingly, and since the claimant was unable to identify any agent of the revolutionary movement the actions of whom forced him to leave Iran, the claim for compensation failed.⁸⁵ In *Yeager v. Iran*,⁸⁶ the Tribunal awarded compensation for expulsion, but in this case it was held that the expulsion was carried out by the Revolutionary Guards after the success of the revolution. Although the Revolutionary

Guards were not at the time an official organ of the Iranian state, it was determined that they were exercising governmental authority with the knowledge and acquiescence of the revolutionary state, making Iran liable for their acts.⁸⁷

Falling somewhat between these two cases is *Rankin v. Iran*,⁸⁸ where the Tribunal held that the claimant had not proved that he had left Iran after the revolution as a result of action by the Iranian government and the Revolutionary Guards as distinct from leaving because of the general difficulties of life in that state during the revolutionary period. Thus, Iranian responsibility was not engaged.

Where a state subsequently ‘acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own’, then it will be considered as an act of state under international law entailing responsibility, even though such conduct was not attributable to the state beforehand.⁸⁹ In the *Iranian Hostages* case, for example, the International Court noted that the initial attack on the US Embassy by militants could not be imputable to Iran since they were clearly not agents or organs of the state. However, the subsequent approval of the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of Iran to the attack and the decision to maintain the occupation of the Embassy translated that action into a state act. The militants thus became agents of the Iranian state for whose acts the state bore international responsibility.⁹⁰

Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness⁹¹

Where a state consents to an act by another state which would otherwise constitute an unlawful act, wrongfulness is precluded provided that the act is within the limits of the consent given.⁹² The most common example of this kind of situation is where troops from one state are sent to another at the request of the latter.⁹³ Wrongfulness is also precluded where the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the UN Charter.⁹⁴ This would also cover force used in self-defence as defined in the customary right as well as under article 51 of the Charter, since that article refers in terms to the ‘inherent right’ of individual and collective self-defence.⁹⁵ Further, the ILC Commentary makes it clear that the fact that an act is taken in self-defence does not necessarily mean that all wrongfulness is precluded, since the principles relating to human rights and humanitarian law have to be respected. The International Court, in particular, noted in its Advisory Opinion in the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* that, ‘[r]espect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality’ and thus in accordance with the right to self-defence.⁹⁶

Article 22 of the ILC Articles provides that the wrongfulness of an act is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure.⁹⁷ International law originally referred in this context to reprisals, whereby an otherwise unlawful act is rendered legitimate by the prior application of unlawful force.⁹⁸ The term ‘countermeasures’ is now the preferred term for reprisals not involving the use of force.⁹⁹ Countermeasures may be contrasted with the provisions laid down in article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, which deals with the consequences of a material breach of a treaty in terms of the competence of the other parties to the treaty

to terminate or suspend it.¹⁰⁰ While countermeasures do not as such affect the legal validity of the obligation which has been breached by way of reprisal for a prior breach, termination of a treaty under article 60 would under article 70 free the other parties to it from any further obligations under that treaty.

The International Court stated in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case that:

In order to be justifiable, a countermeasure must meet certain conditions . . . In the first place it must be taken in response to a previous international wrongful act of another state and must be directed against that state . . . Secondly, the injured state must have called upon the state committing the wrongful act to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make reparation for it . . . In the view of the Court, an important consideration is that the effects of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking account of the rights in question . . . [and] its purpose must be to induce the wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations under international law, and . . . the measure must therefore be reversible.¹⁰¹

In other words, lawful countermeasures must be in response to a prior wrongful act and taken in the light of a refusal to remedy it, directed against

the state committing the wrongful act and proportionate. Further, there is no requirement that the countermeasures taken should be with regard to the same obligation breached by the state acting wrongfully. Thus, the response to a breach of one treaty may be action taken with regard to another treaty, provided that the requirements of necessity and proportionality are respected.¹⁰²

The ILC Articles deal further with countermeasures in Chapter II. Article 49 provides that an injured state¹⁰³ may only take countermeasures against a state responsible for the wrongful act in order to induce the latter to comply with the obligations consequent upon the wrongful act.¹⁰⁴ Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international obligations of the state taking the measures and shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligation in question.¹⁰⁵ Article 50 makes it clear that countermeasures shall not affect the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied by the UN Charter, obligations for the protection of human rights, obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals and other obligations of *jus cogens*.¹⁰⁶ By the same token, obligations under any applicable dispute settlement procedure between the two states continue,¹⁰⁷ while the state taking countermeasures must respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents.¹⁰⁸ Article 51 emphasises the requirement for proportionality, noting that countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.¹⁰⁹ Article 52 provides that before taking countermeasures, the injured state must call upon the responsible state to fulfil its obligations and notify that state of any decision

to take countermeasures while offering to negotiate. However, the injured state may take such countermeasures as are necessary to preserve its rights. Where the wrongful acts have ceased or the matter is pending before a court or tribunal with powers to take binding decisions, then countermeasures should cease (or where relevant, not be taken).¹¹⁰ Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible state has complied with its obligations.¹¹¹

Force majeure has long been accepted as precluding wrongfulness,¹¹² although the standard of proof is high. In the *Serbian Loans* case,¹¹³ for example, the Court declined to accept the claim that the First World War had made it impossible for Serbia to repay a loan. In 1946, following a number of unauthorised flights of US aircraft over Yugoslavia, both states agreed that only in cases of emergency could such entry be justified in the absence of consent.¹¹⁴ Article 23 of the ILC Articles provides for the preclusion of wrongfulness where the act was due to the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event beyond the control of the state, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform obligation.¹¹⁵ In *Re Gill*,¹¹⁶ for example, a British national residing in Mexico had his house destroyed as a result of sudden and unforeseen action by opponents of the Mexican government. The Commission held that failure to prevent the act was due not to negligence, but to genuine inability to take action in the face of a sudden situation.

The emphasis, therefore, is upon the happening of an event that takes place without the state being able to do anything to rectify the event or avert its consequences. There had to be a constraint which the state was unable to

avoid or to oppose by its own power.¹¹⁷ In other words, the conduct of the state is involuntary or at least involves no element of free choice.¹¹⁸

The issue of *force majeure* was raised by France in the *Rainbow Warrior* arbitration in 1990.¹¹⁹ It was argued that one of the French agents repatriated to France without the consent of New Zealand had to be so moved as a result of medical factors which amounted to *force majeure*. The Tribunal, however, stressed that the test of applicability of this doctrine was one of ‘absolute and material impossibility’ and a circumstance rendering performance of an obligation more difficult or burdensome did not constitute a case of *force majeure*.¹²⁰

Article 24 provides that wrongfulness is precluded if the author of the conduct concerned had no other reasonable way in a situation of distress of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to his care.¹²¹ This would cover, for example, the agreement in the 1946 US–Yugoslav correspondence that only in an emergency would unauthorised entry into foreign airspace be justified,¹²² or the seeking of refuge in a foreign port without authorisation by a ship’s captain in storm conditions.¹²³

The difference between distress and *force majeure* is that in the former case there is an element of choice. This is often illusory since in both cases extreme peril exists and whether or not the situation provides an opportunity for real choice is a matter of some difficulty.¹²⁴ The Tribunal in the *Rainbow Warrior* arbitration¹²⁵ noted that three conditions were required to be satisfied in order for this defence to be applicable to the French action in repatriating its two agents: first, the existence of exceptional circumstances of

extreme urgency involving medical and other considerations of an elementary nature, provided always that a prompt recognition of the existence of those exceptional circumstances is subsequently obtained from the other interested party or is clearly demonstrated; secondly, the re-establishment of the original situation as soon as the reasons of emergency invoked to justify the breach of the obligation (i.e. the repatriation) had disappeared; thirdly, the existence of a good faith effort to try to obtain the consent of New Zealand according to the terms of the 1986 Agreement.¹²⁶ It was concluded that France had failed to observe these conditions (except as far as the removal of one of the agents on medical grounds was concerned).

Article 25 provides that necessity may not be invoked unless the act was the only means for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a 'grave and imminent peril' and the act does not seriously impair an essential interest of the other state or states or of the international community as a whole. Further, necessity may not be invoked if the international obligation in question excludes the possibility or the state has itself contributed to the situation of necessity.¹²⁷ An example of this kind of situation is provided by the *Torrey Canyon* incident,¹²⁸ where a Liberian oil tanker went aground off the UK coast but outside territorial waters, spilling large quantities of oil. After salvage attempts, the United Kingdom bombed the ship. The ILC took the view that this action was legitimate in the circumstances because of a state of necessity.¹²⁹ It was only after the incident that international agreements were concluded dealing with this kind of situation.¹³⁰

The Tribunal in the *Rainbow Warrior* case took the view that the defence of state necessity was 'controversial'.¹³¹ However, the International Court in the

Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project case considered that it was ‘a ground recognised in customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation’, although it could only be accepted ‘on an exceptional basis’.¹³² The Court referred to the conditions laid down in an earlier version of, and essentially reproduced in, article 25 and stated that such conditions must be cumulatively satisfied.¹³³ In *M/V Saiga (No. 2)*, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea discussed the doctrine on the basis of the ILC draft as approved by the International Court, but found that it did not apply as no evidence had been produced by Guinea to show that its essential interests were in grave and imminent peril and, in any event, Guinea’s interests in maximising its tax revenue from the sale of gas oil to fishing vessels could be safeguarded by means other than extending its customs law to parts of the exclusive economic zone.¹³⁴

Invocation of State Responsibility¹³⁵

Article 42 of the ILC Articles stipulates that a state is entitled as an injured state¹³⁶ to invoke¹³⁷ the responsibility of another state if the obligation breached is owed to that state individually or to a group of states, including that state or the international community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation specially affects that state or is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other states to which the obligation is owed with regard to the further performance of the obligation. Responsibility may not be invoked if the injured state has validly waived the claim or is to be considered as having, by reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced in the lapse of the claim.¹³⁸ Any waiver would need to be clear and unequivocal,¹³⁹ while the question of acquiescence would have to be judged carefully in the light of the particular circumstances.¹⁴⁰ Where several states are injured by the same wrongful act, each state may separately invoke responsibility,¹⁴¹ and where several states are responsible, the responsibility of each may be invoked.¹⁴²

In the *Barcelona Traction* case, the International Court referred to the obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole as distinct from those owed to another state.¹⁴³ Article 48 builds upon this principle and provides that a state other than an injured state may invoke the responsibility of another state if either the obligation is owed to a group of states including that state, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group, or the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. In such cases, cessation of the wrongful act and

assurances and guarantees of non-repetition may be claimed,¹⁴⁴ as well as reparation.¹⁴⁵

The Consequences of Internationally Wrongful Acts

Cessation

The state responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to cease that act, if it is continuing, and to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition if circumstances so require.¹⁴⁶

The Tribunal in the *Rainbow Warrior* case held that in order for cessation to arise, the wrongful act had to have a continuing character and the violated rule must still be in force at the date the order is given.¹⁴⁷ The obligation to offer assurances of non-repetition was raised by Germany and discussed by the Court in the *LaGrand* case.¹⁴⁸ The Court held that a US commitment to ensure implementation of specific measures was sufficient to meet Germany's request for a general assurance of non-repetition,¹⁴⁹ while with regard to Germany's request for specific assurances, the Court noted that should the United States fail in its obligation of consular notification, it would then be incumbent upon that state to allow the review and reconsideration of any conviction and sentence of a German national taking place in these circumstances by taking account of the violation of the rights contained in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.¹⁵⁰ In the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion,¹⁵¹ the Court, having noted that the decolonisation of Mauritius was not conducted in a manner consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination, held that the United Kingdom's continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago constituted a wrongful act entailing

the international responsibility of the United Kingdom and the obligation to bring it to an end as rapidly as possible. All UN member states were under an obligation to cooperate with the United Nations to complete the decolonisation of Mauritius.

Reparation¹⁵²

The basic principle with regard to reparation, or the remedying of a breach of an international obligation for which the state concerned is responsible,¹⁵³ was laid down in the *Chorzów Factory* case, where the Permanent Court of International Justice emphasised that:

The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.¹⁵⁴

This principle was reaffirmed in a number of cases, including, for example, by the International Court in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case¹⁵⁵ and in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* case,¹⁵⁶ and by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in *M/V Saiga (No. 2)*.¹⁵⁷

Article 31 of the Articles on State Responsibility provides that the responsible state is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act and that injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a state. The obligation to make reparation is governed in all its aspects by international law, irrespective of domestic law provisions.¹⁵⁸ Article 34 provides that full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination.¹⁵⁹

Restitution in kind is the obvious method of performing the reparation, since it aims to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed.¹⁶⁰ While restitution has occurred in the past,¹⁶¹ it is more rare today, if only because the nature of such disputes has changed. A large number of cases now involve expropriation disputes, where it is politically difficult for the state concerned to return expropriated property to multinational companies.¹⁶² Recognising some of these problems, article 35 provides for restitution as long as and to the extent that it is not materially impossible and does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation.¹⁶³ In the *Rainbow Warrior* arbitration,¹⁶⁴ New Zealand sought *inter alia* an Order that the French Government return its agents from France to their previous place of confinement in the Pacific as required by the original agreement of 9 July 1986. New Zealand termed this request ‘*restitutio in integrum*’. France argued that ‘cessation’ of the denounced behaviour was the appropriate terminology and remedy, although in the circumstances barred by time.¹⁶⁵ The Tribunal pointed to the debate in the International Law Commission on

the differences between the two concepts¹⁶⁶ and held that the French approach was correct.¹⁶⁷ The obligation to end an illegal situation was not reparation, but a return to the original obligation, that is cessation of the illegal conduct. However, it was held that since the primary obligation was no longer in force (in the sense that the obligation to keep the agents in the Pacific island concerned expired under the initial agreement on 22 July 1989), an order for cessation of the illegal conduct could serve no purpose.¹⁶⁸

The question of the appropriate reparation for expropriation was discussed in several cases. In the *BP* case,¹⁶⁹ the Tribunal emphasised that there was

no explicit support for the proposition that specific performance, and even less so *restitutio in integrum*, are remedies of public international law available at the option of a party suffering a wrongful breach by a co-contracting party . . . the responsibility incurred by the defaulting party for breach of an obligation to perform a contractual undertaking is a duty to pay damages . . . the concept of *restitutio in integrum* has been employed merely as a vehicle for establishing the amount of damages.¹⁷⁰

However, in the *Texaco* case,¹⁷¹ which similarly involved Libyan nationalisation of oil concessions, the arbitrator held that restitution in kind under international law (and indeed under Libyan law) constituted

the normal sanction for non-performance of contractual obligations and that it is inapplicable only to the extent that restoration of the *status quo ante* is impossible.¹⁷²

This is an approach that in political terms, particularly in international contract cases, is unlikely to prove acceptable to states since it appears a violation of sovereignty. The problems, indeed, of enforcing such restitution awards against a recalcitrant state may be imagined.¹⁷³

The International Court noted in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case that it was a ‘well-established rule of international law that an injured state is entitled to obtain compensation from the state which has committed an internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it’.¹⁷⁴ Article 36(1) provides that in so far as damage caused by an internationally wrongful act is not made good by restitution, the state responsible is under an obligation to give compensation.¹⁷⁵ Article 36(2) states that the compensation to be provided shall cover any financially assessable damage, including loss of profits in so far as this is established.¹⁷⁶ The aim is to deal with economic losses actually caused. Punitive or exemplary damages go beyond the concept of reparation as such¹⁷⁷ and were indeed held in *Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras* (Compensation) to be a principle ‘not applicable in international law at this time’.¹⁷⁸ Further, the International Court has held that compensation may be due for damage caused to the environment and the consequent impairment or loss of the ability of the environment to provide goods and services.¹⁷⁹

Compensation is usually assessed on the basis of the ‘fair market value’ of the property lost, although the method used to calculate this may depend upon the type of property involved.¹⁸⁰ Loss of profits may also be claimed where, for example, there has been interference with use and enjoyment or unlawful taking of income-producing property or in some cases with regard to loss of future income.¹⁸¹

Damage includes both material and non-material (or moral) damage.¹⁸² Monetary compensation may thus be paid for individual pain and suffering and insults. In the *I’m Alone*¹⁸³ case, for example, a sum of \$25,000 was suggested as recompense for the indignity suffered by Canada, in having a ship registered in Montreal unlawfully sunk. A further example of this is provided by the France–New Zealand Agreement of 9 July 1986, concerning the sinking of the vessel *Rainbow Warrior* by French agents in New Zealand, the second paragraph of which provided for France to pay the sum of \$7 million as compensation to New Zealand for ‘all the damage which it has suffered’.¹⁸⁴ It is clear from the context that it covered more than material damage.¹⁸⁵ In the subsequent arbitration in 1990, the Tribunal declared that

an order for the payment of monetary
compensation can be made in respect of the
breach of international obligations involving . .
. serious moral and legal damage, even though
there is no material damage.¹⁸⁶

However, the Tribunal declined to make an order for monetary compensation, primarily since New Zealand was seeking alternative

remedies.¹⁸⁷

Satisfaction constitutes a third form of reparation. This relates to non-monetary compensation and would include official apologies, the punishment of guilty minor officials or the formal acknowledgement of the unlawful character of an act.¹⁸⁸ The Tribunal in the *Rainbow Warrior* arbitration¹⁸⁹ pointed to the long-established practice of states and international courts of using satisfaction as a remedy for the breach of an international obligation, particularly where moral or legal damage had been done directly to the state. In the circumstances of the case, it concluded that the public condemnation of France for its breaches of treaty obligations to New Zealand made by the Tribunal constituted ‘appropriate satisfaction’.¹⁹⁰ The Tribunal also made an interesting ‘Recommendation’ that the two states concerned establish a fund to promote close relations between their respective citizens and additionally recommended that the French government ‘make an initial contribution equivalent to \$2 million to that fund’.¹⁹¹

In some cases, a party to a dispute will simply seek a declaration that the activity complained of is illegal.¹⁹² In territorial disputes, for example, such declarations may be of particular significance. The International Court, however, adopted a narrow view of the Australian submissions in the *Nuclear Tests* case,¹⁹³ an approach that was the subject of a vigorous dissenting opinion.¹⁹⁴ Article 37 of the ILC Articles provides that a state responsible for a wrongful act is obliged to give satisfaction for the injury thereby caused in so far as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. Satisfaction may consist of an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a

formal apology or another appropriate modality.¹⁹⁵ An example of such another modality might be an assurance or guarantee of non-repetition.¹⁹⁶

Serious Breaches of Peremptory Norms (*Jus Cogens*)

One of the major debates taking place with regard to state responsibility concerns the question of international crimes. A distinction was drawn in article 19 of the ILC Draft Articles 1996 between international crimes and international delicts within the context of internationally unlawful acts. It was provided that an internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a state of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach was recognised as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an international crime. All other internationally wrongful acts were termed international delicts.¹⁹⁷ However, the question as to whether states can be criminally responsible has been highly controversial.¹⁹⁸ Some have argued that the concept is of no legal value and cannot be justified in principle, not least because the problem of exacting penal sanctions from states, while in principle possible, could only be creative of instability.¹⁹⁹ Others argued that, particularly since 1945, the attitude towards certain crimes by states has altered so as to bring them within the realm of international law.²⁰⁰ However, the ILC changed its approach²⁰¹ in the light of the controversial nature of the suggestion and the Articles as finally approved in 2001 omit any mention of international crimes of states, but rather seek to focus upon the particular consequences flowing from a breach of obligations *erga omnes* and of peremptory norms (*jus cogens*).²⁰²

Article 41 provides that states are under a duty to cooperate to bring to an end, through lawful means, any serious breach²⁰³ by a state of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of international law²⁰⁴ and not to recognise as lawful any such situation.²⁰⁵

Diplomatic Protection and Nationality of Claims²⁰⁶

The doctrine of state responsibility with regard to injuries to nationals rests upon twin pillars: the attribution to one state of the unlawful acts and omissions of its officials and its organs (legislative, judicial and executive) and the capacity of the other state to adopt the claim of the injured party. Indeed, article 44 of the ILC Articles provides that the responsibility of a state may not be invoked if the claim is not brought in accordance with any applicable rule relating to nationality of claims.²⁰⁷

Nationality is the link between the individual and his or her state as regards particular benefits and obligations. It is also the vital link between the individual and the benefits of international law. Although international law is now moving to a stage whereby individuals may acquire rights free from the interposition of the state, the basic proposition remains that in a state-oriented world system, it is only through the medium of the state that the individual may obtain the full range of benefits available under international law, and nationality is the key.²⁰⁸

The principle of diplomatic protection originally developed in the context of the treatment by a state of foreign nationals. However, the International Court has pointed out that: ‘Owing to the substantive development of international

law over recent decades in respect of the rights it accords to individuals, the scope *ratione materiae* of diplomatic protection, originally limited to alleged violations of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, has subsequently widened to include, *inter alia*, internationally guaranteed human rights.’²⁰⁹

The International Law Commission adopted Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in 2006.²¹⁰ Article 1 provides that, for the purposes of the draft articles,

diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a state, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another state for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that state to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former state with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.²¹¹

A state is under a duty to protect its nationals and it may take up their claims against other states. Diplomatic protection includes, in a broad sense, consular action, negotiation, mediation, judicial and arbitral proceedings, reprisals, a retort, severance of diplomatic relations and economic pressures.²¹² There is under international law, however, no obligation for states to provide diplomatic protection for their nationals abroad,²¹³ although it can be said that nationals have a right to request their government to consider diplomatic protection and that government is under a duty to consider that request rationally.²¹⁴

In addition, once a state does this, the claim then becomes that of the state. This is a result of the historical reluctance to permit individuals the right in international law to prosecute claims against foreign countries, for reasons relating to state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.

This basic principle was elaborated in the *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions* case.²¹⁵ The Permanent Court of International Justice pointed out that:

By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own rights, its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law . . .

Once a state has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the state is sole claimant.²¹⁶ It follows that the exercise of diplomatic protection cannot be regarded as intervention contrary to international law by the state concerned. Coupled with this right of the state is the constraint that a state may in principle adopt the claims only of its own nationals. Diplomatic protection may not extend to the adoption of claims of foreign subjects,²¹⁷ although it has been suggested ‘as an exercise in progressive development of the law’ that a state may adopt the claim of a stateless person or refugee who at the dates of the injury and presentation of the claim is lawfully and habitually resident in that state.²¹⁸ Such diplomatic protection is not a right of the national concerned, but a right

of the state which it may or may not choose to exercise.²¹⁹ It is not a duty incumbent upon the state under international law. As the Court noted in the *Barcelona Traction* case,

within the limits prescribed by international law, a state may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the state is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law.²²⁰

The United Kingdom takes the view that the taking up of a claim against a foreign state is a matter within the prerogative of the Crown, but various principles are outlined in its publication, ‘Rules regarding the Taking up of International Claims by Her Majesty’s Government’, stated to be based on international law.²²¹ This distinguishes between formal claims and informal representations. In the former case, Rule VIII provides that: ‘If, in exhausting any municipal remedies, the claimant has met with prejudice or obstruction, which are a denial of justice, HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] may intervene on his behalf in order to secure justice.’ In the latter case, the United Kingdom will consider making representations if, when all legal remedies have been exhausted, the British national has evidence of a miscarriage or denial of justice. This may apply to cases where fundamental violations of the national’s human rights had demonstrably altered the course of justice. The United Kingdom has also stated that it would consider making

direct representations to third governments where it is believed that they were in breach of their international obligations.²²²

The issue was discussed by the Court of Appeal in *R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*.²²³ It was noted that there was no authority which supported the imposition of an enforceable duty on the UK authorities to protect its citizens; however, the Foreign Office had a discretion whether to exercise the right it had to protect British citizens and had indicated what a citizen may expect of it through, for example, the Rules regarding the Taking up of International Claims. The Court concluded that, in view of the Rules and official statements made,²²⁴ there was a 'clear acceptance by the government of a role in relation to protecting the rights of British citizens abroad, where there is evidence of miscarriage or denial of justice'.²²⁵ While the expectations raised by such Rules and statements were limited and the discretion wide, there was no reason why any decision or inaction by the government should not be judicially reviewable under English law, if it could be shown that such decision or inaction were irrational or contrary to legitimate expectation. It might thus be said that there existed an obligation to consider the position of any particular British citizen and consider the extent to which some action might be taken on his behalf.²²⁶ This legitimate expectation of the citizen was that his or her request would be 'considered', and that in that consideration 'all relevant factors will be thrown into the balance'.²²⁷ The Court held that the 'extreme case' where judicial review would lie in relation to diplomatic protection would be if the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were, contrary to its stated practice, to refuse even to consider whether to make diplomatic representations on behalf of a subject whose fundamental rights were being violated.²²⁸

The scope of a state to extend its nationality²²⁹ to whomsoever it wishes is unlimited, except perhaps in so far as it affects other states. Article 1 of the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 1930, for example, provides that:

It is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other states in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality .
..²³⁰

In the *Nottebohm* case,²³¹ the International Court of Justice decided that only where there existed a genuine link between the claimant state and its national could the right of diplomatic protection arise. However, the facts of that case are critical to understanding the pertinent legal proposition. The government of Liechtenstein instituted proceedings claiming restitution and compensation for Nottebohm against Guatemala for acts of the latter which were alleged to be contrary to international law. Guatemala replied that Nottebohm's right to Liechtenstein nationality and thus its diplomatic protection was questionable. The person in question was born in Germany in 1881 and, still a German national, applied for naturalisation in Liechtenstein in 1939. The point was, however, that since 1905 (and until 1943 when he was deported as a result of war measures) Nottebohm had been permanently resident in Guatemala and had carried on his business from there. The Court noted that Liechtenstein

was entirely free, as was every state, to establish the rules necessary for the acquisition of its nationality, but the crux of the matter was whether Guatemala was obliged to recognise the grant of Liechtenstein nationality. The exercise of diplomatic protection by a state regarding one of its nationals brought the whole issue of nationality out of the sphere of domestic jurisdiction and onto the plane of international law.²³² The Court emphasised that, according to state practice, nationality was a legal manifestation of the link between the person and the state granting nationality and the recognition that the person was more closely connected with that state than with any other.²³³

Having brought out these concepts, the Court emphasised the tenuous nature of Nottebohm's links with Liechtenstein and the strength of his connection with Guatemala. Nottebohm had spent only a very short period of time in Liechtenstein and one of his brothers lived in Vaduz. Beyond that and the formal naturalisation process, there were no other links with that state. On the other hand, he had lived in Guatemala for some thirty years and had returned there upon obtaining his papers from Vaduz. Since the Liechtenstein nationality 'was granted without regard to the concept . . . adopted in international relations' in the absence of any genuine connection, the Court held that Liechtenstein was not able to extend its diplomatic protection to Nottebohm as regards Guatemala.²³⁴ The case has been subject to criticism relating to the use of the doctrine of 'genuine connection' by the Court. The doctrine had until then been utilised with regard to the problems of dual nationality, so as to enable a decision to be made on whether one national state may sue the other on behalf of the particular national. Its extension to the issue of diplomatic protection appeared to be a new move altogether.²³⁵

The ILC in its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection adopted in 2006 did not require establishment of a genuine link as a requirement of nationality²³⁶ and the Commentary argues that the *Nottebohm* case should be limited to its facts alone.²³⁷

The nationality must exist at the date of the injury, and should continue until at least the date of the formal presentation of the claim, although this latter point may depend upon a variety of other facts – for example, any agreement between the contending states as regards the claim.²³⁸

Where an individual possesses dual or multiple nationality, any state of which he is a national may adopt a claim of his against a third state²³⁹ and there appears no need to establish a genuine link between the state of nationality and the dual or multiple national.²⁴⁰ In the case of more than one state of nationality, the rule appears to be that the state with which he has the more effective connection may be able to espouse his claim as against the other state. In the *Mergé* case,²⁴¹ it was emphasised that the principle based on the sovereign equality of states, which excludes diplomatic protection in the case of dual nationality, must yield before the principle of effective nationality whenever such nationality is that of the claimant state. However, where such predominance is not proved, there would be no such yielding. In other words, the test for permitting protection by a state of a national against another state of which he is also a national is the test of effectiveness. This approach was reaffirmed by the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, where the full Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over claims against Iran by a dual national when the ‘dominant and effective nationality’ at the relevant time was American.²⁴² Article 7 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic

Protection provides that a state of nationality may not exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person against a state of which the person is also a national unless the nationality of the former state is predominant, both at the time of the injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim.

As far as a corporation is concerned, it appears that there must be some tangible link between it and the state seeking to espouse its claim. Different cases have pointed to various factors, ranging from incorporation of the company in the particular state to the maintenance of the administrative centre of the company in the state and the existence of substantial holdings by nationals in the company.²⁴³

The Court in the *Barcelona Traction* case²⁴⁴ remarked that the traditional rule gave the right of diplomatic protection of a corporation to the state under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office. Any application of the *Nottebohm* doctrine of the ‘genuine connection’ was rejected as having no general acceptance. Nevertheless, it remains true that some meaningful link must bind the state to the company which seeks its protection. The position as regards the shareholders in a company was discussed in that case. It concerned a dispute between Belgium and Spain relating to a company established in 1911 in Canada, which was involved in the production of electricity in Spain and the majority of whose shares were owned by Belgian nationals. After the Second World War, the Spanish authorities took a number of financial measures which resulted in harm to the company, and in 1948 it was declared bankrupt. The case concerned a Belgian claim in respect of injury to the shareholders, who were Belgian nationals, because of the steps that Spain had adopted. Spain replied

by denying that Belgium had any standing in the case since the injury had been suffered by the company and not the shareholders.

The Court rejected the Belgian claim on the grounds that it did not have a legal interest in the matter. Although shareholders may suffer if wrong is done to a company, it is only the rights of the latter that have been infringed and thus entitle it to institute action. If, on the other hand (as did not happen here), the direct rights of the shareholders were affected, for example as regards dividends, then they would have an independent right of action; but otherwise, only if the company legally ceased to exist. The Court emphasised that the general rule of international law stated that where an unlawful act was committed against a company representing foreign capital, only the national state of the company could sue. In this case, Canada had chosen not to intervene in the dispute. To accept the idea of the diplomatic protection of shareholders would, in the opinion of the International Court of Justice, result in the creation of an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in economic relations especially since the shares of international companies are ‘widely scattered and frequently change hands’.²⁴⁵

Article 9 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection provides that the nationality of a corporation is the state where it was incorporated, although when the corporation is controlled by nationals of another state or states and has no substantial business activities in the state of incorporation, and the seat of management and the financial control of the corporation are both located in another state, that state shall be regarded as the state of nationality. Article 11 provides that the state of nationality of shareholders shall not be entitled to provide diplomatic protection to shareholders where the injury is to the

corporation, unless the corporation has ceased to exist according to the law of the state of incorporation for a reason unrelated to the injury; or the corporation had, at the date of injury, the nationality of the state alleged to be responsible for causing the injury, and incorporation in that state was required by it as a precondition for doing business there.²⁴⁶

The International Court returned to the question of corporations in the *Diallo* (*Guinea v. Congo*) case,²⁴⁷ noting that:

What matters, from the point of view of international law, is to determine whether or not these have a legal personality independent of their members. Conferring independent corporate personality on a company implies granting it rights over its own property, rights which it alone is capable of protecting. As a result, only the state of nationality may exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the company when its rights are injured by a wrongful act of another state. In determining whether a company possesses independent and distinct legal personality, international law looks to the rules of the relevant domestic law.²⁴⁸

In so far as the shareholders of such corporations in the context of diplomatic protection were concerned, the Court emphasised that:

The exercise by a state of diplomatic protection on behalf of a natural or legal person, who is *associé* or shareholder, having its nationality, seeks to engage the responsibility of another state for an injury caused to that person by an internationally wrongful act committed by that state. Ultimately, this is no more than the diplomatic protection of a natural or legal person as defined by Article 1 of the ILC draft Articles; what amounts to the internationally wrongful act, in the case of *associés* or shareholders, is the violation by the respondent state of their direct rights in relation to a legal person, direct rights that are defined by the domestic law of that state, as accepted by both Parties, moreover. On this basis, diplomatic protection of the direct rights of *associés* of a SPRL or shareholders of a public limited company is not to be regarded as an exception to the general legal régime of diplomatic protection for natural or legal persons, as derived from customary international law.²⁴⁹

The United Kingdom, according to the set of Rules regarding the Taking up of International Claims produced by the Foreign Office in 1985,²⁵⁰ may intervene in *Barcelona Traction* situations where a national has an interest as a shareholder or otherwise, and the company is defunct, although this is regarded as an exceptional instance. The United Kingdom may also intervene

where it is the national state of the company that actively wrongs the company in which a UK national has an interest as a shareholder or in some other respect; otherwise the United Kingdom would normally take up such a claim only in concert with the government of the state of incorporation of the company.²⁵¹ Further, practice varies as between states²⁵² and under different treaty regimes.²⁵³

The position with regard to ships is rather different. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in *M/V Saiga (No. 2)* emphasised that under the Law of the Sea Convention 1982, it is the flag state that bears the rights and obligations with regard to the ship itself so that ‘the ship, every thing on it and every person involved or interested in its obligations are treated as an entity linked to the flag state. The nationalities of these persons are not relevant.’²⁵⁴

The Exhaustion of Local Remedies²⁵⁵

Customary international law provides that before international proceedings are instituted or claims or representations made, the remedies provided by the local state should have been exhausted.²⁵⁶ There is a theoretical dispute as to whether the principle of exhaustion of local remedies is a substantive or procedural rule or some form of hybrid concept,²⁵⁷ but the purpose of the rule is both to enable the state to have an opportunity to redress the wrong that has occurred within its own legal order and to reduce the number of international claims that might be brought. Another factor, of course, is the respect that is to be accorded to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of foreign states by not preempting the operation of their legal systems. Article 44 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility provides that the responsibility of a state may not be invoked if the claim is one to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies and any available and effective local remedy has not been exhausted.²⁵⁸

Article 14 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection reiterates the customary rule, noting that no international claim in respect of an injury to a national may be presented before that national has exhausted local remedies, which are defined as ‘legal remedies which are open to an injured person before the judicial or administrative courts or bodies, whether ordinary or special, of the state alleged to be responsible for causing the injury’. Article 15 provides that local remedies do not need to be exhausted where there are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such redress; there is

undue delay in the remedial process which is attributable to the state alleged to be responsible; there was no relevant connection between the injured person and the state alleged to be responsible at the date of injury; the injured person is manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies; or the state alleged to be responsible has waived the requirement that local remedies be exhausted.²⁵⁹

The general rule was well illustrated in the *Ambatielos* arbitration²⁶⁰ between Greece and Britain. The former brought proceedings arising out of a contract signed by Ambatielos, which were rejected by the Tribunal since the remedies available under English law had not been fully utilised. In particular, he had failed to call a vital witness and he had not appealed to the House of Lords from the Decision of the Court of Appeal.

The requirement to exhaust local²⁶¹ remedies applies only to available effective remedies. It will not be sufficient to dismiss a claim merely because the person claiming had not taken the matter to appeal, where the appeal would not have affected the basic outcome of the case. This was stressed in the *Finnish Ships* arbitration,²⁶² where shipowners brought a claim before the Admiralty Transport Arbitration Board, but did not appeal against the unfavourable decision. It was held that since the appeal could only be on points of law, which could not overturn the vital finding of fact that there had been a British requisition of ships involved, any appeal would have been ineffective. Accordingly, the claims of the shipowners would not be dismissed for non-exhaustion of local remedies.

In the *Interhandel* case,²⁶³ the United States seized the American assets of a company owned by the Swiss firm Interhandel, in 1942, which was suspected of being under the control of a German enterprise. In 1958, after nine years of litigation in the US courts regarding the unblocking of the Swiss assets in America, Switzerland took the matter to the International Court of Justice. However, before a decision was reached, the US Supreme Court readmitted Interhandel into the legal proceedings, thus disposing of Switzerland's argument that the company's suit had been finally rejected. The Court dismissed the Swiss government's claim since the local remedies available had not been exhausted. Criticism has been levelled against this judgment on the ground that litigation extending over practically ten years could hardly be described as constituting an 'effective' remedy. However, the fact remains that the legal system operating in the United States had still something to offer the Swiss company even after that time.

The local remedies rule does not apply where one state has been guilty of a direct breach of international law causing immediate injury to another state, as for instance where its diplomatic agents are assaulted. But it does apply where the state is complaining of injury to its nationals.²⁶⁴ The local remedies rule may be waived by treaty stipulation, as for example in Article V of the US–Mexico General Claims Convention of 1923 and Article XI of the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects 1972.

The issue of local remedies was clarified in the *Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI)* case,²⁶⁵ which referred to the concept as 'an important principle of customary international law'.²⁶⁶ The case concerned an action brought by the United

States against Italy alleging injuries to the Italian interests of two US corporations. Italy claimed that local remedies had not been exhausted, while the United States argued that the doctrine did not apply since the case was brought under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 1948 between the two states which provided for the submission of disputes relating to the treaty to the International Court, with no mention of local remedies. The Chamber of the Court, however, firmly held that while the parties to an agreement could if they so chose dispense with the local remedies requirement in express terms, it ‘finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with’.²⁶⁷ In other words, the presumption that local remedies need to be exhausted can only be rebutted by express provision to the contrary.

The Chamber also dealt with a claim by the United States that the doctrine did not apply to a request for a declaratory judgment finding that the treaty in question had been violated. This claim in effect was based on the view that the doctrine would not apply in cases of direct injury to a state. The Chamber felt unable to find in the case a dispute over alleged violation of the treaty resulting in direct injury to the United States that was both distinct from and independent of the dispute with regard to the two US corporations.²⁶⁸ It was stressed that the matter ‘which colours and pervades the US claim as a whole’ was the alleged damage to the two US corporations.²⁶⁹ In the light of this stringent test, it therefore seems that in such mixed claims involving the interests both of nationals and of the state itself one must assume that the local remedies rule applies.

The claim that local remedies had not in fact been exhausted in the case because the two US corporations had not raised the treaty issue before the Italian courts was rejected. It was held that it was sufficient if the essence of the claim had been brought before the competent tribunals. Accordingly, identity of claims as distinct from identity of issues is not required. The Chamber was not convinced that there clearly remained some remedy which the corporations, independently of their Italian subsidiary (ELSI), ought to have pursued and exhausted.²⁷⁰

The Treatment of Aliens²⁷¹

The question of the protection of foreign nationals and their property is an issue which divides states upon both ideological and economic grounds as the interests of capital-exporting and capital-importing states often contradict each other.

The diplomatic protection of nationals abroad developed as the number of nationals overseas grew as a consequence of increasing trading activities and thus the relevant state practice multiplied. In addition, since the US–UK Jay Treaty of 1794, numerous mixed claims commissions were established to resolve problems of injury to aliens,²⁷² while a variety of national claims commissions were created to distribute lump sums received from foreign states in settlement of claims.²⁷³ Such international and national claims procedures together with diplomatic protection therefore enabled nationals abroad to be aided in cases of loss or injury in state responsibility situations.²⁷⁴

The Relevant Standard of Treatment

The developed states of the West have argued historically that there exists an ‘international minimum standard’ for the protection of foreign nationals and their property that must be upheld irrespective of how the state treats its own nationals, whereas other states maintained that all the state need do is treat the alien as it does its own nationals (the ‘national treatment standard’). The reason for the evolution of the latter approach is to be found in the increasing

resentment of Western economic domination rather than in the necessary neglect of basic standards of justice. The Latin American states felt, in particular, that the international minimum standard concept had been used as a means of interference in internal affairs.²⁷⁵ Accordingly, the Calvo doctrine was formulated. This involved a reaffirmation of the principle of non-intervention coupled with the assertion that aliens were entitled only to such rights as were accorded nationals and thus had to seek redress for grievances exclusively in the domestic arena.²⁷⁶ It was intended as a shield against external interference. The international standard concept itself developed during the nineteenth century and received extensive support in case-law.

In the *Neer* case,²⁷⁷ for example, where the American superintendent of a mine in Mexico had been killed, the Commission held ‘that the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international standards’, while in the *Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia* case,²⁷⁸ the Court recognised the existence of a common or generally accepted international law respecting the treatment of aliens, which is applicable to them despite municipal legislation. In the *Garcia* case,²⁷⁹ the US–Mexican Claims Commission emphasised that there existed an international standard concerning the taking of human life, and in the *Roberts* claim,²⁸⁰ reference was made to the test as to whether aliens were treated in accordance with ordinary standards of civilisation. If the principle is clear, the contents or definition of that principle are far from clear. In the *Neer* claim,²⁸¹ the Commission stated that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency,

should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its insufficiency.

In other words, a fairly high threshold is specified before the minimum standard applies. Some indeed have argued that the concept never involved a definite standard with a fixed content, but rather a ‘process of decision’,²⁸² a process which would involve an examination of the responsibility of the state for the injury to the alien in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case.²⁸³ The issue of the content of such a standard has often been described in terms of the concept of denial of justice.²⁸⁴ In effect, that concept refers to the improper administration of civil and criminal justice as regards an alien.²⁸⁵ It would include the failure to apprehend and prosecute those wrongfully causing injury to an alien, as in the *Janes* claim,²⁸⁶ where an American citizen was killed in Mexico. The identity of the murderer was known, but no action had been taken for eight years. The widow was awarded \$12,000 in compensation for the non-apprehension and non-punishment of the murderer. It would also include unreasonably long detention and harsh and unlawful treatment in prison.²⁸⁷

A progressive attempt to resolve the divide between the national and international standard proponents was put forward by Garcia-Amador in a report on international responsibility to the International Law Commission in 1956 based on international human rights. While not initially attractive to the

ILC, human rights law has developed considerably in recent years²⁸⁸ and can now be regarded as establishing certain minimum standards of state behaviour with regard to civil and political rights. It is noticeable, for example, that the relevant instruments do not refer to nationals and aliens specifically, but to all individuals within the territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the state without discrimination.²⁸⁹ One should also note the special efforts being made to deal with non-nationals, in particular the UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live 1985,²⁹⁰ and the continuing concern with regard to migrant workers.²⁹¹

Some differences as regards the relative rights and obligations of nationals and aliens are, of course, inevitable. Non-nationals do not have political rights and may be banned from employment in certain areas (e.g. the diplomatic corps), although they remain subject to the local law. It is also unquestioned that a state may legitimately refuse to admit aliens, or may accept them subject to certain conditions being fulfilled. Whether a state may expel aliens with equal facility is more open to doubt.

A number of cases assert that states must give convincing reasons for expelling an alien. In, for example, the *Boffolo* case,²⁹² which concerned an Italian expelled from Venezuela, it was held that states possess a general right of expulsion, but it could only be resorted to in extreme circumstances and accomplished in a manner least injurious to the person affected. In addition, the reasons for the expulsion must be stated before an international tribunal when the occasion demanded. Many municipal systems provide that the authorities of a country may deport aliens without reasons having to be

stated. The position under customary international law is therefore somewhat confused. As far as treaty law is concerned, article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that an alien lawfully in the territory of a state party to the Convention

may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority.²⁹³

The International Law Commission adopted Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens in 2014.²⁹⁴ Article 3 underlined the general principle that a state has the right to expel an alien from its territory. However, any expulsion must be in accordance with the draft articles and without prejudice to other applicable rules of international law, in particular those relating to human rights. Relevant draft articles include the provisions that any such expulsion has to be in accordance with the law and this would include both internal and international law,²⁹⁵ that a stateless person lawfully in the country cannot be expelled except for reasons of national security or public order²⁹⁶ and that a state cannot make a national an alien by deprivation of nationality for the sole purpose of expulsion.²⁹⁷ It is prohibited to expel a refugee lawfully in the territory of the state concerned save on grounds of national security or public order, nor may a refugee be expelled or returned to a territory where the

person's life or freedom would be threatened.²⁹⁸ In particular, the expulsion of an alien for the purpose of confiscation of assets is forbidden.²⁹⁹ The collective expulsion of aliens is also prohibited.³⁰⁰ Article 22 provides that an alien subject to expulsion shall be expelled to his or her state of nationality³⁰¹ or any other state that has the obligation to receive the alien under international law, or to any state willing to accept him or her at the request of the expelling state or, where appropriate, of the alien in question. Where the state of nationality or any other state that has the obligation to receive the alien under international law has not been identified and no other state is willing to accept the alien, that alien may be expelled to any state where he or she has a right of entry or stay or, where applicable, to the state from where he or she has entered the expelling state.

The burden of proving the wrongfulness of the expelling state's action falls upon the claimant alleging expulsion and the relevant rules would also apply where, even though there is no direct law or regulation forcing the alien to leave, his continued presence in that state is made impossible because of conditions generated by wrongful acts of the state or attributable to it.³⁰²

The Protection of Foreign Property and Investments³⁰³

The expansion of the Western economies since the nineteenth century in particular stimulated an outflow of capital and consequent heavy investment in the developing areas of the world. This resulted in substantial areas of local economies falling within the ownership and control of Western corporations. With the granting of independence to the various developing countries and in view of the nationalisation measures taken by the Soviet Union after the success of the communists in the Russian Revolution of 1917, such properties and influence began to come under pressure. Today, however, a variety of emerging countries from across the globe now invest in other states, predominant examples being China and India. The old patterns have been recast, but many of the previous problems of international law remain.

Since it can hardly be denied that nationalisation is a perfectly legitimate measure for a state to adopt and clearly not illegal as such under international law,³⁰⁴ the problem arises where foreign property is involved. Not to expropriate such property in a general policy of nationalisation might be seen as equivalent to proposing a privileged status within the country for foreign property, as well as limiting the power of the state within its own jurisdiction. There is no doubt that under international law, expropriation of alien property is legitimate.³⁰⁵ This is not disputed. However, certain conditions must be fulfilled.³⁰⁶

The question, of course, arises as to the stage at which international law in fact becomes involved in such a situation. Apart from the relevance of the general rules relating to the treatment of aliens noted in the preceding section, the issue will usually arise out of a contract between a state and a foreign private enterprise. In such a situation, several possibilities exist. It could be argued that the contract itself by its very nature becomes ‘internationalised’ and thus subject to international law rather than (or possibly in addition to) the law of the contracting state. The consequences of this would include the operation of the principle of international law that agreements are to be honoured (*pacta sunt servanda*) which would constrain the otherwise wide competence of a state party to alter unilaterally the terms of a relevant agreement. This proposition was adopted by the Arbitrator in the *Texaco v. Libya* case in 1977,³⁰⁷ where it was noted that this may be achieved in various ways: for example, by stating that the law governing the contract referred to ‘general principles of law’, which was taken to incorporate international law; by including an international arbitration clause for the settlement of disputes; and by including a stabilisation clause in an international development agreement, preventing unilateral variation of the terms of the agreement.³⁰⁸ However, this approach is controversial and case-law is by no means consistent.³⁰⁹ International law will clearly be engaged where the expropriation is unlawful, either because of, for example, the discriminatory manner in which it is carried out or the offering of inadequate or no compensation. More widely, the enormous increase in the various kinds of bilateral and multilateral forms of inter-state and state–private investor dispute settlements has produced an extensive range of commentary upon international economic law matters.

The Property Question

Higgins has pointed to ‘the almost total absence of any analysis of conceptual aspects of property’.³¹⁰ Property would clearly include physical objects and certain abstract entities, for example, shares in companies, debts and intellectual property. The 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens³¹¹ discusses the concept of property in the light of ‘all movable and immovable property, whether tangible or intangible, including industrial, literary and artistic property as well as rights and interests in property’. In the *Liamco* case, the arbitration specifically mentioned concession rights as forming part of incorporeal property,³¹² a crucial matter as many expropriation cases in fact involve a wide variety of contractual rights.³¹³ In the field of human rights, the meaning of property has been referred to in a number of treaties and analysed in a number of cases.³¹⁴ In this context, a ‘legitimate expectation’ of acquiring effective enjoyment of a property right would be covered,³¹⁵ while, for example, the ownership of an economic enterprise may be seen as a collection of rights.³¹⁶ In general, a more flexible interpretation of property is evident.³¹⁷

The Nature of Expropriation³¹⁸

Expropriation involves a taking of property,³¹⁹ but actions short of direct possession of the assets in question may also fall within the category. Thus, expropriation may be direct in the sense of being a formal takeover of the property by the state or indirect. As an example of the latter, the 1961 Harvard Draft included ‘any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment or disposal of property as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference’.³²⁰ In 1965, for example, after a series of Indonesian decrees, the UK government stated that:

in view of the complete inability of British enterprises and plantations to exercise and enjoy any of their rights of ownership in relation to their properties in Indonesia, Her Majesty’s Government has concluded that the Indonesian Government has expropriated this property.³²¹

In *Starrett Housing Corporation v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran* before the Iran–US Claims Tribunal,³²² it was emphasised by the Tribunal that:

measures taken by a state can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the state does not purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner.

In that case, it was held that a taking had occurred by the end of January 1980 upon the appointment by the Iranian Housing Ministry of a temporary manager of the enterprise concerned, thus depriving the claimants of the right to manage and of effective control and use.³²³ However, a series of events prior to that date, including armed incursions and detention of personnel, intimidation and interference with supplies and needed facilities, did not amount to a taking of the property, since investors in foreign countries assume certain risks with regard to disturbances and even revolution. The fact that the risks materialise, held the Tribunal, did not mean that property rights affected by the events could be deemed to have been taken.³²⁴ There is clearly an important, but indistinct, dividing line here.

It has also been held that the seizure of a controlling stock interest in a foreign corporation is a taking of control of the assets and profits of the enterprise in question.³²⁵ In *Biloune v. Ghana Investment Centre*, an investor began construction work relying upon government representations although without building permits; a stop order was then issued based upon the absence of such permit. The Tribunal held that an indirect expropriation had taken place because the totality of the circumstances had the effect of causing

the irreparable cessation of work on the project.³²⁶ In *Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania*,³²⁷ it was held that an expropriation claim must be determined in the light of the effect and that an indirect expropriation might need to be assumed in cases of a substantial deprivation of rights for at least a meaningful period of time, while in *Suez v. Argentina*,³²⁸ it was held that an analysis of a taking must be focused upon the effects and not the intention of the measure in question.

Where the taking constitutes a process rather than one clear act, there will be a problem of determining when the process has reached the point at which an expropriation in fact has occurred.³²⁹ This issue may be important, for example, in determining the valuation date for compensation purposes. In *Santa Elena v. Costa Rica*, the Tribunal stated that ‘a property has been expropriated when the effect of the measures taken by the state has been to deprive the owner of title, possession or access to the benefit and economic use of his property . . . This is a matter of fact for the Tribunal to assess in the light of the circumstances of the case.’³³⁰

The expropriation of a given property may also include a taking of closely connected ancillary rights, such as patents and contracts, which had not been directly nationalised.³³¹

Public Purposes

The Permanent Court in the *Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia* case noted that expropriation must be for ‘reasons of public utility, judicial

liquidation and similar measures'.³³² How far this extends is open to dispute, although it will cover wartime measures.

The issue was raised in the *BP* case,³³³ where the reason for the expropriation of the BP property was the Libyan belief that the United Kingdom had encouraged Iran to occupy certain Persian Gulf Islands. The arbitrator explained that the taking violated international law, 'as it was made for purely extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in character'.³³⁴ This is ambiguous as to the public purpose issue, and in the *Liamco* case³³⁵ it was held that 'the public utility principle is not a necessary requisite for the legality of a nationalisation'.³³⁶ It is to be noted, however, that the 1962 General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources mentions this requirement,³³⁷ although the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States does not.³³⁸ The question may thus still be an open one,³³⁹ although later practice suggests that general measures taken on a non-discriminatory basis for the public good would not constitute unlawful expropriation. The Tribunal in *Santa Elena v. Costa Rica* took the view that international law permitted expropriation of foreign-owned property *inter alia* for a public purpose and noted that this might include a taking for environmental reasons.³⁴⁰

Non-Discrimination

It has been argued that non-discrimination is a requirement for a valid and lawful expropriation.³⁴¹ Although it is not mentioned in the 1962 resolution, the arbitrator in the *Liamco*³⁴² case strongly argued that a discriminatory nationalisation would be unlawful.³⁴³ Nevertheless, in that case, it was held

that Libya's action against certain oil companies was aimed at preserving its ownership of the oil and was non-discriminatory. Indeed, the arbitrator noted that the political motive itself was not the predominant motive for nationalisation and would not *per se* constitute sufficient proof of a purely discriminatory measure.³⁴⁴ While the discrimination factor would certainly be a relevant factor to be considered, it would in practice often be extremely difficult to prove in concrete cases.³⁴⁵

Compensation

The requirement often stipulated is for prompt, adequate and effective compensation, the formula used by US Secretary of State Hull on the occasion of Mexican expropriations.³⁴⁶ It is the standard maintained in particular by the United States³⁴⁷ and found in an increasing number of bilateral investment treaties.³⁴⁸ However, case-law has been less clear. Early cases did not use the Hull formulation³⁴⁹ and the 1962 Permanent Sovereignty Resolution referred to 'appropriate compensation', a phrase cited with approval by the arbitrator in the *Texaco* case³⁵⁰ as a rule of customary law in view of the support it achieved. This was underlined in the *Aminoil* case,³⁵¹ where the tribunal said that the standard of 'appropriate compensation' in the 1962 resolution 'codifies positive principles'.³⁵² It was stated that the determination of 'appropriate compensation' was better accomplished by an inquiry into all the circumstances relevant to the particular concrete case than through abstract theoretical discussion.³⁵³ However, while the 'appropriate compensation' formula of the 1962 resolution is linked to both national and international law, the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States links the formula to domestic law and

considerations only. The former instrument is accepted as a reflection of custom, while the latter is not.³⁵⁴ But in any event, it is unclear whether in practice there would be a substantial difference in result.³⁵⁵

It should also be noted that section IV(1) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment provides that a state may not expropriate foreign private investment except where this is done in accordance with applicable legal procedures, in pursuance in good faith of a public purpose, without discrimination on the basis of nationality and against the payment of appropriate compensation. Section IV(2) notes that compensation will be deemed to be appropriate where it is adequate, prompt and effective.³⁵⁶ Article 13 of the European Energy Charter Treaty 1994 provides that expropriation must be for a purpose which is in the public interest, not discriminatory, carried out under due process of law and accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.³⁵⁷

In the sensitive process of assessing the extent of compensation, several distinct categories should be noted. There is generally little dispute about according compensation for the physical assets and other assets of the enterprise such as debts or monies due. Although there are differing methods as to how to value such assets in particular cases,³⁵⁸ the essential principle is that of fair market value.³⁵⁹ Interest on the value of such assets will also normally be paid.³⁶⁰ There is, however, disagreement with regard to the award of compensation for the loss of future profits. In *AMCO v. Indonesia*,³⁶¹ the Arbitral Tribunal held that:

the full compensation of prejudice, by awarding to the injured party, the *damnum emergens* [loss suffered] and the *lucrum cessans* [expected profits] is a principle common to the main systems of municipal law, and therefore, a general principle of law which may be considered as a source of international law,

although the compensation that could be awarded would cover only direct and foreseeable prejudice and not more remote damage.³⁶²

In *Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico*, the Tribunal noted that normally the fair market value of a going concern which has a history of profitable operation may be based on an estimate of future profits subject to a discounted cash flow analysis,³⁶³ but where the enterprise has not operated for a sufficiently long time to establish a performance record or where it has failed to make a profit, future profits cannot be used so that to determine the fair market value, reference instead to the actual investment made may be appropriate.³⁶⁴

However, it has been argued that one may need to take into account whether the expropriation itself was lawful or unlawful. In *INA Corporation v. Iran*,³⁶⁵ the Tribunal suggested that in the case of a large-scale, lawful nationalisation, ‘international law has undergone a gradual reappraisal, the effect of which may be to undermine the doctrinal value of any “full” or “adequate” (when used as identical to “full”) compensation standard’. However, in a situation involving an investment of a small amount shortly before the nationalisation, international law did allow for compensation in an

amount equal to the fair market value of the investment.³⁶⁶ However, Judge Lagergren noted that the ‘fair market value’ standard would normally be discounted in cases of lawful large-scale nationalisations in taking account of ‘all circumstances’.³⁶⁷

In *Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Iran*,³⁶⁸ Chamber Three of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal held that the property in question had been lawfully expropriated and that ‘a clear distinction must be made between lawful and unlawful expropriations, since the rules applicable to the compensation to be paid by the expropriating state differ according to the legal characterisation of the taking’.³⁶⁹ In the case of an unlawful taking, full restitution in kind or its monetary equivalent was required in order to re-establish the situation which would in all probability have existed if the expropriation had not occurred,³⁷⁰ while in the case of lawful taking, the standard was the payment of the full value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession. The difference was interpreted by the Tribunal to mean that compensation for lost profits was only available in cases of wrongful expropriation. As far as the actual method of valuation was concerned, the Tribunal rejected the ‘discounted cash flow’ method, which would involve the estimation of the likely future earnings of the company at the valuation date and discounting such earnings to take account of reasonably foreseeable risks, since it was likely to amount to restitution as well as being too speculative.³⁷¹

Bilateral Investment Treaties

In practice, many of the situations involving commercial relations between states and private parties fall within the framework of bilateral agreements.³⁷² These arrangements are intended to encourage investment in a way that protects the basic interests of both the capital-exporting and capital-importing states. Indeed, there has been a remarkable expansion in the number of such bilateral investment treaties.³⁷³ The British government, for example, has stated that it is policy to conclude as many such agreements as possible in order to stimulate investment flows. It has also been noted that they are designed to set standards applicable in international law.³⁷⁴ The provisions of such agreements indeed are remarkably uniform and constitute valuable state practice.³⁷⁵ While normally great care has to be taken in inferring the existence of a rule of customary international law from a range of bilateral treaties, the very number and uniformity of such agreements make them significant exemplars.

Some of these common features of such treaties may be noted. First, the concept of an investment is invariably broadly defined. In article 1(a) of the important UK–USSR bilateral investment treaty 1989,³⁷⁶ for example, it is provided that:

the term ‘investment’ means every kind of asset
and in particular, though not exclusively,
includes:

(i) movable and immovable property and any other
related property rights such as mortgages;

- (ii) shares in, and stocks, bonds and debentures of, and any other form of participation in, a company or business enterprise;
- (iii) claims to money, and claims to performance under contract having a financial value;
- (iv) intellectual property rights, technical processes, know-how and any other benefit or advantage attached to a business;
- (v) rights conferred by law or under contract to undertake any commercial activity, including the search for, or the cultivation, extraction or exploitation of natural resources.³⁷⁷

Secondly, both parties undertake to encourage and create favourable conditions for investment, to accord such investments 'fair and equitable treatment'³⁷⁸ and to refrain from impairing by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory.³⁷⁹ In so far as the former is concerned, this to some extent relates back to the concept of the fair treatment of aliens. It is seen as a flexible concept, dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case.³⁸⁰ Recent cases, for example, accept the need for states to be able to exercise a reasonable degree of regulatory control.³⁸¹ In one case, for instance, it was noted that acts violating the fair and equitable standard would include acts 'showing a willful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action falling far below international standards, or even subjective bad faith'.³⁸²

Thirdly, investments by the contracting parties are not to be treated less favourably than those of other states.³⁸³ As far as expropriation is concerned,

article 5 of the UK–USSR agreement, by way of example, provides that investments of the contracting parties are not to be expropriated:

except for a purpose which is in the public interest and is not discriminatory and against the payment, without delay, of prompt and effective compensation. Such compensation shall amount to the real value of the investment expropriated immediately before the expropriation or before the impending expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is the earlier, shall be made within two months of the date of expropriation, after which interest at a normal commercial rate shall accrue until the date of payment and shall be effectively realisable and be freely transferable. The investor affected shall have a right under the law of the contracting state making the expropriation, to prompt review, by a judicial or other independent authority of that party, of his or its case and of the valuation of his or its investment in accordance with the principles set out in this paragraph.

One particular area of concern focuses upon the most-favoured-nation clause.³⁸⁴ This clause has been defined as ‘treatment accorded by the granting state to the beneficiary state, or to persons or things in a determined

relationship with that state, not less favourable than treatment extended by the granting state to a third state or to persons or things in the same relationship with that third state'.³⁸⁵ Accordingly, in most cases, the rights of an investor will be increased by the presence of such a clause in an investment treaty. Under such a clause, the beneficiary state acquires, for itself or for those persons or things in a determined relationship with it, only those rights that fall within the limits of the subject-matter of the clause (*ejusdem generis*), while under this clause the beneficiary state acquires a right to most-favoured-nation treatment only if the granting state extends to a third state benefits within the subject-matter of the clause. Such clauses are found in article I(1) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947, with regard to trade in goods and within the World Trade Organization, with regard to *inter alia* trade in services and intellectual property. Most-favoured-nation clauses have long appeared in investment agreements including bilateral investment treaties and regional trade agreements. One particular area of controversy concerns the extension of such clauses to dispute settlement, so that a particular dispute resolution appearing in one treaty is imported into another by virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause and in some cases to use such a clause to by-pass pre-conditions for arbitration.³⁸⁶

Practice as detailed above confirms the traditional principles dealing with the conditions of a lawful expropriation and compensation, noting also the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the expropriating state over the issues of the legality of the expropriation and the valuation of the property expropriated.³⁸⁷ An attempt to produce a Multilateral Agreement on Investment commenced in 1995 within the framework of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, but foundered in 1998.³⁸⁸ Recently, efforts have been

made to reform the bilateral investment treaty (or international investment agreement) regime to permit states greater room for regulatory control, for example providing for general exceptions for the protection of human health or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and providing for modifications of the dispute settlement mechanism and by nuancing the definition of investments to be protected.³⁸⁹

The Intra-EU BIT Agreement

The very advantages of the bilateral investment treaty system, allowing for corporations to have direct access to international arbitral tribunals for resolving disputes with host states and putting the two on an even plane, has produced a reaction from a number of states. South Africa withdrew from a number of BITs with European countries in 2012,³⁹⁰ in June 2015 Indonesia terminated its investment treaty with the Netherlands,³⁹¹ and in May 2017 Ecuador terminated twelve BITs.³⁹² Within the European Union, the Commission expressed opposition to the settlement of investment disputes on the basis of investment treaties between EU member states, but the member states were divided. In 2018, the European Court of Justice gave judgment in *Slovakia v. Achmea BV*,³⁹³ holding that the arbitration provisions contained in the Slovakia–Netherlands BIT were incompatible with EU law. This led the Union to negotiate an agreement for the termination of BITs between member states and on 5 May 2020, twenty-three of the twenty-seven EU member states signed the agreement.³⁹⁴ In the case of pending arbitration proceedings, article 9 of the Agreement envisions a ‘structured dialogue’, where either party to the arbitration may, within six months of the termination of the respective BIT, ask to enter into a settlement procedure as

prescribed in the Agreement, to be overseen by an impartial facilitator chosen by joint agreement between the investor and the respondent state, failing which the Director General of the Legal Service of the European Commission shall designate a former Member of the CJEU who shall, in turn, appoint the facilitator. The practical effect of the agreement is as yet unclear, not least in view of the relevance of the ICSID Convention and the question of the relative protection of investors' rights under the BITs in question and EU law, as well as the role of the European Energy Charter (which is unaffected by the agreement).³⁹⁵

Lump-Sum Agreements

Many disputes over expropriation of foreign property have in fact been resolved directly by the states concerned on the basis of lump-sum settlements, usually after protracted negotiations and invariably at valuation below the current value of the assets concerned.³⁹⁶ For example, the UK–USSR Agreement on the Settlement of Mutual Financial and Property Claims 1986³⁹⁷ dealt with UK government claims of the order of £500 million in respect of Russian war debt and private claims of British nationals amounting to some £400 million.³⁹⁸ In the event, a sum in the region of £45 million was made available to satisfy these claims.³⁹⁹ The Agreement also provided that money held in diplomatic bank accounts in the United Kingdom belonging to the pre-revolutionary Russian Embassy, amounting to some £2.65 million, was released to the Soviet authorities. As is usual in such agreements, each government was solely responsible for settling the claims of its nationals.⁴⁰⁰ This was accomplished in the United Kingdom through the medium of the Foreign Compensation Commission, which acts to distribute settlement sums

‘as may seem just and equitable to them having regard to all the circumstances’. A distinction was made as between bond and property claims and principles enunciated with regard to exchange rates at the relevant time.⁴⁰¹

The question arises thus as to whether such agreements constitute state practice in the context of international customary rules concerning the level of compensation required upon an expropriation of foreign property. A Chamber of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal in *SEDCO v. National Iranian Oil Company*⁴⁰² noted that deriving general principles of law from the conduct of states in lump-sum or negotiated settlements in other expropriation cases was difficult because of the ‘questionable evidentiary value . . . of much of the practice available’. This was because such settlements were often motivated primarily by non-juridical considerations. The Chamber also held incidentally that bilateral investment treaties were also unreliable evidence of international customary standards of compensation. Views differ as to the value to be attributed to such practice,⁴⁰³ but caution is required before accepting bilateral investment treaties and lump-sum agreements as evidence of customary law. This is particularly so with regard to the latter since they deal with specific situations rather than laying down a framework for future activity.⁴⁰⁴ Nevertheless, it would be equally unwise to disregard them entirely. As with all examples of state practice and behaviour, careful attention must be paid to all the relevant circumstances both of the practice maintained and the principle under consideration.

The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency⁴⁰⁵

One approach to the question of foreign investment and the balancing of the interests of the states concerned is provided by the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 1985, which came into force in 1988.⁴⁰⁶ This Agency is part of the World Bank group and offers political risk insurance (guarantees) to investors and lenders. Membership is open to all members of the World Bank. Article 2 provides that the purpose of the Agency, which is an affiliate of the World Bank, is to encourage the flow of investment for productive purposes among member countries and, in particular, to developing countries. This is to be achieved in essence by the provision of insurance cover ‘against non-commercial risks’, such as restrictions on the transfer of currency, measures of expropriation, breaches of government contracts and losses resulting from war or civil disturbances.⁴⁰⁷

It is also intended that the Agency would positively encourage investment by means of research and the dissemination of information on investment opportunities. It may very well be that this initiative could in the long term reduce the sensitive nature of the expropriation mechanism.

The Responsibility of States for Cyber Activities

The extraordinarily speedy development of the internet and consequential activities in what is becoming known as the ‘cybersphere’ is beginning to pose particular challenges, as well as opportunities, within the context of international law.⁴⁰⁸ Cyber techniques have evolved and continue to progress with unprecedented rapidity and in a global context with participants (and

victims) ranging from states to international organisations, individuals, corporations and other non-state actors. The issue of information security has been on the UN agenda since 1998 and in 2002 the UN General Assembly created a Group of Governmental Experts, but with limited success, although there was agreement that international law, particularly the UN Charter, and the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention apply to cyberspace.⁴⁰⁹ In 2018, the United Nations established two processes to consider relevant issues: an Open-ended Working Group and a Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security.⁴¹⁰

Cyberspace relates to the environment in which computers interconnect and communicate worldwide,⁴¹¹ and cyber activities to the use of cyber infrastructure or means to affect the operation of such infrastructure.⁴¹² The essential factor is that such activities invariably cross frontiers and are difficult to identify. The core principle remains that of state sovereignty, that is that states retain their sovereignty over any cyber infrastructure located on their territory and associated activities, while being able to exercise control and jurisdiction over the same. Similarly, a state remains internationally responsible for any unlawful act involved provided attribution can be demonstrated. The paradox is that while cyber activities may range over multiple countries, they commence from one state that has the competence to exercise jurisdiction and thus in principle the legal problems faced with regard to the high seas or outer space do not apply. Applying the traditional rules of international law, therefore, a state which conducts cyber activities violating the sovereignty of another state or otherwise infringing the norm of non-intervention would be responsible for any internationally wrongful

acts.⁴¹³ Further, a state is under an obligation not to allow its territory or the cyber infrastructure it controls to be used for operations that affect the rights of other states and it must thus exercise due diligence in this respect. The basic rules as to international responsibility as discussed in this chapter remain the same.⁴¹⁴ However, there remain many difficult problems, including as to proof. By its very nature, cyber activities range widely and instantaneously internationally and it may be extremely difficult to prove whence they came. In many cases, the state in question wishes to conceal its activities and in the absence of admission, it may be very difficult to proceed in terms of responsibility. Other difficulties relate to definition of wrongful acts and to enforcement.

There are indeed an increasing number of examples of damage caused to states by cyber activities in circumstances where no other state accepts responsibility. Such examples would include the attack by the Stuxnet virus on Iranian nuclear facilities discovered in 2010 allegedly introduced by Israel and the United States,⁴¹⁵ through to Russian cyber attacks on Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine, and to the claimed Iranian attack on the water system of Israel in 2020 and the response against port facilities in Iran.⁴¹⁶ In all these cases, no express admission of responsibility was made and thus attribution was difficult to demonstrate. A relatively recent development has been the establishment by a number of states of cyber offensive and defensive capabilities and agencies as the race for information and political and strategic advantage advances. Three areas in particular have been the focus of very recent concern. The first relates to the use of force (Chapter 19) or the conduct of hostilities (Chapter 20). The second concerns activities disruptive of domestic elections and constitutional processes and the third has arisen as

a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic that began at the end of 2019 and became a global threat in 2020.

The question as to state (or indeed non-state) sponsored election intrusion whether by interference with election infrastructure or by manipulating voting behaviour is a comparatively recent phenomenon, the most prominent being the alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election,⁴¹⁷ and the UK⁴¹⁸ and other elections.⁴¹⁹ Such activities are likely to cross the line between legitimate attempts to influence political processes and unlawful intervention in domestic affairs, but this area is fraught with definitional as well as evidential problems.⁴²⁰ The question as to interference in the area of health manifested itself during the COVID-19 pandemic which commenced in late 2019. Reports have mentioned a number of cyber attacks on organisations dealing with the pandemic, including attacks against the World Health Organization, research institutes, pharmaceutical manufacturers and hospitals.⁴²¹ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has reported on the particular vulnerability of hospitals to cyber attacks,⁴²² while the unofficial but authoritative *Tallinn Manual* has emphasised that the computer, computer networks and data forming an integral part of the operations or administration of medical units and transports must be respected and protected.⁴²³ In February 2020, the ICRC called on states not to conduct or knowingly support cyber activity that would harm medical services or facilities⁴²⁴ and in March 2020 referred to the range of international law rules that may underpin the prohibition of such activity,⁴²⁵ ranging from international criminal responsibility (referencing the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 2001 criminalising specific cyber activities) to international humanitarian law (see Chapter 20 below), prohibitions on

intervention and violations of sovereignty and international human rights law.⁴²⁶ The ICRC has also proposed an additional norm of responsible state behaviour requiring that states should not conduct or knowingly support cyber activity that would harm medical services or medical facilities, and should take measures to protect medical services from harm.⁴²⁷ Other initiatives in this area are appearing.⁴²⁸

Important legal issues, however, remain to be resolved. First, the extent of harm or damage necessary in order to generate responsibility. This is particularly acute where, for example, information is extracted from computers rather than harmful viruses implanted. Secondly, the extent of responsibility where the harm or damage is caused by the activities of a non-state actor on the territory of the state in question without the knowledge of that state and the question as to whether responsibility is absolute or fault-based. Thirdly, to what extent responsibility is dependent on the precise form or degree of harm caused. Fourthly, in such circumstances how flexibly may the concept of attribution be defined? In principle, one would have thought that attribution means the same as in traditional international law, but practice in this whole area is rapidly evolving.⁴²⁹

Suggestions for Further Reading

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The Law of International Responsibility (ed. J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson), Oxford, 2010

‘Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles’, **96 AJIL**, 2002, p. 773

¹ See generally J. Crawford, *State Responsibility: The General Part*, Cambridge, 2013; *The Law of International Responsibility* (ed. J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson), Oxford, 2010; J. Crawford, *The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility*, Cambridge, 2002; *Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility* (ed. C. Chinkin and F. Baetens), Cambridge, 2015, Part III; *Distribution of Responsibilities in International Law* (ed. A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs), Cambridge, 2015; R. Kolb, *The International Law of State Responsibility*, Cheltenham, 2017; A. Nollkaemper and I. Plakokefalos, *The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law*, Cambridge, 2017; K. Creutz, *State Responsibility in the International Legal Order*, Cambridge, 2020; *Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law* (ed. A. Nollkaemper and I. Plakokefalos), Cambridge, 2014; *Obligations Multilatérales, Droit Impératif et Responsabilité Internationale des États* (ed. P. M. Dupuy), Paris, 2003; *Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions* (ed. M. Fitzmaurice and D. Sarooshi), Oxford, 2003; M. Forteau, *Droit de la Sécurité Collective et Droit de la Responsabilité Internationale de l’État*, Paris, 2006; N. H. B. Jørgensen, *The Responsibility of States for International Crimes*, Oxford, 2003; *International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter* (ed. M. Ragazzi), The Hague, 2005; S. Villalpando, *L’Émergence de la Communauté Internationale dans la Responsabilité des États*, Paris, 2005; C. Eagleton, *The Responsibility of States in International Law*, New York, 1928; *International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens* (ed. R. B. Lillich), Charlottesville, 1983; Lillich, *The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law*, Charlottesville, 1984; I. Brownlie, *System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I*, Oxford, 1983; Bin Cheng, *General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals*, London, 1953; *United Nations Codification of State Responsibility* (ed. M. Spinedi and B. Simma), New York, 1987; Société Française de Droit International, *La Responsabilité dans le Système International*, Paris, 1991; B. Stern, ‘La Responsabilité Internationale Aujourd’hui . . . Demain . . .’, in *Mélanges Apollis*, Paris, 1992; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 848; and *Oppenheim’s International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, chapter 4. See also the Secretary-General’s Compilation of Decisions of International Courts,

Tribunals and Other Bodies, A/62/62, 1 February 2007, as supplemented by A/62/62/Add.1, 17 April 2007.

² See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1973, vol. **II**, pp. 169–70. The issue of state responsibility for injuries caused by lawful activities will be noted in [Chapter 14](#).

³ *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 46.

⁴ 82 ILR, p. 499.

⁵ See 81 *AJIL*, 1987, p. 325; and 74 ILR, p. 256.

⁶ See also the Agreement between France and New Zealand of 9 July 1986: 74 ILR, p. 274.

⁷ 82 ILR, pp. 499, 551.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 38; 116 ILR, p. 1.

¹⁰ 96 ILR, pp. 726, 728.

¹¹ See e.g. *Application of the Genocide Convention (Merits)*, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 128.

¹² See e.g. *Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17*, Decision of 1 July 2003, paras. 46, 49; and *Partial Award, Civilian Claims, Ethiopia's Claim 5*, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Judgment of 17 December 2004, para. 35.

¹³ *Application of the Genocide Convention (Merits)*, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 129. See as to evidence and the International Court, below, [Chapter 18](#), p. 953.

¹⁴ *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1975, vol. **II**, pp. 55–9. See also A. Pellet, ‘The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and Related Texts’, in *Law of International Responsibility*, p. 75; P. Allott, ‘State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law’, 29 *Harvard International Law Journal*, 1988, p. 1; S. Rosenne, *The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility*, Dordrecht, 1991; ‘Symposium: The ILC’s

State Responsibility Articles’, **96** *AJIL*, 2002, p. 773; ‘Symposium: Assessing the Work of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility’, **13** *EJIL*, 2002, p. 1053; and P. M. Dupuy, ‘Quarante Ans de Codification de Droit de la Responsabilité Internationale des États: Un Bilan’, **107** *RGDIP*, 2003, p. 305.

¹⁵ *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1980, vol. **II**, part 2, pp. 30 ff.

¹⁶ ILC Commentary 2001, A/56/10, 2001. This Report contains the Commentary of the ILC to the Articles, which will be discussed in the chapter. The Commentary may also be found in Crawford, *Articles*. Note that the ILC Articles do not address issues of either the responsibility of international organisations or the responsibility of individuals: see articles 57 and 58.

¹⁷ See also General Assembly resolution 59/35. Assembly resolution 62/61, 2008, further commended the Articles on State Responsibility to states and decided to examine the question of a convention on the topic and see resolutions 68/104, 2013, noting the increasing references to the articles; 71/133, 2016, and 74/180, 2019. See also S. Rosenne, ‘State Responsibility: *Festina Lente*’, **75** *BYIL*, 2004, p. 363; and J. Crawford and S. Olleson, ‘The Continuing Debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibility’, **54** *ICLQ*, 2005, p. 959.

¹⁸ See e.g. H. Mosler, *The International Society as a Legal Community*, Dordrecht, 1980, p. 157; and E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Responsibility’, in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, pp. 531, 534.

¹⁹ 2 RIAA, p. 615 (1925); 2 AD, p. 157.

²⁰ 2 RIAA, p. 641.

²¹ PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928, p. 29; 4 AD, p. 258. See also *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, pp. 4, 23; 16 AD, p. 155; *Spanish Zone of Morocco*, 2 RIAA, pp. 615, 641 (1925); *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2018, para. 29; and the *Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua*, IACHR, Judgment of 31 August 2001, Series C, No. 79, para. 163.

²² See e.g. ILC Commentary 2001, p. 63. See also the *Chagos Advisory Opinion*, ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 138 ff. and *Certain Activities (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ

Reports, 2018, pp. 15, 25 ff.

²³ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1976, vol. **II**, pp. 75 ff.; and ILC Commentary 2001, p. 68.

²⁴ See e.g. *Chorzów Factory*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 9, 1928, p. 21; and *Rainbow Warrior* 82 ILR, p. 499.

²⁵ Article 3. See generally *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. **II**, pp. 90 ff.; *ibid.*, 1980, vol. **II**, pp. 14 ff.; and ILC Commentary 2001, p. 74. See also *Noble Ventures v. Romania*, ICSID award of 12 October 2005, para. 53.

²⁶ By which the state is bound at the time the act occurs: Article 13; and ILC Commentary 2001, p. 133. This principle reflects the general principle of intertemporal law: see e.g. *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 845 (1928); and above, Chapter 9, p. 431.

²⁷ See *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 38; 116 ILR, p. 1; and ILC Commentary 2001, p. 124.

²⁸ See article 14. See also e.g. *Rainbow Warrior* 82 ILR, p. 499; *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 54; *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, para. 431; *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Merits), ECtHR, Judgment of 18 December 1996, paras. 41–7, 63–4; 108 ILR, p. 443; and *Cyprus v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras. 136, 150, 158, 175, 189, 269; 120 ILR, p. 10. The International Court in *Navigational Rights* (*Costa Rica v. Nicaragua*), ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 267, underlined the obligation to end a continuing wrong.

²⁹ Article 15.

³⁰ Or directing or controlling it, see article 17; or coercing it, see article 18.

³¹ Article 16. See H. P. Aust, *Complicity in the Law of State Responsibility*, Cambridge, 2011; and M. Jackson, *Complicity in International Law*, Oxford, 2015. See also *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 217.

³² See article 58. See also *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 116; and A. Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International Law’, 52 *ICLQ*, 2003, p. 615.

³³ See e.g. Crawford, *Articles*, p. 12; H. Lauterpacht, *Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law*, Cambridge, 1927, pp. 135–43; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 854; I. Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, 6th ed., Oxford, 2003, pp. 425 ff.; Brownlie, *System*, pp. 38–46; and Aréchaga, ‘International Responsibility’, pp. 534–40. See also J. G. Starke, ‘Imputability in International Delinquencies’, **19 BYIL**, 1938, p. 104; and Cheng, *General Principles*, pp. 218–32.

³⁴ 4 RIAA, p. 60 (1926); 3 AD, p. 213.

³⁵ 5 RIAA, p. 516 (1929); 5 AD, p. 146.

³⁶ 5 RIAA, pp. 529–31. See also *The Jessie*, 6 RIAA, p. 57 (1921); 1 AD, p. 175.

³⁷ 6 RIAA, p. 42 (1920); 1 AD, p. 173.

³⁸ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4; 16 AD, p. 155.

³⁹ See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 509.

⁴⁰ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 18; 16 AD, p. 157. Cf. Judges Krylov and Ecer, *ibid.*, pp. 71–2, 127–8. See also Judge Azevedo, *ibid.*, p. 85.

⁴¹ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 18.

⁴² The question of intention is to be distinguished from the problem of causality, i.e. whether the act or omission in question actually caused the particular loss or damage: see e.g. *Lighthouses* 23 ILR, p. 352.

⁴³ ILC Commentary 2001, pp. 69–70.

⁴⁴ See e.g. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1973, vol. **II**, p. 189. See also Crawford, *State Responsibility*, pp. 113 ff.; various authors in *Law of International Responsibility*, pp. 221 ff.; Brownlie, *System*, pp. 36–7 and chapter 7; L. Condorelli, ‘L’Imputation à l’État d’un Fait Internationallement Illicite’, **188 HR**, 1984, p. 9; and R. Higgins, ‘The Concept of “the State”: A Variable Geometry and Dualist Perceptions’, in *Mélanges Abi-Saab*, The Hague, 2001, p. 547.

⁴⁵ See *Aerial Incident (Israel v. Bulgaria)*, ICJ Reports, 1956, pp. 127, 130. See also the incident where a Soviet fighter plane crashed in Belgium. The USSR accepted responsibility for the loss of life and damage that resulted and compensation was paid: see 91 ILR, p. 287; and J. Salmon, ‘Chute sur le Territoire Belge d’un Avion Militaire Sovietique de 4 Juillet 1989, Problèmes de Responsabilité’, *Revue Belge de Droit International*, 1990, p. 510.

⁴⁶ *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14; 76 ILR, p. 349.

⁴⁷ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 48–51, 146–9; 76 ILR, pp. 382, 480.

⁴⁸ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4; 16 AD, p. 155.

⁴⁹ See 81 *AJIL*, 1987, p. 325; 74 ILR, pp. 241 ff. See also above, p. 678.

⁵⁰ Note also the *USS Stark* incident, in which a US guided missile frigate on station in the Persian Gulf was attacked by Iraqi aircraft in May 1987. The Iraqi government agreed to pay compensation of \$27 million: see 83 *AJIL*, 1989, pp. 561–4.

⁵¹ See also the incident in Salisbury UK, on 4 March 2018, when attempts were made to poison two Russian nationals (an alleged MI6 agent and his daughter). The UK asserted the responsibility of Russia on the basis of a general pattern of Russian conduct, the use of a nerve agent produced in Russia and motive in seeking revenge; see the statements by the UK Prime Minister on 12 and 14 March 2018, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-salisbury-incident-12-march-2018 and www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-salisbury-incident-response-14-march-2018; and statements by the UK representative to the UN Security Council on 14 March 2018, S/PV.8203, p. 2; 5 April 2018, S/PV.8224, p. 6; 18 April 2018, S/PV.8237, p. 3; and 6 September 2018, S/PV.8343, p. 2.

⁵² Article 2 of the ILC Articles notes that the attribution of conduct to the state is based on criteria determined by international law and not on the mere recognition of a link of factual causality.

⁵³ ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 62, 87; 121 ILR, pp. 405, 432; and *LaGrand* (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 9, 16. See also e.g. *OSPAR (Ireland v. UK)*, Final

Award of 2 July 2003, para. 144; 126 ILR, p. 334, 379; *Massey*, 4 RIAA, p. 155 (1927); 4 AD, p. 250; and *Salvador Commercial Co.*, 15 RIAA, p. 477 (1902). As an example of the state organ concerned being from the judiciary, see *Sunday Times*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 30, 1979; 58 ILR, p. 491; and from the legislature, see e.g. *Young, James and Webster*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 44, 1981; 62 ILR, p. 359. Another example would be the armed forces of a state: see *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 242.

⁵⁴ ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 202.

⁵⁵ Thus, not only would communes, provinces and regions of a unitary state be concerned, see e.g. *Heirs of the Duc de Guise*, 13 RIAA, p. 161 (1951); 18 ILR, p. 423, but also the component states of a federal state, see e.g. *LaGrand* (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 9, 16; 118 ILR, pp. 39, 46; *Davy*, 9 RIAA, p. 468 (1903); *Janes*, 4 RIAA, p. 86 (1925); 3 AD, p. 218; and *Pellat*, 5 AD, p. 145. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1971, vol. II, part I, pp. 257 ff.; and ILC Commentary 2001, pp. 84 ff.

⁵⁶ ILC Commentary 2001, p. 92.

⁵⁷ *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. II, pp. 281–2.

⁵⁸ Judgment of 2 May 2007, pp. 43, 99 ff. See also *Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 30 June. As to the Kosovo situation, see above, [Chapter 8](#), p. 384. See also *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece*, ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 644, 660–1.

⁵⁹ 12/03324, 6 September 2013.

⁶⁰ See also *Netherlands v. Mothers of Srebrenica Foundation*, ECLI:NL:HR: 2019:1284, Netherlands Supreme Court, Judgment of 19 July 2019. In *Jaloud v. Netherlands*, ECtHR, Judgment of 20 November 2014, paras. 142 ff., the Court found that the fact that Dutch troops operated in the area in question of Iraq under UK command and within the context of the US and the UK being occupying forces was not sufficient to preclude the operation of article 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. See above [Chapter 6](#), p. 296.

⁶¹ *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. II, p. 288 and ILC Commentary 2001, p. 98. The European Court of Human Rights in *Jaloud* (see **previous footnote**), referencing article 6, held that the Netherlands troops in question in Iraq were not ‘at the disposal’ of any foreign power or ‘under the exclusive direction or control’ of any other state.

⁶² 5 RIAA, pp. 516, 530 (1929); 5 AD, pp. 146, 148. See also Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 136.

⁶³ 13 RIAA, p. 494 (1953); 20 ILR, p. 217.

⁶⁴ 4 RIAA, p. 110 (1926); 3 AD, p. 223.

⁶⁵ 6 RIAA, p. 138 (1924); 2 AD, p. 170.

⁶⁶ 117 ILR, pp. 552, 561. See also *Azinian v. Mexico* 121 ILR, pp. 1, 23; *SPP (ME) Ltd v. Egypt* 106 ILR, p. 501; and *Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico* 119 ILR, pp. 615, 634.

⁶⁷ See ILC Commentary 2001, p. 99 and see also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1975, vol. **II**, p. 67.

⁶⁸ See e.g. *Caire*, 5 RIAA, p. 516 (1929); 5 AD, p. 146; *Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras* (Compensation), IACHR, Series C, No. 4, 1989, para. 170; 95 ILR, pp. 259, 296; and *Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 8 July 2004, para. 319. See also T. Meron, 'International Responsibility of States for Unauthorised Acts of Their Officials', *33 BYIL*, 1957, p. 851.

⁶⁹ 6 RIAA, p. 160 (1925); 3 AD, p. 221. See also *Re Gill* 5 RIAA, p. 157 (1931); 6 AD, p. 203.

⁷⁰ ILC Commentary 2001, p. 104.

⁷¹ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 64–5; 76 ILR, p. 349. See also Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 141.

⁷² 38 ILM, 1999, pp. 1518, 1541.

⁷³ ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 17, 54; 42 ILR, p. 2.

⁷⁴ Preliminary Objections, ECtHR, Judgment of 23 March 1995, para. 62; and the Merits Judgment, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 December 1996, para. 52; 108 ILR, p. 443. See also *Cyprus v. Turkey*, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 10 May 2001, para. 76;

120 ILR, p. 10; *Chiragov v. Armenia* (Merits), ECtHR, Judgment of 16 June 2015, paras. 168 ff.; and *Sandu v. Moldova and Russia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 17 July 2018, para. 10.

⁷⁵ *Nicaragua v. US (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 1986.

⁷⁶ ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 209–10. See also *Netherlands v. Mothers of Srebrenica Foundation*, ECLI:NL:HR: 2019:1284, Judgment of 19 July 2019, where the Netherlands Supreme Court examined article 8, holding that the ICJ test was the correct one in the circumstances and not *Tadić*, noting that what mattered was ‘factual control of the specific conduct in which all factual circumstances and the special context of the case must be considered’, *ibid.*, para. 3.5.4. In the factual circumstances, the Court held that the Netherlands was only liable to the extent of its effective control (reducing the Court of Appeal’s 30 to 10 per cent), *ibid.*, paras. 5, 6. Note T. Dannenbaum, ‘A Disappointing End of the Road for the Mothers of Srebrenica Litigation in the Netherlands’, *EJIL: Talk!*, 23 July 2019.

⁷⁷ See e.g. *Yeager v. Iran*, 17 Iran–US CTR, 1987, pp. 92, 104.

⁷⁸ See e.g. *Home Missionary Society*, 6 RIAA, pp. 42, 44 (1920); 1 AD, p. 173; *Youman*, 4 RIAA, p. 110 (1926); 3 AD, p. 223; and *Herd*, 4 RIAA, p. 653 (1930). See also P. Dumberry, ‘New State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts by an Insurrectional Movement’, 17 *EJIL*, 2006, p. 605.

⁷⁹ E.g. Judge Huber, the *Spanish Zone of Morocco* claims, 2 RIAA, pp. 617, 642 (1925); 2 AD, p. 157; and *Sambaggio*, 10 RIAA, p. 499 (1903). See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1957, vol. II, pp. 121–3; and G. Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, 3rd ed., London, 1957, pp. 653 ff.

⁸⁰ See above, [Chapter 12](#).

⁸¹ See E. M. Borchard, *The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad*, New York, 1927, p. 241; and *Bolivian Railway Co.*, 9 RIAA, p. 445 (1903). See also the ILC Commentary 2001, p. 112.

⁸² ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 52 ff.

⁸³ 16 Iran–US CTR, p. 76; 82 ILR, p. 148.

⁸⁴ 16 Iran–US CTR, p. 83; 82 ILR, pp. 159–60.

⁸⁵ 16 Iran–US CTR, p. 85; 82 ILR, p. 161.

⁸⁶ 17 Iran–US CTR, p. 92; 82 ILR, p. 178.

⁸⁷ 17 Iran–US CTR, p. 104; 82 ILR, p. 194.

⁸⁸ 17 Iran–US CTR, p. 135; 82 ILR, p. 204.

⁸⁹ Article 11; and see ILC Commentary 2001, p. 118. See also Crawford, *State Responsibility*, pp. 181 ff.

⁹⁰ ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 34–5; 61 ILR, pp. 530, 560. See also above, [Chapter 12](#), p. 655. Note that in *Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary*, Judgment of 26 May 2020, paras. 112 ff., the ECtHR declared that article 11 set a ‘very high threshold’ and that ‘acknowledged’ and ‘adopted’ constituted cumulative conditions, going beyond mere approval and endorsement, and had to be ‘clear and unequivocal’. Further, such conduct had to be ‘acknowledged and adopted’ by the state ‘as its own’.

⁹¹ See e.g. Crawford, *State Responsibility*, pp. 274 ff.; various authors in *Law of International Responsibility*, pp. 427 ff.; F. I. Paddeu, ‘Self-Defence as a Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness: Understanding Article 21 of the Articles on State Responsibility’, **85 BYIL**, 2015, p. 90; M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1970, vol. **VII**, pp. 837 ff.; *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 21 ff.; *ibid.*, 1980, vol. **II**, pp. 26 ff.; and ILC Commentary 2001, p. 169. See also A. V. Lowe, ‘Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses’, **10 EJIL**, 1999, p. 405.

⁹² See article 20 of the ILC Articles. See further ILC Commentary 2001, p. 173.

⁹³ See e.g. the dispatch of UK troops to Muscat and Oman in 1957, 574 HC Deb., col. 872, 29 July 1957, and to Jordan in 1958, SCOR, 13th Sess., 831st meeting, para. 28.

⁹⁴ Article 21; and see also ILC Commentary 2001, p. 177.

⁹⁵ See further below, [Chapter 19](#), p. 993.

⁹⁶ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 242; 110 ILR, p. 163.

⁹⁷ See ILC Commentary 2001, p. 180. See also Crawford, *Articles*, pp. 47 ff.

⁹⁸ See e.g. *Naulilaa*, 2 RIAA, p. 1025 (1928); 4 AD, p. 466; and *Cysne*, 2 RIAA, p. 1056; 5 AD, p. 150.

⁹⁹ See e.g. *US–France Air Services Agreement* 54 ILR, pp. 306, 337. See also Report of the International Law Commission, 1989, A/44/10 and *ibid.*, 1992, A/47/10, pp. 39 ff. See also C. Annacker, ‘Part Two of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 37 *German YIL*, 1994, pp. 206, 234 ff.; M. Dawidowicz, ‘Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship to the UN Security Council’, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, p. 333; E. Zoller, *Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures*, New York, 1984; O. Y. Elagab, *The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law*, Oxford, 1988; and M. Dawidowicz, *Third-Party Countermeasures in International Law*, Cambridge, 2017.

¹⁰⁰ See further below, [Chapter 15](#), p. 826.

¹⁰¹ ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 55–7; 116 ILR, p. 1. Note that the ILC took the view that the duty to choose measures that are reversible is not absolute: ILC Commentary 2001, p. 332. See also *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 102; 76 ILR, p. 1.

¹⁰² See ILC Commentary 2001, pp. 326–7.

¹⁰³ See further below, p. 829.

¹⁰⁴ See further below, p. 696.

¹⁰⁵ See ILC Commentary 2001, p. 328.

106 See *Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Eritrea's Claim 17*, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision of 1 July 2003, para. 159, noting that Ethiopia's suspension of prisoner of war exchanges could not be justified as a countermeasure as it affected obligations of a human rights or humanitarian nature.

107 See e.g. 'Symposium on Counter-Measures and Dispute Settlement', 5 *EJIL*, 1994, p. 20; and Report of the International Law Commission, 1995, A/50/10, pp. 173 ff. See also Annacker, 'Part Two', pp. 242 ff.

108 See further ILC Commentary 2001, p. 333.

109 See the *US–France Air Services Agreement* arbitration, 54 ILR, pp. 303, 337. See also the ILC Commentary 2001, p. 341; and the Report of the ILC on its 44th Session, 1992, A/47/10, p. 70.

110 See ILC Commentary 2001, p. 345.

111 *Ibid.*, p. 349.

112 See e.g. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1961, vol. II, p. 46; and ILC Commentary 2001, p. 183.

113 PCIJ, Series A, No. 20, 1929, p. 39. See also *Brazilian Loans*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 21, 1929, p. 120; 5 AD, p. 466.

114 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. II, p. 60; and ILC Commentary 2001, pp. 189–90. This example would cover both *force majeure* and distress (discussed below). Note also that article 18(2) provides that stopping and anchoring by ships during their passage through the territorial sea of another state is permissible where rendered necessary by distress or *force majeure*. See also article 14(3) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958.

115 However, this principle does not apply if the situation of *force majeure* is due wholly or partly to the conduct of the state invoking it or the state has assumed the risk of that situation occurring: article 23(2). See also *Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Co. v. Burundi* 96 ILR, pp. 279, 318.

116 5 RIAA, p. 159 (1931); 6 AD, p. 203.

117 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. **II**, p. 133.

118 ILC Commentary 2001, p. 183.

119 82 ILR, pp. 499, 551.

120 *Ibid.*, p. 553.

121 ILC Commentary 2001, p. 189. This would not apply if the situation of distress is due wholly or partly to the conduct of the state invoking it or the act in question is likely to create a comparable or greater peril: article 24(2).

122 See above, p. 463.

123 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. **II**, p. 134; and ILC Commentary 2001, pp. 189–90.

124 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. **II**, pp. 133–5.

125 82 ILR, pp. 499, 555.

126 See above, p. 678.

127 See ILC Commentary 2001, p. 194.

128 Cmnd 3246, 1967. See also below, Chapter 14, p. 784, **note 317**.

129 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1980, vol. **II**, p. 39. See also *Co. General of the Orinoco*, 10 RIAA, p. 280.

130 See e.g. the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969.

131 82 ILR, pp. 499, 554–5. The doctrine has also been controversial in academic writings: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1980, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 47–9. See also J. Barboza, ‘Necessity

(Revisited) in International Law’, in *Essays in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs* (ed. J. Makarczyk), The Hague, 1984, p. 27; R. Boed, ‘State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct’, 3 *Yale Human Rights and Development Journal*, 2000, p. 1; and A. O. Sykes, ‘Economic “Necessity” in International Law’, 109 *AJIL*, 2015, p. 296.

¹³² ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 40; 116 ILR, p. 1. See also *R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office and BAE Systems* [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), paras. 143 ff.

¹³³ ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 41. In addition, the state could not be the sole judge of whether these strictly defined conditions had been met. See also the *Construction of a Wall* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 194–5; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 113–15.

¹³⁴ Judgment of 1 July 1999, 120 ILR, pp. 143, 191–2. It is currently too early to say whether and to what extent the circumstances precluding wrongfulness may apply to the COVID-19 crisis and obligations to which particular states are parties, see e.g. F. Paddeu and F. Jephcott, ‘COVID-19 and Defences in the Law of State Responsibility: Parts I and II’, EJIL: Talk!, 17 March 2020, www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-state-responsibility-part-i/ and www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-state-responsibility-part-ii/. See also K. de Vriese, ‘COVID-19 and “War” Clauses in Investment Treaties: A Breach through the Wall of State Sovereignty?’, EJIL: Talk!, 10 June 2020, www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-war-clauses-in-investment-treaties-a-breach-through-the-wall-of-state-sovereignty/.

¹³⁵ See e.g. Annacker, ‘Part Two’, pp. 214 ff. See also ILC Commentary 2001, p. 294.

¹³⁶ The provisions concerning the injured state were particularly complex in earlier formulations: see e.g. article 40 of Part II of the ILC Draft Articles of 1996. See also Crawford, *Articles*, pp. 23 ff.

¹³⁷ I.e. taking measures of a formal kind, such as presenting a claim against another state or commencing proceedings before an international court or tribunal, but not simply protesting: see ILC Commentary 2001, p. 294.

¹³⁸ Article 45. See also ILC Commentary 2001, p. 307.

¹³⁹ See *Certain Phosphate Lands (Nauru v. Australia)* (Preliminary Objection), ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 240, 247; 97 ILR, p. 1.

¹⁴⁰ ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 253–4.

¹⁴¹ Article 46. See also ILC Commentary 2001, p. 311.

¹⁴² Article 47. See also ILC Commentary 2001, p. 313, noting that the general rule in international law is that of separate responsibility of a state for its own wrongful acts. There is neither a rule of joint and separate responsibility nor a prohibition of this. It will depend on the circumstances. See *Eurotunnel* 132 ILR, pp. 1, 59–60. Note that the UK has taken the position that with regard to combined operations in Iraq, ‘each nation would be directly liable for the consequences of actions taken by its own forces’, 436 HC Deb., col. 862W, 12 July 2005, UKMIL, 76 *BYIL*, 2005, p. 875.

¹⁴³ ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 32; 46 ILR, p. 178.

¹⁴⁴ As per article 30.

¹⁴⁵ See ILC Commentary 2001, p. 318.

¹⁴⁶ Article 30; and see ILC Commentary 2001, p. 216; Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 461; and C. Derman, ‘La Cessation de l’Acte Illicite’, *Revue Belge de Droit International Public*, 1990 I, p. 477.

¹⁴⁷ 82 ILR, pp. 499, 573.

¹⁴⁸ ICJ Reports, 2001, p. 466; 134 ILR, p. 1. Cf. *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 68; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 171. See as to the distinction between cessation and restitution, *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 32–3; *Germany v. Italy* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 99, 153–4. See also O. Corten, ‘The Obligation of Cessation’, in *Law of International Responsibility*, p. 545; and Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 464.

¹⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 512–13, 134 ILR, pp. 1, 50–1. This was reaffirmed in *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 69; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 172.

¹⁵⁰ ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 513–41; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 51–2. See, as to consular notification, above, [Chapter 12](#), p. 671.

¹⁵¹ ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 138–40.

¹⁵² See e.g. Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 480; B. Stern, ‘The Obligation to Make Reparation’, in *Law of International Responsibility*, p. 563; M. Whiteman, *Damages in International Law*, Washington, DC, 3 vols., 1937–43; F. A. Mann, ‘The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and National Law’, 48 *BYIL*, 1978, p. 1; de Aréchaga, ‘International Responsibility’, pp. 564 ff.; and E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of the Century’, 159 *HR*, 1978, pp. 1, 285–7. See also Cheng, *General Principles*, pp. 233 ff.; Brownlie, *System*, part VIII; and C. Gray, *Judicial Remedies in International Law*, Oxford, 1987.

¹⁵³ See e.g. C. Dominicé, ‘Observations sur les Droits de l’État Victime d’un Fiat Internationalement Illicite’, in *Droit International* (ed. P. Weil), Paris, 1982, vol. I, p. 25; and B. Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and Damage Caused: Relationship between Responsibility and Damage’, *HR*, 1984 II, pp. 19, 73 ff.

¹⁵⁴ PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928, pp. 47–8. In an earlier phase of the case, the Court stated: ‘It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention’, PCIJ, Series A, No. 9, 1927, p. 21. See also *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 45; 61 ILR, pp. 530, 571, where the Court held that Iran was under a duty to make reparation to the US.

¹⁵⁵ ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 80; 116 ILR, p. 1.

¹⁵⁶ ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 232. See also the *Construction of a Wall* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 198; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 117–18; and *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 257. Note also *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 324, 331 ff.; and *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (Compensation)*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 15, 25.

¹⁵⁷ 120 ILR, pp. 143, 199. See also *S. D. Myers v. Canada* 121 ILR, pp. 72, 127–8; *Aloeboetoe v. Suriname*, IACHR, 1993, Series C, No. 15, para. 43; 116 ILR, p. 260; *Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations)*, IACHR, 1998, Series C, No. 42, para. 84; 116 ILR,

p. 388; and *Suarez-Rosero v. Ecuador* (Reparations), IACHR, Series C, No. 44, 1999, para. 39; 118 ILR, p. 92, regarding this as ‘one of the fundamental principles of general international law, repeatedly elaborated upon by the jurisprudence’. See also the Decision of 14 March 2003 of an UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal in *CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic*, Final Award of 9 ICSID Reports 121.

¹⁵⁸ See e.g. *Suarez-Rosero v. Ecuador* (Reparations), IACHR, Series C, No. 44, 1999, para. 42; 118 ILR, p. 92. See also article 32 of the ILC Articles.

¹⁵⁹ See also ILC Commentary 2001, p. 235; and *Suarez-Rosero v. Ecuador* (Reparations), IACHR, Series C, No. 44, 1999, para. 42; 118 ILR, p. 92. Note further that interest is payable on any principal sum payable when necessary to achieve full reparation and will run from the date the principal sum should have been paid until the date it is paid: article 38; and see ILC Commentary 2001, p. 268. Article 39 provides that in the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the contribution to the injury by wilful or negligent action or omission of the injured state or any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought: see also ILC Commentary 2001, p. 275; and *LaGrand*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 487, 508; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 26, 46.

¹⁶⁰ See e.g. Annacker, ‘Part Two’, pp. 221 ff. See also *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 103–4, where the Court noted that ‘customary international law provides for restitution as one form of reparation for injury, restitution being the re-establishment of the situation which existed before occurrence of the wrongful act’. Restitution must be appropriate to the injury suffered, taking into account the nature of the wrongful act causing it: *ibid.*, p. 104; and see also *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 59.

¹⁶¹ See e.g. the post-1945 Peace Treaties with Hungary, Romania and Italy. See also *Spanish Zone of Morocco*, 2 RIAA, p. 617 (1925); 2 AD, p. 157; *Martini*, 2 RIAA, p. 977 (1930); 5 AD, p. 153; *Palmagero Gold Fields*, 5 RIAA, p. 298 (1931); and *Russian Indemnity*, 11 RIAA, p. 431 (1912). Brownlie notes that in certain cases, such as the illegal possession of territory or acquisition of objects of special cultural, historical or religious significance, restitution may be the only legal remedy: *System*, p. 210, and *Temple of Preah Vihear*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 6, 36–7; 33 ILR, pp. 48, 73.

¹⁶² See e.g. *Aminoil* 66 ILR, pp. 529, 533.

¹⁶³ See also ILC Commentary 2001, p. 237. See also *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 103–4.

¹⁶⁴ 82 ILR, p. 499.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 571.

¹⁶⁶ See e.g. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. II, part 1, pp. 79 ff.

¹⁶⁷ 82 ILR, p. 572.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 573. Note that article 30 of the ILC Articles provides that the injured state is entitled, where appropriate, to obtain assurances or guarantees of non-repetition of the wrongful act. However, the International Court noted in *Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 267, that it would only order such assurances or guarantees of non-repetition if the circumstances so warrant, which was for the court to assess, and that this would require special circumstances since the good faith of the state in question must be presumed.

¹⁶⁹ 53 ILR, p. 297. This concerned the expropriation by Libya of BP oil concessions.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

¹⁷¹ 17 ILM, 1978, p. 1; 53 ILR, p. 389.

¹⁷² 17 ILM, 1978, p. 36; 53 ILR, pp. 507–8. In fact, the parties settled the dispute by Libya supplying \$152 million worth of crude oil, 17 ILM, 1998, p. 2.

¹⁷³ These points were explained by the arbitrator in *Liamco* 20 ILM, 1981, pp. 1, 63–4; 62 ILR, pp. 141, 198. See also *Aminoil* 21 ILM, 1982, p. 976; 66 ILR, p. 519. See further e.g. A. Fatouros, ‘International Law and the International Contract’, 74 *AJIL*, 1980, p. 134. The issue of compensation for expropriated property is discussed further below, p. 700.

¹⁷⁴ ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 81; 116 ILR, p. 1. See also *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 198; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 117–18; and *Application of the Genocide*

Convention (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 232. In the latter case, the Court referred to article 36.

¹⁷⁵ In *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 81; 116 ILR, p. 1, the Court held that both states were entitled to claim and obliged to provide compensation. Accordingly, the parties were called upon to renounce or cancel all financial claims and counter-claims. Compensation would be appropriate particularly where restitution is materially impossible or unduly burdensome, see *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 15, 26. See more generally D. Shelton, *Remedies in International Human Rights Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005; and C. N. Brower and J. D. Brueschke, *The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal*, The Hague, 1998, chapters 14–18.

¹⁷⁶ See ILC Commentary 2001, p. 243. See also the Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session, A/48/10, p. 185.

¹⁷⁷ See *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 15, 26. See generally Whiteman, *Damages*; and Aréchaga, ‘International Responsibility’, p. 571. See also N. Jorgensen, ‘A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law’, **68 BYIL**, 1997, p. 247; *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1956, vol. **II**, pp. 211–12; and Annacker, ‘Part Two’, pp. 225 ff.

¹⁷⁸ IACHR, Series C, No. 7, 1989, pp. 34, 52; 95 ILR, p. 306. Note that the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission discussed the question as to whether the potentially crippling effect of a compensation payment could be taken into consideration without deciding the matter: *Final Award: Eritrea’s Damages Claim*, 26 RIAA, pp. 505, 523–4 (2009); and *Final Award: Ethiopia’s Damages Claim*, 26 RIAA, pp. 631, 650–1 (2009).

¹⁷⁹ See *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 15, 28. See as to the valuation of such damage, *ibid.*, pp. 29 ff.

¹⁸⁰ See on this the analysis in the ILC Commentary 2001, pp. 255 ff. See also the UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal Decision of 14 March 2003 in *CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic*, Final Award, 9 ICSID Reports 121.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 260 ff.

¹⁸² See article 31(2).

183 3 RIAA, p. 1609 (1935); 7 AD, p. 203.

184 74 ILR, pp. 241, 274.

185 See the Arbitral Tribunal in *Rainbow Warrior* 82 ILR, pp. 499, 574.

186 82 ILR, pp. 499, 575.

187 *Ibid.* Note that in *Arctic Sunrise* (Compensation), Arbitral Award of 10 July 2017, paras. 49–51, 84–5, the Tribunal posited a test of reasonableness for material claims that were difficult to prove and a test of what was ‘appropriate’ with regard to claims for non-material injury. See also the ECtHR cases concerning ‘just satisfaction’ under article 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights stated to be based on the principles of international law, *Cyprus v. Turkey* (Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, Judgment of 12 May 2014; and *Georgia v. Russia (I)*, ECtHR, Judgment of 31 January 2019.

188 See Annacker, ‘Part Two’, pp. 230 ff.; C. Barthe, ‘Réflexions sur la Satisfaction en Droit International’, **49** *AFDI*, 2003, p. 105; de Aréchaga, ‘International Responsibility’, p. 572; D. W. Bowett, ‘Treaties and State Responsibility’, in *Mélanges Virally*, Paris, 1991, pp. 137, 144; and Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, p. 653. See also *I’m Alone*, 3 RIAA, pp. 1609, 1618 (1935); 7 AD, p. 206; and *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 35; 16 AD, pp. 155, 167.

189 82 ILR, p. 499. See also E. Wyler and A. Papaux, ‘Satisfaction’, in *Law of International Responsibility*, p. 623.

190 82 ILR, p. 577.

191 *Ibid.*, p. 578. See also *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 234.

192 See e.g. *Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926, p. 18; and *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 35; 16 AD, p. 155. Note also that under article 41 of the ECHR 1950, the ECtHR may award ‘just satisfaction’, which often takes the form of a declaration by the Court that a violation of the Convention has taken place: see e.g. *Neumeister*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 17, 1974; 41 ILR, p. 316. See also

Pauwels, *ibid.*, No. 135, 1989; Lamy, *ibid.*, No. 151, 1989; and Huber, *ibid.*, No. 188, 1990.

¹⁹³ ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 253; 57 ILR, p. 398.

¹⁹⁴ ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 312–19; 57 ILR, p. 457.

¹⁹⁵ See Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 527; and ILC Commentary 2001, p. 263. Satisfaction is not to be disproportionate to the injury and not in a form which is humiliating to the responsible state: article 37(3).

¹⁹⁶ See above, p. 696.

¹⁹⁷ See M. Mohr, ‘The ILC’s Distinction between “International Crimes” and “International Delicts” and Its Implications’, in Spinedi and Simma, *UN Codification*, p. 115; and K. Marek, ‘Criminalising State Responsibility’, *14 Revue Belge de Droit International*, 1978–79, p. 460. See also D. Costelloe, *Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms in International*, Cambridge, 2017.

¹⁹⁸ See e.g. J. Crawford, ‘International Crimes of States’, in *Law of International Responsibility*, p. 405; Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 378; A. Ollivier, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of the State’, *ibid.*, p. 703; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, pp. 533 ff. See also G. Gilbert, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of States’, *39 ICLQ*, 1990, p. 345; and N. Jorgensen, *The Responsibility of States for International Crimes*, Oxford, 2000. As to individual criminal responsibility, see above, [Chapter 8](#).

¹⁹⁹ See e.g. I. Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Oxford, 1963, pp. 150–4.

²⁰⁰ See e.g. de Aréchaga, ‘International Law’.

²⁰¹ See Crawford, *Articles*, pp. 17 ff. for a critical analysis of draft article 19 and a discussion of subsequent developments. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1976, vol. II, pp. 102–5; Report of the International Law Commission, 1994, A/49/10, pp. 329 ff. and *ibid.*, 1995, A/50/10, pp. 93 ff.; and *Bosnia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 115.

²⁰² See above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 104.

203 Article 40(2) describes a breach as serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible state to fulfil the obligation.

204 Examples given of peremptory norms are the prohibitions of aggression, slavery and the slave trade, genocide, racial discrimination and apartheid, and torture, and the principle of self-determination: see ILC Commentary 2001, pp. 283–4.

205 See, as to examples of non-recognition, above, Chapter 8, p. 398. Article 41(3) is in the form of a saving clause, providing that the article is without prejudice to other consequences referred to in Part Two of the Articles and to such further consequences that such a breach may have under international law.

206 See e.g. Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 567; C. F. Amerasinghe, *Diplomatic Protection*, Oxford, 2008; *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 511; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 903; H. Meunier, 'Le Fondement de la Protection Diplomatique', 59 *AFDI*, 2013, p. 221; and A. Vermeer-Künzli, 'A Matter of Interest: Diplomatic Protection and State Responsibility *Erga Omnes*', 56 *ICLQ*, 2007, p. 553. See also Final Report of the ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, 2006, www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/14; and the seven reports of ILC Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, 2001–06, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_8.htm.

207 See ILC Commentary 2001, p. 304.

208 See e.g. *The Changing Role of Nationality under International Law* (ed. S. Forlati and A. Annoni), London, 2013; and C. Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015, pp. 104 ff. See also above, Chapter 11, p. 567. Note also the claim for reparations made by Croatia in its application of 2 July 1999 to the International Court against Yugoslavia in *Application of the Genocide Convention* both on behalf of the state and 'as *parens patriae* for its citizens', Application, pp. 20–1. The Court ultimately dismissed Croatia's claim and Serbia's counter-claim, but noted that it 'encourages the Parties to continue their co-operation with a view to offering appropriate reparation to the victims of such violations, thus consolidating peace and stability in the region': see *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 153.

209 *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 582, 599.

²¹⁰ See Report of the ILC on its 58th Session, A/61/10, 2006, p. 13. The Articles were commended by the General Assembly: see resolutions 62/67 of 6 December 2007; 65/27 of 6 December 2010; and 68/113 of 16 December 2013 with the possibility of working towards a convention. See also the discussions in the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/71/dipl_prot.shtml.

²¹¹ See *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 582, 599, where the Court noted that article 1 reflected customary law.

²¹² *Kaunda v. President of South Africa* CCT 23/04, [2004] ZACC 5, paras. 26–7; and *Van Zyl v. Government of RSA* [2007] SCA 109 (RSA), para. 1.

²¹³ See e.g. *HMHK v. Netherlands* 94 ILR, p. 342; and *Comercial F SA v. Council of Ministers* 88 ILR, p. 691. See also *Kaunda*, paras. 29, 34, noting that diplomatic protection is not recognised in international law as a human right, but a prerogative of the state to be exercised at its discretion (per Chief Justice Chaskalson).

²¹⁴ See *Van Zyl v. Government of RSA* [2007] SCA 109 (RSA), para. 6.

²¹⁵ PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924, p. 12. See *Panevezys–Saldutiskis*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 76, 1939; 9 AD, p. 308. See also Vattel, who noted that ‘whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the state, which must protect that citizen’, *The Law of Nations*, 1916 trans., p. 136.

²¹⁶ See e.g. *Lonrho Exports Ltd v. ECGD* [1996] 4 All ER 673, 687; 108 ILR, p. 596.

²¹⁷ However, note article 20 of the EEC Treaty, under which every person holding the nationality of a member state (and thus a citizen of the EU under article 17) is entitled to receive diplomatic protection by the diplomatic or consular authority of any member state on the same conditions as nationals of that state when in the territory of a third state where the country of his or her nationality is not represented.

²¹⁸ See article 8 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. In *R v. Al-Rawi* [2006] EWCA Civ 1279, para. 89, the Court of Appeal held that there was no basis for accepting that non-British nationals enjoyed an *Abbasi* expectation that the UK government would consider making representations to a foreign state on their behalf. Article 8 was not

regarded as part of customary international law: *ibid.*, paras. 118–20. Note the special position of a national working for an international organisation, where there may be a danger to the independence of the official where diplomatic protection is exercised: see e.g. *Reparation for Injuries Suffered*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 174, 183.

²¹⁹ See e.g. *Interhandel*, ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 6, 27; *Administrative Decision No. V*, 7 RIAA, p. 119; 2 AD, pp. 185, 191; and *US v. Dulles* 222 F.2d 390 (1954). See also *DUSPIL*, 1973, pp. 332–4.

²²⁰ ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 44; 46 ILR, p. 178.

²²¹ See 37 *ICLQ*, 1988, p. 1006; and UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 526.

²²² UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, pp. 528–9.

²²³ [2002] EWCA Civ 1598; 126 ILR, p. 685.

²²⁴ See UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, pp. 528–9.

²²⁵ [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, para. 92.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 106.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 98–9.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 104. The Court noted: ‘In such, unlikely, circumstances we consider that it would be appropriate for the court to make a mandatory order to the Foreign Secretary to give due consideration to the applicant’s case’, *ibid.*

²²⁹ Whether acquired by birth, descent, succession of states, naturalisation or in another manner not inconsistent with international law: see article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.

²³⁰ See *Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923, p. 24. See also article 3(2) of the European Convention on Nationality 1997. This would include the rules of international human rights law: see e.g. *Proposed Amendments to the*

Naturalisation Provision of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, IACHR, Series A, No. 4, 1984, para. 38; 79 ILR, p. 282.

²³¹ ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 4; 22 ILR, p. 349. The Court emphasised that to exercise protection, e.g. by applying to the Court, was to place oneself on the plane of international law: *ibid.*, p. 16. See *Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923, pp. 7, 21; 2 AD, p. 349, where it was noted that while questions of nationality were in principle within the domestic jurisdiction of states, the right of a state to use its discretion was limited by obligations undertaken towards other states. See also the *Flegenheimer* claim, 14 RIAA, p. 327 (1958); 25 ILR, p. 91, and article 1 of the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 1930. See further on nationality and international law, above, [Chapter 11](#), p. 567.

²³² ICJ Reports, 1955, pp. 20–1; 22 ILR, p. 357.

²³³ ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 23; 22 ILR, p. 359.

²³⁴ ICJ Reports, 1955, pp. 25–6; 22 ILR, p. 362.

²³⁵ See Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 578; and R. Y. Jennings, ‘General Course on Principles of International Law’, 121 *HR*, 1967, pp. 323, 459.

²³⁶ Article 4 provides that a state of nationality means a state whose nationality that person has acquired, in accordance with the law of that state, by birth, descent, naturalisation, succession of states or in any other manner, not inconsistent with international law.

²³⁷ Report of the ILC on its 58th Session, A/61/10, 2006, pp. 32–3. See also the *Flegenheimer* claim, 14 RIAA, p. 327 (1958); 25 ILR, p. 91.

²³⁸ See e.g. Borchard, *Diplomatic Protection*, pp. 660 ff.; Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. VIII, 1967, pp. 1243–7; and *Nottebohm*, ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 4; 22 ILR, p. 349. See also the view of the US State Department that it has consistently declined to espouse claims which have not been continuously owned by US nationals: see 76 *AJIL*, 1982, pp. 836–9, and the Rules regarding International Claims issued by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1985, to the same effect: see 37 *ICLQ*, 1988, p. 1006. See also I. Sinclair, ‘Nationality of Claims: British Practice’, 27 *BYIL*, 1950, p. 125. Note that the ILC endorsed the principle of continuous nationality in article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles. Article 5(2) provides that

protection may be offered even where the person was not a national at the date of the injury, provided that the person had the nationality of a predecessor state or lost his or her previous nationality and acquired, for a reason unrelated to the bringing of the claim, the nationality of the former state in a manner not inconsistent with international law. Note also article 10 of the Institut de Droit International's resolution on State Succession and State Responsibility; see M. G. Kohen and P. Dumberry, *The Institute of International Law's Resolution on State Succession and State Responsibility*, Cambridge, 2019, p. 64; and draft article 15 on Succession of States in Respect of State Responsibility proposed in the Special Rapporteur's third report on this subject, A/CN.4/731, 2 May 2019, para. 138.

²³⁹ 14 RIAA, p. 236 (1955); 22 ILR, p. 443. See also *Canevaro*, 11 RIAA, p. 397 (1912). See article 6(1) of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. See also article 3 of the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 1930.

²⁴⁰ See e.g. *Salem*, 2 RIAA, p. 1161 (1932); 6 AD, p. 188; the *Mergé* claim, 14 RIAA, p. 236 (1955); 22 ILR, p. 443; and *Dallal v. Iran* 3 Iran–US CTR, 1983, p. 23.

²⁴¹ 14 RIAA, p. 236 (1955); 22 ILR, p. 443. See also *Canevaro*, 11 RIAA, p. 397 (1912). Cf. *Salem*, 2 RIAA, p. 1161 (1932); 6 AD, p. 188.

²⁴² *Iran v. US*, Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–US CTR, p. 251; 75 ILR, p. 176; *Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat* 2 Iran–US CTR, p. 157; 72 ILR, p. 478; *Malek v. Iran* 19 Iran–US CTR, p. 48; *Saghi v. Iran* 87 AJIL, 1993, p. 447; and the Decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in *Schavernoch v. Foreign Claims Commission* 1 SCR 1092 (1982); 90 ILR, p. 220. See also the decision by the UK Foreign Secretary on 7 March 2019 to exercise diplomatic protection in the matter of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, an arbitrarily detained dual Iranian-British national, stating that this constituted ‘formal recognition by the British government that her treatment fails to meet Iran’s obligations under international law and elevates it to a formal state to state issue’, www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-affords-nazanin-zaghari-ratcliffe-diplomatic-protection#:~:text=Foreign%20Secretary%20affords%20Nazanin%20Zaghari%20Ratcliffe%20diplomatic%20protection,efforts%20to%20secure%20her%20release.

²⁴³ See Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 577; V. Lowe, ‘Injuries to Corporations’, in *Law of International Responsibility*, p. 1005; and Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, pp. 387–412. See also *Sola Tiles Inc. v. Iran* 83 ILR, p. 460. Note that ECOSOC General Comment No. 24 (2017) on state obligations in the context of business activities underlines that states

will be responsible under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for the action or inaction of business entities: (a) if the entity is in fact acting on the state party's instructions or is under its control or direction in carrying out the particular conduct at issue as may be the case in public contracts; (b) when such an entity is empowered under legislation to exercise elements of governmental authority or if the circumstances call for such exercise in the absence of default of the official authorities; or (c) if and to the extent that the state acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its own, E/C.12/GC/24.

²⁴⁴ ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 42; 46 ILR, pp. 178, 216.

²⁴⁵ ICJ Reports, 1970, p. 49; 46 ILR, p. 223. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, *Elektronika Sicula (US v. Italy)*, ICJ Reports, 1989, pp. 15, 84; 84 ILR, pp. 311, 390.

²⁴⁶ However, where the injury is a direct one to shareholders as distinct from the corporation, their state of nationality is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of them: see article 12.

²⁴⁷ Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 582, 605. See also *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 639, 674 ff.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 606. The Court also examined whether the general rule that where an unlawful act was committed against a foreign company only the national state of the company could sue still remained and concluded that it did: *ibid.*, pp. 614 ff.

²⁵⁰ See above, p. 705. The increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties in the 1970s may be partly explained as the response to the post-*Barcelona Traction* need to protect shareholders. See e.g. M. Sornarajah, 'State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties', 20 *Journal of World Trade Law*, 1986, pp. 79, 87. Note that in *Diallo* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 582, 614–15, the Court noted that questions as to the rights of companies and their shareholders were in contemporary international law more a matter for bilateral and multilateral treaties for the protection of foreign investments and that the role of diplomatic protection 'had somewhat faded'.

²⁵¹ See also the position adopted by the UK in the *III Finance Ltd v. Aegis Consumer Finance Inc.* litigation before the US courts to the effect that entities incorporated in any territory for which the UK is internationally responsible are the UK citizens for the purposes of the US federal alienage jurisdiction statute in question, UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, pp. 552 ff.; and similarly in the *Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd* litigation, UKMIL, 72 *BYIL*, 2001, p. 603.

²⁵² See e.g. J. Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection’, in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2009.

²⁵³ See e.g. the Algiers Declaration concerning the settlement of US–Iranian claims, 20 ILR, 1981, p. 230; article 25 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 1965; and *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, Washington, DC, 1987, vol. I, pp. 127–8.

²⁵⁴ 120 ILR, pp. 143, 184–5; and see e.g. article 292 of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982. See also *Grand Prince (Belize v. France)*, ITLOS, Judgment of 20 April 2001, 125 ILR, p. 272.

²⁵⁵ See further above, *Chapter 6*, p. 247. See also *Panevezys–Saldutiskis*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 76, 1939; 9 AD, p. 308; Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 580; Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. III, p. 1558; Borchard, *Diplomatic Protection*, pp. 817–18; A. A. Cançado Trindade, *The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law*, Cambridge, 1983; C. Law, *The Local Remedies Rule in International Law*, Geneva, 1961; C. F. Amerasinghe, *Local Remedies in International Law*, Cambridge, 2nd ed., 2004; and J. Kokott, ‘Interim Report on the Exhaustion of Local Remedies’, International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, London, 2000, p. 606.

²⁵⁶ See e.g. *Interhandel (Switzerland v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 6, 27; and *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 582, 599–600. See also *Ex parte Ferhut Butt* 116 ILR, pp. 607, 614–15 (High Court) and 619 (Court of Appeal). The requirement also arises in a number of treaties: see e.g. article 35, European Convention on Human Rights; article 46, Inter-American Convention on Human Rights; article 5, Optional Protocol I, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and article 295 of the Law of the Sea Convention.

²⁵⁷ See e.g. the discussions in *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1977, vol. **II**, part 2, pp. 30 ff.; and Report of the ILC on its 54th Session, 2002, pp. 131 ff.

²⁵⁸ ILC Commentary 2001, p. 305.

²⁵⁹ The International Court noted in *Diallo* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 582, 601, that administrative remedies can only be taken into consideration for purposes of the local remedies rule if they are aimed at vindicating a right and not at obtaining a favour, unless they constitute an essential prerequisite for the admissibility of subsequent contentious proceedings.

²⁶⁰ 12 RIAA, p. 83 (1956); 23 ILR, p. 306. It was noted that it was the whole system of legal protection as proved by municipal law, which must have been put to the test before a state as the protector of its nationals could prosecute the claim on the international plane: *ibid.*, pp. 119–20.

²⁶¹ The terms domestic or municipal remedies are also used.

²⁶² 2 RIAA, p. 1479 (1934); 7 AD, p. 231.

²⁶³ ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 6; 27 ILR, p. 475. The Court declared that the ‘rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established principle of customary international law’: ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 27; 27 ILR, p. 490. See also Rules VII and VIII of the International Claims Rules of the FCO, above, p. 705; Pleadings, *Israel v. Bulgaria*, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 531–2; and T. Meron, ‘The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies’, 25 *BYIL*, 1959, p. 95. Note, in addition, the *North American Dredging Co.* claim, 4 RIAA, p. 26 (1926); 3 AD, p. 4.

²⁶⁴ See e.g. the *Heathrow Airport User Charges* arbitration, 102 ILR, pp. 215, 277 ff.

²⁶⁵ ICJ Reports, 1989, p. 15; 84 ILR, p. 311.

²⁶⁶ ICJ Reports, 1989, p. 42; 84 ILR, p. 348.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.* It was noted that for an international claim to be admissible, it would be sufficient if the essence of the claim had been brought before the competent tribunals and pursued as

far as permitted by local law and procedure and without success: *ibid.*, p. 46.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 42–4; 84 ILR, pp. 348–50.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43; 84 ILR, p. 349.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 46–8; 84 ILR, pp. 352–4. See e.g. M. H. Adler, ‘The Exhaustion of the Local Remedies Rule After the International Court of Justice’s Decision in *ELSI*’, 39 *ICLQ*, 1990, p. 641; and F. A. Mann, ‘Foreign Investment in the International Court of Justice: The *ELSI* Case’, 86 *AJIL*, 1992, pp. 92, 101–2. See also *M/V Saiga (No. 2)* 120 ILR, pp. 143, 182–4; and *LaGrand*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 487–8; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 26–7. Note it is for the applicant to prove that local remedies were indeed exhausted or did not need to be exhausted exceptionally, and for the respondent state to prove that there did exist effective remedies in the domestic legal system that were not exhausted: *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 582, 600.

²⁷¹ See references in **note 1**. See also Guha Roy, ‘Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injury to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?’, 55 *AJIL*, 1961, p. 863; A. Fatouros, ‘International Law and the Third World’, 50 *Virginia Law Review*, 1964, p. 783; I. Shihata, *Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment*, Dordrecht, 1993; *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 903; and *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, Washington, DC, 1987, vol. II, p. 184. See also the draft articles on the Expulsion of Aliens provisionally adopted on first reading by the drafting committee of the ILC in 2012, A/CN.4/L.797, and the Principles Concerning Admission and Treatment of Aliens adopted by the Asian–African Legal Consultative Committee at its fourth session: www.refworld.org/docid/44eae2224.html.

²⁷² See e.g. A. M. Stuyt, *Survey of International Arbitrations (1794?1984)*, Dordrecht, 1990.

²⁷³ See e.g. *International Claims* (ed. R. B. Lillich and B. Weston), Charlottesville, 1982; and R. B. Lillich and B. Weston, *International Claims: Their Settlement by Lump-Sum Agreements*, Charlottesville, 2 vols., 1975. See also the US–People’s Republic of China Claims Settlement Agreement of 1979, *DUSPIL*, 1979, pp. 1213–15; and Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. VIII, pp. 933–69.

274 Note the establishment of the UN Compensation Commission following the ending of the Gulf War in 1991 to enable the settlement of claims arising out of that conflict: see below, [Chapter 17](#), p. 912.

275 See e.g. Guha Roy, 'Law of Responsibility'; J. Castañeda, 'The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International Law', **15** *International Organisation*, 1961, p. 38; and R. P. Anand, *New States and International Law*, Delhi, 1972.

276 See e.g. R. Lillich, 'Duties of States Regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens', **161** *HR*, 1978, pp. 329, 349.

277 4 RIAA, p. 60 (1926); 3 AD, p. 213.

278 PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926; 3 AD, p. 429.

279 4 RIAA, p. 119 (1926). See also *Chattin*, 4 RIAA, p. 282 (1927); 4 AD, p. 248.

280 4 RIAA, p. 77 (1926); 3 AD, p. 227.

281 4 RIAA, pp. 60, 61–2 (1926); 3 AD, p. 213. See similarly *Chattin*, 4 RIAA, p. 282 (1927); 4 AD, p. 248.

282 M. S. McDougal *et al.*, *Studies in World Public Order*, New Haven, 1960, p. 869.

283 See Lillich, 'Duties', p. 350.

284 See e.g. A. V. Freeman, *The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice*, London, 1938; and Z. Douglas, 'International Responsibility for Domestic Adjudication: Denial of Justice Deconstructed', **63** *ICLQ*, 2014, p. 867.

285 See *AMCO v. Indonesia* (Merits) 89 ILR, pp. 405, 451.

286 4 RIAA, p. 82 (1925); 3 AD, p. 218.

287 See e.g. the *Roberts* claim, 4 RIAA, p. 77 (1926); 3 AD, p. 227; and the *Quintanilla* claim, 4 RIAA, p. 101 (1926); 3 AD, p. 224.

288 See above, Chapter 6. See also Crawford, *State Responsibility*, p. 584; and S. Marks and F. Azizi, ‘Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights Obligations: International Mechanisms’, in *Law of International Responsibility*, p. 725.

289 See e.g. article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.

290 General Assembly resolution 40/144. See also E/CN.4/Sub.2/392 (1977); and R. B. Lillich and S. Neff, ‘The Treatment of Aliens and International Human Rights Norms’, *21 German YIL*, 1978, p. 97.

291 See further above, Chapter 6, p. 287.

292 10 RIAA, p. 528 (1903). See also *US v. Breger, Whiteman, Digest*, vol. **VIII**, p. 861; R. Plender, *International Migration Law*, 2nd ed., Dordrecht, 1988; and G. Goodwin-Gill, *International Law and the Movement of Persons Between States*, Oxford, 1978.

293 See also e.g. article 12(4) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

294 A/CN.4/L.832, 2014 and Report of the International Law Commission on its 66th Session, A/69/10, p. 10; and UN General Assembly resolution 69/119 of 18 December 2014. See also J. Wojnowska-Radziska, *The Right of an Alien to be Protected against Arbitrary Expulsion in International Law*, The Hague, 2015; and M. Morel, *The Right Not to be Displaced in International Law*, Brussels, 2014.

295 Articles 4 and 5. See also *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 639, 663.

296 Article 7. Note also article 3 of the European Convention on Establishment 1956, which provides that nationals of other contracting states lawfully residing in the territory may be expelled only if they endanger national security or offend against public order or morality.

297 Article 8. Note also *Kurić v. Slovenia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 26 June 2012, where it was held that the applicants had been rendered stateless after the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia by the respondent state and later had their records removed from the civil registry, thus losing their right to residence. The Court found that the prolonged refusal to

resolve the applicants' residence status constituted an interference with their right to private and/or family life contrary to article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, in addition, that they had been discriminated against contrary to articles 8 and 14 because they were in a disadvantaged situation compared to other foreigners in Slovenia. See also *ibid.*, Judgment of 12 March 2014, in which compensation ('just satisfaction' under article 41) was awarded.

298 See, as regards refugees, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol; G. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, *The Refugee in International Law*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2007; and J. C. Hathaway and M. Foster, *The Law of Refugee Status*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2014. An alien may not be expelled to a state where his or her life would be threatened on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, birth or other status, or any other ground impermissible under international law (article 23), or where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 24).

299 Article 11.

300 Article 9. See also article 22 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers; article 4 of the Fourth Protocol (1963) to the European Convention on Human Rights; and article 22(9) of the American Convention on Human Rights. Note also the African Union Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 2009.

301 Where states have expelled aliens, international law requires their national state to admit them. This is a general principle, but cf. Lord Denning in *R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Thakrar* [1974] QB 684; 59 ILR, p. 450. Note that the Lord Chancellor, in dealing with the expulsion of British aliens from East Africa, accepted that in international law a state was under a duty as between other states to accept expelled nationals: see 335 HL Deb., col. 497, 14 September 1972. See also *Van Duyn v. Home Office*, Case No. 41/74, [1974] ECR 1337; 60 ILR, p. 247.

302 See *Rankin v. Iran* 17 Iran-US CTR, pp. 135, 142; 82 ILR, pp. 204, 214. See also Goodwin-Gill, *International Law and the Movement of Persons*; and M. Pellonpää, *Expulsion in International Law*, Helsinki, 1984.

³⁰³ See e.g. Z. Douglas, *The International Law of Investment Claims*, Cambridge, 2009; *The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law* (ed. P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino and C. Schreuer), Oxford, 2008; M. Paparinskis, Chin Leng Lim and J. Ho, *International Investment Law and Arbitration*, Cambridge, 2018; *Standards of Investment Protection* (ed. A. Reinisch), Oxford, 2008; R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, *Principles of International Investment Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2012; J. W. Salacuse, *The Law of Investment Treaties*, Oxford, 2015; S. W. Schill, *The Multilateralisation of International Investment Law*, Cambridge, 2014; S. Subedi, *International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2016; *The Foundations of International Investment Law* (ed. Z. Douglas, J. Pauwelyn and J. E. Viñuales), Oxford, 2014; J. Kokott, 'Interim Report on the Role of Diplomatic Protection in the Field of the Protection of Foreign Investment', International Law Association, Report of the Seventieth Conference, New Delhi, 2002, p. 259; A. F. Lowenfeld, *International Economic Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2008, part VI; M. Sornarajah, *The International Law on Foreign Investment*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2010; M. Sornarajah, *The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes*, The Hague, 2000; I. Brownlie, 'Legal Status of Natural Resources', **162 HR**, 1979, p. 245; R. Higgins, 'The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law', **176 HR**, 1982, p. 267; and *The Valuation of Nationalised Property in International Law* (ed. R. B. Lillich), Charlottesville, 3 vols., 1972–75. See also *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 911 ff.; A. Mouri, *The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal*, Dordrecht, 1994; N. Schrijver, *Sovereignty over Natural Resources*, Cambridge, 1997; and F. Beveridge, *The Treatment and Taxation of Foreign Investment under International Law*, Manchester, 2000.

³⁰⁴ See e.g. *De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua and Others* 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (1985); 88 ILR, pp. 75, 89.

³⁰⁵ See e.g. *AMCO v. Indonesia* (Merits) 89 ILR, pp. 405, 466.

³⁰⁶ See e.g. the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1363.

³⁰⁷ 53 ILR, p. 389.

³⁰⁸ This is, however, controversial, see e.g. C. Greenwood, 'State Contracts in International Law – the Libyan Oil Arbitrations', **53 BYIL**, 1982, pp. 27, 41 ff.; and

Fatouros, ‘International Law’, p. 134. Note also the use of ‘umbrella’ clauses, whereby the host state promises to comply with obligations undertaken concerning a particular investment, see e.g. OECD, *Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements*, 2006. This is susceptible of several interpretations, but perhaps the most persuasive is that it constitutes a basis for a substantive treaty claim, but does not as such convert a contractual into a treaty claim, see e.g. *SGS v. Philippines* 8 ICSID Reports 515 (2004); and *CMS v. Argentina* 14 ICSID Reports 251 (2007).

309 See e.g. J. Paulsson, ‘The ICSID Klöckner v. Cameroon Award: The Duties of Partners in North–South Economic Development Agreements’, **1** *Journal of International Arbitration*, 1984, p. 145; *Aminoil* 21 ILM, 1982, p. 976; 66 ILR, p. 519; and D. W. Bowett, ‘State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach’, **59** *BYIL*, 1988, p. 49.

310 Higgins, ‘Taking of Property’, p. 268.

311 55 *AJIL*, 1961, p. 548 (article 10(7)).

312 20 ILM, 1981, pp. 1, 53; 62 ILR, pp. 141, 189. See also *Shufeldt*, 2 RIAA, pp. 1083, 1097 (1930); 5 AD, p. 179.

313 See also below, p. 729, concerning the definition of ‘investments’ in bilateral and other investment treaties, which use that term rather than ‘property’.

314 See in particular article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; article 21 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 1969; article 14 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981; Article 1 of Protocol I of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 as regards the protection of the right to property and the prohibition of deprivation of possessions ‘except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law’. See e.g. the following cases: *Marckx*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 31, 1979; 58 ILR, p. 561; *Sporrong and Lönnroth*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 52, 1982; 68 ILR, p. 86; *Loizidou v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 December 1996; 108 ILR, p. 444. However, it has been held that the reference to international law did not apply to the taking by a state of the property of its own nationals: see *Lithgow*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 102, 1986; 75 ILR, p. 438; *James*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 98; 75 ILR, p. 397; and *Mellacher v. Austria*, ECtHR, Series A, No.

169, 1989. See also G. Brock, 'The Protection of Property Rights Under the European Convention on Human Rights', in *Legal Issues of European Integration*, 1986, p. 52.

315 See e.g. *Kopecký v. Slovakia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 28 September 2004, para. 35(c), noting that: 'An applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions related to his "possessions" within the meaning of this provision. "Possessions" can be either "existing possessions" or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a "legitimate expectation" of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast, the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition (see *Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany* [GC], no. 42527/98, §§ 82–3, ECHR 2001-VIII; and *Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. Czech Republic* (dec.) [GC], no. 39794/98, § 69, ECHR 2002-VII)'.

316 See e.g. *Iatridis v. Greece*, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 25 March 1991, para. 54, referring to goodwill.

317 See e.g. *Methanex v. US*, NAFTA Arbitral Tribunal, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits of 3 August 2005, para. 17, noting that 'the restrictive notion of property as a material "thing" is obsolete and has ceded its place to a contemporary conception which includes managerial control over components of a process that is wealth producing'.

318 See e.g. Dolzer and Schreuer, *International Investment Law*, chapter VI; and A. Reinisch, 'Expropriation', in *Oxford Handbook*, p. 407.

319 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Arbitral Tribunal noted that the term 'expropriation', 'carries with it the connotation of a "taking" by a government-type authority of a person's "property" with a view to transferring ownership of that property to another person, usually the authority that exercised its *de jure* or *de facto* power to do the "taking": *S. D. Myers v. Canada* 121 ILR, pp. 72, 122.

320 55 *AJIL*, 1961, pp. 553–4 (article 10(3)(a)).

321 *BPIL*, 1964, p. 200. See also 4 *ILM*, 1965, pp. 440–7. Note also *Shanghai Power Co. v. US* 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983), where it was held that the settlement of the plaintiff's claim by

the US government in an agreement with China for less than its worth did not constitute a taking for which compensation was required in the context of the Fifth Amendment.

322 Interlocutory Award, 4 Iran–US CTR, p. 122; 85 ILR, p. 349.

323 4 Iran–US CTR, p. 154; 85 ILR, p. 390. See also *Harza Engineering Co. v. Iran* 1 Iran–US CTR, p. 499; 70 ILR, p. 117; and *AIG v. Iran* 4 Iran–US CTR, p. 96. See also *SEDCO v. NIOC* 84 ILR, p. 483.

324 4 Iran–US CTR, p. 156; 85 ILR, p. 392. Cf. the Concurring Opinion by Judge Holtzmann on this issue, 4 Iran–US CTR, pp. 159, 178; 85 ILR, p. 414.

325 *Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia* 86 ILR, p. 45 and 90 ILR, p. 596. See also *Agip SpA v. Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo* 67 ILR, p. 319; and *Benvenuti and Bonfant v. Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo*, *ibid.*, p. 345.

326 95 ILR, pp. 183, 207–10. See also *Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico* 119 ILR, pp. 615, 639–40, a case under NAFTA, article 1110 of which prohibits direct and indirect expropriation, where the Tribunal noted that expropriation included ‘covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use of reasonably to be expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state’: para. 108. See also *CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic* 9 ICSID Reports, p. 121; and *Middle East Cement Shipping v. Egypt* 7 ICSID Reports, p. 178.

327 ICSID, ARB/05/22, 24 July 2008, paras. 455–6; www.italaw.com/cases/157.

328 ICSID Award of 30 July 2010, paras. 122–5.

329 See e.g. *Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine* 44 ILM 2005, p. 404, paras. 20.22, 20.26, noting that the plea of ‘creeping expropriation’ proceeded on the basis of an investment existing at a particular time that was eroded by a series of acts attributable to the state to the extent that it is violative of the relevant international standard of protection against expropriation. See also *Siemens v. Argentina*, Award of 6 February 2007; and W. M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, ‘Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the BIT Generation’, 74 *BYIL*, 2003, p. 115.

330 39 ILM, 2000, pp. 1317, 1329.

331 PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926. See also *Norwegian Shipowners' Claims*, 1 RIAA, p. 307 (1922); and *Sporrong and Lönnroth* before the ECtHR, Series A, No. 52, 1982; 68 ILR, p. 86. See also *Papamichalopoulos v. Greece*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 260, 1993, p. 15. Note in addition *Revere Copper v. Opic* 56 ILR, p. 258. See G. C. Christie, 'What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?', **38 BYIL**, 1962, p. 307; *DUSPIL*, 1976, p. 444; Brownlie, *System*, pp. 24–5; Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. **VIII**, pp. 1006 ff.; and *Third US Restatement on Foreign Relations Law*, vol. **II**, pp. 200–1.

332 PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926, p. 22. See also article 14 of the Resolution on Legal Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration by an Investor against the Authorities of the Host State, adopted at the Tokyo Session of the Institut de Droit International, 2013. This required that any expropriation of foreign property had to be *inter alia* for public purposes.

333 53 ILR, p. 297.

334 *Ibid.*, p. 329.

335 20 ILM, 1981, p. 1; 62 ILR, p. 141.

336 20 ILM, 1981, pp. 58–9; 62 ILR, p. 194.

337 Paragraph 4 of the 1962 Resolution provides that: 'Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation in accordance with the rules in force in the state taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the state taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign states and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication.'

338 Article 2(2)(c) of the 1974 Charter provides that every state has the right to nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property in which case appropriate

compensation should be paid by the state adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the state considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalising state and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all states concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of states and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.

³³⁹ See also *Agip SpA v. Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo* 67 ILR, pp. 319, 336–9.

³⁴⁰ 39 ILM, 2000, pp. 1317, 1329. The fact that the taking was for a laudable environmental reason did not affect the duty to pay compensation: *ibid.* See also *Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates* 23 Iran–US CTR, p. 378; *Methanex v. US* 44 ILM, 2005, p. 1345; and *Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic*, Arbitration Panel, Partial Award of 17 March 2006, www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf.

³⁴¹ See e.g. G. White, *Nationalisation of Foreign Property*, London, 1961, pp. 119 ff. See also A. Maniruzzaman, ‘Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in the International Law of Foreign Investment’, 8 *Journal of Transnational Law and Policy*, 1999, p. 141.

³⁴² 20 ILM, 1981, p. 1; 62 ILR, p. 141.

³⁴³ 20 ILM, 1981, pp. 58–9; 62 ILR, p. 194.

³⁴⁴ 20 ILM, 1981, p. 60. See also Section IV of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, and article 13 of the European Energy Charter Treaty 1994.

³⁴⁵ See also article 14 of the Resolution on Legal Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration 2013. This required that any expropriation of foreign property had to be *inter alia* on a non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with due process of law.

³⁴⁶ Hackworth, *Digest*, vol. III, 1940–4, p. 662. See also Dolzer and Schreuer, *International Investment Law*, pp. 296 ff.; T. Walde and B. Sabahi, ‘Compensation, Damages and Valuation’, in *Oxford Handbook*, p. 1049; and E. Lauterpacht, ‘Issues of

Compensation and Nationality in the Taking of Energy Investments’, **8** *Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law*, 1990, p. 241.

347 See e.g. *DUSPIL*, 1976, p. 444; and D. Robinson, ‘Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised)’, **78** *AJIL*, 1984, p. 176.

348 Robinson, ‘Expropriation’, p. 178. See further below, p. 728.

349 See e.g. *Chorzów Factory*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928, p. 46; 4 AD, p. 268; and *Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims*, 1 RIAA, pp. 307, 339–41 (1922). See also O. Schachter, ‘Compensation for Expropriation’, **78** *AJIL*, 1984, p. 121.

350 17 ILM, 1978, pp. 3, 29; 53 ILR, pp. 389, 489. See also *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank* 658 F.2d 875 (1981); 66 ILR, p. 421.

351 21 ILM, 1982, p. 976; 66 ILR, p. 519.

352 21 ILM, 1982, p. 1032; 66 ILR, p. 601.

353 21 ILM, 1982, p. 1033.

354 See e.g. *Texaco* 17 ILM, 1978, pp. 1, 29–31; 53 ILR, p. 489. Note that the *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, p. 196 (para. 712), refers to the requirement of ‘just compensation’ and not the Hull formula. This is defined as ‘an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken and to be paid at the time of taking or within a reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of taking and in a form economically usable by the foreign national’: *ibid.*, p. 197. See also Schachter, ‘Compensation’, p. 121.

355 See generally also R. Dolzer, ‘New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property’, **75** *AJIL*, 1981, p. 533; M. Sornarajah, ‘Compensation for Expropriation’, **13** *Journal of World Trade Law*, 1979, p. 108; and Sornarajah, *International Law on Foreign Investment*.

356 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1382. See also article 1110 of NAFTA, 32 ILM, 1993, p. 605; and article 14.8 of the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement, which replaced NAFTA, and was signed in 2018 and in force 1 July 2020, <https://ustr.gov/usmca>.

357 34 ILM, 1995, p. 391. See also article 14 of the Resolution on Legal Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration 2013. This required that compensation for expropriation had to be prompt, adequate and effective.

358 See e.g. *Aminoil* 21 ILM, 1982, pp. 976, 1038; 66 ILR, pp. 519, 608–9.

359 Fair market value means essentially the amount that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the shares of a going concern, ignoring the expropriation situation completely: see e.g. *INA Corp. v. Iran* 8 Iran–US CTR, pp. 373, 380; 75 ILR, p. 603.

360 See the Memorandum of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the Practice of International Tribunals in Awarding Interest, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 768.

361 24 ILM, 1985, pp. 1022, 1036–7; 89 ILR, pp. 405, 504. See also *Chorzów Factory*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928; 4 AD, p. 268; *Sapphire* 35 ILR, p. 136; *Norwegian Shipowners' Claims*, 1 RIAA, p. 307 (1922); the *Lighthouses* arbitration 23 ILR, p. 299; and *Benvenuti and Bonfant v. Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo* 67 ILR pp. 345, 375–9.

362 24 ILM, 1985, pp. 1022, 1037; 89 ILR, p. 505. See also *Sola Tiles Inc. v. Iran* 83 ILR, p. 460.

363 119 ILR, pp. 615, 641. See also *Benvenuti and Bonfant v. Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo* 67 ILR, p. 345; and *AGIP SPA v. The Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo* 67 ILR, p. 318.

364 119 ILR, pp. 641–2. See also *Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran* 10 Iran–US CTR, 1986, pp. 121, 132–3; and *Biloune v. Ghana Investment Centre* 95 ILR, pp. 183, 228–9.

365 8 Iran–US CTR, p. 373; 75 ILR, p. 595.

366 8 Iran–US CTR, p. 378; 75 ILR, p. 602.

367 8 Iran–US CTR, p. 390; 75 ILR, p. 614.

368 15 Iran–US CTR, pp. 189, 246–52; 83 ILR, p. 500.

369 15 Iran–US CTR, p. 246; 83 ILR, p. 565.

370 See also Judge Lagergren’s Separate Opinion in *INA Corp. v. Iran* 8 Iran–US CTR, p. 385; 75 ILR, p. 609.

371 But see e.g. *AIG v. Iran* 4 Iran–US CTR, pp. 96, 109–10, where in a case of lawful expropriation lost profits were awarded. See also Section IV of the World Bank Guidelines; and article 13 of the European Energy Charter Treaty 1994.

372 See e.g. Subedi, *International Investment Law*, chapter 5; Dolzer and Schreuer, *International Investment Law*, pp. 13 ff.; Lowenfeld, *International Economic Law*, pp. 554 ff.; E. Denza and D. Brooks, ‘Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom Experience’, 36 *ICLQ*, 1987, p. 908; A. Akinsanya, ‘International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in the Third World’, 36 *ICLQ*, 1987, p. 58; F. A. Mann, ‘British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’, 52 *BYIL*, 1981, p. 241; D. Vagts, ‘Foreign Investment Risk Reconsidered: The View From the 1980s’, 2 *ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal*, 1987, p. 1; P. B. Gann, ‘The US Bilateral Investment Treaties Program’, 21 *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 1986, p. 373; Kokott, ‘Foreign Investment’, p. 259; and C. McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaties and General International Law’, 57 *ICLQ*, 2008, p. 361. Note, in addition, the UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor–State Arbitration 2015.

373 An *IIA Issues Note* from UNCTAD in July 2020 gives the figure of 3,284 such treaties with 349 effective terminations leaving at least 2,654 in force, <https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2020d4.pdf>. See also: Dolzer and Schreuer, *International Investment Law*, p. 13; and Lowenfeld, *International Economic Law*, p. 554.

374 See the text of the Foreign Office statement in UKMIL, 58 *BYIL*, 1987, p. 620. Such agreements are in UK practice usually termed ‘investment promotion and protection agreements’ (IPPAs). In March 2000, it was stated that the UK had entered into ninety-three such treaties: UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 606.

375 See Kokott, ‘Interim Report’, p. 263. See also Dolzer, ‘New Foundations’, pp. 553, 565–6; and B. Kishoiyian, ‘The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation

of Customary International Law’, 14 *Netherlands Journal of International Law and Business*, 1994, p. 327.

376 Text reproduced in 29 ILM, 1989, p. 366.

377 See also e.g. the similar provisions in the UK–Philippines Investment Agreement 1981 and the UK–Hungary Investment Agreement 1987. See also article 1(6) of the European Energy Charter Treaty 1994.

378 See e.g. S. C. Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law’, Report of the International Law Commission, A/66/10, Annex D, p. 335. See also article 13 of the Resolution on Legal Aspects of Recourse to Arbitration 2013. This noted that: ‘Fair and equitable treatment, which is a key standard of investment protection, must accord investors and investments, in particular: (i) due process, (ii) non-discrimination and not-arbitrary treatment, (iii) due diligence, and (iv) respect of legitimate expectations.’ There are a significant number of cases on this standard, see e.g. *Tecmed v. Mexico* 10 ICSID Reports, pp. 13, 192 (2003); *Waste Management (No. 2) v. Mexico* 11 ICSID Reports, pp. 361, 386 (2004); and *Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic* 15 ICSID Reports, pp. 250, 339 (2006). Much will depend on the circumstances; see *Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, pp. 600 ff.

379 See e.g. article 2 of the UK–USSR agreement.

380 See e.g. *Mondev International Ltd v. US*, Award of 11 October 2002, para. 118; and *Waste Management v. Mexico*, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3, Final Award of 30 April 2004, para. 99.

381 See e.g. *Lemire v. Ukraine*, ICSID, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability of 14 January 2010, para. 500.

382 *Genin v. Estonia*, Arbitral Award of 25 June 2001, para. 367. See Dolzer and Schreuer, *Principles of International Investment Law*, chapter VII.

383 See e.g. article 3 of the UK–USSR agreement.

384 See e.g. Dolzer and Schreuer, *Principles of International Investment Law*, pp. 206 ff.; and Subedi, *International Investment Law*, p. 91. See also the Final Report of the Study

Group on the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, A/CN.4/L.852, adopted by the International Law Commission in 2015: see Report of the International Law Commission on its 67th Session, A/70/10, chapter IV. Note the Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, 1978, *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1978, vol. **II**, Part Two, pp. 16 ff.

385 Article 5 of the Draft Articles 1978 (see **previous footnote**).

386 See e.g. *Maffezeni v. Spain*, ICSID Case No. ARD/97/7, Decision of 25 January 2000; *Siemens v. Argentina*, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004; *Gas Natural SDG v. Argentina*, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005; and *Hochtief AG v. Argentina*, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 October 2011. However, cf. *Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentina*, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award of 8 September 2008; and *Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentina*, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award of 22 August 2012. Much will depend upon the interpretation of the phrases used. See Y. Radi, 'The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties', **18** *EJIL*, 2007, p. 757; and Final Report of the Study Group on the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, A/CN.4/L.852, paras. 104 ff. Note that the Study Group concluded that 'there is little doubt that in principle MFN provisions are capable of applying to the dispute settlement provisions of BITs . . . the question is truly one of treaty interpretation that can be answered only in respect of each particular case': *ibid.*, paras. 162, 163.

387 Note that provisions for compensation for expropriation may also be contained in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation as part of a framework arrangement dealing with foreign trade and investment: see e.g. article IV(3) of the Convention of Establishment 1959 between the US and France, 11 UST 2398.

388 See e.g. S. J. Canner, 'The Multilateral Agreement on Investment', **31** *Cornell International Law Journal*, 1998, p. 657; A. Böhmer, 'The Struggle for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment – an Assessment of the Negotiation Process in the OECD', **41** *German YIL*, 1998, p. 267; and T. Waelde, 'Multilateral Investment Agreements (MITs) in the Year 2000', in *Mélanges Philippe Kahn*, Paris, 2000, p. 389. Discussions on investment continue within the framework of the World Trade Organization: see www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm.

389 See e.g. UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note, July 2020, pp. 6 ff., <https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2020d4.pdf>; and UNCTAD, UNCTAD's Reform Package for the International Investment Regime, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/uploaded-files/document/UNCTAD_Reform_Package_2018.pdf.

390 See <https://cf.iisd.net/itn/2012/10/30/news-in-brief-9/>.

391 See D. Price, 'Indonesia's Bold Strategy on Bilateral Investment Treaties: Seeking an Equitable Climate for Investment', 7 *Asian Journal of International Law*, 2017, p. 124.

392 See www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=088877a2-58cf-4f24-a579-4a51b3309098. India has also withdrawn from a number of BITs, <https://hsfnnotes.com/arbitration/2017/03/16/mixed-messages-to-investors-as-india-quietly-terminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-with-58-countries/#:~:text=The%20Government%20of%20India%20says,as%20early%20as%20April%202017>.

393 Case No. 284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, 6 March 2018.

394 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/publication/200505-bilateral-investment-treaties-agreement_en.

395 A further question remaining relates to article 2(2) which confirms that the 'sunset clauses' (which extend the protection of investments made prior to the date of termination of the BIT for a further period of time) in the intra-EU BITs are terminated. It remains to be seen how this may be handled in practice.

396 See e.g. Lillich and Weston, *International Claims: Their Settlement*; and R. B. Lillich and B. Weston, 'Lump-Sum Agreements: Their Continuing Contribution to the Law of International Claims', 82 *AJIL*, 1988, p. 69. See also D. J. Bederman, 'Interim Report on Lump Sum Agreements and Diplomatic Protection', International Law Association, Report of the Seventieth Conference, New Delhi, 2002, p. 230; R. Bank and F. Foltz, 'Lump Sum Agreements', in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2013; and N. Wühler and H. Niebergall, *Property Restitution and Compensation: Practices and*

Experiences of Claims Programmes, International Organisation for Migration, Geneva, 2008.

³⁹⁷ Cm 30. Note that this agreement dealt with claims arising before 1939.

³⁹⁸ As against these claims, the USSR had made extensive claims in the region of £2 billion in respect of alleged losses caused by British intervention in the USSR between 1918 and 1921: see UKMIL, 57 *BYIL*, 1986, p. 606.

³⁹⁹ The British government waived its entitlement to a share in the settlement in respect of its own claims: *ibid.*, p. 608.

⁴⁰⁰ See also the UK–China Agreement on the Settlement of Property Claims 1987, UKMIL, 58 *BYIL*, 1987, p. 626.

⁴⁰¹ See, with regard to the UK–USSR agreement, the Foreign Compensation (USSR) (Registration and Determination of Claims) Order 1986, SI 1986/2222 and the Foreign Compensation (USSR) (Distribution) Order 1987.

⁴⁰² 10 Iran–US CTR, pp. 180, 185; 80 *AJIL*, 1986, p. 969.

⁴⁰³ See e.g. Bowett, ‘State Contracts with Aliens’, pp. 65–6.

⁴⁰⁴ Note the view of the International Court in the *Barcelona Traction* case that such settlements were *sui generis* and provided no guide as to general international practice: ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 4, 40.

⁴⁰⁵ See e.g. S. K. Chatterjee, ‘The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’, 36 *ICLQ*, 1987, p. 76; and I. Shihata, *The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and Foreign Investment*, Dordrecht, 1987. The Convention came into force on 12 April 1988: see 28 *ILM*, 1989, p. 1233 and see also www.miga.org/.

⁴⁰⁶ See e.g. the UK Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Act 1988.

⁴⁰⁷ Article 11.

⁴⁰⁸ See generally K. Kittichaisaree, *Public International Law of Cyberspace*, Basel, 2017; F. Delerue, *Cyber Operations and International Law*, Cambridge, 2020; H. Moynihan, *The Application of International Law to State Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention*, Chatham House, 2019; R. Buchan, *Cyber Espionage and International Law*, Oxford, 2018; International Group of Experts, *Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2017; D. Efrony and Y. Shany, 'A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyber Operations and Subsequent State Practice', **112** *AJIL*, 2018, p. 583; G. Brown and K. Poellet, 'The Customary International Law of Cyberspace', **6** *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 2012, p. 126; S. Watts and T. Richard, 'Baseline Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace', **22** *Lewis and Clark Law Review*, 2018, p. 771; and J. Jolley, 'Attribution, State Responsibility and the Duty to Prevent Malicious Cyber-Attacks in International Law', 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3056832. As to cyber warfare, see below, *Chapter 19*, p. 1027.

⁴⁰⁹ Resolution 56/19 (2002); and A. Henriksen, 'The End of the Road for the UN GGE Process: The Future Regulation of Cyberspace', **5** *Journal of Cybersecurity*, 2019, p. 1. See also the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts, A/70/174 (22 July 2015). See also the list of non-binding norms on responsible state behaviour, Moynihan, *The Application of International Law*, p. 52.

⁴¹⁰ General Assembly resolutions 73/27 and 73/266; and see www.un.org/disarmament/open-ended-working-group/ and www.un.org/disarmament/group-of-governmental-experts/.

⁴¹¹ It has been defined as: 'The environment formed by physical and non-physical components to store, modify and exchange data using computer networks', *Tallinn Manual*, p. 564.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11–29. See also M. N. Schmitt and L. Vihul, 'Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace', **95** *Texas Law Review*, 2017, p. 1639.

⁴¹⁴ *Tallinn Manual*, pp. 84 ff.

⁴¹⁵ See www.britannica.com/technology/Stuxnet; Brown and Poellet, 'The Customary International Law of Cyberspace', pp. 130 ff.; and the UK government's statement on 4 October 2018 on Russian cyber attacks, www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/reckless-campaign-cyber-attacks-russian-military-intelligence-service-exposed.

⁴¹⁶ See www.ft.com/content/3ea57426-40e2-42da-9e2c-97b0e39dd967.

⁴¹⁷ Intelligence Community Assessment, *Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections* ('a declassified version of a highly classified assessment'), ICA 2017-01D, 6 January 2017.

⁴¹⁸ See Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, HC 632, 'Russia', 21 July 2020, <https://docs.google.com/a/independent.gov.uk/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=aW5kZXBlbmRlbnQuZ292LnVrfGlzY3xneDo1Y2RhMGEyN2Y3NjM0OWFl>.

⁴¹⁹ See e.g. B. Sander, 'Democracy Under the Influence: Paradigms of State Responsibility for Cyber Influence Operations on Elections', *18 Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2019, p. 1; N. Tsagourias, 'Electoral Cyber Interference, Self-Determination and the Principle of Non-Intervention', *EJIL: Talk!*, 26 August 2019; and Moynihan, *The Application of International Law*, pp. 40 ff.

⁴²⁰ See e.g. Y. Ronen, 'Some Evidentiary Dimensions to Attributing Unlawful Cyber Operations to States', Hebrew University Law Faculty, Research Paper No. 03-20, April 2020. See also C. Antonopoulos, 'State Responsibility in Cyberspace', in *Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace* (ed. N. Tsagourias and R. Buchan), Cheltenham, 2015, pp. 55, 64, suggesting a reversal of the burden of proof with regard to cyber operations.

⁴²¹ See Oxford Statement on the International Law Protections against Cyber Operations Targeting the Health Care Sector, *EJIL: Talk!*, 21 May 2020. Note the statement by US, UK and Canadian security services that 'Russian spies are targeting organisations trying to develop a coronavirus vaccine in the UK, US and Canada', see www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53429506, 16 July 2020.

⁴²² See www.icrc.org/en/document/potential-human-cost-cyber-operations. Note also that the ICRC has recorded over 200 incidents of physical violence, https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2020/05/26/call-global-leaders-stop-cyberattacks-healthcare/?utm_campaign=Outreach_newsletter97&utm_medium=email&hsmi=89128254&hsenc=p2ANqtz-9DNlvo9rvFcQzOktx-PDM7c9NBzZ3WzuPSr1GWSSvP8UDhJ43EirbeQLiYHCHFeEhscDBTO91xjnKVqvifTPIMH_d1Cw&utm_content=89128254&utm_source=hs_email.

⁴²³ *Tallinn Manual*, p. 515 (Rule 132).

⁴²⁴ See www.icrc.org/en/document/norms-responsible-state-behavior-cyber-operations-should-build-international-law.

⁴²⁵ See https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2020/04/02/cyber-attacks-hospitals-covid-19/#_blank.

⁴²⁶ See e.g. para. 63 of the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 36 on the right to life (article 6), CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018 as including ‘persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner’. See further above, *Chapter 6*, p. 277, **note 222**.

⁴²⁷ See www.icrc.org/en/document/norms-responsible-state-behavior-cyber-operations-should-build-international-law.

⁴²⁸ Note in particular the Oxford Statement on the International Law Protections against Cyber Operations Targeting the Health Care Sector, EJIL: Talk!, 21 May 2020, which proposes a series of rules and principles, including: (1) international law applies to cyber operations by states, including those that target the health care sector; and (2) international law prohibits cyber operations by states that have serious adverse consequences for essential medical services in other states and noting also that international human rights law requires states to respect and ensure the right to life and the right to health to all people within their jurisdiction, including through taking measures to prevent third parties from interfering with such rights by cyber means and underlining the applicability of international humanitarian law and international criminal law.

⁴²⁹ See e.g. the statement by the US Department of State Legal Advisor on 18 September 2012 on ‘International Law and Cyberspace’; the statement by the UK Attorney General on 23 May 2018 on ‘Cyber and International Law’; the EU Council Decision concerning Cyber-Attacks, 7299/19, 14 May 2019 allowing *inter alia* for the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to persons, entities or bodies responsible for cyber attacks or attempted cyber attacks; and the French Ministry of Defence statement of policy, *Droit International Appliqué aux Opérations dans le Cyberspace*, 9 September 2019.

International Environmental Law

Recent years have seen an appreciable growth in the level of understanding of the dangers facing the international environment¹ and an extensive range of environmental problems is now the subject of serious international concern.² These include atmospheric pollution, marine pollution, global warming and ozone depletion, the dangers of nuclear and other extra-hazardous substances and threatened wildlife species.³ Such problems have an international dimension in two obvious respects. First, pollution generated from within a particular state often has a serious impact upon other countries. The prime example would be acid rain, whereby chemicals emitted from factories rise in the atmosphere and react with water and sunlight to form acids. These are carried in the wind and fall eventually to earth in the rain, often thousands of miles away from the initial polluting event. Secondly, it is now apparent that environmental problems cannot be resolved by states acting individually. Accordingly, cooperation between the polluting and the polluted state is necessitated. However, the issue becomes more complicated in those cases where it is quite impossible to determine from which country a particular form of environmental pollution has emanated. This would be the case, for example, with ozone depletion. In other words, the international nature of pollution, both with regard to its creation and the damage caused, is now accepted as requiring an international response.

The initial conceptual problem posed for international law lies in the state-oriented nature of the discipline. Traditionally, a state would only be responsible in the international legal sense for damage caused where it could be clearly demonstrated that this resulted from its own unlawful activity.⁴ This has proved to be an inadequate framework for dealing with environmental issues for a variety of reasons, ranging from difficulties of proof to liability for lawful activities and the particular question of responsibility of non-state offenders. Accordingly, the international community has slowly been moving away from the classic state responsibility approach to damage caused towards a regime of international cooperation.

A broad range of international participants are concerned with developments in this field. States, of course, as the dominant subjects of the international legal system, are deeply involved, as are an increasing number of international organisations, whether at the global, regional or bilateral level. The UN General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions concerning the environment,⁵ and the UN Environment Programme was established after the Stockholm Conference of 1972. This has proved a particularly important organisation in the evolution of conventions and instruments in the field of environmental protection. It is based in Nairobi and consists of a Governing Council of fifty-eight members elected by the General Assembly. UNEP has been responsible for the development of a number of initiatives, including the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity.⁶ An Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable Development was set up in 1992 to improve cooperation between the various UN bodies concerned with this

topic. In the same year, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development was established by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC). It consists of fifty-three states elected by ECOSOC for three-year terms and it exists in order to follow up the UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992.⁷ The techniques of supervision utilised in international bodies include reporting,⁸ inspection⁹ and standard-setting through the adoption of conventions, regulations, guidelines and so forth. In 1994, it was agreed to transform the Global Environment Facility from a three-year pilot programme¹⁰ into a permanent financial mechanism to award grants and concessional funds to developing countries for global environmental protection projects.¹¹ The Facility focuses upon climate change, the destruction of biological diversity, the pollution of international waters and ozone depletion. Issues of land-degradation¹² also fall within this framework.¹³ In addition, a wide range of non-governmental organisations are also concerned with environmental issues.

It has been argued that there now exists an international human right to a clean environment.¹⁴ There are, of course, a range of general human rights provisions that may have a relevance in the field of environmental protection, such as the right to life, right to an adequate standard of living, right to health, right to food and so forth, but specific references to a human right to a clean environment have tended to be few and ambiguous. The preamble to the seminal Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment 1972 noted that the environment was ‘essential to . . . the enjoyment of basic human rights – even the right to life itself’, while Principle 1 stated: ‘Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life

of dignity and well-being.’ Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 provided that ‘all people shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development’, while article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights 1988 declared that ‘everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment’ and that ‘the states parties shall promote the protection, preservation and improvement of the environment’. Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 explicitly referred to the need for the education of the child to be directed *inter alia* to ‘the development of respect for the natural environment’.¹⁵ It should also be noted that the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991 calls for the ‘establishment of an environmental impact assessment procedure that permits public participation’ in certain circumstances.

However, the references to human rights in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992¹⁶ are rather sparse. Principle 1 declares that human beings are ‘at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.’ Beyond this tangential reference, human rights concerns were not, it is fair to say, at the centre of the documentation produced by the 1992 conference. In fact, it is fair to say that the focus of the conference was rather upon states and their sovereign rights than upon individuals and their rights.

Nevertheless, moves to associate the two areas of international law are progressing cautiously. In 1994, the final report on Human Rights and the

Environment was delivered to the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (as it was then called).¹⁷ The Report contains a set of Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, which includes the notion that ‘human rights, an ecologically sound environment, sustainable development and peace are interdependent and indivisible’ and that ‘all persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment. This right and other human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, are universal, interdependent and indivisible.’¹⁸ The Inter-American Court of Human Rights adopted an Advisory Opinion on human rights and the environment on 15 November 2017 in which it held that in the case of large-scale transboundary infrastructure projects, the states parties to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under certain circumstances and so be responsible for the human rights in the territory in question. It was also declared that the provision (article 26) calling for the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights included an autonomous right to a healthy environment.¹⁹

An important stage was reached with the adoption of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 1998,²⁰ which explicitly links human rights and the environment and recognises that ‘adequate protection of the environment is essential to human well-being and the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to life itself’. Article 1 provides that each contracting party ‘shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters’ and thereby marks the acceptance by parties of obligations towards

their own citizens. Article 9 stipulates that parties should establish a review procedure before a court of law or other independent and impartial body for any persons who consider that their request for information has not been properly addressed, and article 15 provides that ‘optional arrangements of a non-confrontational, non-judicial and consultative status’ should be established for reviewing compliance with the Convention. Such arrangements are to allow for appropriate public involvement ‘and may include the option of considering communications from members of the public on matters relating to this Convention’.²¹

The question of the relationship between the protection of the environment and the need for economic development is another factor underpinning the evolution of environmental law. States that are currently attempting to industrialise face the problem that to do so in an environmentally safe way is very expensive and the resources that can be devoted to this are extremely limited. The Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment 1972 emphasised in Principle 8 that ‘economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favourable living and working environment for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life’, while the sovereign right of states to exploit their own resources was also stressed.²² Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992, noted that states have ‘the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies’, while Principle 3 states that ‘the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations’. The correct balance between development

and environmental protection is now one of the main challenges facing the international community and reflects the competing interests posed by the principle of state sovereignty on the one hand and the need for international cooperation on the other. It also raises the issue as to how far one takes into account the legacy for future generations of activities conducted at the present time or currently planned. Many developmental activities, such as the creation of nuclear power plants for example, may have significant repercussions for many generations to come.²³ The Energy Charter Treaty²⁴ signed at Lisbon in 1994 by OECD and Eastern European and CIS states refers to environmental issues in the context of energy concerns in a rather less than robust fashion. Article 19 notes that contracting parties ‘shall strive to minimise in an economically efficient manner harmful environmental impacts’. In so doing, parties are to act ‘in a cost-effective manner’. Parties are to ‘strive to take precautionary measures to prevent or minimise environmental degradation’ and agree that the polluter should ‘in principle, bear the cost of pollution, including transboundary pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting investment in the energy cycle or international trade’.

One potentially innovative method for linking economic underdevelopment and protection of the environment is the ‘debt for nature swaps’ arrangement, whereby debts owed abroad may be converted into an obligation upon the debtor state to spend the amount of the debt upon local environment projects.²⁵

State Responsibility and the Environment²⁶

The Basic Duty of States

The principles of state responsibility²⁷ dictate that states are accountable for breaches of international law. Such breaches of treaty or customary international law enable the injured state to maintain a claim against the violating state, whether by way of diplomatic action or by way of recourse to international mechanisms where such are in place with regard to the subject-matter at issue. Recourse to international arbitration or to the International Court of Justice is also possible provided the necessary jurisdictional basis has been established. Customary international law imposes several important fundamental obligations upon states in the area of environmental protection. The view that international law supports an approach predicated upon absolute territorial sovereignty, so that a state could do as it liked irrespective of the consequences upon other states, has long been discredited. The basic duty upon states is not so to act as to injure the rights of other states.²⁸ This duty has evolved partly out of the regime concerned with international waterways. In the *International Commission on the River Oder* case,²⁹ for example, the Permanent Court of International Justice noted that ‘this community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian states in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privileges of any riparian state in relation to others’.³⁰ But the principle is of far wider application. It was held in the *Island of Palmas* case³¹ that the concept of territorial sovereignty incorporated an obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other states.

In the *Trail Smelter* arbitration,³² the Tribunal was concerned with a dispute between Canada and the United States over sulphur dioxide pollution from a Canadian smelter, built in a valley shared by British Columbia and the state of Washington, which damaged trees and crops on the American side of the border. The Tribunal noted that:

under principles of international law, as well as the law of the United States, no state has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.³³

The International Court reinforced this approach, by emphasising in the *Corfu Channel* case³⁴ that it was the obligation of every state ‘not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states’.³⁵ The Court also noted in the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*, in 1995, that its conclusion with regard to French nuclear testing in the Pacific was ‘without prejudice to the obligations of states to respect and protect the environment’.³⁶ In addition, in its Advisory Opinion to the UN General Assembly on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, the Court declared that ‘the existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of

other states or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment'.³⁷

This judicial approach has now been widely reaffirmed in international instruments. Article 192 of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 provides that 'states have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment', while article 194 notes that 'states shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other states and their environment'.³⁸ The shift of focus from the state alone to a wider perspective including the high seas, deep seabed and outer space is a noticeable development.³⁹

It is, however, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 that is of especial significance. It stipulates that, in addition to the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, states have 'the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction'. Although a relatively modest formulation repeated in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration 1992 (with the addition of a reference to developmental policies), it has been seen as an important turning-point in the development of international environmental law.⁴⁰ Several issues of importance are raised in the formulation contained in Principle 21 and to those we now turn.

The Appropriate Standard

It is sometimes argued that the appropriate standard for the conduct of states in this field is that of strict liability. In other words, states are under an absolute obligation to prevent pollution and are thus liable for its effects irrespective of fault.⁴¹ While the advantage of this is the increased responsibility placed upon the state, it is doubtful whether international law has in fact accepted such a general principle.⁴² The leading cases are inconclusive. In the *Trail Smelter* case,⁴³ Canada's responsibility was accepted from the start, the case focusing upon the compensation due and the terms of the future operation of the smelter,⁴⁴ while the strict theory was not apparently accepted in the *Corfu Channel* case.⁴⁵ In the *Nuclear Tests* case,⁴⁶ the Court did not discuss the substance of the claims concerning nuclear testing in view of France's decision to end its programme.⁴⁷

Treaty practice here is variable. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 1972 provides for absolute liability for damage caused by space objects on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight (article II), but for fault liability for damage caused elsewhere or to persons or property on board a space object (article III).⁴⁸ Most treaties, however, take the form of requiring the exercise of diligent control of sources of harm, so that responsibility is engaged for breaches of obligations specified in the particular instruments.⁴⁹

The test of due diligence is in fact the standard that is accepted generally as the most appropriate one.⁵⁰ Article 194 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, for example, provides that states are to take 'all measures . . . that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable

means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities’.

Accordingly, states in general are not automatically liable for damage caused irrespective of all other factors. However, it is rather less clear what is actually meant by due diligence. In specific cases, such as the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, for example, particular measures are specified and references made to other relevant treaties. In other cases, the issue remains rather more ambiguous.⁵¹ The test of due diligence undoubtedly imports an element of flexibility into the equation and must be tested in the light of the circumstances of the case in question. States will be required, for example, to take all necessary steps to prevent substantial pollution and to demonstrate the kind of behaviour expected of ‘good government’,⁵² while such behaviour would probably require the establishment of systems of consultation and notification.⁵³ It is also important to note that elements of remoteness and foreseeability are part of the framework of the liability of states. The damage that occurs must have been caused by the pollution under consideration. The tribunal in the *Trail Smelter* case⁵⁴ emphasised the need to establish the injury ‘by clear and convincing evidence’.

Damage Caused

The first issue is whether indeed any damage must actually have been caused before international responsibility becomes relevant or whether there can be liability for risk of damage. It appears that at this stage international law in general does not recognise such a liability,⁵⁵ certainly outside the category of ultra-hazardous activities.⁵⁶ However, it should be noted that article 1(4) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 defines pollution of the marine environment as ‘the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances

or energy into the marine environment . . . which results or is likely to result in . . . deleterious effects’. In other words, actual damage is not necessary in this context. It is indeed possible that customary international law may develop in this direction, but it is too early to conclude that this has already occurred. Most general definitions of pollution rely upon damage or harm having been caused before liability is engaged.⁵⁷

The next issue is to determine whether a certain threshold of damage must have been caused. In the *Trail Smelter* case,⁵⁸ the Tribunal focused on the need to show that the matter was of ‘serious consequence’, while article 1 of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 1979 provides that the pollution concerned must result ‘in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment’.⁵⁹ Article 3 of the ILA Montreal Rules 1982 stipulates that states are under an obligation to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollution to such an extent that no substantial injury is caused in the territory of another state.⁶⁰ Such formulations do present definitional problems and the qualification as to the threshold of injury required is by no means present in all relevant instruments.⁶¹ The issue of relativity and the importance of the circumstances of the particular case remain significant factors, but less support can be detected at this stage for linkage to a concept of reasonable and equitable use of its territory by a state occasioning liability for use beyond this.⁶²

As far as the range of interests injured by pollution is concerned, the *Trail Smelter* case⁶³ focused upon loss of property. Later definitions of pollution in

international instruments have broadened the range to include harm to living resources or ecosystems, interference with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment or the sea. Article 1(4) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, for example, includes impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities. Article 1(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer 1985 defines adverse effects upon the ozone layer as changes in the physical environment, including climatic changes ‘which have significant deleterious effects on human health or on the composition, resilience and productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on materials useful to mankind’,⁶⁴ while the Convention on Climate Change 1992 defines adverse effects of climate change as ‘changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare’.⁶⁵ The Convention on Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources 1988⁶⁶ defines damage to the environment and ecosystem of that polar region as ‘any impact on the living or non-living components of that environment or those ecosystems, including harm to atmospheric, marine or terrestrial life, beyond that which is negligible or which has been assessed and judged to be acceptable pursuant to [the] Convention’.⁶⁷ The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992 defines ‘transboundary impact’, which is the subject of provision, in terms of ‘any significant adverse effect on the environment resulting from a change in the conditions of transboundary waters caused by a human activity’.⁶⁸ The Council of Europe’s Convention on Civil Liability for Environmental Damage 1993 defines damage to include loss or damage by ‘impairment of the environment’,⁶⁹ while the environment itself is taken to

include natural resources both abiotic and biotic, property forming part of the cultural heritage and ‘the characteristic aspects of the landscape’.⁷⁰ The type of harm that is relevant clearly now extends beyond damage to property,⁷¹ but problems do remain with regard to general environmental injury that cannot be defined in material form.⁷²

Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities⁷³

The International Law Commission started considering in 1978 the topic of ‘International Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law’⁷⁴ and the main focus of the work of the Commission was on environmental harm.⁷⁵ It was argued that international liability differed from state responsibility in that the latter is dependent upon a prior breach of international law,⁷⁶ while the former constitutes an attempt to develop a branch of law in which a state may be liable internationally with regard to the harmful consequences of an activity which is in itself not contrary to international law. This was a controversial approach. The theoretical basis and separation from state responsibility were questioned.⁷⁷ The ILC revised its work and eventually adopted Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities in 2001.⁷⁸

Article 1 of the Draft provides that the articles are to apply to activities not prohibited by international law which involve a ‘risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical consequences’. The Commentary to the Draft Articles specifies that the notion of risk is to be taken objectively ‘as denoting an appreciation of possible harm resulting from an activity which a properly informed observer had or ought to have had’.⁷⁹ Members of the Commission had in the past been divided as to whether the focus of the topic should be upon risk or upon harm;⁸⁰ this now appears settled. Article 2 of the Draft provides that ‘risk of causing significant transboundary harm’ is to be defined as including ‘a high probability of causing significant

transboundary harm and a low probability of causing disastrous transboundary harm'.⁸¹ In other words, the relevant threshold is established by a combination of risk and harm and this threshold must reach a level deemed 'significant'.⁸² The International Law Commission has taken the view that this term, while factually based, means something more than 'detectable', but need not reach the level of 'serious' or 'substantial'.⁸³ The state of origin (i.e. where the activities are taking place or are to take place) 'shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimise the risk thereof'.⁸⁴ The relevant test is that of due diligence, this being that which is generally considered to be appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary harm in the particular instance and this test requires the state to keep up to date with technological and scientific developments.⁸⁵

States are to cooperate in good faith in trying to prevent such activities from causing significant transboundary injury and in minimising the effects of the risk, and they are to seek the assistance as necessary of competent international organisations.⁸⁶ The state is to take legislative, administrative and other action, including the establishment of suitable monitoring mechanisms to implement the provisions in the draft articles,⁸⁷ and is to require prior authorisation for any activities within the scope of the article.⁸⁸ In deciding upon such authorisation, the state must base its answer on an assessment of the possible transboundary harm, including any environmental impact assessment.⁸⁹ If a risk is indeed indicated by such an assessment, timely notification must be made to the state likely to be affected⁹⁰ and information provided,⁹¹ while the states concerned are to enter into consultation with a view to achieving acceptable solutions regarding

measures to be adopted in order to prevent or minimise the risk of causing significant transboundary harm or to minimise the risk thereof. Such solutions must be based on an equitable balance of interests.⁹²

In 2006, the ILC adopted the Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities,⁹³ the purpose of which is to ensure prompt and adequate compensation to victims of transboundary damage and to preserve and protect the environment. States are to take all necessary measures to ensure such compensation is available, including the imposition of liability upon operators without requiring proof of fault.⁹⁴

International Cooperation – Relevant Principles

The application of the classical international law approach, founded upon state responsibility for breaches of international obligations and the requirement to make reparation for such breaches, to environmental problems is particularly problematic. In many cases, it is simply impossible to prove that particular damage has been caused by one particular source. The protection of the environment is a global problem requiring a global response. Accordingly, the approach to dealing with environmental matters has shifted from the bilateral state responsibility paradigm to the establishment and strengthening of international cooperation. Similarly, it became obvious during the COVID-19 pandemic which commenced in late 2019 that only international cooperation could successfully diagnose the

disease and provide either an effective vaccine or medication that could mitigate its effects.

A developing theme of international environmental law, therefore, relates to the requirement for states to cooperate in dealing with transboundary pollution issues. Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration 1972 noted that ‘international matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit’, while Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration 1992 emphasised that ‘states shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem’. Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration refers both to national and international activities in this field by stating that:

states shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also co-operate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.⁹⁵

Use of Territory

The *Corfu Channel* case⁹⁶ established the principle that states are not knowingly to allow their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states and from this can be deduced a duty to inform other states of known environmental hazards. A large number of international agreements reflect this proposition. Article 198 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, for example, provides that ‘when a state becomes aware of cases in which the marine environment is in imminent danger of being damaged or had been damaged by pollution, it shall immediately notify other states it deems likely to be affected by such damage, as well as the competent international authorities’.⁹⁷ Article 13 of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 1989 provides that states parties shall, whenever it comes to their knowledge, ensure that in the case of an accident occurring during the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes which are likely to present risks to human health and the environment in other states, those states are immediately informed.⁹⁸ This has also led to the principle of prevention, whereby states are held to be under a general duty to prevent, reduce, limit or control activities that might cause or risk environmental damage.⁹⁹

It is also to be noted that in 1974 the OECD (the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) adopted a Recommendation that prior to the initiation of works or undertakings that might create a risk of significant transfrontier pollution, early information should be provided to states that are or may be affected.¹⁰⁰ In 1988, the OECD adopted a Council Decision in which it is provided that states must provide information for the prevention of and the response to accidents at hazardous installations and transmit to exposed countries the results of their studies on proposed installations. A

duty to exchange emergency plans is stipulated, as well as a duty to transmit immediate warning to exposed countries where an accident is an imminent threat.¹⁰¹ The point is also emphasised in the Rio Declaration of 1992. Principle 18 provides that states shall immediately notify other states of any natural disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the environment of those states, while Principle 19 stipulates that states shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected states on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those states at an early stage and in good faith.¹⁰²

There may also be a requirement of prior consultation. Article 5 of the ILA Montreal Rules provides that states planning to carry out activities which might entail a significant risk of transfrontier pollution shall give early notice to states likely to be affected. This provision builds upon, for example, the *Lac Lanoux* arbitration between France and Spain,¹⁰³ which concerned the proposed diversion of a shared watercourse. The arbitral tribunal noted in particular the obligation to negotiate in such circumstances.¹⁰⁴ Some treaties establish a duty of prior notification, one early example being the Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment 1974. Article 5 of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 1979 provides that consultations shall be held, upon request, at an early stage between the state within whose jurisdiction the activity is to be conducted and states which are actually affected by or exposed to a significant risk of long-range transboundary air pollution.¹⁰⁵ The increasing range of state practice¹⁰⁶ has led the International Law Association to conclude that ‘a rule of international customary law has emerged that in principle a state is obliged to render

information on new or increasing pollution to a potential victim state’.¹⁰⁷

Article 8 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001 provides that where an assessment indicates a risk of causing significant transboundary harm, the state of origin is to inform the state likely to be affected with timely notification and information and may not take any decision on authorisation within six months of the response of the state likely to be affected.¹⁰⁸

The evolution of a duty to inform states that might be affected by the creation of a source of new or increasing pollution has been accompanied by consideration of an obligation to make environmental impact assessments.¹⁰⁹

This requirement is included in several treaties.¹¹⁰ Article 204 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 provides that states should ‘observe, measure, evaluate and analyse by recognised scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution on the marine environment’ and in particular ‘shall keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these activities are likely to pollute the marine environment’. Reports are to be published, while under article 206, when states have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of, or significant and harmful changes to, the marine environment, ‘they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of such assessments’.¹¹¹

Environmental Impact Assessments

The EEC Council Directive 85/337 provides that member states shall adopt all necessary measures to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment are made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects,¹¹² while the issue was taken further in the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991. Under this Convention, states parties are to take the necessary legal, administrative and other measures to ensure that prior to a decision to authorise or undertake a proposed activity listed in Appendix I¹¹³ that is likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary impact, an environmental impact assessment is carried out. The party of origin must notify any party which may be affected of the proposed activity, providing full information. Once the affected party decides to participate in the environmental impact assessment procedure under the provisions of the Convention, it must supply information to the party of origin of the proposed activity at its request relating to the potentially affected environment under its jurisdiction.¹¹⁴ The documentation to be submitted to the competent authority of the party of origin is detailed in Appendix III and it is comprehensive. Consultations must take place between the party of origin and the affected parties concerning the potential transboundary impact and the measures to reduce or eliminate the impact,¹¹⁵ and in taking the final decision on the proposed activity the parties shall ensure that due account is taken of the outcome of the environmental impact assessment and consultations held.¹¹⁶ Post-project analyses may also be carried out under article 7.¹¹⁷ Other instruments provide for such environmental impact assessments¹¹⁸ and some international organisations have developed their own assessment requirements.¹¹⁹ The question of environmental impact assessments was raised in the *Pulp Mills* case,¹²⁰ where the Court concluded that ‘it may now be considered a requirement

under general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource'. It was also held that the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment was a continuous one, and that monitoring of the project's effects on the environment should be undertaken, where necessary, throughout the life of the project, although an environmental impact assessment had to be conducted prior to the implementation of a project. The Court in the *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua / Nicaragua v. Costa Rica* joined cases¹²¹ stated that this principle 'applied generally to proposed activities which may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context'. The Court continued by noting that:

to fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant transboundary environmental harm, a state must, before embarking on an activity having the potential adversely to affect the environment of another state, ascertain if there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the requirement to carry out an environmental impact assessment.

This leaves open the question of how precisely such risks are to be determined and, indeed, by whom. To date, the requirement focuses upon the state undertaking the activity in question and thus to some extent remains a subjective process.¹²²

The Precautionary Principle

Other principles of international cooperation in the field of environmental protection are beginning to emerge and inform the development of legal norms. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that ‘in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ This marks a step away from the traditional approach, which required states to act on the basis of scientific knowledge and constitutes a recognition that in certain circumstances to await formal scientific proof may prevent urgent action being taken in time. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol to that Convention both referred in their respective preambles to ‘precautionary measures’,¹²³ while the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development 1990 noted that in order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. It was emphasised that ‘environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation’ and part of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration was repeated. The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992 provides in article 2(5)(a) that the parties would be guided by ‘the precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of hazardous substances shall not be postponed on the ground that scientific research has not fully proved a causal link between these substances, on the one hand and the potential transboundary impact, on the other’. References to the

precautionary principle appear also in the Convention on Biodiversity 1992¹²⁴ and in the Convention on Climate Change 1992.¹²⁵ The principle was described by Judge Weeramantry as one gaining increasing support as part of the international law of the environment.¹²⁶

Recognition has also emerged of the special responsibility of developed states in the process of environmental protection.¹²⁷ Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration stipulates that ‘states have common but differentiated responsibilities’. In particular, it is emphasised that ‘the developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command’. Article 3(1) of the Convention on Climate Change provides that the parties should act to protect the climate system ‘on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ so that the developed countries would take the lead in combating climate change.¹²⁸

Sustainable Development

In addition, the concept of sustainable development has been evolving in a way that circumscribes the competence of states to direct their own development.¹²⁹ The International Court in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case referred specifically to the concept of sustainable development,¹³⁰ while Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration notes that the right to development must be fulfilled so as to ‘equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations’¹³¹ and Principle 4

states that in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process.¹³² Principle 27 called for cooperation in the further development of international law in the field of sustainable development.¹³³ The Climate Change Convention declares in article 3(4) that ‘the parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development’, while the Biodiversity Convention refers on several occasions to the notion of ‘sustainable use’.¹³⁴ Quite what is meant by sustainable development is somewhat unclear and it may refer to a range of economic, environmental and social factors.¹³⁵ Clearly, however, some form of balance between these factors will be necessitated.¹³⁶

The Polluter Pays

Another emerging principle, more widely accepted in some countries and regions than others, is the notion that the costs of pollution should be paid by the polluter.¹³⁷ Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration notes that ‘the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution, with due regard to the public interests and without distorting international trade and investment’. The principle has been particularly applied with regard to civil liability for damage resulting from hazardous activities¹³⁸ and has particularly been adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development¹³⁹ and the European Community.¹⁴⁰ The polluter-pays principle has been referred to both in the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 and in the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 1992 as ‘a general principle of international environmental law’.¹⁴¹ Again, quite how far this principle

actually applies is uncertain. It is, in particular, unclear whether all the costs of an environmental clean-up would be covered. State practice appears to demonstrate that such costs should be apportioned between the parties.¹⁴²

Atmospheric Pollution¹⁴³

Perhaps the earliest perceived form of pollution relates to the pollution of the air. The burning of fossil fuels releases into the atmosphere sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides which change into acids and are carried by natural elements and fall as rain or snow or solid particles. Such acids have the effect of killing living creatures in lakes and streams and of damaging soils and forests.¹⁴⁴ While the airspace above the territorial domain of a state forms part of that state,¹⁴⁵ the imprecise notion of the atmosphere would combine elements of this territorial sovereignty with areas not so defined. The legal characterisation of the atmosphere, therefore, is confused and uncertain, but one attractive possibility is to refer to it as a shared resource or area of common concern.¹⁴⁶

The question of how one defines the term ‘pollution’ has been addressed in several international instruments. In a Recommendation adopted in 1974 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,¹⁴⁷ pollution is broadly defined as ‘the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the environment resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems, and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment’.¹⁴⁸ This definition was substantially reproduced in the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 1979¹⁴⁹

and in the Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution adopted by the International Law Association in 1982.¹⁵⁰ Several points ought to be noted at this stage. First, actual damage must have been caused. Pollution likely to result as a consequence of certain activities is not included. Secondly, the harm caused must be of a certain level of intensity, and, thirdly, the question of interference with legitimate uses of the environment requires further investigation.

The core obligation in customary international law with regard to atmospheric pollution was laid down in the *Trail Smelter* case,¹⁵¹ which provided that no state had the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another state or to persons or property therein, where the case was of serious consequence and the injury established by clear and convincing evidence.¹⁵²

In 1979, on the initiative of the Scandinavian countries and under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution was signed.¹⁵³ The definition of pollution is reasonably broad,¹⁵⁴ while article 1(b) defines long-range transboundary air pollution as air pollution whose physical origin is situated wholly or in part within the area under the national jurisdiction of one state and which has adverse effects in the area under the jurisdiction of another state at such a distance that it is not generally possible to distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources or groups of sources.

The obligations undertaken under the Convention, however, are modest. States ‘shall endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and

prevent air pollution, including long-range transboundary air pollution'.¹⁵⁵ The question of state liability for damage resulting from such pollution is not addressed. The Convention provides that states are to develop policies and strategies by means of exchanges of information and consultation¹⁵⁶ and to exchange information to combat generally the discharge of air pollutants.¹⁵⁷ Consultations are to be held upon request at an early stage between contracting parties actually affected by or exposed to a significant risk of long-range transboundary air pollution and contracting parties within which and subject to whose jurisdiction a significant contribution to such pollution originates or could originate, in connection with activities carried on or contemplated therein.¹⁵⁸ The parties also undertook to develop the existing 'Co-operative programme for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transmission of air pollutants in Europe' (EMEP).¹⁵⁹

In 2001, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants was signed. The Convention provides for the control of the production, trade in, disposal and use of twelve named persistent organic pollutants (although there is a health exception temporarily for DDT). There is a procedure to add other such pollutants to the list and an interim financial mechanism with the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)¹⁶⁰ was established as the principal entity to help developing countries.¹⁶¹ In May 2005, a conference of states parties established a subsidiary body, the Persistent Organic Pollutants Review Committee,¹⁶² in order to assist in implementation activities.

In 1986, a Protocol to the Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources¹⁶³ extended that agreement to atmospheric emissions of pollutants.¹⁶⁴ Article 212 of the Law of the Sea

Convention 1982 requires states to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control atmospheric pollution of the marine environment, although no specific standards are set.¹⁶⁵

Climate Change¹⁶⁶

The problem of global warming and the expected increase in the temperature of the earth in the decades to come has focused attention on the issues particularly of the consumption of fossil fuels and deforestation. In addition, the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, which has the effect of letting excessive ultraviolet radiation through to the surface of the earth, is a source of considerable concern. The problem of the legal characterisation of the ozone layer is a significant one. Article 1(1) of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 defines this area as ‘the layer of atmospheric ozone above the planetary boundary layer’. This area would thus appear, particularly in the light of the global challenge posed by ozone depletion and climate change, to constitute a distinct unit with an identity of its own irrespective of national sovereignty or shared resources claims. UN General Assembly resolution 43/53, for example, states that global climate change is ‘the common concern of mankind’.¹⁶⁷ Whatever the precise legal status of this area, what is important is the growing recognition that the scale of the challenge posed can only really be tackled upon a truly international or global basis.

In the first serious effort to tackle the problem of ozone depletion, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was adopted in 1985, entering into force three years later. This Convention is a framework agreement, providing the institutional structure for the elaboration of Protocols laying down specific standards concerning the production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the agents which cause the destruction of the

ozone layer. Under the Convention, contracting parties agree to take appropriate measures to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer.¹⁶⁸ The parties also agree to cooperate in the collection of relevant material and in the formulation of agreed measures, and to take appropriate legislative or administrative action to control, limit, reduce or prevent human activities under their jurisdiction or control 'should it be found that these activities have or are likely to have adverse effects resulting from modification or likely modification of the ozone layer'.¹⁶⁹ A secretariat and disputes settlement mechanism were established.¹⁷⁰ However, overall the Convention is little more than a framework within which further action could be taken.

In 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was adopted and this called for a phased reduction of CFCs and a freeze on the use of halons.¹⁷¹ The control measures of the Protocol are based on the regulation of the production of 'controlled substances'¹⁷² by the freezing of their consumption¹⁷³ at 1986 levels followed by a progressive reduction, so that by mid-1998 consumption was to be reduced by 20 per cent in comparison with the 1986 figure. From mid-1998 onwards, consumption was to be reduced to 50 per cent of the 1986 level.¹⁷⁴ However, this was subsequently felt to have been insufficient and, in 1989, the parties to the Convention and Protocol adopted the Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, in which the parties agreed to phase out the production and consumption of CFCs controlled by the Protocol as soon as possible, but not later than the year 2000, and to phase out halons and control and reduce other substances which contribute significantly to ozone depletion as soon as

feasible. An Implementation Committee was established under the Montreal Protocol together with a non-compliance procedure, whereby a party querying the carrying out of obligations by another party can submit its concerns in writing to the secretariat. The secretariat with the party complained against will examine the complaint and the matter will then be passed to the Implementation Committee, which will try and secure a friendly settlement and make a report to the meeting of the parties, which can take further measures to ensure compliance with the Protocol.

The parties to the Protocol made a series of Adjustments and Amendments to the Protocol in June 1990,¹⁷⁵ including making specific reference to the requirement to take into account the developmental needs of developing countries and the need for the transfer of alternative technologies, and a Multilateral Fund was established.¹⁷⁶

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted in 1992¹⁷⁷ and its objective is to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system and such level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.¹⁷⁸ The states parties undertake *inter alia* to develop, update and publish national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks¹⁷⁹ of all greenhouse gases not covered by the Montreal Protocol; to formulate, implement and update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate changes.¹⁸⁰ Developed country

parties, and certain other parties listed in Annex I,¹⁸¹ commit themselves to take the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions and particularly to adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.¹⁸² In addition, developed country parties and other developed parties included in Annex II¹⁸³ are to provide the financial resources to enable the developing country parties to meet their obligations under the Convention and generally to assist them in coping with the adverse effects of climate change. The parties agree to give full consideration to actions necessary to assist developing country parties that may be, for example, small island countries, countries with low-lying coastal areas, countries prone to natural disasters, drought and desertification and landlocked and transit states.¹⁸⁴

The Conference of the Parties is established as the supreme body of the Convention and has the function *inter alia* to review the implementation of the Convention, periodically examine the obligations of the parties and the institutional arrangements established, promote the exchange of information, facilitate at the request of two or more parties the coordination of measures taken to address climate change, promote and guide the development of comparable methodologies for the preparation of inventories, assess the implementation of the Convention by the parties, consider and adopt regular reports on implementation and make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of the Convention.¹⁸⁵ In addition, the Convention provides for a secretariat to be established, together with a subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice and a subsidiary body

for implementation.¹⁸⁶ The Convention as a whole is a complex document and the range of commitments entered into, particularly by developed country parties, is not wholly clear.¹⁸⁷

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol¹⁸⁸ commits developed country parties to individual, legally binding targets to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, adding up to a total cut of at least 5 per cent from 1990 levels in the ‘commitment period’ of 2008–12. Developing countries are obliged simply to meet existing commitments. Certain activities since 1990 which have the effect of removing greenhouse gases, such as forestry schemes (so-called ‘carbon sinks’), may be offset against emission targets. The Protocol also allows states to aggregate their emissions, thus allowing, for example, EU members if they wish to be counted together permitting less-developed members to increase emissions on the account of other members. In addition, states may receive credits for supporting emission-reducing projects in other developed states (‘joint implementation’) and in certain circumstances in developing states (‘the clean development mechanism’), and the possibility has been provided for trading emission permits, so that some countries may purchase the unused emission quotas of other countries (‘emissions trading’).

The Conference of the Parties meets regularly to review the Convention and Protocol. There are two supplementary bodies: one on scientific and technological advice and one on implementation. The financial mechanism of the Convention is operated by the Global Environment Facility, established by the World Bank, UN Environment Programme and UN Development Programme in 1991, while advice is received from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, established by the World Meteorological

Organisation and the UN Environmental Programme.¹⁸⁹ Annex 1 countries (essentially the developed states) must provide annual inventory reports on greenhouse gas emissions to the secretariat, which are subject to in-depth and technical review.¹⁹⁰ Developing countries are subject to weaker reporting requirements. There is a Compliance Committee with facilitative and enforcement branches for parties to the Kyoto Protocol (as amended by the Marrakesh Accords 2001).¹⁹¹

The Paris Agreement was adopted on 12 December 2015¹⁹² with the aim to keep the global temperature rise this century below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and, if possible, to 1.5 degrees. The agreement is complex and only a brief and basic comment will be made. The parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, while recognising that peaking will take longer for developing country parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. In order to achieve this, the agreement establishes binding commitments by the parties to establish and maintain ‘nationally determined contributions’ that they intend to achieve and to this end agree to pursue domestic mitigation measures. This is in distinction to previous attempts to assert internationally agreed targets. Such contributions are to be communicated every five years and each contribution is to represent a ‘progression’ beyond the then current contribution. Different requirements are placed upon developed and developing states parties (the principle of ‘equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective

capabilities’). The former are to continue to take the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets, while the latter are to continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances.

In order to implement the agreement, an ‘enhanced transparency framework for action and support’ was established, taking into account the different capacities of the parties. Under this system emission targets would be set domestically and measuring, reporting and verification would take place at the international level. Information provided by the parties would be considered by a ‘technical expert review’. Further, a ‘global stocktake’ will take place by a Conference of the Parties in 2023 and thereafter every five years. In addition, a committee of twelve experts was to be established as a non-compliance mechanism to facilitate implementation of the agreement and this will report to the Conference of the Parties annually.¹⁹³ The agreement came into force on 4 November 2016.¹⁹⁴

Outer Space¹⁹⁵

The Outer Space Treaty 1967 provides that the exploration and use of outer space is to be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all states.¹⁹⁶

The harmful contamination of space or celestial bodies is to be avoided, as are adverse changes in the environment of the earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter.¹⁹⁷ Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are not to be placed in orbit around the earth, installed on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space, and the moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.¹⁹⁸ The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1979 provides that the moon and its natural resources are the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.¹⁹⁹ Article VII stipulates that in exploring and using the moon, states parties are to take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment or by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise.

There is, in particular, a growing problem with regard to debris located in outer space. Such debris, consisting of millions of objects of varying size in space,²⁰⁰ constitutes a major hazard to spacecraft. While liability for damage caused by objects launched into space is absolute,²⁰¹ the specific problem of space debris has been addressed in the Buenos Aires International Instrument on the Protection of the Environment from Damage Caused by Space Debris, adopted by the International Law Association at its 1994 Conference.²⁰² The

draft emphasises the obligations to cooperate in the prevention of damage to the environment, in promoting the development and exchange of technology to prevent, reduce and control space debris and in the flow and exchange of information, and to hold consultations when there is reason to believe that activities may produce space debris likely to cause damage to the environment or to persons or objects or significant risks thereto. The principle proclaimed by the draft is that each state or international organisation party to the instrument that launches or procures the launching of a space object is internationally liable for damage arising therefrom to another party to the instrument as a consequence of space debris produced by any such object.²⁰³ Current problems under consideration include the phenomenon of the privatisation and commercialisation of space,²⁰⁴ remote sensing, suborbital flights and use of satellite data.²⁰⁵ In 2011, the Permanent Court of Arbitration adopted *Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities* in order to fill the gap left by UN treaties in the field of dispute settlement, where private parties do not have *locus standi*.²⁰⁶

International Watercourses²⁰⁷

International watercourses are systems of surface waters and ground waters which are situated in more than one state.²⁰⁸ Such watercourses form a unitary whole and normally flow into a common terminus. While there has historically been some disagreement as to the extent of the watercourse system covered, particularly whether it includes the complete river basin with all associated tributaries and groundwater systems, a broader definition is the approach adopted in recent years. Customary law has developed rules with regard to equal riparian rights to international rivers,²⁰⁹ but these were not extensive.²¹⁰ The International Law Association, a private organisation of international lawyers, proposed the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers in 1966,²¹¹ in which it was noted that each basin state was entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial use of the waters and that all states were obliged to prevent new forms of water pollution that would cause substantial injury in the territory of other basin states.²¹²

In 1992, the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes was adopted in Helsinki within the framework of the UN Economic Commission for Europe.²¹³ Under this Convention, all parties must take all appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce any significant adverse effect on the environment resulting from a change in the conditions of transboundary waters caused by a human activity. Such effects on the environment include effects on human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape and also effects on the cultural

heritage.²¹⁴ In taking such measures, states parties are to be guided by the precautionary principle²¹⁵ and by the polluter-pays principle, by which the costs of pollution prevention, control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter.²¹⁶ Each party undertakes to set emission limits for discharges from point sources into surface waters based on best available technology²¹⁷ and to define, where appropriate, water-quality objectives and adopt water-quality criteria²¹⁸ for the purpose of preventing, controlling and reducing transboundary impact. The measures to be taken must ensure, for example, the application of low- and non-waste technology; the prior licensing of waste-water discharge; the application of biological or equivalent processes to municipal waste water; the use of environmental impact assessments and sustainable water-resources management.²¹⁹

The Convention also calls for the parties to establish monitoring programmes, to cooperate in research and development projects and to exchange relevant information as early as possible.²²⁰ Riparian parties are to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements in order to coordinate their activities and to consult together at the request of any one riparian party.²²¹ Article 7 provides that the parties ‘shall support appropriate international efforts to elaborate rules, criteria and procedures in the field of responsibility and liability’.

The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997 provides that watercourse states shall in their respective territories utilise an international watercourse in an ‘equitable and reasonable manner’. In particular, optimal utilisation must be consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.²²² Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable

utilisation include, in addition to physical factors of a natural character and the social and economic needs of the watercourse states concerned, the 'conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect'.²²³ Article 7 provides that watercourse states shall take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse states. Where such harm is caused, consultations are to take place in order to eliminate or mitigate such harm and with regard to compensation where appropriate. Articles 9 and 11 provide for regular exchanges of data and information, while watercourse states are to exchange information and consult in particular on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition of an international watercourse. Before a watercourse state implements or permits the implementation of planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse states, it is to provide such states with timely notification and sufficient technical data and information for the evaluation of the possible effects of the planned measures.²²⁴ Unless otherwise agreed, the notified states have a period of six months for such evaluation during which exchanges of data and information are to take place and the planned measures are not to be implemented without the consent of the notified states. If no reply to the notification is received, the notifying state may proceed to implement the planned measures. If a reply is received, the states are to consult and negotiate with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the situation.²²⁵ Where a watercourse state has serious reason to believe that measures that may have a significant adverse impact are being planned, it may itself set in motion the above procedures.²²⁶

Article 20 stipulates that watercourse states shall protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses²²⁷ and shall act to prevent, reduce and control pollution²²⁸ of an international watercourse that may cause significant harm to other watercourse states or to their environment.

Watercourse states are to take all necessary measures to prevent the introduction of species, alien or new, into an international watercourse which may have effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse resulting in significant harm to other watercourse states.²²⁹

It is thus clear that the international community is coming to terms with the need to protect the environment of international watercourses.²³⁰ How evolving international environmental rules relate to the more traditional principles of international law was one of the issues before the International Court in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case.²³¹ Hungary and Czechoslovakia entered into a treaty in 1977 by which there would be created on the Danube between the two states a barrage system, a dam, a reservoir, hydro-electric power stations and a 25-kilometre canal for diverting the Danube from its original course through a system of locks. A dispute developed in the light of Hungary's growing environmental concerns. Hungary suspended work on the project in 1989, while Czechoslovakia (now the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) proceeded with a 'provisional solution' as from 1991, which involved damming the Danube at a point on Czechoslovakian territory. In 1992, Hungary announced the termination of the treaty of 1977 and related instruments. The case came before the International Court ultimately by way of a Special Agreement in 1993 between Hungary and Slovakia (the successor to the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in so far as the project was concerned). The case

essentially revolved around the relationship between the treaty and subsequent environmental concerns. The Court emphasised that newly developed norms of environmental law were relevant for the implementation of the treaty,²³² while: ‘The awareness of the vulnerability of the environment and the recognition that environmental risks have to be assessed on a continuous basis have become much stronger in the years since the treaty’s conclusion.’²³³ However, the Court found that the treaty was still in force and Hungary was not entitled to terminate it.²³⁴

Ultra-Hazardous Activities²³⁵

It has been argued that ultra-hazardous activities form a distinct category in the field of international environmental law and one in which the principle of strict or absolute liability operates. The definition of what constitutes such activity, of course, is somewhat uncertain, but the characterisation can be taken to revolve around the serious consequences that are likely to flow from any damage that results, rather than upon the likelihood of pollution occurring from the activity in question. The focus therefore is upon the significant or exceptional risk of severe transnational damage.²³⁶ The effect of categorising a particular activity as ultra-hazardous would, it appears, be to accept the strict liability principle rather than the due diligence standard commonly regarded as the general rule in pollution situations.²³⁷ In other words, the state under whose territory or jurisdiction the activity took place would be liable irrespective of fault. This exception to the general principle can be justified as a method of moving the burden of proof and shifting the loss clearly from the victim to the state. It would also operate as a further incentive to states to take action in areas of exceptional potential harm.

In determining what areas of activity could be characterised as ultra-hazardous, some caution needs to be exercised. There can be little doubt that nuclear activities fall within this category as a general rule, but beyond this there appears to be no agreement. The Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects 1972 specifically provides that a launching state shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage

caused by its space objects on the surface of the earth,²³⁸ but this is the only clear example of its kind.

Nuclear Activities²³⁹

The use of nuclear technology brings with it risks as well as benefits and the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1986 and that at the nuclear reactor in Fukushima in 2011²⁴⁰ brought home to international opinion just how devastating the consequences of a nuclear mishap could be. Concern in this area had hitherto focused upon the issue of nuclear weapons. In 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was signed.²⁴¹ However, France and China did not become parties to this treaty and continued atmospheric nuclear testing. Australia and New Zealand sought a declaration from the International Court that French atmospheric nuclear testing was contrary to international law, but the Court decided the case on the basis that a subsequent French decision to end such testing was binding and thus the issue was moot.²⁴² In response to renewed French nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995, albeit underground rather than atmospheric, New Zealand asked the International Court to review the situation pursuant to the 1974 judgment and declare that France was acting illegally as being likely to cause the introduction into the marine environment of radioactive material and in failing to conduct an environmental impact assessment. While the Court referred to ‘the obligations of states to respect and protect the natural environment’, it declared that the request had to be dismissed as not falling within the relevant paragraph of the 1974 judgment permitting a re-examination of the situation since the latter judgment had concerned atmospheric tests alone.²⁴³ Measures to prevent the spread of

nuclear weapons were adopted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, although the possession itself of nuclear weapons does not contravene international law.²⁴⁴

A variety of international organisations are now involved to some extent in the process of developing rules and principles concerning nuclear activities and environmental protection. The International Atomic Energy Agency, to take the prime example, was established in 1956 in order to encourage the development of nuclear power, but particularly since the Chernobyl accident its nuclear safety role has been emphasised. The Convention on Assistance in Cases of Nuclear Emergency 1986, for example, gave it a coordinating function and an obligation to provide appropriate resources where so requested.²⁴⁵ The IAEA has established a series of standards and guidelines including, for example, in the context of the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants, although such standards do not have the force of law.²⁴⁶ Other international organisations also have a role to play in the sphere of nuclear activities.²⁴⁷

The Provision of Information

There appears to be a general principle requiring that information be provided in certain situations²⁴⁸ and several bilateral agreements have expressed this in the context of nuclear accidents.²⁴⁹ In general, such agreements provide that each state is to inform the other without delay of any emergency resulting from civil nuclear activities and any other incident that could have radiological consequences for the second state. Reciprocal information

systems are set up and warning notification centres established. Such agreements, however, do not cover exchange of military information.²⁵⁰

Following the Chernobyl accident and the failure of the Soviet Union to provide immediate information, the Vienna Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1986 was rapidly adopted, under the auspices of the IAEA. This provides that in the event of a nuclear accident, the relevant state shall ‘forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency . . . those states which are or may be physically affected . . . of the nuclear accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact location’. Additionally, such states must be promptly provided with information relevant to minimising the radiological consequences.²⁵¹ States are to respond promptly to a request for further information or consultations sought by an affected state.²⁵²

It is also to be noted that although the Convention does not apply to military nuclear accidents, the five nuclear weapons states made Statements of Voluntary Application indicating that they would apply the Convention to all nuclear accidents, including those not specified in that agreement.²⁵³

Since this Convention was adopted, a variety of bilateral agreements have been signed which have been more wide-ranging than those signed beforehand and which in some cases have gone beyond the provisions specified in the Notification Convention. The agreements signed by the United Kingdom with Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark during 1987–88, for example, specify that there is an obligation to notify the other parties if there is an accident or activity in the territory of the notifying state from

which a transboundary effect of radiological safety significance is likely and additionally where abnormal levels of radiation are registered that are not caused by release from facilities or activities in the notifying state's territory. Extensive provisions dealing with exchanges of information are also included.²⁵⁴

The Provision of Assistance²⁵⁵

The earliest treaty providing for assistance in the event of radiation accidents was the Nordic Mutual Assistance Agreement 1963. This dealt with the general terms of assistance, the advisory and coordinating role of the IAEA, financing, liability, and privileges and immunities. The United Nations established the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) in 1972²⁵⁶ and this provides assistance in pre-disaster planning. In 1977, the IAEA concluded an agreement with UNDRO with the purpose of coordinating their assistance activities in the nuclear accident field and in 1984 published a series of guidelines²⁵⁷ setting out the mechanics of cooperation between states, including references to the problems of costs, liability, privileges and immunities.

In 1986, following the Chernobyl accident and at the same time as the Notification Convention, the Vienna Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency was adopted. This provides that a state in need of assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency may call for such assistance from any other state party either directly or through the IAEA.²⁵⁸ This applies whether or not such accident or emergency originated within its territory, jurisdiction or control.

States requesting assistance (which may include medical assistance and help with regard to the temporary relocation of displaced persons²⁵⁹) must provide details of the type of assistance required and other necessary information.²⁶⁰ The IAEA must respond to a request for assistance by making available appropriate resources allocated for this purpose and by transmitting promptly the request to other states and international organisations possessing the necessary resources. In addition, if requested by the state seeking assistance, the IAEA will coordinate the assistance at the international level. The IAEA is also required to collect and disseminate to the states parties information concerning the availability of experts, equipment and materials and with regard to methodologies, techniques and available research data relating to the response to such situations.²⁶¹ The general range of assistance that can be provided by the Agency is laid down in some detail.²⁶²

In general terms, the Assistance Convention seeks to balance considerations relating to the sovereignty of the requesting state,²⁶³ the legitimate rights of the assisting state or states²⁶⁴ and the interests of the international community in rendering rapid assistance to affected states. Whether the balance achieved is a fair one is open to discussion.²⁶⁵

Nuclear Safety

The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted by the IAEA in 1994. This emphasises that responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the state having jurisdiction over a nuclear installation²⁶⁶ and obliges states parties to take legislative and administrative measures to implement Convention obligations²⁶⁷ via a regulatory body²⁶⁸ and to submit reports to periodic

review meetings of all parties.²⁶⁹ The Convention provides that operators of nuclear installations must be licensed²⁷⁰ and it is the operators that remain primarily responsible for the safety of the installations.²⁷¹ The Convention specifies a number of safety considerations, but these are not in the form of binding obligations upon the parties.²⁷²

Civil Liability²⁷³

In addition to the issue of the responsibility or liability of the state for the activity under consideration, the question of the proceedings that may be taken by the individual victims is also raised. One possible approach is to permit the victim to have access to the legal system of the foreign polluter and thus to all remedies available on a non-discriminatory basis. This would have the effect of transforming the transboundary pollution into a national matter.²⁷⁴ This approach is evident in some treaties.²⁷⁵ The problem is that while placing the foreign victim on a par with nationals within the domestic legal system of the offender, it depends for its value upon the legal system possessing internal legislation of appropriate substantive content. This is not always the case. There are, however, several international agreements dealing specifically with the question of civil liability in the sphere of nuclear activities which operate on the basis of certain common general principles.

The OECD Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy 1960²⁷⁶ provides that the operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable for damage to or loss of life of any person and damage to or loss of any property (other than the nuclear installation and associated property or means of transport). The IAEA Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear

Damage 1963 has similar provisions, but is aimed at global participation. However, both the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention systems have suffered from relatively limited participation and a Joint Protocol was adopted in 1988 linking the Paris and Vienna Convention regimes, so that parties under each of these conventions may benefit from both of them. In 1997, a Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention and a Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage were adopted by over eighty states. These instruments increased the scope of liability of operators to a limit of not less than 300 million Special Drawing Rights (approx. 400 million US dollars) and the geographical scope of the Convention. In addition, an improved definition of nuclear damage, to include, for example, environmental damage, was provided.²⁷⁷

These conventions operate upon similar principles. It is the actual operator of the nuclear installation or ship that is to bear the loss²⁷⁸ and this is on the basis of absolute or strict liability. Accordingly, no proof of fault or negligence is required. The conventions require operators to possess appropriate liability insurance or other financial security under the conditions laid down by the competent public authorities, unless the operator is itself a state,²⁷⁹ and the relevant states are to ensure that claims up to the liability limits are met.²⁸⁰ This recognition of the residual responsibility of the state is unique.²⁸¹ The amount of liability of the operator may, however, be limited.²⁸² The relevant conventions also determine which state has jurisdiction over claims against operators or their insurers. In general, jurisdiction lies with the state where the nuclear incident occurred, although where a nuclear incident takes place outside the territory of a contracting party or where the place of the nuclear incident cannot be determined with

certainly, jurisdiction will lie with the courts of the contracting party in whose territory the nuclear installation of the operator liable is situated.²⁸³ Judgments given by the competent courts are enforceable in the territory of any contracting party.

The issue of inter-state claims is more difficult, as was demonstrated by the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Many states have paid compensation to persons affected within their jurisdiction by the fallout from that accident, but while positions have been reserved with regard to claims directly against the former Soviet Union, it seems that problems relating to the obligations actually owed by states and the doubt over the requisite standard of care have prevented such claims from actually being made.²⁸⁴

Hazardous Wastes²⁸⁵

The increasing problem of the disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes and the practice of dumping in the Developing Countries, with its attendant severe health risks, has prompted international action.²⁸⁶ The Oslo Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 1972²⁸⁷ provides for a ban on the dumping of certain substances²⁸⁸ and for controls to be placed on the dumping of others.²⁸⁹ The London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972²⁹⁰ prohibits the dumping of wastes except as provided in the Convention itself, and this is strictly controlled.

In 1988, the Organisation of African Unity adopted a resolution proclaiming the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa to be a crime against Africa and its people. In 1991, the OAU adopted the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa,²⁹¹ under which parties are to prohibit the import of all hazardous wastes for any reason into Africa by non-parties and to prohibit the dumping at sea of such wastes. The OECD has adopted a number of Decisions and Recommendations concerning the transfrontier movements and exports of hazardous wastes.²⁹² In 1989, the OECD adopted a Recommendation²⁹³ noting that the polluter-pays principle should apply to accidents involving hazardous substances. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 1989 provides that parties shall prohibit the export of hazardous and other wastes to parties which have prohibited the import of

such wastes and have so informed the other parties. In the absence of prohibition by the importing state, export to that state of such wastes is only permissible where consent in writing to the specific import is obtained.²⁹⁴

The Convention also provides that any proposed transboundary movement of hazardous wastes must be notified to the competent authorities of the states concerned by the state of export. The latter shall not allow the generator or exporter of hazardous wastes to commence the transboundary movement without the written consent of the state of import and any state of transit.²⁹⁵

In 1990, the IAEA adopted a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste,²⁹⁶ emphasising that every state should ensure that such movements take place only with the prior notification and consent of the sending, receiving and transit states in accordance with their respective laws and regulations. Appropriate regulatory authorities were called for, as well as the necessary administrative and technical capacity to manage and dispose of such waste in a manner consistent with international safety standards.²⁹⁷

The Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents adopted in 1992 applies to industrial accidents in an installation or during transportation resulting from activities involving hazardous substances (identified in Annex I). It does not apply to nuclear accidents, accidents at military installations, dam failures, land-based transport accidents, accidental release of genetically modified organisms, accidents caused by activities in the marine environment or spills of oil or other harmful substances at sea.²⁹⁸ The Convention provides that parties of origin²⁹⁹ should identify hazardous activities within the jurisdiction and ensure that affected parties are notified

of any such proposed or existing activity. Consultations are to take place on the identification of those hazardous activities that may have transboundary effects.³⁰⁰ A variety of preventive measures are posited.³⁰¹ In particular, the party of origin shall require the operator in charge of such hazardous activity to demonstrate the safe performance of that activity by the provision of information.³⁰² Parties are to develop policies on the siting of new hazardous activities and on significant modifications to existing hazardous activities, while adequate emergency preparedness to respond to industrial accidents is to be established and maintained.³⁰³ An industrial accident notification system is established,³⁰⁴ while by article 13 the parties ‘shall support appropriate international efforts to elaborate rules, criteria and procedures in the field of responsibility and liability’.³⁰⁵

Marine Pollution³⁰⁶

Marine pollution can arise from a variety of sources, including the operation of shipping, dumping at sea,³⁰⁷ activities on the seabed³⁰⁸ and the effects of pollution originating on the land and entering the seas.³⁰⁹ There are a large number of treaties, bilateral, regional and multilateral, dealing with such issues and some of the more significant of them in the field of pollution from ships will be briefly noted.

Pollution from Ships

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 basically prohibits the discharge of oil within 50 miles of land and has been essentially superseded by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973,³¹⁰ which is concerned with all forms of non-accidental pollution from ships apart from dumping. In Annexes and other amendments and Protocols to the Convention,³¹¹ detailed standards are laid down covering oil, noxious liquid substances in bulk, harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form, sewage and garbage. The Convention covers ships flying the flag of, or operated under the authority of, a state party, but does not apply to warships or state-owned ships used only on governmental non-commercial service.

Article 211(2) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 provides that states are to legislate for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from vessels flying their flag or of their registry.

Such rules are to have the same effect at least as that of generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organisation³¹² or general diplomatic conference. States are also to ensure that the ships of their nationality or of their registry comply with ‘applicable international rules and standards’ and with domestic rules governing the prevention, reduction and control of pollution.³¹³ In addition, coastal states have jurisdiction physically to inspect, and, where the evidence so warrants, commence proceedings against ships in their territorial waters, where there are clear grounds for believing that the ship concerned has violated domestic or international pollution regulations.³¹⁴ It should also be noted that a state in whose port a vessel is may take legal proceedings against that vessel not only where it is alleged to have violated that state’s pollution laws or applicable international rules in its territorial sea or economic zone,³¹⁵ but also in respect of any discharge outside its internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone in violation of applicable international rules and standards.³¹⁶

Where an accident takes place, the Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969³¹⁷ permits states parties to take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil.³¹⁸ An International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation was signed in London in November 1990, with the purpose of ensuring prompt and effective action in the event of a pollution incident. It requires ships to carry detailed plans for dealing with pollution emergencies. Pollution incidents must be reported without delay and, in the event of a

serious incident, other states likely to be affected must be informed and details given to the International Maritime Organization. National and regional systems for dealing with such incidents are encouraged and the contracting parties agree to cooperate and provide advisory services, technical support and equipment at the request of other parties.³¹⁹

As far as liability is concerned, the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 provides that where oil escaping from a ship causes damage on the territory or territorial sea of a contracting party, the shipowner is strictly liable for such damage, which includes the costs of both preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by such measures.³²⁰ This liability is limited, however, unless the pollution is the result of the fault of the shipowner.³²¹ The shipowner must maintain insurance or other financial security to cover its liability. Claims may be brought in the courts of the party in which loss or damage has occurred or preventive measures taken and the judgments of such courts are generally recognisable and enforceable in the courts of all parties. The 1969 Convention was amended by the Protocol on Liability 1992,³²² which includes in the definition of damage compensation for impairment of the environment provided that this is limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken.³²³ The Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage was adopted in 1971 and enables compensation to be paid in certain cases not covered by the Civil Liability Convention. The Convention and Protocols of 1976 and 1984 were superseded by a Protocol of 1992 and the Convention ceased to be in force as from 24 May 2002. The 1992 Protocol established a separate, 1992

International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, known as the 1992 Fund, and this was accompanied by a Supplementary Fund in 2003.³²⁴

Suggestions for Further Reading

U. Beyerlin and T. Marauhn, *International Environmental Law*, Oxford, 2011

P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, *International Law and the Environment*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2009

P.-M. Dupuy and J. Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2018

M. Fitzmaurice and D. French, *International Environmental Law and Governance*, The Hague, 2015

P. Sands and J. Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, 4th ed., Cambridge, 2018

The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (ed. D. Bodansky, J. Brunee and E. Hay), Oxford, 2007

¹ See generally M. Fitzmaurice and D. French, *International Environmental Law and Governance*, The Hague, 2015; P. Sands and J. Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, 4th ed., Cambridge, 2018; P.-M. Dupuy and J. Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2018; A. Gillespie, *International Environmental Law, Policy and Ethics*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2014; P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, *International Law and the Environment*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2009; C. Redgwell, *Intergenerational Trusts and Environmental Protection*, Manchester, 1999; U. Beyerlin and T. Marauhn, *International Environmental Law*, Oxford, 2011; *International Law in the Era of Climate Change* (ed. R. Rayfuse and S. V. Scott), London, 2012; *International Environmental Law and the Global South* (ed. A. Shawkat, S. Atapattu, C. G. Gonzalez and J. Razzaque), Cambridge, 2016; E. Benvenisti, *Sharing Transboundary Resources*, Cambridge, 2002; M. Bothe and P. Sand, *La Politique de l'Environnement: De la Réglementation aux Instruments Économique*, The Hague, 2003; *The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law* (ed. D. Bodansky, J. Brunee and E. Hay), Oxford, 2007; *Research Handbook on International Environmental Law* (ed. M. Fitzmaurice, D. M. Ong

and P. Merkouris), Cheltenham, 2010; R. Romi, *Droit International et Européen de l'Environnement*, Paris, 2005; R. Wolfrum and N. Matz, *Conflicts in International Environmental Law*, Berlin, 2003; A. Kiss and D. Shelton, *A Guide to International Environmental Law*, The Hague, 2007; A. Kiss, 'International Protection of the Environment', in *The Structure and Process of International Law* (ed. R. St J. Macdonald and D. Johnston), The Hague, 1983, p. 1069; E. Brown Weiss, *In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity*, Dobbs Ferry, 1989; and P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 1412. Note that in 2013, the International Law Commission decided to include on its agenda the topics of 'Protection of the Atmosphere' and 'Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts', A/66/10, Annexes B and E, pp. 315, 351 respectively. In so far as the former is concerned, see the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/711, 2018, and as regards the latter topic, see second report of the Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/728, 2019; and see Report of the International Law Commission, 2019, A/74/10, pp. 209 ff.

² This may be measured by the fact that in July 1993, the ICJ established a special Chamber to deal with environmental questions. It has as yet heard no cases. See R. Ranjeva, 'L'Environnement, La Cour Internationale de Justice et sa Chambre Spéciale pour les Questions d'Environnement', *AFDI*, 1994, p. 433. Note also the Environmental Annex (Annex IV) to the Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty 1995 and article 18 of the Treaty, 34 ILM, 1995, p. 43. See also Annex II on Water Related Matters.

³ See, as to endangered species, e.g. M. Carwardine, *The WWF Environment Handbook*, London, 1990; and Lyster's *International Wildlife Law* (ed. M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell), 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2011. See also the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 1973 covering animals and plants, and the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, which *inter alia* calls upon parties to promote priority access on a fair and equitable basis by all parties, especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by contracting parties.

⁴ See further above, [Chapter 13](#).

⁵ See e.g. resolutions 2398 (XXII); 2997 (XXVII); 34/188; 35/8; 37/137; 37/250; 42/187; 44/244; 44/228; 45/212; 47/188; 69/220 and 70/1.

⁶ See generally www.unenvironment.org/.

⁷ See generally <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/>.

⁸ As e.g. under the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources Convention 1974 and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 1989.

⁹ See e.g. the Antarctic Treaty 1959 and its Protocol on Environmental Protection 1991. See, with regard to the International Whaling Commission, P. Birnie, *International Regulation of Whaling*, New York, 1985, p. 199. See also *Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening)*, ICJ Reports, 2014, p. 226.

¹⁰ See 30 ILM, 1991, p. 1735.

¹¹ See 33 ILM, 1994, p. 1273.

¹² See also the UN Convention to Combat Desertification 1994, *ibid.*, p. 1328.

¹³ See generally www.thegef.org.

¹⁴ See e.g. Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, chapter 10; M. Pallemmaerts, 'International Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio: Back to the Future?', in *Greening International Law* (ed. P. Sands), London, 1993, pp. 1, 8; *Environnement et Droits de l'Homme* (ed. P. Kromarek), Paris, 1987; G. Alfredsson and A. Ovsiousk, 'Human Rights and the Environment', *60 Nordic Journal of International Law*, 1991, p. 19; W. P. Gormley, *Human Rights and Environment*, Leiden, 1976; *Human Rights and Environmental Protection* (ed. A. Cançado Trindade), 1992; D. Shelton, 'Whatever Happened in Rio to Human Rights?', *3 Yearbook of International Environmental Law*, 1992, p. 75; Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 252 ff.; and *Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection* (ed. M. Anderson and A. E. Boyle), Oxford, 1996. See also M. Déjeant-Pons and M. Pallemmaerts, *Human Rights and the Environment*, Strasbourg, 2002.

¹⁵ The final text of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) meeting on the environment in Sofia in 1989 reaffirmed respect for the right of individuals, groups and organisations concerned with the environment to express freely their views, to associate with others and assemble peacefully, to obtain and distribute relevant information

and to participate in public debates on environmental issues, CSCE/SEM.36. See also EC Directive 90/313, 1990.

¹⁶ See *The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development* (ed. J. Viñuales), Oxford, 2015. See generally, as to the Rio Conference, S. Johnson, *The Earth Summit*, Dordrecht, 1993.

¹⁷ E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9.

¹⁸ Note also the European Charter on Environment and Health 1989 and the Dublin Declaration on the Environmental Imperative adopted by the European Council 1990. The Institut de Droit International adopted a resolution on the environment at its Strasbourg Session in September 1997, article 2 of which noted that: ‘Every human being has the right to live in a healthy environment.’

¹⁹ 112 *AJIL*, 2018, p. 460. In *Netherlands v. Urgenda*, Netherlands Supreme Court, Judgment of 20 December 2019, www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad-der-Nederlanden/Nieuws/Paginas/Dutch-State-to-reduce-greenhouse-gas-emissions-by-25-by-the-end-of-2020.aspx, the Court held that the risks of climate change fell within the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly article 2 on the right to life and article 8 on the right to privacy and determined that these provisions obliged the state to take measures against the risk of dangerous climate change. See also Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, chapter 17; and L. Loucaides, ‘Environmental Protection through the Jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 75 *BYIL*, 2004, p. 249.

²⁰ Adopted through the UN Economic Commission for Europe. The Convention came into force on 30 October 2001, see generally www.unece.org/env/welcome/, and the first meeting of states parties took place in October 2002. Note that in January 2003 a Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers was adopted which obliges companies to register annually their releases into the environment and transfer to other companies of certain pollutants. This information will then appear in the Pollutant Release and Transfer Register. This became binding in October 2009.

²¹ Decision 1/7 adopted on 30 October 2002 set up an eight-member Compliance Committee to consider submissions made with regard to allegations of non-compliance with the Convention by one party against another or by members of the public against any

contracting party unless that party has opted out of the procedure within one year of becoming a party. The Committee may also prepare a report on compliance with or implementation of the provisions of the Convention and monitor, assess and facilitate the implementation of and compliance with the reporting requirements made under article 10, para. 2, of the Convention and specified in Decision 1/8. See generally R. R. Churchill and G. Uffstein, 'Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law', **94** *AJIL*, 2000, p. 623.

²² Principle 21. See also S. P. Subedi, 'Balancing International Trade with Environmental Protection', **25** *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 1999, p. 373; T. Schoenbaum, 'International Trade and Protection of the Environment', **91** *AJIL*, 1997, p. 268; and N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, D. Magraw, M. J. Oliva, M. Orellana and E. Tuerk, *Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence*, London, 2006. Note the OECD Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Cooperation 2006. Note also *Iron Rhine (Belgium v. Netherlands)*, 2005, paras. 59, 243; 150 ILR, p. 143; www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1155.

²³ See e.g. A. D'Amato, 'Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?', **84** *AJIL*, 1990, p. 190; Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 188 ff.; E. Weiss, 'Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment', **84** *AJIL*, 1990, p. 198; and Brown Weiss, *Intergenerational Equity*. See also *Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources*, Supreme Court of the Philippines, 33 ILM, 1994, pp. 173, 185; and Judge Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion in the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 288, 341; 106 ILR, pp. 1, 63.

²⁴ 33 ILM, 1995, p. 360.

²⁵ See e.g. F. G. Minujin, 'Debt-for-Nature Swops: A Financial Mechanism to Reduce Debt and Preserve the Environment', **21** *Environmental Policy and Law*, 1991, p. 146; and S. George, *The Debt Boomerang*, London, 1992, pp. 30–1.

²⁶ See e.g. B. D. Smith, *State Responsibility and the Marine Environment*, Oxford, 1988. See also R. Lefebvre, *Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State Liability*, Dordrecht, 1996.

²⁷ See further above, Chapter 13.

²⁸ See the doctrine expressed by Judson Harmon, Attorney-General of the US in 1895, 21 *Op. Att’y. Gen.* 274, 283 (1895), cited in V. P. Nanda, *International Environmental Law and Policy*, New York, 1995, pp. 155–6.

²⁹ PCIJ, Series A, No. 23, 1929; 5 AD, p. 83.

³⁰ PCIJ, Series A, No. 23, 1929, p. 27; 5 AD, p. 84. See also the case concerning the *Auditing of Accounts between the Netherlands and France*, Arbitral Award of 12 March 2004, para. 97.

³¹ 2 RIAA, pp. 829, 839 (1928).

³² See 33 *AJIL*, 1939, p. 182 and 35 *AJIL*, 1941, p. 684; 9 AD, p. 315. See also J. E. Read, ‘The Trail Smelter Arbitration’, 1 *Canadian YIL*, 1963, p. 213; R. Kirgis, ‘Technological Challenge of the Shared Environment: US Practice’, 66 *AJIL*, 1974, p. 291; and L. Goldie, ‘A General View of International Environmental Law – a Survey of Capabilities, Trends and Limits’, in *Hague Colloque 1973*, pp. 26, 66–9.

³³ 35 *AJIL*, 1941, p. 716; 9 AD, p. 317. Canada invoked the *Trail Smelter* principle against the US when an oil spill at Cherry Point, Washington, DC, resulted in contamination of beaches in British Columbia: see 11 *Canadian YIL*, 1973, p. 333.

³⁴ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 22; 16 AD, pp. 155, 158.

³⁵ See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge de Castro in *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 388; 57 ILR, pp. 350, 533; and *Lac Lanoux* 24 ILR, p. 101.

³⁶ ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 288, 306; 106 ILR, pp. 1, 28.

³⁷ ICJ Reports, 1996, para. 29; 35 ILM, 1996, pp. 809, 821. See also *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 6, 67; 116 ILR, p. 1. In *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 56, the Court concluded: ‘A state is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory,

or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another state.’

³⁸ See also Principle 3 of the UN Environment Programme Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment concerning Resources Shared by Two or More States 1978; the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted in General Assembly resolution 1974 3281 (XXIX) and General Assembly resolution 34/186 (1979). See also above, [Chapter 10](#), p. 534.

³⁹ See A. E. Boyle, ‘Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental Perspective’, **60** *BYIL*, 1989, pp. 257, 271.

⁴⁰ See e.g. Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, p. 198. See also the Preamble to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 1979; and the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 241; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 191. See also Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 145 ff.; and Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, pp. 8 ff.

⁴¹ See e.g. Goldie, ‘General View’, pp. 73–85; and J. Schneider, *World Public Order of the Environment*, Toronto, 1979, chapter 6. See also G. Handl, ‘State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons’, **74** *AJIL*, 1980, p. 525; Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 147 ff.; and Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 700 ff.

⁴² See e.g. Boyle, ‘Nuclear Energy’, pp. 289–97; and Handl, ‘State Liability’, pp. 535–53.

⁴³ 33 *AJIL*, 1939, p. 182 and 35 *AJIL*, 1941, p. 681; 9 AD, p. 315.

⁴⁴ See Boyle, ‘Nuclear Energy’, p. 292; and G. Handl, ‘Balancing of Interests and International Liability for the Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revisited’, **13** *Canadian YIL*, 1975, pp. 156, 167–8.

⁴⁵ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 22–3; 16 AD, pp. 155, 158.

⁴⁶ ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 253; 57 ILR, p. 350.

⁴⁷ See also the *Gut Dam* arbitration between the US and Canada, 8 ILM, 1969, p. 118; and see Schneider, *World Public Order*, p. 165. Cf. Handl, ‘State Liability’, pp. 525, 538 ff.

⁴⁸ See e.g. the Canadian claim in the Cosmos 954 incident, 18 ILM, 1992, p. 907.

⁴⁹ See e.g. article 1 of the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972; article 2 of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 1979; article 2 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985; and articles 139, 194 and 235 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982; articles 7 and 8 of the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities 1988; and article 2 of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992. See also the Commentary by the International Law Commission to article 7 of the Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of the International Law Commission, 46th Session, 1994, pp. 236 ff.

⁵⁰ This is the view taken by the ILC in its Commentary on the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001, Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, A/56/10, p. 392; Guideline 3 of the ILC Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere, Fifth Report as provisionally adopted, A/CN.4/711, 2018, Annex I and ITLOS, Seabed Disputes Chamber, *Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations in the Area*, 2011, para. 117. See also e.g. Handl, ‘State Liability’, pp. 539–40; Boyle, ‘Nuclear Energy’, p. 272; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 147 ff. Note the importance of due diligence in the COVID-19 pandemic; see e.g. UN Development Programme, *Human Rights, Due Diligence and COVID-19*, www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/human-rights-due-diligence-and-covid-19-rapid-self-assessment-for-business.html; and A. Coco and T. de Souza Dias, ‘Due Diligence and COVID-19: States’ Duties to Prevent and Halt the Coronavirus Outbreak’, Parts I and II, EJIL: Talk!, 24 and 25 March 2020.

⁵¹ See e.g. the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention 1979.

⁵² I.e. the standard of conduct expected from a government mindful of its international obligations: see R. J. Dupuy, ‘International Liability for Transfrontier Pollution’, in *Trends in Environmental Policy and Law* (ed. M. Bothe), Geneva, 1980, pp. 363, 369.

⁵³ See *Responsibility and Liability of States in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution*, an OECD Report by the Environment Committee, 1984, p. 4.

⁵⁴ 35 *AJIL*, 1941, p. 716; 9 AD, p. 317.

⁵⁵ See e.g. Kiss, 'International Protection', p. 1076.

⁵⁶ See below, p. 774.

⁵⁷ See also the commentary to the Montreal Rules adopted by the ILA in 1982, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, p. 159. Note, however, that the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, adopted in 2001, concern activities not prohibited by international law which involve a 'risk of causing significant transboundary harm', Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 380.

⁵⁸ 35 *AJIL*, 1941, p. 716; 9 AD, p. 317.

⁵⁹ Note also that General Assembly resolution 2995 (XXVII) refers to 'significant harmful results'. See also article 1 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 380.

⁶⁰ Note the formulation by L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, 8th ed., London, 1955, vol. I, p. 291, that the interference complained of must be 'unduly injurious to the inhabitants of the neighbouring state'.

⁶¹ See e.g. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and article 194 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.

⁶² See the views of e.g. R. Quentin-Baxter, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. II, part 1, pp. 112–19; and S. McCaffrey, *ibid.*, 1986, vol. II, part 1, pp. 133–4. See also Boyle, 'Nuclear Energy', p. 275; and E. Boyle, 'Chernobyl and the Development of International Environmental Law', in *Perestroika and International Law* (ed. W. Butler), London, 1990, pp. 203, 206.

⁶³ 35 *AJIL*, 1941, p. 684; 9 AD, p. 315. See also A. Rubin, 'Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration', 50 *Oregon Law Review*, 1971, p. 259.

⁶⁴ See also the OECD Recommendation of Equal Right of Access in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution 1977 and article 1(15) of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 1988.

⁶⁵ Article 1(1).

⁶⁶ See generally on Antarctica, C. Redgwell, 'Environmental Protection in Antarctica: The 1991 Protocol', **43 ICLQ**, 1994, p. 599; and above, Chapter 9, p. 457. Note Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies 2005. See also, with regard to the Arctic, D. R. Rothwell, 'International Law and the Protection of the Arctic Environment', **44 ICLQ**, 1995, p. 280.

⁶⁷ Article 1(15). See also article 2 of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991; and article 1 of the Code of Conduct on Accidental Pollution of Transboundary Inland Waters 1990.

⁶⁸ Article 1(2).

⁶⁹ Article 2(7)(c).

⁷⁰ Article 2(10). See also article 1 of the ILC's Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities 2006, A/61/10, pp. 110, 121.

⁷¹ Note that the Canadian claim for clean-up costs consequential upon the crash of a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite was settled: see 18 ILM, 1979, p. 902.

⁷² Note that Security Council resolution 687 (1991) declared that Iraq was liable under international law *inter alia* 'for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources' occurring as a result of the unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. As to damage caused by private persons, see e.g. Handl, 'State Liability'; and G. Doeker and T. Gehring, 'Private or International Liability for Transnational Environmental Damage – The Precedent of Conventional Liability Regimes', *2 Journal of Environmental Law*, 1990, p. 1. Note that some treaties specifically provide for the liability of the state for the acts of non-state entities, for example article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 1967; article I of the Convention on International Liability for

Damage Caused by Space Objects 1972 and article XIV of the Moon Treaty 1979. See further below, p. 779, with regard to civil liability schemes.

⁷³ See e.g. J. Barboza, 'International Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law and Protection of the Environment', **247 HR**, 1994 III, p. 291; A. Boyle, 'State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?', **39 ICLQ**, 1990, p. 1; M. Akehurst, 'International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law', **16 Netherlands YIL**, 1985, p. 3; D. B. Magraw, 'Trans-boundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of International Liability', **80 AJIL**, 1986, p. 305; and C. Tomuschat, 'International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law: The Work of the International Law Commission', in *International Responsibility for Environmental Harm* (ed. F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi), London, 1991, p. 37. See also Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, p. 222; and Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, chapter 16.

⁷⁴ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1978, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 149.

⁷⁵ See e.g. Quentin-Baxter's preliminary report, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1980, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 24.

⁷⁶ See above, [Chapter 13](#).

⁷⁷ See e.g. Boyle, 'State Responsibility', p. 3; and I. Brownlie, *System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I*, Oxford, 1983, p. 50.

⁷⁸ Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 379.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁸⁰ See e.g. S. McCaffrey, 'The Fortieth Session of the International Law Commission', **83 AJIL**, 1989, pp. 153, 170; and S. McCaffrey, 'The Forty-First Session of the International Law Commission', **83 AJIL**, 1989, pp. 937, 944.

⁸¹ Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 386.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 387. See also article 1 of the Code of Conduct on Accidental Pollution of Trans-boundary Inland Waters adopted by the Economic Commission for Europe in 1990.

⁸³ Report of ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 388.

⁸⁴ Article 3.

⁸⁵ Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 394.

⁸⁶ Article 4. See also Guideline 8 of the ILC Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere as provisionally adopted, Fifth Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere, A/CN.4/711, Annex I, 2018.

⁸⁷ Article 5.

⁸⁸ Article 6.

⁸⁹ Article 7.

⁹⁰ Articles 8 and 17.

⁹¹ Article 8. See also articles 12, 13 and 14.

⁹² Article 9. Article 10 of the Draft lays down a series of relevant factors and circumstances in achieving this ‘equitable balance of interests’, including the degree of risk of significant transboundary harm and the availability of means of preventing or minimising such risk or of repairing the harm; the importance of the activity, taking into account its overall advantages of a social, economic and technical character for the state of origin in relation to the potential harm for the states likely to be affected; the risk of significant harm to the environment and the availability of means of preventing or minimising such risk or restoring the environment; the economic viability of the activity in relation to the costs of prevention demanded by the states likely to be affected and to the possibility of carrying out the activity elsewhere or by other means or replacing it with an alternative activity; the degree to which the states likely to be affected are prepared to contribute to the costs of prevention; and the standards of protection which the states likely to be affected apply to the same or comparable activities and the standards applied in

comparable regional or international practice. Note that this article draws upon article 6 of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997.

⁹³ A/61/10, p. 110.

⁹⁴ Principles 3 and 4.

⁹⁵ Note Guideline 8 of the ILC Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere as provisionally adopted, Fifth Report, A/CN.4/711, Annex I, noting that: ‘States have the obligation to cooperate, as appropriate, with each other and with relevant international organisations for the protection of the atmosphere from atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation.’

⁹⁶ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 22; 16 AD, pp. 155, 158. See above, p. 492.

⁹⁷ See also article 211(7). Article 13 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001 provides that states concerned should provide the public likely to be affected by a relevant activity with information on the activity and the risk and harm which may result. The International Court in *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 87 held that this provision did not constitute a legal basis for an obligation.

⁹⁸ See also e.g. article 8 of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973; Annex 6 of the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 1974; and article 9 of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Protocol of Co-operation in Case of Emergency 1976.

⁹⁹ See e.g. Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, p. 55. See also *Iron Rhine (Belgium v. Netherlands)*, 2005, paras. 59, 222; 150 ILR, p. 143. See also *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 55–6, where the Court noted that ‘the principle of prevention, as a customary rule, has its origins in the due diligence that is required of a state in its territory. It is “every state’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states” (*Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania)*, *Merits, Judgment*, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22). A state is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its

territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another state.’

100 Title E, para. 6. See also the OECD Recommendation for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution 1977, Title C, para. 8.

101 C(88)84.

102 See also article 3 of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991; and Principle 5 of the ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss 2006, A/61/10, p. 166.

103 24 ILR, p. 101.

104 *Ibid.*, p. 119. See also *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 46–7; 41 ILR, pp. 29, 76.

105 Note also that article 8(b) calls for the exchange of information *inter alia* on major changes in national policies and in general industrial development and on their potential impact, which would be likely to cause significant changes in long-range transboundary air pollution.

106 See ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, 1982, pp. 172–3.

107 *Ibid.*, p. 173. See also Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Transboundary Air Pollution 1987. Note also e.g. the UNEP Recommendation concerning the Environment Related to Offshore Drilling and Mining within the Limits of National Jurisdiction 1981 and the Canada–Denmark Agreement for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment 1983.

108 Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 406. See also Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration; article 3 of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991; and the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997, below, p. 771.

109 See e.g. the UNEP Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment 1987.

110 See e.g. the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution 1978, article XI; the Nordic Environmental Protection Convention 1974, article 6; and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctica Treaty 1991, article 8. See also article 7 of the Draft Articles on Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001, Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 402.

111 A similar process is underway with regard to the siting of nuclear power installations: see e.g. the agreements between Spain and Portugal, 1980; the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1977; Belgium and France, 1966; and Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1982. See also Boyle, ‘Chernobyl’, p. 212.

112 See also Directive 2004/35/EC, 21 April 2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, as amended by Directive 2006/21/EC. See Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, p. 66; Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, chapter 14; and Judge Dugard, Separate Opinion, *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 842, 846 ff. See also Guideline 5 of the ILC Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment as provisionally adopted, Fifth Report, A/CN.4/711, Annex I.

113 These activities include: crude oil and certain other refineries; thermal power stations and other combustion installations with a certain minimum power output and nuclear installations; nuclear facilities; major cast iron and steel installations; asbestos plants; integrated chemical installations; construction of motorways, long-distance railway lines and long airport runways; pipelines; large trading ports; toxic and dangerous waste installations; large dams and reservoirs; major mining; offshore hydrocarbon production; major oil and chemical storage facilities; and deforestation of large areas.

114 If it decides not so to participate, the environmental impact assessment procedure will continue or not according to the domestic law and practice of the state of origin: article 3(4).

115 Article 5.

¹¹⁶ Article 6(1). Account must also be taken of concerns expressed by the public of the affected party in the areas likely to be affected under article 3(8).

¹¹⁷ See also Appendix V.

¹¹⁸ See e.g. the Antarctic Protocol on Environmental Protection 1991.

¹¹⁹ See e.g. the World Bank under its Operational Directive 4.00 of 1989.

¹²⁰ ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 83–4.

¹²¹ ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 706. Note that in the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 288, 344 ff., Judge Weeramantry, in his Dissenting Opinion, declared that ‘when a matter is brought before it which raises serious environmental issues of global importance, and a prima facie case is made out of the possibility of environmental damage, the Court is entitled to take into account the Environmental Impact Assessment principle in determining its preliminary approach’: *ibid.*, p. 345.

¹²² Note that the Court did discuss some of the relevant factors: *ibid.*, para. 155. See also the International Law Commission’s work on Draft Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment, draft guideline IV of which provides that: ‘States have the obligation to ensure that an environmental impact assessment is undertaken of proposed activities under their jurisdiction or control which are likely to cause significant adverse impact on the atmosphere in terms of atmospheric pollution or atmospheric degradation’: Report of the International Law Commission, 2016, A/71/10, pp. 281, 284.

¹²³ See also the preamble to the 1994 Oslo Protocol to the 1979 Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention and EC Regulation 178/2002 (with regard to food).

¹²⁴ Although the reference in the Preamble does not expressly invoke the term. See generally *International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity* (ed. M. Bowman and C. Redgwell), Dordrecht, 1995.

¹²⁵ Article 3(3). See also article 174 (ex article 130r(2)) of the Treaty on European Union 2002 and article 4(3) of the OAU Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa 1991. Note also articles 5 and 6 of the Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement 1995.

¹²⁶ In his Dissenting Opinion in the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 288, 342; 106 ILR, pp. 1, 64. See *The Precautionary Principle and International Law* (ed. D. Freestone and E. Hey), Dordrecht, 1996; Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, p. 58; P. Martin-Bidou, 'Le Principe de Précaution en Droit International de l'Environnement', **103 RGDIP**, 1999, p. 631; and *Le Principe de Précaution, Signification et Conséquences* (ed. E. Zaccai and J. N. Missa), Brussels, 2000; Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 152 ff.; Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 229 ff.; *Le Principe de Précaution: Aspects de Droit International et Communautaire* (ed. C. Leben), Paris, 2002; and A. Trouwborst, *Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law*, The Hague, 2002. See also the Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001, Report of the ILC on its 53rd Session, p. 414 and the Guidelines for Applying the Precautionary Principle to Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource Management adopted by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature in May 2007.

¹²⁷ See e.g. D. French, 'Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities', **49 ICLQ**, 2000, p. 35.

¹²⁸ See also articles 4 and 12. Note that the 1990 amendment to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Depleting Substances provides that the capacity of developing countries to comply with their substantive obligations will depend upon the implementation by the developed countries of their financial obligations.

¹²⁹ See e.g. *Sustainable Development, International Criminal Justice, and Treaty Implementation* (ed. S. Jodoin and M.-C. Cordonier Segger), Cambridge, 2013; *Sustainable Development and International Law* (ed. W. Lang), Dordrecht, 1995; *Sustainable Development and Good Governance* (ed. K. Ginther, E. Denters and P. de Waart), Dordrecht, 1995; Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, p. 579; Sands

and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 217 ff.; P. Sands, 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', **65 BYIL**, 1994, p. 303; M.-C. Cordonier Segger and C. G. Weeramantry, *Sustainable Justice: Reconciling Economic, Social and Environmental Law*, Leiden, 2005; P. S. Elder, 'Sustainability', **36 McGill Law Journal**, 1991, p. 832; D. McGoldrick, 'Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated Conception', **45 ICLQ**, 1996, p. 796; *International Law and Sustainable Development* (ed. A. Boyle and D. Freestone), Oxford, 1999; *Environmental Law, the Economy and Sustainable Development* (ed. R. Revesz, P. Sands and R. Stewart), Cambridge, 2000; Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 115 ff.; and X. Fuentes, 'Sustainable Development and the Equitable Utilisation of International Watercourses', **69 BYIL**, 1998, p. 119. See also the Report of the ILA Committee on Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development, ILA, Report of the Sixty-sixth Conference, 1994, p. 111 and Report of the Seventieth Conference, 2002, p. 308; and N. Schrijver, 'The Evolution of Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception, Meaning and Status', **329 HR**, 2007, p. 217. Note in particular the adoption of General Assembly resolution 70/1, on 25 September 2015, setting out an outcome document of the UN summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda, entitled 'Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development'. This set out seventeen sustainable development goals, including zero hunger, good health, clear water and sanitation, and climate action: www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/. These came into force on 1 January 2016: www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/. See also Guideline 5 of the ILC Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment as provisionally adopted, Fifth Report, A/CN.4/711, Annex I.

130 ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 78; 116 ILR, p. 1. See also *Shrimp/Turtle*, WTO Appellate Body, 38 ILM, 1999, p. 121, para. 129; and *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 48–9.

131 See also Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration 1972.

132 Note that article 2(1)(vii) of the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1990 calls upon the Bank to promote 'environmentally sound and sustainable development'.

133 See also Agenda 21, adopted at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development 1992, paras. 8, 39.

¹³⁴ See e.g. the Preamble and articles 1, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17 and 18. See also the Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, adopted at the Rio Conference 1992.

¹³⁵ See e.g. M. Redclift, 'Reflections on the "Sustainable Development" Debate', 1 *International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology*, 1994, p. 3. Note that the Report of the GATT Panel on the United States Restrictions on the Import of Tuna declares that the objective of sustainable development, which includes the protection and preservation of the environment, has been widely recognised by the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 33 ILM, 1994, p. 839.

¹³⁶ Note that the General Assembly established the Commission on Sustainable Development in resolution 47/191 in order to ensure an effective follow-up to the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development as well as generally to work for the integration of environment and development issues and to examine the progress of the implementation of Agenda 21 (the programme of action adopted by the Conference) in order to achieve sustainable development.

¹³⁷ See e.g. Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, p. 71; Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 240 ff.; Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 322 ff.; and A. Boyle, 'Making the Polluter Pay? Alternatives to State Responsibility in the Allocation of Transboundary Environmental Costs', in Francioni and Scovazzi, *International Responsibility for Environmental Harm*, p. 363.

¹³⁸ See further below, p. 779.

¹³⁹ See e.g. the OECD Council Recommendations C(74)223 (1974) and C(89)88 (1989).

¹⁴⁰ See article 174 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 2002.

¹⁴¹ See also article 2(5)(b) of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992; and Principle 4 of the ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss 2006, A/61/10, p. 151.

¹⁴² See e.g. Boyle, 'Making the Polluter Pay?', p. 365; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, p. 92.

¹⁴³ See Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, chapter 5; Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, chapter 7; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, chapter 6. Note also International Law Commission examination of the ‘Protection of the Atmosphere’, A/66/10, Annex B, p. 315 and the second report of the Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/681, 2015, which defines the atmosphere as ‘the layer of gases surrounding the earth in the troposphere and the stratosphere, within which the transport and dispersion of airborne substances occurs’: *ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁴ See *Keesing’s Record of World Events*, pp. 36782 ff. (1989).

¹⁴⁵ See above, Chapter 9, p. 462.

¹⁴⁶ See e.g. Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, p. 337.

¹⁴⁷ OECD Doc.C(74)224, cited in P. Sands, *Chernobyl: Law and Communication*, Cambridge, 1988, p. 150.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Title A.

¹⁴⁹ The major difference being the substitution of ‘air’ for ‘environment’ in view of the focus of the Convention.

¹⁵⁰ Note that the term ‘air’ was replaced by ‘environment’. See also: article 1 of the Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources 1974; and article 2 of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 1976. The Institut de Droit International, in a draft resolution accompanying its final report on Air Pollution Across National Frontiers, defines pollution as ‘any physical, chemical or biological alteration in the composition or quality of the atmosphere which results directly or indirectly from human action or omission and produces injurious or deleterious effects across national frontiers’, **62 I** *Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International*, 1987, p. 266.

¹⁵¹ 35 *AJIL*, 1941, p. 716; 9 *AD*, p. 317.

¹⁵² Note also the adoption in 1963 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

¹⁵³ See e.g. A. Rosencranz, ‘The ECE Convention of 1979 on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’, 75 *AJIL*, 1981, p. 975; L. Tollan, ‘The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’, 19 *Journal of World Trade Law*, 1985, p. 615; and A. Kiss, ‘La Convention sur la Pollution Atmosphérique Transfrontière à Longue Distance’, *Revue Juridique de l’Environnement*, 1981, p. 30. See also P. Okowa, *State Responsibility for Transboundary Air Pollution*, Oxford, 2000. See generally www.unece.org/env/lrtap/.

¹⁵⁴ See above, p. 762.

¹⁵⁵ Article 2.

¹⁵⁶ Article 3. Note that under article 6, states undertake to develop the best policies and strategies using the ‘best available technology which is economically feasible’.

¹⁵⁷ Article 4. See also article 8.

¹⁵⁸ Article 5. See also article 8(b).

¹⁵⁹ A range of Protocols have been adopted, including the Helsinki Protocol 1985 dealing with the reduction of sulphur emissions or their transboundary fluxes; the Sophia Protocol in 1988 concerning the control of emissions of nitrogen oxides or their transboundary fluxes; the 1991 Protocol concerning the control of emissions of volatile organic compounds and their transboundary fluxes; and the 1994 Oslo Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, see www.unece.org/leginstr/env.html.

¹⁶⁰ The Global Environmental Facility was itself set up in 1991 to aid developing countries to fund projects and programmes protecting the global environment. In particular, the Facility supports projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer and persistent organic pollutants: see www.thegef.org/. See also the Beijing Declaration of the Second Global Environmental Facility 2003, 44 ILM, 2005, p. 1004.

¹⁶¹ See the Convention website, www.pops.int/.

¹⁶² See www.pops.int/documents/meetings/poprc/.

¹⁶³ See below, p. 783.

¹⁶⁴ Note also that in 1987 the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea urged states to ratify the Protocol: see 27 ILM, 1988, p. 835; while in 1990 North Sea states agreed to achieve by 1999 a reduction of 50 per cent or more in atmospheric and river-borne emissions of hazardous substances, provided that best available technology permitted this: see IMO Doc. MEPC 29/INF.26.

¹⁶⁵ Note that the Canada–US Air Quality Agreement 1991 required the reduction of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from the two states to agreed levels by the year 2000. Compliance monitoring by continuous emission monitoring systems was provided for. See generally UNEP, *Bridging the Emissions Gap*, 2011.

¹⁶⁶ See e.g. Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 277 ff.; Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, pp. 171 ff.; *The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law* (ed. C. P. Carlarne, K. R. Grayand and R. Tarasofsky), Oxford, 2016; D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and L. Rajamani, *International Climate Change Law*, Oxford, 2017; *International Law and Global Climate Change* (ed. R. Churchill and D. Freestone), Dordrecht, 1991; *Implementing the Climate Regime. International Compliance* (ed. O. S. Stokke, J. Hovi and G. Ulfstein), London, 2005; P. Lawrence, ‘International Legal Regulation for Protection of the Ozone Layer: Some Problems of Implementation’, 2 *Journal of Environmental Law*, 1990, p. 17; T. Stoel, ‘Fluorocarbon: Mobilising Concern and Action’, in *Environmental Protection, The International Dimension* (ed. D. A. Kay and H. K. Jacobson), 1983, p. 45; R. J. Engelmann, ‘A Look at Some Issues Before an Ozone Convention’, 8 *Environmental Policy and Law*, 1982, p. 49; H. Heimsoeth, ‘The Protection of the Ozone Layer’, 10 *Environmental Policy and Law*, 1983, p. 34; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 349 ff. See also www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/climate-change.

¹⁶⁷ See also the Noordwijk Declaration of the Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change 1989. See e.g. C. A. Fleischer, ‘The International Concern for the Environment: The Concept of Common Heritage’, in Bothe, *Trends in Environmental Law and Policy*, p. 321.

¹⁶⁸ Article 2(1). ‘Adverse effects’ is defined in article 1(2) to mean ‘changes in the physical environment or biota, including changes in climate, which have significant

deleterious effects on human health or on the composition, resilience and productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on materials useful to mankind’.

169 Article 2.

170 Articles 7 and 11. See also the UN Environment Programme, *Handbook for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer*, 7th ed., Nairobi, 2006.

171 See 26 ILM, 1987, p. 1541 and 28 ILM, 1989, p. 1301. See also R. Benedick, *Ozone Diplomacy*, Cambridge, MA, 1991; and A. C. Aman, ‘The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: Providing Prospective Remedial Relief for Potential Damage to the Environmental Commons’, in Francioni and Scovazzi, *International Responsibility for Environmental Harm*, p. 185. See also UN Environment Programme, *Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer*, 7th ed., Nairobi, 2006.

172 I.e. ozone-depleting substances listed in Annex A.

173 This is defined to constitute production plus imports minus exports of controlled substances: see articles 1(5) and (6) and 3.

174 There are two exceptions, however, first, for the purposes of ‘industrial rationalisation between parties’ and, secondly, with regard to certain developing countries: see article 5.

175 See 30 ILM, 1991, p. 537.

176 Additional Amendments were adopted in 1992 (Copenhagen), 1997 (Montreal) and 1999 (Beijing). Adjustments have been made six times, including those in Copenhagen in 1992, Montreal in 1997 and Beijing in 1999, increasing the substances covered. See also the Montreal Adjustment on the Production and Consumption of HCFCs (hydrochlorofluorocarbons) 2007, and a further amendment was adopted in Kigali to reduce hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in October 2016. See also EC Regulation 91/594 of 4 March 1991, providing that after 30 June 1997 there should be no production of CFCs unless the European Commission had determined that such production was essential.

177 31 ILM, 1992, p. 849. See e.g. J. Werksman, ‘Designing a Compliance System for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’, in *Improving Compliance with*

International Environmental Agreements (ed. J. Cameron, J. Werksman, P. Rodinck *et al.*), London, 1996, p. 85. See also Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 356 ff.; and Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 300 ff. See also <http://unfccc.int/2860.php>.

178 Article 2.

179 Defined as any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere, article 1(8).

180 Article 4(1).

181 E.g. former European Soviet Republics such as Belarus, the Ukraine and the Baltic states.

182 Article 4(2)(a). Developed country and other Annex I parties must submit within six months of the Convention coming into force and periodically thereafter, detailed information on such matters with the aim of returning anthropogenic emissions to their 1990 levels. This information provided is to be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties on a periodic basis, see article 4(2)(b).

183 Essentially EU countries, the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Iceland, Japan, Switzerland and Turkey.

184 Article 4(8).

185 Article 7.

186 Articles 8–10.

187 The Convention entered into force in 1994 and the following year the first session of the Conference was held in Berlin. It currently has 197 parties.

188 This came into force on 16 February 2005. See D. Freestone and C. Streck, *Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work*, Oxford, 2005. See also Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, p. 307;

Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, pp. 179 ff.; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, p. 360.

¹⁸⁹ See www.ipcc.ch.

¹⁹⁰ The requirements are more stringent with regard to the Kyoto Protocol parties.

¹⁹¹ Note the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007, which analysed the dangers of human-induced climate change. It was endorsed by governments by consensus: see www.ipcc.ch.

¹⁹² FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. See also Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 318 ff.; and Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, pp. 184 ff.

¹⁹³ Note also that article 24 of the agreement refers to article 14 of the Climate Change Convention, which provides for recourse to the ICJ or to an arbitral tribunal.

¹⁹⁴ The US announced its intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on 4 August 2017, but this was reversed by President Biden after his inauguration, www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/20/paris-climate-agreement-joe-biden-returns-us. See also the Conferences of Parties held in Bonn in 2017 (COP-23), <https://cop23.com.fj/>; Katowice in 2018 (COP-24), <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/katowice-climate-package#eq-10>; and Madrid in 2019 (COP-25), <https://unfccc.int/cop25>. Note that the International Law Commission decided in 2018 to include the topic ‘sea-level rise in international law’ in its programme of work and established a Study Group, A/74/10, p. 340 (2019).

¹⁹⁵ See further above, *Chapter 9*, p. 462. See also Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 290 ff.

¹⁹⁶ Article I.

¹⁹⁷ Article IX.

¹⁹⁸ Article IV. See also the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution 47/68 (1992). Goals for

radioactive protection and safety are stipulated.

199 See articles III and XI.

200 Such debris may result from pollution from spacecraft, abandoned satellites, orbital explosions and satellite break-ups or hardware released during space launches and other normal manoeuvres. See e.g. L. Roberts, 'Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris: Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes', *15 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 1992, p. 53. See also S. Gorove, 'Towards a Clarification of the Term "Space Objects" – an International Legal and Policy Imperative?', *21 Journal of Space Law*, 1993, p. 10.

201 See e.g. B. Hurwitz, *Space Liability for Outer Space Activities*, Dordrecht, 1992; and see further above, [Chapter 9](#), p. 467.

202 Report of the Sixty-sixth Conference, Buenos Aires, 1994, pp. 317 ff. This, of course, is not a binding treaty, but a suggested draft from an influential private organisation.

203 Article 8 of the Buenos Aires International Instrument.

204 See e.g. ILA Report of Space Law Committee on 'Legal Aspects of the Privatisation and Commercialisation of Space Activities', Report of the Conference, Sofia, 2012, www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees.

205 See e.g. ILA Report on 'Dispute Settlement, Suborbital Flights, Use of Satellite Data and Space Debris', Report of the Conference, Washington, DC, 2014, www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/29.

206 See <https://pca-cpa.org/en/documents/pca-conventions-and-rules/>.

207 See e.g. Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, chapter 8; Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, p. 109; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, chapter 10. See also S. McCaffrey, *The Law of International Watercourses*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2019; L. Boisson de Chazournes, *Fresh Water in International Law*, Oxford, 2013; O. McIntyre, *Environmental Protection of International Watercourses in International Law*, Aldershot, 2007; A. Rieu-Clarke, *A Fresh Approach to International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Lessons*

from the *Law of International Water-courses*, London, 2007; R. Baxter, *The Law of International Waterways*, Cambridge, MA, 1964; J. G. Polakiewicz, 'La Responsabilité de l'État en Matière de Pollution des Eaux Fluviales ou Souterraines Internationales', *Journal de Droit International*, 1991, p. 283; H. Ruiz Fabri, 'Règles Coutumières Générales et Droit International Fluvial', *AFDI*, 1990, p. 818; J. Sette-Camara, 'Pollution of International Rivers', **186** *HR*, 1984, p. 117; and P. Wouters, 'The Legal Response to Water Conflicts: The UN Watercourses Convention and Beyond', **42** *German YIL*, 1999, p. 293.

208 See e.g. article 1(1) of the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992; and article 2 of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997. See also Report of the International Law Commission on its 46th Session, 1994, p. 197.

209 See *Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the Oder*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 23, 1929, p. 27; 5 AD, p. 83. The Permanent Court noted here that, 'the community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian states in the user of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian state in relation to the others'. This was reaffirmed in the case concerning the *Auditing of Accounts between the Netherlands and France*, Arbitral Award of 12 March 2004, para. 97. The International Court has noted: 'Modern development of international law has strengthened this principle for non-navigational uses of international watercourses': *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 56; 116 ILR, p. 1.

210 See *Lac Lanoux* 24 ILR, p. 101. The Tribunal noted, for example, that while the interests of riparian states had to be taken into account by a riparian state proposing changes to the river system, there was no rule precluding the use of hydraulic power of international watercourses without a prior agreement between the interested states: *ibid.*, p. 130.

211 Report of the Fifty-second Conference, 1966, p. 484.

212 See also the Rules on Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin adopted by the ILA in 1982, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, 1982, p. 535, and the Rules on International Groundwaters adopted in 1986, Report of the Sixty-second Conference, 1986.

See also the work of the Institut de Droit International, *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International*, 1979, p. 193.

213 See also the Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters 2003.

214 Articles 1(2) and 2(1). Note that in *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 100, the Court underlined that the part of the obligation to preserve the aquatic environment includes the duty to protect the flora and fauna of the river in question.

215 See above, p. 758.

216 See above, p. 761.

217 This is defined in Annex I.

218 See Annex III.

219 Article 3.

220 Articles 4–6 and 11–13. Provisions regarding notification about critical situations and mutual assistance appear in articles 14 and 15.

221 Articles 9 and 10.

222 Article 5. This provision was expressly referred to by the International Court in *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 80; 116 ILR, p. 1. See also article 8, which emphasises that watercourse states shall cooperate in order to attain optimal utilisation and adequate protection of an international watercourse.

223 Article 6.

224 Article 12.

225 Articles 11–17.

226 Article 18. Article 19 provides for an expedited procedure where there is the utmost urgency in the implementation of planned measures.

227 See also article 23 with regard to measures necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment.

228 Pollution is here defined as ‘any detrimental alteration in the composition or quality of the waters of an international watercourse which results directly or indirectly from human conduct’: article 21(1).

229 Article 22.

230 See also the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers adopted by the International Law Commission in 2008, A/63/10, chapter 4. Note that a variety of regional and bilateral agreements and arrangements exist with regard to international watercourses: see e.g. the agreements concerning the International Commission of the Rhine, the US–Canadian International Joint Commission and provisions concerning the Zambezi River System and the Niger Basin. See Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 366 ff.; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 572 ff.

231 ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 7; 116 ILR, p. 1.

232 ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 67.

233 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

234 *Ibid.*, pp. 76, 82. Note that in March 2003, the establishment of a Water Co-operation Facility to mediate in disputes between countries sharing a single river basin was announced: see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2872427.stm>.

235 See e.g. Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, chapter 12; Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, chapter 7; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, chapters 8 and 9. See also D. A. Bagwell, ‘Hazardous and Noxious Substances’, **62** *Tulane Law Review*, 1988, p. 433; L. F. Goldie, ‘Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liability in Terms of Relative Exposure to Risk’, **16** *Netherlands YIL*, 1985, p. 247; Barboza, ‘International

Liability’, pp. 331 ff.; W. Jenks, ‘The Scope and Nature of Ultra-Hazardous Liability in International Law’, **117 HR**, 1966, p. 99; Handl, ‘State Liability’, pp. 553 ff.; and R. J. Dupuy, *La Responsabilité des États pour les Dommages d’Origine Technologique et Industrielle*, Paris, 1976, pp. 206–9.

236 Handl, ‘State Liability’, p. 554.

237 See above, p. 747.

238 See above, p. 468.

239 See e.g. Sands, *Chernobyl*, p. 536; Boyle, ‘Nuclear Energy’ and ‘Chernobyl’; Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, p. 279; J. C. Woodliffe, ‘Tackling Transboundary Environmental Hazards in Cases of Emergency: The Emerging Legal Framework’, in *Current Issues in European and International Law* (ed. R. White and B. Smythe), London, 1990; and J. C. Woodliffe, ‘Chernobyl: Four Years On’, **39 ICLQ**, 1990, p. 461. See also S. Tromans, *Nuclear Law: The Law Applying to Nuclear Installations and Radioactive Substances in its Historic Context*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2010.

240 See Sands, *Chernobyl*, pp. 1–2. See also IAEA, *Summary Report on the Post Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident*, Vienna, 1986. See as to the nuclear accident at the Fukushima nuclear reactors on 11 March 2011, e.g., www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident.aspx, where a massive tsunami following a major earthquake caused the meltdown of the three cores and as a result four reactors had to be written off.

241 See also the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed 1971; the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1967; and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 1985. See also the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017, A/CONF.229/2017/8. It is not in force as there are currently eighty-one signatories, but only thirty-eight parties, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=en.

242 See *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 253; 57 ILR, p. 398.

²⁴³ *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 288, 305–6; 106 ILR, pp. 1, 27–8.

²⁴⁴ See e.g. M. N. Shaw, 'Nuclear Weapons and International Law', in *Nuclear Weapons and International Law* (ed. I. Pogany), London, 1987, p. 1. See also below, [Chapter 20](#), p. 1052.

²⁴⁵ See further below, p. 778.

²⁴⁶ Note, however, that under the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, states are to take account of IAEA standards in preventing pollution of the seas from the dumping of nuclear waste. See also IAEA, *International Fact-Finding Expert Mission of the Nuclear Accident Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami*, 2011.

²⁴⁷ E.g. EURATOM (established in 1957), the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (established in 1957) and the ILO (International Labour Organization). See Boyle, 'Nuclear Energy', pp. 266–8.

²⁴⁸ See above, p. 756. See also Principle 20 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration.

²⁴⁹ The first was concluded between France and Belgium in 1966 concerning the Ardennes Nuclear Power Station. Other examples include Switzerland–Federal Republic of Germany 1978 and France–UK 1983. The latter agreement was supplemented by a formal arrangement between the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and the French equivalent for the continuous exchange of information on safety issues.

²⁵⁰ See Woodliffe, 'Tackling Transboundary Environmental Hazards', pp. 117–20.

²⁵¹ Article 2. See also article 5.

²⁵² Article 6.

²⁵³ See text in 25 ILM, 1986, p. 1394.

²⁵⁴ See e.g. Woodliffe, ‘Chernobyl’, p. 464. See the European Community Council Directive 87/600 of December 1987, which provides for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency. See also the EC Environmental Information Directive 1990 providing for a right of access to environmental information; article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 1992; and Chapter III of the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment 1993.

²⁵⁵ See e.g. A. O. Adede, *The IAEA Notification and Assistance Conventions in Case of a Nuclear Accident: Landmarks in the History of Multilateral Treaty-Making*, London, 1987.

²⁵⁶ A Disaster Relief Co-ordinator was provided for in General Assembly resolution 2816 (XXVI). See Sands, *Chernobyl*, p. 45.

²⁵⁷ Guidelines for Mutual Emergency Assistance Arrangements in Connection with a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; Sands, *Chernobyl*, p. 199.

²⁵⁸ Article 2(1).

²⁵⁹ Article 2(5).

²⁶⁰ Article 2(2).

²⁶¹ Article 5.

²⁶² *Ibid.*

²⁶³ Under article 3(a), and unless otherwise agreed, the requesting state has the overall direction, control, coordination and supervision of the assistance within its territory.

²⁶⁴ Under article 7, the assisting state is entitled, unless it offers its assistance without costs, to be reimbursed for all the costs incurred by it, which are to be provided promptly, and under article 10(2), unless otherwise agreed, a requesting state is liable to compensate the assisting state for all loss of or damage to equipment or materials and for the death of or injury to personnel of the assisting party or persons acting on its behalf. There is no

provision dealing with liability for damage caused by the assisting state. See also article 8 dealing with privileges and immunities.

²⁶⁵ See e.g. Sands, *Chernobyl*, p. 47; and Woodliffe, ‘Tackling Transboundary Environmental Hazards’, p. 127.

²⁶⁶ Defined as ‘a land-based civil nuclear power plant’: article 2(1).

²⁶⁷ Articles 4 and 7.

²⁶⁸ Article 8.

²⁶⁹ Articles 5 and 20–25. The IAEA is to provide the secretariat for the meetings of the parties: article 28.

²⁷⁰ Article 7(2)(ii).

²⁷¹ Article 9.

²⁷² Articles 10–19. See also the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management 1997, which is based upon the IAEA’s Principles of Radioactive Waste Management 1995 and the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste 1990. Its main provisions are similar to those of the Nuclear Safety Convention.

²⁷³ See e.g. Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, pp. 520 ff.; and Sands, *Principles*, pp. 771 ff.

²⁷⁴ See e.g. Boyle, ‘Nuclear Energy’, pp. 297–8.

²⁷⁵ See e.g. the Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment 1974. See also OECD Recommendations C(74)224, C(76)55 and C(77)28.

²⁷⁶ Together with Protocols of 1964 and 1982.

²⁷⁷ See e.g. 36 ILM, 1997, p. 1454, and *ibid.*, p. 1473. Note also the Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships 1962, which provides that the operator of a

nuclear ship shall be absolutely liable for any nuclear damage upon proof that such damage has been caused by a nuclear incident involving the nuclear fuel of, or radioactive products or waste produced in, such ship, and the Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material 1971, which provides that a person held liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident shall be exonerated from such liability if the operator of a nuclear installation is liable for such damage under either the Paris or Vienna Conventions.

278 A carrier or handler of nuclear material may be regarded as such an operator where the latter consents and the necessary legislative framework so provides: see e.g. article 4(d) of the Paris Convention.

279 See e.g. article 10 of the Paris Convention, article VII of the Vienna Convention and article III of the Brussels Convention on Nuclear Ships 1962.

280 *Ibid.*

281 Cf. the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969.

282 See articles V and VI of the Vienna Convention as amended in 1997, articles 7 and 8 of the Paris Convention, and articles III and V of the Brussels Convention on Nuclear Ships.

283 Article 13 of the Paris Convention, article XI of the Vienna Convention and article X of the Brussels Convention on Nuclear Ships.

284 See e.g. Sands, *Chernobyl*, pp. 26–8.

285 See e.g. Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, chapter 12; and Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, chapter 8.

286 See *Keesing's Record of World Events*, pp. 36788–9 (1989). See also Principle 6 of the Stockholm Declaration 1972 and Principle 14 of the Rio Declaration 1992.

287 This is limited essentially to the North-East Atlantic area.

288 Listed in Annex I.

289 Listed in Annex II.

290 This is a global instrument.

291 30 ILM, 1991, p. 773.

292 See e.g. 23 ILM, 1984, p. 214; 25 ILM, 1986, p. 1010; and 28 ILM, 1989, pp. 277, 259.

293 C(89)88.

294 Article 4. Note also the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 1998.

295 Article 6.

296 30 ILM, 1991, p. 556.

297 See now also the Principles of Radioactive Waste Management 1995 and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management 1997.

298 Article 2(2).

299 I.e. parties under whose jurisdiction an industrial accident occurs or is capable of occurring: article 1(g).

300 Article 4. See also Annexes II and III.

301 See article 6 and Annex IV.

302 Article 6(2) and Annex V.

303 Articles 7 and 8 and Annex V.

304 Article 10 and Annex IX.

305 See also the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Establishment of the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals 1995, signed by the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labour Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the UN Industrial Development Programme, the UN Environment Programme and the World Health Organization. The areas for coordination include the international assessment of chemical risks, information exchange and the prevention of illegal international traffic in toxic and dangerous products: see 34 ILM, 1995, p. 1311.

306 See e.g. Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, chapter 11; Dupuy and Viñuales, *International Environmental Law*, chapter 4; Birnie *et al.*, *International Law and the Environment*, chapter 7; R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, *The Law of the Sea*, 3rd ed., Manchester, 1999, chapter 15; A. E. Boyle, 'Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention', **79 AJIL**, 1985, p. 347; L. Caflisch, 'International Law and Ocean Pollution: The Present and the Future', **8 Revue Belge de Droit International**, 1972, p. 7; and O. Schachter, 'The Value of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Preserving our Freedoms and Protecting the Environment', **23 Ocean Development and International Law**, 1992, p. 55. Note also the move to negotiate a treaty on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, see General Assembly resolution 72/249 and www.un.org/bbnj/.

307 See above, p. 781; and Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 363. See also D. Bodansky, 'Protecting the Marine Environment from Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS III and Beyond', **18 Ecology Law Quarterly**, 1991, p. 719; and Y. Sasamura, 'Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution from Ships', **25 Law of the Sea Institute Proceedings**, 1993, p. 306.

308 See Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 370.

309 Articles 194 and 207 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 provide in general terms for states to reduce marine pollution from land-based sources. Note that the Montreal Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources 1985 built upon article 207. A number of regional conventions (many of them UN Environment Programme Regional Seas Conventions) lay down specific rules dealing with the control of particular substances: see e.g. the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution 1976 and its two Protocols of 1980 and 1982; the

Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution 1978 and Protocols of 1978, 1989 and 1990; the Abidjan Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central Africa Region 1981 and Protocol of 1981; the Lima Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the South-East Pacific 1981 and Protocols; the Cartagena Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region 1983 and two Protocols of 1983 and 1990; the Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution 1992; the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 1992; and the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 1992.

310 Known as the MARPOL Convention. This was modified by Protocols of 1978 and 1997. See also [Chapter 10](#), p. 534.

311 Note e.g. that Annexes I and II are fully binding, while Annexes III, IV and V are options which a state may declare it does not accept when first becoming a party to the Convention: article 14. A number of the Annexes have been amended: see [www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-\(MARPOL\).aspx](http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx).

312 The International Maritime Organization: see www.imo.org.

313 Article 217.

314 Article 220(2).

315 Article 220(1).

316 Article 218, a provision characterised as ‘truly innovatory’ by Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 350.

317 The adoption of this Convention followed the *Torrey Canyon* incident in 1967 in which a ship aground, although on the high seas, was bombed in order to reduce the risk of oil pollution: see Churchill and Lowe, *Law of the Sea*, p. 354. See also the Report of the Home Office, Cmnd 3246 (1967).

318 This was extended by a Protocol of 1973 to cover pollution from substances other than oil. Note that the International Convention on Salvage 1989 seeks to integrate environmental factors into the salvage rewards system.

319 See e.g. the Bonn Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil 1969 and the Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances 1983. Many of the UN Environment Programme Regional Seas Conventions have Protocols dealing with emergency situations: see e.g. Sands and Peel, *Principles of International Environmental Law*, pp. 500 ff.

320 Except where the damage results from war or acts of God; is wholly caused by an act or omission done by a third party with intent to cause damage; or where the damage is wholly caused by the negligent or other wrongful act of any government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of navigational aids: see articles II and III. See also the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources 1977, which establishes the liability of the operator of an installation under the jurisdiction of a party for pollution damage resulting from incidents taking place beyond the coastal low-water line.

321 Article V.

322 When this entered into force on 30 May 1996, the 1969 Convention became known as the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992.

323 Article 2(3).

324 Amendments adopted in 2000 raised the amounts of compensation and a Protocol of 2003 established a Supplementary Fund: see www.iopcfunds.org/.

The Law of Treaties

Compared with municipal law the various methods by which rights and duties may be created in international law are relatively unsophisticated.¹ Within a state, legal interests may be established by contracts between two or more persons, or by agreements under seal, or under the developed system for transferring property, or indeed by virtue of legislation or judicial decisions. International law is more limited as far as the mechanisms for the creation of new rules are concerned. Custom relies upon a measure of state practice supported by *opinio juris* and is usually, although not invariably, an evolving and timely process. Treaties, on the other hand, are a more direct and formal method of international law creation.

States transact a vast amount of work by using the device of the treaty, in circumstances which underline the paucity of international law procedures when compared with the many ways in which a person within a state's internal order may set up binding rights and obligations. For instance, wars will be terminated, disputes settled, territory acquired, special interests determined, alliances established and international organisations created, all by means of treaties. No simpler method of reflecting the agreed objectives of states really exists and the international convention has to suffice both for straightforward bilateral agreements and complicated multilateral expressions

of opinions. Thus, the concept of the treaty and how it operates becomes of paramount importance to the evolution of international law.

A treaty is basically an agreement between parties on the international scene.² Although treaties may be concluded, or made, between states and international organisations, they are primarily concerned with relations between states. An International Convention on the Law of Treaties was signed in 1969 and came into force in 1980, while a Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations was signed in 1986.³ The emphasis, however, will be on the appropriate rules which have emerged as between states. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties partly reflects customary law⁴ and constitutes the basic framework for any discussion of the nature and characteristics of treaties. Certain provisions of the Convention may be regarded as reflective of customary international law, such as the rules on interpretation,⁵ material breach⁶ and fundamental change of circumstances.⁷ Others may not be so regarded, and constitute principles binding only upon states parties.

The fundamental principle of treaty law is undoubtedly the proposition that treaties are binding upon the parties to them and must be performed in good faith.⁸ This rule is termed *pacta sunt servanda* and is arguably the oldest principle of international law. It was reaffirmed in article 26 of the 1969 Convention,⁹ and underlies every international agreement for, in the absence of a certain minimum belief that states will perform their treaty obligations in good faith, there is no reason for countries to enter into such obligations with one another.

The term 'treaty' itself is the one most used in the context of international agreements, but there are a variety of names which can be, and sometimes are, used to express the same concept, such as protocol, act, charter, covenant, pact and concordat. They each refer to the same basic activity and the use of one term rather than another often signifies little more than a desire for variety of expression.

A treaty is defined, for the purposes of the Convention, in article 2 as:

an international agreement concluded between
states in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular
designation.¹⁰

In addition to excluding agreements involving international organisations, the Convention does not cover agreements between states which are to be governed by municipal law, such as a large number of commercial accords. This does not mean that such arrangements cannot be characterised as international agreements, or that they are invalid, merely that they are not within the purview of the 1969 Convention. Indeed, article 3 stresses that international agreements between states and other subjects of international law or between two or more subjects of international law, or oral agreements, do not lose their validity by being excluded from the framework of the Convention.

There are no specific requirements of form in international law for the existence of a treaty,¹¹ although it is essential that the parties intend to create legal relations as between themselves by means of their agreement.¹² This is logical since many agreements between states are merely statements of commonly held principles or objectives and are not intended to establish binding obligations. For instance, a declaration by a number of states in support of a particular political aim may in many cases be without legal (though not political) significance, as the states may regard it as a policy matter and not as setting up juridical relations between themselves. To see whether a particular agreement is intended to create legal relations, all the facts of the situation have to be examined carefully.¹³ Examples of non-binding international agreements would include the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975.¹⁴

The International Court regarded a mandate agreement as having the character of a treaty,¹⁵ while in the *Anglo-Iranian Oil Company* case¹⁶ doubts were expressed about whether a concession agreement between a private company and a state constituted an international agreement in the sense of a treaty.¹⁷ Optional declarations with regard to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court itself under article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court have been regarded as treaty provisions,¹⁸ while declarations made by way of unilateral acts concerning legal or factual situations may have the effect of creating legal obligations.¹⁹ In the latter instance, of course, a treaty as such is not involved.

Where the parties to an agreement do not intend to create legal relations or binding obligations or rights thereby under international law, the agreement

will not be a treaty, although, of course, its political effect may still be considerable.²⁰ Of particular interest are memoranda of understanding, which are not as such legally binding unless manifesting the intent to be bound,²¹ but may be of legal consequence.²² As to exchanges of notes, these may constitute a treaty, but only where both parties exchange an identical text and agree to be bound by the same.²³ A large role may be played in the normal course of interstate dealings by informal non-treaty instruments precisely because they are intended to be non-binding and are thus flexible, confidential and relatively speedy in comparison with treaties.²⁴ They may be amended with ease and without delay and may be terminated by reasonable notice (subject to provision to the contrary). It is this intention not to create a binding arrangement governed by international law which marks the difference between treaties and informal international instruments.²⁵ The International Court addressed this issue in *Qatar v. Bahrain*,²⁶ with regard to Minutes dated 25 December 1990 signed by the parties and Saudi Arabia. The Court emphasised that whether an agreement constituted a binding agreement would depend upon 'all its actual terms' and the circumstances in which it had been drawn up,²⁷ and in the situation involved in the case, the Minutes were to be construed as an international agreement creating rights and obligations for the parties since on the facts they enumerated the commitments to which the parties had consented.²⁸ In addition, a treaty may contain a variety of provisions, not all of which constitute legal obligations.²⁹

The 1969 Convention also concerns treaties which are the constituent instruments of international organisations, such as the UN Charter, and internal treaties adopted within international organisations.³⁰

The Making of Treaties³¹

Formalities

Treaties may be made or concluded by the parties in virtually any manner they wish. There is no prescribed form or procedure, and how a treaty is formulated and by whom it is actually signed will depend upon the intention and agreement of the states concerned. Treaties may be drafted as between states, or governments, or heads of states, or governmental departments, whichever appears the most expedient. For instance, many of the most important treaties are concluded as between heads of state, and many of the more mundane agreements are expressed to be as between government departments, such as minor trading arrangements.

Where precisely in the domestic constitutional establishment the power to make treaties is to be found depends upon each country's municipal regulations and varies from state to state. In the United Kingdom, the treaty-making power is within the prerogative of the Crown,³² whereas in the United States it resides with the President 'with the advice and consent of the Senate' and the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators.³³ International law leaves such matters to domestic law.³⁴

Nevertheless, there are certain rules that apply in the formation of international conventions. In international law, states have the capacity to make agreements, but since states are not identifiable human persons, particular principles have evolved to ensure that persons representing states

indeed have the power so to do for the purpose of concluding the treaty in question. Such persons must produce what is termed ‘full powers’ according to article 7 of the 1969 Convention, before being accepted as capable of representing their countries.³⁵ ‘Full powers’ refers to documents certifying status from the competent authorities of the state in question. This provision provides security to the other parties to the treaty that they are making agreements with persons competent to do so.³⁶ However, certain persons do not need to produce such full powers, by virtue of their position and functions. This exception refers to heads of state and government, and foreign ministers for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of the treaty;³⁷ heads of diplomatic missions for the purpose of adopting the text of the treaty between their country and the country to which they are accredited; and representatives accredited to international conferences or organisations for the purpose of adopting the text of the treaty in that particular conference or organisation. The International Court noted in the preliminary objections to jurisdiction phase of *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* that: ‘According to international law, there is no doubt that every head of state is presumed to be able to act on behalf of the state in its international relations.’³⁸

Sinclair notes that UK practice distinguishes between ‘general full powers’ held by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ministers of State and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and UK Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, European Communities and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which enable any treaty to be negotiated and signed, and ‘special full

powers' granted to a particular person to negotiate and sign a specific treaty.³⁹

Any act relating to the making of a treaty by a person not authorised as required will be without any legal effect, unless the state involved afterwards confirms the act.⁴⁰ One example of this kind of situation arose in 1951 with regard to a convention relating to the naming of cheeses. It was signed by a delegate on behalf of both Sweden and Norway, but it appeared that he had authority only from Norway. However, the agreement was subsequently ratified by both parties and entered into effect.⁴¹

Consent

Once a treaty has been drafted and agreed by authorised representatives, a number of stages are then necessary before it becomes a binding legal obligation upon the parties involved. The text of the agreement drawn up by the negotiators of the parties has to be adopted and article 9 provides that adoption in international conferences takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the states present and voting, unless by the same majority it is decided to apply a different rule. This procedure follows basically the practices recognised in the UN General Assembly⁴² and carried out in the majority of contemporary conferences. An increasing number of conventions are now adopted and opened for signature by means of UN General Assembly resolutions, such as the 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights and the 1984 Convention against Torture, using normal Assembly voting procedures. Another significant point is the tendency in recent conferences to operate by way of consensus so that there would be no voting until all efforts

to reach agreement by consensus have been exhausted.⁴³ In cases other than international conferences, adoption will take place by the consent of all the states involved in drawing up the text of the agreement.⁴⁴

The consent of the states parties to the treaty in question is a vital factor, since states may (in the absence of a rule being also one of customary law) be bound only by their consent. Treaties are in this sense contracts between states and if they do not receive the consent of the various states, their provisions will not be binding upon them. There are, however, a number of ways in which a state may express its consent to an international agreement. It may be signalled, according to article 11, by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. In addition, it may be accomplished by any other means, if so agreed.

Consent by Signature⁴⁵

A state may regard itself as having given its consent to the text of the treaty by signature in defined circumstances noted by article 12, that is, where the treaty provides that signature shall have that effect, or where it is otherwise established that the negotiating states were agreed that signature should have that effect, or where the intention of the state to give that effect to the signature appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiations.

Although consent by ratification is probably the most popular of the methods adopted in practice, consent by signature does retain some significance,

especially in light of the fact that to insist upon ratification in each case before a treaty becomes binding is likely to burden the administrative machinery of government and result in long delays. Accordingly, provision is made for consent to be expressed by signature.⁴⁶ This would be appropriate for the more routine and less politicised of treaties. The act of signature is usually a formal affair. Often in the more important treaties, the head of state will formally add his signature in an elaborate ceremony. In multilateral conventions, a special closing session will be held at which authorised representatives will sign the treaty. However, where the convention is subject to acceptance, approval or ratification, signature will in principle be a formality and will mean no more than that state representatives have agreed upon an acceptable text, which will be forwarded to their particular governments for the necessary decision as to acceptance or rejection.⁴⁷ However, signature has additional meaning in that in such cases, and pending ratification, acceptance or approval, a state must refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty until such time as its intentions with regard to the treaty have been made clear.⁴⁸

Consent by Exchange of Instruments

Article 13 provides that the consent of states to be bound by a treaty constituted by instruments exchanged between them may be expressed by that exchange when the instruments declare that their exchange shall have that effect or it is otherwise established that those states had agreed that the exchange of instruments should have that effect.

Consent by Ratification⁴⁹

The device of ratification by the competent authorities of the state is historically well established and was originally devised to ensure that the representative did not exceed his powers or instructions with regard to the making of a particular agreement. Although ratification (or approval) was originally a function of the sovereign, it has in modern times been made subject to constitutional control.

The advantages of waiting until a state ratifies a treaty before it becomes a binding document are basically twofold: internal and external. In the latter case, the delay between signature and ratification may often be advantageous in allowing extra time for consideration, once the negotiating process has been completed. But it is the internal aspects that are the most important, for they reflect the change in political atmosphere that has occurred in the last 150 years and has led to a much greater participation by a state's population in public affairs. By providing for ratification, the feelings of public opinion have an opportunity to be expressed with the possibility that a strong negative reaction may result in the state deciding not to ratify the treaty under consideration.

The rules relating to ratification vary from country to country. In the United Kingdom, although the power of ratification comes within the prerogative of the Crown, it has become accepted that treaties involving any change in municipal law, or adding to the financial burdens of the government or having an impact upon the private rights of British subjects, will be first submitted to Parliament and subsequently ratified.⁵⁰ Different considerations apply in the case of the United States.⁵¹ However, the question of how a state

effects ratification is a matter for internal law alone and outside international law.

Article 14 of the 1969 Vienna Convention notes that ratification will express a state's consent to be bound by a treaty where the treaty so provides; it is otherwise established that the negotiating states were agreed that ratification should be required; the representative of the state has signed the treaty subject to ratification or the intention of the state to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during negotiations.⁵²

Within this framework, there is a controversy as to which treaties need to be ratified. Some writers maintain that ratification is only necessary if it is clearly contemplated by the parties to the treaty,⁵³ and this approach has been adopted by the United Kingdom.⁵⁴ On the other hand, it has been suggested that ratification should be required unless the treaty clearly reveals a contrary intention.⁵⁵ The United States, in general, will dispense with ratification only in the case of executive agreements.⁵⁶ Ratification in the case of bilateral treaties is usually accomplished by exchanging the requisite instruments, but in the case of multilateral treaties the usual procedure is for one party to collect the ratifications of all states, keeping all parties informed of the situation. It is becoming more accepted that in such instances, the UN Secretary-General will act as the depositary for ratifications.⁵⁷ In some cases, signatures to treaties may be declared subject to 'acceptance' or 'approval'. The terms, as noted in articles 11 and 14(2), are very similar to ratification and similar provisions apply. Such variation in terminology is not of any real significance and only refers to a somewhat simpler form of ratification.

Consent by Accession⁵⁸

This is the normal method by which a state becomes a party to a treaty it has not signed either because the treaty provides that signature is limited to certain states, and it is not such a state, or because a particular deadline for signature has passed. Article 15 notes that consent by accession is possible where the treaty so provides, or the negotiating states were agreed or subsequently agree that consent by accession could occur in the case of the state in question. Important multilateral treaties often declare that states or, in certain situations, other specific entities may accede to the treaty at a later date, that is after the date after which it is possible to signify acceptance by signature.⁵⁹

Reservations to Treaties⁶⁰

A reservation is defined in article 2 of the Convention as:

a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state.⁶¹

Where a state is satisfied with most of the terms of a treaty, but is unhappy about particular provisions, it may, in certain circumstances, wish to refuse to accept or be bound by such provisions, while consenting to the rest of the agreement. By the device of excluding certain provisions, states may agree to be bound by a treaty which otherwise they might reject entirely. This may have beneficial results in the cases of multilateral conventions, by inducing as many states as possible to adhere to the proposed treaty. To some extent, it is a means of encouraging harmony among states of widely differing social, economic and political systems, by concentrating upon agreed, basic issues and accepting disagreement on certain other matters.

The capacity of a state to make reservations to an international treaty illustrates the principle of sovereignty of states, whereby a state may refuse its consent to particular provisions so that they do not become binding upon it. On the other hand, of course, to permit a treaty to become honeycombed

with reservations by a series of countries could well jeopardise the whole exercise. It could seriously dislocate the whole purpose of the agreement and lead to some complicated interrelationships among states. This problem does not arise in the case of bilateral treaties, since a reservation by one party to a proposed term of the agreement would necessitate a renegotiation.⁶² An agreement between two parties cannot exist where one party refuses to accept some of the provisions of the treaty.⁶³ This is not the case with regard to multilateral treaties, and here it is possible for individual states to dissent from particular provisions, by announcing their intention either to omit them altogether, or understand them in a certain way. Accordingly, the effect of a reservation is simply to exclude the treaty provision to which the reservation has been made from the terms of the treaty in force between the parties.⁶⁴

Reservations must be distinguished from other statements made with regard to a treaty that are not intended to have the legal effect of a reservation, such as understandings, political statements or interpretative declarations. In the latter instance, no binding consequence is intended with regard to the treaty in question. What is involved is a political manifestation for primarily internal effect that is not binding upon the other parties.⁶⁵ A distinction has been drawn between ‘mere’ interpretative declarations and ‘qualified’ interpretative declarations,⁶⁶ with the latter category capable in certain circumstances of constituting reservations.⁶⁷ Another way of describing this is to draw a distinction between ‘simple interpretative declarations’ and ‘conditional interpretative declarations’.⁶⁸ The latter is described in the ILC Guide to Practice as referring to a situation where the state subjects its consent to be bound by the treaty to a specific interpretation of the treaty, or specific provisions thereof.⁶⁹

In the *Anglo-French Continental Shelf* case,⁷⁰ the Arbitral Tribunal emphasised that French reservations to article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, challenged by the United Kingdom, had to be construed in accordance with the natural meaning of their terms.⁷¹ The United Kingdom contended that the third French reservation to article 6 (which concerned the non-applicability of the principle of equidistance in areas of ‘special circumstances’ as defined by the French government, naming specifically *inter alia* the Bay of Granville) was in reality only an interpretative declaration. The Tribunal, however, held that although this reservation contained elements of interpretation, it also constituted a specific condition imposed by France on its acceptance of the article 6 delimitation regime. This went beyond mere interpretation as it made the application of that regime dependent upon acceptance by other states of France’s designation of the named areas as involving ‘special circumstances’. It therefore had the purpose of seeking to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain treaty provisions with regard to their application by the reserving state and thus constituted a reservation.⁷²

In the *Belilos* case⁷³ in 1988, the European Court of Human Rights considered the effect of one particular interpretative declaration made by Switzerland upon ratification.⁷⁴ The Court held that one had to look behind the title given to the declaration in question and to seek to determine its substantive content. It was necessary to ascertain the original intention of those drafting the declaration and thus recourse to the *travaux préparatoires* was required. In the light of these, the Court felt that Switzerland had indeed intended to ‘avoid the consequences which a broad view of the right of access to the courts . . . would have for the system of public administration and of

justice in the cantons and consequently . . . put forward the declaration as qualifying [its] consent to be bound by the Convention'.⁷⁵ Having so decided, the Court held that the declaration in question, taking effect as a reservation, did not in fact comply with article 64 of the European Convention, which prohibited reservations of a general character⁷⁶ and required a brief statement of the law in force necessitating the reservation.⁷⁷ Accordingly, the declaration was invalid. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Court has accepted a test favourable to states as to the situations under which a declaration may be regarded as a reservation, only to emphasise the requirements of article 64 concerning the validity of reservations to the European Convention. One should therefore be rather cautious before applying the easier test regarding interpretative declarations generally. Nevertheless, there remains a problem of states making interpretative declarations that seek to act as reservations to treaties that prohibit reservations. In such situations, it is likely that the effect of such declarations would be ineffective as against other parties who would therefore be entitled to regard the treaty as in force fully between all the parties, taking no account of the declaration.⁷⁸

In order to determine whether a unilateral statement made constitutes a reservation or an interpretative declaration, the statement will have to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms and within the context of the treaty in question. The intention of the state making the statement at that time will also need to be considered.⁷⁹ In the special case of a bilateral treaty, an interpretative declaration made by one party which is accepted by the other party will constitute an authoritative interpretation of that treaty.⁸⁰

The general rule that became established was that reservations could only be made with the consent of all the other states involved in the process. This was to preserve as much unity of approach as possible to ensure the success of an international agreement and to minimise deviations from the text of the treaty. This reflected the contractual view of the nature of a treaty,⁸¹ and the League of Nations supported this concept.⁸² The effect of this was that a state wishing to make a reservation had to obtain the consent of all the other parties to the treaty. If this was not possible, that state could either become a party to the original treaty (minus the reservation, of course) or not become a party at all. However, this restrictive approach to reservations was not accepted by the International Court of Justice in the *Reservations to the Genocide Convention* case.⁸³ This was an Advisory Opinion by the Court, requested by the General Assembly after some states had made reservations to the 1948 Genocide Convention, which contained no clause permitting such reservations, and a number of objections were made.

The Court held that:

a state which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by one or more parties to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.

Compatibility, in the Court's opinion, could be decided by states individually since it was noted that:

if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can . . . consider that the reserving state is not a party to the Convention.⁸⁴

The Court did emphasise the principle of the integrity of a convention, but pointed to a variety of special circumstances with regard to the Genocide Convention in question, which called for a more flexible interpretation of the principle. These circumstances included the universal character of the United Nations under whose auspices the Convention had been concluded; the extensive participation envisaged under the Convention; the fact that the Convention had been the product of a series of majority votes; the fact that the principles underlying the Convention were general principles already binding upon states; that the Convention was clearly intended by the United Nations and the parties to be definitely universal in scope and that it had been adopted for a purely humanitarian purpose so that states parties did not have interests of their own, but a common interest. All these factors militated for a flexible approach in this case.

The Court's approach, although having some potential disadvantages,⁸⁵ was in keeping with the move to increase the acceptability and scope of treaties and with the trend in international organisations away from the unanimity rule in decision-making and towards majority voting.⁸⁶ The 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties accepted the Court's views.⁸⁷

By article 19, reservations may be made when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, but they cannot be made where the reservation is prohibited by the treaty, or where the treaty provides that only specified reservations may be made and these do not include the reservation in question, or where the reservation is not compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.⁸⁸

In the instances where a reservation is possible, the traditional rule requiring acceptance by all parties will apply where, by article 20(2), ‘it appears from the limited number of the negotiating states and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty’.

Article 20(4) then outlines the general rules to be followed with regard to treaties not within article 20(2) and not constituent instruments of international organisations. These are that:

- (a)** acceptance by another contracting state of a reservation constitutes the reserving state a party to the treaty in relation to that other state if or when the treaty is in force for those states;
- (b)** an objection by another contracting state to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving states unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting state;
- (c)** an act expressing a state’s consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting state has accepted the reservation.

The effect of reservations is outlined in article 21. This declares that a reservation established with regard to another party modifies, for the reserving state in its relations with the other party, the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates, to the extent of the reservation. The other party is similarly affected in its relations with the reserving state. An example of this was provided by the Libyan reservation to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations with regard to the diplomatic bag, permitting Libya to search the bag with the consent of the state whose bag it was, and insist that it be returned to its state of origin. Since the United Kingdom did not object to the reservation, it could have acted similarly with regard to Libya's diplomatic bags.⁸⁹ However, the reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty as between themselves.

Article 21(3) provides that where a state objects to a reservation, but not to the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving state, then 'the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two states to the extent of the reservation'. This provision was applied by the Arbitral Tribunal in the *Anglo-French Continental Shelf* case, where it was noted that:

the combined effect of the French reservations and their rejection by the United Kingdom is neither to render article 6 [of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958] inapplicable *in toto*, as the French Republic contends, nor to render it applicable *in toto*, as

the United Kingdom primarily contends. It is to render the article inapplicable as between the two countries to the extent of the reservations.⁹⁰

A number of important issues, however, remain unresolved. In particular, it is unclear what effect an impermissible reservation has.⁹¹ One school of thought takes the view that such reservations are invalid,⁹² another that the validity of any reservation is dependent upon acceptance by other states.⁹³ While there is a presumption in favour of the permissibility of reservations, this may be displaced if the reservation is prohibited explicitly or implicitly by the treaty or it is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty.⁹⁴ A further problem is to determine when these conditions under which reservations may be deemed to be impermissible have been met. This is especially difficult where it is contended that the object and purpose of a treaty have been offended. The meaning of the term is not free from uncertainty,⁹⁵ although it has been accepted that a reservation to a particular method of dispute settlement laid down in a treaty would not normally be seen as contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty.⁹⁶

The question is also raised as to the authority able to make such a determination. At the moment, unless the particular treaty otherwise provides,⁹⁷ whether a reservation is impermissible is a determination to be made by states parties to the treaty themselves. In other words, it is a subjective application of objective criteria.⁹⁸ Once the impermissibility of a reservation has been demonstrated, there are two fundamental possibilities. Either the treaty provision to which the reservation has been attached applies

in full to the state that made the impermissible reservation or the consent of the state to the treaty as a whole is vitiated so that the state is no longer a party to the treaty. A further question is whether the other parties to the treaty may accept and thus legitimate an impermissible reservation or whether a determination of impermissibility is conclusive. All that can be said is that state practice on the whole is somewhat inconclusive.

There is a trend with regard to human rights treaties to regard impermissible reservations as severing that reservation so that the provision in question applies in full to the reserving state.⁹⁹ In the *Belilos* case,¹⁰⁰ the European Court of Human Rights laid particular emphasis upon Switzerland's commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights,¹⁰¹ so that the effect of defining the Swiss declaration as a reservation which was then held to be invalid was that Switzerland was bound by the provision (article 6) in full. This view was reaffirmed in *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Preliminary Objections).¹⁰² The Court analysed the validity of the territorial restrictions attached to Turkey's declarations under former articles 25 and 46 recognising the competence of the Commission and the Court¹⁰³ and held that they were impermissible under the terms of the Convention. The Court then concluded that the effect of this in the light of the special nature of the Convention as a human rights treaty was that the reservations were severable so that Turkey's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Commission and the Court remained in place, unrestricted by the terms of the invalid limitations attached to the declarations.¹⁰⁴

The UN Human Rights Committee in its controversial General Comment 24/52 of 2 November 1994¹⁰⁵ emphasised the special nature of human rights

treaties and expressed its belief that the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties were ‘inappropriate to address the problems of reservations to human rights treaties’. The Committee took the view that provisions contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, which represented customary international law, could not be the subject of reservations, while in the case of reservations to non-derogable provisions not falling into this category, states had ‘a heavy onus’ to justify such reservations. The Committee also emphasised that the effect of an unacceptable reservation would normally be that the provision operated in full with regard to the party making such a reservation and not that the Covenant would not be in force at all for such a state party. The Committee also regarded itself as the only body able to determine whether a specific reservation was or was not compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.¹⁰⁶

The controversy with regard to this included the issue as to the powers of the Committee and other such monitoring organs as distinct from courts which under their constituent treaties had the competence to interpret the same in a binding manner.¹⁰⁷ The International Law Commission adopted Preliminary Conclusions on Reservations to Normative Multilateral Treaties Including Human Rights Treaties in 1997, in which it reaffirmed the applicability of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reservations regime to all treaties, including human rights treaties. The ILC accepted that human rights monitoring bodies were competent to comment and express recommendations upon *inter alia* the admissibility of reservations, but declared that this did not affect ‘the traditional modalities of control’ by contracting parties in accordance with the two Vienna Conventions of 1969

and 1986, nor did it mean that such bodies could exceed the powers given to them for the performance of their general monitoring role.¹⁰⁸ It was particularly emphasised that ‘it is the reserving state that has the responsibility of taking action’ in the event of inadmissibility and such state could modify or withdraw the reservation or withdraw from the treaty.¹⁰⁹

There is, however, apart from this controversy, the question as to the large number of reservations to human rights treaties, many of which have been criticised as being contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties.¹¹⁰

In general, reservations are deemed to have been accepted by states that have raised no objections to them at the end of a period of twelve months after notification of the reservation, or by the date on which consent to be bound by the treaty was expressed, whichever is the later.¹¹¹ Reservations must be in writing and communicated to the contracting states and other states entitled to become parties to the treaty, as must acceptances of, and objections to, reservations.

Most multilateral conventions today will in fact specifically declare their position as regards reservations. Some, however, for example the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, make no mention at all of reservations, while others may specify that reservations are possible with regard to certain provisions only.¹¹² Still others may prohibit altogether any reservations.¹¹³

Unless the treaty otherwise provides, reservations may be withdrawn at any time without the consent of a state or of an international organisation which has accepted the reservation being required for its withdrawal, subject to

agreement to the contrary, only when the other states to the treaty have received notification of that withdrawal.¹¹⁴

Entry into Force of Treaties

Basically treaties will become operative when and how the negotiating states decide, but in the absence of any provision or agreement regarding this, a treaty will enter into force as soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating states.¹¹⁵ In many cases, treaties will specify that they will come into effect upon a certain date or after a determined period following the last ratification. It is usual where multilateral conventions are involved to provide for entry into force upon ratification by a fixed number of states, since otherwise large multilateral treaties may be prejudiced. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, for example, provides for entry into force on the thirtieth day following the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General, while the Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 itself came into effect thirty days after the deposit of the thirty-fifth ratification and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court required sixty ratifications. Of course, even though the necessary number of ratifications has been received for the treaty to come into operation, only those states that have actually ratified the treaty will be bound. It will not bind those that have merely signed it, unless, of course, signature is in the particular circumstances regarded as sufficient to express the consent of the state to be bound.

Article 80 of the 1969 Convention (following article 102 of the United Nations Charter) provides that, after their entry into force, treaties should be

transmitted to the UN Secretariat for registration and publication. These provisions are intended to end the practice of secret treaties, which was regarded as contributing to the outbreak of the First World War, as well as enabling the UN Treaty Series, which contains all registered treaties, to be as comprehensive as possible.¹¹⁶

The Application of Treaties¹¹⁷

Once treaties enter into force, a number of questions can arise as to the way in which they apply in particular situations. Article 25 provides that a treaty may in whole or in part be provisionally applied pending its entry into force if the treaty so provides or the parties have in some other manner so agreed.¹¹⁸ A number of treaties contain such a provisional application term.¹¹⁹ These cannot, of course, remove the necessity for the due processes of ratification and accession as relevant. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating states have otherwise agreed, such provisional application will terminate if the state concerned notifies the other states between which the treaty is being provisionally applied of its intention not to become a party to the treaty.¹²⁰

In the absence of contrary intention, the treaty will not operate retroactively so that its provisions will not bind a party as regards any facts, acts or situations prior to that state's acceptance of the treaty.¹²¹ Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, article 29 provides that a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory. This is the general rule, but it is possible for a state to stipulate that an international agreement will apply only to part of its territory. In the past,

so-called ‘colonial application clauses’ were included in some treaties by the European colonial powers, which declared whether or not the terms of the particular agreement would extend to the various colonies.¹²²

With regard to the problem of successive treaties on the same subject-matter, article 30 provides that:

1. Subject to article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations,¹²³ the rights and obligations of states parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59,¹²⁴ the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
 - (a) as between states parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
 - (b) as between a state party to both treaties and a state party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both states are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.

5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41,¹²⁵ or to any question of the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60¹²⁶ or to any question of responsibility which may arise for a state from the conclusion or application of a treaty, the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another state under another treaty.

The problem raised by successive treaties is becoming a serious one with the growth in the number of states and the increasing number of treaties entered into, and the added complication of enhanced activity at the regional level.¹²⁷ The rules laid down in article 30 provide a general guide and in many cases the problem will be resolved by the parties themselves expressly.

Third States

A point of considerable interest with regard to the creation of binding rules of law for the international community centres on the application and effects of treaties upon third states, that is states which are not parties to the treaty in question.¹²⁸ The general rule is that international agreements bind only the parties to them. The reasons for this rule can be found in the fundamental principles of the sovereignty and independence of states, which posit that states must consent to rules before they can be bound by them. This, of course, is a general proposition and is not necessarily true in all cases. However, it does remain as a basic line of approach in international law. Article 34 of the Convention echoes the general rule in specifying that ‘a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent’.¹²⁹

It is quite clear that a treaty cannot impose obligations upon third states and this was emphasised by the International Law Commission during its deliberations prior to the Vienna Conferences and Convention.¹³⁰ There is, however, one major exception to this and that is where the provisions of the treaty in question have entered into customary law.¹³¹ In such a case, all states would be bound, regardless of whether they had been parties to the original treaty or not. One example of this would be the laws relating to warfare adopted by the Hague Conventions earlier this century and now regarded as part of customary international law.¹³²

This point arises with regard to article 2(6) of the UN Charter, which states that:

the organisation shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

It is sometimes maintained that this provision creates binding obligations rather than being merely a statement of attitude with regard to non-members of the United Nations.¹³³ This may be the correct approach since the principles enumerated in article 2 of the Charter can be regarded as part of customary international law, and in view of the fact that an agreement may legitimately provide for enforcement sanctions to be implemented against a state guilty of aggression. Article 75 of the Convention provides:

the provisions of the Convention are without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor state in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations with reference to that state's aggression.

Article 35 notes that an obligation may arise for a third state from a term of a treaty if the parties to the treaty so intend and if the third state expressly accepts that obligation in writing.¹³⁴

As far as rights allocated to third states by a treaty are concerned, the matter is a little different. The Permanent Court of International Justice declared in the *Free Zones* case¹³⁵ that:

the question of the existence of a right acquired under an instrument drawn between other states is . . . one to be decided in each particular case: it must be ascertained whether the states which have stipulated in favour of a third state meant to create for that state an actual right which the latter has accepted as such.

Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that:

a right arises for a third state from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the

provision to accord that right either to the third state, or to a group of states to which it belongs, or to all states, and the third state assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides.

Further, particular kinds of treaties may create obligations or rights *erga omnes* and, in such cases, all states would presumptively be bound by them and would also benefit. Examples might include multilateral treaties establishing a particular territorial regime, such as the Suez and Kiel Canals or the Black Sea Straits.¹³⁶ In the *SS Wimbledon* case,¹³⁷ the Permanent Court noted that ‘an international waterway . . . for the benefit of all nations of the world’ had been established. In other words, for an obligation to be imposed by a treaty upon a third state, the express agreement of that state in writing is required, whereas in the case of benefits granted to third states, their assent is presumed in the absence of contrary intention. This is because the general tenor of customary international law has leaned in favour of the validity of rights granted to third states, but against that of obligations imposed upon them, in the light of basic principles relating to state sovereignty, equality and non-interference.

The Amendment and Modification of Treaties

Although the two processes of amending and modifying international agreements share a common aim in that they both involve the revision of treaties, they are separate activities and may be accomplished in different manners. Amendments refer to the formal alteration of treaty provisions, affecting all the parties to the particular agreement, while modifications relate to variations of certain treaty terms as between particular parties only. Where it is deemed desirable, a treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties, but in such a case all the formalities as to the conclusion and coming into effect of treaties as described so far in this chapter will have to be observed except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.¹³⁸ It is understandable that as conditions change, the need may arise to alter some of the provisions stipulated in the international agreement in question. There is nothing unusual in this and it is a normal facet of international relations. The fact that such alterations must be effected with the same formalities that attended the original formation of the treaty is only logical since legal rights and obligations may be involved and any variation of them involves considerations of state sovereignty and consent which necessitate careful interpretation and attention. It is possible, however, for oral or tacit agreement to amend, providing it is unambiguous and clearly evidenced. Many multilateral treaties lay down specific conditions as regards amendment. For example, the UN Charter in article 108 provides that amendments will come into force for all member states upon adoption and ratification by two-thirds of the members of the organisation, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Problems can occur where, in the absence of specific amendment processes, some of the parties oppose the amendments proposed by others. Article 40 of

the Vienna Convention specifies the procedure to be adopted in amending multilateral treaties, in the absence of contrary provisions in the treaty itself. Any proposed amendment has to be notified to all contracting states, each one of which is entitled to participate in the decision as to action to be taken and in the negotiation and conclusion of any agreements. Every state which has the right to be a party to the treaty possesses also the right to become a party to the amendment, but such amendments will not bind any state which is a party to the original agreement and which does not become a party to the amended agreement,¹³⁹ subject to any provisions to the contrary in the treaty itself.

The situation can become a little more complex where a state becomes a party to the treaty after the amendments have come into effect. That state will be a party to the amended agreement, except as regards parties to the treaty that are not bound by the amendments. In this case, the state will be considered as a party to the unamended treaty in relation to those states.

Two or more parties to a multilateral treaty may decide to change that agreement as between themselves in certain ways, quite irrespective of any amendment by all the parties. This technique, known as modification, is possible provided it has not been prohibited by the treaty in question and provided it does not affect the rights or obligations of the other parties. Modification, however, is not possible where the provision it is intended to alter is one 'derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole'.¹⁴⁰ A treaty may also be modified by the terms of another later agreement¹⁴¹ or by the establishment subsequently of a rule of *jus cogens*.¹⁴²

Treaty Interpretation¹⁴³

One of the enduring problems facing courts and tribunals and lawyers, both in the municipal and international law spheres, relates to the question of interpretation.¹⁴⁴ Accordingly, rules and techniques have been put forward to aid judicial bodies in resolving such problems.¹⁴⁵ As far as international law is concerned, there are three basic approaches to treaty interpretation.¹⁴⁶ The first centres on the actual text of the agreement and emphasises the analysis of the words used.¹⁴⁷ The second looks to the intention of the parties adopting the agreement as the solution to ambiguous provisions and can be termed the subjective approach in contradistinction to the objective approach of the previous school.¹⁴⁸ The third approach adopts a wider perspective than the other two and emphasises the object and purpose of the treaty as the most important backcloth against which the meaning of any particular treaty provision should be measured.¹⁴⁹ This teleological school of thought has the effect of underlining the role of the judge or arbitrator, since he will be called upon to define the object and purpose of the treaty, and it has been criticised for encouraging judicial law-making. Nevertheless, any true interpretation of a treaty in international law will have to take into account all aspects of the agreement, from the words employed to the intention of the parties and the aims of the particular document. It is not possible to exclude completely any one of these components.

Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention comprise in some measure aspects of all three doctrines. Article 31 lays down the fundamental rules of interpretation and can be taken as reflecting customary international law.¹⁵⁰

Article 31(1) declares that a treaty shall be interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.¹⁵¹ The International Court noted in the *Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations* case¹⁵² that ‘the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur’.¹⁵³ On the basis of this provision, for example, the European Court of Human Rights held in the *Lithgow* case¹⁵⁴ that the use of the phrase ‘subject to the conditions provided for . . . by the general principles of international law’ in article 1 of Protocol I of the European Convention in the context of compensation for interference with property rights, could not be interpreted as extending the general principles of international law in this field to establish standards of compensation for the nationalisation of property of nationals (as distinct from aliens).¹⁵⁵ The word ‘context’ is held to include the preamble and annexes of the treaty as well as any agreement or instrument made by the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.¹⁵⁶

The Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission in its boundary delimitation decision emphasised that the elements contained in article 31(1) were guides to establishing what the parties actually intended or their ‘common will’¹⁵⁷ and in this process the principle of ‘contemporaneity’ is relevant. This means that a treaty should be interpreted by reference to the circumstances prevailing when the treaty was concluded,¹⁵⁸ so that, for instance, expressions and geographical names used in the instrument should be given the meaning that they would have possessed at that time.¹⁵⁹ However, as the

International Court has noted, this does not prevent it from taking into account, in interpreting a treaty, ‘the present-day state of scientific knowledge, as reflected in the documentary material submitted to it by the parties’.¹⁶⁰

It has also been noted that the process of interpretation ‘is a judicial function, whose purpose is to determine the precise meaning of a provision, but which cannot change it’.¹⁶¹

In addition, any subsequent agreement or practice relating to the treaty must be considered together with the context.¹⁶² Subsequent agreement or practice may indeed have several roles. As objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty, they will constitute authentic means of interpretation,¹⁶³ and they may also mark a clarification of the meaning of the treaty. In addition, such subsequent agreement or practice may constitute an alteration in the legal relations between the parties established by the treaty in question in the sense of the particular term used having a meaning capable of evolving over time.¹⁶⁴

The provision whereby any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties shall be taken into account in interpreting a treaty¹⁶⁵ was used somewhat controversially in *Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States)* to justify recourse to the rules concerning the use of force in the context of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 1955.¹⁶⁶

Where the interpretation according to the provisions of article 31 needs confirmation, or determination since the meaning is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation under article 32. These means include the preparatory works (*travaux préparatoires*) of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion and may be employed in the above circumstances to aid the process of interpreting the treaty in question.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the International Court has underlined that ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’.¹⁶⁸ The Court has also noted, however, that the parties themselves may intend to give an evolving meaning to particular provisions.¹⁶⁹

Case-law provides some interesting guidelines to the above-stated rules. In the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* case,¹⁷⁰ the Court was asked whether the UN Secretary-General could appoint the third member of a Treaty Commission upon the request of one side to the dispute where the other side (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) refused to appoint its own representative. It was emphasised that the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms of the Peace Treaties with the three states concerned envisaged the appointment of the third member after the other two had been nominated. The breach of a treaty obligation could not be remedied by creating a Commission which was not the kind of Commission envisaged by the Treaties. The principle of effectiveness could not be used by the Court to attribute to the provisions for the settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which would be contrary to their letter and spirit. The Court also stressed the nature of the disputes clause as being one that had to be strictly construed. Thus, the character of the provisions to be interpreted is significant in the context of

utilising the relevant rules of interpretation. The principle of effectiveness¹⁷¹ will be used, however, in order to give effect to provisions in accordance with the intentions of the parties¹⁷² and in accordance with the rules of international law.¹⁷³

In two areas, it should be noted, the principle of effectiveness allied with the broader purposes approach has been used in an especially dynamic manner. In the case of treaties that also operate as the constitutional documents of an international organisation, a more flexible method of interpretation would seem to be justified, since one is dealing with an instrument that is being used in order to accomplish the stated aims of that organisation. In addition, of course, the concept and nature of subsequent practice possesses in such cases an added relevance.¹⁷⁴ This approach has been used as a way of inferring powers, not expressly provided for in the relevant instruments, which are deemed necessary in the context of the purposes of the organisation.¹⁷⁵ This programmatic interpretation doctrine in such cases is now well established and especially relevant to the United Nations, where over sixty years of practice related to the principles of the organisation by over 190 states is manifest.

The more dynamic approach to interpretation is also evident in the context of human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which created a system of implementation.¹⁷⁶ It has been held that a particular legal order was thereby established involving objective obligations to protect human rights rather than subjective, reciprocal rights.¹⁷⁷ Accordingly, a more flexible and programmatic or purpose-oriented method of interpretation was adopted, emphasising that the Convention constituted a

living instrument that had to be interpreted ‘in the light of present-day conditions’.¹⁷⁸ In addition, the object and purpose of the Convention requires that its provisions be interpreted so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.¹⁷⁹

Indeed, in this context, it was noted in the *Licensing of Journalists* case¹⁸⁰ that while it was useful to compare the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights with other relevant international instruments, this approach could not be utilised to read into the Convention restrictions existing in other treaties. In this situation, ‘the rule most favourable to the individual must prevail’.

Article 31(4) provides that a special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. It would appear that the standard of proof is fairly high, since a derogation from the ordinary meaning of the term is involved. It is not enough that one party only uses the particular term in a particular way.¹⁸¹

Where a treaty is authenticated in more than one language, as often happens with multilateral agreements, article 33 provides that, in the absence of agreement, in the event of a difference of meaning that the normal processes of interpretation cannot resolve, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.¹⁸²

Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties¹⁸³

General Provisions

Article 42 states that the validity and continuance in force of a treaty may only be questioned on the basis of the provisions in the Vienna Convention. Article 44 provides that a state may only withdraw from or suspend the operation of a treaty in respect of the treaty as a whole and not particular parts of it, unless the treaty otherwise stipulates or the parties otherwise agree. If the appropriate ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty relates solely to particular clauses, it may only be invoked in relation to those clauses where:

- (a)** the said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application;
- (b)** it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of consent of the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole; and
- (c)** continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not be unjust.

Thus, the Convention adopts a cautious approach to the general issue of separability of treaty provisions in this context.¹⁸⁴

Article 45 in essence provides that a ground for invalidity, termination, withdrawal or suspension may no longer be invoked by the state where, after becoming aware of the facts, it expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or by reason of its conduct may be deemed to have acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or its continuance in force.¹⁸⁵

Invalidity of Treaties

Municipal Law

A state cannot plead a breach of its constitutional provisions as to the making of treaties as a valid excuse for condemning an agreement. There has been for some years disagreement among international lawyers as to whether the failure to abide by a domestic legal limitation by, for example, a head of state in entering into a treaty, will result in rendering the agreement invalid or not.¹⁸⁶ The Convention took the view that in general it would not, but that it could in certain circumstances.

Article 46(1) provides that:

state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.

Violation will be regarded as manifest if it would be ‘objectively evident’ to any state conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice, and in good faith.¹⁸⁷ For example, where the representative of the state has had his authority to consent on behalf of the state made subject to a specific restriction which is ignored, the state will still be bound by that consent save

where the other negotiating states were aware of the restriction placed upon his authority to consent prior to the expression of that consent.¹⁸⁸ This particular provision applies as regards a person authorised to represent a state and such persons are defined in article 7 to include heads of state and government and foreign ministers, in addition to persons possessing full powers.¹⁸⁹

The International Court dealt with this question in *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, where it had been argued by Nigeria that the Maroua Declaration of 1975 between the two states was not valid as its constitutional rules had not been complied with. The Court noted that the Nigerian head of state had signed the Declaration and that a limitation of his capacity would not be ‘manifest’ unless at least properly publicised. This was especially so since heads of state are deemed to represent their states for the purpose of performing acts relating to the conclusion of treaties.¹⁹⁰ The Court also noted that ‘there is no general legal obligation for states to keep themselves informed of legislative and constitutional developments in other states which are or may become important for the international relations of these states’.¹⁹¹

It should, of course, also be noted that a state may not invoke a provision of its internal law as a justification for its failure to carry out an international obligation. This is a general principle of international law¹⁹² and finds its application in the law of treaties by virtue of article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

Error

Unlike the role of mistake in municipal laws of contract, the scope in international law of error as invalidating a state's consent is rather limited. In view of the character of states and the multiplicity of persons actually dealing with the negotiation and conclusion of treaties, errors are not very likely to happen, whether they be unilateral or mutual.

Article 48 declares that a state may only invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty, if the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that state to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty. But if the state knew or ought to have known of the error, or if it contributed to that error, then it cannot afterwards free itself from the obligation of observing the treaty by pointing to that error.

This restrictive approach is in harmony with the comments made in a number of cases, including the *Temple of Preah Vihear* case,¹⁹³ where the International Court of Justice rejected Thailand's argument that a particular map contained a basic error and therefore it was not bound to observe it, since 'the plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error, or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible error'.¹⁹⁴ The Court felt that in view of the character and qualifications of the persons who were involved on the Thai side in examining the map, Thailand could not put forward a claim of error.

Fraud and Corruption

Where a state consents to be bound by a treaty as a result of the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating state, that state may under article 49 invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound. Where a negotiating state directly or indirectly corrupts the representative of another state in order to obtain the consent of the latter to the treaty, that corruption may under article 50 be invoked as invalidating the consent to be bound.¹⁹⁵

Coercion

Of more importance than error, fraud or corruption in the law of treaties is the issue of coercion as invalidating consent. Where consent has been obtained by coercing the representative of a state, whether by acts or threats directed against him, it shall, according to article 51 of the Convention, be without any legal effect.¹⁹⁶

The problem of consent obtained by the application of coercion against the state itself is a slightly different one. Prior to the League of Nations, it was clear that international law did not provide for the invalidation of treaties on the grounds of the use or threat of force by one party against the other and this was a consequence of the lack of rules in customary law prohibiting recourse to war. With the signing of the Covenant of the League in 1919, and the Kellogg–Briand Pact in 1928 forbidding the resort to war to resolve international disputes, a new approach began to be taken with regard to the illegality of the use of force in international relations.

With the elucidation of the Nuremberg principles and the coming into effect of the UN Charter after the Second World War, it became clear that

international law condemned coercive activities by states.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other measure inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

It followed that treaties based on coercion of a state should be regarded as invalid.¹⁹⁷

Accordingly, article 52 of the Convention provides that '[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations'. This article was the subject of much debate in the Vienna Conference preceding the adoption of the Convention. Communist and certain Developing Countries argued that coercion comprised not only the threat or use of force, but also economic and political pressures.¹⁹⁸ The International Law Commission did not take a firm stand on the issue, but noted that the precise scope of the acts covered by the definition should be left to be determined in practice by interpretation of the relevant Charter provisions.¹⁹⁹

The Vienna Conference, however, issued a Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, which condemned the exercise of such coercion to procure the formation of a treaty. These points were not included in the Convention itself, which leaves one to conclude that the application of political or economic pressure to secure the consent of a state to a treaty may not be contrary to international law, but clearly much will depend upon the relevant circumstances.

In international relations, the variety of influences which may be brought to bear by a powerful state against a weaker one to induce it to adopt a particular line of policy is wide-ranging and may cover not only coercive threats, but also subtle expressions of displeasure. The precise nuances of any particular situation will depend on a number of factors, and it will be misleading to suggest that all forms of pressure are as such violations of international law.

The problem was noted by Judge Padilla Nervo in the International Court in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland)* case²⁰⁰ when he stated that:

there are moral and political pressures which cannot be proved by the so-called documentary evidence, but which are in fact indisputably real and which have, in history, given rise to treaties and conventions claimed to be freely concluded and subjected to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*.²⁰¹

It should also be noted that the phrase ‘in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter’ was used so that article 52 should by no means be construed as applying solely to members of the United Nations, but should be treated as a universal rule.

*Jus Cogens*²⁰²

Article 53 of the Convention provides that:

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted, and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Article 64 declares that ‘[i]f a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates’.²⁰³

As noted in Chapter 3,²⁰⁴ the concept of *jus cogens*, of fundamental and entrenched rules of international law, is well established in doctrine now, but controversial as to content and method of creation. The insertion of articles

dealing with *jus cogens* in the 1969 Convention underlines the basic principles with regard to treaties.

Consequences of Invalidity

Article 69 provides that an invalid treaty is void and without legal force. If acts have nevertheless been performed in reliance on such a treaty, each party may require any other party to establish as far as possible in their mutual relations the position that would have existed if the acts had not been performed. Acts performed in good faith before the invalidity was invoked are not rendered unlawful by reason only of the invalidity of the treaty.

Where a treaty is void under article 53, article 71 provides that the parties are to eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with *jus cogens* and bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm. Where a treaty terminates under article 64, the parties are released from any obligation further to perform the treaty, but this does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination, provided that the rights, obligations or situations may be maintained thereafter in conformity with the new peremptory norm.

The Termination of Treaties²⁰⁵

There are a number of methods available by which treaties may be terminated or suspended.

Termination by Treaty Provision or Consent

A treaty may be terminated or suspended in accordance with a specific provision in that treaty, or otherwise at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation.²⁰⁶ Where, however, a treaty contains no provision regarding termination and does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal specifically, a state may only denounce or withdraw from that treaty where the parties intended to admit such a possibility or where the right may be implied by the nature of the treaty.²⁰⁷ In General Comment No. 26 of 1997, the UN Human Rights Committee, noting that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had no provision for termination or denunciation, concluded, on the basis of the Vienna Convention provisions, that the parties had not intended to admit of such a possibility. The Committee based itself on the fact that states parties were able to withdraw their acceptance of the right of inter-state complaint, while the First Optional Protocol, concerning the right of individual communication, provided in terms for denunciation. The Committee also emphasised that the Covenant, as an instrument codifying universal human rights, was not the type of treaty which, by its nature, implies a right of denunciation.²⁰⁸

A treaty may, of course, come to an end if its purposes and objects have been fulfilled or if it is clear from its provisions that it is limited in time and the requisite period has elapsed. The Tribunal in the *Rainbow Warrior* case²⁰⁹ held that the breach of the New Zealand–France Agreement 1986, concerning the two captured French agents who had sunk the vessel in question,²¹⁰ had commenced on 22 July 1986 and had run continuously for the three-year period of confinement of the agents stipulated in the agreement. Accordingly, the period concerned had expired on 22 July 1989, so that France could not be said to be in breach of its international obligations after that date.

However, this did not exempt France from responsibility for its previous breaches of its obligations, committed while these obligations were in force. Claims arising out of a previous infringement of a treaty which has since expired acquire an existence independent of that treaty.²¹¹ The termination of a treaty does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.²¹²

Just as two or more parties to a multilateral treaty may modify as between themselves particular provisions of the agreement,²¹³ so they may under article 58 agree to suspend the operation of treaty provisions temporarily and as between themselves alone if such a possibility is provided for by the treaty. Such suspension may also be possible under that article, where not prohibited by the treaty in question, provided it does not affect the rights or obligations of the other parties under the particular agreement and provided it is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Where all the parties to a treaty later conclude another agreement relating to the same subject-matter, the earlier treaty will be regarded as terminated where it appears that the matter is to be governed by the later agreement or where the provisions of the later treaty are so incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time.²¹⁴

Material Breach²¹⁵

There are two approaches to be considered. First, if one state violates an important provision in an agreement, it is not unnatural for the other states

concerned to regard that agreement as ended by it. It is in effect a countermeasure,²¹⁶ a rather unsubtle but effective means of ensuring the enforcement of a treaty. The fact that an agreement may be terminated where it is breached by one party may act as a discouragement to any party that might contemplate a breach of one provision, but would be unwilling to forgo the benefits prescribed in others. On the other hand, to render treaties revocable because one party has acted contrary to what might very well be only a minor provision in the agreement taken as a whole, would be to place the states participating in a treaty in rather a vulnerable position. There is a need for flexibility as well as certainty in such situations. Customary law supports the view that something more than a mere breach itself of a term in an agreement would be necessary to give the other party or parties the right to abrogate that agreement. In the *Tacna-Arica* arbitration,²¹⁷ between Chile and Peru, the arbitrator noted, in referring to an agreement about a plebiscite in former Peruvian territory occupied by Chile, that:

It is manifest that if abuses of administration could have the effect of terminating such an agreement, it would be necessary to establish such serious conditions as the consequence of administrative wrongs as would operate to frustrate the purpose of the agreement.²¹⁸

The relevant provision of the Vienna Convention is contained in article 60, which codifies existing customary law.²¹⁹ Article 60(3) declares that a material breach of a treaty consists in either a repudiation of the treaty not

permitted by the Vienna Convention or the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.²²⁰ The second part of article 60(3) was applied in the *Rainbow Warrior* case,²²¹ where the obligation to confine the two French agents in question on a Pacific Island for a minimum period of three years was held to have constituted the object or purpose of the New Zealand–France Agreement 1986, so that France committed a material breach of this treaty by permitting the agents to leave the island before the expiry of the three-year period.

Where such a breach occurs in a bilateral treaty, then under article 60(1) the innocent party may invoke that breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part. The International Court has made clear that it is only a material breach of the treaty itself, by a state party to it, which entitles the other party to rely on it for grounds of termination.²²² Further, termination on the basis of a breach which has not yet occurred, such as Hungary's purported termination of a bilateral treaty on the basis of works done by Czechoslovakia which had not at the time resulted in a diversion of the Danube River, would be deemed premature and would not be lawful.²²³ In *Croatia v. Slovenia*,²²⁴ the Arbitral Tribunal confirmed that article 60(1) applied to arbitration agreements and that conversations held by the Agent of Slovenia with the Slovenian-nominated member of the Tribunal which in the circumstances constituted breaches of the arbitration agreement were attributable to that state. It was further noted that 'the right of a party to seek the termination of a treaty on the ground that the other party has repudiated it is closely related to the principle *inadimplenti non est adimplendum*. To safeguard expectations of reciprocity underlying a treaty relationship, a party should not be required to perform a treaty that the other party has clearly and

definitively rejected.’²²⁵ However, repudiation of the agreement had to be distinguished from a purported breach of any of its provisions, which may constitute a material breach under article 60(3)(b).²²⁶ The Tribunal concluded that ‘[t]ermination of a treaty due to such a breach under article 60, paragraph 1 is warranted only if the breach defeats the object and purpose of the treaty’ and held in the circumstances of the case that in view of the remedial action taken, the breaches of the arbitration agreement by Slovenia did not render the continuation of the proceedings impossible and, therefore, did not defeat the object and purpose of the agreement. Accordingly, Croatia was not entitled to terminate the agreement under article 60(1) and the arbitration agreement remained in force.²²⁷

There is a rather different situation in the case of a multilateral treaty since a number of innocent parties are involved that might not wish the treaty to be denounced by one of them because of a breach by another state. To cover such situations, article 60(2) prescribes that a material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:

(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either:

(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting state, or

(ii) as between all the parties;

(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting state;

(c) any party other than the defaulting state to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty.²²⁸

It is interesting to note that the provisions of article 60 regarding the definition and consequences of a material breach do not apply, by article 60(5), to provisions relating to the ‘protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties’. This is because objective and absolute principles are involved and not just reciprocal rights and duties.²²⁹

Supervening Impossibility of Performance²³⁰

Article 61 of the Convention²³¹ is intended to cover such situations as the submergence of an island, or the drying up of a river where the consequence of such events is to render the performance of the treaty impossible. Where the carrying out of the terms of the agreement becomes impossible because of the ‘permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty’, a party may validly terminate or withdraw from it. However, where the impossibility is only temporary, it may be invoked solely to suspend the operation of the treaty. Impossibility cannot be used in this way where it arises from the breach by the party attempting to terminate or suspend the agreement of a treaty or other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.²³²

Fundamental Change of Circumstances²³³

The doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* is a principle in customary international law providing that where there has been a fundamental change of circumstances since an agreement was concluded, a party to that agreement may withdraw from or terminate it. It is justified by the fact that some treaties may remain in force for long periods of time, during which fundamental changes might have occurred. Such changes might encourage one of the parties to adopt drastic measures in the face of a general refusal to accept an alteration in the terms of the treaty. However, this doctrine has been criticised on the grounds that, having regard to the absence of any system for compulsory jurisdiction in the international order, it could operate as a disrupting influence upon the binding force of obligations undertaken by states. It might be used to justify withdrawal from treaties on rather tenuous grounds.²³⁴

The modern approach is to admit the existence of the doctrine, but severely restrict its scope.²³⁵ The International Court in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland)* case declared that:

International law admits that a fundamental change in the circumstances which determined the parties to accept a treaty, if it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations imposed by it, may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground

for invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty.²³⁶

Before the doctrine may be applied, the Court continued, it is necessary that such changes ‘must have increased the burden of the obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the performance something essentially different from that originally undertaken’.²³⁷

Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, which the International Court of Justice regarded in many respects as a codification of existing customary law,²³⁸ declares that:

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:

(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and

(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:

(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or

(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other

international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.

The article also notes that instead of terminating or withdrawing from a treaty in the above circumstances, a party might suspend the operation of the treaty.

The doctrine was examined in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case, where the International Court concluded that:

The changed circumstances advanced by Hungary are, in the Court's view, not of such a nature, either individually or collectively, that their effect would radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed in order to accomplish the Project. A fundamental change of circumstances must have been unforeseen; the existence of the circumstances at the time of the Treaty's conclusion must have constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the Treaty. The negative and conditional wording of article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is a clear indication moreover that the stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change of circumstances should be applied only in exceptional cases.²³⁹

As to the consequences of the termination or suspension of a treaty, Article 70 provides that:

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides²⁴⁰ or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present Convention:

- (a) releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty;
- (b) does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.

2. If a state denounces or withdraws from a multilateral treaty, paragraph 1 applies in the relations between that state and each of the other parties to the treaty from the date when such denunciation or withdrawal takes effect.²⁴¹

Article 72 provides that:

1. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the suspension of the operation of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present Convention:

- (a) releases the parties between which the operation of the treaty is suspended from the obligation to perform the treaty in their mutual relations during the period of the suspension;
- (b) does not otherwise affect the legal relations between the parties established by the treaty.

2. During the period of the suspension the parties shall refrain from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the operation of the treaty.²⁴²

Dispute Settlement²⁴³

Article 66 provides that if a dispute has not been resolved within twelve months by the means specified in article 33 of the UN Charter, then further procedures will be followed. If the dispute concerns article 53 or 64 (*jus cogens*), any one of the parties may by a written application submit it to the International Court of Justice for a decision unless the parties by common consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitration. If the dispute concerns other issues in the Convention, any one of the parties may by request to the UN Secretary-General set in motion the conciliation procedure laid down in the Annex to the Convention.

Treaties between States and International Organisations²⁴⁴

The International Law Commission completed Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations in 1982 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations was adopted in 1986.²⁴⁵ Its provisions closely follow the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention *mutatis mutandis*. However, article 73 of the 1986 Convention notes that ‘as between states parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, the relations of those states under a treaty between two or more states and one or more international organisations shall be governed by that Convention’. Whether this provision affirming the superiority of the

1969 Convention for states will in practice prejudice the interests of international organisations is an open question. In any event, there is no doubt that the strong wish of the Conference adopting the 1986 Convention was for uniformity, despite arguments that the position of international organisations in certain areas of treaty law was difficult to assimilate to that of states.²⁴⁶

Special concern in the International Law Commission focused on the effects that a treaty concluded by an international organisation has upon the member states of the organisation. Article 36 *bis* of the ILC Draft²⁴⁷ provided that:

Obligations and rights arise for states members of an international organization from the provisions of a treaty to which that organization is a party when the parties to the treaty intend those provisions to be the means of establishing such obligations and according such rights and have defined their conditions and effects in the treaty or have otherwise agreed thereon, and if:

(a) the states members of the organization, by virtue of the constituent instrument of that organization or otherwise, have unanimously agreed to be bound by the said provisions of the treaty; and

(b) the assent of the states members of the organization to be bound by the relevant provisions of the treaty has been duly brought to the knowledge of the negotiating states and negotiating organizations.

Such a situation would arise, for example, in the case of a customs union, which was an international organisation, normally concluding tariff agreements to which its members are not parties. Such agreements would be of little value if they were not to be immediately binding on member states.²⁴⁸

However, despite the fact that the European Community was particularly interested in the adoption of this draft article, it was rejected at the Conference.²⁴⁹ It was replaced by article 74(3) of the Convention, which provides:

The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudice any question that may arise in regard to the establishment of obligations and rights for states members of an international organisation under a treaty to which that organisation is a party.

Accordingly, the situation in question would fall to be resolved on the basis of the consent of the states concerned in the specific circumstances and on a case-by-case basis.

The other area of difference between the 1986 and 1969 Conventions concerns the provisions for dispute settlement. Since international organisations cannot be parties to contentious proceedings before the International Court, draft article 66 provided for the compulsory arbitration of disputes concerning issues relating to the principles of *jus cogens*, with the

details of the proposed arbitral tribunal contained in the Annex. The provisions of the 1969 Convention relating to the compulsory conciliation of disputes concerning the other articles were incorporated in the draft with little change. The 1986 Convention itself, however, adopted a different approach. Under article 66(2), where an international organisation authorised under article 96 of the UN Charter to request advisory opinions is a party to a dispute concerning *jus cogens*, it may apply for an advisory opinion to the International Court, which ‘shall be accepted as decisive by all the parties to the dispute concerned’. If the organisation is not so authorised under article 96, it may follow the same procedure acting through a member state. If no advisory opinion is requested or the Court itself does not comply with the request, then compulsory arbitration is provided for.²⁵⁰

Suggestions for Further Reading

A. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law and Practice*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2013

J. Klabbers, *The Concept of Treaty in International Law*, The Hague, 2013

R. Kolb, *The Law of Treaties: An Introduction*, Cheltenham, 2016

The Oxford Guide to Treaties (ed. D. Hollis), Oxford, 2012

The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (ed. O. Corten and P. Klein), Oxford, 2 vols., 2011

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (ed. O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach), Heidelberg, 2011

¹ See generally A. D. McNair, *The Law of Treaties*, Oxford, 1961; M. Fitzmaurice and P. Merkouris, *Treaties in Motion: The Evolution of Treaties from Formation to Termination*, Cambridge, 2020; J. Klabbers, *The Concept of Treaty in International Law*, The Hague,

2013; A. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law and Practice*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2013; *Essays on the Law of Treaties* (ed. J. Klabbers and R. Lefeber), The Hague, 2012; R. Kolb, *The Law of Treaties: An Introduction*, Cheltenham, 2016; M. Fitzmaurice and O. Elias, *Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties*, Utrecht, 2005; *The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties* (ed. O. Corten and P. Klein), Oxford, 2011, 2 vols.; *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* (ed. O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach), Heidelberg, 2011; *The Oxford Guide to Treaties* (ed. D. Hollis), Oxford, 2012; *40 Years of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (ed. A. Orakhelashvili and S. Williams), London, 2010; *Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties* (ed. C. J. Tams, A. Tzanakopoulos and A. Zimmermann), Cheltenham, 2014; *Conceptual and Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of Treaties* (ed. M. J. Bowman and D. Kritsiotis), Cambridge, 2018; M. Villiger, *Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, The Hague, 2008; *Developments of International Law in Treaty Making* (ed. R. Wolfrum and V. Röben), Berlin, 2005; *Multilateral Treaty-Making* (ed. V. Gowlland-Debas), The Hague, 2000; T. O. Elias, *The Modern Law of Treaties*, London, 1974; D. P. O'Connell, *International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1970, vol. I, pp. 195 ff.; I. Sinclair, *The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, 2nd ed., Manchester, 1984; P. Reuter, *Introduction to the Law of Treaties*, 2nd ed., Geneva, 1995; S. Bastid, *Les Traités dans la Vie Internationale*, Paris, 1985; and S. Rosenne, *Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945–1986*, Cambridge, 1989. See also *Oppenheim's International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London, 1992, p. 1197; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 132; and *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, chapter 16.

² See *Vattenfall and Others v. Germany*, 182 ILR, pp. 1, 42, where the Arbitral Tribunal noted that it was 'unquestionable that international conventions or international treaties concluded by and between sovereign states constitute international law'.

³ This was based upon the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1982, vol. II, part 2, pp. 9 ff. These articles were approved by the General Assembly and governmental views solicited and received. A plenipotentiary conference was held between 18 February and 21 March 1986 to produce a Convention based on those draft articles. See Assembly resolutions 37/112, 38/139 and 39/86.

⁴ See e.g. *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 47; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 37; and *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1973, pp. 3, 18; 55 ILR, pp. 183, 198. See also Rosenne, *Developments*, p. 121.

⁵ See e.g. *Beagle Channel*, HMSO, 1977, p. 7; 52 ILR, p. 93; *La Bretagne (Canada v. France)* 82 ILR, pp. 590, 612; *Golder v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 18, p. 14; 57 ILR, pp. 201, 213–14; and *Lithgow*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 102, 1986, para. 114; 75 ILR, pp. 438, 482–3.

⁶ See e.g. *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 47; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 37.

⁷ See e.g. *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)* (Jurisdictional Phase), ICJ Reports, 1973, pp. 3, 21; 55 ILR, pp. 183, 201.

⁸ Note also the references to good faith in articles 26, 31, 46 and 69 of the 1969 Convention. See *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 268; 57 ILR, pp. 398, 413; *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 392, 418; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 129; *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 264; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 214; and *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 67. See also J. F. O'Connor, *Good Faith in International Law*, Aldershot, 1991; E. Zoller, *La Bonne Foi en Droit International Public*, Paris, 1977; and H. Thirlway, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960–89 (Part One)', **60 BYIL**, 1989, pp. 4, 7. See also above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 87.

⁹ See e.g. *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 78–9; 116 ILR, p. 1.

¹⁰ The same definition is given (substituting states and international organisations for states alone) in the 1986 Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations and in draft article 2(1) of the ILC Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, A/CN.4/178, 2007, p. 5. See also H. Thirlway, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989: Supplement, 2006: Part Three', **77 BYIL**, 2006, pp. 1, 3; M. Fitzmaurice, 'The Identification and Character of Treaties and Treaty Obligations between States in International Law', **73 BYIL**, 2002, p. 141; and P. Gautier, 'Article 2', in Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 33.

¹¹ See e.g. the *Newfoundland/Nova Scotia* arbitration, 2001, para. 3.15. See also *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1978, pp. 3, 39; 60 ILR, p. 511. See K. Raustiala, 'Form and Substance in International Agreements', 99 *AJIL*, 2005, p. 581.

¹² See *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 540–1, 548. See also e.g. *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, Washington, DC, 1987, vol. I, p. 149.

¹³ Registration of the agreement with the UN under article 102 of the UN Charter is one useful indication. However, as the International Court pointed out in *Qatar v. Bahrain*, non-registration does not affect the actual validity of an international agreement nor its binding quality: ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 115, 121; 102 ILR, pp. 1, 18.

¹⁴ See further above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 312.

¹⁵ *South West Africa Cases* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 319, 330; 37 ILR, pp. 3, 12.

¹⁶ ICJ Reports, 1952, pp. 93, 112; 19 ILR, pp. 507, 517.

¹⁷ But see *Texaco v. Libya* 53 ILR, p. 389.

¹⁸ *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1973, pp. 3, 16; 55 ILR, pp. 183, 196.

¹⁹ *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 267; 57 ILR, pp. 398, 412. See also the Ihlen Declaration, held to constitute a binding statement, in *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933; 6 AD, p. 95; and *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 573–4; 80 ILR, pp. 459, 477. See further above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 103.

²⁰ The test will focus upon the intent of the parties as seen in the language and context of the document concerned, the circumstances of its conclusion and the explanations given by the parties: see the view of the US Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, 88 *AJIL*, 1994, p. 515. See also A. Aust, 'Alternatives to Treaty-Making: MOUs as Political Commitments', in Hollis, *Treaties*, p. 46; O. Schachter, 'The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements', 71 *AJIL*, 1977, p. 296; and Rosenne, *Developments*, p. 91. See e.g. the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which was understood to be

non-binding and thus not a treaty by the parties involved, *DUSPIL*, 1975, pp. 326–7. See also the statement of the US Deputy Legal Adviser for the US Mission to the UN that, ‘in many areas, non-binding instruments can serve as effective means for promoting international cooperation and shaping state conduct. They may also provide advantages – including greater flexibility and potential for faster implementation – that may make them preferable to treaties in some circumstances’, *DUSPIL*, 2015, p. 126.

²¹ The UK Foreign Office has noted that a memorandum of understanding is ‘a form frequently used to record informal arrangements between states on matters which are inappropriate for inclusion in treaties or where the form is more convenient than a treaty (e.g. for confidentiality). They may be drawn up as a single document using non-treaty terms, signed on behalf of two or more governments, or consist of an exchange of notes or letters recording an understanding between two governments’, UKMIL, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 534; and see FCDO, *Treaties and MOUs: Guidance on Practice and Procedures*, 2nd ed. updated, 2014, www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-treaties. See also Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 3. Note that in *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 21 ff., the International Court held that a ‘memorandum of understanding’ could, in fact, constitute a treaty if concluded in the form of a treaty and with the intention of the parties to be bound. It was also noted at pp. 29 ff. that the instrument would be interpreted in the light of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these provisions reflecting customary international law.

²² See e.g. the dispute between the US and the UK as to the legal status of a memorandum of understanding relating to the US–UK Air Services Agreement 1977 (Bermuda II) in the context of the *Heathrow Airport User Charges* arbitration, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, pp. 712 ff. and 88 *AJIL*, 1994, pp. 738 ff. The Tribunal noted that the memorandum of understanding was not a source of independent legal rights and duties, but ‘consensual subsequent practice of the parties’ and an aid to the interpretation of the Bermuda II Agreement: 102 ILR, pp. 215, 353. In *Iron Rhine (Belgium v. Netherlands)*, Arbitral Award of 24 May 2005, paras. 156 ff., the Tribunal noted that the memorandum in question, while not as such binding, in the circumstances of the case was not legally irrelevant. The Supreme Court held in *Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v. Rahmatullah* [2012] UKSC 48, paras. 11 ff., that memoranda of understanding were not legally binding, but that their significance in legal terms should not be underestimated as they may constitute the means for the fulfilment in good faith of legal obligations. The Court concluded in para. 15 that: ‘Memoranda of Understanding or their equivalent, Diplomatic Notes, are therefore a means by which courts have been invited to

accept that the assurances which they contain will be honoured. And indeed courts have responded to that invitation by giving the assurances the weight that one would expect to be accorded to solemn undertakings formally committed to by responsible governments.’ See also *Lord Advocate v. Dean* [2017] UKSC 44.

²³ See *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 546.

²⁴ See e.g. Rosenne, *Developments*, pp. 107 ff.; A. Aust, ‘The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments’, 35 *ICLQ*, 1986, p. 787; R. Baxter, ‘International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”’, 29 *ICLQ*, 1980, p. 549; and F. Roessler, ‘Law, *De Facto* Agreements and Declarations of Principles in International Economic Relations’, 21 *German YIL*, 1978, p. 41.

²⁵ Aust provides as examples the two memoranda of understanding on the avoidance of overlaps and conflicts relating to deep sea-bed areas, *Modern Treaty Law*, p. 22. See also with regard to memoranda of understanding concerning deportations, *AS & DD (Libya) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2008] EWCA Civ 289; and *Othman (Jordan) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2008] EWCA Civ 290. Note also *Othman (Abu Qatada) v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 17 January 2012, para. 164.

²⁶ ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 112; 102 ILR, p. 1.

²⁷ ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 121; 102 ILR, p. 18, citing *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1978, p. 39; 60 ILR, p. 511. See also *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 543.

²⁸ ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 121–2; 102 ILR, pp. 18–19. See also K. Widdows, ‘What is an International Agreement in International Law?’, 50 *BYIL*, 1979, p. 117; and J. A. Barberis, ‘Le Concept de “Traité International” et ses Limites’, *AFDI*, 1984, p. 239. In *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 549 ff., the International Court noted that whether a joint communiqué constituted an international agreement would depend upon the nature of the act or transaction to which the communiqué gave expression, citing *Greece v. Turkey*, ICJ Reports, 1979, pp. 3, 39.

²⁹ See *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 803, 820; 130 ILR, pp. 174, 201. Note that the use of the word ‘treaty’ may not necessarily be determinative of its legal status, e.g. ‘treaties’ signed with representatives of indigenous

peoples during the colonial period giving protectorate or territorial or sovereignty rights to the colonial power: see *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 404 ff.; and *Island of Palmas*, 2 RIAA, pp. 858–9 (1928). See also I. Brownlie, *Treaties with Indigenous Peoples*, Oxford, 1992.

³⁰ Article 5. See further Rosenne, *Developments*, chapter 4.

³¹ See e.g. Hollis, *Treaties*, Part II; Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, Part II; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, Part II; H. Blix, *Treaty-Making Power*, New York, 1960; and E. W. Vierdag, ‘The Time of the Conclusion of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions’, *59 BYIL*, 1988, p. 75.

³² See e.g. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, p. 168 and www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-information-office/p14.pdf. See also S. de Smith and R. Brazier, *Constitutional and Administrative Law*, 6th ed., London, 1989, p. 140.

³³ See e.g. *Fourth US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 2018, § 303. See, with regard to the Presidential power to terminate a treaty, *DUSPIL*, 1979, pp. 724 ff.; and *Goldwater v. Carter* 617 F.2d 697; 100 S.Ct. 533 (1979). See also L. Henkin, ‘Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)’, *74 AJIL*, 1980, p. 954.

³⁴ See e.g. *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 429.

³⁵ See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 29 ff.; Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 5; and M. Jones, *Full Powers and Ratification*, Cambridge, 1946.

³⁶ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, p. 193.

³⁷ Such persons may also duly authorise other officials to adopt on behalf of a state, the text of a treaty or to express the consent of the state to be bound by a treaty, see *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 22.

³⁸ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 622; 115 ILR, p. 1; and see also *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 430.

³⁹ Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, p. 32. See also Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (ed. I. Roberts), 6th ed., Oxford, 2009, p. 64.

⁴⁰ Article 8.

⁴¹ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, p. 195.

⁴² See article 18 of the UN Charter.

⁴³ See e.g. with regard to the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, as discussed in Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 37–9. See also the UN *Juridical Yearbook*, 1974, pp. 163–4, where the Director of the General Legal Division, Office of Legal Affairs, declared that the term ‘consensus’ in UN organs ‘was used to describe a practice under which every effort is made to achieve unanimous agreement; and if that could not be done, those dissenting from the general trend were prepared simply to make their position and reservations known and placed on the record’. See also Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, pp. 80 ff.

⁴⁴ Article 9(1). This reflects the classic rule: Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, p. 33.

⁴⁵ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, p. 196.

⁴⁶ See e.g. the Maroua Declaration, *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 429–30; and see also *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 22–23.

⁴⁷ The International Court has stated that ‘signed but unratified treaties may constitute an accurate expression of the understanding of the parties at the time of signature’: *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 68.

⁴⁸ Article 18. See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 42–4; and *Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926, p. 30. See also H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989 (Part Four)’, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, pp. 1, 48 ff.; and J. Klabbbers, ‘How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Towards Manifest Intent’, 34 *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 2001, p. 283. Note that, having signed the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court in

December 2000, the US notified the UN on 6 May 2002 that it did not intend to become a party to the Statute and that there were therefore no legal obligations arising from its signature: see *DUSPIL*, 2002, p. 148.

⁴⁹ Defined in article 2(1)(b) as ‘the international act . . . whereby a state establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty’. It is thus to be distinguished as a concept from ratification in the internal constitutional sense, although clearly there is an important link: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, pp. 197–8.

⁵⁰ See above, [Chapter 4](#), p. 129.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁵² Note the Court’s observation in *Croatia v. Serbia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 412, 450, that: ‘Accession or ratification is a simple act of will on the part of the State manifesting an intention to undertake new obligations and to acquire new rights in terms of the treaty, effected in writing in the formal manner set out in the Treaty (cf. Articles 15 and 16 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).’

⁵³ See e.g. G. Fitzmaurice, ‘Do Treaties Need Ratification?’, **15 BYIL**, 1934, p. 129; and O’Connell, *International Law*, p. 222. See also H. Blix, ‘The Requirement of Ratification’, **30 BYIL**, 1953, p. 380.

⁵⁴ See e.g. Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, p. 40; and O’Connell, *International Law*, p. 222.

⁵⁵ See e.g. McNair, *Law of Treaties*, p. 133.

⁵⁶ O’Connell, *International Law*, p. 222. See also *DUSPIL*, 1974, pp. 216–17; and *ibid.*, 1979, pp. 678 ff.

⁵⁷ See P. T. B. Kohona, ‘Some Notable Developments in the Practice of the UN Secretary-General as a Depositary of Multilateral Treaties: Reservations and Declarations’, **99 AJIL**, 2005, p. 433.

⁵⁸ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, p. 199.

⁵⁹ See e.g. articles 26 and 28 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

⁶⁰ See e.g. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 8; A. Pellet, 'Article 19', in Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 405; Hollis, *Treaties*, p. 277; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 239; C. Redgwell, 'Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multilateral Treaties', **64 BYIL**, 1993, p. 245; G. Gaja, 'Unruly Treaty Reservations', in *Le Droit International à l'Heure de sa Codifications*, Milan, 1987, p. 313; G. Fitzmaurice, 'Reservations to Multilateral Treaties', **2 ICLQ**, 1953, p. 1; D. W. Bowett, 'Reservations to Non-restricted Multilateral Treaties', **48 BYIL**, 1976–77, p. 67; P. H. Imbert, *Les Réserves aux Traités Multilatéraux*, Paris, 1979; Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, chapter 3; D. W. Greig, 'Reservations: Equity as a Balancing Force?', **16 Australian YIL**, 1995, p. 21; O'Connell, *International Law*, pp. 229 ff.; J. M. Ruda, 'Reservations to Treaties', **146 HR**, 1975, p. 95; G. Horn, *Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties*, Leiden, 1988; *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 1241; K. L. McCall-Smith, 'Severing Reservations', **63 ICLQ**, 2014, p. 599; and Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 195. See also Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, adopted by the ILC in 2011, A/66/10.

⁶¹ Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 1986 provides that a reservation means 'a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a state or by an international organisation when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state or to that organisation'. See also the definition contained in para. 1.1 of the ILC Guide to Practice, A/66/10, Add. 1.

⁶² See the statement of British practice to this effect, UKMIL, **68 BYIL**, 1997, p. 482.

⁶³ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, p. 203. See also draft guideline 1.5.1 of the ILC Guide to Practice, Report of the ILC on its 54th Session, 2002, p. 55.

⁶⁴ See e.g. *Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. US)* (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 916, 924; and *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, p. 432.

⁶⁵ See e.g. *Temeltasch* (1983) 5 EHRR 417 on the difference between reservations and interpretative declarations generally and in the context of the European Human Rights Convention. See, for examples of UK practice, UKMIL, 68 *BYIL*, 1997, p. 483. See also L. D. M. Nelson, 'Declarations, Statements and "Disguised Reservations" with respect to the Convention on the Law of the Sea', 50 *ICLQ*, 2001, p. 767; R. Sapienza, 'Les Déclarations Interprétatives Unilatérales et l'Interprétation des Traités', 103 *RGDIP*, 1999, p. 601; P. H. Imbert, 'Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights before the Strasbourg Commission', 33 *ICLQ*, 1984, p. 558; and *UN Juridical Yearbook*, 1976, pp. 220–1. Paragraph 1.2 of the ILC Guide to Practice provides that an interpretative declaration means 'a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a state or an international organisation whereby that state or international organisation purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or of certain of its provisions': A/66/10, Add. 1. See also Pok Yin S. Chow, 'Reservations as Unilateral Acts? Examining the International Law Commission's Approach to Reservations', 66 *ICLQ*, 2017, p. 335.

⁶⁶ See D. McRae, 'The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations', 49 *BYIL*, 1978, p. 155. See also *Temeltasch*, pp. 432–3; and the First Pellet Report, pp. 58 ff.

⁶⁷ Quite what the effect might be of the former is unclear: see e.g. the First Pellet Report, p. 60.

⁶⁸ See e.g. Nelson, 'Declarations', p. 776.

⁶⁹ Paragraph 1.4, A/66/10, Add. 1.

⁷⁰ Cmnd 7438 (1979); 54 ILR, p. 6.

⁷¹ Cmnd 7438, pp. 41–2; 54 ILR, pp. 48–9. It was also stressed that reservations have to be appreciated in the light of the law in force at the time that the reservations (and any objections to them) are made: Cmnd 7438, p. 35; 54 ILR, p. 42.

⁷² Cmnd 7438, p. 43; 54 ILR, p. 50.

⁷³ ECtHR, Series A, No. 132, 1988. See also S. Marks, 'Reservations Unhinged: The *Belilos* Case Before the European Court of Human Rights', 39 *ICLQ*, 1990, p. 300.

⁷⁴ Switzerland made in total two interpretative declarations and two reservations upon ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights. The declaration in question concerned article 6, para. 1 of the Convention dealing with the right to fair trial and provided that Switzerland considered that that right was intended solely to ensure ultimate control by the judiciary over the acts or decisions of the public authorities. The issue concerned the right of appeal from the Lausanne Police Board to the Criminal Cassation Division of the Vaud Cantonal Court, which could not in fact hear fresh argument, receive witnesses or give a new ruling on the merits, and whether the declaration prevented the applicant from relying on article 6 in the circumstances.

⁷⁵ At pp. 18–19.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 20–1.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 21–2.

⁷⁸ See e.g. Nelson, ‘Declarations’, p. 781. See also below, p. 803.

⁷⁹ See para. 1.3.1 of the ILC Guide to Practice, A/66/10, Add. 1. Paragraph 1.3.2 also states that the phrasing or name used provides an indication of the purported legal effect: *ibid.*

⁸⁰ Paragraph 1.6.3. Note the UK Attorney General’s opinion dated 12 March 2019 concerning the UK–EU Instrument relating to the UK Withdrawal from the EU Agreement (as endorsed by the European Council on 25 November 2018) which was accompanied by a UK Unilateral Declaration. With regard to the latter, the Attorney General wrote: ‘A unilateral declaration by one party to a bilateral treaty constitutes an authentic interpretation of the treaty *if* it is accepted by the other party. Whilst it is not an agreed document, it too has legal status as an interpretative document, and will be lodged with the depositary of the Withdrawal Agreement and form part of the context of the treaty in accordance with the principle set out in article 31 of the Vienna Convention’ (emphasis in the original); see www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-opinion-on-joint-instrument-and-unilateral-declaration-concerning-the-withdrawal-agreement.

⁸¹ See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 54–5; and Ruda, ‘Reservations’, p. 112. See also Redgwell, ‘Universality or Integrity’, p. 246.

⁸² Report of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, 8 LNOJ, pp. 880–1 (1927).

⁸³ ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 15; 18 ILR, p. 364.

⁸⁴ ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 29–30.

⁸⁵ See e.g. Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations’.

⁸⁶ Although the International Law Commission was initially critical, it later changed its mind: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1951, vol. II, pp. 130–1; cf. *ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 62–5, 178–9. Note also that the UN General Assembly in 1959 resolved that the Secretary-General as a depositary was to apply the Court’s approach to all conventions concluded under UN auspices unless they contained provisions to the contrary.

⁸⁷ See Redgwell, ‘Universality or Integrity’, pp. 253 ff.

⁸⁸ See also para. 1.3.3 of the ILC Guide to Practice, A/66/10, Add. 1.

⁸⁹ See Foreign Affairs Committee, *Report on the Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges*, 1984, pp. 23–4, and above, [Chapter 12](#), p. 659.

⁹⁰ Cmnd 7438 (1979), p. 45; 54 ILR, p. 52. See also A. E. Boyle, ‘The Law of Treaties and the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration’, 29 *ICLQ*, 1980, p. 498; and Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 70–6.

⁹¹ See e.g. J. K. Koh, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision’, 23 *Harvard International Law Journal*, 1982, p. 71; and Redgwell, ‘Universality or Integrity’, p. 263. See also above, p. 798, concerning interpretative declarations being used as ‘disguised’ reservations where no reservations are permitted under the treaty in question.

⁹² See e.g. Bowett, ‘Reservations’, pp. 77, 84. Impermissible reservations are divided into those that may be severed from ratification of or accession to the convention in question and those that are contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. In the latter case, both the reservation and the whole acceptance of the treaty by the reserving state are to be

regarded as nullities. This question of permissibility is the preliminary issue; the question of opposability, or the reaction of other states, is a secondary issue, presupposing the permissibility of the reservation, *ibid.*, p. 88. See also *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 1247, note 1.

⁹³ See e.g. Ruda, 'Reservations', p. 190.

⁹⁴ Paragraph 3.3.2 of the ILC Guide to Practice notes that the formulation of an impermissible reservation produces its consequences pursuant to the law of treaties and does not engage the international responsibility of the State or international organisation which has formulated it: A/66/10, Add. 1.

⁹⁵ Note that para. 3.1.5 of the ILC Guide to Practice provides that: 'A reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty if it affects an essential element of the treaty that is necessary to its general tenor, in such a way that the reservation impairs the *raison d'être* of the treaty'; see A/66/10, Add. 1. Paragraph 3.1.5.1 states that: 'The object and purpose of the treaty is to be determined in good faith, taking account of the terms of the treaty in their context, in particular the title and preamble of the treaty. Recourse may also be had in particular to the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion and, where appropriate, the subsequent practice of the parties', *ibid.*

⁹⁶ See e.g. *Yugoslavia v. Spain*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 761, 772; *Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 916, 924; and *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 32. In a joint separate opinion, five judges suggested that the principle is not necessarily absolute in scope: ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 70 ff. See also para. 3.1.5.7 of the ILC Guide to Practice, A/66/10, Add. 1, noting, however, that where the reservation purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of a provision of the treaty essential to its *raison d'être*, or the reservation has the effect of excluding the reserving state or international organisation from a dispute settlement or treaty implementation monitoring mechanism with regard to a treaty provision that it has previously accepted, if the very purpose of the treaty is to put such a mechanism into effect, then such reservation may be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

⁹⁷ Note e.g. that article 20(2) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 provides that a reservation will be regarded as

contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty if at least two-thirds of the states parties to the convention object to the reservation.

⁹⁸ See e.g. Ago, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1965, vol. I, p. 161.

⁹⁹ See e.g. Y. Tyagi, 'The Conflict of Law and Policy on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties', 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 181; Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, pp. 146 ff.; *Human Rights as General Norms and a State's Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections to Human Rights Conventions* (ed. J. P. Gardner), London, 1997; and K. Korkelia, 'New Challenges to the Regime of Reservations Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', 13 *EJIL*, 2002, p. 437. See also the Commentary to the ILC Guide to Practice, A/66/10, Add. 1, pp. 383 ff.

¹⁰⁰ ECtHR, Series A, No. 132, 1988. See also above, p. 798.

¹⁰¹ The Court noted that 'it is beyond doubt that Switzerland is, and regards itself as, bound by the Convention irrespective of the validity of the declaration': *ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁰² ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995; 103 ILR, p. 621.

¹⁰³ These were held to constitute 'a disguised reservation', ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, p. 22.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–9.

¹⁰⁵ CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 6. See also 15 *Human Rights Law Journal*, 1994, p. 464; and M. Nowak, 'The Activities of the UN Human Rights Committee: Developments from 1 August 1992 to 31 July 1995', 16 *Human Rights Law Journal*, 1995, pp. 377, 380.

¹⁰⁶ See the critical observations made by the governments of the US and the UK with regard to this General Comment: 16 *Human Rights Law Journal*, 1995, pp. 422 ff. Note in particular the US view that 'reservations contained in the United States instruments of ratification are integral parts of its consent to be bound by the Covenant and are not severable. If it were to be determined that any one or more of them were ineffective, the ratification as a whole could thereby be nullified': *ibid.*, p. 423. The UK government took the view that while 'severability of a kind may well offer a solution in appropriate cases', severability would involve excising both the reservation and the parts of the treaty to which

it related: *ibid.*, p. 426. It was noted that a state which sought to ratify a human rights treaty subject to a reservation ‘which is fundamentally incompatible with participation in the treaty regime’ could not be regarded as a party to that treaty: *ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ See also e.g. C. Redgwell, ‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights General Comment No. 24 (52)’, **46** *ICLQ*, 1997, p. 390.

¹⁰⁸ See the Commentary to the ILC Guide to Practice, A/66/10, Add. 1, p. 391, note 1799.

¹⁰⁹ Report of the ILC on its 49th Session, A/52/10, pp. 126–7. See also the working group on reservations established by the UN human rights treaty organs, A/60/278; HRI/MC/2005/5/Add.1; and HRI/MC/2006/5. Paragraph 3.1.5.6 of the ILC Guide to Practice notes that: ‘To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a treaty containing numerous interdependent rights and obligations, account shall be taken of that interdependence as well as the importance that the provision to which the reservation relates has within the general tenor of the treaty, and the extent of the impact that the reservation has on the treaty’: see A/66/10, Add.1, pp. 383 ff. Note in addition that para. 3.2 of the Guide to Practice notes that treaty-monitoring bodies may assess within their competence the permissibility of reservations to a treaty.

¹¹⁰ See e.g. the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1979, General Recommendations No. 4 (1987), No. 20 (1992) and No. 21 (1994) of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. See generally B. Clark, ‘The Vienna Conventions Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination against Women’, **85** *AJIL*, 1991, p. 281; and R. J. Cook, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’, **30** *Va. JIL*, 1990, p. 643. See also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1223 (1993) on Reservations Made by Member States to Council of Europe Conventions; W. A. Schabas, ‘Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for Innovation and Reform’, **32** *Canadian YIL*, 1994, p. 39; and I. Ziemele, *Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation*, Leiden, 2004.

¹¹¹ Article 20(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See the IACHR’s Advisory Opinion on the *Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights* 22 *ILM*, 1983, p. 37; 67 *ILR*, p. 559.

112 E.g. the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 12(1). See also above, p. 800, regarding article 64 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.

113 See e.g. article 37 of the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface 1952.

114 See article 22(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; and *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 25–6. See also para. 3.5.1 of the ILC Guide, A/66/10, Add. 1.

115 Article 24. See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 44–7. See also Thirlway, ‘Law and Procedure (Part Four)’, pp. 32 ff.; Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 9; Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 628; and Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 391.

116 Article 102 of the UN Charter also provides that states may not invoke an unregistered treaty before any UN organ.

117 See e.g. Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 639; Hollis, *Treaties*, p. 220; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 407; Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, p. 154; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 1248. See also Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 217.

118 See e.g. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, p. 154; and A. Q. Mertsch, *Provisionally Applied Treaties: Their Binding Force and Legal Nature*, The Hague, 2012. The International Law Commission appointed a Special Rapporteur to study the topic in 2012 and a series of draft guidelines is being formulated and considered: see e.g. the Special Rapporteur’s Fourth Report, A/CN.4/699 (2016) and A/CN.4/L.877 (2016).

119 See e.g. article I(5) of Decision 1/CP.21 of the Paris Agreement concerning the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 2015. This provides that: ‘Parties to the Convention may provisionally apply all of the provisions of the Agreement pending its entry into force, and *requests* Parties to provide notification of any such provisional application to the Depositary’ (emphasis in the original). See also *Iron Rhine (Belgium v. Netherlands)*, 2005, 150 ILR, p. 143. Note also *Hulley Enterprises v. Russia* (the *Yukos* arbitration), Arbitral Award of 18 July 2014, PCA Case No. AA 226, which was set aside by The Hague District Court in April 2016, C/09/477160/HA ZA 15–1:

<http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:4230>. The key issue was whether the Energy Charter Treaty 1994 was binding on Russia which had signed but not ratified it.

120 Article 25(2). The International Law Commission adopted on first reading in 2018 a Guide to Provisional Application of Treaties, A/CN.4/L.910 (28 May 2018). This noted *inter alia* that a treaty may be provisionally applied if the treaty in question so provides or in some other manner it has been so agreed (Draft Guideline 3). This may be accomplished through a separate treaty or any other means or arrangements, including a resolution adopted by an international organisation or a declaration by a state or an international organisation accepted by the other states or international organisations concerned (Draft Guideline 4). Such provisional application would terminate with the coming into force of the treaty in the relations between the states or international organisations concerned or upon notification (Draft Guideline 9). Note also the Special Rapporteur's proposal of Draft Model Clauses on Provisional Applications, see Report of the ILC 2019, A/74/10, p. 352, Annex A.

121 Article 28. See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, pp. 212–13; and *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924. See also *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, para. 95, noting that ‘the obligation to prevent genocide can be applicable only to acts that might occur after the Convention has entered into force for the State in question’. Note article 4 of the Convention, which provides that, without prejudice to the application of customary law, the Convention will apply only to treaties concluded by states after the entry into force of the Convention with regard to such states.

122 See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 87–92. See also e.g. article 63 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. Practice would appear to suggest that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a treaty would under customary law apply to all the territory of a party, including colonies: see e.g. McNair, *Law of Treaties*, pp. 116–17. However, this would not apply so as to include territory occupied by the state in question; see *Western Sahara Campaign UK v. HMRC Commissioners*, Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), 181 ILR, pp. 288, 384, paras. 62 ff. See also *Council v. Front Polisario*, Case No. C-104/16 P, EU:C:2016:973, paras. 95, 132.

123 This stipulates that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of a member state of the UN under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement,

the former shall prevail. See also *Lockerbie (Libya v. UK; Libya v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 15; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 498.

124 This deals with termination or suspension of a treaty by a later treaty: see further below, p. 819.

125 This deals with agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only: see further below, p. 811.

126 This deals with material breach of a treaty: see further below, p. 826.

127 See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 93–8; and Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 12. See also McNair, *Law of Treaties*, pp. 219 ff.; Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 764; and Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 505.

128 See e.g. Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 98–106; Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 14; and Oppenheim's *International Law*, p. 1260. The rule is sometimes referred to by the maxim *pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt*. See also Thirlway, 'Law and Procedure (Part One)', p. 63; Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 887; and Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 605.

129 See also below, Chapter 16, p. 842, on succession of states in respect of treaties.

130 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, p. 227.

131 Article 38. See above, Chapter 3, p. 81; and *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3; 41 ILR, p. 29. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, p. 230.

132 The Hague Regulations attached to Hague Convention IV 1907. See below, Chapter 20, p. 1038.

133 See e.g. H. Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations*, London, 1950, pp. 106–10. See also McNair, *Law of Treaties*, pp. 216–18.

134 See, as to the creation here of a collateral agreement forming the basis of the obligation, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, p. 227.

135 PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 46, 1932, pp. 147–8; 6 AD, pp. 362, 364.

136 See e.g. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, pp. 228–9; Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 929; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 655; and N. Ragazzi, *The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes*, Oxford, 1997. See further, as to *erga omnes* obligations, above, [Chapter 13](#), p. 703.

137 PCIJ, Series A, No. 1, 1923, p. 22; 2 AD, p. 99. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, pp. 228–9; and E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, **159 HR**, 1978, pp. 1, 54; and E. de Aréchaga, ‘Treaty Stipulations in Favour of Third States’, **50 AJIL**, 1956, pp. 338, 355–6.

138 Article 39. See also Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 106–9; Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 15; Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 963; Hollis, *Treaties*, p. 347; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 699; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, p. 232.

139 See article 30(4)(b).

140 Article 41.

141 See article 30, and above, p. 811.

142 See above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 104, and below, p. 823.

143 See e.g. Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, chapter 5; Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 804; Hollis, *Treaties*, p. 475; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 521; *Interpretation in International Law* (ed. A. Biachi, D. Peat and M. Windsor), Oxford, 2015; E. Bjorge, *The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties*, Oxford, 2014; C. Djeffal, *Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation*, Cambridge, 2015; R. Gardiner, *Treaty Interpretation*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015; U. Linderfalk, ‘Is Treaty Interpretation an Art or a Science?’, **26 EJIL**, 2015, p. 169; G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4’, **33 BYIL**, 1957, p. 203 and **28 BYIL**, 1951, p. 1; H. Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’, **26 BYIL**, 1949, p. 48; M. S. McDougal, H. Lasswell and J. C. Miller, *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order*, Yale, 1967; and O’Connell, *International Law*, pp. 251 ff. See also S. Sur, *L’Interprétation en Droit International Public*, Paris, 1974; M. K.

Yasseen, ‘L’Interprétation des Traités d’après la Convention de Vienne’, **151 HR**, 1976 III, p. 1; H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989 (Part Three)’, **62 BYIL**, 1991, pp. 2, 16 ff. and ‘(Part Four)’, **62 BYIL**, 1992, p. 3; H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989; Supplement, 2006: Part Three’, **77 BYIL**, 2006, p. 1; and Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 13.

144 Note that a unilateral interpretation of a treaty by the organs of one state would not be binding upon the other parties: see McNair, *Law of Treaties*, pp. 345–50; and the *David J. Adams* claim, 6 RIAA, p. 85 (1921); 1 AD, p. 331.

145 But see J. Stone, ‘Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation’, **1 Sydney Law Review**, 1955, p. 344.

146 See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 114–15; and Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations’.

147 See Fitzmaurice, ‘Law and Procedure’, pp. 204–7.

148 See e.g. H. Lauterpacht, ‘De l’Interprétation des Traités: Rapport et Projet de Résolutions’, **43 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International**, 1950, p. 366.

149 See e.g. Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations’, pp. 7–8, 13–14; and Fitzmaurice, ‘Law and Procedure’, pp. 207–9.

150 The International Court has on a number of occasions reaffirmed that articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention reflect customary law: see e.g. *India v. Pakistan*, ICJ Reports, 2019, para. 71; *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nautical miles) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 3, 19; *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 64; *Peru v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2014, pp. 3, 28; *Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 237; ITLOS Advisory Opinion on *Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area*, 1 February 2011, para. 57; *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 109–10; *Indonesia/Malaysia*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 645–6; *Botswana v. Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1999, p. 1045; *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 21–2; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 20–1; and *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 6, 18; 102 ILR, pp. 47, 59. Other courts and tribunals have done likewise: see e.g. the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on

United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna in 1994, 33 ILM, 1994, pp. 839, 892; the case concerning the *Auditing of Accounts between the Netherlands and France*, Arbitral Award of 12 March 2004, para. 59; and *Iron Rhine (Belgium v. Netherlands)*, Arbitral Award of 24 May 2005, para. 45; 150 ILR, p. 143. See also *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 1271.

¹⁵¹ See e.g. the *German External Debts* arbitration, 19 ILM, 1980, pp. 1357, 1377. See also Judge Ajibola's Separate Opinion in *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 71; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 69. As to 'object and purpose', see e.g. *LaGrand*, ICJ Reports, 2001, para. 102; 134 ILR, p. 41. As to 'good faith', see e.g. article 26 of the Vienna Convention; and *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 67. See also above, p. 87.

¹⁵² ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 4, 8; 17 ILR, pp. 326, 328.

¹⁵³ See also the *La Bretagne* arbitration (*Canada v. France*), 82 ILR, pp. 590, 620.

¹⁵⁴ ECtHR, Series A, No. 102, 1986, para. 114; 75 ILR, pp. 438, 482.

¹⁵⁵ See also *James*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 98, para. 61; 75 ILR, pp. 397, 423; and the IACHR's Advisory Opinions in *Enforceability of the Right to Reply*, 79 ILR, pp. 335, 343; and *Meaning of the Word 'Laws'* 79 ILR, pp. 325, 329.

¹⁵⁶ Article 31(2). See also *Rights of Nationals of the USA in Morocco*, ICJ Reports, 1952, pp. 176, 196; 19 ILR, pp. 255, 272; *Beagle Channel*, HMSO, 1977, p. 12; 52 ILR, p. 93; and the *Young Loan* arbitration, 59 ILR, pp. 495, 530.

¹⁵⁷ 130 ILR, pp. 1, 34. See also Lord McNair in *Argentina/Chile Frontier Award (La Palena)* 38 ILR, pp. 10, 89.

¹⁵⁸ See *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 346. See also D. W. Greig, *Intertemporality and the Law of Treaties*, London, 2001; and, as to the doctrine of intertemporal law, above, [Chapter 9](#), p. 431.

¹⁵⁹ *Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission Decision on Delimitation* 130 ILR, pp. 1, 34–5.

¹⁶⁰ *Botswana v. Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 1045, 1060.

¹⁶¹ See e.g. the *Argentina/Chile Award (Laguna del Desierto)* 113 ILR, pp. 1, 44.

¹⁶² Article 31(3)(a) and (b). See also *Treaties and Subsequent Practice* (ed. G. Nolte), Oxford, 2013; and the work of the ILC on Treaties over Time commencing in 2008, A/66/10, Add. 1, chapter XI. After a title change to ‘Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Interpretation of Treaties’ in 2013, the ILC adopted a set of Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties in 2018, A/73/10, chapter IV. See also the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/715.

¹⁶³ Draft Conclusion 3.

¹⁶⁴ See Draft Conclusion 8; and see also e.g. *Temple of Preah Vihear*, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 6; 33 ILR, p. 48; *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 22; 49 ILR, p. 2; *Taba* 80 ILR, p. 224; and *Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission Decision on Delimitation* 130 ILR, p. 1, 34 ff.

¹⁶⁵ Article 31(3)(c).

¹⁶⁶ *Merits*, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 182; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 341–2. Judge Higgins in her Separate Opinion noted: ‘The Court reads this provision as incorporating the totality of the substantive international law (which in paragraph 42 of the Judgment is defined as comprising Charter law) on the use of force. But this is to ignore that Article 31, paragraph 3, requires “the context” to be taken into account: and “the context” is clearly that of an economic and commercial treaty’: *ibid.*, pp. 225, 237; 130 ILR, pp. 383, 395. See also *Iran v. US*, Case No. A/18, 5 Iran–US CTR, p. 251; 75 ILR, pp. 175, 188, where the Full Tribunal held, citing article 31(3)(c), that jurisdiction existed over claims against Iran by dual Iran–US nationals when the dominant and effective nationality of the claimant at the relevant period was that of the US; and *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, p. 25; 103 ILR, p. 621.

¹⁶⁷ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, p. 223, doubting the rule in *River Oder*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 23, 1929; 5 AD, pp. 381, 383, that the *travaux préparatoires* of certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles could not be taken into account since three of the

states before the Court had not participated in the preparatory conference. See also *Young Loan* 59 ILR, pp. 495, 544–5; Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 141–7; and *Lithgow*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 102, 1986, para. 117; 75 ILR, pp. 438, 484. Note that in e.g. *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 27; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 26; *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 6, 21; 102 ILR, pp. 47, 62; and *India v. Pakistan*, ICJ Reports, 2019, para. 76, the International Court held that while it was not necessary to have recourse to the *travaux préparatoires* to elucidate the content of the instruments in question, it could turn to them to confirm its reading of the text. See also the *Construction of a Wall* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 174 ff.; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 92 ff.

168 *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 22; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 21. Note that in *Lotus*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, p. 17, para. 37, the Court held that there was no need to have regard to the *travaux préparatoires* if the text of the convention in question was sufficiently clear.

169 *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 83. Note also the presumption that states, when creating new international obligations, do not intend to derogate from their previous obligations – see *Nada v. Switzerland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 September 2012, para. 170 – so that two diverging commitments are thus to be harmonised as far as possible in order to produce effects that are fully in accordance with existing law. In *Right of Passage (Portugal v. India)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 125, 142, the International Court referred to the rule of interpretation that a text emanating from a government must, in principle, be interpreted as producing and intended to produce effects in accordance with existing law and not in violation of it.

170 ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 221, 226–30; 17 ILR, pp. 318, 320–2. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, p. 220.

171 The International Court in *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)* declared that the principle of effectiveness ‘has an important role in the law of treaties’, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 432, 455.

172 See e.g. *Ambatielos* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1952, p. 28; 19 ILR, p. 416. See also *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 24; 16 AD, pp. 155, 169; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, p. 219.

¹⁷³ See e.g. *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 432, 455; *Right of Passage (Preliminary Objections)*, ICJ Reports, 1957, p. 142; and *Argentina/Chile Award (Laguna del Desierto)* 113 ILR, pp. 1, 45.

¹⁷⁴ Note that by article 5, the Vienna Convention is deemed to apply to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organisation. See also C. F. Amerasinghe, *Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2005, chapter 2; C. F. Amerasinghe, 'Interpretation of Texts in Open International Organizations', 65 *BYIL*, 1994, p. 175; M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 64–73; S. Rosenne, 'Is the Constitution of an International Organization an International Treaty?', 12 *Comunicazioni e Studi*, 1966, p. 21; and G. Distefano, 'La Pratique Subséquente des Etats Parties à un Traité', *AFDI*, 1994, p. 41.

¹⁷⁵ See e.g. *Reparation for Injuries Suffered*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174; 16 AD, p. 318; *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151; 34 ILR, p. 281; *Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations*, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 4; 17 ILR, p. 326; and *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 16; 49 ILR, p. 2. See also Shaw, *Title to Territory*; R. Higgins, 'The Development of International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations', *PASIL*, 1965, p. 119; and H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, 5th ed., The Hague, 2011, chapter 9. See further below, [Chapter 22](#), pp. 1152 ff.

¹⁷⁶ See further above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 294. See also J. G. Merrills, *The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights*, 2nd ed., Manchester, 1993, chapter 4. Note that the ECtHR in *Loizidou v. Turkey* (Preliminary Objections), Series A, No. 310, 1995, p. 26; 103 ILR, p. 621, emphasised the fundamental differences as between the role and purposes of the ICJ and the European Court. See also *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 209 ff.

¹⁷⁷ See e.g. *Austria v. Italy* 4 *European Yearbook of Human Rights*, 1960, pp. 116, 140; and *Ireland v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 25, 1978, p. 90. See also the IACHR's Advisory Opinion on the *Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights* 22 ILM, 1983, pp. 37, 47; 67 ILR, pp. 559, 568, which adopted a similar approach.

¹⁷⁸ See e.g. *Tyrer*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 26, 1978, p. 15; 58 ILR, pp. 339, 553; *Marckx*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 31, 1979, p. 14; 58 ILR, pp. 561, 583; *Wemhoff*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 7, 1968; 41 ILR, p. 281; and *Loizidou*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, p. 23; 103 ILR, p. 621. See also H. Waldock, 'The Evolution of Human Rights Concepts and the Application of the European Convention on Human Rights', in *Mélanges Offerts à Paul Reuter*, Paris, 1981, p. 535. Note also the approach taken by the UN Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 24/52 of 2 November 1994 on Reservations: see 15 *Human Rights Law Journal*, 1994, p. 464; and above, p. 805.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g. *Soering v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 161, 1989, p. 34; 98 ILR, p. 270; *Artico v. Italy*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 37, 1980; and *Loizidou v. Turkey*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 310, 1995, p. 23; 103 ILR, p. 621.

¹⁸⁰ Advisory Opinion of the IACHR, 1985, 75 ILR, pp. 30, 47–8.

¹⁸¹ See *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933, p. 49; 6 AD, p. 95; and *Anglo-French Continental Shelf*, Cmnd 7438, p. 50; 54 ILR, p. 6.

¹⁸² See *LaGrand*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 502; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 40–1; *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924, p. 19; 2 AD, p. 27, which called for the more restrictive interpretation in such cases; and *Young Loan* 59 ILR, p. 495. See also Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, pp. 22–6.

¹⁸³ Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1015; Hollis, *Treaties*, p. 551; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 775; and *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 1284. See also N. Kontou, *The Termination and Revision of Treaties in the Light of New Customary International Law*, Oxford, 1995; and Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapters 16 and 17.

¹⁸⁴ See Judge Lauterpacht, *Norwegian Loans*, ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 9, 55–9; 24 ILR, pp. 782, 809; and Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 165–7.

¹⁸⁵ See e.g. *Arbitral Award by the King of Spain*, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 192, 213–14; 30 ILR, pp. 457, 473; and *Temple of Preah Vihear*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 6, 23–32; 33 ILR, pp. 48, 62. See also *Argentina/Chile Frontier Award (La Palena)* 38 ILR, p. 10 and above, [Chapter 9](#).

¹⁸⁶ See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 169–71, distinguishing between the constitutionalist and internationalist schools; and K. Holloway, *Modern Trends in Treaty Law*, London, 1967, pp. 123–33. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, pp. 240–1.

¹⁸⁷ Article 46(2).

¹⁸⁸ Article 47. See e.g. *Eastern Greenland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, 1933; 6 AD, p. 95; and *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 112, 121–2; 102 ILR, pp. 1, 18–19.

¹⁸⁹ See above, p. 636.

¹⁹⁰ ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 430.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 430–1. See also *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 23 ff.

¹⁹² See e.g. the *Alabama Claims* arbitration; J. B. Moore, *International Arbitrations*, New York, 1898, vol. I, p. 495; and *Greco-Bulgarian Communities*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 17, 1930, p. 32; 5 AD, p. 4. See also the *Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement* case, ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 12, 34–5; 82 ILR, pp. 225, 252; and *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 24.

¹⁹³ ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 6; 33 ILR, p. 48.

¹⁹⁴ ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 26; 33 ILR, p. 65.

¹⁹⁵ Such instances are very rare in practice: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, pp. 244–5; and Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 173–6.

¹⁹⁶ See e.g. *First Fidelity Bank NA v. Government of Antigua and Barbuda Permanent Mission* 877 F.2d 189, 192 (1989); 99 ILR, pp. 126, 130.

¹⁹⁷ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. II, pp. 246–7. See also *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1973, pp. 3, 14; 55 ILR, pp. 183, 194.

198 See Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 177–9.

199 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, pp. 246–7.

200 ICJ Reports, 1973, p. 3; 55 ILR, p. 183.

201 ICJ Reports, 1973, p. 47; 55 ILR, p. 227.

202 See e.g. Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1224; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 897; J. Sztucki, *Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, New York, 1974; C. Rozakis, *The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties*, Leiden, 1976; L. Hannikainen, *Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law*, Helsinki, 1988; A. Gomez Robledo, ‘Le Jus Cogens International: Sa Genèse, Sa Nature, Ses Fonctions’, **172 HR**, 1981, p. 9; L. Alexidze, ‘Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law’, **172 HR**, p. 219; G. Gaja, ‘Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention’, **172 HR**, 1981, p. 271; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 1292. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, pp. 247–8; and Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, chapter 7.

203 See also article 71 and below, p. 824. See also A. Lagerwall, ‘Article 64’, in Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1455.

204 See above, p. 104.

205 See e.g. Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1236; Hollis, *Treaties*, p. 634; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 945; E. David, *The Strategy of Treaty Termination*, New Haven, 1975; A. Vamvoukis, *Termination of Treaties in International Law*, Oxford, 1985; and R. Plender, ‘The Role of Consent in the Termination of Treaties’, **57 BYIL**, 1986, p. 133. See also Thirlway, ‘Law and Procedure (Part Four)’, pp. 63 ff.; and Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 16.

206 Articles 54 and 57. See e.g. article 50(1) of the Treaty on European Union providing that: ‘Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.’ The Court of Justice of the European Union held in *Wightman v. Secretary of State for Exiting the EU*, Case No. C-621/18, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, Judgment of 10 December 2018 that, following the UK notification

on 29 March 2017 to the European Council of the UK's intention to withdraw from the EU, a member state is entitled to revoke unilaterally the notification of its intention to withdraw from the EU at any time prior to the expiry of the two-year period (or longer if extended) as laid down in article 50(3). See H. Woolaver, 'From Joining to Leaving: Domestic Law's Role in the International Legal Validity of Treaty Withdrawal', *30 EJIL*, 2019, p. 73.

207 Article 56. Examples given by J. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 6th ed., Oxford, 1963, p. 331, include treaties of alliance and commerce. See also *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 420; 76 ILR, pp. 1, 131.

208 A/53/40, annex VII.

209 82 ILR, pp. 499, 567–8.

210 See above, p. 678.

211 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge McNair in *Ambatielos*, ICJ Reports, 1952, pp. 28, 63; 19 ILR, pp. 416, 433.

212 Article 70(1)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. See below, p. 830. Note that in article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties adopted by the ILC in 2011, A/66/10, Add. 1, chapter VI, it is provided that the existence of an armed conflict does not *ipso facto* terminate or suspend the operation of treaties (a) as between the states parties to the armed conflict and (b) as between a state party to the conflict and a state that is not. Article 14 provides that a state exercising its inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter is entitled to suspend in whole or in part the operation of a treaty to which it is a party in so far as that operation is incompatible with the exercise of that right. This formulation is based upon article 7 of the resolution on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 1985: *ibid.*, p. 18.

213 Article 41; and above, p. 811.

214 Article 59.

215 See e.g. Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1351; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1021; S. Rosenne, *Breach of Treaty*, Cambridge, 1985. See also D.

N. Hutchinson, ‘Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties’, **59 BYIL**, 1988, p. 151; and M. M. Goma, *Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach*, The Hague, 1996.

216 See above, Chapter 13, p. 691.

217 2 RIAA, p. 921 (1925).

218 *Ibid.*, pp. 943–4.

219 See *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 38; 116 ILR, p. 1.

220 See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 46–7; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 37.

221 82 ILR, pp. 499, 564–6.

222 *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 65; 116 ILR, p. 1.

223 ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 66.

224 Partial Arbitral Award of 30 June 2016, paras. 204, 210.

225 *Ibid.*, para. 213, citing B. Simma, ‘Reflections on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Its Background in General International Law’, **20 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht**, 1970, pp. 5, 20.

226 *Ibid.*, para. 214.

227 *Ibid.*, paras. 218, 225.

228 See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, pp. 253–5. See also *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 47; 49 ILR, p. 37; and *US–France Air Services Agreement* 54 ILR, pp. 304, 331.

229 See e.g. G. Fitzmaurice, 'General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law', **92 HR**, 1957, pp. 1, 125–6; and above, Chapter 6, p. 294.

230 See e.g. Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1382; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1051; McNair, *Law of Treaties*, pp. 685–8; and Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 190–2.

231 This is also a codification of customary law: see *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 38; 116 ILR, p. 1.

232 See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, p. 256. See also *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 63–4; 116 ILR, p. 1.

233 See e.g. M. N. Shaw and C. Fournet, 'Article 62', in Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1411; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1067; D. F. Vagts, 'Rebus Revisited: Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law', **43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law**, 2004–05, p. 459; M. Bennett and N. Roughan, 'Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Treaty of Waitangi', **37 Victoria University Wellington Law Review**, 2006, 505; C. Hill, *The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Law*, Leiden, 1934; O. Lissitzyn, 'Treaties and Changed Circumstances (*Rebus Sic Stantibus*)', **61 AJIL**, 1967, p. 895; P. Cahier, 'Le Changement Fondamental de Circonstances et la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le Droit des Traités', in *Mélanges Ago*, Milan, 1987, vol. **I**, p. 163; and Vamvoukis, *Termination*, part 1. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1966, vol. **II**, pp. 257 ff. Note the decision in *TWA Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.* 23 ILM, 1984, pp. 814, 820, that a private person could not plead the *rebus* rule.

234 This was apparently occurring in the immediate pre-1914 period: see J. Garner, 'The Doctrine of *Rebus Sic Stantibus* and the Termination of Treaties', **21 AJIL**, 1927, p. 409; and Sinclair, *Vienna Convention*, p. 193. See also G. Harastzi, 'Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances', **146 HR**, 1975, p. 1.

235 See e.g. *Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 46, 1932, pp. 156–8; 6 AD, pp. 362, 365.

236 ICJ Reports, 1973, pp. 3, 20–1; 55 ILR, p. 183.

237 *Ibid.*

238 ICJ Reports, 1973, p. 18. See also *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 38; 116 ILR, p. 1.

239 ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 65. This was followed by the ECJ in *Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz*, Case No. C-162/96, [1998] ECR I-3655, 3705–7. Note that article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, A/66/10, Add. 1, 2011, provides that the existence of an armed conflict does not *ipso facto* terminate or suspend the operation of treaties (a) as between states parties to the conflict and (b) as between a state party to the conflict and a state that is not.

240 Examples here would include article XXIV of the European Space Agency Convention 1975, article 29 of the INMARSAT Convention 1976 and article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. In the latter case, a mechanism for withdrawal is laid down, see e.g. *Wightman v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union*, Case No. C-621/18, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, para. 56; and *RO*, Case No. C-327/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:733, para. 46. In the absence of any withdrawal agreement as per article 50 of the TEU, then the provisions of article 70 of the Vienna Convention would apply.

241 See e.g. Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, pp. 1603 ff.; and the *Rainbow Warrior* arbitration, 82 ILR, p. 568 as to the meaning of this provision, which in practice is difficult to quantify; see also House of Lords European Union Committee Report on Brexit and the EU Budget, 4 March 2017, paras. 115 ff.

242 See also article 65 with regard to the relevant procedures to be followed.

243 See e.g. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, chapter 20; Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1513; Dörr and Schmalenbach, *Vienna Convention*, p. 1151; and J. G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, 5th ed., Cambridge, 2011. See also below, [Chapter 17](#).

244 See e.g. G. Gaja, ‘A “New” Vienna Convention on Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations: A Critical Commentary’, 58 *BYIL*, 1987, p. 253; and F. Morgenstern, ‘The Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International

Organizations’, in *International Law at a Time of Perplexity* (ed. Y. Dinstein), Dordrecht, 1989, p. 435. See also Corten and Klein, *Vienna Convention*.

²⁴⁵ See above, **note 3**.

²⁴⁶ See Morgenstern, ‘Convention’, pp. 438–41.

²⁴⁷ Described in the ILC Commentary as the article arousing the most controversy, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1982, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 43.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 43–4.

²⁴⁹ See e.g. Gaja, ‘“New” Vienna Convention’, p. 264.

²⁵⁰ See also above, Chapter 13, p. 678, regarding the relationship between treaties and state responsibility. The issue of state succession to treaties is covered in Chapter 16.

16

State Succession

Political entities are not immutable. They are subject to change. New states appear and old states disappear.¹ Federations, mergers, dissolutions and secessions take place. International law has to incorporate such events into its general framework with the minimum of disruption and instability. Such changes have come to the fore since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of over 100 new, independent countries.

Difficulties may result from the change in the political sovereignty over a particular territorial entity for the purposes of international law and the world community. For instance, how far is a new state bound by the treaties and contracts entered into by the previous sovereign of the territory? Does nationality automatically devolve upon the inhabitants to replace that of the predecessor? What happens to the public property of the previous sovereign, and to what extent is the new authority liable for the debts of the old?

State succession in international law cannot be confused with succession in municipal law and the transmission of property and so forth to the relevant heir. Other interests and concerns are involved and the principles of state sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference prevent a universal succession principle similar to domestic law from being adopted. Despite attempts to assimilate Roman law views regarding the continuity of the legal

personality in the estate which falls by inheritance,² this approach could not be sustained in the light of state interests and practice. The opposing doctrine, which basically denied any transmission of rights, obligations and property interests between the predecessor and successor sovereigns, arose in the heyday of positivism in the nineteenth century. It manifested itself again with the rise of the decolonisation process in the form of the 'clean slate' principle, under which new states acquired sovereignty free from encumbrances created by the predecessor sovereign.

The issue of state succession can arise in a number of defined circumstances, which mirror the ways in which political sovereignty may be acquired by, for example, decolonisation of all or part of an existing territorial unit, dismemberment of an existing state, secession, annexation and merger. In each of these cases, a once-recognised entity disappears in whole or in part to be succeeded by some other authority, thus precipitating problems of transmission of rights and obligations. However, the question of state succession does not infringe upon the normal rights and duties of states under international law. These exist by virtue of the fundamental principles of international law and as a consequence of sovereignty and not as a result of transference from the previous sovereign. The issue of state succession should also be distinguished from questions of succession of governments, particularly revolutionary succession, and consequential patterns of recognition and responsibility.³

In many cases, such problems will be dealt with by treaties, whether multilateral treaties dealing with primarily territorial dispositions as, for example, the Treaty of St Germain 1919, which resolved some succession

questions relating to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,⁴ or bilateral agreements as between, for instance, colonial power and new state, which, however, would not bind third states. The system of devolution agreements signed by the colonial power with the successor, newly decolonised state, was used by, for example, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. Such agreements provided in general that all the rights and benefits, obligations and responsibilities devolving upon the colonial power in respect of the territory in question arising from valid international instruments would therefore devolve upon the new state.⁵ This system, however, was not seen as satisfactory by many new states and several of them resorted to unilateral declarations, providing for a transitional period during which treaties entered into by the predecessor state would continue in force and be subject to review as to which should be accepted and which rejected.⁶ In the case of bilateral treaties, those not surviving under customary law would be regarded as having terminated at the end of the period.

However, the issue of state succession in international law is particularly complex. Many of the rules have developed in specific response to particular political changes and such changes have not always been treated in a consistent manner by the international community.⁷ The Arbitration Commission established by the Conference on Yugoslavia, for instance, emphasised that ‘there are few well-established principles of international law that apply to state succession. Application of these principles is largely to be determined case by case, though the 1978 and 1983 Vienna Conventions do offer some guidance’,⁸ while the German Federal Supreme Court noted in the *Espionage Prosecution* case that ‘the problem of state succession is one of the most disputed areas of international law’.⁹ The international aspects of

succession are governed through the rules of customary international law. There are two relevant Conventions: the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978, which entered into force in 1996; and the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts 1983, which is not yet in force (having currently only seven parties). However, many of the provisions contained in these Conventions reflect existing international law.

State succession itself may be briefly defined as the replacement of one state by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory.¹⁰ However, this formulation conceals a host of problems since there is a complex range of situations that stretches from continuity of statehood through succession to non-succession. State succession is essentially an umbrella term for a phenomenon occurring upon a factual change in sovereign authority over a particular territory. In many circumstances, it is unclear as to which rights and duties will flow from one authority to the other and upon which precise basis. Much will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, for example whether what has occurred is a merger of two states to form a new state; the absorption of one state into another, continuing state; a cession of territory from one state to another; secession of part of a state to form a new state; the dissolution or dismemberment of a state to form two or more states; or the establishment of a new state as a result of decolonisation. The role of recognition and acquiescence in this process is especially important.

The relevant date of succession is the date at which the successor state replaces the predecessor state in the responsibility for the international

relations of the territory to which the succession relates.¹¹ This is invariably the date of independence. However, problems may arise where successive dates of independence arise with regard to a state that is slowly disintegrating, such as Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Arbitration Commission noted that the date of succession was a question of fact to be assessed in the light of all the relevant circumstances.¹²

Continuity and Succession

Questions relating to continuity and succession may be particularly difficult.¹³ Where a new entity emerges, one has to decide whether it is a totally separate creature from its predecessor, or whether it is a continuation of it in a slightly different form. For example, it seems to be accepted that India is the same legal entity as British India and Pakistan is a totally new state.¹⁴ Yugoslavia was generally regarded as the successor state to Serbia,¹⁵ and Israel as a completely different being from British-mandated Palestine.¹⁶ Cession or secession of territory from an existing state will not affect the continuity of the latter state, even though its territorial dimensions and population have been diminished. Pakistan after the independence of Bangladesh is a good example of this. In such a case, the existing state remains in being, complete with the rights and duties incumbent upon it, save for those specifically tied to the ceded or seceded territory. Where, however, a state is dismembered so that all of its territory falls within the territory of two or more states, these rights and duties will be allocated as between the successor states. In deciding whether continuity or succession has occurred with regard to one of the parties to the process, one has to consider the classical criteria of the creation of statehood,¹⁷ together with assertions as to

status made by the parties directly concerned and the attitudes adopted by third states and international organisations.

This issue arose with regard to events concerning the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In the former case, upon the demise of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation took the position that it was the continuation of that state.¹⁸ This was asserted particularly with regard to membership of the United Nations.¹⁹ Of great importance was the Decision of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 21 December 1991 supporting Russia's continuance of the membership of the Soviet Union in the United Nations, including permanent membership of the Security Council, and other international organisations.²⁰ Although not all of the instruments produced by the Commonwealth of Independent States at the end of 1991 were strictly consistent with the continuity principle,²¹ it is clear that Russia's claim to be the continuation of the Soviet Union (albeit within different borders of course) was supported by the other former republics and was accepted by international practice.²² A rather special situation arose with regard to the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), which became independent after the First World War, but were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. This annexation had been refused recognition by some states²³ and accepted *de facto* but not *de jure* by some others.²⁴ The Baltic states declared their independence in August 1991.²⁵ The European Community adopted a Declaration on 27 August 1991 welcoming 'the restoration of the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic states which they lost in 1941'.²⁶ The United States recognised the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states on 4 September 1991.²⁷ The implication of this internationally accepted restoration of independence would appear to be that these states do not

constitute successor states to the former Soviet Union and would therefore be free of such rights and obligations as would be consequential upon such succession.²⁸

In contrast to this situation, the issue of Yugoslavia has been more complicated and tragic. The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) took place over several months²⁹ as the various constituent republics proclaimed independence.³⁰ The process was regarded as having been completed in the view of the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia³¹ by the time of its Opinion No. 8 issued on 4 July 1992.³² The Commission noted that a referendum had been held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in February and March 1992 producing a majority in favour of independence, while Serbia and Montenegro had established ‘a new state, the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”’ on 27 April 1992. The Commission noted that the common federal bodies of the SFRY had ceased to function, while Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia had been recognised by the member states of the European Community and other states and had been admitted to membership of the United Nations.³³ The conclusion was that the former SFRY had ceased to exist.³⁴ This was particularly reaffirmed in Opinion No. 10.³⁵

Nevertheless, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continued to maintain that it constituted not a new state, but the continuation of the former SFRY. This claim was opposed by the other former republics of the SFRY³⁶ and by the international community.³⁷ The Security Council, for example, in resolution 777 (1992) declared that ‘the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist’ and that ‘the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations'.³⁸ However, the Yugoslav position changed in 2000 and it requested admission to the United Nations as a new member.³⁹ The question as to the legal status of Yugoslavia as between 1992 and 2000 remained a source of some controversy, since its admission to the United Nations in 2000 could not operate retroactively. The International Court in 2003 described this situation as *sui generis* and fraught with legal difficulties,⁴⁰ but in its judgment in the series of cases brought by Yugoslavia against NATO members following the Kosovo conflict in 1999, the Court concluded that Yugoslavia had been a member of the United Nations (and thus a party to the Statute of the Court) from 1 November 2000 and that the *sui generis* status of that state could not have amounted to membership of the United Nations.⁴¹ Accordingly, while in 1996 the Court decided that Yugoslavia could appear before it in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, it held in 2003 that the situation as to Yugoslavia's status was *sui generis* and not without legal difficulty, but finally decided in 2004 that Yugoslavia could not bring an action against NATO states as it had not been a UN member and thus a party to the Statute in 1999.⁴² In its decision on the merits in *Application of the Genocide Convention* in 2007, the Court noted that its Decision of 1996 constituted *res judicata* and could not be reopened in the light of its subsequent rulings.⁴³

State succession also covers the situation of unification. One method of unification is by the creation of a totally new state, such as the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Under the agreement between the two states of 22 April 1990 the establishment of the Republic of Yemen was accomplished by way of a merger of the two existing states into a new entity with a new name.⁴⁴

Unification may also be achieved by the absorption of one state by another in circumstances where the former simply disappears and the latter continues, albeit with increased territory and population. Such was the case with Germany.

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, Germany was divided into the US, Soviet, UK and French zones of occupation and a special Berlin area not forming part of any zone.⁴⁵ Supreme authority was exercised initially by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Four Allied Powers⁴⁶ and subsequently by the three Allied High Commissioners in Bonn, with parallel developments occurring in the Soviet zone. The Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which came into force in 1955, terminated the occupation regime and abolished the Allied High Commission. The Three Allied Powers retained, however, their rights and obligations with regard to Berlin⁴⁷ and relating to 'Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement'.⁴⁸ Recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was on the same basis, that is as a sovereign state having full authority over internal and external affairs subject to the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers in respect of Berlin and Germany as a whole.⁴⁹ Accordingly, it was accepted that in some sense Germany as a whole continued to exist as a state in international law.⁵⁰ The question of the relationship of the two German states to each other and with regard to the pre-1945 German state has occasioned considerable interest and generated no little complexity, not least

because the FRG always claimed to be the successor of the pre-1945 Germany.⁵¹

On 18 May 1990, a treaty between the two German states was signed establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union. In essence this integrated the GDR into the FRG economic system, with the Deutsche Mark becoming legal tender in the GDR and with the Bundesbank becoming the central bank for the GDR as well as for the FRG.⁵² On 31 August 1990, a second treaty was signed between the two German states which provided for unification on 3 October 1990 by the accession of the GDR under article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic. On 12 September 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was signed by the two German states and the Four Allied Powers.⁵³ This latter agreement settled definitively matters arising out of the Second World War. It confirmed the borders of unified Germany as those of the FRG and the GDR (i.e. the post-war Oder–Neisse frontier with Poland), provided for a reduction in the armed forces of Germany and for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of the GDR. The Four Allied Powers terminated their rights and responsibilities regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole so that the united Germany has full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.⁵⁴

The Treaty between the FRG and the GDR of 31 August 1990 clearly provided that the latter was simply assimilated into the former. Article 1 of the Treaty stipulated that ‘upon the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with article 23 of the Basic Law⁵⁵ taking effect on 3 October 1990, the Länder of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia⁵⁶

shall become Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany'. This approach, whereby unified Germany came about by a process of absorption of the constituent provinces of the former GDR into the existing FRG by way of the extension of the constitution of the latter, is reinforced by other provisions in the Unification Treaty. Article 7, for example, provided that the financial system of the FRG 'shall be extended to the territory specified in article 3' (i.e. the *Länder* of the former GDR), while article 8 declared that 'upon the accession taking effect, federal law shall enter into force in the territory specified in article 3'.⁵⁷ International practice also demonstrates acceptance of this approach.⁵⁸ No state objected to this characterisation of the process.⁵⁹ In other words, the view taken by the parties directly concerned and accepted by the international community demonstrates acceptance of the unification as one of the continuity of the FRG and the disappearance or extinction of the GDR.

Succession to Treaties⁶⁰

The importance of treaties within the international legal system requires no repetition.⁶¹ They constitute the means by which a variety of legal obligations are imposed or rights conferred upon states in a wide range of matters from the significant to the mundane. Treaties are founded upon the pre-existing and indispensable norm of *pacta sunt servanda* or the acceptance of treaty commitments as binding. Treaties may fall within the following categories: multilateral treaties, including the specific category of treaties concerning international human rights; treaties concerned with territorial definition and regimes; bilateral treaties; and treaties that are treated as 'political' in the circumstances.

The rules concerning succession to treaties are those of customary international law together with the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978, which came into force in 1996 and which applies with regard to a succession taking place after that date.⁶²

As far as devolution agreements are concerned, article 8 of the Convention provides that such agreements of themselves cannot affect third states and this reaffirms an accepted principle, while article 9, dealing with unilateral declarations, emphasises that such a declaration by the successor state alone cannot of itself affect the rights and obligations of the state and third states. In other words, it would appear, the consent of the other parties to the treaties in question or an agreement with the predecessor state with regard to bilateral issues is required.

Categories of Treaties: Territorial, Political and Other Treaties

Treaties may for succession purposes be generally divided into three categories. The first relates to territorially grounded treaties, under which rights or obligations are imposed directly upon identifiable territorial units. The prime example of these are agreements relating to territorial definition. Waldock, in his first Report on Succession of States and Governments in Respect of Treaties in 1968, declared that ‘the weight both of opinion and practice seems clearly to be in favour of the view that boundaries established by treaties remain untouched by the mere fact of a succession. The opinion of jurists seems, indeed, to be unanimous on the point . . . [and] State practice in

favour of the continuance in force of boundaries established by treaty appears to be such as to justify the conclusion that a general rule of international law exists to that effect',⁶³ while Bedjaoui has noted that 'in principle the territory devolves upon the successor State on the basis of the pre-existing boundaries'.⁶⁴

For reasons relating to the maintenance of international stability, this approach has been clearly supported by state practice. The Latin American concept of *uti possidetis juris*, whereby the administrative divisions of the former Spanish Empire were to constitute the boundaries of the newly independent states in South America in the first third of the nineteenth century was the first internationally accepted expression of this approach.⁶⁵ It was echoed in US practice⁶⁶ and explicitly laid down in resolution 16 of the meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity in 1964, by which all member states pledged themselves to respect colonial borders.⁶⁷ The principle of succession to colonial borders was underlined by the International Court in the *Burkina Faso/Mali* case.⁶⁸ The extension of the principle of *uti possidetis* from decolonisation to the creation of new states out of existing independent states is supported by international practice, taking effect as the transformation of administrative boundaries into international boundaries generally.⁶⁹ Of course, much will depend upon the particular situation, including the claims of the states concerned and the attitude adopted by third states and international organisations, particularly the United Nations. This principle regarding the continuity of borders in the absence of consent to the contrary is reinforced by other principles of international law, such as the provision enshrined in article 62(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that a

fundamental change in circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty that establishes a boundary.⁷⁰ In addition, article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Succession to Treaties, although in terminology which is cautious and negative, specifies that:

A succession of States does not as such affect:

- (a) a boundary established by treaty; or
- (b) obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary.

The International Court dealt with succession to boundary treaties generally in the *Libya/Chad* case, where it was declared that ‘once agreed, the boundary stands, for any other approach would vitiate the fundamental principle of the stability of boundaries, the importance of which has been repeatedly emphasised by the Court’.⁷¹ More particularly, the Court emphasised that ‘a boundary established by treaty thus achieves a permanence which the treaty itself does not necessarily enjoy. The treaty can cease to be in force without in any way affecting the continuance of the boundary . . . when a boundary has been the subject of agreement, the continued existence of that boundary is not dependent upon the continuing life of the treaty under which the boundary is agreed.’⁷² It is particularly important to underline that the succession takes place, therefore, not as such to the boundary treaty, but rather to the boundary as established by the treaty. The Tribunal in the *Eritrea–Yemen* case emphasised that boundary and territorial treaties made between two parties constituted a special category of

treaties representing a ‘legal reality which necessarily impinges upon third states, because they have effect *erga omnes*’.⁷³

Territorially grounded treaties extend somewhat beyond the establishment of boundaries into the more controversial area of agreements creating other territorial regimes, such agreements being termed ‘localised’ or ‘real’ or ‘dispositive’.⁷⁴ Examples of such arrangements might include demilitarised zones, rights of transit, port facilities and other servitudes generally.⁷⁵

Despite some reservations by members of the International Law Commission⁷⁶ and governments,⁷⁷ article 12 of the Vienna Convention provides that a succession of states does not as such affect obligations or rights relating to the use of any territory or to restrictions upon its use established by a treaty for the benefit of any foreign state, group of states or all states and considered as attaching to the territory in question. The International Court declared that article 12 reflected a rule of customary law in addressing the issue of territorial regimes in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case and confirmed that treaties concerning water rights or navigation on rivers constituted territorial treaties.⁷⁸ It also noted that since the 1977 treaty in question in that case between Hungary and Czechoslovakia established *inter alia* the navigational regime for an important section of an international waterway, a territorial regime within the meaning of article 12 was created.⁷⁹

Political or ‘personal’ treaties establish rights or obligations deemed to be particularly linked to the regime in power in the territory in question and to its political orientation. Examples of such treaties would include treaties of alliance or friendship or neutrality.⁸⁰ Such treaties do not bind successor

states for they are seen as exceptionally closely tied to the nature of the state which has ceased to exist. However, it is not at all clear what the outer limits are to the concept of political treaties and difficulties over definitional problems do exist. Apart from the categories of territorial and political treaties, where succession rules in general are clear, other treaties cannot be so easily defined or categorised for succession purposes and must be analysed separately.

Succession to Treaties Generally

Practice seems to suggest ‘a tendency’⁸¹ or ‘a general inclination’⁸² to succession to ‘some categories of multilateral treaties’⁸³ or to ‘certain multilateral conventions’.⁸⁴ However, this ‘modern-classical’ approach is difficult to sustain as a general rule of comprehensive applicability.⁸⁵ One simply has to examine particular factual situations, take note of the claims made by the relevant states and mark the reactions of third states. In the case of bilateral treaties, the starting-point is from a rather different perspective. In such cases, the importance of the individual contractual party is more evident, since only two states are involved and the treaty is thus more clearly reciprocal in nature. This means that the actual practice of the states concerned with regard to the question as to whether a particular bilateral treaty is to be accepted as binding upon the successor state becomes critical. The presumption in the past has been one of non-succession, depending upon all the particular circumstances of the case. Practice with regard to the United States, Panama, Belgium and Finland, for example, supports the ‘clean slate’ approach.⁸⁶ However, there has been some more recent practice demonstrating a tendency to question or to reverse this rule or presumption.⁸⁷

Article 34(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention provides that: ‘any treaty in force at the date of the succession of states in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor state continues in force in respect of each successor state so formed’, although this does not apply where the states concerned otherwise agreed or if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the successor state would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.⁸⁸ Practice has, however, been inconsistent,⁸⁹ and it would be premature to assert that a new rule or presumption had been established as a matter of international law. Accordingly, what will matter will be the pattern of relations between the two states to see exactly what it can be said that they agreed to.

Absorption and Merger

Where one state is absorbed by another and no new state is created (such as the 1990 accession to the Federal Republic of Germany of the *Länder* of the German Democratic Republic), the former becomes extinct, whereas the latter simply continues, albeit in an enlarged form. The basic situation is that the treaties of the former, certainly in so far as they may be deemed ‘political’,⁹⁰ die with the state concerned,⁹¹ although territorial treaties defining the boundaries of the entity absorbed will continue to define such boundaries. Other treaties are also likely to be regarded as at an end.⁹² However, treaties of the absorbing state continue and will extend to the territory of the extinguished state. These principles are, of course, subject to contrary intention expressed by the parties in question. For example, in the case of German unification, article 11 coupled with Annex I of the

Unification Treaty 1990 excluded from the extension of treaties of the FRG to the territory of the former GDR a series of treaties dealing primarily with NATO matters.

Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on Succession to Treaties provides that where two or more states unite and form one successor state, treaties continue in force unless the successor state and the other state party or states parties otherwise agree or it appears that this would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation. Article 31(2) provides that such treaties would apply only in respect of the part of the territory of the successor state in respect of which the treaty was in force at the date of the succession of states. This is so unless the successor state makes a notification that the multilateral treaty in question shall apply in respect of its entire territory⁹³ or, if the multilateral treaty in question is one in which by virtue either of its terms or by reason of the limited number of participants and its object and purpose the participation of any other state must be considered as requiring the consent of all the parties,⁹⁴ the successor state and the other states parties otherwise agree. This general principle would apply also in the case of a bilateral treaty, unless the successor state and the other state party otherwise agree.⁹⁵

While these provisions bear some logic with regard to the situation where two states unite to form a new third state,⁹⁶ they do not really take into account the special circumstances of unification where one state simply takes over another state in circumstances where the latter is extinguished. In these situations, the model provided by German unification appears to be fully consistent with international law and of value as a precedent. Article 11 of the

Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 provided that all international treaties and agreements to which the FRG was a contracting party were to retain their validity and that the rights and obligations arising therefrom would apply also to the territory of the GDR.⁹⁷ Article 12 provided that international treaties of the GDR were to be discussed with the parties concerned with a view to regulating or confirming their continued application, adjustment or expiry, taking into account protection of confidence, the interests of the state concerned, the treaty obligations of the FRG as well as the principles of a free, democratic order governed by the rule of law, and respecting the competence of the European Communities. The united Germany would then determine its position after such consultations. It was also stipulated that should the united Germany intend to accede to international organisations or other multilateral treaties of which the GDR, but not the FRG, was a member, agreement was to be reached with the respective contracting parties and the European Communities, where the competence of the latter was affected. The situation thus differs from the scenario envisaged in article 31 of the 1978 treaty.⁹⁸

In the case of mergers to form a new third state, the formulation in article 31 is more relevant and acceptable. Practice appears to support that approach. For example, in the cases of both the Egypt–Syria merger to form the United Arab Republic in 1958⁹⁹ and the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form Tanzania in 1964,¹⁰⁰ the continuation of treaties in the territories to which they had applied before the respective mergers was stipulated.¹⁰¹

Cession of Territory from One State to Another

When part of the territory of one state becomes part of the territory of another state, the general rule is that the treaties of the former cease to apply to the territory, while the treaties of the latter extend to the territory. Article 15 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States to Treaties, dealing with this ‘moving-frontiers’ rule,¹⁰² provides for this, with the proviso that where it appears from the treaty concerned or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty to the territory would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the condition for its operation, this extension should not happen. This is basically consistent with state practice. When, for example, the United States annexed Hawaii in 1898, its treaties were extended to the islands and Belgium was informed that US–Belgium commercial agreements were thenceforth to be applied to Hawaii also.¹⁰³ Similarly, it was held that after 1919, German treaties would not apply to Alsace-Lorraine, while French treaties would thereafter be extended to that territory.¹⁰⁴ Article 15 would therefore seem to reiterate existing custom,¹⁰⁵ although there have been indications to the contrary in the past.¹⁰⁶

Separation from an Existing State to Form a New State or States

The factual situations out of which a separation or dismemberment takes place are many and varied. They range from a break-up of a previously created entity into its previous constituent elements, as in the 1961 dissolution of the United Arab Republic into the pre-1958 states of Egypt and Syria or the dissolution of the Federation of Mali, to the complete fragmenting of a state into a variety of successors not being coterminous with previous territorial units, such as the demise of Austria-Hungary in 1919.¹⁰⁷

Where there is a separation or secession from an independent state which continues, in order to create a new state, the former continues as a state, albeit territorially reduced, with its international rights and obligations intact.¹⁰⁸

With regard to the seceding territory itself, the leading view appeared to have been that the newly created state would commence international life free from the treaty rights and obligations applicable to its former sovereign.¹⁰⁹

Reasons for this included the important point that it was difficult to maintain as a rule of general application that states that have not signed particular treaties are bound by them.

State practice essentially reinforced the basic proposition. When Belgium seceded from the Netherlands in 1830, it was deemed to start international life with ‘a clean slate’ and the same approach was adopted with regard to the secession of Cuba from Spain in 1898 and that of Panama from Colombia in 1903. Similarly, when Finland seceded from the Russian Empire after the First World War, the view taken by the United Kingdom and the United States was that Finland was not bound by the existing Russian treaties dealing with the territory.¹¹⁰

While essentially this is the position taken by the Vienna Convention on Succession to Treaties with regard to decolonised territories (discussed in the following subsection), article 34 provides that ‘any treaty in force at the date of the succession of states in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor state continues in force in respect of each successor state so formed’. Any treaty which applied only to part of the territory of the predecessor state which has become a successor state will continue in force in respect of the latter only. These provisions will not apply if the states concerned otherwise

agree or if it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the successor state would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.¹¹¹

As far as the predecessor state is concerned in such a situation (assuming the predecessor state remains in existence), article 35 provides that existing treaties remain in force after the succession in respect of the remaining territory, unless the parties otherwise agree or it is established that the treaty related only to the territory which has separated from the predecessor state or it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the predecessor state would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.

The approach in the Vienna Convention was adopted on the basis of the International Law Commission draft which had taken the position that ‘in modern international law having regard to the need for the maintenance of the system of multilateral treaties and of the stability of treaty relationships, as a general rule the principle of *de jure* continuity should apply’.¹¹² This may have been an attempt to distinguish decolonised territories (termed ‘newly independent states’ in the Convention) from other examples of independence, but it constitutes a rather different approach from the traditional one and the formulation in article 34 cannot be taken as necessarily reflective of customary law. Much will depend upon the views of the states concerned.

What can be said is that the requirements of international stability in certain areas in particular will stimulate states generally to encourage an approach of succession to multilateral obligations by the newly independent secessionist states. The Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union adopted by the European Community on 16 December 1991 certainly noted that the common position of EC member states on recognition required *inter alia* ‘acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability’.¹¹³ But, of course, conditions attached to the essentially political process of recognition are not the same as accepting consequences arising out of succession itself. However, there were certainly indications that the United States was taking the position that Russia and the non-Baltic successor states to the Soviet Union should be regarded as bound by some at least of the Soviet treaties.¹¹⁴ This approach was clearly developed in view of the political need to ensure continuity with regard to arms control agreements and mechanisms.¹¹⁵ Of course, the impact of Russia constituting the continuance of the Soviet Union is to maintain in force for the former the obligations of the latter, but there was concern about the control of the nuclear and other weapons subject to treaty regulation which were now situated in the successor states to the Soviet Union. The signing of agreements with the major successor states appears to have mitigated the strength of this particular approach. Indeed, it should be noted that separate agreements with the nuclear successor states of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were apparently required in order to ensure the compliance of those states with regard to the arms control treaties binding upon the Soviet Union,¹¹⁶ although these states had agreed generally to be bound by international obligations deriving from treaties signed by the Soviet Union.¹¹⁷

Whether, in view of the greatly increased network of multilateral treaties and the vastly enhanced interdependence of states founded and manifested upon such agreement, it is possible to say that the international community is moving towards a position of a presumption of continuity, is in reality difficult to establish. Certainly, the potentially disruptive effect of the creation of new states needs to be minimised, but it is far too early to be able to declare that continuity or a presumption of continuity is now the established norm.

‘Newly Independent States’

The post-Second World War period saw the dismantling of the overseas European empires. Based in international legal terms upon the principle of self-determination, which was founded upon a distinction between such territories and the metropolitan authority, decolonisation produced a number of changes in the international legal system.¹¹⁸ The Vienna Convention on Succession to Treaties sought to establish a special category relating to decolonised territories. These were termed ‘newly independent states’ and defined in article 2(1)(f) as successor states ‘the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession of states was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor state was responsible’.¹¹⁹ Article 16 laid down the general rule that such states were not bound to maintain in force or to become a party to any treaty by reason only of the fact that the treaty had been in force regarding the territory in question at the date of succession. This approach was deemed to build upon the traditional ‘clean slate’ principle applying to new states created out of

existing states, such as the United States and the Spanish American Republics when they had obtained independence.¹²⁰ This was also consistent with the view taken by the UN Secretariat in 1947 when discussing Pakistan's position in relation to the organisation, where it was noted that 'the territory which breaks off, Pakistan, will be a new state; it will not have the treaty rights and obligations of the old state'.¹²¹

It should be noted that the provision dealing with bilateral treaties was more vigorously worded, no doubt because the personal and reciprocal nature of such treaties is that more obvious, or in the words of the International Law Commission 'dominant', and also because, unlike the case of multilateral treaties, there is no question of the treaty coming into force between the new state and the predecessor state.¹²² While state practice demonstrates some continuity in areas such as air services agreements and trade agreements, the Commission felt that this did not reflect a customary rule, as distinct from the will of the states concerned, and that the fundamental rule with regard to bilateral treaties was that their continuance in force after independence was a matter for agreement, express or tacit, between the newly independent state and the other state party which had contracted with the predecessor state.¹²³ Article 24 notes that a bilateral treaty in force for the territory in question is considered to be in force for the newly independent state and the other state party where they expressly so agree or by reason of their conduct they are to be considered as having so agreed.¹²⁴

There is, of course, a distinction between a new state being obliged to become a party to a treaty binding the predecessor state and having the facility or perhaps even the right to become a party to that treaty. Practice

shows that new states may benefit from a ‘fast track’ method of participating in treaties. For example, new states are not required to adhere to the formal mechanism of accession as if they were existing non-party states¹²⁵ and article 17 of the Vienna Convention provides that a ‘newly independent state’ may by a notification of succession establish its status as a party to a multilateral treaty which at the date of succession was in force in respect of the territory to which the succession relates, unless it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the newly independent state would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions of its operation. In addition, where it appears from the nature of the treaty itself that the participation of any other state would require the consent of all the parties, such consent must be forthcoming for the new state to participate.¹²⁶

The ‘clean slate’ principle has also in practice been mitigated by the terms of the process by which many colonies achieved independence. A number of colonial powers, particularly the United Kingdom, adopted the practice of concluding devolution agreements by which certain treaties signed on behalf of the territory becoming independent continued to apply to the newly independent state.¹²⁷ While such agreements would be considered *res inter alios* with regard to third states, they were of value in establishing the appropriate framework for relations between the former colonial power and the new state. Other newly independent states adopted the practice of making unilateral declarations by which they made known their views as to treaty succession. Such unilateral declarations often took the form of specifying that treaties would continue in force for an interim period during which time they would be reviewed,¹²⁸ but they could not in themselves, of course, alter treaty

relationships with third states.¹²⁹ Devices such as devolution agreements and unilateral declarations were of value, however, in mitigating the effects that an absolute ‘clean slate’ approach might otherwise have had.

Dissolution of States

Where an existing state comes to an end as an international person and is replaced by two or more other states, it is accepted that political treaties will not continue, but that territorially grounded treaties will continue to attach to the territories in question now subject to new sovereign arrangements. The situation with regard to other treaties is more uncertain.¹³⁰

State practice concerning dissolution has centred to all intents and purposes upon the dismemberment of ‘unions of state’ that is the ending of what had originally been a union of two international persons. Examples would include Colombia in 1829–31; Norway/Sweden in 1905; the United Arab Republic in 1960; the Mali Federation in 1960; the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963;¹³¹ and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in 1992.¹³² It is difficult to deduce clear rules of state succession from these episodes since much depended upon the expressed intentions of the states concerned. Perhaps a presumption in favour of continuity of treaties with regard to each component part may be suggested, but this is subject to expressed intention to the contrary.¹³³

Article 34 of the Vienna Convention provides for treaties in force for all or part of the predecessor state to continue in force with regard to the specific territory unless the states concerned otherwise agree or it appears from the

treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions of its operation. Whether this constitutes a rule of customary law also is unclear, but in the vast majority of situations the matter is likely to be regulated by specific agreements. Upon the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, for example, on 1 January 1993, the United Kingdom took the position that, as appropriate, treaties and agreements in force to which the United Kingdom and that state were parties remained in force as between the United Kingdom and the successor states.¹³⁴ The question of Yugoslavia was more complicated in that until 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia maintained that it was a continuation of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while the other former republics maintained that the former SFRY had come to an end to be replaced by a series of new states.

The issue of article 34 and automatic succession arose in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)*, where Bosnia argued that the rule applied with regard to the Genocide Convention and Yugoslavia denied this. The Court, however, did not make a determination on this point.¹³⁵ The issue arose again in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case, where the parties argued as to whether the rule of automatic succession applied or not. The Court similarly declined to make a determination and focused instead on the significance of article 12.¹³⁶

International Human Rights Treaties

A territorial treaty binds successor states by virtue of attaching to the territory itself and establishing a particular regime that transcends the treaty. Can it be maintained that international human rights treaties are analogous and thus ‘attach’ to the inhabitants concerned within the territory of the predecessor state and thus continue to bind successor states? There is no doubt that human rights treaties constitute a rather specific category of treaties. They establish that obligations are owed directly to individuals and often provide for direct access for individuals to international mechanisms.¹³⁷ The very nature of international human rights treaties varies somewhat from that of traditional international agreements. The International Court in the *Reservations to the Genocide Convention* case emphasised that ‘in such a Convention the contracting states do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the *raison d’être* of the Convention’.¹³⁸ In the *Barcelona Traction* case,¹³⁹ the Court differentiated between obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole and those arising vis-à-vis another state. The former are obligations that derive ‘from the outlawing of aggression and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination’. In view of the importance of such rights, ‘all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations *erga omnes*’. It is also the case that the process of interpretation of international human rights treaties is more dynamic than is the case with regard to other international agreements. Human rights treaties create not merely subjective, reciprocal rights, but rather particular legal orders involving objective obligations to protect human rights.¹⁴⁰

Where a state party to human rights treaties either disintegrates completely or from which another state or states are created, and the classical rules of succession were followed, there is a danger that this might result in a situation where people formerly protected by such treaties are deprived of such protection as a consequence or by-product of state succession.¹⁴¹ The practice of the UN Human Rights Committee¹⁴² with regard to the Yugoslav tragedy is particularly interesting here. After the conclusion of its 45th session, the UN Human Rights Committee requested special reports with regard to specific issues (for example, the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’, arbitrary detention, torture and advocacy of hatred) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), noting ‘that all the peoples within the territory of the former Yugoslavia are entitled to the guarantees of the Covenant’.¹⁴³ Representatives of all three states appeared before the Committee to discuss the relevant issues, no objection being made to the competence of the Committee, even though only Croatia had actually notified the Secretary-General of its succession to the human rights treaties of the former Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁴ In the formal Comments of the Human Rights Committee upon the initial short reports submitted by the three states,¹⁴⁵ the Committee emphasised clearly and unambiguously that ‘all the peoples within the territory of the former Yugoslavia are entitled to the guarantees of the Covenant’.¹⁴⁶ In its General Comment No. 26 of October 1997, the Committee took the view that ‘once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in government . . . or State succession’.¹⁴⁷

The Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 1994/16 on 25 February 1994 in which it ‘reiterates its call to successor states which have not yet done so to confirm to appropriate depositories that they continue to be bound by obligations under international human rights treaties’ and ‘emphasises the special nature of the human rights treaties aimed at the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. In addition, the Commission requested the human rights treaty bodies to continue further the ‘continuing applicability of the respective international human rights treaties to successor states’ and the Secretary-General ‘to encourage successor states to confirm their obligations under the international human rights treaties to which their predecessors were a party as from the date of their independence’.¹⁴⁸

The issue of succession to the Genocide Convention in the Yugoslav situation was raised before the International Court specifically in the preliminary objections phase of *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)*. The Court held that it was unnecessary to determine this question in the circumstances since both Bosnia and Yugoslavia were clearly parties to the Convention by one means or another by the date of the filing of the Application.¹⁴⁹ The issue was, however, addressed particularly in two Separate Opinions. Judge Shahabuddeen declared that ‘to effectuate its object and purpose, the [Genocide] Convention would fall to be construed as implying the expression of a unilateral undertaking by each party to the Convention to treat successor states as continuing as from independence any status which the predecessor state had as a party to the Convention’. It was suggested that it might be possible to extend this object and purpose argument to human rights treaties generally.¹⁵⁰

Judge Weeramantry in his Separate Opinion undertook a close analysis of the underlying principles and concluded by pointing to 'a principle of contemporary international law that there is automatic state succession to so vital a human rights convention as the Genocide Convention'.¹⁵¹ One of the main reasons for this was the danger of gaps appearing in the system of human rights protection as between the dissolution of the predecessor state and the acceptance of human rights treaty obligations by the successor state or states.

Accordingly, the question of continued application of human rights treaties within the territory of a predecessor state irrespective of a succession is clearly under consideration and the European Court of Human Rights has taken the view that fundamental rights protected by international human rights treaties should belong to individuals living in the territory of the state concerned, notwithstanding subsequent dissolution.¹⁵² Whether such a principle has been clearly established as a general principle is at the present moment unclear. However, with regard to those human rights which are established as a matter of customary international law, the new state will be bound by these as such.

Succession with Respect to Matters Other Than Treaties

Membership of International Organisations¹⁵³

Succession to membership of international organisations will proceed (depending upon the terms of the organisation's constitution) according to whether a new state is formed or an old state continues in a slightly different form. In the case of the partition of British India in 1947, India was considered by the UN General Assembly as a continuation of the previous entity, while Pakistan was regarded as a new state, which had then to apply for admission to the organisation.¹⁵⁴ Upon the merger of Egypt and Syria in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic, the latter was treated as a single member of the United Nations, while upon the dissolution of the merger in 1961, Syria simply resumed its separate membership of the organisation.¹⁵⁵ In the case of the merger of North and South Yemen in 1990, the new state simply replaced the predecessor states as a member of the relevant international organisations. Where the predecessor state is dissolved and new states are created, such states will have to apply anew for membership to international organisations. For example, the new states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia were admitted as new members of the United Nations on 19 January 1993.¹⁵⁶

The Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly considered the situation of new states being formed through division of a member state and the membership problem and produced the following principles:¹⁵⁷

1. That, as a general rule, it is in conformity with legal principles to presume that a state which is a member of the Organization of the United Nations does

not cease to be a member simply because its Constitution or frontier has been subjected to changes, and that the extinction of the state as a legal personality recognised in the international order must be shown before its rights and obligations can be considered thereby to have ceased to exist.

2. That when a new state is created, whatever may be the territory and the populations which it comprises and whether or not they formed part of a state member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of the Charter claim the status of a member of the United Nations unless it has been formally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.

3. Beyond that, each case must be judged according to its merits.

Succession to Assets and Debts¹⁵⁸

The relevant international law in this area is based upon customary law. The Vienna Convention on Succession to State Property, Archives and Debts 1978 is not currently in force, although most of its provisions (apart from those concerning ‘newly independent states’) are reflective of custom. The primary rule with regard to the allocation of assets (including archives) and debts in succession situations is that the relevant parties should settle such issues by agreement. Virtually all of the rules that are formulated, for example in the Vienna Convention 1978, are deemed to operate only where such agreement has not taken place.¹⁵⁹ In addition, the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia declared in Opinion No. 9 that ‘the successor states to the SFRY must together settle all aspects of the succession by agreement’¹⁶⁰ and reinforced this approach in Opinion No. 14, declaring that ‘the first principle applicable to state succession is that the successor states should consult with each other and agree a settlement of all questions relating to the succession’.¹⁶¹

State Property¹⁶²

The classic rule postulates that only the public property of the predecessor state passes automatically to the successor state,¹⁶³ but this, of course, raises the question of the definition of public property. The distinction between public and private property is to some extent based upon the conceptual differences between public and private law, a distinction unknown to common law countries. Although in many cases there will be a relevant

agreement to define what is meant by public property in this context,¹⁶⁴ this does not always occur and recourse to municipal law is often required. This indeed may be necessitated to a large extent also because international law itself simply does not provide many of the required definitions with regard to, for example, public companies or public utility undertakings.¹⁶⁵

The relevant municipal law for such purposes is that of the predecessor state. It is that law which will define the nature of the property in question and thus in essence decide its destination in the event of a succession.¹⁶⁶ Article 8 of the Vienna Convention 1983 provides that state property for the purposes of the Convention means ‘property, rights and interests which, at the date of the succession of states, were, according to the internal law of the predecessor state, owned by that state’¹⁶⁷ and this can be taken as reflective of customary law. The Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia reiterated this position by declaring that ‘to determine whether the property, debts and archives belonged to the SFRY, reference should be had to the domestic law of the SFRY in operation at the date of succession’.¹⁶⁸ The relevant date for the passing of the property is the date of succession¹⁶⁹ and this is the date of independence, although difficulties may arise in the context of the allocation of assets and debts where different dates of succession occur for different successor states.¹⁷⁰ Such problems would need to be resolved on the basis of agreement between the relevant parties.¹⁷¹

The Arbitration Commission was faced with two particular problems. First, the 1974 SFRY Constitution had transferred to the constituent republics ownership of many items of property. This, held the Commission, led to the conclusion that such property could not be held to have belonged to the

SFRY whatever their origin or initial financing.¹⁷² Secondly, the Commission was faced with the concept of ‘social ownership’, a concept regarded as particularly highly developed in the SFRY. In the event, the Commission resolved the dilemma by adopting a mixture of the territorial principle and a functional approach. It was noted that ‘social ownership’ was ‘held for the most part by “associated labour organisations” – bodies with their own legal personality, operating in a single republic and coming within its exclusive jurisdiction. Their property, debts and archives are not to be divided for purposes of state succession: each successor state exercises its sovereign powers in respect of them.’¹⁷³ However, where other organisations operated ‘social ownership’ either at the federal level or in two or more republics, ‘their property, debts and archives should be divided between the successor states in question if they exercised public prerogatives on behalf of the SFRY of individual republics’. Where such public prerogatives were not being exercised, the organisations should be regarded as private-sector enterprises to which state succession does not apply.¹⁷⁴

The Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001, however, provides: ‘It shall be for the successor state on whose territory immovable and tangible movable property is situated to determine, for the purposes of this Annex, whether that property was state property of the SFRY in accordance with international law.’¹⁷⁵

It is a recognised principle of customary international law that the public property of a predecessor state with regard to the territory in question passes to the successor state.¹⁷⁶ Thus, as a general rule, the test of succession of

public, or state, property as so characterised under the laws of the predecessor state is a territorial one.

However, one needs to distinguish here between immovable and movable property. State immovable property situated in the territory to which the succession relates passes to the successor state.¹⁷⁷ This is provided for in the Vienna Convention 1983.¹⁷⁸ It is also evident in state practice,¹⁷⁹ most recently being reaffirmed by the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia¹⁸⁰ and in the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001.¹⁸¹

In the case of immovable property situated outside the successor state or states, traditional state practice posits that where the predecessor state continues in existence this property should remain with the predecessor state (subject to agreement to the contrary by the states concerned, of course). Only special circumstances might modify this principle.¹⁸² Where the predecessor state ceases to exist, it would appear that its property abroad should be divided proportionately between the successor states.¹⁸³

Article 15(1)(b) of the Convention makes out a special, and highly controversial, case for ‘newly independent states’. This provides that ‘immovable property, having belonged to the territory to which the succession of states relates, situated outside it and having become state property of the predecessor state during the period of dependence, shall pass to the successor state’, while other immovable state property situated outside the territory ‘shall pass to the successor state in proportion to the contribution of the dependent territory’. Neither of these propositions can be regarded as

part of customary international law and their force would thus be dependent upon the coming into effect of the Convention, should this happen.¹⁸⁴

As far as movable property connected with the territory in question is concerned,¹⁸⁵ the territorial principle continues to predominate. O'Connell notes that 'such property as is destined specifically for local use is acquired by the successor state',¹⁸⁶ while the formulation in the Vienna Convention 1983 is more flexible. This provides that 'movable state property of the predecessor state connected with the activity of the predecessor state in respect of the territory to which the succession of states applies shall pass to the successor state'.¹⁸⁷ There are, however, likely to be difficulties of precision in specific cases with regard to borderline instances of what may be accepted as either property 'destined specifically for local use' or property 'connected with the activity of the predecessor state in . . . the territory'. The view taken by the Arbitration Commission in Opinion No. 14 appears to be even more flexible, for it simply notes that 'public property passes to the successor state on whose territory it is situated'.¹⁸⁸ However, particular kinds of property may be dealt with differently. For example, the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues provides that the rule is not to apply to tangible state property of great importance to the cultural heritage of one of the successor states and which originated there, even though situated elsewhere at the date of independence. Such property is to go to the state whose cultural heritage it is.¹⁸⁹ Secondly, military property is to be made the subject of special arrangements.¹⁹⁰

The situation with regard to movable property outside the territory in question is more complicated. Article 17(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention

1983 provides that such property (in the case of separation of part of a state) ‘shall pass to the successor state in an equitable proportion’. This must be regarded as a controversial proposition since it appears to modify the dominant territorial approach to the succession of state property.¹⁹¹ However, in the case of the dissolution of the predecessor state, the argument in favour of an equitable division of movable property not linked to the territory in respect of which the succession occurs is much stronger.¹⁹² The Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia limited itself to noting the general principle that state property, debts and archives of the SFRY (other than immovable property within each of the successor states) should be divided between the successor states¹⁹³ and that, while each category of assets and liabilities need not be divided equitably, the overall outcome had to be an equitable division.¹⁹⁴

The state succession situation which in general poses the least problem is that of absorption or merger, since the absorbing or newly created state respectively will simply take over the assets and debts of the extinguished state. The issues were, however, discussed in detail in the context of German unification. Article 21 of the Unification Treaty provides that the assets of the German Democratic Republic which served directly specified administrative tasks were to become Federal assets¹⁹⁵ and were to be used to discharge public tasks in the territory of the former GDR. Article 22 dealt with public assets of legal entities in that territory, including the land and assets in the agricultural sectors which did not serve directly specified administrative tasks.¹⁹⁶ Such financial assets were to be administered in trust by the Federal Government and be appointed by federal law equally between the Federal Government on the one hand and the *Länder* of the former GDR on the other,

with the local authorities receiving an appropriate share of the *Länder* allocation. The Federal Government was to use its share to discharge public tasks in the territory of the former GDR, while the distribution of the *Länder* share to the individual *Länder* was to take place upon the basis of population ratio. Publicly owned assets used for the housing supply became the property of the local authorities together with the assumption by the latter of a proportionate share of the debts, with the ultimate aim of privatisation.

In fact, state practice demonstrates that with the exception of some clear and basic rules, all will depend upon the particular agreement reached in the particular circumstances. In the case of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the two successor states agreed to divide the assets and liabilities of the predecessor state¹⁹⁷ in the ratio of two to one (the approximate population ratio of the two new states).¹⁹⁸ In the case of the former Soviet Union, Russia and the successor states signed agreements in 1991 and 1992 apportioning assets and liabilities of the predecessor state with the share of Russia being 61.34 per cent and the Ukraine being 16.37 per cent.¹⁹⁹ In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the Agreement on Succession Issues 2001, in addition to the provisions referred to above,²⁰⁰ provided for the distribution of assets on the basis of agreed proportions.²⁰¹ Financial assets in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were distributed on a slightly different proportional basis (that became known as the IMF key).²⁰² The IMF key was also used with regard to the distribution of assets in the Bank of International Settlements in an arrangement dated 10 April 2001.²⁰³

State Archives

Archives are state property with special characteristics. Many are difficult by their nature to divide up, but they may be relatively easily reproduced and duplicated. Archives are a crucial part of the heritage of a community and may consist of documents, numismatic collections, iconographic documents, photographs and films. The issue has been of great concern to UNESCO, which has called for the restitution of archives as part of the reconstitution and protection of the national cultural heritage and has appealed for the return of an irreplaceable cultural heritage to those that created it.²⁰⁴ In this general context, one should also note articles 149 and 303 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. The former provides that all objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the International Seabed Area are to be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 'particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the state or country of origin, or the state of historical and archaeological origin', while the latter stipulates that states have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea and shall cooperate for this purpose.

In general, treaties between European states dealing with cessions of territory included archival clauses providing for the treatment of archives, while such clauses are very rare in cases of decolonisation.²⁰⁵

Article 20 of the 1983 Vienna Convention provides that state archives in the present context means:

all documents of whatever date and kind,
produced or received by the predecessor state
in the exercise of its functions which, at the

date of the succession of states, belonged to the predecessor state according to its internal law and were preserved by it directly or under its control as archives for whatever purpose.

Generally, such archives will pass as at the date of succession and without compensation, without as such affecting archives in the territory owned by a third state.²⁰⁶

Where part of the territory of a state is transferred by that state to another state, in the absence of agreement, the part of the state archives of the predecessor state which, for normal administration of the territory concerned, should be at the disposal of the state to which the territory is transferred, shall pass to the successor state, as shall any part of the state archives that relates exclusively or principally to the territory.²⁰⁷ In the case of ‘newly independent states’, the same general provisions apply,²⁰⁸ but with some alterations. Archives having belonged to the territory in question and having become state archives of the predecessor state during the period of dependence are to pass to the successor state. The reference here to archives that became state archives is to pre-colonial material, whether kept by central government, local governments or tribes, religious ministers, private enterprises or individuals.²⁰⁹ One may mention here the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 1947, which provided that Italy was to restore all archives and objects of historical value belonging to Ethiopia or its natives and removed from Ethiopia to Italy since October 1935.²¹⁰ In the case of Vietnam, the 1950 Franco-Vietnamese agreement provided for the return as of right of all historical archives,²¹¹ while a dispute between France and Algeria has been

in existence since the latter's independence over pre-colonial material removed to France.²¹²

Article 28(2) provides that the passing or the appropriate reproduction of parts of the state archives of the predecessor state (other than those already discussed above) of interest to the territory concerned is to be determined by agreement, 'in such a manner that each of these states [i.e. predecessor and successor] can benefit as widely and equitably as possible from those parts of the state archives of the predecessor state'. The reference here is primarily to material relating to colonisation and the colonial period, and in an arrangement of 1975, the French specifically noted the practice of microfilming in the context of France's acquisition of Algeria.²¹³ Article 28(3) emphasises that the predecessor state is to provide the newly independent state with the best available evidence from its state archives relating to territorial title and boundary issues. This is important as many post-colonial territorial disputes will invariably revolve around the interpretation of colonial treaties delimiting frontiers and colonial administrative practice concerning the area in contention.²¹⁴

Where two or more states unite to form one successor state, the state archives of the former will pass to the latter.²¹⁵ Where part of a state secedes to form another state, unless the states otherwise agree the part of the state archives of the predecessor state, which for normal administration of the territory concerned should be in that territory, will pass, as will those parts of the state archives that relate directly to the territory that is the subject of the succession.²¹⁶

The same provisions apply in the case of a dissolution of a state, which is replaced by two or more successor states, in the absence of agreement, with the addition that other state archives are to pass to the successor states in an equitable manner, taking into account all relevant circumstances.²¹⁷ These principles were confirmed in the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001,²¹⁸ while it was additionally provided that archives other than those falling within these categories are to be the subject of an agreement between the successor states as to their equitable distribution.²¹⁹

Articles 28, 30 and 31 also contain a paragraph explaining that the relevant agreements over state archives ‘shall not infringe the right of the peoples of those states to development, to information about their history and to their cultural heritage’. Despite the controversy over whether such a right does indeed exist in law as a right and precisely how such a provision might be interpreted in practice in concrete situations, the general concept of encouraging awareness and knowledge of a people’s heritage is to be supported.²²⁰

Public Debt²²¹

This is an area of particular uncertainty and doubt has been expressed as to whether there is a rule of succession in such circumstances. As in other parts of state succession, political and economic imperatives play a large role and much practice centres upon agreements made between relevant parties.

The public debt (or national debt) is that debt assumed by the central government in the interests of the state as a whole. It constitutes a particularly

sensitive issue since third parties are involved who are often reluctant to accept a change in the identity of the debtor. This encourages an approach based on the continuing liability for the debt in question and in situations where a division of debt has taken place for that situation to continue with the successor state being responsible to the predecessor state (where this continues, of course) for its share rather than to the creditor directly. And as article 36 of the Vienna Convention 1983 notes, a succession of states does not as such affect the rights and obligations of creditors.²²²

Public debts²²³ may be divided into national debts, being debts owned by the state as a whole; local debts, being debts contracted by a sub-governmental territorial unit or other form of local authority; and localised debts, being debts incurred by the central government for the purpose of local projects or areas.²²⁴

Local debts clearly pass under customary international law to the successor state, since they constitute arrangements entered into by sub-governmental territorial authorities now transferred to the jurisdiction of the successor state and a succession does not directly affect them. In effect, they continue to constitute debts borne by the specific territory in question.²²⁵ Similarly, localised debts, being closely attached to the territory to which the succession relates, also pass to the successor state in conformity with the same territorial principle.²²⁶

There appears to be no definitive answer to the question as to the allocation of the national debt as such. In the case of absorption or merger, the expanding or newly created state respectively will simply take over the

national debt of the extinguished state.²²⁷ The German unification example is instructive. Article 23 of the Unification Treaty provided that the total national budget debt of the German Democratic Republic was to be assumed by a special Federal fund administered by the Federal Minister of Finance. The Federal Government was to be liable for the obligations of the special fund which was to service the debt and might raise loans *inter alia* to redeem debts and to cover interest and borrowing costs. Until 31 December 1993, the Federal Government and the Trust Agency were each to reimburse one-half of the interest payments made by the special fund. As from 1 January 1994, the Federal Government, the Trust Agency and the *Länder* of the former GDR assumed the total debt accrued at that date by the special fund, which was dissolved. The sureties, warranties and guarantees assumed by the GDR were taken over by the Federal Republic, while the interests of the GDR in the Berlin State Bank were transferred to the *Länder* of the former GDR. The liabilities arising from the GDR's responsibility for the Berlin State Bank were assumed by the Federal Government.

In the case of secession or separation where the predecessor state continues to exist, it would appear that the presumption is that the responsibility for the general public debt of the predecessor state remains with the predecessor state after the succession.²²⁸ This would certainly appear to be the case where part of a state is transferred to another state.²²⁹ Generally, the paucity of practice leads one to be reluctant to claim that a new rule of international law has been established with regard to such situations, so that the general principle of non-division of the public debt is not displaced. However, successor states may be keen to establish their international creditworthiness by becoming involved in a debt allocation arrangement in circumstances

where in strict international law this may not be necessary.²³⁰ Further, the increasing pertinence of the notion of equitable distribution might have an impact upon this question.

A brief review of some practice may serve to illustrate the complexity of the area. When Texas seceded from Mexico in 1840, for example, it denied any liability for the latter's debts, although an *ex gratia* payment was in the circumstances made. However, no part of Colombia's debt was assumed by Panama upon its independence in 1903. The arrangements made in the peace treaties of 1919 and 1923 were complex, but it can be noted that while no division of the public debt occurred with regard to some territories emerging from the collapsed empires, in most cases there was a negotiated and invariably complicated settlement. The successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for example, assumed responsibility for such portions of the pre-war bonded debt as were determined by the Reparations Committee, while Turkey took over a share of the Ottoman public debt on a revenue proportionality basis.²³¹ When, in 1921, the Irish Free State separated from the United Kingdom, it was provided that the UK public debt would be apportioned 'as may be fair and equitable', having regard to any claims by way of set-off or counter-claim.

The agreement between India (the continuation of British India) and Pakistan (the new state) provided for the responsibility of the former with regard to all the financial obligations, including loans and guarantees, of British India. India thus remained as the sole debtor of the national debt, while Pakistan's share of this, as established upon the basis of proportionality relating to its share of the assets of British India that it received, became a debt to India.²³²

With regard to secured debts, the general view appears to be that debts secured by mortgage of assets located in the territory in question survive the transfer of that territory. The Treaties of St Germain and Trianon in 1919, for example (articles 203 and 186 respectively), provided that assets thus pledged would remain so pledged with regard to that part of the national debt that it had been agreed would pass to the particular successor state. Such debts had to be specifically secured and the securities had to be ‘railways, salt mines or other property’.²³³ However, where debts have been charged to local revenue, the presumption lies the other way.

Much will depend upon the circumstances and it may well be that where the seceding territory constituted a substantial or meaningful part of the predecessor state, considerations of equity would suggest some form of apportionment of the national debt. It was with this in mind, together with the example of the United Kingdom–Irish Free State Treaty of 1921, that led the International Law Commission to propose the draft that led to article 40 of the Vienna Convention 1983.

Article 40 provides that where part of a state separates to form another state, unless otherwise agreed, the state debt of the predecessor state passes to the successor state ‘in an equitable proportion’ taking into account in particular the property, rights and interests which pass to the successor state in relation to that debt.²³⁴ It is doubtful that this proposition constitutes a codification of customary law as such in view of the confused and disparate practice of states to date, but it does reflect a viable approach.

However, in the case of separation where the predecessor state ceases to exist, some form of apportionment of the public debt is required and the provision in article 41 for an equitable division taking into account in particular the property, rights and interests which pass to the successor states in relation to that debt, is reasonable and can be taken to reflect international practice.²³⁵ The basis for any equitable apportionment of debts would clearly depend upon the parties concerned and would have to be regulated by agreement. A variety of possibilities exists, including taxation ratio, extent of territory, population, nationality of creditors, taxable value as distinct from actual revenue contributions, value of assets and contributions of the territory in question to the central administration.²³⁶ The Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001 provides that ‘allocated debts’, that is external debts where the final beneficiary of the debt is located on the territory of a specific successor state or group of successor states, are to be accepted by the successor state on the territory of which the final beneficiary is located.²³⁷

In common with the other parts of the 1983 Convention, a specific article is devoted to the situation of the ‘newly independent state’. Article 38 provides that ‘no state debt of the predecessor state shall pass to the newly independent state’ in the absence of an agreement between the parties providing otherwise, ‘in view of the link between the state debt of the predecessor state connected with its activity in the territory to which the succession of states relates and the property, rights and interests which pass to the newly independent state’. State practice generally in the decolonisation process dating back to the independence of the United States appears to show that there would be no succession to part of the general state debt of the predecessor state, but that this would differ where the debt related specifically

to the territory in question.²³⁸ It is unlikely that this provision reflects customary law.

Private Rights

The question also arises as to how far a succession of states will affect, if at all, private rights. Principles of state sovereignty and respect for acquired or subsisting rights are relevant here and often questions of expropriation provide the context. As far as those inhabitants who become nationals of the successor state are concerned, they are fully subject to its laws and regulations, and apart from the application of international human rights rules, they have little direct recourse to international law in these circumstances. Accordingly, what does become open to discussion is the protection afforded to aliens by international provisions relating to the succession of rights and duties upon a change of sovereignty.

It is within this context that the doctrine of acquired rights²³⁹ has been formulated. This relates to rights obtained by foreign nationals and has been held by some to include virtually all types of legal interests. Its import is that such rights continue after the succession and can be enforced against the new sovereign. Some writers declare this proposition to be a fundamental principle of international law,²⁴⁰ while others describe it merely as a source of confusion.²⁴¹ There is a certain amount of disagreement as to its extent. On the one hand, it has been held to mean that the passing of sovereignty has no effect upon such rights, and on the other that it implies no more than that aliens should be, as far as possible, insulated from the changes consequent upon succession.

The principle of acquired rights was discussed in a number of cases that came before the Permanent Court of International Justice between the two world wars, dealing with the creation of an independent Poland out of the former German, Russian and Austrian Empires. Problems arose specifically with regard to rights obtained under German rule, which were challenged by the new Polish authorities. In the *German Settlers in Poland* case,²⁴² Poland had attempted to evict German settlers from its lands, arguing that since many of them had not taken transfer of title before the Armistice, they could be legitimately ejected. According to the German system, such settlers could acquire title either by means of leases, or by means of an arrangement whereby they paid parts of the purchase price at regular intervals and upon payment of the final instalment the land would become theirs. The Court held that German law would apply in the circumstances until the final transfer of the territory and that the titles to land acquired in this fashion would be protected under the terms of the 1919 Minorities Treaty. More importantly, the Court declared that even in the absence of such a treaty:

private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty . . . even those who contest the existence in international law of a general principle of state succession do not go so far as to maintain that private rights, including those acquired from the state as the owner of the property, are invalid as against a successor in sovereignty.²⁴³

The fact that there was a political purpose behind the colonisation scheme

would not affect the private rights thus secured, which could be enforced against the new sovereign. It is very doubtful that this would be accepted today. The principles emerging from such inter-war cases affirming the continuation of acquired rights have modified the views expressed in the *West Rand Gold Mining Company* case²⁴⁴ to the effect that, upon annexation, the new sovereign may choose which of the contractual rights and duties adopted by the previous sovereign it wishes to respect.

The inter-war cases mark the high-water mark of the concept of the continuation of private rights upon succession, but they should not be interpreted to mean that the new sovereign cannot alter such rights. The expropriation of alien property is possible under international law subject to certain conditions.²⁴⁵ What the doctrine does indicate is that there is a presumption of the continuation of foreign acquired rights, though the matter is best regulated by treaty. Only private rights that have become vested or acquired would be covered by the doctrine. Thus, where rights are to come into operation in the future, they will not be binding upon the new sovereign.²⁴⁶ Similarly, claims to unliquidated damages will not continue beyond the succession. Claims to unliquidated damages occur where the matter in dispute has not come before the judicial authorities and the issue of compensation has yet to be determined by a competent court or tribunal. In the *Robert E. Brown* claim,²⁴⁷ an American citizen's prospecting licence had been unjustifiably cancelled by the Boer republic of South Africa in the 1890s and Brown's claim had been dismissed in the Boer courts. In 1900, the United Kingdom annexed the republic and Brown sought (through the US government) to hold it responsible. This contention was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal, which said that Brown's claim did not represent an

acquired right since the denial of justice that had taken place by the Boer Court's wrongful rejection of his case had prevented the claim from becoming liquidated. The Tribunal also noted that liability for a wrongful act committed by a state did not pass to the new sovereign after succession.

The fact that the disappearance of the former sovereign automatically ends liability for any wrong it may have committed is recognised as a rule of international law, although where the new state adopts the illegal actions of the predecessor, it may inherit liability since it itself is in effect committing a wrong. This was brought out in the *Lighthouses* arbitration²⁴⁸ in 1956 between France and Greece, which concerned the latter's liability to respect concessions granted by Turkey to a French company regarding territory subsequently acquired by Greece. The problem of the survival of foreign nationals' rights upon succession is inevitably closely bound up with ideological differences and economic pressures.

State Succession and Nationality²⁴⁹

The issue of state succession and nationality links together not only those two distinct areas, but also the question of human rights. The terms under which a state may award nationality are solely within its control,²⁵⁰ but problems may arise in the context of a succession. In principle, the issue of nationality will depend upon the municipal regulations of the predecessor and successor states. The laws of the former will determine the extent to which the inhabitants of an area to be ceded to another authority will retain their nationality after the change in sovereignty, while the laws of the successor state will prescribe the conditions under which the new nationality will be

granted. The general rule would appear to be that nationality will change with sovereignty, although it will be incumbent upon the new sovereign to declare the pertinent rules with regard to people born in the territory or resident there, or born abroad of parents who are nationals of the former regime. Similarly, the ceding state may well provide for its former citizens in the territory in question to retain their nationality, thus creating a situation of dual nationality. This would not arise, of course, where the former state completely disappears.

Some states acquiring territory may provide for the inhabitants to obtain the new nationality automatically while others may give the inhabitants an option to depart and retain their original nationality. Actual practice is varied and much depends on the circumstances, but it should be noted that the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provides that states involved in the cession of territory should ensure that no person becomes stateless as a result of the particular change in sovereignty. There may indeed be a principle in international law to the effect that the successor state should provide for the possibility of nationals of the predecessor state living in or having a substantial connection with the territory taken over by the successor state.²⁵¹ It may indeed be, on the other hand, that such nationals have the right to choose their nationality in such situations, although this is unclear. The Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia referred in this context to the principle of self-determination as proclaimed in article 1 of the two International Covenants on Human Rights 1966. The Commission stated that, ‘by virtue of that right every individual may choose to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or language community he wishes’. Further, it was noted that:

In the Commission's view one possible consequence of this principle might be for the members of the Serbian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to be recognised under agreements between the Republics as having the nationality of their choice, with all the rights and obligations which that entails with respect to the states concerned.²⁵²

In 1997, the European Convention on Nationality was adopted.²⁵³ Article 19 provides that states parties should seek to resolve issues concerning nationality and state succession by agreement between themselves. Article 18 stipulates that in deciding on the granting or the retention of nationality in cases of state succession, each state party concerned shall take account, in particular, of the genuine and effective link of the person concerned with the state; the habitual residence of the person concerned at the time of state succession; the will of the person concerned; and the territorial origin of the person concerned. In the case of non-nationals, article 20 provides for respect for the principle that nationals of a predecessor state habitually resident in the territory over which sovereignty is transferred to a successor state and who have not acquired its nationality shall have the right to remain in that state.

In 1999, the International Law Commission adopted Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to a Succession of States.²⁵⁴ Article 1 (defined as the 'very foundation' of the draft articles²⁵⁵), reaffirming the right to a nationality, provides that individuals who on the date of succession had the nationality of the predecessor state, irrespective of

the mode of acquisition of that nationality, have the right to the nationality of at least one of the states concerned. States are to take all appropriate measures to prevent persons who had the nationality of the predecessor state on the date of succession from becoming stateless as a result of the succession,²⁵⁶ while persons having their habitual residence in the territory concerned are presumed to acquire the nationality of the successor state.²⁵⁷ The intention of the latter provision is to avoid a gap arising between the date of succession and the date of any agreement or legislation granting nationality.²⁵⁸ Article 11 stipulates that each state concerned shall grant a right to opt for its nationality to persons concerned who have appropriate connection with that state if those persons would otherwise become stateless as a result of the succession of states, and that when this right has been exercised, the state whose nationality they have opted for shall attribute its nationality to such persons. Conversely, the state whose nationality they have renounced shall withdraw its nationality from such persons, unless they would thereby become stateless. Article 12 provides that where the acquisition or loss of nationality in relation to the succession of states would impair the unity of a family, the states concerned shall take all appropriate measures to allow that family to remain together or to be reunited.²⁵⁹

The second part of the set of draft articles concerns specific succession situations and their implications for nationality. Article 20 concerns the situation where one state transfers part of its territory to another state. Here the successor state shall attribute its nationality to the persons concerned who have their habitual residence in the transferred territory and the predecessor state shall withdraw its nationality from such persons, unless otherwise indicated by the exercise of the right of option which such persons shall be

granted. The predecessor state shall not, however, withdraw its nationality before such persons acquire the nationality of the successor state. Where two or more states unite to form one successor state, the successor state shall attribute its nationality to all persons who on the date of succession held the nationality of a predecessor state.²⁶⁰

In the case both of the dissolution of the predecessor state to form two or more successor states and the separation of parts of a territory to form one or more successor states while the predecessor state continues to exist, the same fundamental rules apply. Articles 22 and 24 respectively provide that each successor state shall, unless otherwise indicated by the exercise of a right of option,²⁶¹ attribute its nationality to: (a) persons concerned having their habitual residence in its territory; and (b) other persons concerned having an appropriate legal connection with a constituent unit of the predecessor state that has become part of that successor state; and (c) persons not otherwise entitled to a nationality of any state concerned having their habitual residence in a third state, who were born in or, before leaving the predecessor state, had their last habitual residence in what has become the territory of that successor state or having any other appropriate connection with that successor state.²⁶²

These provisions are meant to prevent a situation, such as occurred with regard to some successor states of the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, where the test of nationality of the successor state centred upon the possession of the citizenship of the former constituent republics rather than upon habitual residence, thus having the effect of depriving certain persons of the nationality of the successor state.²⁶³

State Succession and Responsibility²⁶⁴

This topic is one of considerable uncertainty in practice.²⁶⁵ The general principle has often been stated that a successor state is not liable for the unlawful acts of the predecessor state.²⁶⁶ However, this is to state the matter too baldly. In the *Lighthouses* arbitration,²⁶⁷ the Tribunal held that it was possible for the successor state (Greece) to adopt the wrongful act of its predecessors (Turkey and Crete) and thus be responsible. It was also noted that there was no absolute rule of non-liability, but that much would depend on the circumstances, including the method of succession. One leading writer has concluded that there was no universal criterion for distinguishing claims which may be made against the successor state from those which may not.²⁶⁸ Further, it is unclear whether customary international law in applying a rule of presumed non-succession or indeed a fact-dependent approach to international delicts also addresses the question of succession to domestic torts.²⁶⁹ The Institut de Droit International in its 2015 resolution has suggested that in cases of succession in which there is no single successor state, all the successor states will enjoy the rights or assume the obligations arising from the commission of an internationally wrongful act in an equitable manner, unless otherwise agreed by the states or subjects of international law concerned.²⁷⁰ Where the predecessor state continues, in principle that state should still be responsible for its unlawful acts, unless there is a clear, direct and intrinsic link between the consequences of the act and the territory and population of the part of the state which either separates and becomes independent or merges with a third state, or, indeed, where the successor state accepts responsibility for the unlawful act of the predecessor state.²⁷¹ Where there is a dissolution of the predecessor state and two or more successor states are created, the Institut de Droit International resolution of 2015 proposes a general rule of succession with regard to the rights or

obligations arising from an internationally wrongful act in relation to which the predecessor state has been the author or the injured state.²⁷² However, it must be acknowledged that the matter will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case and it may be premature to assert that a presumption one way or another has now become established as a proposition of international law.

Coda: Hong Kong²⁷³

Of particular interest in the context of state succession and the decolonisation process has been the situation with regard to Hong Kong. While Hong Kong island and the southern tip of the Kowloon peninsula (with Stonecutters Island) were ceded to Britain in perpetuity,²⁷⁴ the New Territories (comprising some 92 per cent of the total land area of the territory) were leased to Britain for ninety-nine years commencing 1 July 1898.²⁷⁵ Accordingly, the British and Chinese governments opened negotiations and in 1984 reached an agreement. This Agreement took the form of a Joint Declaration and Three Annexes²⁷⁶ and lays down the system under which Hong Kong has been governed as from 1 July 1997. A Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) was established, which enjoys a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs. It is vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws of Hong Kong remain basically unaffected. The government of the SAR is composed of local inhabitants and the current social and economic systems continue unchanged. The SAR retains the status of a free port and a separate customs territory and remains an international financial centre with a freely convertible currency. Using the name of 'Hong

Kong, China', the SAR may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and relevant international organisations. Existing systems of shipping management continue and shipping certificates relating to the shipping register are issued under the name of 'Hong Kong, China'.

These policies are enshrined in a Basic Law of the SAR to remain unchanged for fifty years. Annex I of the Agreement also provides that public servants in Hong Kong, including members of the police and judiciary, will remain in employment and upon retirement will receive their pension and other benefits due to them on terms no less favourable than before and irrespective of their nationality or place of residence. Airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in Hong Kong continue to operate and the system of civil aviation management continues. The SAR has extensive authority to conclude agreements in this field. Rights and freedoms in Hong Kong are maintained, including freedoms of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of belief, of movement, to strike and to form and join trade unions. In an important provision, article XIII of Annex I stipulates that the provisions of the International Covenants on Human Rights 1966 are to continue in force. Accordingly, a high level of succession has been provided for.

However, the Hong Kong situation is unusual and currently volatile. On 30 June 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China adopted a National Security Law for Hong Kong greatly increasing Beijing's control over the territory. This law establishes 'crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces'

and its application extends to non-permanent residents and people ‘from outside [Hong Kong] . . . who are not permanent residents of Hong Kong’.²⁷⁷ The United Kingdom has asserted that this law constitutes a ‘clear and serious breach of the Joint Declaration’.²⁷⁸

Suggestions for Further Reading

M. Craven, *The Decolonisation of International Law: State Succession and the Law of Treaties*, Oxford, 2007

D. P. O’Connell, *State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law*, Cambridge, 2 vols., 1967

M. N. Shaw, ‘State Succession Revisited’, 5 *Finnish YIL*, 1994, p. 34

Succession of States (ed. M. Mrak), The Hague, 1999

¹ See generally D. P. O’Connell, *State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law*, Cambridge, 2 vols., 1967; D. P. O’Connell, ‘Recent Problems of State Succession in Relation to New States’, 130 *HR*, 1970, p. 95; K. Zemanek, ‘State Succession after Decolonisation’, 116 *HR*, 1965, p. 180; O. Udokang, *Succession of New States to International Treaties*, New York, 1972; J. H. W. Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, Leiden, 1974, vol. VII; I. Brownlie’s *Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, chapter 19; UN, *Materials on Succession of States*, New York, 1967 and supplement A/CN.4/263, 1972, and UN, *Materials on Succession of States in Matters Other than Treaties*, New York, 1978; International Law Association, *The Effect of Independence on Treaties*, London, 1965; Z. Mériboute, *La Codification de la Succession d’États aux Traités*, Paris, 1984; S. Torres Bernardez, ‘Succession of States’, in *International Law: Achievements and Prospects* (ed. M. Bedjaoui), Paris, 1991, p. 381; D. Bardonnet, *La Succession d’États à Madagascar*, Paris, 1970; R. Müllerson, ‘The Continuity and Succession of States by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia’, 42 *ICLQ*, 1993, p. 473; M. Koskenniemi and M. Lehto, ‘La Succession d’États dans l’ex-URSS’, *AFDI*, 1992, p. 179; M. Bedjaoui, ‘Problèmes Récents de Succession d’États dans les États Nouveaux’, 130 *HR*, 1970, p. 455; *Oppenheim’s International Law* (ed. R. Y. Jennings and A. D. Watts), 9th ed., London,

1992, p. 208; J. Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006; P. Radan, *The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law*, London, 2002; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 600; M. N. Shaw, 'State Succession Revisited', 5 *Finnish YIL*, 1994, p. 34; *Succession of States* (ed. M. Mrak), The Hague, 1999; B. Stern, 'La Succession d'États', 262 *HR*, 1996, p. 9; *State Succession: Codification Tested against Facts* (ed. P. M. Eisemann and M. Koskenniemi), Dordrecht, 2000; and *State Practice Regarding State Succession and Issues of Recognition* (ed. J. Klabbers *et al.*), The Hague, 1999.

² See O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, pp. 9 ff.

³ See above, [Chapters 8](#) and [13](#).

⁴ See O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. II, pp. 178–82. This treaty provided for the responsibility of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for the latter's public debts. See also the Treaty of Peace with Italy 1947.

⁵ See e.g. the UK–Burma Agreement of 1947. See also N. Mugerwa, 'Subjects of International Law', in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, pp. 247, 300–1; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. II, p. 186. See also O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. II, pp. 352–73.

⁶ See e.g. the Tanganyika statement of December 1961, quoted in Mugerwa, 'Subjects', p. 302, subsequently followed by similar declarations by e.g. Uganda, Kenya and Burundi. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. II, p. 192. In Zambia's case, it was stated that the question would be governed by customary international law: see O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. II, p. 115.

⁷ See Shaw, 'State Succession Revisited'.

⁸ Opinion No. 13, 96 ILR, pp. 726, 728. See also *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 236; and *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, Washington, DC, 1987, p. 100.

⁹ Case No. 2 BGz 38/91; 94 ILR, pp. 68, 77–8.

¹⁰ See article 2 of the Vienna Conventions of both 1978 and 1983; and Opinion No. 1 of the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission, 92 ILR, pp. 162, 165. See also *Guinea-Bissau v.*

Senegal 83 ILR, pp. 1, 22; and *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 598; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 514. Note also *Bashir v. Home Secretary* [2018] UKSC 45, paras. 69 ff.

¹¹ See article 2(1)(e) of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978; and article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts 1983. See also Opinion No. 11 of the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission, 96 ILR, p. 719.

¹² See Opinion No. 11, 96 ILR, p. 719. However, see also the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues of June 2001, 41 ILM, 2002, p. 3. See further below, p. 860.

¹³ See e.g. M. Craven, 'The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law', 9 *EJIL*, 1998, p. 142.

¹⁴ See e.g. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 101–3.

¹⁵ See e.g. O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. II, pp. 378–9. See also *Artukovic v. Rison* 784 F.2d 1354 (1986).

¹⁶ O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. II, pp. 155–7.

¹⁷ See above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 181.

¹⁸ See e.g. R. Müllerson, *International Law, Rights and Politics*, London, 1994, pp. 140–5; and Y. Blum, 'Russia Takes over the Soviet Union's Seat at the United Nations', 3 *EJIL*, 1992, p. 354.

¹⁹ See 31 ILM, 1992, p. 138.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

²¹ For example, the Minsk Agreement signed by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine stated that the Soviet Union 'as a subject of international law no longer existed', while the Alma Ata Declaration, signed by all of the former Soviet Republics except for Georgia (which acceded in 1993) and the Baltic states, stated that 'with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist': *ibid.*, pp. 147–9.

²² See e.g. the views expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, pp. 639, 652–5; and the comments by an official of the FCO submitted to the Outer House of the Court of Session in Scotland in *Coreck Maritime GmbH v. Sevrybokholodflot*, UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 636. As to French practice recognising Russia as the continuation of the Soviet Union, see AFDI, 1993, p. 1038. See also L. Henkin, R. C. Pugh, O. Schachter and H. Smit, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 3rd ed., St Paul, 1993, p. 539. Note that there is a distinction between the issue of continuity or succession to membership of international organisations and continuity or succession generally. However, the nature and importance of the UN is such that the question of membership of that organisation is strong evidence of continuity generally.

²³ For example, the US: see *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 193. As to French practice, see AFDI, 1993, p. 1038; and *Gerbaud v. Meden* 18 ILR, p. 288.

²⁴ See e.g. the UK: see *A/S Tallinna Laevauhisus v. Tallinna Shipping Co. (The Vapper)* (1946) 79 LL. R 245; and the statement of the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 16 January 1991, 183 HC Deb., col. 853.

²⁵ See Müllerson, *International Law*, pp. 119–20.

²⁶ See UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, p. 558.

²⁷ See Müllerson, *International Law*, p. 121.

²⁸ See Shaw, 'State Succession Revisited', pp. 56 ff.

²⁹ See generally M. Weller, 'The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', 86 *AJIL*, 1992, p. 569; Y. Blum, 'UN Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?', 86 *AJIL*, 1992, p. 830; and Müllerson, *International Law*, pp. 125 ff.

³⁰ Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991 (postponed for three months) and Macedonia on 17 September 1991. Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a resolution on sovereignty on 14 October 1991. The view taken at this point by Opinion No. 1 issued by the Arbitration Commission, established by the Conference on Yugoslavia convened by the European Community on 17 August 1991, was that 'the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

was in process of dissolution', 92 ILR, p. 166. See also M. Craven, 'The EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia', 66 *BYIL*, 1995, p. 333.

³¹ Which consisted of five of the Presidents of Constitutional Courts in EC countries, chaired by M. Badinter.

³² 92 ILR, p. 199.

³³ On 22 May 1992: see General Assembly resolutions 46/236, 46/237 and 46/238. Note that the 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' was admitted to the UN on 8 April 1993: see Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

³⁴ 92 ILR, p. 202. See also Opinion No. 9, *ibid.*, p. 203.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

³⁶ See e.g. E/CN.4/1995/121 and E/CN.4/1995/122.

³⁷ Note e.g. that both the International Monetary Fund (on 15 December 1992) and the World Bank (on 25 February 1993) found that the former Yugoslavia had ceased to exist: see P. R. Williams, 'State Succession and the International Financial Institutions', 43 *ICLQ*, 1994, pp. 776, 802–3.

³⁸ See also Security Council resolution 757 (1992) and General Assembly resolution 47/1. See also the letter dated 29 September 1992 from the UN Legal Counsel carefully analysing the legal situation in terms of representation, A/47/485, Annex; and *Application of the Genocide Convention*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 3, 13–14; 95 ILR, pp. 1, 28–9.

³⁹ It was so admitted on 1 November 2000: see General Assembly resolution 55/12. On 4 February 2003, the name of the country was officially changed from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro and thence to Serbia upon the secession of Montenegro on 28 June 2006: see General Assembly resolution 60/264. See also Crawford, *Creation of States*, pp. 707 ff.

⁴⁰ See *Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996*, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 7, 31.

⁴¹ *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1335 ff.

⁴² See the critical comments on this ‘change of position’ by the Court by seven judges in their joint declaration, *ibid.*, pp. 1353, 1355–7.

⁴³ Merits, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 86 ff. See also *Croatia v. Serbia* (Preliminary Objection), ICJ Reports, 2008, p. 412; and *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Article 1 of the Agreement declared that ‘there shall be established between the State of the Yemen Arab Republic and the State of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen . . . a full and complete union, based on a merger, in which the international personality of each of them shall be integrated in a single international person called “the Republic of Yemen”’: see 30 ILM, 1991, p. 820.

⁴⁵ See e.g. the *Fourth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1989–90*, June 1990. Note that part of the Soviet zone was placed under Soviet administration (the city of Königsberg, now Kaliningrad and the surrounding area) and the territory of Germany east of the Oder–Neisse line was placed under Polish administration.

⁴⁶ Article 2 of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany of 14 November 1944, as amended by the Agreement of 1 May 1945.

⁴⁷ See, in particular, I. Hendry and M. Wood, *The Legal Status of Berlin*, Cambridge, 1987. See also Cmd 8571, 1952 and the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Cmnd 5135, 1971.

⁴⁸ Article 2, Convention on Relations. Parallel developments took place in the Soviet zone. Note the USSR–German Democratic Republic Treaty of 1955.

⁴⁹ See the Fourth Report, p. 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵¹ See e.g. M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1963, vol. I, pp. 332–8; and F. A. Mann, ‘Germany’s Present Legal Status Revisited’, 16 *ICLQ*, 1967, p. 760. See also the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of

Germany in *Re Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic*, 1972, 78 ILR, p. 149.

⁵² See 29 ILM, 1990, p. 1108.

⁵³ See 29 ILM, 1990, p. 1186.

⁵⁴ Note that by the Declaration of 1 October 1990, the Allied Powers suspended all rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole upon the unification of Germany, pending the entry into force of the Treaty on the Final Settlement: see Annex 2 of the Observations by the Government to the Fourth Report, October 1990, Cm 1246.

⁵⁵ This provided that the Basic Law was to apply in Greater Berlin and specified *Länder* (forming the Federal Republic of Germany), while ‘in other parts of Germany it shall be put into force on their accession’. This method had been used to achieve the accession of the Saarland in 1956.

⁵⁶ I.e. the constituent provinces of the GDR.

⁵⁷ Note also that under article 11, treaties entered into by the FRG would continue and extend to the *Länder* of the former GDR, while under article 12, the question of the continuation, amendment or expiry of treaties entered into by the former GDR was to be discussed individually with contracting parties: see below, p. 848.

⁵⁸ Such as the European Community. See e.g. GATT document L/6759 of 31 October 1990 in which the Commission of the European Community stated that Germany had become united by way of the accession of the GDR to the FRG. See generally T. Oeter, ‘German Unification and State Succession’, 51 *ZaöRV*, 1991, p. 349; J. Frowein, ‘Germany Reunited’, *ibid.*, p. 333; and R. W. Piotrowicz and S. K. N. Blay, *The Unification of Germany in International and Domestic Law*, Amsterdam, 1997. See also UK Foreign Office affidavit, UKMIL, 68 *BYIL*, 1997, p. 520.

⁵⁹ See also *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 210.

⁶⁰ Note particularly the work of the International Law Commission on this topic: see *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1974, vol. II, part 1, pp. 157 ff., and the five Reports of Sir Humphrey Waldock (*ibid.*, 1968, vol. II, p. 88; 1969, vol. II, p. 45;

1970, vol. **II**, p. 25; 1971, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 143; and 1972, vol. **II**, p. 1) and the Report of Sir Francis Vallat (*ibid.*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 1). See also the International Law Association, *The Effect of Independence on Treaties*, London, 1965; A. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law and Practice*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2013, chapter 21; and M. Craven, *The Decolonisation of International Law: State Succession and the Law of Treaties*, Oxford, 2007.

⁶¹ See above, [Chapter 15](#).

⁶² See article 7.

⁶³ *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1968, vol. **II**, pp. 92–3.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁶⁵ See e.g. the *Colombia–Venezuela* Arbitral Award, 1 RIAA, pp. 223, 228; and the *Beagle Channel* Award, 52 ILR, p. 93. See also A. O. Cukwurah, *The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law*, Manchester, 1967, p. 114; O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 273 ff.; and P. De La Pradelle, *La Frontière*, Paris, 1928, pp. 86–7.

⁶⁶ See the view of the US Secretary of State in 1856 that the US regarded it ‘as an established principle of the public law and of international right that when a European colony in America becomes independent it succeeds to the territorial limits of the colony as it stood in the hands of the present country’: Manning’s *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. **III** (Great Britain), doc. 2767, cited in Cukwurah, *Settlement*, p. 106.

⁶⁷ See e.g. M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 185–7; and other works cited in [Chapter 9](#), p. 448.

⁶⁸ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 565; 80 ILR, pp. 440, 469–70. See also the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, which noted in Opinion No. 3 with regard to the status of the former internal boundaries between Serbia on the one hand and Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other, that ‘except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and in particular, from the principle of *uti possidetis*. *Uti possidetis* . . . is today recognised as a general principle’: 92 ILR, pp. 170, 171.

⁶⁹ See also article 5 of the Minsk Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States of 8 December 1991 and the Alma Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991, which reaffirmed the territorial integrity of the former republics of the USSR. Note also that under the Treaty on the General Delimitation of the Common State Frontiers of 29 October 1992, the boundary between the two new states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, emerging out of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993, was to be that of the administrative border existing between the Czech and Slovak parts of the former state. See further above, Chapter 9, p. 450.

⁷⁰ See above, Chapter 15, p. 828.

⁷¹ ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 37; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 36.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ 114 ILR, pp. 1, 48.

⁷⁴ See O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 231 ff. See also Udokang, *Succession*, pp. 327 ff.

⁷⁵ See Shaw, *Title to Territory*, pp. 244–8. See also *Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 46, 1932, p. 145; 6 AD, pp. 362, 364; and *Aaland Islands*, LNOJ, Sp. Supp. No. 3, 1920, p. 18. See above, Chapter 9, p. 460; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, pp. 157, 196 ff. Note that, by article 12(3), the provisions of article 12 do not apply to treaties providing for the establishment of foreign military bases on the territory concerned. See further O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 12–23, 231 ff.

⁷⁶ See e.g. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **I**, pp. 206–7.

⁷⁷ See e.g. *UN Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties*, 1977, Comments of Governments (A/Conf.80/5), pp. 145, 153, 161, 167, 170, 171, 173.

⁷⁸ ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 72; 116 ILR, p. 1.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 71–2. See also J. Klabbbers, ‘Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: The World Court, State Succession and the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros* case’, **11** *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 1998, p. 345.

⁸⁰ See e.g. O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 2, 80, 136; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 211.

⁸¹ O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, p. 212.

⁸² Udokang, *Succession*, p. 225.

⁸³ O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, p. 213.

⁸⁴ Udokang, *Succession*, p. 225.

⁸⁵ But see Jenks’ view that multilateral law-making treaties devolve upon successor states, ‘State Succession in Respect of Law-making Treaties’, **29** *BYIL*, 1952, pp. 105, 108–10.

⁸⁶ See e.g. Udokang, *Succession*, pp. 412–15.

⁸⁷ See e.g. K. Keith, ‘Succession to Bilateral Treaties by Seceding States’, **61** *AJIL*, 1967, pp. 521, 544–6.

⁸⁸ See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 169, 265. Note that a different approach is taken with regard to ‘newly independent states’: see below, p. 851.

⁸⁹ See e.g. with regard to US and UK practice concerning the USSR and Yugoslavia, below, **notes 109** and **117**. See also P. Dumberry, ‘An Uncharted Question of State Succession: Are New States Automatically Bound by the BITs Concluded by Predecessor States Before Independence?’, **6** *Journal of International Dispute Settlement*, 2015, p. 74. See also C. J. Tams, ‘State Succession to Investment Treaties: Mapping the Issues’, **31** *ICSID Review*, 2016, p. 314.

⁹⁰ See here e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 211; Oeter, ‘German Unification’, p. 363; and Koskenniemi and Lehto, ‘La Succession’, p. 203.

⁹¹ *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 211.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 212–13.

⁹³ Unless it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in respect of the entire territory of the successor state would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation (article 31(3)).

⁹⁴ Article 17(3).

⁹⁵ See the examples of the union of Egypt and Syria to form the United Arab Republic between 1958 and 1961 and the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964, where the treaties of the component territories continued in force within those territorial limits: see O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. II, pp. 71–8. The article 31 situation has to be distinguished from the situation involving a 'newly independent state' (see article 29 and below, p. 851), and from the article 15 situation, where part of the territory of one state is transferred to another state (below, p. 848).

⁹⁶ But see above, pp. 844 ff., with regard to boundary treaties and below, p. 855, regarding human rights treaties.

⁹⁷ However, as noted, Annex I to the Treaty provided that certain listed treaties are not to apply to the territory of the former GDR. These treaties relate in essence to NATO activities.

⁹⁸ It should also be noted that the *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, p. 108, provides that 'when a state is absorbed by another state, the international agreements of the absorbed state are terminated and the international agreements of the absorbing state become applicable to the territory of the absorbed state'.

⁹⁹ See O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. II, pp. 71 ff.; and D. Cottrán, 'Some Legal Aspects of the Formation of the United Arab Republic and the United Arab States', 8 *ICLQ*, 1959, p. 346.

¹⁰⁰ See O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. II, pp. 77 ff.

101 See also *Ltd Partnership Z v. High Court (Obergericht) of the Canton of Thurgau*, Federal Supreme Court, Insolvency Chamber, Judgment of 15 June 2005, partly published as BGE 131 III 448.

102 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, Part One, p. 208.

103 See e.g. O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 374–8.

104 *Ibid.*, p. 379.

105 The exception to the ‘moving treaty-frontiers’ rule reflects the concept that ‘political treaties’ would not pass, *ibid.*, p. 25. See further above, p. 841, with regard to the reunification of Germany in 1990. See also article IX of Annex 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Agreement 1984 on Hong Kong, below, p. 877.

106 See e.g. O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 374 ff.

107 *Ibid.*, chapter 10.

108 Save, of course, with regard to those that relate solely to the seceding territory.

109 See O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 88 ff.; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 222. See also the *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, p. 108, which provides: ‘When part of a state becomes a new state, the new state does not succeed to the international agreements to which the predecessor state was party, unless, expressly or by implication, it accepts such agreements and the other party or parties thereto agree or acquiesce.’ However, see US views to the contrary in 1992, in E. Williamson, ‘A U.S. Perspective on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia’, *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1992, pp. 10–15; and see also *DUSPIL*, 2003, pp. 245 ff. In practice, the US concluded exchanges of notes with the successor states of the former USSR confirming that treaties listed in annexes would continue in force, taking as a point of departure article 34: Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, p. 328. The UK informed all the former Soviet republics that it regarded bilateral treaties between the UK and the USSR as remaining in force and then concluded exchanges of notes with the new states listing bilateral treaties regarded as

continuing in force without prejudice to whether other bilateral treaties also remained in force, *ibid.*

110 *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 263. See also O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 96–100; and *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 222. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 265–6.

111 See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, pp. 260 ff.

112 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 169. See also UKMIL, 69 *BYIL*, 1998, p. 482.

113 See 92 ILR, pp. 173–4.

114 See Müllerson, ‘Continuity’. See also T. Love, ‘International Agreement Obligations after the Soviet Union’s Break-up: Current United States Practice and its Consistency with International Law’, 26 *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 1993, pp. 373, 396. See also above, **note 109**.

115 Müllerson, ‘Continuity’, pp. 398–401.

116 See ‘US–CIS Protocol to START Treaty’, 86 *AJIL*, 1992, p. 799. See also the Agreement on Joint Measures with Respect to Nuclear Weapons, 31 *ILM*, 1992, p. 152; and Müllerson, *International Law*, pp. 150–2.

117 Alma Ata Declaration, 21 December 1991, 21 *ILM*, 1992, pp. 148, 149. The US and Ukraine agreed by an exchange of notes on 10 May 1995 that in so far as bilateral treaties between them were concerned, article 34 of the Convention would be taken as ‘a point of departure’. A treaty-by-treaty review by the two states was conducted, as a result of which it was decided that some treaties had become obsolete, others would not be applied and others, specifically listed in the Annex to the note, were to be regarded as still in force: see 89 *AJIL*, 1995, p. 761; see also above, **note 109**. The note specifically excluded matters concerning succession to US–USSR bilateral arms limitation and related agreements, with regard to which special mechanisms had been established.

118 See above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 208.

119 See also the Vienna Convention on Succession to State Property, Archives and Debt 1983, article 2(1)(e).

120 See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 211. See also, as to the theoretical basis of the ‘clean slate’ principle, the Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 644; 115 ILR, p. 10.

121 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 211.

122 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

123 *Ibid.*, pp. 237–9.

124 The above rules also apply to newly independent states (as defined in the Convention) formed from two or more territories: see article 30 (referring to articles 16–29). Where a treaty affects one or more but not all of the territories in question, there is a presumption that on succession it will apply to the newly independent state: *ibid.* See also *Re Bottali* 78 ILR, p. 105; and *M v. Federal Department of Justice and Police* 75 ILR, p. 107.

125 See *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 229.

126 Article 17(3). See also article 27(2).

127 See e.g. O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 352 ff.; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 182–7. See also article 8 of the Vienna Convention.

128 See, for a survey of practice, *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 187–93.

129 See article 9 of the Vienna Convention.

130 See e.g. O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 219–20.

131 See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1974, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 260–3; and O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 164 ff.

132 This state consisted of two distinct units, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, each with their own parliament. The Constitutional Law on the Dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Republic of 25 November 1992 provided for the dissolution of that state and for the establishment of the successor states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, the two republics issued a joint declaration informing the international community that the two successor states would succeed to all international treaties to which the predecessor state had been a party and that where necessary negotiations would take place, particularly where the impact upon the two republics differed: see J. Malenovsky, ‘Problèmes Juridiques Liés à la Partition de la Tchécoslovaquie’, *AFDI*, 1993, p. 305.

133 The case of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 was a special case, since it could be regarded as a dissolution of the union of Austria and Hungary (where the latter, unlike the former, asserted continuity) coupled with the secession of territories that either joined other states, such as Romania, or were merged into new states, such as Poland or Czechoslovakia.

134 See the letters sent by the UK Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 1 January 1993, UKMIL, 65 *BYIL*, 1994, pp. 586 ff.

135 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 611–12; 115 ILR, p. 1. See also M. Craven, ‘The *Genocide* Case, the Law of Treaties and State Succession’, 68 *BYIL*, 1997, p. 127.

136 ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 71; 116 ILR, p. 1. As to article 12, see above, p. 845.

137 See R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, p. 95.

138 ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 15, 23; 18 ILR, p. 364.

139 ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 4, 32; 46 ILR, pp. 178, 206.

140 See e.g. *Austria v. Italy*, 4 *European Yearbook of Human Rights*, 1960, pp. 116, 140; *Ireland v. UK*, ECtHR, Series A, No. 25, 1978, pp. 90–1; and *Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights* 67 ILR, pp. 559, 568. See also above, [Chapter 15](#), p. 797.

141 Note that the editors of *Oppenheim's International Law* take the view that in cases of the separation resulting in the creation of a new state, the latter 'is bound by – or at least entitled to accede to – general treaties of a "law-making" nature, especially those of a humanitarian character, previously binding on it as part of the state from which it has separated', p. 222. See also *Čelebići Camp*, Case No. IT-96-21-A, ICTY, Appeal Chamber, Judgment of 20 February 2001, paras. 96, 97, 111, 113; and *Bijelic v. Montenegro and Serbia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 28 April 2009, paras. 53–6, 58, 69. Note also the discussion in *Bashir v. Home Secretary* [2018] UKSC 45.

142 See above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 277, **note** 216.

143 CCPR/C/SR.1178/Add. 1, pp. 2–3.

144 See Müllerson, *International Law*, p. 157. In the ensuing discussion in the Committee, Müllerson (at the time a member) noted that human rights treaties besides being interstate instruments also conferred rights upon individuals 'who could not be deprived of those rights in the event of state succession', while Serrano Caldera emphasised that 'state succession should be viewed as a matter of the acquired rights of the population of the state that had ratified the Covenant, which were not diluted when a state was divided': CCPR/C/SR.1178/Add. 1, pp. 2, 4, 9.

145 These reports were supplemented by Special Reports from each of the three states in April 1993: see that of Croatia, CCPR/C/87; that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), CCPR/C/88; and that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CCPR/C/89.

146 See CCPR/C/79/Add. 14–16, 28 December 1992. Note that at its 49th session, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 1993/23 of 5 March 1993 in which it encouraged successor states to confirm to appropriate depositaries that they continued to be bound by obligations under relevant international human rights treaties. See also the Report of the UN Secretary-General, E/CN.4/1994/68. On 25 May 1994, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination sent a communication to those successor states of the USSR that had not yet declared their adherence or succession to the Convention, inviting them to confirm the applicability of compliance with the Convention's provisions: see E/CN.4/1995/80, p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ A/53/40, annex VII. Cf. Aust, *Modern Treaty Law*, pp. 371–2. See also M. Kamminga, ‘State Succession in respect of Human Rights Treaties’, **6** *EJIL*, 1995, p. 469; and A. Rasulov, ‘Revisiting State Succession to Humanitarian Treaties: Is There a Case for Automaticity?’, **14** *EJIL*, 2003, p. 141.

¹⁴⁸ See also Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/18 adopted on 24 February 1995. Note that the fifth meeting of persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies in September 1994 took the view that successor states were automatically bound by obligations under international human rights instruments from the respective date of independence and that observance of the obligations should not depend on a declaration of confirmation made by the government of the successor state, E/CN.4/1995/80, pp. 3–4.

¹⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 612.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 636.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 645 ff.

¹⁵² See *Bijelic v. Montenegro and Serbia*, ECtHR, Judgment of 28 April 2009, paras. 53–6, 58, 69. The Court concluded by finding that the European Convention on Human Rights should be deemed to have been continuously in force for Montenegro: *ibid.*

¹⁵³ See O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **II**, pp. 183 ff.; and H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, 5th ed., The Hague, 2011, chapter 2.

¹⁵⁴ This issue, of a separation of part of an existing state to form a new state, was considered by the UN to be on a par with the separation from the UK of the Irish Free State and from the Netherlands of Belgium, where the remaining portions continued as existing states: see O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, pp. 184–7.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 197–8. This situation, which differed from the India–Pakistan precedent of 1947, has been criticised: see e.g. C. Rousseau, ‘Sécession de la Syrie et de la RUA’, **66** *RGDIP*, 1962, p. 413. See also E. Cotran, ‘Some Legal Aspects of the Formation of the United Arab Republic and the United Arab States’, **8** *ICLQ*, 1959, p. 346.

¹⁵⁶ See Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 73, 77. See above, pp. 838 ff, with regard to the position of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and membership of the UN.

¹⁵⁷ A/CN.4/149, p. 8, quoted in O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, p. 187.

¹⁵⁸ See generally O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, pp. 199 ff.; E. H. Feilchenfeld, *Public Debts and State Succession*, New York, 1931; UN, Materials on Succession of States in Matters Other than Treaties; International Law Association Reports on Aspects of the Law of State Succession 2004 (preliminary) and 2006 (final); A. Stanič, 'Financial Aspects of State Succession: The Case of Yugoslavia', *12 EJIL*, 2001, p. 751; C. Rousseau, *Droit International Public*, Paris, 1977, vol. III, p. 374; M. Streinz, 'Succession of States in Assets and Liabilities – a New Regime?', *26 German YIL*, 1983, p. 198; P. Monnier, 'La Convention de Vienne sur la Succession d'États en Matière de Biens, Archives et Dettes d'État', *AFDI*, 1984, p. 221; V. D. Degan, 'State Succession Especially in Respect of State Property and Debts', *4 Finnish YIL*, 1993, p. 130; Mrak, *Succession of States*; and E. Nathan, 'The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts', in *International Law at a Time of Perplexity* (ed. Y. Dinstein), Dordrecht, 1989, p. 489. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. II, part 2.

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. articles 14, 17, 18, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40 and 41.

¹⁶⁰ 92 ILR, p. 205.

¹⁶¹ 96 ILR, p. 731.

¹⁶² Note that private rights are unaffected as such by a succession: see e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 216; and below, p. 870.

¹⁶³ See e.g. the UN Tribunal for Libya, 22 ILR, p. 103. See also International Law Association, *Final Report*, p. 1.

¹⁶⁴ See e.g. the treaties concerned with the establishment of Cyprus in 1960, 382 UNTS, pp. 3 ff.; and the Treaty of Peace with Italy 1947, 49 UNTS, Annex XIV, p. 225.

¹⁶⁵ For an example, see the dispute concerning property belonging to the Order of St Mauritz and St Lazarus, AFDI, 1965, p. 323. See also Stern, ‘Succession’, p. 329.

¹⁶⁶ See *Chorzów Factory*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, p. 30; and *German Settlers in Poland*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 6, 1923, p. 6; but cf. *Peter Pázmány University*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 61, 1933, p. 236.

¹⁶⁷ See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1970, vol. II, pp. 136–43 and *ibid.*, 1981, vol. II, p. 23; cf. O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, pp. 202–3.

¹⁶⁸ Opinion No. 14, 96 ILR, p. 732.

¹⁶⁹ Note that article 10 of the Vienna Convention 1983 provides that the date of the passing of state property of the predecessor state is that of the date of succession of states ‘unless otherwise agreed by the states concerned or decided by an appropriate international body’. Article 21 repeats this principle in the context of state archives and article 35 with regard to state debts.

¹⁷⁰ See e.g. Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 11, 96 ILR, p. 719. Cf. the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues of June 2001, 41 ILM, 2002, p. 3. See also *AY Bank Ltd v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Others* [2006] EWHC 830 (Ch); and *Croatia v. Serbia* [2010] Ch 200. Note C. Stahn, ‘The Agreement on Succession Issues of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 96 *AJIL*, 2002, p. 379.

¹⁷¹ See the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001, articles 3 and 7 of Annex A and article 4(3) of Annex B.

¹⁷² Opinion No. 14, 96 ILR, p. 732.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Article 6 of Annex A. This is to be contrasted with the more usual reference to domestic law at the relevant time.

176 See e.g. the *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, pp. 102 ff.; *Brownlie's Principles*, pp. 624–5; and O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, pp. 199–200. See also *Peter Pázmány University*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 61, 1933, p. 237; and *Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Ltd (No. 2)* [1939] 1 Ch 182; 9 AD, p. 94. See also *Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon* 536 F.Supp. 829, 855 (1981); 94 ILR, pp. 133, 180. Note that under article 11 of the Vienna Convention 1983, which basically reflects practice, no compensation is payable for the passing of state property unless otherwise agreed, and article 12 provides that third states' property in the territory of the predecessor state remains unaffected by the succession.

177 E.g. fixed military installations, prisons, airports, government offices, state hospitals and universities: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. II, part 2, p. 33.

178 In article 14 (with regard to the transfer of part of a state to another state); article 15(1) (a) (with regard to 'newly independent states'); article 16 (upon a uniting of states to form one successor state); article 17 (with regard to separation of part of a state to form a new state); and article 18 (with regard to the dissolution of a state).

179 See e.g. O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, pp. 220–1. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. II, part 2, p. 29.

180 Opinion No. 14, 96 ILR, p. 731.

181 Article 2(1) of Annex A.

182 See e.g. *Oppenheim's International Law*, p. 223, note 6.

183 *Ibid.*, p. 221. Article 18(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention 1983 provides that 'immovable state property of the predecessor state situated outside its territory shall pass to the successor states in equitable proportions'. Note that the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001 deals specifically with the allocation of diplomatic and consular premises: see Annex B.

184 It is to be noted that article 15 does not, unlike other succession situations, refer to agreements between the predecessor and successor states. This was deliberate as the International Law Commission, which drafted the articles upon which the Convention is

based, felt that this was required as a recognition of the special circumstances of decolonisation and the fact that many such agreements are unfavourable to the newly independent state: see *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 38. The article is also unusual in that it provides that immovable state property situated outside the territory and movable state property other than that already covered in the article ‘to the creation of which the dependent territory has contributed’ shall pass to the successor state in proportion to the contribution of the dependent territory. This was intended to introduce the application of equity to the situation and was designed to preserve, *inter alia*, ‘the patrimony and the historical and cultural heritage of the people inhabiting the dependent territory concerned’: *ibid*. It is unclear how far this extends. It may cover contributions to international institutions made where the territory is a dependent territory, but beyond this one can only speculate.

185 E.g. currency and state public funds: *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 2, pp. 35–6.

186 O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, p. 204.

187 Article 17. See also articles 14(2)(b), 15(1)(d) and 18(1)(c).

188 96 ILR, p. 731. See also article 3(1) of Annex A of the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001.

189 Article 3(2) of Annex A.

190 Article 4(1) of Annex A.

191 See O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, p. 204. Cf. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 46–7.

192 See article 18(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention 1983. See also the Decision of the Austrian Supreme Court in *Croatia and Others v. Girocredit Bank AG der Sparkassen* 36 ILM, 1997, p. 1520.

193 Opinion No. 14, 96 ILR, pp. 731–2. See now the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001, as discussed.

¹⁹⁴ Opinion No. 13, *ibid.*, p. 728. The Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001 provides that where the allocation of property results in a ‘significantly unequal distribution’ of SFRY state property, then the matter may be raised with the Joint Committee established under article 5 of Annex A.

¹⁹⁵ Unless they were earmarked on 1 October 1989 predominantly for administrative tasks which under the Basic Law of the FRG are to be discharged by the *Länder*, local authorities or other public administrative bodies, in which case they will accrue to the appropriate institution of public administration. Administrative assets used predominantly for tasks of the former Ministry of State Security/Office for National Security are to accrue to the Trust Agency established under the Law on the Privatisation and Reorganisation of Publicly Owned Assets (Trust Law) of 17 June 1990 for the purpose of privatising former publicly owned companies.

¹⁹⁶ These were termed ‘financial assets’ and deliberately exclude social insurance assets.

¹⁹⁷ Apart from immovable property located within each republic which went to the republic concerned in accordance with the territorial principle.

¹⁹⁸ See e.g. Degan, ‘State Succession’, p. 144.

¹⁹⁹ See Müllerson, *International Law*, p. 144; and Stern, ‘Succession’, pp. 379 ff. The proportions were reached using four criteria: the participation of the republics concerned in the imports and exports respectively of the former USSR, the proportion of GNP, and the proportion of populations: see W. Czaplinski, ‘Equity and Equitable Principles in the Law of State Succession’, in Mrak, *Succession of States*, pp. 61, 71. However, several successor states refused to accept this and the arrangement never came into being, and in 1993 Russia claimed all of the assets and liabilities of the former USSR (see Stern, ‘Succession’, p. 405), and a number of bilateral agreements were signed to reflect this (see International Law Association, *Final Report*, pp. 7 ff.). A special agreement was reached in 1997 with regard to the division of the Black Sea fleet based in the Crimea in Ukraine, following a number of unsuccessful efforts: Stern, ‘Succession’, p. 386.

²⁰⁰ See above, p. 860.

201 These were Bosnia and Herzegovina 15.5 per cent; Croatia 23 per cent; Macedonia 7.5 per cent; Slovenia 16 per cent; and Yugoslavia 38 per cent: see article 4 of Annex C. This proportion was also used for all other rights and interests of the SFRY not otherwise covered in the Agreements (such as patents, trademarks, copyrights and royalties): Annex F.

202 This was as follows: Bosnia and Herzegovina 13.20 per cent; Croatia 28.49 per cent; Macedonia 5.40 per cent; Slovenia 16.39 per cent; and FRY 36.52 per cent: see IMF Press Release No. 92/92, 15 December 1992. See also Williams, 'State Succession', pp. 776, 802, note 168; and I. Shihata, 'Matters of State Succession in the World Bank's Practice', in Mark, *Succession of States*, pp. 75, 87.

203 See Appendix to the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001.

204 UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 18th Session, Resolutions, 1974, pp. 68 ff., 20 C/102, 1978, paras. 18–19; and UNESCO Records of the General Conference, 20th Session, Resolutions, 1978, pp. 92–3. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 78–80. Note in addition the call for a New International Cultural Order: see e.g. M. Bedjaoui, *Towards a New International Economic Order*, Paris, 1979, pp. 75 ff., 245 ff.; and General Assembly Resolutions 3026 A (XXVII), 3148 (XXVIII), 3187 (XXVIII), 3391 (XXX) and 31/40. See also A. Jakubowski, *State Succession in Cultural Property*, Oxford, 2015.

205 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 93.

206 Articles 21–4.

207 Article 27.

208 Article 28(1)(b) and (c).

209 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 62.

210 49 UNTS, p. 142.

211 See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1979, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 113.

212 *Ibid.*, pp. 113–14.

213 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 64.

214 See e.g. the Mali–Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) border dispute; Shaw, *Title to Territory*, pp. 257–8; and *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 554; 80 ILR, p. 459.

215 Article 29.

216 Article 30.

217 Article 31. Note in particular the dispute between Denmark and Iceland, after the dissolution of their Union, over valuable parchments: see Verzijl, *International Law*, vol. **VII**, 1974, p. 153; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 68–9; and the Treaty of St Germain of 1919 with Austria which contained provisions relating to the succession to archives of various new or reconstituted states.

218 See Annex D.

219 *Ibid.*, article 6.

220 See further, with regard to article 3(2) of Annex A of the Yugoslav Agreement on Succession Issues 2001, above, p. 862.

221 See generally O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, chapters 15–17; *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1977, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 49 ff.; and Zemanek, ‘State Succession’.

222 Note that the Convention does not deal with private creditors, a point which is criticised in the *Third US Restatement on Foreign Relations Law*, p. 106, but article 6 of the Convention constitutes in effect a savings clause here.

223 Note that the Convention is concerned with state debts which are defined in article 33 as ‘any financial obligation of a predecessor state arising in conformity with international law with another state, an international organisation or any other subject of international law’.

²²⁴ See O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, chapters 15–17; and *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 76. A variety of other distinctions have also been drawn, *ibid.*

²²⁵ See e.g. O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, pp. 416 ff.

²²⁶ *Ibid.* See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 90; and *Ottoman Public Debt*, 1 RIAA, p. 529 (1925).

²²⁷ Article 39 of the Convention provides that where two or more states unite to form a successor state, the state debts of the former states will pass to the successor state.

²²⁸ See *Ottoman Public Debt*, 1 RIAA, p. 529 (1925).

²²⁹ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1977, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 81.

²³⁰ See Williams, ‘State Succession’, pp. 786, 802–3.

²³¹ See e.g. O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, pp. 397–401; and Feilchenfeld, *Public Debts*, pp. 431 ff.

²³² O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, pp. 404–6.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

²³⁴ The same rule applies in the case of the transfer of part of a state to another state: see article 37.

²³⁵ See e.g. *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 221.

²³⁶ In the 1919 Peace Treaties, the principle of distribution proportional to the future paying capacity of the ceded territories was utilised, measured by reference to revenues contributed in the pre-war years, while in the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, concerning the consequences of the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the principle considered was that of proportional distribution based solely upon actual past contributions to the amortisation of debts: see O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, pp. 454–6. Cf. *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 113. The phrase ultimately adopted in the Vienna Convention was: ‘taking

into account, in particular, the property, rights and interests which pass to the successor state in relation to that state debt'. In other words, stress was laid upon the factor of proportionality of assets to debts.

²³⁷ Article 2(1)(b) of Annex C.

²³⁸ See *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1981, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 91–105; and *ibid.*, 1977, vol. **II**, part 1, pp. 86–107. Note the varied practice of succession to public debts in the colonisation process, *ibid.*, pp. 87–8, and with regard to annexations, *ibid.*, pp. 93–4. See also *West Rand Gold Mining Co. v. R* [1905] 2 KB 391; and O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, pp. 373–83.

²³⁹ See, in particular, O'Connell, *State Succession*, chapter 10; *Oppenheim's International Law*, pp. 215 ff.; and T. H. Cheng, *State Succession and Commercial Obligations*, New York, 2006. See also O. Shoyele, 'Acquired Rights, State Succession and the African States: Perspectives in International Law', **10** *Sri Lanka Journal of International Law*, 1998, p. 243.

²⁴⁰ See e.g. O'Connell, *State Succession*, vol. **I**, pp. 239–40.

²⁴¹ See e.g. *Brownlie's Principles*, p. 415.

²⁴² PCIJ, Series B, No. 6, 1923; 2 AD, p. 71. The proposition was reaffirmed in *Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926; 3 AD, p. 429; and *Chorzów Factory*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, 1928; 4 AD, p. 268. See also *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924; and *US v. Percheman* 32 US (7 Pet.) 51 (1830).

²⁴³ See also *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 400, referring to 'full respect for acquired rights'; *German–Poland Border Treaty Constitutionality* 108 ILR, p. 656; and cf. *Gosalia v. Agarwal* 118 ILR, p. 429.

²⁴⁴ [1905] 2 KB 391.

²⁴⁵ See above, [Chapter 13](#), p. 722.

²⁴⁶ In *Alisic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Others*, Admissibility Decision of 17 October 2011, paras. 53–4, the ECtHR noted that the successor states of the Former Yugoslavia had all accepted that persons who had deposited foreign currency savings in commercial banks in the Former Yugoslavia had acquired an entitlement to collect at any time their deposits plus interest. See also the Judgment of 6 November 2012, para. 67, in the same case.

²⁴⁷ 6 RIAA, p. 120 (1923); 2 AD, p. 66. See also *Hawaiian Claims*, 6 RIAA, p. 157 (1925); 3 AD, p. 80.

²⁴⁸ 12 RIAA, p. 155 (1956); 23 ILR, p. 659. Cf. the Decision of the Namibian Supreme Court in *Minister of Defence, Namibia v. Mwandinghi* 91 ILR, p. 341, taking into account the provisions of the Namibian Constitution.

²⁴⁹ See O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, chapters 20 and 21; P. Weis, *Nationality and Statelessness in International Law*, 2nd ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979; I. Ziemele, *State Continuity and Nationality: Past, Present and Future as Defined by International Law*, The Hague, 2005; P. Dumberry, ‘Obsolete and Unjust: The Rule of Continuous Nationality in the Context of State Succession’, 76 *Nordic Journal of International Law*, 2007, p. 153; C. Economidès, ‘Les Effets de la Succession d’États sur la Nationalité’, 103 *RGDIP*, 1999, p. 577; *Nationalité, Minorités et Succession d’États en Europe de l’Est* (ed. E. Decaux and A. Pellet), Paris, 1996; European Commission for Democracy Through Law, *Citizenship and State Succession*, Strasbourg, 1997; *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 218; and Reports of the International Law Commission, A/50/10, 1995, p. 68; A/51/10, 1996, p. 171; A/52/10, 1997, p. 11; A/53/10, 1998, p. 189; and A/54/10, 1999, p. 12. See also above, [Chapters 11](#), p. 567, and [13](#), p. 703.

²⁵⁰ See e.g. article 1 of the Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 1930; *Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923, p. 24; 2 AD, p. 349; *Acquisition of Polish Nationality*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 7, 1923, p. 16; 2 AD, p. 292; and *Nottebohm*, ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 23; 22 ILR, p. 349.

²⁵¹ See *Oppenheim’s International Law*, p. 219.

²⁵² Opinion No. 2, 92 ILR, pp. 167, 168–9. The Commission concluded by stating that the republics ‘must afford the members of those minorities and ethnic groups [i.e. the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia] all the human rights and fundamental

freedoms recognised in international law, including, where appropriate, the right to choose their nationality’, *ibid.*, p. 169.

²⁵³ See also the Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons, European Commission for Democracy Through Law, 1996, CDL-NAT (1996) 007e-rev-restr. and the Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession 2006, which provides that any person with the nationality of the predecessor state who has or would become stateless as a result of state succession has the right to nationality of a state concerned in accordance with the Convention.

²⁵⁴ See Report of the International Law Commission on its 51st Session, A/54/10, 1999, p. 12.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

²⁵⁶ Article 4. Article 16 provides that persons concerned shall not be arbitrarily deprived of the nationality of the predecessor state nor arbitrarily denied the right to acquire the nationality of the successor state.

²⁵⁷ Article 5. Article 12 states that the status of persons concerned as habitual residents shall not be affected by the succession of states.

²⁵⁸ Report of the International Law Commission on its 51st Session, p. 40.

²⁵⁹ A child born after the date of succession who has not acquired any nationality has the right to the nationality of the state concerned on whose territory he or she was born: article 13.

²⁶⁰ Article 21. This, the Commission concluded, was a rule of customary law: see Report of the International Law Commission on its 51st Session, p. 80.

²⁶¹ Article 23 provides that successor states shall grant a right of option to persons concerned covered by the provisions of article 22 who are qualified to acquire the nationality of two or more successor states, while each successor state shall grant a right to opt for its nationality to persons concerned who are not covered by the provisions of article 22. Where the predecessor state continues, article 26 provides that both the predecessor and

successor states shall grant a right of option to all persons concerned who are qualified to have the nationality of both the predecessor and successor states or of two or more successor states.

262 In the case of categories (b) and (c), the provision does not apply to persons who have their habitual residence in a third state and also have the nationality of that other or any other state: see article 8.

263 See Report of the International Law Commission on its 51st Session, pp. 83–5; and J. F. Rezek, ‘Le Droit International de la Nationalité’, **198 HR**, 1986, pp. 342–3. Article 25 provides that in the case where the predecessor state continues, then it shall withdraw its nationality from persons concerned who are qualified to acquire the nationality of the successor state in accordance with article 24. It shall not, however, withdraw its nationality before such persons acquire the nationality of the successor state. Unless otherwise indicated by the exercise of a right of option, the predecessor state shall not, however, withdraw its nationality from such persons who: (a) have their habitual residence in its territory; (b) are not covered by subparagraph (a) and have an appropriate legal connection with a constituent unit of the predecessor state that has remained part of the predecessor state; (c) have their habitual residence in a third state, and were born in or, before leaving the predecessor state, had their last habitual residence in what has remained part of the territory of the predecessor state or have any other appropriate connection with that state.

264 See O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, chapter 19; M. G. Kohen and P. Dumberry, *The Institute of International Law’s Resolution on State Succession and State Responsibility*, Cambridge, 2019; Report, ‘State Succession in Matters of State Responsibility’, **76 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International**, Paris, 2015, p. 509 and Resolution adopted, *ibid.*, p. 693; ILC Third Report on Succession of States in Respect of State Responsibility, A/CN.4/731, 2 May 2019; P. Dumberry, *State Succession to International Responsibility*, The Hague, 2007; V. Mikulka, ‘State Succession and Responsibility’ and ‘Succession of States in Respect of Rights of an Injured State’, in *The Law of International Responsibility* (ed. J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson), Oxford, 2010, pp. 291, 965 respectively; W. Czaplinski, ‘State Succession and State Responsibility’, **28 Canadian YIL**, 1990, p. 339; M. J. Volkovitsch, ‘Righting Wrongs: Towards a New Theory of State Succession to Responsibility for International Delicts’, **92 Columbia Law Review**, 1992, p. 2162; and J. Crawford, *State Responsibility: The General Part*, Cambridge, 2013, chapter 13. Note also *Minister of Defence, Namibia v. Mwandighi* (SA 5/91) [1991] NASC 5; 1992 (2) SA 355 (NmS) (25 October 1991). The International

Law Commission decided to include the topic ‘Succession of States in Respect of State Responsibility’ in its programme of work in May 2017, see e.g. the Special Rapporteur’s third report, A/CN.4/731, 2 May 2019.

²⁶⁵ Note Judge Xue’s Declaration in *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 381 at 387 that ‘little can be found about state succession to responsibility in the field of general international law’.

²⁶⁶ See also *Hawaiian Claims*, 6 RIAA, p. 157 (1925).

²⁶⁷ 23 ILR, pp. 81, 91–2. See also *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 53 ff.

²⁶⁸ O’Connell, *State Succession*, vol. I, p. 486. Note that state practice demonstrates that in many cases the relevant parties agreed upon succession to rights, interests and obligations of the predecessor state: see e.g. Crawford, *State Responsibility*, pp. 447 ff.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 482; and see also *Mutua v. Foreign and Commonwealth Office* [2011] EWHC 1913 (QB), paras. 89, 95.

²⁷⁰ Article 7, 76 *Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International*, Paris, 2015, pp. 693, 697.

²⁷¹ Articles 11–13, *ibid.*, pp. 699 ff.

²⁷² Article 15, *ibid.*, p. 700. See also *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia)*, ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 7.

²⁷³ See e.g. R. Mushkat, *One Country, Two International Legal Personalities*, Hong Kong, 1997; and R. Mushkat, ‘Hong Kong and Succession of Treaties’, 46 *ICLQ*, 1997, p. 181.

²⁷⁴ See the Treaty of Nanking 1842, 30 BFSP, p. 389; and the Convention of Peking 1860, 50 BFSP, p. 10.

²⁷⁵ 90 BFSP, p. 17. All three treaties were denounced by China as ‘unequal treaties’.

²⁷⁶ See 23 ILM, 1984, p. 1366.

²⁷⁷ See e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52765838;

www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/28/china-vote-npc-national-security-laws-hong-kong-us-protest; and <https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683>.

²⁷⁸ See the statement of the Foreign Secretary to the House of Commons, 678 *House of Commons Hansard*, 1 July 2020, col. 329. See also the cross-regional joint statement by the UK representative to the UN Human Rights Council on behalf of twenty-seven states, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-human-rights-council-44-cross-regional-statement-on-hong-kong-and-xinjiang.

The Settlement of Disputes by Peaceful Means

It is fair to say that international law has always considered its fundamental purpose to be the maintenance of international peace.¹ Although ethical preoccupations stimulated its development and inform its growth, international law has historically been regarded by the international community primarily as a means to ensure the establishment and preservation of world peace and security. This chapter is concerned with the procedures available within the international order for the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts, except for judicial procedures covered elsewhere.²

Basically, the techniques of conflict management fall into two categories: diplomatic procedures and adjudication. The former involves an attempt to resolve differences either by the contending parties themselves or with the aid of other entities by the use of the discussion and fact-finding methods. Adjudication procedures involve the determination by a disinterested third party of the legal and factual issues involved, either by arbitration or by the decision of judicial organs.

The political approach to conflict settlement is divided into two sections, with the measures applicable by the United Nations being separately examined (in Chapter 21) as they possess a distinctive character. Although for the sake of

convenience each method of dispute settlement is separately examined, it should be noted that in any given situation a range of mechanisms may well be utilised. A good example of this is afforded by the successful settlement of the Chad–Libya boundary dispute. Following a long period of conflict and armed hostilities since the dispute erupted in 1973, the two states signed a Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute on 31 August 1989 in which they undertook to seek a peaceful solution within one year. In the absence of a political settlement, the parties undertook to take the matter to the International Court.³ After inconclusive negotiations, the dispute was submitted to the International Court by notification of the Framework Agreement by the two parties.⁴ The Decision of the Court was delivered on 3 February 1994. The Court accepted the argument of Chad that the boundary between the two states was defined by the Franco–Libyan Treaty of 10 August 1955.⁵ Following this decision, the two states concluded an agreement providing for Libyan withdrawal from the Aouzou Strip by 30 May 1994. The agreement provided for monitoring of this withdrawal by UN observers.⁶ The two parties also agreed to establish a joint team of experts to undertake the delimitation of the common frontier in accordance with the decision of the International Court.⁷ On 4 May 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 915 (1994) establishing the UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) and authorising the deployment of observers and support staff for a period up to forty days.⁸ On 30 May, Libya and Chad signed a Joint Declaration stating that the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces had been effected as of that date to the satisfaction of both parties as monitored by UNASOG.⁹ The Security Council terminated the mandate of UNASOG upon the successful conclusion of the mission by resolution 926 (1994) on 13 June that year.¹⁰

However, states are not obliged to resolve their differences at all, and this applies in the case of serious legal conflicts as well as peripheral political disagreements. All the methods available to settle disputes are operative only upon the consent of the particular states.¹¹ This, of course, can be contrasted with the situation within municipal systems. It is reflected in the different functions performed by the courts in the international and domestic legal orders respectively, and it is one aspect of the absence of a stable, central focus within the world community.

The mechanisms dealing with the peaceful settlement of disputes require in the first instance the existence of a dispute. The definition of a dispute has been the subject of some consideration by the International Court,¹² but the reference by the Permanent Court in the *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions* (Jurisdiction) case¹³ to ‘a disagreement over a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons’ constitutes an authoritative indication. A distinction is sometimes made between legal and political disputes, or justiciable and non-justiciable disputes.¹⁴ Although maintained in some international treaties, it is to some extent unsound, in view of the fact that any dispute will involve some political considerations and many overtly political disagreements may be resolved by judicial means. Whether any dispute is to be termed legal or political may well hinge upon the particular circumstances of the case, the views adopted by the relevant parties and the way in which they choose to characterise their differences. It is in reality extremely difficult to point to objective general criteria clearly differentiating the two.¹⁵ This does not, however, imply that there are not significant differences between the legal and political procedures available

for resolving problems. For one thing, the strictly legal approach is dependent upon the provisions of the law as they stand at that point, irrespective of any reforming tendencies the particular court may have, while the political techniques of settlement are not so restricted. It is also not unusual for political and legal organs to deal with aspects of the same basic situation.¹⁶

The role of political influences and considerations in inter-state disputes is obviously a vital one, and many settlements can only be properly understood within the wider international political context. In addition, how a state proceeds in a dispute will be conditioned by political factors. If the dispute is perceived to be one affecting vital interests, for example, the state would be less willing to submit the matter to binding third-party settlement than if it were a more technical issue, while the existence of regional mechanisms will often be of political significance.

Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter provides that:

All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States¹⁷ develops this principle and notes that:

states shall accordingly seek early and just

settlement of their international disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice.

The same methods of dispute settlement are stipulated in article 33(1) of the UN Charter, although in the context of disputes the continuance of which being likely to endanger international peace and security. The 1970 Declaration, which is not so limited, asserts that in seeking an early and just settlement, the parties are to agree upon such peaceful means as they see appropriate to the circumstances and nature of the dispute.

There would appear, therefore, to be no inherent hierarchy with regard to the methods specified and no specific method required in any given situation. States have a free choice as to the mechanisms adopted for settling their disputes.¹⁸ This approach is also taken in a number of regional instruments, including the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement 1948 (the Pact of Bogotá) of the Organization of American States; the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 1957; and the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975. In addition, it is to be noted that the parties to a dispute have the duty to continue to seek a settlement by other peaceful means agreed by them, in the event of the failure of one particular method. Should the means elaborated fail to resolve a dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the parties under article 37(1) of the Charter ‘*shall* refer it to the Security Council’.¹⁹

Diplomatic Methods of Dispute Settlement

Negotiation²⁰

Of all the procedures used to resolve differences, the simplest and most utilised form is understandably negotiation. It consists basically of discussions between the interested parties with a view to reconciling divergent opinions, or at least understanding the different positions maintained. It does not involve any third party, at least at that stage, and so differs from the other forms of dispute management. In addition to being an extremely active method of settlement itself, negotiation is normally the precursor to other settlement procedures as the parties decide among themselves how best to resolve their differences.²¹ It is eminently suited to the clarification, if not always resolution, of complicated disagreements. It is by mutual discussions that the essence of the differences will be revealed and the opposing contentions elucidated. Negotiations are the most satisfactory means to resolve disputes since the parties are so directly engaged. Negotiations, of course, do not always succeed, since they do depend on a certain degree of mutual goodwill, flexibility and sensitivity. The International Court has observed that negotiations are distinct from mere protests or disputations and require at the least, ‘a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party with a view to resolving the dispute’.²²

In certain circumstances there may exist a duty to enter into negotiations arising out of particular bilateral or multilateral agreements.²³ Article 283(1) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 provides, for example, that when a dispute arises between states parties concerning the interpretation or

application of the Convention, ‘the parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means’.²⁴ Other treaties may predicate resort to third-party mechanisms upon the failure of negotiations.²⁵ In addition, although it has been emphasised that ‘[n]either in the Charter or otherwise in international law is any general rule to be found to the effect that the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations constitutes a precondition for a matter to be referred to the Court’,²⁶ it is possible that tribunals may direct the parties to engage in negotiations in good faith and may indicate the factors to be taken into account in the course of negotiations between the parties.²⁷ Where there is an obligation to negotiate, this would imply also an obligation to pursue such negotiations as far as possible with a view to concluding agreements.²⁸ The Court held in the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases that:

the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition . . . they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it.²⁹

The Court in the *German External Debts* case emphasised that although an agreement to negotiate did not necessarily imply an obligation to reach an agreement, ‘it does imply that serious efforts towards that end will be

made’.³⁰ In the *Lac Lanoux* arbitration, it was stated that ‘consultations and negotiations between the two states must be genuine, must comply with the rules of good faith and must not be mere formalities’.³¹ Examples of infringement of the rules of good faith were held to include the unjustified breaking off of conversations, unusual delays and systematic refusal to give consideration to proposals or adverse interests.³²

The point was also emphasised by the International Court in the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* case, where it noted the reference in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’. The Court then declared that:

The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct: the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects – by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.³³

Where disputes are by their continuance likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, article 33 of the UN Charter provides that the parties to such disputes shall first of all seek a solution by negotiation,

inquiry or mediation, and then resort, if the efforts have not borne fruit, to more complex forms of resolution.³⁴

Good Offices and Mediation³⁵

The employment of the procedures of good offices and mediation involves the use of a third party, whether an individual or individuals, a state or group of states or an international organisation, to encourage the contending parties to come to a settlement. Unlike the techniques of arbitration and adjudication, the process aims at persuading the parties to a dispute to reach satisfactory terms for its termination by themselves. Provisions for settling the dispute are not prescribed.

Technically, good offices are involved where a third party attempts to influence the opposing sides to enter into negotiations, whereas mediation implies the active participation in the negotiating process of the third party itself. In fact, the dividing line between the two approaches is often difficult to maintain as they tend to merge into each another, depending upon the circumstances. One example of the good offices method is the role played by the US President in 1906 in concluding the Russian–Japanese War,³⁶ or the function performed by the Soviet Union in assisting in the peaceful settlement of the India–Pakistan dispute in 1965.³⁷ Another might be the part played by France in encouraging US–North Vietnamese negotiations to begin in Paris in the early 1970s.³⁸ A mediator, such as the US Secretary of State in the Middle East in 1973–74,³⁹ has an active and vital function to perform in seeking to cajole the disputing parties into accepting what are often his own proposals. It is his responsibility to reconcile the different claims and improve the atmosphere pervading the discussions.

The UN Secretary-General can sometimes play an important role by the exercise of his good offices.⁴⁰ An example of this was provided in the situation relating to Afghanistan in 1988. The Geneva Agreements of that year specifically noted that a representative of the Secretary-General would lend his good offices to the parties.⁴¹ Good offices may also be undertaken by the Secretary-General jointly with office-holders of regional organisations.⁴² Further, the role played by the United Nations in mediation has received increasing attention.⁴³ The UN Secretary-General's Report on the UN and Conflict Prevention, 2015, noted under the heading of 'good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation' that much work was being done and that: 'These terms epitomize what the United Nations was established to do.'⁴⁴ There is also increasing cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organisations on mediation.⁴⁵

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 laid down many of the rules governing these two processes. It was stipulated that the signatories to the treaties had a right to offer good offices or mediation, even during hostilities, and that the exercise of the right was never to be regarded by either of the contending sides as an unfriendly act.⁴⁶ It was also explained that such procedures were not binding. The Conventions laid a duty upon the parties to a serious dispute or conflict to resort to good offices or mediation as far as circumstances allow, before having recourse to arms.⁴⁷ This, of course, has to be seen in the light of the relevant Charter provisions regarding the use of force, but it does point to the part that should be played by these diplomatic procedures.

Inquiry⁴⁸

Where differences of opinion on factual matters underlie a dispute between parties, the logical solution is often to institute a commission of inquiry to be conducted by reputable observers to ascertain precisely the facts in contention.⁴⁹ Provisions for such inquiries were first elaborated in the 1899 Hague Conference as a possible alternative to the use of arbitration.⁵⁰ However, the technique is limited in that it can only have relevance in the case of international disputes, involving neither the honour nor the vital interests of the parties, where the conflict centres around a genuine disagreement as to particular facts which can be resolved by recourse to an impartial and conscientious investigation.⁵¹

Inquiry was most successfully used in the Dogger Bank incident of 1904 where Russian naval ships fired on British fishing boats in the belief that they were hostile Japanese torpedo craft.⁵² The Hague provisions were put into effect⁵³ and the report of the international inquiry commission contributed to a peaceful settlement of the issue.⁵⁴ This encouraged an elaboration of the technique by the 1907 Hague Conference,⁵⁵ and a wave of support for the procedure.⁵⁶ The United States, for instance, concluded forty-eight bilateral treaties between 1913 and 1940 with provisions in each one of them for the creation of a permanent inquiry commission. These agreements were known as the 'Bryan treaties'.⁵⁷

However, the use of commissions of inquiry in accordance with the Hague Convention of 1907 proved in practice to be extremely rare. The *Red*

Crusader inquiry of 1962⁵⁸ followed an interval of some forty years since the previous inquiry. This concerned an incident between a British trawler and a Danish fisheries protection vessel, which subsequently involved a British frigate. Although instituted as a fact-finding exercise, it did incorporate judicial aspects. A majority of the Commission were lawyers and the procedures followed a judicial pattern. In addition, aspects of the report reflected legal findings, such as the declaration that the firing on the trawler by the Danish vessel in an attempt to stop it escaping arrest for alleged illegal fishing ‘exceeded legitimate use of armed force’.⁵⁹ In the *Letelier and Moffitt* case, the only decision to date under one of the Bryan treaties, a US–Chile Commission was established in order to determine the amount of compensation that would be paid by Chile to the United States in respect of an assassination alleged to have been carried out by it in Washington, DC.⁶⁰ As in the *Red Crusader* inquiry, the Commission in its decision in January 1992 made a number of judicial determinations and the proceedings were conducted less as a fact-finding inquiry and more as an arbitration.⁶¹

The value of inquiry within specified institutional frameworks, nevertheless, has been evident. Its use has increased within the United Nations generally.⁶² Of some interest have been inquiries into aspects of the Gaza dispute. For example, in 2009, the UN Human Rights Council established the Goldstone inquiry, which reported that both Israel and the Palestinian armed groups had breached international humanitarian law.⁶³ In 2011, the UN Secretary-General appointed a panel of inquiry into the Mavi Marmara incident, when Israel intercepted ships intending to breach the blockade on Gaza.⁶⁴ There is also a facility for inquiries in the context of the UN specialised agencies.⁶⁵ Inquiry is also part of other processes of dispute settlement in the context of

general fact-finding.⁶⁶ But inquiry as a separate and discrete mechanism in accordance with the Hague Convention of 1907 has fallen out of favour,⁶⁷ to be replaced by inquiries in the sense of fact-finding within the context of the various UN organs.⁶⁸ In many disputes, of course, the determination of the relevant circumstances would simply not aid a settlement, while its nature as a third-party involvement in a situation would discourage some states. On the other hand, the tendency of such fact-finding missions to reach legal conclusions has somewhat blurred the lines between inquiries and other methods of dispute settlement.

Conciliation⁶⁹

The process of conciliation involves a third-party investigation of the basis of the dispute and the submission of a report embodying suggestions for a settlement. As such, it involves elements of both inquiry and mediation, and in fact the process of conciliation emerged from treaties providing for permanent inquiry commissions.⁷⁰ Conciliation reports are only proposals and as such do not constitute binding decisions.⁷¹ They are thus different from arbitral awards. The period between the world wars was the heyday for conciliation commissions and many treaties made provision for them as a method for resolving disputes. But the process has not been widely employed and certainly has not justified the faith evinced in it by states between 1920 and 1938.⁷²

Nevertheless, conciliation processes do have a role to play. They are extremely flexible and by clarifying the facts and discussing proposals may stimulate negotiations between the parties. The rules dealing with conciliation were elaborated in the 1928 General Act on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (revised in 1949). The function of the commissions was defined to include inquiries and mediation techniques. Such commissions were to be composed of five persons: one appointed by each opposing side and the other three to be appointed by agreement from among the citizens of third states. The proceedings were to be concluded within six months and were not to be held in public. The conciliation procedure was intended to deal with mixed legal–factual situations and to operate quickly and informally.⁷³

There have of late been a number of proposals to reactivate the conciliation technique, but how far they will succeed in their aim remains to be seen.⁷⁴ A number of multilateral treaties do, however, provide for conciliation as a means of resolving disputes. The 1948 American Treaty of Pacific Settlement; the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; the 1964 Protocol on the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union); the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the 1981 Treaty Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States; the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations; the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties; the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea; and the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, for example, all contain provisions concerning conciliation.

The conciliation procedure was used in the Iceland–Norway dispute over the continental shelf delimitation between Iceland and Jan Mayen island.⁷⁵ The agreement establishing the Conciliation Commission stressed that the question was the subject of continuing negotiations and that the Commission report would not be binding, both elements characteristic of the conciliation method. The Commission had also to take into account Iceland's strong economic interests in the area as well as other factors. The role of the concept of natural prolongation within continental shelf delimitation was examined, as well as the legal status of islands and relevant state practice and court decisions. The solution proposed by the Commission was for a joint development zone, an idea that would have been unlikely to come from a judicial body reaching a decision solely on the basis of the legal rights of the

parties. In other words, the flexibility of the conciliation process seen in the context of continued negotiations between the parties was demonstrated.⁷⁶

Such commissions have also been established outside the framework of specific treaties, for example by the United Nations. Instances would include the Conciliation Commission for Palestine under General Assembly resolution 194 (III), 1948, and the Conciliation Commission for the Congo under resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 1960.

International Institutions and Dispute Settlement⁷⁷

Regional Organisations⁷⁸

Article 52(1) of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides that nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.⁷⁹ Article 52(2) stipulates that UN members entering into such arrangements or agencies are to make every effort to settle local disputes peacefully through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council, and that the Security Council encourages the development of the peaceful settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements. That having been said, article 52(4) stresses that the application of articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter relating to the roles of the Security Council and General Assembly remains unaffected.⁸⁰ The supremacy of the Security Council is reinforced by article 53(1), which provides that while the Council may, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, ‘no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council’. It should also be noted that by article 24 the Security Council possesses ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, while article 103 of the Charter emphasises that, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of a UN member under the Charter and obligations under any other international agreement, the former are to prevail.⁸¹ In addition, under article 36, the Security Council

may ‘at any stage of a dispute . . . recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment’,⁸² while article 37 provides that should the parties to a dispute fail to settle it, they ‘shall refer it to the Security Council’.

Furthermore, should the Council itself deem that the continuance of a dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, ‘it shall decide whether to take action under article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate’.⁸³ Thus, although reference where appropriate to regional organisations or arrangements should take place, this does not affect the comprehensive role of the United Nations through the Security Council or General Assembly in dealing in various ways with disputes between states.⁸⁴ While provisions contained in regional instruments may prevent or restrict resort to mechanisms outside those instruments,⁸⁵ this does not constrain in any way the authority or competence of the United Nations.⁸⁶ In many cases, a matter may be simultaneously before both the United Nations and a regional organisation and such concurrent jurisdiction does not constitute a jurisdictional problem for the United Nations.⁸⁷ In practice and in relation to the adoption of active measures, the United Nations is likely to defer to appropriate regional mechanisms while realistic chances exist for a regional settlement.⁸⁸

Various regional organisations have created machinery for the settlement of disputes.

The African Union (Formerly the Organisation of African Unity)⁸⁹

The Organisation of African Unity was established in 1963. Article XIX of its Charter referred to the principle of ‘the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration’ and to assist in achieving this a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established by the Protocol of 21 July 1964.⁹⁰ The jurisdiction of the Commission was not, however, compulsory and it was not utilised. African states were historically unwilling to resort to judicial or arbitral methods of dispute settlement and in general preferred informal third-party involvement through the medium of the OAU. In the Algeria–Morocco boundary dispute,⁹¹ for example, the OAU established an ad hoc commission consisting of the representatives of seven African states to seek to achieve a settlement of issues arising out of the 1963 clashes.⁹² Similarly in the Somali–Ethiopian conflict,⁹³ a commission was set up by the OAU in an attempt to mediate.⁹⁴ This commission failed to resolve the dispute, although it did reaffirm the principle of the inviolability of frontiers of member states as attained at the time of independence.⁹⁵ In a third case, the Western Sahara dispute,⁹⁶ an OAU committee was established in July 1978, which sought unsuccessfully to reach a settlement in the conflict,⁹⁷ while the OAU also established committees to try to mediate in the Chad Civil War, again with little success.⁹⁸ Despite mixed success, it became fairly established practice that in a dispute involving African states, initial recourse will be made to OAU mechanisms, primarily ad hoc commissions or committees.

In an attempt to improve the mechanisms available, the OAU approved a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993 (termed ‘the Cairo Declaration’).⁹⁹ It was intended to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing further; however, it was not

successful and in 2001 the OAU Assembly decided to incorporate the Central Organ of the Mechanism as one of the organs of the African Union (which had come into force in May that year).¹⁰⁰ The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union was adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on 9 July 2002.¹⁰¹ This instrument creates the Peace and Security Council as a ‘standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’, to be supported by the Commission of the African Union,¹⁰² a Panel of the Wise,¹⁰³ a Continental Early Warning System,¹⁰⁴ an African Standby Force¹⁰⁵ and a Special Fund.¹⁰⁶ A series of guiding principles are laid down, including early response to crises, respect for the rule of law and human rights, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and respect for borders inherited on the achievement of independence.¹⁰⁷ The Council is composed of fifteen members based on equitable regional representation and rotation¹⁰⁸ and its functions include: the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; early warning and preventive diplomacy; peacemaking including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and inquiry; peace-support operations and intervention; peace-building; and humanitarian action.¹⁰⁹ Article 9 provides that the Council ‘shall take initiatives and action it deems appropriate’ with regard to situations of potential and full-blown conflicts and shall use its discretion to effect entry, whether through the collective intervention of the Council itself or through its chairperson and/or the chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise and/or in collaboration with the regional mechanisms.¹¹⁰ The Protocol came into force on 26 December 2003. Two subsidiary committees were established: the Committee of Experts and the Military Staffs Committee. Other committees

that have been created are: the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Committee; the Sanctions Committee; and the Counter-Terrorism Committee.¹¹¹

There are in addition a number of subregional organisations in Africa which are playing an increasing role in conflict resolution. First and foremost is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created in 1975. The constituent instrument was revised in 1993¹¹² and article 58 of the revised treaty refers to the responsibility of ECOWAS to prevent and settle regional conflicts, with the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as the adopted regional intervention force. The mission of ECOWAS is to promote economic integration and its institutions include: the Authority of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the Community Parliament; the Economic and Social Council; the Community Court of Justice; a secretariat (transformed into a commission); and a cooperation fund. ECOWAS intervened in the Liberian Civil War in 1990 via ECOMOG¹¹³ and has been concerned with the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.¹¹⁴ An ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was established in 1999 and a Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance adopted in 2001.¹¹⁵ In 2008, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework was adopted in order to determine a comprehensive operational conflict prevention and peace-building strategy.¹¹⁶

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992.¹¹⁷ In 1996, it decided to establish an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and in 2001 it adopted a Protocol on Politics, Defence

and Security Co-operation.¹¹⁸ Under this Protocol, the objective of the Organ is to promote peace and security in the region and in particular to ‘consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed’.¹¹⁹ A number of structures of the Organ were set up,¹²⁰ including a chairperson,¹²¹ the troika (the chairperson together with the incoming and outgoing chairpersons), a ministerial committee,¹²² an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee,¹²³ and an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee.¹²⁴ The Organ has jurisdiction to seek to resolve any ‘significant inter-state conflict’¹²⁵ or any ‘significant intra-state conflict’.¹²⁶ It may employ a variety of peaceful means, including diplomacy, negotiations, mediation, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal and shall establish an early warning system to prevent the outbreak or escalation of a conflict. Where peaceful means fail, the chairperson acting on the advice of the Ministerial Committee may recommend to the Summit of the Community that enforcement action be taken, but such action may only be taken as a matter of last resort and only with the authorisation of the UN Security Council.¹²⁷

The Organization of American States¹²⁸

Article 23 of the Charter of the OAS, signed at Bogotá in 1948 and as amended by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias 1985 provides that international disputes between member states must be submitted to the Organization for peaceful settlement, although this is not to be interpreted as an impairment of the rights and obligations of member states under articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter.¹²⁹ The 1948 American Treaty of Pacific Settlement (the Pact of Bogotá, to be distinguished from the Charter) sets out

the procedures in detail, ranging from good offices, mediation and conciliation to arbitration and judicial settlement by the International Court of Justice. This treaty, however, has not been successful¹³⁰ and in practice the OAS has utilised the Inter-American Peace Committee created in 1940 for peaceful resolution of disputes. This was replaced in 1970 by the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement, a subsidiary organ of the Council. Since the late 1950s, the Permanent Council of the OAS, a plenary body at ambassadorial level, has played an increasingly important role.¹³¹ One example concerned the frontier incidents that took place on the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1985. The Council set up a fact-finding committee and, after hearing its report, adopted a resolution calling for talks to take place within the Contadora negotiating process.¹³² The Esquipulas II agreement of 14 November 1987 established an International Verification and Follow-up Commission to be composed of the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora and Support Group States together with the UN and OAS Secretaries-General.¹³³

The Arab League¹³⁴

The Arab League, established in 1945, aims at increasing cooperation between the Arab states. Its facilities for peaceful settlement of disputes among its members are not, however, very well developed, and in practice consist primarily of informal conciliation attempts. One notable exception was the creation in 1961 of an Inter-Arab Force to keep the peace between Iraq and Kuwait.¹³⁵ An Arab Security Force was sent to Lebanon in 1976 to be succeeded by the Arab Deterrent Force between 1976 and 1983. The Arab League was not able to play a significant part in either the Kuwait crisis of

1990–91 or the Iraq crisis of 2002–03, nor with regard to the Libyan and Syrian Civil Wars, for example, erupting after the ‘Arab Spring’ process started at the end of 2010 or indeed the Yemen Civil War.

Europe¹³⁶

The European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes adopted by the Council of Europe in 1957 provides that legal disputes (as defined in article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute) are to be sent to the International Court, although conciliation may be tried before this step is taken.¹³⁷ Other disputes are to go to arbitration, unless the parties have agreed to accept conciliation.

Within the NATO alliance,¹³⁸ there exist good offices facilities, and inquiry, mediation, conciliation and arbitration procedures may be instituted. In fact, the Organization proved of some use, for instance in the long-standing ‘cod war’ between Britain and Iceland, two NATO partners.¹³⁹ The Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has gradually been establishing dispute resolution mechanisms.¹⁴⁰ Under the key documents of this organisation,¹⁴¹ the participating states are to endeavour in good faith to reach a rapid and equitable solution of their disputes by using a variety of means. Under the Valletta Report 1991, as amended by the Stockholm Decision of 1992, any party to a dispute may request the establishment of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which once established may offer comments or advice with regard to negotiations between the parties in dispute, or any other appropriate dispute settlement process, and may engage in fact-finding and other conciliation functions. The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration was signed in 1992 and came into force two years later. Under

this Convention, a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration¹⁴² has been established in Geneva. Conciliation may be undertaken by a Conciliation Commission constituted for each dispute and drawn from a list established under the Convention.¹⁴³ The Commission will draw up a report containing its proposals for the peaceful settlement of the dispute and the parties will then have a period of thirty days during which to examine the proposals. If the parties do not accept the proposed settlement, the report will be forwarded to the OSCE Council through the Senior Council (formerly the Committee of Senior Officials).¹⁴⁴ The Convention also provided for the establishment of Arbitral Tribunals, similarly constituted for each dispute and drawn from a list.¹⁴⁵ Such a tribunal would be set up by express agreement between the parties in dispute¹⁴⁶ or where the state brought to arbitration has agreed in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.¹⁴⁷ The award of the Tribunal would be final and binding as between the parties.¹⁴⁸

In addition, the OSCE is able to send Missions to various participating states, with their consent, as part of its early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management responsibilities. Such Missions have been sent to Yugoslavia to promote dialogue between the populations of Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina and the authorities of the state; to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; to Georgia; Moldova; Tajikistan; Estonia; Ukraine; and Chechnya. Additional Missions have operated in Albania and Kosovo,¹⁴⁹ Moldova and Georgia.¹⁵⁰ Under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled at Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement), the OSCE was made responsible for the supervision of elections,¹⁵¹ for providing the framework for the conduct of discussions between the Bosnian parties on

confidence and security-building measures and for measures of subregional arms control,¹⁵² and for assisting in the creation of a Bosnian Commission on Human Rights.¹⁵³

Specialised Agencies¹⁵⁴

The various specialised agencies¹⁵⁵ which encourage international cooperation in functional spheres have their own procedures for settling disputes between their members relating to the interpretation of their constitutional instruments. Such procedures vary from organisation to organisation, although the general pattern involves recourse to one of the main organs of the institution upon the failure of negotiations. If this fails to result in a settlement, the matter may be referred to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration unless otherwise agreed.¹⁵⁶ In such cases, recourse to the Court is by way of a request for an advisory opinion,¹⁵⁷ although by virtue of constitutional provisions, the judgment of the Court would be accepted as binding and not as advisory.¹⁵⁸ In other cases, the opinions to be given by the International Court or by an arbitral tribunal are to be non-binding.¹⁵⁹ A number of organisations provide for other mechanisms of inquiry and dispute settlement.¹⁶⁰

The Settlement of International Economic Disputes¹⁶¹

There are a number of procedures and mechanisms which seek to resolve disputes in particular areas, usually economic and involving mixed disputes, that is between states and non-state entities. These processes are becoming of considerable significance and many of them are having a meaningful impact upon general international law. Indeed, investor–state dispute settlement (often termed ISDS) is a significant growing, but controversial, area as a balance is sought between the encouragement and protection of foreign investment and respect for the political and economic sovereignty of states.¹⁶² This section will briefly survey some of these mechanisms.

The dispute settlement procedures established under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade commenced with bilateral consultations under article XXII.¹⁶³ From this point, article XXIII provided for a party to refer a dispute for conciliation¹⁶⁴ where it was felt that ‘any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly’ under GATT was being ‘nullified or impaired’. A Panel, composed of experts chosen by the Director-General of GATT, then would seek to ascertain the relevant facts and reach a settlement.¹⁶⁵ In 1989, a series of improvements was adopted pending the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations. These improvements included the provision that the Council would normally accept the report of the Panel within fifteen months of the complaint and provisions relating to mediation, conciliation and arbitration were added.¹⁶⁶

The GATT process was absorbed within the World Trade Organization, which came into being on 1 January 1995. Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1994 is entitled 'Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes'.¹⁶⁷ Under the WTO scheme, disputes arising out of the agreements contained in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round are dealt with by the WTO General Council acting as the Dispute Settlement Body. Where a member state considers that a measure adopted by another member state has deprived it of a benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the GATT or other covered agreements, it may call for consultations with the other party and the latter must reply within ten days and enter into consultations within thirty days of receiving the request. If bilateral consultations have failed to resolve the dispute, the parties may agree to bring the dispute to the WTO Director-General, who may offer good offices, conciliation or mediation assistance. Where consultations fail to produce a settlement after sixty days, the complaining state may turn to the Dispute Settlement Body. This Body may establish a three-member panel, whose report should be produced within six months. Detailed procedures are laid down in the Understanding. The panel report is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body within sixty days, unless there is a consensus against adoption or one of the parties notifies an intention to appeal on grounds of law. The standing Appellate Body established by the Dispute Settlement Body consists of seven experts, three of whom may sit to hear appeals at any one time. Appeal proceedings generally are to last no more than sixty (or at most ninety) days. Unless there is a consensus against adoption within thirty days, the Dispute Settlement Body will accept the Appellate Body report.

Within thirty days of the adoption of the report, the parties must agree to comply with the recommendations and if this does not happen within a reasonable period, the party concerned must offer mutually acceptable compensation. If after twenty days, no satisfactory compensation is agreed, the complaining state may request authorisation from the Dispute Settlement Body to suspend concessions or obligations against the other party and this should be granted within thirty days of the end of the reasonable period. In any event, the Dispute Settlement Body will monitor the implementation of rulings or recommendations.¹⁶⁸

There are two particular points to make. First, a significant number of cases have been referred to the Dispute Settlement Body¹⁶⁹ and, secondly, the establishment of an Appellate Body, composed of trade law experts, has been having an important impact upon the development of international trade law and, indeed, more widely upon international law.¹⁷⁰ As a reflection of the latter, a number of issues of general international law interest have been dealt with, ranging from consideration of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and treaty interpretation¹⁷¹ to questions relating to procedural issues such as burden of proof.¹⁷² However, the Appellate Body is currently in crisis. By the end of 2019, only one of its members remained in office and three are required for a quorum. The reason has been that the United States has consistently vetoed the appointment of new appellate judges, justifying this on the grounds of the Appellate Body's 'overreach', its undue reliance on 'precedent' and its alleged disregard for the rules.¹⁷³

A number of regional dispute mechanisms concerning economic questions have been established. The most developed is the European Union, which has

a fully functioning judicial system with the Court of Justice in Luxembourg with wide-ranging jurisdiction.¹⁷⁴ Other relevant, but modest regional economic mechanisms include Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay),¹⁷⁵ Comesa¹⁷⁶ and ECOWAS.¹⁷⁷

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1992, linking the United States, Mexico and Canada, aiming at the free movement and liberalisation of goods, services, people and investment, and also containing dispute settlement provisions.¹⁷⁸ Tribunals established under NAFTA must apply both the NAFTA Treaty and applicable rules of international law.¹⁷⁹ Interim measures of protection may be ordered and the award of the tribunal is final and binding.¹⁸⁰ Questions relating to interpretation of the Treaty must be remitted to the Free Trade Commission, whose interpretations are binding.¹⁸¹ The dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 20 are applicable primarily to inter-state disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the NAFTA, including disputes relating to the financial services provisions of Chapter 14. Should attempts to resolve the particular dispute by consultation within certain time limits, and good offices, mediation and conciliation by the Free Trade Commission within certain time limits fail, the parties may request that the Commission establish a five-person Arbitral Panel.¹⁸²

However, with effect from 1 July 2020, NAFTA has been replaced by the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement with changed dispute settlement arrangements, although NAFTA claims may be filed before 1 July 2023 where the dispute arises with regard to investments made before 1 July 2020 and existed at that date. The major difference with regard to dispute

settlement (contained in Chapter 14 of the Agreement) is that Canada is not a party to the investor–state arbitration provisions, so that foreign investors in Canada will need to have recourse to the Canadian courts and not to international mechanisms.¹⁸³ More restricted standards for investors to bring claims have been introduced.¹⁸⁴ Chapter 31 of the Agreement deals with inter-state dispute settlement and provides for consultation and voluntary good offices, mediation or conciliation. Should there be no agreement, the parties may establish a panel to produce a report. If the disputing parties are unable to agree on a resolution to the dispute pursuant to the final report within forty-five days, the complaining party may suspend the application to the responding party of benefits of equivalent effect to the non-conformity or the nullification or impairment until the disputing parties agree on a resolution to the dispute.

The World Bank (i.e. the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association) established in 1993 an Inspection Panel system providing an independent forum for private citizens who believe that their interests have been or may be harmed by a project financed by the World Bank.¹⁸⁵ Upon receipt of a request by such private persons, the three-person Panel decides whether it is within its mandate and, if so, sends it to Bank Management who prepare a response for the Panel. A preliminary review is undertaken by the Panel that includes an independent assessment of the merits of Bank Management’s response. A recommendation is then submitted to the Board of the Bank as to whether the claims should be investigated. If the Board approves a recommendation to investigate, the Panel proceeds with the investigation and its findings are then sent to the Board and to Bank Management. The management must then

within six weeks submit its recommendations to the Board on what actions the Bank should take in response to the Panel's findings. The Board will then make a final decision as to future action based upon the Panel's findings and the recommendations of Bank Management.¹⁸⁶

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established under the auspices of the World Bank by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and the Nationals of Other States 1965 and administers ad hoc arbitrations.¹⁸⁷ It constitutes a framework within which conciliation and arbitration takes place and provides an autonomous system free from municipal law in which states and non-state investors (from member states) may settle disputes. States parties to the Convention¹⁸⁸ undertake to recognise awards made by arbitral tribunals acting under the auspices of the Centre as final and binding in their territories and to enforce them as if they were final judgments of national courts.¹⁸⁹ The jurisdiction of the Centre extends to 'any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a contracting state . . . and a national of another contracting state, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre'.¹⁹⁰ Accordingly, states must not only become parties to the Convention, but also agree in writing to the submission of the particular dispute to the settlement procedure, although this may be achieved in a concession agreement between the investor and the state concerned. In fact, bilateral investment treaties between states parties to the Convention frequently provide for recourse to arbitration under the auspices of the Centre in the event of an investment dispute.¹⁹¹ Further, a number of multilateral treaties now provide (or provided) for the submission to ICSID of disputes arising.¹⁹² In 1978, the Centre introduced the ICSID Additional Facility

which extends its jurisdiction to include disputes where only one of the parties is a contracting state or a national of a contracting state and disputes not arising directly out of an investment, provided the dispute relates to a transaction which has ‘features that distinguish it from an ordinary commercial transaction’ and further provides for fact-finding proceedings.

The Convention requires individuals to be nationals of a state other than the one complained against and article 25(2) specifically excludes dual nationals. Nationality is determined according to the rules of the state of nationality claimed and must exist both at the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered. The same principles apply to companies, except that article 25(2)(b) includes also juridical persons which had the nationality of the contracting state party to the dispute on the date on which consent to submission of the dispute occurred and which ‘because of foreign control, the parties agreed should be treated as a national of another contracting state for the purposes of this Convention’. This may be achieved in a bilateral investment treaty and may be implied in the circumstances.¹⁹³

Disputes are referred to conciliation commissions or arbitral tribunals constituted under ICSID’s auspices. Conciliation has been rare, but arbitration more frequent.¹⁹⁴ The Secretary-General may be asked to establish an Arbitral Tribunal by either party to a dispute that falls within the jurisdiction of ICSID. The parties nominate an uneven number of arbitrators with the chosen arbitrators deciding upon a neutral president of the tribunal. The applicable law is as agreed by the parties and otherwise the law of the contracting state party to the dispute together with such rules of international

law as may be applicable.¹⁹⁵ Awards are binding and not subject to any appeal or other remedy other than those provided within the Convention system itself.¹⁹⁶ Each contracting state is obliged to recognise ICSID awards and enforce pecuniary obligations imposed as if they were final judgments in its own courts.¹⁹⁷ A number of significant awards have now been made.¹⁹⁸

Another procedure of growing importance is the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.¹⁹⁹ A number of agreements provide for the settlement of disputes by arbitration under the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce and several cases have been heard.²⁰⁰ Also to be noted is the set of rules adopted by the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1966 and amended, most recently, in 2013.²⁰¹ A number of arbitrations are taking place pursuant to these rules. In addition, UNCITRAL Working Group III is studying the operations of the investor–state dispute system generally, a system which has become controversial, not least because of the perceived effect upon the economic and social policies of states.²⁰²

At this point, mention should be made of the bilateral investment treaties' system.²⁰³ As noted in Chapter 13,²⁰⁴ such treaties, of which there are now some 3,000, provide a framework within which nationals (including corporations) of one state party to the particular treaty are able to invest in the territory of the other state party under the protection of relevant rules of international law, such as fair and equitable treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and the prohibition of expropriation save for a purpose which is in the public interest and is not discriminatory and against the payment, without delay, of prompt and effective compensation. These treaties also contain

dispute settlement provisions, which *inter alia* provide that the states parties concerned agree to the submission of any dispute between one of the states and the foreign national or corporation regarding the terms of the particular treaty to binding third-party arbitration, usually ICSID or the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce or arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of UNCITRAL.²⁰⁵ Dispute resolution clauses vary from treaty to treaty, it is important to point out, but many provide for an initial period for an attempt to resolve the dispute by negotiation or pursuit of local remedies followed by recourse to international arbitration at the request of the national or company concerned. Should the two states parties to the treaty have a dispute over the interpretation or application of the agreement, and in the absence of settlement by diplomatic means, either party may have recourse to international arbitration.²⁰⁶ An increasing number of investor–state arbitrations under bilateral investment treaties between the host state and the state of which the investor has nationality are taking place and a considerable and valuable case-law is being established since the first such case in 1987.²⁰⁷

A development of the bilateral investment treaty approach has been the establishment of regional trade agreements which in terms of dispute resolution build upon the former model. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was signed between the European Union and Canada in August 2014 and entered into force provisionally in September 2017.²⁰⁸ This is a free-trade arrangement which provides for a range of tariff reductions between the parties. Its dispute resolution provisions are based on the establishment of a fifteen-person permanent tribunal (five each from the European Union and Canada and five from other states) to hear claims

brought by investors for breach of the investment protection provisions.²⁰⁹ An Appellate Tribunal is also provided.²¹⁰ Cases would be heard by divisions of the tribunal composed of three members (one each from the European Union and Canada to be chaired by a person from a third state). These provisions would replace the current eight bilateral investment treaties between Canada and particular members of the European Union. A Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement linking the United States and eleven other states, including Japan, Australia and Canada, was signed in February 2016, but the United States withdrew its signature in January 2017 and the effort fell away.²¹¹ However, the other parties agreed in January 2018 to establish the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and by 14 January 2019, it entered into force for seven countries (Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam).²¹² In so far as investor–state dispute settlement is concerned, Section B of Chapter 9 of the agreement provides that if a dispute cannot be resolved through consultation or negotiation within six months, the claimant (investor) may submit the claim to arbitration, which may be under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both the respondent and the party of the claimant are parties to the ICSID Convention; or under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, provided that either the respondent or the party of the claimant is a party to the ICSID Convention; or under the UNCITRAL (UN Commission on International Trade Law) Arbitration Rules; or, if the claimant and respondent agree, any other arbitral institution or any other arbitration rules.²¹³ No appellate mechanism is provided for, but article 9.23(11) states that in the event that such a mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investor–state dispute settlement tribunals is developed in the future under other institutional

arrangements, the parties shall consider whether awards rendered under the agreement should be subject to that appellate mechanism. It is to be noted here that article 8.29 of CETA provides that its parties are to pursue with other trading partners the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes. Once such a multilateral mechanism is established, the CETA Joint Committee would then adopt a decision providing that investment disputes under Section F of CETA would be decided pursuant to the multilateral mechanism and make appropriate transitional arrangements. Taken together, therefore, these instruments may possibly lay the foundations for a comprehensive multilateral investment tribunal arrangement which could subsume bilateral investment treaty methodologies. However, it must be recognised that concerns have been raised about the argued diminution of the powers of states to regulate their own economies faced with such investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms and the proposed creations remain controversial.²¹⁴

An institution which constitutes a mixed model, combining elements of inter-state arbitration with elements of state–individual arbitration is the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal which was established in The Hague by the Claims Settlement Declaration in 1981.²¹⁵ The Tribunal is an international arbitral body set up to adjudicate claims of US nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals against the United States arising out of alleged violations of property rights as a result of the circumstances surrounding the hostage crisis. The Tribunal also has jurisdiction to hear certain official claims between the United States and Iran arising out of contractual arrangements for the purchase and sale of goods and services, and disputes relating to the interpretation and implementation of the Claims Settlement Agreement itself.

As another indication of its mixed character, article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration provides that the Tribunal shall apply ‘such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances’.

In order to ensure payment of awards to US nationals, a Security Account was established with \$1 billion capital from Iranian assets frozen in the United States as a result of the hostage crisis. Once the sum falls below \$500 million, Iran is under an obligation to replenish the Account.²¹⁶ Under the terms of the Agreement, all claims had to be filed by 19 January 1982.²¹⁷ The Tribunal has nine judges, three each chosen by Iran and the United States and three by the remaining six. It sits in three chambers of three persons each and in important cases in plenary session. It operates under UNCITRAL Rules, save as modified by the parties or the Tribunal.²¹⁸ Awards are final and binding and enforceable in any foreign court in accordance with domestic law.²¹⁹

A variety of important issues have been addressed by the Tribunal, including the treatment of dual nationality in claims²²⁰ and in particular issues relating to expropriation.²²¹ Although claims of under \$250,000 are to be represented by the government of the national concerned, claims in excess of this are presented by the individual claimants themselves, while the agents of the two states are present during the hearing with the right of audience.²²² Nevertheless, the Tribunal has emphasised on several occasions that the claim remains that of the individual and is not that of the state, as would be normal in classical state responsibility situations.²²³

Whether this model will be used in other similar situations is an open question, particularly since the trend in the post-war era has tended towards the lump-sum settlement of such disputes.²²⁴ But the value of the Tribunal in general terms in resolving the large number of claims in question and in addressing significant issues of international law cannot be denied.

The establishment of the UN Compensation Commission constitutes an interesting and significant development.²²⁵ It was created by Security Council resolution 692 (1991) to process claims for compensation for ‘any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait’.²²⁶ It constitutes a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and comprises a Governing Council (being the fifteen members at any given time of the Security Council), a secretariat and Commissioners appointed to review and resolve claims.²²⁷ In resolution 705 (1991), the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided that compensation to be paid by Iraq should not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq.²²⁸ In resolution 706 (1991), the Council authorised states to import a certain amount of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products in order to pay for essential food and humanitarian purchases by Iraq and provide payments for the UN Compensation Commission via the Compensation Fund.²²⁹ Iraq at first refused to cooperate,²³⁰ but in 1996, the ‘oil for food’ scheme put forward in resolution 986 (1995) began to function. This resolution provided also that 30 per cent of the proceeds of such oil sales were to be allocated to the Compensation Fund. This percentage was reduced to 25 per cent in resolution 1330 (2000).

The Compensation Commission has received an overwhelming number of claims. Some 2.6 million claims from around 100 states were received.²³¹ The claims were divided into six categories.²³² The deadline of 1 January 1995 was set for the filing of category A to D claims; 1 January 1996 for the filing of category E and F claims; and 1 February 1997 for category F environmental claims. Provisional Rules were adopted by the Commission in 1992.²³³ Claims are subject to a preliminary assessment by the secretariat and then sent to panels of commissioners sitting in private.²³⁴ Recommendations are then sent to the Governing Council for decision from which there is no appeal. The first compensation awards were made in spring 1995.²³⁵ By March 2003, a total of 2,597,527 claims had been resolved and \$16,708,302,236 compensation paid.²³⁶ The Commission has awarded compensation with regard to damage caused within Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan and Gulf states by Iraqi Scud missiles fired during the conflict.²³⁷

The Commission constitutes an interesting hybrid between a fact-finding political organ and a quasi-judicial mechanism.²³⁸ It has been noted that panels are required, in the absence of specific guidance by the Security Council or the Governing Council, to apply international law.²³⁹ It has had to deal with a remarkable number of claims with great success and has proceeded upon an expedited basis by relying upon computerised handling of smaller claims and without a judicial hearing stage.²⁴⁰

Binding Methods of Inter-State Dispute Settlement

As has been seen, there is a considerable variety of means, mechanisms and institutions established to resolve disputes in the field of international law. However, a special place is accorded to the creation of judicial bodies. Such courts and tribunals may be purely inter-state or permit individuals to appear as applicants or respondents.²⁴¹ They may be permanent or temporary, being established to resolve one particular dispute. In resolving disputes, a variety of techniques is likely to be used and references to judicial bodies should be seen as part of a larger process of peaceful settlement. As Jennings has written, ‘the adjudicative process can serve, not only to resolve classical legal disputes, but it can also serve as an important tool of preventive diplomacy in more complex situations’.²⁴² The following section will deal with arbitration and the following chapter with the International Court of Justice.

Arbitration²⁴³

In determining whether a body established by states to settle a dispute is of a judicial, administrative or political nature, the Tribunal in the *Laguna del Desierto* case emphasised that ‘the practice of international law is to look at the nature of the procedure followed by those states before the body in question’.²⁴⁴

The procedure of arbitration grew to some extent out of the processes of diplomatic settlement and represented an advance towards a developed international legal system. In its modern form, it emerged with the Jay Treaty of 1794 between Britain and America, which provided for the establishment of mixed commissions to solve legal disputes between the parties.²⁴⁵ The procedure was successfully used in the *Alabama Claims* arbitration²⁴⁶ of 1872 between the two countries, which resulted in the United Kingdom having to pay compensation for the damage caused by a Confederate warship built in the United Kingdom. This success stimulated further arbitrations, for example the *Behring Sea*²⁴⁷ and *British Guiana and Venezuela Boundary*²⁴⁸ arbitrations at the close of the nineteenth century.²⁴⁹

The 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes included a number of provisions on international arbitration, the object of which was deemed to be, under article 15, ‘the settlement of differences between states by judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect for law’. This became the accepted definition of arbitration in international law. It was repeated in article 37 of the 1907 Hague

Conventions and adopted by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case concerning the *Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne*²⁵⁰ and by the International Court.²⁵¹

International arbitration was held to be the most effective and equitable manner of dispute settlement, where diplomacy had failed. An agreement to arbitrate implied the legal obligation to accept the terms of the award under article 18 of the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. In addition, a Permanent Court of Arbitration was established.²⁵² It is not really a court since it is not composed of a fixed body of judges. It consists of a panel of persons, nominated by the contracting states²⁵³ (each one nominating a maximum of four), comprising individuals ‘of known competency in questions of international law, of the highest moral reputation and disposed to accept the duties of an arbitrator’.²⁵⁴ Where contracting states wish to go to arbitration, they are entitled to choose the members of the tribunal from the panel. Thus, it is in essence machinery facilitating the establishment of arbitral tribunals. The PCA also consists of an International Bureau, which acts as the registry of the Court and keeps its records, and a Permanent Administrative Council, exercising administrative control over the Bureau. Administrative support was provided in this context by the Bureau in the *Heathrow Airport User Charges* arbitration.²⁵⁵ The PCA has been used in a variety of cases from an early date.²⁵⁶

Between 1900 and 1932, some twenty disputes went through the PCA procedure, but from that point the numbers began to fall drastically. However, more recently the PCA has started to play an increasingly important role, so much so that an element of ‘institutionalisation’ of

arbitration has been detected by some writers.²⁵⁷ It has served as the registry in, for example, the two phases of the *Eritrea–Yemen* arbitration²⁵⁸ and for the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission²⁵⁹ and Claims Commission²⁶⁰ and in the *Larsen v. Hawaii* arbitration.²⁶¹ It also provided facilities in cases such as the *Mox* arbitration between the United Kingdom and Ireland²⁶² and *Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic*.²⁶³ The PCA acts in addition as registry for numerous investor–state arbitrations under bilateral or multilateral investment treaties or investment laws,²⁶⁴ and has also adopted, for example, Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States,²⁶⁵ Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State,²⁶⁶ Optional Rules of Arbitration Involving International Organizations and States,²⁶⁷ Optional Rules for Arbitration between International Organizations and Private Parties²⁶⁸ and Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment in 2001.²⁶⁹ The International Law Commission itself formulated a set of Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1958.²⁷⁰

Arbitral tribunals may be composed in different ways.²⁷¹ There may be a single arbitrator or a collegiate body. In the latter case, each party will appoint an equal number of arbitrators with the chairman or umpire being appointed by either the parties or the arbitrators already nominated. In many cases, a head of state will be suggested as a single arbitrator and he will then nominate an expert or experts in the field of international law or other relevant disciplines to act for him.²⁷² Under the PCA system, and in the absence of agreement to the contrary, each party selects two arbitrators from the panel, only one of whom may be a national of the state. These arbitrators

then choose an umpire, but, if they fail to do so, this task will be left to a third party, nominated by agreement. If this also fails to produce a result, a complicated process then ensues culminating in the drawing of lots.²⁷³ An unusual situation was revealed in *Croatia v. Slovenia*,²⁷⁴ when it transpired that one of the two Slovenian agents was discovered in July 2015 communicating with the Slovenian-nominated member of the Arbitral Tribunal. As a result, both the agent and tribunal member resigned. The latter was replaced by Judge Abraham (President of the International Court of Justice). This was followed by the resignation of the Croatian-nominated member of the Tribunal and Croatia's notification that it believed that Slovenia had committed a material breach of the arbitration agreement permitting Croatia to terminate it.²⁷⁵ Judge Abraham then resigned from the Tribunal. Slovenia objected to Croatia's notification and declared that the Tribunal had the power and duty to continue the proceedings. It refrained from appointing a replacement for Judge Abraham. Accordingly, the President of the Tribunal appointed a replacement for him and also appointed a replacement for the previous Croatian-nominated member. The recomposed Tribunal issued a Partial Award on 20 June 2016 in which it declared that the arbitration agreement was not terminated and the case could continue.²⁷⁶ Two points should be made here. First, the Tribunal reaffirmed the general principle that an international tribunal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret for this purpose the instruments which govern that jurisdiction (known as the principle of *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* or *competence de la competence*),²⁷⁷ and, secondly, that what had happened had violated the principle of the independence and impartiality of members of an Arbitral Tribunal.²⁷⁸ It was, however, felt that in the circumstances, the arbitration could continue.²⁷⁹

States are not obliged to submit a dispute to the procedure of arbitration, in the absence of their consent.²⁸⁰ This consent may be expressed in arbitration treaties, in which the contracting states agree to submit certain kinds of disputes that may arise between them to arbitration, or in specific provisions of general treaties, which provide for disputes with regard to the treaty itself to be submitted to arbitration,²⁸¹ although the number of treaties dealing primarily with the peaceful settlement of disputes has declined since 1945.²⁸² Consent to the reference of a dispute to arbitration with regard to matters that have already arisen is usually expressed by means of a *compromis*, or special agreement, and the terms in which it is couched are of extreme importance. This is because the jurisdiction of the tribunal is defined in relation to the provisions of the treaty or *compromis*, whichever happens to be the relevant document in the particular case. However, in general, the tribunal may determine its competence in interpreting the *compromis* and other documents concerned in the case.²⁸³

The law to be applied in arbitration proceedings is international law,²⁸⁴ but the parties may agree upon certain principles to be taken into account by the tribunal and specify this in the *compromis*. In this case, the tribunal must apply the rules specified. For example, in the *British Guiana and Venezuela Boundary* dispute,²⁸⁵ it was stated that occupation for fifty years should be accepted as constituting a prescriptive title to territory. And in the *Trail Smelter* case,²⁸⁶ the law to be applied was declared to be US law and practice with regard to such questions as well as international law.²⁸⁷

Agreements sometimes specify that the decisions should be reached in accordance with ‘law and equity’ and this means that the general principles of justice common to legal systems should be taken into account as well as the provisions of international law. Such general principles may also be considered where there are no specific rules covering the situation under discussion.²⁸⁸ The rules of procedure of the tribunal are often specified in the *compromis* and decided by the parties by agreement as the process commences. Hague Convention I of 1899 as revised in 1907 contains agreed procedure principles, which would apply in the absence of express stipulation. It is characteristic of arbitration that the tribunal is competent to determine its own jurisdiction and therefore interpret the relevant instruments determining that jurisdiction.²⁸⁹ Once an arbitral award has been made, it is final and binding upon the parties,²⁹⁰ but in certain circumstances the award itself may be regarded as a nullity.²⁹¹ There is disagreement among lawyers as to the grounds on which such a decision may be taken. It is, however, fairly generally accepted that where a tribunal exceeds its powers under the *compromis*, its award may be treated as a nullity, although this is not a common occurrence. Such excess of power (*excès de pouvoir*) may be involved where the tribunal decides a question not submitted to it, or applies rules it is not authorised to apply. The main example of the former is the *North-Eastern Boundary* case²⁹² between Canada and the United States, where the arbitrator, after being asked to decide which of two lines constituted the frontier, in fact chose a third line.

It is sometimes argued that invalidity of the *compromis* is a ground of nullity,²⁹³ while the corruption of a member of the tribunal or a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure are further possibilities as

grounds of nullity.²⁹⁴ Article 35 of the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure drawn up by the International Law Commission, for example, provides for a successful plea of nullity in three cases: excess of power; corruption of a tribunal member; or serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, including failure to state the reasons for the award.²⁹⁵ ‘Essential error’ has also been suggested as a ground of nullity, but the definition of this is far from unambiguous.²⁹⁶ It would appear not to cover the evaluation of documents and evidence,²⁹⁷ but may cover manifest errors,²⁹⁸ such as not taking into account a relevant treaty or a clear mistake as to the appropriate municipal law.²⁹⁹ Of course, once a party recognises the award as valid and binding, it will not be able to challenge the validity of the award at a later stage.³⁰⁰ In certain circumstances, it may be open to a party to request a revision or reopening of the award in order to provide for rectification of an error or consideration of a fact unknown at the time to the tribunal and the requesting party which is of such a nature as to have a decisive influence on the award.³⁰¹

Arbitration as a method of settling disputes combines elements of both diplomatic and judicial procedures. It depends for its success on a certain amount of goodwill between the parties in drawing up the *compromis* and constituting the tribunal, as well as actually enforcing the award subsequently made. A large part depends upon negotiating processes. On the other hand, arbitration is an adjudicative technique in that the award is final and binding and the arbitrators are required to base their decision on law.³⁰² It will be seen in the following section just how close arbitration is to judicial settlement of disputes by the International Court of Justice, and it is no coincidence that the procedure of arbitration through the PCA began to

decline with the establishment and consolidation of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1920s.

In recent years, however, there has been a rise in the number of inter-state arbitrations. The *Rann of Kutch* case,³⁰³ the *Anglo-French Continental Shelf* case,³⁰⁴ the *Beagle Channel* case³⁰⁵ and the *Taba* case³⁰⁶ were all the subject of arbitral awards, usually successfully.³⁰⁷ More recent examples include the *Eritrea–Yemen* arbitration,³⁰⁸ the *Eritrea–Ethiopia* boundary delimitation case,³⁰⁹ the *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago* maritime delimitation case,³¹⁰ the *Philippines v. China* South China Sea arbitration³¹¹ and the *Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia)* arbitration.³¹² It may be that further such issues may be resolved in this fashion, although much depends on the evaluation of the parties as to the most satisfactory method of dispute settlement in the light of their own particular interests and requirements. Of especial interest, however, was the *Abyei* arbitration,³¹³ between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement concerning the operations of the experts of the Abyei Boundaries Commission. It essentially required the Tribunal to delimit an area which became part of the boundary between Sudan and the newly created South Sudan in 2011.³¹⁴

Arbitration is an extremely useful process where some technical expertise is required, or where greater flexibility and speed than is available before the International Court is desired.³¹⁵ The states themselves choose the arbitrators and lay down the applicable law and rules of procedure, as well as set the timetable. In addition, the states involved may wish for the proceedings to be confidential, something which is not achievable in the International Court

with its public oral hearings and publication of written proceedings. However, the parties pay all the costs of the arbitration, including the fees due to the registrar and arbitrators, while in the International Court, the judges and members of the registry are paid by the United Nations.³¹⁶

Arbitration may be the appropriate mechanism to utilise as between states and international institutions, since only states may appear before the ICJ in contentious proceedings. The establishment of arbitral tribunals has often been undertaken in order to deal relatively quietly and cheaply with a series of problems within certain categories: for example, the mixed tribunals established after the First World War to settle territorial questions; or the Mexican Claims commissions which handled various claims against Mexico.³¹⁷ An attempt was made to tackle issues raised by the situation in the Former Yugoslavia by the establishment of an Arbitration Commission.³¹⁸ However, the Commission, while issuing a number of Opinions on issues concerning, for example, statehood, recognition, human rights and boundary matters, was not able to act as an arbitral tribunal as between the parties to the conflict.

Like arbitration, judicial settlement is a binding method of dispute settlement, but by means of an established and permanent body. There are a number of international and regional courts deciding disputes between subjects of international law, in accordance with the rules and principles of international law.³¹⁹ However, by far the most important, both by prestige and jurisdiction, is the International Court of Justice, and this is the subject of the following chapter.

Suggestions for Further Reading

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² See above, [Chapter 6](#) with regard to regional human rights courts; [Chapter 7](#) with regard to international criminal courts and tribunals; [Chapter 10](#) with regard to dispute settlement under the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982; and [Chapter 18](#) with regard to the ICJ.

³ See Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/1994/512, 27 April 1994, 33 ILM, 1994, p. 786; and generally M. M. Ricciardi, 'Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis', 17 *Yale Journal of International Law*, 1992, p. 301.

⁴ Libya on 31 August 1990 and Chad on 3 September 1990: see *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 6, 14; 100 ILR, pp. 1, 13.

⁵ ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 40; 100 ILR, p. 39.

⁶ 100 ILR, p. 102, article 1. See also 33 ILM, 1994, p. 619.

⁷ 100 ILR, p. 103, article 6. See also the letter of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/1994/432, 13 April 1994, *ibid.*, pp. 103–4.

⁸ Note that on 14 April, the Security Council adopted resolution 910 (1994) by which the initial UN reconnaissance team was exempted from sanctions operating against Libya by virtue of resolution 748 (1992). The observer group received a similar exemption by virtue of resolution 915 B.

⁹ See Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/1994/672, 6 June 1994, 100 ILR, pp. 111 ff. The Joint Declaration was countersigned by the Chief Military Observer of UNASOG as a witness.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹¹ With the exception of binding Security Council resolutions: see further below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1082.

¹² See further below, [Chapter 18](#), p. 933.

¹³ PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924, p. 11.

¹⁴ See H. Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law in the International Community*, London, 1933, especially pp. 19–20. See also Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, pp. 14 ff.

¹⁵ See further below, p. 933.

¹⁶ See *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 22–3; 61 ILR, pp. 530, 548–9; and *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 435–6; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 146–7.

¹⁷ General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV). See also the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, General Assembly resolution 37/590; resolutions 2627 (XXV); 2734 (XXV); 40/9; the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations which may Threaten International Peace and Security 1988, resolution 43/51; and the Declaration on Fact-finding, resolution 46/59.

¹⁸ See article 33(1) of the UN Charter and section I(3) and (10) of the Manila Declaration.

¹⁹ Emphasis added. Note that the International Court in *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 145, referred to the principle that parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, should seek a solution by peaceful means, as a principle of customary international law.

²⁰ See UN, *Handbook*, chapter II; UN, *Principles and Guidelines for International Negotiations*, adopted in General Assembly resolution 53/101 (1998); Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, chapter 2; Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, chapter 1; Merrills, ‘Mosaic’; K. Wellens, *Negotiations in the Caselaw of the International Court of Justice: A Functional Analysis*, Cheltenham, 2014; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, chapter 2; B. Starkey, M. A. Boyer and J. Wilkenfeld, *International Negotiation in a Complex World*, 4th ed., Lanham, 2015; and H. Lachs, ‘The Law and Settlement of International Disputes’, in Brus *et al.*, *Dispute Settlement*, pp. 287–9. See also Murty, ‘Settlement’, pp. 678–9; A. Watson, *Diplomacy*, London, 1982; F. Kirgis, *Prior Consultation in International Law*, Charlottesville, 1983; P. J. De Waart, *The Element of Negotiation in the Pacific Settlement of Disputes between States*, The Hague, 1973; A. Lall, *Modern International Negotiation*, New York, 1966; G. Geamanu, ‘Théorie et Pratiques des Négociations en Droit

International’, 166 HR, 1980 I, p. 365; B. Y. Diallo, *Introduction à l’Étude et à la Pratique de la Négociation*, Paris, 1998; N. E. Ghazali, ‘La Négociation Diplomatique dans la Jurisprudence Internationale’, *Revue Belge de Droit International*, 1992, p. 323; and D. Anderson, ‘Negotiations and Dispute Settlement’, in *Remedies in International Law* (ed. M. Evans), Oxford, 1998, p. 111. Note also that operative para. 10 of the Manila Declaration emphasises that direct negotiations are a ‘flexible and effective means of peaceful settlement’.

²¹ See Judge Nervo, *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1973, pp. 3, 45; 55 ILR, pp. 183, 225. See also *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924, p. 15, noting that ‘[b]efore a dispute can be made the subject of an action at law, its subject matter should have been clearly defined by diplomatic negotiations’; and *Right of Passage (Preliminary Objections)*, ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 105, 148; 24 ILR, pp. 840, 848–9. The Court noted in *Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 22, 1932, p. 13; 5 AD, pp. 461, 463, that the judicial settlement of disputes was ‘simply an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the parties’.

²² *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 70, 132. In *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 539, the Court declared that negotiation is part of the usual practice of states in their bilateral and multilateral relations, but ‘the fact that a given issue is negotiated at a given time is not sufficient to give rise to an obligation to negotiate’. For that obligation to arise, the intention of the parties to be legally bound must be demonstrated, *ibid*. Note that certain treaties provide for consultations in certain circumstances: see article 84 of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations 1975; article 41 of the Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978; and article 42 of the Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Property, Archives and Debts 1983.

²³ See *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 3; 55 ILR, p. 238. See also article VIII(2) of the Antarctic Treaty 1959; article XV of the Moon Treaty 1979; article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978; article 84 of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations 1975; and article 283 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.

²⁴ This provision has been discussed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. See e.g. *Southern Bluefin Tuna* 28 ILM, 1999, p. 1624; and *Mox* 41 ILM, 2002, p. 405. In *Land Reclamation (Malaysia v. Singapore)* 126 ILR, p. 487, it was held that there was no need to continue the exchange of views where it was clear that the exchange could yield no positive result, *ibid.*, para. 48. In *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, Arbitral Award of 11 April 2006, paras. 201–3, it was held that article 283(1) could not reasonably be interpreted to require that, when several years of negotiations had already failed to resolve the dispute, further and separate exchanges of views would be required. It was noted that the requirement of article 283(1) for settlement by negotiation is in relation to the obligation to agree upon a delimitation under articles 74 and 83, subsumed within the negotiations which those articles require already to have taken place.

²⁵ See e.g. the Revised General Act for the Settlement of Disputes 1949; the International Maritime Organization Treaty 1948; and the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. Note also article 22 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965, which provides for recourse to the International Court where the dispute is ‘not settled by negotiations or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention [application to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination]’, see *Ukraine v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2019, paras. 106 ff. The Court held that these preliminary conditions were alternative and not cumulative, *ibid.*, para. 113.

²⁶ *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 303.

²⁷ See *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 53–4; 41 ILR, pp. 29, 83. See also *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 32; 55 ILR, pp. 238, 267.

²⁸ See *Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 42, p. 116; 6 AD, pp. 403, 405. An obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement, *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 68; and *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 538–9. A requirement that a dispute cannot be settled by negotiations implies that ‘no reasonable probability exists that further negotiations would lead to a settlement’, *Belgium v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 422, 446. The International Court has found that a negotiation precondition was satisfied when the parties’ ‘basic position ha[d] not subsequently evolved’, *ibid.* The Court’s inquiry into the

sufficiency of negotiations is a question of fact to be considered in each case, *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 70, 133. See also *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, para. 93. A genuine attempt to negotiate can be made outside of bilateral diplomacy, including in the context of international organisations, see *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 70, 133; and *ICAO*, para. 93.

²⁹ ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 47. The Court has noted that, ‘like all similar obligations to negotiate in international law, the negotiations have to be conducted in good faith’: *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 423. See also *Bolivia v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 538. Questions as to the meaning of ‘negotiations’ arose in both *Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 69, 99; and *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 46 ff.

³⁰ 47 ILR, pp. 418, 454. See also *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 68; and *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 70, 132–3. Note Judge Greenwood’s Separate Opinion, *ibid.*, p. 226.

³¹ 24 ILR, pp. 101, 119. The Court has noted that the questions of whether negotiations as distinct from mere protests or disputations have taken place and whether they have failed or become futile or deadlocked are essentially questions of fact for consideration in each case. See also *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 70, 133.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 128. See also the *Tacna–Arica* arbitration, 2 RIAA, pp. 921 ff.

³³ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 263–4; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 213–14. The Court usually urges the parties to negotiate when making an order granting (or indeed declining) provisional measures: see e.g. *Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark)*, ICJ Reports, 1991, p. 12; and the *Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay* Orders of 13 July 2006 and 23 January 2007. See further as to provisional measures, below, [Chapter 18](#), p. 957.

³⁴ See *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 47; 41 ILR, pp. 29, 77; and *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 32; 55 ILR, p. 267.

³⁵ See UN, *Handbook*, p. 33; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, pp. 43 ff.; Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 27; Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, chapter 2; R. R. Probst, ‘Good

Offices' In the Light of Swiss International Practice and Experience, Dordrecht, 1989; *New Approaches to International Mediation* (ed. C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb), New York, 1988; J. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 6th ed., Oxford, 1963, pp. 373–6; and Murty, 'Settlement', pp. 680–1. See also *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (ed. S. Touval and I. W. Zartman), Boulder, 1985; J. Greig and P. Diehl, *International Mediation*, Cambridge, 2012; and *Mediation in International Relations* (ed. J. Bercovitch and J. Z. Rubin), London, 1992. See also UN General Assembly resolution 65/238, 2011, on strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution. Note also UN, *Guidance for Effective Mediation*, 2012.

³⁶ Murty, 'Settlement', p. 681. Note also the exercise of US good offices in relation to a territorial dispute between France with regard to its protectorate of Cambodia and Thailand, SCOR, First Year, 81st meeting, pp. 505–7.

³⁷ See GAOR, 21st session, Supp. No. 2, part I, chapter III.

³⁸ See *AFDI*, 1972, pp. 995–6. Note also the role played by Cardinal Samoré, a Papal mediator in the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, between 1978 and 1985: see Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 30; and 24 ILM, 1985, pp. 1 ff.

³⁹ See *DUSPIL*, 1974, pp. 656–8, 759–62.

⁴⁰ See Security Council resolution 367 (1975) requesting the UN Secretary-General to undertake a good offices mission to Cyprus. See the statement by the Secretary-General of the functions of good offices cited in UN, *Handbook*, pp. 35–6. See also B. G. Ramcharan, 'The Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary-General in the Field of Human Rights', 76 *AJIL*, 1982, p. 130. Note also para. 12 of the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security 1988, General Assembly resolution 43/51. See also below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1086.

⁴¹ S/19835, annex. See also Security Council resolution 622 (1988).

⁴² E.g. with the Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity with regard to the Western Sahara and Mayotte situations, UN, *Handbook*, p. 39, and with the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States with regard to Central America, *ibid*.

⁴³ See e.g. General Assembly resolutions 65/283 (2011), 66/291 (2012), 68/203 (2014) and 70/304 (2016) and Security Council resolution 2171 (2014).

⁴⁴ S/2015/730, para. 24. See also the UN Secretary-General's Report on 'Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution', A/66/811 (2012). See in particular the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, *ibid.*, Annex I. Note also the establishment of the Mediation Support Unit within the Policy and Mediation Division of the UN Department of Political Affairs and, within the unit, the creation of a Standby Team of mediation experts, <https://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support>.

⁴⁵ See UN Secretary-General's Report on 'Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations on mediation', A/70/328 (2015).

⁴⁶ Article 3 of Hague Convention I 1899 and Convention I 1907.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, article 2.

⁴⁸ See Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 24; Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, chapter 3; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, chapter 3; M. S. Becker and S. M. H. Nouwen, 'International Commissions of Inquiry: What Difference Do They Make? Taking an Empirical Approach', 30 *EJIL*, 2019, p. 819; and N. Bar-Yaacov, *The Handling of International Disputes by Means of Inquiry*, London, 1974. See also UN, *Handbook*, pp. 24 ff.; T. Bensalah, *L'Enquête Internationale dans le Règlement des Conflits*, Paris, 1976; P. Ruegger, 'Quelques Réflexions sur le Rôle Actuel et Futur des Commissions Internationales d'Enquête', in *Mélanges Bindschedler*, Paris, 1980, p. 427; and P. Ruegger, 'Nouvelles Réflexions sur le Rôle des Procédures Internationales d'Enquête dans la Solution des Conflits Internationaux', in *Études en l'Honneur de Robert Ago*, Milan, 1987, p. 327.

⁴⁹ Inquiry as a specific procedure under consideration here is to be distinguished from the general process of inquiry or fact-finding as part of other mechanisms for dispute settlement, such as through the UN or other institutions. See *Fact-Finding Before International Tribunals* (ed. R. B. Lillich), Charlottesville, 1992.

⁵⁰ See Bar-Yaacov, *International Disputes*, chapter 2. The incident of the destruction of the US battleship *Maine* in 1898, which precipitated the American–Spanish War, was particularly noted as an impetus to the evolution of inquiry as an important ‘safety valve’ mechanism: *ibid.*, pp. 33–4. This was particularly in the light of the rival national inquiries that came to opposing conclusions in that episode: see the inquiry commission in that case, *Annual Register*, 1898, p. 362.

⁵¹ Article 9 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1899.

⁵² Bar-Yaacov, *International Disputes*, chapter 3. See also Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 44 ff.; and J. B. Scott, *The Hague Court Reports*, New York, 1916, p. 403.

⁵³ The Commission of Inquiry consisted of four naval officers of the UK, Russian, French and American fleets, plus a fifth member chosen by the other four (in the event an Austro-Hungarian). It was required to examine all the circumstances, particularly with regard to responsibility and blame.

⁵⁴ It was found that there was no justification for the Russian attack. In the event, both sides accepted the report and the sum of £65,000 was paid by Russia to the UK: Bar-Yaacov, *International Disputes*, p. 70.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, chapter 4. Note also the *Tavignano* inquiry, Scott, *Hague Court Reports*, p. 413; the *Tiger* inquiry, Bar-Yaacov, *International Disputes*, p. 156; and the *Tubantia* inquiry, Scott, *Hague Court Reports*, p. 135. See also Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 46 ff.; and Bar-Yaacov, *International Disputes*, pp. 141–79.

⁵⁶ Bar-Yaacov, *International Disputes*, chapter 5.

⁵⁷ These were prefigured by the Taft or Knox Treaties of 1911 (which did not come into operation), *ibid.*, pp. 113–17. The USSR also signed a number of treaties which provide for joint inquiries with regard to frontier incidents, *ibid.*, pp. 117–19.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179–95; and Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 51 ff. See also 35 ILR, p. 485; Cmnd 776; and E. Lauterpacht, *The Contemporary Practice of the UK in the Field of International Law*, London, 1962, vol. I, pp. 50–3.

⁵⁹ Lauterpacht, *Contemporary Practice*, p. 53; Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 52; and Bar-Yaacov, *International Disputes*, p. 192.

⁶⁰ Chile denied liability, but agreed to make an *ex gratia* payment equal to the amount of compensation that would be payable upon a finding of liability, such amount to be determined by the Commission.

⁶¹ 88 ILR, p. 727; and see Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 54 ff.

⁶² See the announcement by the UN Secretary-General of a mission in 1988 to Iran and Iraq to investigate the situation of prisoners of war at the request of those states, S/20147. See also Security Council resolution 384 (1975) concerning East Timor. The General Assembly adopted a Declaration on Fact-Finding in resolution 46/59 (1991). See also the operation of the UN Compensation Commission established to resolve claims against Iraq resulting from its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and described by the UN Secretary-General as performing an ‘essentially fact-finding function’, S/2259, 1991, para. 20: see Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 42; and Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 59, and the work of the World Bank Inspection Panel. See further below, pp. 905 and 912.

⁶³ See A/HRC/12/48 (2009). Note that Judge Goldstone subsequently reconsidered elements of his report as to intentionality of some Israeli attacks and as to inquiries initiated by Israel; see www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html.

⁶⁴ The Palmer Report concluded that the Israeli blockade of Gaza was legal, but criticised the decision to board the vessels and the conduct of the flotilla; see <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/Palmer-Committee-Final-report.pdf>.

⁶⁵ See article 26 of the ILO Constitution. See also the inquiry by the International Civil Aviation Organization in 1983 into the shooting down of a Korean airliner: Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 26.

⁶⁶ Note e.g. article 90 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1949 providing for the establishment of an International Fact-Finding Commission, and Security Council resolution 780 (1992) establishing a Commission of Experts to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia: see M. C. Bassiouni, ‘The United

Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)', **88 AJIL**, 1994, p. 784.

⁶⁷ Note, however, the Permanent Court of Arbitration's Optional Rules for Fact-Finding Commissions of Inquiry, effective December 1997.

⁶⁸ See e.g. the UN Human Rights Council-appointed International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68, 2012; the EU-appointed inquiry into Georgia, 2009; the UN Secretary-General Panel of Experts Report on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 2011, and inquiries concerning Darfur, Syria, ISIS and Myanmar; see further, Chapter 20, p. 1066.

⁶⁹ See UN, *Handbook*, pp. 45 ff.; Lauterpacht, *Function of Law*, pp. 260–9; Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, chapter 4; Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 29; Murty, 'Settlement', pp. 682–3; H. Fox, 'Conciliation', in David Davies Memorial Institute, *International Disputes*, p. 93; J. P. Cot, *La Conciliation Internationale*, Paris, 1968; Bowett, 'Contemporary Developments', chapter 2; V. Degan, 'International Conciliation: Its Past and Future', *Völkerrecht und Rechtsphilosophie*, 1980, p. 261; *Conciliation in International Law; The OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration* (ed. C. Tomuschat, R. P. Mazzeschi and D. Thurer), The Hague, 2016; and R. Donner, 'The Procedure of International Conciliation: Some Historical Aspects', **1 Journal of the History of International Law**, 1999, p. 103.

⁷⁰ See Murty, 'Settlement'. Merrills notes that by 1940, nearly 200 conciliation treaties had been concluded: *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 64.

⁷¹ See para. 6 of the annex to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 provides that conciliation awards should be considered in good faith, while article 85(7) of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations provides that any party to the dispute may declare unilaterally that it will abide by the recommendations in the report as far as it is concerned. Note that article 14(3) of the Treaty Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 1981 stipulates that member states undertake to accept the conciliation procedure as compulsory.

⁷² But note the Chaco Commission, 1929, the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission, 1947, and the Franco-Swiss Commission, 1955: see Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 64 ff. See also Bar-Yaacov, *International Disputes*, chapter 7.

⁷³ Article 15(1) of the Geneva General Act as amended provides that: ‘The task of the Conciliation Commission shall be to elucidate the questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of enquiry or otherwise, and to endeavour to bring the parties to an agreement. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the parties of the terms of settlement which seem suitable to it, and lay down the period within which they are to make their decision.’

⁷⁴ See the Regulations on the Procedure of Conciliation adopted by the Institut de Droit International, *Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International*, 1961, pp. 374 ff. See also the UN Model Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes Between States 1995, General Assembly resolution 50/50, and the Optional Conciliation Rules adopted by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1996: see *Basic Documents: Conventions, Rules, Model Clauses and Guidelines*, The Hague, 1998. Note also the Optional Rules for Conciliation of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and the Environment adopted by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in April 2002.

⁷⁵ 20 ILM, 1981, p. 797; 62 ILR, p. 108. The Commission Report was accepted by the parties: 21 ILM, 1982, p. 1222.

⁷⁶ See also the 1929 Chaco Conciliation Commission; the 1947 Franco–Siamese Commission; the 1952 Belgian–Danish Commission; the 1954–55 Franco–Swiss Commission and the 1958 Franco–Mexican Commission. See UN, *Handbook*, p. 48; and Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 838.

⁷⁷ See below, [Chapter 21](#) for peaceful settlement of disputes through the UN and [Chapter 22](#) generally with regard to international institutions.

⁷⁸ See *Bowett’s Law of International Institutions* (ed. P. Sands and P. Klein), 5th ed., London, 2001; Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, chapter 11; Murty, ‘Settlement’, pp. 725–8; K. Oellers-Frahm and N. Wühler, *Dispute Settlement in Public International Law*, New York, 1984, pp. 92 ff.; and Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, pp. 951 ff.

⁷⁹ See *The Charter of the United Nations* (ed. B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte and A. Paulus), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2012, pp. 1429 ff. See also H. Saba, ‘Les Accords Régionaux dans la Charte des Nations Unies’, **80 HR**, 1952 I, p. 635; D. E. Acevedo, ‘Disputes under Consideration by the UN Security Council or Regional Bodies’, in *The International Court*

of *Justice at a Crossroads* (ed. L. F. Damrosch), Dobbs Ferry, 1987; B. Andemicael, *Regionalism and the United Nations*, Dobbs Ferry, 1979; J. M. Yepes, 'Les Accords Régionaux et le Droit International', **71 HR**, 1947 II, p. 235.

80 See further below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1083.

81 See *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 440; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 151.

82 This refers to disputes the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security: article 33.

83 Article 37(2).

84 Note that section I, para. 6 of the Manila Declaration on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes adopted in General Assembly resolution 37/10, 1982, provides that states parties to relevant regional arrangements or agencies shall make every effort to settle disputes through such mechanisms, but that this 'does not preclude states from bringing any dispute to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations'.

85 See below, p. 1126.

86 See M. Bartos, 'L'ONU et la Co-opération Régionale', **27 RGDIP**, 1956, p. 7.

87 The International Court noted in *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 440; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 151, in the context of contended regional discussions, that 'even the existence of active negotiations in which both parties might be involved should not prevent both the Security Council and the Court from exercising their separate functions under the Charter and the Statute of the Court'.

88 In such cases, the Security Council is likely to inscribe the dispute on its agenda and, providing the dispute is not one actually endangering international peace and security, refer the matter to the appropriate regional agency under article 52(2) and (3), keeping it under review on the agenda: see UN, *Handbook*, p. 96.

⁸⁹ See e.g. K. D. Magliveras and G. J. Naldi, *The African Union and the Predecessor Organization of African Unity*, The Hague, 2004. The Organisation of African Unity was established in 1963 and replaced by the African Union with the coming into force of the Constitutive Act in May 2001. As to the OAU, see generally T. Maluwa, 'The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African States, 1963–1983: Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends', **38** *ICLQ*, 1989, p. 299; S. G. Amoo and I. W. Zartman, 'Mediation by Regional Organizations: The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad', in Bercovitch and Rubin, *Mediation*, p. 131; B. Boutros Ghali, *L'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine*, Paris, 1968; M. Bedjaoui, 'Le Règlement Pacifique des Différends Africains', *AFDI*, 1972, p. 85; B. Andemicael, *Le Règlement Pacifique des Différends Survenant entre États Africains*, New York, 1973; E. Jouve, *L'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine*, Paris, 1984; T. O. Elias, *Africa and the Development of International Law*, Leiden, 1972; Z. Cervenka, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter*, London, 1968; and M. N. Shaw, 'Dispute Settlement in Africa', **37** *YBWA*, 1983, p. 149. See also *African Union Handbook*, 6th ed., Addis Ababa and Wellington, 2019.

⁹⁰ Elias, *Africa*, chapter 9.

⁹¹ See I. Brownlie, *African Boundaries*, London, 1979, p. 55; and M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 196–7.

⁹² See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, pp. 19939–40 (1963); and Shaw, 'Dispute Settlement', p. 153.

⁹³ See Brownlie, *African Boundaries*, p. 826. See also Shaw, *Title to Territory*, pp. 197–201.

⁹⁴ *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 1973, p. 2845 and *ibid.*, June 1973, pp. 2883–4, 2850.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, August 1980, pp. 5763–4. This is the principle of *uti possidetis*: see further above, [Chapter 9](#), p. 448.

⁹⁶ See Shaw, *Title to Territory*, pp. 123 ff.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*; and Shaw, 'Dispute Settlement', pp. 160–2.

⁹⁸ Shaw, 'Dispute Settlement', pp. 158–60.

⁹⁹ AHG/Dec. 1 (XXVIII) and see the Report of the OAU Secretary-General, Doc. CM/1747 (LVIII) and AHG/Dec. 3 (XXIX), 1993. See also M. C. Djiena-Wembon, 'A Propos du Nouveau Mécanisme de l'OUA sur les Conflits', *98 RGDIP*, 1994, p. 377; and R. Ranjeva, 'Reflections on the Proposals for the Establishment of a Pan-African Mechanism for the Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts', in *Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organizations* (ed. N. Blokker and S. Muller), Dordrecht, 1994, vol. I, p. 93.

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. C. A. A. Packer and D. Rukare, 'The New African Union and its Constitutive Act', *96 AJIL*, 2002, p. 365.

¹⁰¹ This is stated to replace the Cairo Declaration 1993 and to supersede the resolution and decisions of the OAU relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa which are in conflict with the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 2002: see article 22(1) and (2). See also *African Union Handbook*, p. 70.

¹⁰² See further article 10.

¹⁰³ This is to be composed of five highly respected African personalities selected by the chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the member states concerned and shall undertake such action at the request of the Council or chairperson of the Commission or at its own initiative as deemed appropriate for the prevention of conflicts: see article 11.

¹⁰⁴ This is to include an observation and monitoring centre to be known as 'the situation room' located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the African Union, together with observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms: see article 12.

¹⁰⁵ This is to consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents and shall perform functions such as observation missions, peace support missions, interventions, preventive deployment, peace-building and humanitarian assistance: see articles 13–15.

¹⁰⁶ Article 2.

107 Article 4.

108 Article 5.

109 Article 6. See also the list of powers in article 7.

110 See further article 16.

111 See as to the range of technical and other bodies and committees, *African Union Handbook*, pp. 60 ff., 75 ff.

112 There was a further revision in the Protocol of 2001 adopted at Dakar.

113 See e.g. *Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis* (ed. M. Weller), Cambridge, 1994.

114 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 1132 (1997) and 1233 (1999).

115 The Mechanism's highest decision-making body is the Authority, consisting of the heads of state, with powers to act on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace-keeping, security, humanitarian support, peace-building, control of cross-border crime and proliferation of small arms (see article 6), while a nine-person Mediation and Security Council is mandated to take appropriate decisions under the Protocol on behalf of the Authority (see articles 7–10). See also Security Council resolution 1197 (1998) and www.ecowas.int/documentation/legal-texts-and-documents-on-regional-security/.

116 Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08. See also G. O. Yabi, *The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau*, Abuja, 2010; and L. I. Okere, 'Ecowas Conflict Management and Peace-Keeping Initiatives in West Africa', 37 *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalisation*, 2015, p. 30.

117 See e.g. B. Chigora, 'The SAD Community', 11 *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 2000, p. 522. It evolved out of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference established in 1979.

118 See www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=english&path=legal/protocols/&page=p_politics_defence_and_security_co-operation.

119 Article 2(f).

120 Article 3.

121 See further article 4.

122 See further article 5.

123 See further article 6.

124 See further article 7.

125 I.e. one concerning territorial boundaries or natural resources or in which aggression or military force has occurred or where peace and security of the region or of another state party who is not a party to the conflict is threatened: see article 11(2)(a).

126 I.e. one involving large-scale violence, including genocide and gross violation of human rights or a military coup or a civil war or a conflict threatening the peace and security of the region or of another state party: article 11(2)(b).

127 Article 11(3). See also G. Cawthra, *The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe*, Maputo, 2010. See also as to the role of SADC in the 2014 Lesotho crisis, www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/appraising-the-efficacy-of-sadc-in-resolving-the-2014-lesotho-conflict/.

128 See Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 277 ff.; and Bowett's *International Institutions*, pp. 205 ff. See also E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, 'La Co-ordination des Systèmes de l'ONU et de l'Organisation des États Américains pour le Règlement Pacifique des Différends et la Sécurité Collective', **111 HR**, 1964 I, p. 423; and A. Cançado Trindade, 'Mécanismes de Règlement Pacifiques des Différends en Amérique Centrale: De Contadora à Esquipulas II', *AFDI*, 1987, p. 798.

¹²⁹ Note that as originally drafted in the 1948 Charter, article 20 (as it then was) provided that submission to the OAS procedures had to occur prior to referral to the UN Security Council.

¹³⁰ Although note *Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 69, 88; 84 ILR, pp. 218, 243, where the Court held that it had jurisdiction by virtue of article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá. See also e.g. *Peru v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2014, pp. 3, 10; and *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 139, 146.

¹³¹ See articles 82–90 of the OAS Charter.

¹³² OAS Permanent Council resolutions CP/Res. 427 (618/85); CP/doc. 1592/85 and A/40/737-S/17549, annex IV.

¹³³ The countries involved in the Contadora negotiating process were Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, while the Support Group consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay. See A/43/729-S/20234.

¹³⁴ See H. A. Hassouna, *The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes*, Leiden, 1975; Bowett, 'Contemporary Developments', p. 229; M. Abdennabi, *La Ligue des États Arabes et les Conflits Inter-Arabs (1962–1980)*, Paris, 1985; B. Boutros Ghali, 'The Arab League 1945–1970', 25 *Revue Égyptienne de Droit International*, 1969, p. 67; and S. Al-Kadhem, 'The Role of the League of Arab States in Settling Inter-Arab Disputes', 32 *Revue Égyptienne de Droit International*, 1976, p. 1.

¹³⁵ Note also the pan-Arab 'peacekeeping force' in the Lebanon between 1976 and 1982: see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, pp. 28117 ff. (1961). See also I. Pogany, *The Arab League and Peacekeeping in Lebanon*, London, 1987. The Council also appointed committees to deal with the 1963 Algerian–Moroccan and Democratic People's Republic of Yemen–Yemen Arab Republic boundary disputes: see UN Security Council resolutions 179 (1963) and 188 (1964). See also Simma *et al.*, *Charter of the United Nations*, p. 852.

¹³⁶ See L. Caflisch, 'Vers des Mécanismes Pan-Européennes de Règlement Pacifique des Différends', 97 *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1993, p. 1.

¹³⁷ Note that some states have entered reservations to this provision.

¹³⁸ See Bowett's *International Institutions*, p. 191; and Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 276. See also www.nato.int/.

¹³⁹ Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 282.

¹⁴⁰ See generally above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 312, and below, [Chapter 22](#), p. 1138, **note 21**.

¹⁴¹ See the Helsinki Final Act 1975; the Charter of Paris 1990; and the Valletta Report of the Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 1991.

¹⁴² This consists of the conciliators and arbitrators appointed under articles 3 and 4.

¹⁴³ See articles 1 and 2. Each state party is to appoint two conciliators: article 3.

¹⁴⁴ Article 25.

¹⁴⁵ Articles 2 and 4. Each state party is to appoint one arbitrator and one alternate.

¹⁴⁶ Either between two or more states parties to the Convention or between one or more states parties to the Convention and one or more OSCE participating states: article 26(1).

¹⁴⁷ Article 26.

¹⁴⁸ Article 31. See also UN, *Handbook*, p. 87; and *OSCE Handbook 2000*, p. 37; and see www.osce.org/cca.

¹⁴⁹ See *OSCE Handbook 1996*, pp. 16 ff., and Annual Report for 2001. A series of Sanctions Assistance Missions, operating under the guidance of the OSCE/EU Sanctions Co-ordinator, was sent to various countries in order to assist them in maintaining sanctions imposed by the Security Council in the Yugoslav crisis: *ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁵⁰ See Annual Report for 2007, pp. 54, 60. Note also the Minsk Process established by the OSCE in 1995 in order to resolve the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning Nagorno-Karabakh: www.osce.org/mg.

151 See Annex 3 of the Agreement.

152 Annex 1-B of the Agreement. The subregional arms control involves Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia.

153 Annex 6 of the Agreement. See also article 22 of the ASEAN Charter, 2007, which calls for the maintenance and establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms to resolve disputes between ASEAN members and 2010 Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, <http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2010/2010-protocol-to-the-asean-charter-on-dispute-settlement-mechanisms/>; see G. Naldi, 'The ASEAN Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: An Appraisal', 5 *Journal of International Dispute Settlement*, 2014, p. 105.

154 See generally C. A. Colliard, 'Le Règlement des Différends dans les Organisations Intergouvernementales de Caractère Non Politique', in *Mélanges Basdevant*, Paris, 1960, p. 152. It should also be noted that several international treaties expressly provide mechanisms and methods for the peaceful resolution of disputes arising therefrom: see e.g. with regard to the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, above, [Chapter 10](#), p. 545, and with regard to the Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, above, [Chapter 15](#), p. 831.

155 See Murty, 'Settlement', pp. 729–32. See further below, [Chapter 22](#), p. 1135.

156 See article 37 of the ILO Constitution; article XIV(2) of the UNESCO Constitution; article 75 of the World Health Organization Constitution; article 17 of the Food and Agriculture Organization Constitution; article XVII of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute; and articles 50 and 82 of the Convention of the International Telecommunications Union.

157 See article 96(2) of the UN Charter.

158 See e.g. Article XII of the Annex to the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal Statute. See also ICJ's Advisory Opinion on *Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development*, ICJ Reports, 2012, p. 10. See further [Chapter 18](#), p. 976.

159 See article 22(1) of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Constitution; and article 65 of the International Maritime Organization Constitution.

160 See the 1962 Special Protocol to the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education which provides for a Conciliation and Good Offices Commission and the 1962 Special Protocol to the ILO Convention against Discrimination in Education which provides for a Conciliation and Good Offices Commission: see Murty, ‘Settlement’, pp. 729–30; and *Bowett’s International Institutions*, chapter 3. See also the World Intellectual Property Organization Mediation, Arbitration and Expedited Arbitration Rules 1994, 34 ILM, 1995, p. 559.

161 See e.g. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, chapter 9; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, chapter 8.9; C. McLachlan, L. Shore and M. Weiniger, *International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2017; *Establishing Judicial Authority in International Economic Law* (ed. J. Jemielniak, L. Nielsen and H. P. Olsen), Cambridge, 2016; and G. Malinverni, *Le Règlement des Différends dans les Organisations Internationales Economiques*, Leiden, 1974.

162 See e.g. *The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration* (ed. M. Wiabel, A. Kaushal, K.-H. L. Chung and C. Balchin), The Hague, 2010. See further below, **notes 188 and 192**.

163 See UN, *Handbook*, pp. 136 ff.; J. H. Jackson, *The World Trading System*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA, 1997, chapter 4; and T. Flory, ‘Les Accords du Tokyo Round du GATT et la Réforme des Procédures de Règlement des Différends dans la Système Commercial Interétatique’, **86 RGDIP**, 1982, p. 235.

164 Before this stage, a party could seek the good offices of the Director-General of GATT to facilitate a confidential conciliation: see the 1982 GATT Ministerial Declaration.

165 See in particular the 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement. The report of the Panel would be sent to the GATT Council, which would usually adopt it by consensus. Where the disputing parties had not implemented the recommendations within a reasonable time, the complaining party was able to take retaliatory action with the authorisation of the Council. See e.g. L. Henkin, R. C. Pugh, O. Schachter and H. Smit, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 3rd ed., St Paul, 1993, p. 1414.

¹⁶⁶ See E. Canal-Forgues and R. Ostrihansky, ‘New Developments in GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures’, **24** *Journal of World Trade*, 1990; and J.-G. Castel, ‘The Uruguay Round and the Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures’, **38** *ICLQ*, 1989, p. 834.

¹⁶⁷ See e.g. S. Lester, B. Mercurio and A. Davies, *World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2018; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, chapter 9; A. F. Lowenfeld, *International Economic Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2008, part III; *The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization* (ed. P. Van den Bossche), 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2008; J. H. Jackson, *Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law*, Cambridge, 2006, chapter 5; M. Herdegen, *Principles of International Economic Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016, part III; *Dispute Settlement in the WTO* (ed. J. Cameron and K. Campbell), London, 1998; Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 99; R. Yerxa and B. Wilson, *Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement – the First Ten Years*, Cambridge, 2005; M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum and P. C. Mavroidis, *The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2015; T. Broude, *International Governance in the WTO: Judicial Boundaries and Political Capitulation*, London, 2004; D. Z. Cass, *The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System*, Oxford, 2005; *Bowett’s International Institutions*, p. 379; A. H. Qureshi and A. Ziegler, *International Economic Law*, 4th ed., London, 2019; J. Pauwelyn, ‘Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO’, **94** *AJIL*, 2000, p. 335; and J. Cameron and K. R. Gray, ‘Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’, **50** *ICLQ*, 2001, p. 248. See also www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm.

¹⁶⁸ Rules of Conduct were adopted in December 1996: see WT/DSB/RC/1 and www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/rc_e.htm. See also the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, amended most recently in 2010: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_procedures_e.htm. See also the annual report for 2018, WT/AB/29, 28 May 2019.

¹⁶⁹ Over 200 by mid-2000: see Cameron and Gray, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement’, p. 250, and 595 by December 2018: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disputstats_e.htm.

¹⁷⁰ See e.g. D. M. McRae, ‘The Emerging Appellate Jurisdiction in International Trade Law’, in Cameron and Campbell, *Dispute Settlement*, p. 1; and Jackson, *Sovereignty, the*

WTO, pp. 163 ff. There have been 170 notices of appeal filed as at the end of 2018: see Annual Report of the Appellate Body 2018, 2019, Annex 7; and www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm. Lowenfeld, *International Economic Law*, p. 211, wrote that the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism ‘is a great success – more so than any other arrangement for resolving international legal disputes at government level’.

¹⁷¹ See e.g. *Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline*, WT/DS2/AB/R, 1996; and *Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products*, WT/DS58/AB/R, 1998. See also D. Palmer and P. C. Mavroidis, ‘The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law’, *92 AJIL*, 1998, p. 398; and Jackson, *Sovereignty, the WTO*, pp. 182 ff.

¹⁷² See e.g. *Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products*, WT/DS90/AB/R, 1999.

¹⁷³ See e.g. US Trade Representative, *Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation*, Washington, DC, 2020.

¹⁷⁴ As to which see e.g. P. Craig and G. De Búrca, *EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials*, 6th ed., Oxford, 2015; D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, *European Union Law: Text and Materials*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2014; S. Weatherill, *Law and Values in the European Union*, Oxford, 2016, and Weatherill, *Cases and Materials on EU Law*, 12th ed., Oxford, 2016; and A. Arnall, *The European Court of Justice*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006. See also R. Schütze, *Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution*, Cambridge, 2014.

¹⁷⁵ See the Mercosur Treaty 1991. The Protocol of Brasilia 1991 (complemented by Decision 17, 1998) establishes a rudimentary dispute settlement system for states parties based upon diplomatic negotiations with arbitration as a last resort. Arbitration was not used until 1999 and the first arbitral award was the *Siscomex* case: see D. Ventura, ‘First Arbitration Award in Mercosur – a Community Law in Evolution?’, *14 Leiden Journal of International Law*, 2000, p. 447. See also www.mercosur.int.

¹⁷⁶ See the Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 1993, www.comesa.int/.

¹⁷⁷ The Economic Community of West African States: see the treaty of 1975 and revisions of 1993 and 2001 and Protocol 1 on the Community Court of Justice 1991 and

Supplementary Protocols 2005 and 2006, www.comm.ecowas.int/institutions/community-court-of-justice/.

178 See 32 ILM, 1993, pp. 682 ff. See also *Bowett's International Institutions*, p. 222; D. S. Huntington, 'Settling Disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement', 34 *Harvard International Law Journal*, 1993, p. 407; Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 111; and N. Kinnear, A. Bjorkland and J. Hannaford, *Investment Disputes under NAFTA*, The Hague, 2006. Under Chapter 11, each NAFTA party must provide investors from the other NAFTA parties national (non-discriminatory) treatment and may not expropriate investments of those investors except in accordance with international law. An investor from one NAFTA party may seek money damages for measures of one of the other NAFTA parties that are claimed to breach this Chapter. Under Chapter 11 investment disputes may be raised by individual investors of one state party against another state party and, if not resolved by negotiations, may be submitted to arbitration either under the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the ICSID Additional Facility or the rules of the UN Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

179 See article 1131.

180 Articles 1134 and 1136.

181 See articles 1131 and 1132. See also e.g. with regard to the terms 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' under article 1105, *Mondev International Ltd v. US* 6 ICSID Reports, 2002, p. 192, paras. 100 ff.; *United Parcel Service of America v. Canada* 7 ICSID Reports, 2002, p. 288, para. 97; *Loewen Group v. US* 7 ICSID Reports, 2003, p. 442, paras. 124 ff.; and *Methanex v. US*, Award of 3 August 2005, Part II, Chapter H, para. 23.

182 See articles 2003–2008.

183 Note that Canadian and Mexican investors will be able to rely on their rights under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, see www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng.

¹⁸⁴ See e.g. http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/11/26/usmca-an-analysis-of-the-proposed-isds-mechanism/?doing_wp_cron=1593181277.1140859127044677734375.

¹⁸⁵ See e.g. I. Shihata, *The World Bank Inspection Panel*, Oxford, 1994; A. Naude Fourie, *The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight*, The Hague, 2009; D. L. Clark, *A Citizen's Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel*, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, 1999; D. Clark, *Demanding Accountability: Civil Society and the World Bank Inspection Panel*, Lanham, 2003; G. Alfredsson, R. Ring and G. Melander, *The Inspection Panel of the World Bank: A Different Complaints Procedure*, The Hague, 2001; 'Conclusions of the Second Review of the World Bank Inspection Panel', *39 ILM*, 2000, p. 243; and A. Gowlland Gualtieri, 'The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank to Non-State Actors', *72 BYIL*, 2002, p. 213. See also the Inspection Panel's Annual Report, 2018–19, www.inspectionpanel.org/sites/www.inspectionpanel.org/files/publications/annual-report-2018-2019.pdf.

¹⁸⁶ As of June 2020, a total of 147 requests had been sent to the Panel: see www.inspectionpanel.org/panel-cases?search=&order=field_case_case_no&sort=desc.

¹⁸⁷ See Lowenfeld, *International Economic Law*, pp. 536 ff.; R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, *Principles of International Investment Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2012, pp. 238 ff.; C. Schreuer, with L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch and A. Sinclair, *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2009; A. R. Parra, *The History of ICSID*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2017; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, pp. 346 ff.; A. Broches, 'The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes', *3 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 1966, p. 263; A. Broches, 'The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States', *136 HR*, 1972, p. 350; *Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID* (ed. M. Kinnear and G. R. Fischer), The Hague, 2015; *The International Arbitral Process: Public and Private* (ed. J. G. Wetter), Dobbs Ferry, 1979, vol. II, p. 139; Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 59; P. Muchlinski, *Multinational Enterprises and the Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2007; and *The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law* (ed. P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino and C. Schreuer), Oxford, 2008. See also www.worldbank.org/icsid/.

¹⁸⁸ In becoming parties, states may expressly include or exclude certain kinds of disputes: see article 25(4). As of June 2020, there were 163 signatory and contracting states and 153 ratifying states: see <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member->

[States.aspx](#). Bolivia (2007), Ecuador (2009) and Venezuela (2012) have withdrawn from the Convention. These withdrawals underlined a growing concern over the perception that international arbitrations can overturn legitimate government policies aimed at economic or environmental welfare of the people of a state: see e.g. C. J. Tams, ‘Procedural Aspects of Investor–State Dispute Settlement: The Emergence of a European Approach?’, 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402141.

¹⁸⁹ Wetter, *Arbitral Process*, vol. II, p. 139.

¹⁹⁰ Article 25(1) of the Convention.

¹⁹¹ See I. Pogany, ‘The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Hungary’, 4 *ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law Journal*, 1989, pp. 39, 51. See also *Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka* 30 ILM, 1991, p. 577. Of particular interest is the fact that since the Lisbon Treaty 2007, the EU has been competent to conclude international investment agreements with third states, something which had been a prerogative of member states: see articles 206 and 207, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. As a result, the EU is developing a foreign investment policy: see e.g. A. Dimopoulos, *EU Foreign Investment Law*, Oxford, 2011; *EU Framework for Foreign Direct Investment Control* (ed. J. H. J. Bourgeois), Leiden, 2019; A. Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and Other Investment Agreements’, 12 *Santa Clara Journal of International Law*, 2014, p. 111; and N. J. Calamita, ‘The Making of Europe’s International Investment Policy: Uncertain First Steps’, 39 *Legal Issues of European Integration*, 2012, p. 301. See further, above, p. 732.

¹⁹² See e.g. article 1120 of the NAFTA Treaty 1992; and *Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico* 119 ILR, p. 615. See also article 26(4) of the Energy Charter Treaty 1994. As to the operations of the latter instrument, see e.g. *Hulley Enterprises v. Russia* (the *Yukos* arbitration), Arbitral Award of 18 July 2014, PCA Case No. AA 226, which concluded that Russia was bound to arbitrate under the Treaty’s provisional application clause and awarded a total of US\$50 billion to the claimants, on the ground that Russia had breached article 13 of the Treaty dealing with expropriation. However, these awards were set aside by The Hague District Court in April 2016, C/09/477160/HA ZA 15-1, www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7258.pdf.

¹⁹³ See e.g. *AMCO v. Indonesia* 1 ICSID Reports, p. 377.

¹⁹⁴ As of June 2020, a total of 519 cases had been concluded with 266 pending: see <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/ConcludedCases.aspx?status=c>.

¹⁹⁵ See Chapter IV of the Convention.

¹⁹⁶ Article 53.

¹⁹⁷ Article 54. However, this is subject to domestic legislation as regards sovereign immunity: see article 55.

¹⁹⁸ See P. Lalive, ‘The First “World Bank” Arbitration (*Holiday Inns v. Morocco*): Some Legal Problems’, 51 *BYIL*, 1980, p. 123. See also *AGIP Spa v. Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo* 67 ILR, p. 318; *Benvenuti and Bonfant v. Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo*, *ibid.*, p. 345, dealing with questions of state responsibility and damages; and *LETSCO v. Government of Liberia* 89 ILR, p. 313; and *Tradex Hellas SA v. Albania*, ARB/94/2, 1999 concerning expropriation. See also *Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico* 119 ILR, p. 615, concerning state responsibility, expropriation and compensation; and *SGS Société de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan* 129 ILR, p. 360, concerning e.g. relations between domestic courts and ICSID tribunals and the definition of investment.

¹⁹⁹ See Wetter, *Arbitral Process*, vol. II, p. 145. See also www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/dispute-resolution-services/icc-international-court-of-arbitration/.

²⁰⁰ See *Dalmia Cement v. National Bank of Pakistan* 67 ILR, p. 611; and *Westland Helicopters Ltd v. Arab Organization for Industrialization* 80 ILR, p. 595.

²⁰¹ See e.g. C. Croft, C. Kee and J. Waincymer, *A Guide to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules*, Cambridge, 2013; and I. Dore, *The UNCITRAL Framework for Arbitration in Contemporary Perspective*, London, 1993. See also www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html.

²⁰² See e.g. A. Roberts, ‘Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Report of Investor–State Arbitration’, 112 *AJIL*, 2018, p. 410; and https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state. Note e.g. the draft code of conduct for adjudicators in investor–state dispute settlement, May 2020, <https://uncitral.un.org/en/codeofconduct>.

203 Note the particular issue of the relationship between pre-accession bilateral investment treaties and the EU and whether the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union permits the former to continue in the light of article 344 which provides that: ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the [EU] Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.’ In *Slovakia v. Achmea BV*, Case No. 284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, 6 March 2018, the ECJ held that the arbitration provisions contained in the Slovakia–Netherlands BIT were incompatible with EU law. Accordingly, the EU negotiated an agreement for the termination of BITs between member states and on 5 May 2020, twenty-three of the twenty-seven EU member states signed this agreement, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publication/200505-bilateral-investment-treaties-agreement_en. See also M. Wierzbowski and A. Gubrynowicz, ‘Conflict of Norms Stemming from Intra-EU BITs and EU Legal Obligations: Some Remarks on Possible Solutions’, in *International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer* (ed. C. Binder and C. Schreuer), Oxford, 2009, p. 544; and B. de Witte, ‘A Selfish Court? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute Settlement Beyond the European Union’, in *The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law* (ed. M. Cremona and A. Thies), Oxford, 2014, p. 33.

204 See above, p. 728.

205 See e.g. article 8 of the Model UK Bilateral Investment Treaty 2008; articles 24 and 25 of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2012.

206 See e.g. articles 7, 8 and 9 of the UK Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2008; and articles 23–25 and 37 of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2012. See also J. Pohl, K. Mashigo and A. Nohen, ‘Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey’, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2012/02, OECD Publishing, 2012, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k8xb71nf628-en>.

207 *Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Sri Lanka* (registered in 1987), ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3. As of 1 January 2019, the total number of known investor–state cases pursuant to international investment agreements had reached 942, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d4_en.pdf, but see also <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement> giving the figure of 1,023 known treaty-based investor–state cases. As to perceived problems with the system,

see e.g. UNCTAD, *IIA Issues Note*, July 2020, pp. 6 ff., <https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2020d4.pdf>; and UNCTAD, *UNCTAD's Reform Package for the International Investment Regime*, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/uploaded-files/document/UNCTAD_Reform_Package_2018.pdf; and see also above, *Chapter 13*, p. 728.

208 Although the EU has the exclusive competence to negotiate and conclude trade agreements since the Lisbon Treaty 2009, CETA was concluded as a mixed agreement requiring ratification by all member states before it can fully enter into force, as of June 2020 about half of the EU membership has ratified CETA, see e.g. D. Webb, 'CETA: the EU–Canada Free Trade Agreement', House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 7492, 7 May 2019. In *Opinion 2/15*, ECJ, 16 May 2017, the Court held that the EU–Singapore Free Trade Agreement fell within the exclusive competence of the EU, with the exceptions of various investment protection and dispute settlement provisions, which fell within a shared competence of the EU and member states.

209 See CETA *Chapter 8*, Section F, articles 8.18 ff. Note *Opinion 1/17*, ECJ, 30 April 2019, which found these provisions compatible with EU primary law.

210 *Ibid.*, article 8.28.

211 See <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership>.

212 See www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng#:~:text=On%20December%2030%2C%202018%20the,entered%20into%20force%20for%20Vietnam.

213 See articles 9.18 and 9.19.

214 See e.g. the dissenting opinion of Roberts CJ in the US Supreme Court decision in *BG v. Argentina* 572 US 25 (2014). Note also M. Happold, 'Investor–State Dispute Settlement using the ECOWAS Court of Justice: An Analysis and Some Proposals', 34 *ICSID Review*, 2019, p. 496.

²¹⁵ See 1 Iran–US CTR, pp. 3–56; 20 ILM, 1981, pp. 223 ff. See also *The Jurisprudence of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal* (ed. G. H. Aldrich), Oxford, 1996; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, pp. 352 ff.; L. Brilmayer, C. Giorgetti and L. Charlton, *International Claims Commissions: Righting Wrongs after Conflict*, Cheltenham, 2017; Lowenfeld, *International Economic Law*, pp. 541 ff.; *The Iran–US Claims Tribunal at 25* (ed. C. Gibson and S. Drahozal), Oxford, 2007; D. Stewart and L. Sherman, ‘Development at the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal: 1981–1983’, **24** *Va. JIL*, 1983, p. 1; D. Lloyd Jones, ‘The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal: Private Rights and State Responsibility’, **24** *Va. JIL*, 1984, p. 259; *The Iran–US Claims Tribunal 1981–83* (ed. R. Lillich), Charlottesville, 1984; *The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution to the Law of State Responsibility* (ed. R. Lillich and D. B. Magraw), New York, 1998; S. J. Toope, *Mixed International Arbitration*, Cambridge, 1990, chapter 9; D. D. Caron, ‘The Nature of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution’, **84** *AJIL*, 1990, p. 104; A. Avanessian, *Iran–United States Claims Tribunal in Action*, The Hague, 1993; R. Khan, *The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal*, Dordrecht, 1990; W. Mapp, *The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal: The First Ten Years 1981–1991*, Manchester, 1993; and the *Iran–United States Claims Tribunal Reports*, 1981 to date. See also www.iusct.net/.

²¹⁶ By early 1989, this had taken place on twenty-six occasions: see **83** *AJIL*, 1989, p. 915.

²¹⁷ Approximately 1,000 claims for amounts of \$250,000 or more, and 2,800 claims for amounts of less than \$250,000 were filed within the time limit, which does not apply to disputes between the two governments concerning the interpretation of the Algiers Declarations. By 9 May 2016, there had been 602 awards and 83 interim and interlocutory awards filed and 136 decisions filed in 140 cases. Altogether, 3,936 cases had been finalised by award, decision or order: see Communiqué of 9 May 2016 and [www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/Communique%2016.1%20\(9%20May%202016\).pdf](http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/Communique%2016.1%20(9%20May%202016).pdf).

²¹⁸ Article III of the Claims Settlement Declaration.

²¹⁹ Article IV of the Claims Settlement Declaration.

²²⁰ See above, Chapter 13, p. 708.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 719 ff.

²²² See H. Fox, ‘States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate’, **37 ICLQ**, 1988, pp. 1, 21.

²²³ See *State Party Responsibility for Awards Rendered Against Its Nationals*, Case No. A/21, 14 Iran–US CTR, pp. 324, 330. See now Award No. 602-A15(IV)/A24-FT of 2 July 2014, which concerned the obligation of the US under the Algiers Declarations to terminate litigation initiated by US nationals against Iran in US courts.

²²⁴ See above, [Chapter 13](#), p. 733.

²²⁵ See e.g. *War Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission* (ed. C. S. Gibson, T. M. Rajah and T. J. Feighery), Oxford, 2015; D. Campanelli, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC): Reflections on its Judicial Character’, **4 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals**, 2005, p. 107; *Oppenheim’s International Law United Nations* (ed. R. Higgins et al.), Oxford, 2017, chapter 30; Brilmayer *et al.*, *International Claims Commissions*; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, pp. 355 ff.; V. Heiskanen, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission’, **296 HR**, 2002, p. 314; Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 41; *The United Nations Compensation Commission: A Handbook* (ed. M. Frigessi di Ratalma and T. Treves), The Hague, 1999; A. Kolliopoulos, *La Commission d’Indemnisation des Nations Unies et le Droit de la Responsabilité Internationale*, Paris, 2001; A. Grattini, ‘The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New Procedures on War Reparations’, **13 EJIL**, 2002, p. 161; D. Caron and B. Morris, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission: Practical Justice, Not Retribution’, **13 EJIL**, 2002, p. 183; and M. B. Fox, ‘Imposing Liability for Losses from Aggressive War: An Economic Analysis of the UN Compensation Commission’, **13 EJIL**, 2002, p. 201. See also <https://uncc.ch/home>.

²²⁶ Paragraph 16 of resolution 687 (1991) established that ‘Iraq . . . is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait’ and para. 18 of the resolution established a fund to pay compensation for such claims together with a Commission to administer it.

²²⁷ See Report of the Secretary-General of 2 May 1991, S/22559.

²²⁸ See also Report of the Secretary-General of 31 May 1991, S/22661.

²²⁹ See also the Report of the Secretary-General, S/23006, 1991 and Security Council resolution 712 (1991).

²³⁰ In resolution 778 (1992), the Council called upon states which held frozen assets representing the proceeds of sales of Iraqi petroleum to transfer these to a special escrow account, from which 30 per cent would be transferred to the Compensation Fund.

²³¹ See 35 ILM, 1996, p. 942; and Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 43 (the claims included those from some 1 million Egyptian workers). The claims amounted to over \$300 billion.

²³² Category ‘A’ claims cover claims of individuals arising from their departure from Iraq or Kuwait between the date of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the date of the ceasefire, 2 March 1991, with compensation for successful claims being set by the Governing Council at the fixed sum of US\$2,500 for individual claimants and US\$5,000 for families. Category ‘B’ claims cover individual claims for serious personal injury or death of spouse, children or parents, with compensation set at US\$2,500 for individual claimants and up to US\$10,000 for families. Category ‘C’ claims cover individual claims for damages up to \$100,000. Category ‘D’ claims cover individual claims for damages above \$100,000. Category ‘E’ claims cover claims of corporations, other private legal entities and public sector enterprises. Category ‘F’ claims cover claims made by governments and international organisations for various losses. See e.g. Decision 1, S/22885, annex II, paras. 14–16 and S/23765, annex. In Decision 11, it was decided that members of the Allied Coalition Forces were not eligible for compensation unless, in accordance with the adopted criteria, the claimants were prisoners-of-war and the loss or injury arose from mistreatment in violation of international humanitarian law: S/24363, annex II, *ibid*. See also A/AC.26/1994/2, reproduced in 34 ILM, 1995, p. 307.

²³³ See S/AC.26/1992/10 and 31 ILM, 1992, p. 1053.

²³⁴ Note that the Commissioners completed their work of verification and evaluation of claims and the determination of whether the damages in question were suffered as a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in June 2005:
www.uncc.ch/commissioners.

²³⁵ S/AC.26/1995/2–5. See also 35 ILM, 1996, p. 956. For examples of claims, see e.g. 109 ILR, p. 1; and *Egyptian Workers' Claims* 117 ILR, p. 195.

²³⁶ Details of claims and payments may be found on www.uncc.ch/claims.

²³⁷ See the Report and Recommendations Concerning the Third Instalment of 'E2' Claims: S/AC.26/1999/R.40, para. 77. Note that in recent years due to the security situation in Iraq, the requirement that Iraq deposit 5 per cent of the proceeds from all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas and 5 per cent of the value of any non-monetary payments of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas made to service providers into the Compensation Fund has been postponed: see e.g. Governing Council Decisions 272 (2014), S/AC.26/Dec.272 (2014), and 273 (2015), S/AC.26/Dec.273 (2015).

²³⁸ See the Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/22559, 2 May 1991. This Report in particular emphasised that the Compensation Commission was neither a Court nor an Arbitral Tribunal, but 'a political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding function of examining the claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving disputed claims'. It was recognised, however, that 'some elements of due process should be built into the procedure', *ibid.*, para. 20: see Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 42; and Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 55. See also the Guidelines adopted by the Governing Council on 2 August 1991, S/22885. Both documents are reproduced in 30 ILM, 1991, pp. 1703 ff. Note that Collier and Lowe refer to the UNCC as prominent among 'the most notable recent innovations': *Settlement*, p. 41.

²³⁹ See article 31 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, annexed to the Compensation Commission Governing Council Decision of 26 June 1992, S/AC.26/1992/10; and *Egyptian Workers' Claims* 117 ILR, pp. 195, 247.

²⁴⁰ See Collier and Lowe, *Settlement*, p. 43. Note that the claims-processing exercise concluded in 2005 and payments to individuals concluded in 2007 and in that year the UNCC Secretariat was reduced to a residual format, <https://uncc.ch/secretariat>.

²⁴¹ See above, **note 2**.

²⁴² R. Y. Jennings, 'Presentation', in *Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice* (ed. C. Peck and R. S. Lee), The Hague, 1997, p. 79. See also *Litigating*

International Law Disputes: Weighing the Options (ed. N. Klein), Cambridge, 2014; *Deference in International Courts and Tribunals: Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation* (ed. L. Gruszczynski and W. Werner), Oxford, 2014; *The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication* (ed. C. P. R. Romano, K. Alter and Y. Shany), Oxford, 2015; and P. Webb, *International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation*, Oxford, 2016.

²⁴³ See e.g. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, chapter 5; Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, chapter 5; Wetter, *Arbitral Process*; L. Simpson and H. Fox, *International Arbitration*, London, 1959; L. Malintoppi, 'Methods of Dispute Resolution in Inter-State Litigation: When States Go To Arbitration Rather Than Adjudication', 5 *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals*, 2006, p. 133; L. Caflisch, 'L'Avenir de l'Arbitrage Interétatique', *AFDI*, 1979, p. 9; and Murty, 'Settlement'. See also Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 964; Oellers-Frahm and Zimmermann, *Dispute Settlement*; Economides, 'L'Obligation de Règlement Pacifique'; S. Schwebel, L. Sobota and R. Manton, *International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2020; A. M. Stuyt, *Survey of International Arbitrations (1794–1984)*, Dordrecht, 1990; V. Coussirat-Coustere and P. M. Eisemann, *Repertory of International Arbitral Jurisprudence*, Dordrecht, 4 vols., 1989–91; C. Gray and B. Kingsbury, 'Developments in Dispute Settlement: International Arbitration since 1945', 63 *BYIL*, 1992, p. 97; L. Sohn, 'International Arbitration Today', 108 *HR*, 1976, p. 1; *International Arbitration* (ed. F. Soons), Dordrecht, 1990; and Fox, 'States', p. 1.

²⁴⁴ 113 ILR, pp. 1, 42.

²⁴⁵ See Simpson and Fox, *International Arbitration*, pp. 1–4; and R. C. Morris, *International Arbitration and Procedure*, New Haven, 1911. Note also the Treaty of Ghent 1814, which incorporated the concept of a neutral element within the commission, *ibid.* See also G. Schwarzenberger, 'Present-Day Relevance of the Jay Treaty Arbitrations', 53 *Notre Dame Lawyer*, 1978, p. 715.

²⁴⁶ J. B. Moore, *International Arbitrations*, Washington, DC, 1898, vol. I, p. 495.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 755.

²⁴⁸ UNRIAA, vol. XXVIII, p. 331.

²⁴⁹ See also ‘Projet de Règlement pour la Procédure Arbitrale Internationale’, *Annuaire de l’Institute de Droit International*, 1877, p. 126.

²⁵⁰ PCIJ, Series B, No. 12, 1925, p. 26.

²⁵¹ See *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, paras. 9, 40, 76–7. See also *Dubai/Sharjah* 91 ILR, pp. 543, 574, 575.

²⁵² See Murty, ‘Settlement’, p. 685; M. Hudson, *The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920–1942*, New York, 1943, p. 11; *The Permanent Court of Arbitration: International Arbitration and Dispute Settlement* (ed. P. Hamilton, H. C. Requena, L. van Scheltinga and B. Shifman), The Hague, 1999; J. Allain, *A Century of International Adjudication: The Rule of Law and its Limits*, The Hague, 2000, chapter 1; and J. Jonkman, ‘The Role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in International Dispute Resolution’, 279 *HR*, 1999, p. 9. See also www.pca-cpa.org/.

²⁵³ There are currently 122, <https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/>.

²⁵⁴ Article 44 of the Convention as revised in 1907.

²⁵⁵ See 88 *AJIL*, 1994, p. 739, note 4.

²⁵⁶ See e.g. the UK–France Agreement of 1903, providing for referral of differences of a legal nature to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, so long as the ‘vital interests’ of the parties were not involved: Cd 1837.

²⁵⁷ See Malintoppi, ‘Methods’, p. 135. See generally H. Von Mangoldt, ‘Arbitration and Conciliation’, in Wetter, *Arbitral Process*, vol. V, pp. 243 ff.; and D. Johnson, ‘International Arbitration Back in Favour?’, 34 *YBWA*, 1980, p. 305. The PCA is currently acting as registry in eight inter-state arbitrations, and thirty-four arbitrations or other proceedings under contracts or other agreements to which one party is a state, state-controlled entity or intergovernmental organisation: see <https://pcacases.com/web/allcases/>.

²⁵⁸ See 114 ILR, p. 1 (Phase One: Territorial Sovereignty) and 119 ILR, p. 417 (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation).

259 Decision of 13 April 2002: see 129 ILR, p. 1.

260 See S/2001/608. As to some Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission decisions, see above, Chapter 12, p. 700, **note 178**.

261 See 119 ILR, p. 566.

262 See 126 ILR, p. 310.

263 Arbitration Panel, Partial Award of 17 March 2006.

264 The PCA is currently acting as registry in forty investor–state arbitrations: <https://pcacases.com/web/allcases/>.

265 In 1992: see 32 ILM, 1993, p. 572. These are based upon the UNCITRAL (UN Commission on International Trade Law) Arbitration Rules, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1976 in resolution 31/98.

266 With effect from 1993: see <https://pca-cpa.org/en/documents/pca-conventions-and-rules/>.

267 *Ibid.*, with effect from 1996.

268 *Ibid.*

269 *Ibid.* Note also Optional Conciliation Rules, Optional Rules for Fact-finding Commissions of Inquiry, Optional Rules for Conciliation of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and the Environment, Guidelines for Adapting the PCA Arbitration Rules to Disputes Arising under Multilateral Agreements and Multiparty Contracts, and Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space, *ibid.*

270 Resolution 1262 (XI). These are, however, merely optional. See also Report of the ILC, 1958, A/3859. Note also the 1928 General Act, the 1929 General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration and the 1949 Revised General Act. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1953, vol. **II**, p. 208.

²⁷¹ See e.g. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 88 ff. It is, of course, an issue for the parties to decide.

²⁷² E.g. *Argentina/Chile Frontier Award (La Palena)*, 38 ILR, p. 10; and *Beagle Channel*, HMSO, 1977; 52 ILR, p. 93. Note also *Interpretation of Peace Treaties*, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 221; 17 ILR, p. 318.

²⁷³ Note e.g. failed challenges to arbitrators, *OPIC Karimum Corp. v. Venezuela*, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/14, Judgment of 5 May 2011; and *Mauritius v. UK*, Reasoned Decision on Challenge of 30 November 2011, www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1429.

²⁷⁴ Partial Arbitral Award of 30 June 2016, paras. 37 ff.

²⁷⁵ See as to the material breach and termination point above, *Chapter 15*, p. 826.

²⁷⁶ See Award, paras. 145 ff.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 148 ff. See also *Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 111, 119; *Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926* (Final Protocol), Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Series B, No. 16, 1928, p. 20; *Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal*, Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, ICJ Reports, 1991, pp. 53, 68–9; and *Abyei* arbitration, Final Award of 22 July 2009, para. 499; 48 ILM, p. 1258.

²⁷⁸ Award, para. 175.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 178 ff. See also Tanaka, *Peaceful Settlement*, pp. 112–13. Note also the challenge to Sir Christopher Greenwood, the British member of the Tribunal hearing the *Chagos Marine Protected Area* arbitration, on account of his prior work as a counsel for the UK government. The Tribunal concluded that ‘a party challenging an arbitrator must demonstrate and prove that, applying the standards applicable to inter-state cases, there are justifiable grounds for doubting the independence and impartiality of that arbitrator in a particular case’, Reasoned Decision on Challenge, 30 November 2011, p. 31.

²⁸⁰ See e.g. *Eastern Carelia*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 5, 1923, p. 27; 2 AD, p. 394; and *Ambatielos*, ICJ Reports, 1953, p. 19; 20 ILR, p. 547.

281 See *Arbitration and Security: The Systematic Survey of the Arbitration Conventions and Treaties of Mutual Security Deposited with the League of Nations*, Geneva, 1927; and *Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1928–1948*, New York, 1949.

282 See L. Sohn, ‘Report on the Changing Role of Arbitration in the Settlement of International Disputes’, International Law Association, 1966, pp. 325, 334.

283 In the absence of agreement to the contrary. See e.g. *Nottebohm*, ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 111, 119; 20 ILR, pp. 567, 572. See also article 48 of the Hague Convention 1899; and article 73 of the Hague Convention 1907.

284 See e.g. *Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims*, 1 RIAA, p. 309 (1921); and *Dubai/Sharjah* 91 ILR, pp. 543, 585–8. Note that article 28 of the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, as revised in 1949, provides that where nothing is laid down in the arbitration agreement as to the law applicable to the merits of the case, the tribunal should apply the substantive rules as laid down in article 38 of the ICJ Statute (i.e. international treaties, custom and general principles of law). See further above, [Chapter 3](#).

285 UNRIAA, vol. XXVIII, p. 331.

286 3 RIAA, p. 1908 (1938); 9 AD, p. 315.

287 Note that in international commercial arbitrations, the reference often incorporates municipal law: see e.g. *BP* 53 ILR, p. 297, where the basic reference was to ‘the principles of the Law of Libya common to the principles of international law’. See also article 33(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, 3 May 1983, requiring the Tribunal to decide all cases ‘on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances’. By way of contrast, the tribunal in *OSPAR (Ireland v. UK)*, operating on the basis of article 32 of the OSPAR Convention, held that the only applicable law was the Convention itself: 126 ILR, p. 334.

288 See e.g. *Re Competence of the Conciliation Commission* 22 ILR, p. 867; and above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 82. See also article 28 of the 1928 General Act as revised in 1949, article 10

of the ILC Model Articles and articles 26 and 28 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 1957. Note in addition *Rann of Kutch* 50 ILR, p. 520.

289 See *Nottebohm* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 111, 119; 20 ILR, pp. 567, 571–3. See also Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, Interlocutory Decision of 4 July 1992, 92 ILR, pp. 194, 197.

290 Articles 81 and 84, Hague Convention I 1907. The principle of *res judicata* also applies to arbitral awards: see e.g. *Trail Smelter*, 3 RIAA, p. 1905 (1938); 9 AD, p. 324; and *Orinoco Steamship Co.*, 11 RIAA, p. 227 (1910).

291 See e.g. W. M. Reisman, *Nullity and Revision*, New Haven, 1971; E. K. Nantwi, *The Enforcement of International Judicial Decisions and Arbitral Awards in Public International Law*, Leiden, 1967; and O. Schachter, ‘The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions’, 54 *AJIL*, 1960, p. 1.

292 See C. C. Hyde, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Boston, 1945, vol. **III**, p. 1636. See also *Pelletier*, *ibid.*, p. 1640; *Panama–Costa Rica Boundary*, 11 RIAA, p. 519 (1900); *US Foreign Relations*, 1914, p. 994; *Chamizal*, 11 RIAA, p. 309; and the *Cerruti* arbitrations, 6 *AJIL*, 1912, p. 965.

293 See e.g. Murty, ‘Settlement’, pp. 693–4; and A. D. McNair, *The Law of Treaties*, Oxford, 1961, pp. 66–77.

294 See Schachter, ‘Enforcement’, p. 3. See also, as regards corruption, Moore, *International Arbitrations*, vol. **II**, pp. 1660–4; and the *Buraïmi* arbitration, Wetter, *Arbitral Process*, vol. **III**, p. 357 and 545 HC Deb., col. 199, 1955.

295 See *British Guiana and Venezuela Boundary*, UNRIAA, vol. **XXVIII**, p. 331; and Wetter, *Arbitral Process*, vol. **III**, pp. 81 ff. See also *Arbitral Award by the King of Spain*, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 188, 216; 30 ILR, pp. 457, 476.

296 See e.g. Murty, ‘Settlement’, p. 696; and Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 113 ff.

297 *Arbitral Award by the King of Spain*, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 188, 215–16; 30 ILR, pp. 457, 475. See also, as regards the Argentinian claim of nullity of the *Beagle Channel*

Award, 17 ILM, 1978, p. 738; 52 ILR, pp. 267–85.

298 See *Trail Smelter*, 3 RIAA, pp. 1905, 1957 (1938); 9 AD, p. 331.

299 See e.g. Schreck, Moore, *International Arbitrations*, vol. II, p. 1357.

300 *Arbitral Award by the King of Spain*, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 188, 213; 30 ILR, p. 473. See also the Application of 29 March 2018 by Guyana asking for the ICJ to reaffirm the legal validity and binding effect of the Award regarding the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela, of 3 October 1899, which it was argued Venezuela had first accepted and then repudiated.

301 See e.g. Wetter, *Arbitral Process*, vol. II, pp. 539 ff. See also article 29 of the ILC Model Rules.

302 See the definition of arbitration in *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1953, vol. II, p. 202.

303 50 ILR, p. 2. See also J. G. Wetter, ‘The Rann of Kutch Arbitration’, 65 *AJIL*, 1971, p. 346.

304 Cmnd 7438, 1978; 54 ILR, p. 6. See further above, [Chapter 10](#), p. 510.

305 HMSO, 1977; 52 ILR, p. 93. See M. N. Shaw, ‘The Beagle Channel Arbitration Award’, 6 *International Relations*, 1978, p. 415.

306 80 ILR, p. 224. See also D. W. Bowett, ‘The Taba Award of 29 September 1988’, 23 *Israel Law Review*, 1989, p. 429; G. Lagergren, ‘The Taba Tribunal 1986–89’, 1 *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 1989, p. 525; and P. Weil, ‘Some Observations on the Arbitral Award in the Taba Case’, 23 *Israel Law Review*, 1989, p. 1.

307 Argentina initially rejected the Award in *Beagle Channel*, but later mediation and negotiations resolved the issue: see 17 ILM, 1978, p. 738; 24 ILM, 1985, p. 1.

308 114 ILR, p. 1; 119 ILR, p. 417.

309 See 129 ILR, p. 1. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘Title, Control and Closure? The Experience of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission’, 56 *ICLQ*, 2007, p. 755.

310 Award of 11 April 2006. See also *Guyana v. Suriname*, Arbitral Award of 17 September 2007; see further on maritime delimitations, above, [Chapter 10](#), p. 506.

311 Award of 12 July 2016; see further above, [Chapter 10](#), p. 484.

312 Arbitral Award of 14 August 2015 and Award on Compensation of 10 July 2017. Current cases include *Ukraine v. Russia* concerning the detention of Ukrainian naval vessels and *Ukraine v. Russia* concerning coastal rights in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Straits, <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/>.

313 Award of 22 July 2009.

314 See also the *Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India)*, Partial Award of 18 February 2013 and Final Award of 20 December 2013.

315 E.g. in *Argentina/Chile Frontier Award (La Palena)* of 1966, the Tribunal consisted of a lawyer and two geographical experts: 38 ILR, p. 10. See Malintoppi, ‘Methods’; and R. Y. Jennings, ‘The Differences Between Conducting a Case in the ICJ and in an *Ad Hoc* Tribunal – an Insider’s View’, in *Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda* (ed. N. Ando, E. McWhinney and R. Wolfrum), The Hague, 2002, p. 893.

316 Note that article 287 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 provides that where a state has not chosen by a written declaration one of the dispute settlement methods laid down, it will be deemed to have opted for arbitration under Annex VII of the Convention. In the case of such arbitrations, the parties nominate one each of the five-member tribunal, with the remaining members being chosen by agreement. In the absence of such agreement, the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea will make the necessary appointments: see e.g. the *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago* Award of 11 April 2006; and the *Guyana v. Suriname* Arbitral Award of 17 September 2007. See also e.g. the *South China Seas (Philippines v. China)* arbitration, Award of 12 July 2016; and, currently, *Ukraine v. Russia* concerning coastal rights in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Straits, <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/>.

317 See e.g. A. H. Feller, *Mexican Claims Commissions 1923–1934*, New York, 1935.

318 Established pursuant to the Declaration of 27 August 1991 of the European Community: see Bull. EC, 7/8 (1991). See generally M. Craven, 'The EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia', **66** *BYIL*, 1995, p. 333.

319 See above, **note 2**.

The International Court of Justice¹

The impetus to create a world court for the international community developed as a result of the atmosphere engendered by The Hague Conferences of 1897 and 1907. The establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, although neither permanent nor, in fact, a court, marked an important step forward in the consolidation of an international legal system.² However, no lasting concrete steps were taken until after the conclusion of the First World War. The Covenant of the League of Nations called for the formulation of proposals for the creation of a world court and in 1920 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was created. It stimulated efforts to develop international arbitral mechanisms. Together with arbitration, the Permanent Court was intended to provide a reasonably comprehensive system serving the international community. It was intended as a way to prevent outbreaks of violence by enabling easily accessible methods of dispute settlement in the context of a legal and organisational framework to be made available.³

The PCIJ was superseded after the Second World War by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), described in article 92 of the Charter as the ‘principal judicial organ’ of the United Nations. In essence, it is a continuation of the Permanent Court, with virtually the same statute and jurisdiction, and with a

continuing line of cases, no distinction being made between those decided by the PCIJ and those by the ICJ.⁴

The Organisation of the Court⁵

The ICJ is composed of fifteen members:

elected regardless of their nationality, from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognised competence in international law.⁶

The procedure for the appointment of judges is interesting in that it combines both legal and political elements, while seeking to exclude as far as possible the influence of national states over them. The system established by the Root–Phillimore plan in 1920 is in essence followed. This plan played a large part in the actual creation of the PCIJ and succeeded in allaying many suspicions regarding the composition of the proposed Court.⁷

The members of the Court are elected by the General Assembly and Security Council (voting separately) from a list of qualified persons drawn up by the national groups of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or by specially appointed national groups in the case of UN members that are not represented in the PCA.⁸ This provision was inserted to restrict political pressures in the selection of judges. The elections are staggered and take place once every

three years, with regard to five judges each time. In this way some element of continuity among the Court is maintained.

In practice, there is close coordination between the Assembly and Security Council in electing judges and political factors do obtrude, especially in view of the requirement contained in article 9 of the Statute that:

[the] electors should bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilisation and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.

This process has attracted much criticism on the grounds of attendant politicisation, but in the circumstances it is difficult to see a way to avoid this completely.⁹ The opinions of individual judges can be crucial, particularly in sensitive cases, and the alteration in the stance adopted by the Court with regard to *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia* between 1966¹⁰ and 1971¹¹ can be attributed in large measure to changes in the composition of the Court that took place in the intervening period. Candidates must obtain an absolute majority of votes in both the Assembly and the Council,¹² and no two successful applicants may be of the same nationality.¹³ In general, the composition of the Court has included a national of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France) with the remaining ten reflecting an ‘equitable geographical distribution’ as agreed by

the Security Council at the time of its enlargement in 1965.¹⁴ However, at the 2017 elections, the British judge was not re-elected, thus marking a significant change in the long-standing tradition of having a national from each of the permanent members and also modifying the geographical balance in favour of Asia and to the disadvantage of the 'Western Europe and Other Group'.¹⁵

The members of the Court are elected for nine years and may be re-elected.¹⁶ They enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities when on official business,¹⁷ and a judge cannot be dismissed unless it is the unanimous opinion of the other members of the Court that he or she has ceased to fulfil the required conditions.¹⁸ There is a requirement that a judge may not exercise any political or administrative function or engage in any other professional occupation. No judge may act as agent, advocate or counsel in any case nor participate in the decision of any case in which he or she has previously taken part as agent, advocate or counsel for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of inquiry, or in any other capacity.¹⁹ Judges of the International Court have historically been asked to act as members of international arbitral tribunals, both inter-state and investment, due to their knowledge and experience. However, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in October 2018, the President of the Court announced that the Court had decided the previous month that members of the Court would not normally accept to participate in international arbitration and, in particular, they would not participate in investor–state arbitration or in commercial arbitration.²⁰ The Court elects a president and vice-president for a three-year term which can be renewed,²¹ and it is situated at The Hague.²²

Since the aim of the election procedures relating to the composition of the Court is to produce a judicial body of independent members rather than state representatives, the Statute provides in article 31 that judges of the nationality of each of the parties in a case before the Court shall retain their right to sit in that case. However, the effect of this is somewhat reduced by the provision in that article that the parties to a dispute before the ICJ are entitled to choose a person to sit as judge for the duration of that case, where they do not have a judge of their nationality at the International Court of Justice already.²³ This procedure of appointing ad hoc judges may be criticised as possibly adversely affecting the character of the Court as an independent organ of legal experts.²⁴ The reason for the establishment and maintenance of the provision may be found within the realm of international politics and the need for political legitimacy and can only be understood as such.²⁵ Nevertheless, it may be argued that the procedure increases the judicial resources available to the Court in enabling the appointing state's arguments to be fully appreciated.²⁶ Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Provisional Measures) in a discussion of the nature of the ad hoc judge, declared that, together with the duty of impartiality, the ad hoc judge has the special obligation to ensure that so far as is reasonable, every relevant argument in favour of the party appointing him has been fully appreciated in the course of collegial reflection.²⁷ In practice, the institution has not resulted in any disruption of the functioning of the ICJ.²⁸ While it is overwhelmingly the case that ad hoc judges support the state that has so nominated them, this is not invariably so.²⁹ The Court has also permitted the use of ad hoc judges in advisory proceedings, although only where it has found that an opinion is requested 'upon a legal question' actually pending between two or more states.³⁰

Article 29 of the ICJ Statute provides for the establishment of a Chamber of Summary Procedure for the speedy dispatch of business by five judges. It has not as yet been called upon. More controversially, a seven-member Chamber for Environmental Matters was established in July 1993.³¹ Article 26 permits the creation of Chambers composed of three or more members as the Court may determine for dealing with particular categories of cases³² or to deal with a particular case. This procedure was revised in the 1978 Rules of Court³³ and used for the first time in the *Gulf of Maine* case.³⁴ The question of the composition of the Chamber is decided by the Court after the parties have been consulted, and in such cases the identity of the judges to comprise the Chamber is clearly of critical value. In the *Gulf of Maine* case, it was alleged that Canada and the United States threatened to withdraw the case if their wishes as to composition were not carried out.³⁵ Judge Oda has underlined that ‘in practical terms, therefore, it is inevitable, if a chamber is to be viable, that its composition must result from a consensus between the parties and the Court’, although the Chamber is a component of the Court and ‘the process of election whereby it comes into being should be as judicially impartial as its subsequent functioning’.³⁶

Recourse to a Chamber provides the parties with flexibility in the choice of judges to hear the case and to that extent parallels arbitration.³⁷ Of the first two matters before Chambers of the Court, perhaps the more interesting from the perspective of the future development of the ICJ was the *Burkina Faso/Mali* case,³⁸ since African states had hitherto been most reluctant in permitting third-party binding settlement of their disputes. Chambers of the Court have also been utilised in the *Elettronica Sicula (ELSI)* case,³⁹ the

Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute between El Salvador and Honduras (Nicaragua Intervening),⁴⁰ the *Application for Revision of the Judgment in El Salvador/Honduras* (Nicaragua Intervening)⁴¹ and *Benin v. Niger*.⁴²

The Rules of the Court, which govern its procedure and operations, were adopted in 1946 and revised in 1972 and 1978.⁴³ Articles 79 and 80 of the 1978 Rules were amended in 2000, in 2005,⁴⁴ in October 2019⁴⁵ and articles 59 and 94 in 2020.⁴⁶ The internal judicial practice of the Court has been the source of discussion in recent years⁴⁷ and some changes have taken place.⁴⁸ The Court, for example, now adopts Practice Directions.⁴⁹ The Court has the power to regulate its own procedure.⁵⁰ Written pleadings are governed by articles 44 to 53 of the Rules of Court, which in fact allow the parties considerable latitude. While it is for the Court itself to determine the number, order and timing of filings of pleadings, this is done in consultation with the parties and the Court is ready to allow parties to extend time limits or determine whether, for example, there should be further rounds of pleadings.⁵¹

The Jurisdiction of the Court⁵²

General

The International Court is a judicial institution that decides cases on the basis of international law as it exists at the date of the decision. It cannot formally create law as it is not a legislative organ.⁵³ The Court has emphasised that ‘it states the existing law and does not legislate. This is so even if, in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its scope and sometimes note its general trend.’⁵⁴ Its views as to what the law is are of the highest authority. However, the matters that come before it are invariably intertwined with political factors. On occasions, such matters are also the subject of consideration before the political organs of the United Nations or other international organisations or indeed the subject of bilateral negotiations between the parties. This raises issues as to the proper function and role of the Court. The International Court of Justice is by virtue of article 92 of the Charter the ‘principal judicial organ of the United Nations’. It is also, as Judge Lachs put it, ‘the guardian of legality for the international community as a whole, both within and without the United Nations’.⁵⁵ It has been emphasised that the ‘function of the Court is to state the law’⁵⁶ and it can only decide on the basis of law.⁵⁷ The issue of judicial function was examined in an important joint declaration by seven judges in *Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom*,⁵⁸ one of the cases brought by what was originally the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against NATO countries arising out of the Kosovo conflict in 1999. It was noted that when choosing between various grounds upon which to accept or reject jurisdiction, there

were three criteria to guide the Court. These were, first, consistency with previous case-law in order to provide predictability as ‘consistency is the essence of judicial reasoning’; secondly, certitude, whereby the Court should choose the ground most secure in law; and, thirdly, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the Court should be ‘mindful of the possible implications and consequences for the other pending cases’.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, political factors cannot but be entwined with questions of law. The Court has noted that while political aspects may be present in any legal dispute brought before it, the Court was only concerned to establish that the dispute in question was a legal dispute ‘in the sense of a dispute capable of being settled by the application of principles and rules of international law’.⁶⁰ The fact that other elements are present cannot detract from the characterisation of a dispute as a legal dispute.⁶¹ The Court has also referred to the assessment of the legality of the possible conduct of states with regard to international legal obligations as an ‘essentially judicial task’.⁶² Accordingly, ‘the task of the Court must be to respond, on the basis of international law, to the particular legal dispute brought before it. As it interprets and applies the law, it will be mindful of context, but its task cannot go beyond that.’⁶³

The fact that the same general political situation may come before different organs of the United Nations has raised the problem of concurrent jurisdiction. The Court, however, has been consistently clear that the fact that the issue before the Court is also the subject of active negotiations between the parties,⁶⁴ or the subject of good offices activity by the UN Secretary-General⁶⁵ or the subject of consideration by the Security Council⁶⁶ or

regional organisations,⁶⁷ will not detract from the competence of the Court or the exercise of its judicial function. The Court has noted that the Security Council has functions of a political nature, while the Court itself has functions of a legal nature, and that therefore both organs could perform their separate but complementary functions with regard to the same events.⁶⁸ The Court may also indicate provisional measures of protection at the same time as the UN Secretary-General is organising a fact-finding mission to investigate the same events.⁶⁹ The Court's essential function is to resolve in accordance with international law disputes placed before it⁷⁰ and to refrain from deciding points not included in the final submissions of the parties.⁷¹ The provision as to international law relates to the sources of law available for application by the Court and is considered subsequently.⁷² The obligation to decide was referred to by the Court in the *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf* (Application for Permission to Intervene) case,⁷³ where it was noted that it was the duty of the Court 'to give the fullest decision it may in the circumstances of each case'.⁷⁴ However, this obligation is subject, for example, to jurisdictional limitations (for example, with regard to the rights of third states)⁷⁵ and questions related to judicial propriety.⁷⁶

The Nature of a Legal Dispute

Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court requires that a matter brought before it should be a legal dispute.⁷⁷ Although it is not possible to point to a specific definition, the approach adopted by the Permanent Court in the *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions* (Jurisdiction) case⁷⁸ constitutes the appropriate starting point. The Court declared that a dispute could be regarded as 'a disagreement over a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of

interests between two persons’. It is to be distinguished from a situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. This is a subtle but important difference since, for the process of settlement to operate successfully, there has to be a specific issue or issues readily identifiable to be resolved. In principle the date for determining the existence of a dispute is the date on which the application is submitted to the Court.⁷⁹

In the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* case,⁸⁰ the Court noted that ‘whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determination’ and pointed out that in the instant case ‘the two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or the non-performance of certain treaty obligations’ so that ‘international disputes have arisen’. A mere assertion is not sufficient; it must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other.⁸¹ This was somewhat re-phrased by the Court in *Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom*,⁸² so that ‘a dispute exists when it is demonstrated, on the basis of evidence, that the respondent was aware, or could not have been unaware, that its views were “positively opposed by the applicant”’. The basic approach was reaffirmed in *Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement*,⁸³ where the Court in an Advisory Opinion noted that the consistent challenge by the UN Secretary-General to the decisions contemplated and then taken by the US Congress and Administration with regard to the closing of the PLO offices in the United States (which of necessity included the PLO Mission to the United Nations in New York) demonstrated the existence of a dispute between the US and the UN relating to the Headquarters Agreement. In the *East Timor* case,⁸⁴ the Court again reaffirmed its earlier case-law and went on to note that ‘Portugal

has rightly or wrongly, formulated complaints of fact and law against Australia, which the latter has denied. By virtue of this denial, there is a legal dispute.’ This acceptance of a relatively low threshold was underlined in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)*,⁸⁵ where the Court stated that ‘by reason of the rejection by Yugoslavia of the complaints formulated against it by Bosnia-Herzegovina, “there is a legal dispute” between them’. Such denial of the allegations made against Yugoslavia had occurred ‘whether at the stage of proceedings relating to the requests for the indication of provisional measures, or at the stage of the present proceedings relating to those objections’.⁸⁶ In other words, in order for a matter to constitute a legal dispute, it is sufficient for the respondent to an application before the Court merely to deny the allegations made even if the jurisdiction of the Court is challenged.⁸⁷

While it is for the parties to put forward their views, and particularly for the applicant, in its application, to present to the Court the dispute with which it wishes to seize the Court,⁸⁸ it is for the Court itself to determine on an objective basis the subject-matter of the dispute before it, that is ‘to isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim’.⁸⁹ The Rules of Court require that the application specify the ‘facts and grounds on which the claim is based’ and that a memorial include a statement of the ‘relevant facts’ (articles 38(2) and 49(1) respectively). To identify the subject-matter of the dispute, the Court bases itself on the application, as well as the written and oral pleadings of the parties. In particular, it takes account of the facts that the applicant identifies as the basis for its claim.⁹⁰ Should the Court conclude that the dispute in question has disappeared by the time it makes its decision, because, for example, the object of the claim has been achieved by

other means, then the ‘necessary consequences’ will be drawn and no decision may be given.⁹¹ In all events, the determination on an objective basis of the existence of a dispute is for the Court itself.⁹² It is also clear that the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations is not a prerequisite to going to the Court absent specific requirements.⁹³

Contentious Jurisdiction⁹⁴

The jurisdiction of the International Court falls into two distinct parts: its capacity to decide disputes between states; and its capacity to give advisory opinions when requested so to do by particular qualified entities. The latter will be noted in the following section.

Under article 36(6) of the Statute, the Court has the competence to decide its own jurisdiction in the event of a dispute and the Court has underlined on a number of occasions that the question as to the establishment of jurisdiction is a matter for the Court itself.⁹⁵ Although a party seeking to assert a fact must prove it, the issue of jurisdiction is a question of law to be resolved by the Court in the light of the relevant facts.⁹⁶ Further, jurisdiction must be determined as at the time that the act instituting proceedings was filed, so that if the Court had jurisdiction at that date, it will continue to have jurisdiction irrespective of subsequent events.⁹⁷ Subsequent events may lead to a finding that an application has become moot, but cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction.⁹⁸ It should also be noted that in dealing with issues of jurisdiction, the Court will not attach as much importance to matters of form as would be the case in domestic law.⁹⁹ The Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction to take such action as may be required in order to ensure that the

exercise of its jurisdiction over the merits, once established, is not frustrated, and to ensure the orderly settlement of all matters in dispute, to ensure the ‘inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function’ of the Court and to ‘maintain its judicial character’.¹⁰⁰ The Court has also held that where jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required in order to consider the question of remedies.¹⁰¹

It has been emphasised that the function of a decision on jurisdiction is solely to determine whether the case on the merits may proceed ‘and not to engage in a clarification of a controverted issue of a general nature’, while a case will not be declined simply on the basis of the alleged motives of one of the parties or because the judgment may have implications in another case.¹⁰² The Court has freedom to select the ground upon which it will base its judgment and when its jurisdiction is challenged on diverse grounds, it is free to base its decision on one or more grounds of its own choosing, in particular ‘the ground which in its judgment is more direct and conclusive’.¹⁰³ Once the Court has reached a decision on jurisdiction, that decision assumes the character of *res judicata*,¹⁰⁴ that is it becomes final and binding upon the parties. Subject only to the possibility of revision under article 61 of the Statute,¹⁰⁵ the findings of a judgment are, for the purposes of the case and between the parties, to be taken as correct, and may not be reopened on the basis of claims that doubt has been thrown on them by subsequent events.¹⁰⁶

As well as the question of the jurisdiction of the Court, which essentially concerns issues as to the consent of the parties, it is necessary that the application be admissible.¹⁰⁷ Admissibility refers to the application of relevant general rules of international law, such as exhaustion of local

remedies in cases concerning diplomatic protection.¹⁰⁸ Objections to admissibility normally take the form of an assertion that, even if the Court has jurisdiction and the facts stated by the applicant state are assumed to be correct, nonetheless there are reasons why the Court should not proceed to an examination of the merits.¹⁰⁹ Together they form the necessary prerequisite to the Court proceeding to address the merits of a case. Also of relevance in the pre-merits consideration of an application to the Court is the question of standing or jurisdiction *ratione personae*, a matter which logically arises before a consideration of jurisdiction and admissibility. It refers to the question of the receivability of the request, sometimes termed the process of seisin, which constitutes ‘a procedural step independent of the basis of jurisdiction invoked’, although the question as to whether the Court has been validly seized is a question of jurisdiction.¹¹⁰ It is also to be underlined that the absence of jurisdiction to resolve disputes about compliance with a particular obligation under international law does not affect the existence and binding force of that obligation. States are required to fulfil their obligations under international law, the Court has emphasised, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and they remain responsible for acts contrary to international law which are attributable to them.¹¹¹

Article 34 of the ICJ Statute declares that only states may be parties in cases before the Court.¹¹² This is of far-reaching importance since it prohibits recourse to the Court by private persons and international organisations, save in so far as some of the latter may be able to obtain advisory opinions. The Court is open to all states that are parties to the Statute.¹¹³ Article 93 of the UN Charter provides that all UN members are *ipso facto* parties to the ICJ

Statute, and that non-members of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute on conditions determined by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. In the case of Switzerland, for example, the Assembly and Security Council declared that it could become a party to the ICJ Statute provided it accepted the provisions of that Statute, accepted all the obligations of a UN member under article 94 of the Charter (i.e. undertaking to comply with the decision of the Court), and agreed to pay a certain amount towards the expenses of the Court.¹¹⁴ The Security Council has in fact resolved that access to the ICJ for a state not party to the Statute is possible provided that such state has previously deposited with the registrar of the Court a declaration (either general or particular) accepting the jurisdiction of the Court and undertaking to comply in good faith with the decision or decisions of the Court.¹¹⁵ West Germany filed a general declaration with the ICJ on this basis before it joined the United Nations,¹¹⁶ while Albania¹¹⁷ and Italy¹¹⁸ filed particular declarations with regard to cases with which they were involved.

Article 35(2) of the Statute further provides that the conditions under which the Court shall be open to states other than those parties to the Statute shall be laid down by the Security Council¹¹⁹ ‘subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force’. The Court has rather restrictively interpreted this condition to refer to treaties in force as at the date of the entry into force of the Statute and providing for the jurisdiction of what was then the new Court.¹²⁰ Although only states may be parties before the Court, the Court may request information relevant to cases before it from public international organisations and may receive information presented by these organisations on their own initiative.¹²¹

The question as to whether a party has the right to appear before the Court under the Statute is not dependent upon consent and is an issue which the Court itself must inquire into and determine prior to considering any objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.¹²² Article 35(1) of the Statute provides that the Court shall be open to the states parties to the Statute, or as the Court itself has stated: ‘The Court can exercise its judicial function only in respect of those states which have access to it under article 35.’ Only states which have access to the Court, therefore, are in a position to confer jurisdiction upon it.¹²³ In *Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom*,¹²⁴ the Court concluded that Serbia and Montenegro could not be regarded as a party to the Statute at the time of the application.¹²⁵

The Court has certain inherent powers flowing from its role as a judicial organ.¹²⁶ These would include in certain circumstances the right of its own motion to put an end to proceedings in a case.¹²⁷ However, this appeared to be restricted to two circumstances: first, in cases before the adoption of article 38(5) of the Rules, where an application is made without a basis of jurisdiction in the hope that the other state would accept it;¹²⁸ and, secondly, where the Court accedes to the request of respondent states to remove cases from the list on the grounds of being manifestly lacking in jurisdiction.¹²⁹ This approach by the Court in the *Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom* case was criticised by Judge Kooijmans¹³⁰ and by Judge Higgins, who noted that there was nothing in the case-law to suggest that the exercise of the Court’s inherent powers in the absence of discontinuance was limited to the two circumstances referred to by the Court.¹³¹ Judge Higgins emphasised that: ‘The Court’s inherent jurisdiction derives from its judicial character and the need for powers to regulate matters connected with the administration of

justice, not every aspect of which may have been foreseen in the Rules.’ The ‘very occasional need’ to exercise such inherent powers might arise at any stage, from summary dismissal of a case to jurisdictional questions to merits issues.¹³²

Under article 79 of the Rules, the Court may decide after consulting the parties to separate questions concerning its jurisdiction or the admissibility of the application. Failing this, article 79*bis* provides that an objection by the respondent to the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of the application, or other objection the decision upon which is requested before any further proceedings on the merits, is to be made in writing as soon as possible, and not later than three months after the delivery of the Memorial. The other party should provide a written statement of its observations and submissions generally within four months from the date of the filing of the preliminary objections.¹³³ Under article 79*ter* (4) of the Rules (as amended in October 2019), the Court shall decide upon a preliminary question or uphold or reject a preliminary objection or it may declare that the objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character, in which case the matter will be dealt with together with the merits.¹³⁴ The Court has stated that, in principle, a party raising preliminary objections to its jurisdiction is entitled to have those objections answered in the preliminary stage of the proceedings, unless the Court does not have before it all facts necessary to decide the question raised or if answering the preliminary objection would determine the dispute, or some elements thereof, on the merits.¹³⁵

Article 36(1)

The Court has jurisdiction under article 36(1) of its Statute in all cases referred to it by parties, and regarding all matters specially provided for in the UN Charter or in treaties or conventions in force.¹³⁶ As in the case of arbitration, parties may refer a particular dispute to the ICJ by means of a special agreement, or *compromis*, which will specify the terms of the dispute and the framework within which the Court is to operate.¹³⁷ This method was used in the *Minquiers and Ecrehos* case,¹³⁸ and in a number of others.¹³⁹

The jurisdiction of the Court is founded upon the consent of the parties,¹⁴⁰ which need not be in any particular form and in certain circumstances the Court will infer it from the conduct of the parties. In the *Corfu Channel* (Preliminary Objections) case,¹⁴¹ the Court inferred consent from the unilateral application of the plaintiff state (the United Kingdom) coupled with subsequent letters from the other party involved (Albania) intimating acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. The idea whereby the consent of a state to the Court's jurisdiction may be established by means of acts subsequent to the initiation of proceedings is known as the doctrine of *forum prorogatum*.¹⁴² It will usually arise where one party files an application with the Court unilaterally inviting another state to accept jurisdiction with regard to the particular dispute where jurisdiction would not otherwise exist with regard to the matter at issue. If the other state accedes to this, then the Court will have jurisdiction.¹⁴³

The doctrine has been carefully interpreted to avoid giving the impression of a creeping extension by the Court of its own jurisdiction by means of fictions. Consent has to be clearly present, if sometimes inferred, and not merely a technical creation.¹⁴⁴ The Court has emphasised that such consent has to be

‘voluntary and indisputable’.¹⁴⁵ In the *Corfu Channel* case, the United Kingdom sought to found the Court’s jurisdiction *inter alia* on the recommendation of the Security Council that the dispute be referred to the Court, which it was agreed was a ‘decision’ binding upon UN member states in accordance with article 25 of the Charter.¹⁴⁶ Accordingly, it was maintained by the United Kingdom that Albania was obliged to accept the Court’s jurisdiction irrespective of its consent. The ICJ did not deal with this point, since it actually inferred consent, but, in a joint separate opinion, seven judges of the Court rejected the argument, which was regarded as an attempt to introduce a new meaning of compulsory jurisdiction.¹⁴⁷ A particularly difficult case with regard to the question as to whether relevant events demonstrated an agreement between the parties to submit a case to the Court is that of *Qatar v. Bahrain*.¹⁴⁸ The issue centred upon minutes of a meeting signed by the Foreign Ministers of both states (the Doha Minutes) in December 1990. The status of such Minutes was controverted,¹⁴⁹ but the Court held that they constituted an agreement under international law.¹⁵⁰ There was also disagreement over the substance of the Minutes and thus the subject-matter of the dispute to be placed before the Court. Bahrain defined the issue as including the question of ‘sovereignty’ over Zubarah, while Qatar merely accepted that that was how Bahrain characterised the issue.¹⁵¹ The Court concluded that this was sufficient to lay the whole dispute, including this element, before it.¹⁵² Questions do therefore remain with regard to the extent of the consensual principle after this decision.¹⁵³

It is a well-established principle that the Court will only exercise jurisdiction over a state with its consent¹⁵⁴ and it ‘cannot therefore decide upon legal rights of third states not parties to the proceedings’.¹⁵⁵ As a consequence of

this principle (often termed the indispensable third-party principle), the Court will not entertain actions between states that in reality implead a third state without its consent. This rule was underlined in the *Monetary Gold* case,¹⁵⁶ where it was noted that where the legal interests of the third party ‘would form the very subject-matter of the decision’, the Court could not entertain proceedings in the absence of that state. In *Nicaragua v. United States*, the Court noted that the circumstances of the *Monetary Gold* case ‘probably represent the limit of the power of the Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction’.¹⁵⁷ This approach was underlined in *Certain Phosphate Lands (Nauru v. Australia)*, where the Court emphasised that the absence of a request from a third party to intervene ‘in no way precludes the Court from adjudicating upon claims submitted to it, provided that the legal interests of the third state which may possibly be affected do not form the very subject-matter of the decision that is applied for’.¹⁵⁸ The test referred to was whether the determination of the third state’s responsibility was a prerequisite for the claims raised before the Court by one party against the other.¹⁵⁹ In the *East Timor* case,¹⁶⁰ the Court held that it could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of another state which was not a party to the case, whatever the nature of the obligations in question (i.e. even if they were *erga omnes* obligations, as was the case with regard to the right to self-determination).¹⁶¹ It was felt that in view of the situation, the Court would have to rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia’s conduct with regard to East Timor as a prerequisite for deciding upon Portugal’s claims against Australia¹⁶² and that such a determination would constitute the very subject-matter of the judgment requested and thus infringe the *Monetary Gold* principle.¹⁶³ However, in *Croatia v. Serbia*, the Court found that the principle was not applicable with regard to a state which no longer existed since such a state no longer

possessed any rights and was thus incapable of giving or withholding consent to the jurisdiction of the Court and in any event it was not necessary that the Court rule on the legal situation of the particular third state as a ‘prerequisite for the determination of the present claim’.¹⁶⁴

The question of standing may occasionally arise, particularly where parties to a multilateral treaty are concerned. The Court noted in *Reservations to the Genocide Convention*¹⁶⁵ that in such a convention, all the contracting states had a common interest, namely the accomplishment of the high purpose which is the *raison d’être* of the Convention so that the purely contractual approach would not suffice. In *The Gambia v. Myanmar*,¹⁶⁶ the Court stated that: ‘In view of their shared values, all the states parties to the Genocide Convention have a common interest to ensure that acts of genocide are prevented and that, if they occur, their authors do not enjoy impunity. That common interest implies that the obligations in question are owed by any state party to all the other states parties to the convention . . . It follows that any state party to the Genocide Convention, and not only a specially affected state, may invoke the responsibility of another state party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations *erga omnes partes*, and to bring that failure to an end.’

Apart from those instances where states specifically refer a dispute to it, the Court may also be granted jurisdiction over disputes arising from international treaties where such treaties contain a ‘compromissory clause’ providing for this.¹⁶⁷ In fact, quite a large number of international treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, do include a clause awarding the ICJ jurisdiction with regard to questions that might arise from the interpretation

and application of the agreements.¹⁶⁸ Examples of the more important of such conventions include the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1965 Convention on Investment Disputes, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination¹⁶⁹ and the 1970 Hague Convention on Hijacking. In *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)*,¹⁷⁰ the Court founded its jurisdiction upon article IX of the Genocide Convention. In *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran* (the *Iranian Hostages* case),¹⁷¹ the Court founded jurisdiction upon article 1 of the Optional Protocols concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (to which both Iran and the United States were parties), which accompany both the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963. Common article 1 of the Protocol provides that disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Conventions lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The Court also founded jurisdiction in *Nicaragua v. United States* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility)¹⁷² *inter alia* upon a treaty provision, article XXIV(2) of the 1956 US–Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation providing for submission of disputes over the interpretation or application of the treaty to the ICJ unless the parties agree to settlement by some other specific means.

In its judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility in *Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras)*,¹⁷³ the International Court emphasised that the existence of jurisdiction was a question of law and dependent upon the intention of the parties. The issue of jurisdiction in the case centred, in the view of the Court, upon article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá 1948, which declared that the parties ‘[i]n conformity with article

36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice . . . recognise, in relation to any other American state, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory *ipso facto* . . . in all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them' concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of a fact which if established would constitute the breach of an international obligation or the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. Objections to jurisdiction put forward by Honduras on the grounds that article XXXI was not intended to have independent force, and was merely an encouragement to the parties to deposit unilateral declarations of acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and that article XXXI would only operate after the exhaustion of conciliation procedures referred to in article XXXII, were rejected on the basis of interpretation.¹⁷⁴ Article XXXI nowhere envisaged that the undertaking contained therein might be amended subsequently by unilateral declaration and the reference to article 36(2) of the Statute was insufficient to have that effect,¹⁷⁵ while the reference in article XXXII of the Pact to a right of recourse to the International Court upon the failure of conciliation provided a second basis for the jurisdiction of the Court and not a limitation upon the first.¹⁷⁶ In other words, the commitment contained in article XXXI of the Pact was sufficient to enable the Court to exercise jurisdiction.¹⁷⁷

Where a treaty in force provides for reference of a matter to the PCIJ or to a tribunal established by the League of Nations, article 37 of the Statute declares that such matter shall be referred to the ICJ, provided the parties to the dispute are parties to the Statute. It is basically a bridging provision and provides some measure of continuity between the old Permanent Court and the new International Court.¹⁷⁸ Under article 36(6) of the Statute, as noted

above, the Court has the competence to decide its own jurisdiction in the event of a dispute.¹⁷⁹

Article 36(2)¹⁸⁰

This article has been of great importance in extending the jurisdiction of the International Court. Article 36(2), the so-called ‘optional clause’, stipulates that:

The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognise as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:

- (a) the interpretation of a treaty;
- (b) any question of international law;
- (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

This provision was intended to operate as a method of increasing the Court’s jurisdiction, by the gradual increase in its acceptance by more and more states. By the end of 1984, forty-seven declarations were in force and deposited with the UN Secretary-General, comprising less than one-third of

the parties to the ICJ Statute. By June 2020, this number had risen to seventy-four.¹⁸¹

The Court discussed the nature of such declarations in *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections) and stated that:

Any state party to the Statute, in adhering to the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with article 36, paragraph 2, accepts jurisdiction in its relations with states previously having adhered to that clause. At the same time, it makes a standing offer to the other states parties to the Statute which have not yet deposited a declaration of acceptance. The day one of those states accepts that offer by depositing in its turn its declaration of acceptance, the consensual bond is established and no further condition needs to be met.¹⁸²

Declarations pursuant to article 36(2) are in the majority of cases conditional and, as noted, are dependent upon reciprocity for operation. This means that the Court will only have jurisdiction under article 36(2) to the extent that both the declarations of the two parties in dispute cover the same issue or issues. The doctrine of the lowest common denominator thus operates since the acceptance, by means of the optional clause, by one state of the jurisdiction of the Court is in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation. It is not that declarations in identical terms from the parties are necessary, but

both declarations must grant jurisdiction to the Court regarding the dispute in question.

In practice, this can lead to the situation where one party may rely on a condition, or reservation, expressed in the declaration of the other party. This occurred in the *Norwegian Loans* case,¹⁸³ between France and Norway. The Court noted that:

since two unilateral declarations are involved, such jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court only to the extent to which the declarations coincide in conferring it. A comparison between the two declarations shows that the French declaration accepts the Court's jurisdiction within narrower limits than the Norwegian declaration; consequently, the common will of the parties, which is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, exists within these narrower limits indicated by the French reservation.¹⁸⁴

Accordingly, Norway was entitled to invoke the French reservation to defeat the jurisdiction of the Court. However, much will depend upon the precise terms of the declarations. Declarations made under the optional clause in the PCIJ Statute and still in force are deemed to continue with regard to the ICJ,¹⁸⁵ but in the *Aerial Incident* case¹⁸⁶ between Israel and Bulgaria, the Court declared that this in fact only applied to states signing the ICJ Statute

in 1945 and did not relate to states, like Bulgaria, which became a party to the Statute many years later as a result of admission to the United Nations.

The issue also arose in the jurisdictional phase of *Nicaragua v. United States*.¹⁸⁷ Nicaragua had declared that it would accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in 1929, but had not ratified this. The United States argued that accordingly Nicaragua never became a party to the PCIJ Statute and could not therefore rely on article 36(5). The Court, in an interesting judgment, noted that the Nicaraguan declaration, unconditional and unlimited as to time, had ‘a certain potential effect’ and that the phrase in article 36(5) ‘still in force’ could be so interpreted as to cover declarations which had only potential and not binding effect. Ratification of the ICJ Statute in 1945 by Nicaragua had the effect, argued the Court, of transforming this potential commitment into an effective one.¹⁸⁸ Since this was so, Nicaragua could rely on the US declaration of 1946 accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction as the necessary reciprocal element.¹⁸⁹

The reservations that have been made in declarations by states under the optional clause, restricting the jurisdiction of the ICJ,¹⁹⁰ vary a great deal from state to state, and are usually an attempt to prevent the Court becoming involved in a dispute which is felt to concern vital interests. One condition made by a number of states, particularly the United States, stipulates that matters within the domestic jurisdiction ‘as determined by’ that particular state are automatically excluded from the purview of the Court.¹⁹¹ The validity of this type of reservation (known as the ‘Connally amendment’ from the American initiator of the relevant legislation) has been widely questioned,¹⁹² particularly since it appears to contradict the power of the

Court under article 36(6) to determine its own jurisdiction, and in reality it withdraws from the Court the jurisdiction conferred under the declaration itself. Indeed, it is a well-established principle of international law that the definition of domestic jurisdiction is an issue of international and not domestic law.¹⁹³

Many reservations relate to requirements of time (*ratione temporis*),¹⁹⁴ according to which acceptances of jurisdiction are deemed to expire automatically after a certain period or within a particular time after notice of termination has been given to the UN Secretary-General. Some states exclude the jurisdiction of the ICJ with regard to disputes arising before or after a certain date in their declarations.¹⁹⁵ Reservations *ratione personae* may also be made, for example the UK reservation concerning disputes between member states of the British Commonwealth.¹⁹⁶ Reservations may also be made *ratione materiae*, excluding disputes where other means of dispute settlement have been agreed.¹⁹⁷ Other restrictive grounds exist.¹⁹⁸ However, once the Court is dealing with a dispute, any subsequent expiry or termination of a party's declaration will not modify the Court's jurisdiction.¹⁹⁹

A state may withdraw or modify its declaration.²⁰⁰ The US declaration of 1946 provided for termination after a six-month period of notice. What the Court in the jurisdictional phase of *Nicaragua v. United States*²⁰¹ had to decide was whether a modifying notification²⁰² expressly deemed to apply immediately could have effect over the original declaration. It decided that the six-month notice provision remained valid and could be invoked by

Nicaragua against the United States, since it was an undertaking that constituted an integral part of the instrument that contained it.

Article 36(2) declarations constitute unilateral acts and the Court will interpret them in order to establish whether or not mutual consent has been given to its jurisdiction and ‘in a natural and reasonable way, having due regard to the intention of the state concerned at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court’.²⁰³ Further, the Court must decide whether ‘the force of the arguments militating in favour of jurisdiction is preponderant’.²⁰⁴

The Court has emphasised that there is a ‘fundamental distinction between the existence of the Court’s jurisdiction over a dispute, and the compatibility with international law of the particular acts which are the subject of the dispute’.²⁰⁵ This is so even with regard to rights and obligations *erga omnes* or peremptory norms of general international law (*jus cogens*). The mere fact that a principle has this elevated character in the international legal system is not enough of itself to confer jurisdiction, for this is dependent upon the consent of the parties.²⁰⁶ However, the Court has also emphasised that whether or not it finds that it has jurisdiction with regard to a particular dispute, the parties ‘remain in all cases responsible for acts attributable to them that violate the rights of other states’.²⁰⁷

Once the Court has established jurisdiction, its treatment of the substance of the dispute will be framed by the terms of the jurisdiction it has found exists, for the Court as a matter of principle cannot deal with issues that lie outside the consensual ambit it has determined subsists with regard to the dispute in

question.²⁰⁸ However, the Court has the competence to determine the meaning of its own jurisdiction (termed the principle of *kompetenz kompetenz* or *compétence de la compétence*) and may interpret the terms of the relevant *compromis*, or treaty or declaration as it deems appropriate in the circumstances.²⁰⁹ In *Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States)*, for example, the Court founded its jurisdiction upon article XXI(2) of the 1955 US–Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights concerning disputes as to the interpretation or application of that treaty.²¹⁰ Article XX(1) (d) of that treaty provided that the treaty ‘shall not preclude the application of measures . . . necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests’. The Court noted, in what may be seen as an expansive approach, that ‘the interpretation and application of that article will necessarily entail an assessment of the conditions of legitimate self-defence under international law’ and further held that the question of the application of that article ‘involves the principle of the prohibition in international law of the use of force, and the qualification to it constituted by the right of self-defence’.²¹¹

Sources of Law, Propriety and Legal Interest

In its deliberations, the Court will apply the rules of international law as laid down in article 38 (treaties, custom, general principles of law).²¹² However, the Court may decide a case *ex aequo et bono*, that is on the basis of justice and equity untrammelled by technical legal rules where the parties agree.²¹³ This has not yet occurred, although it should not be confused with the ability of the ICJ to apply certain equitable considerations in a case within the

framework of international law.²¹⁴ The question of gaps in international law in addressing a case arose in the Advisory Opinion concerning the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*.²¹⁵ Although not a contentious case and therefore not as such binding, the fact that the Court was unable to give its view on a crucial issue in international law may have ramifications. The Court took the view that it could not ‘conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake’.²¹⁶ This appearance of a *non liquet* is of some concern as a matter of principle, unconnected with the substance of the legal principle in question.²¹⁷

Before dealing with the merits of a case, the Court may have to deal with preliminary objections as to its jurisdiction or as to the admissibility of the application.²¹⁸ As noted above, preliminary objections must be made within three months after the delivery of the Memorial of the applicant state.²¹⁹ The Court has emphasised that objections to jurisdiction require decision at the preliminary stage of the proceedings.²²⁰ A decision on preliminary objections to jurisdiction cannot determine merits issues, even where dealt with in connection with preliminary objections. Such reference can only be provisional.²²¹ Where it has established its right to exercise jurisdiction, the Court may well decline to exercise that right on grounds of propriety. In the *Northern Cameroons* case,²²² the Court declared that:

it may pronounce judgment only in connection
with concrete cases where there exists, at the
time of adjudication, an actual controversy

involving a conflict of legal interests between the parties. The Court's judgment must have some practical consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal relations.

In addition, the Court itself (and not the parties) is the guardian of its judicial integrity; even a *compromis* or special agreement defining the question to be put before the Court cannot alter the limits of the Court's judicial function as it sees it.²²³ Further, events subsequent to the filing of the application may render the application without object, so that the Court is not required to give a decision.²²⁴

In addition, and following the *South West Africa* case (Second Phase) in 1966,²²⁵ it may be necessary for the Court to establish that the claimant state has a legal interest in the subject-matter of the dispute. The fact that political considerations may have motivated the application is not relevant, so long as a legal dispute is in evidence. Similarly, the fact that a particular dispute has other important aspects is not of itself sufficient to render the application inadmissible.²²⁶

Evidence

Unlike domestic courts, the International Court is flexible with regard to the introduction of evidence.²²⁷ Strict rules of admissibility common in domestic legal systems do not exist here.²²⁸ The Court has the competence *inter alia* to

determine the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of an international obligation.²²⁹ It may make all arrangements with regard to the taking of evidence,²³⁰ call upon the agents to produce any document or to supply any explanations as may be required,²³¹ or at any time establish an inquiry mechanism or obtain expert opinion.²³² The Court may indeed make on-site visits.²³³ However, it has no power to compel production of evidence generally, nor may witnesses be subpoenaed, nor is there any equivalent to proceedings for contempt of court.²³⁴ The use of experts has been comparatively rare,²³⁵ as has been recourse to witnesses.²³⁶ Agents are rarely asked to produce documents or supply explanations and there have been only two on-site visits to date.²³⁷ This has meant that the Court has sought to evaluate claims primarily upon an assessment of the documentary evidence provided, utilising also legal techniques such as inferences and admissions against interest.²³⁸ The Court, for example, has noted that the evidence of government and military figures of a state involved in litigation before the Court would be treated with ‘great reserve’,²³⁹ while witness statements produced in the form of affidavits would be treated with caution and in assessing such affidavits, a number of factors would have to be taken into account, including whether they had been made by state officials or private persons not interested in the outcome of the proceedings and whether a particular affidavit attested to the existence of facts or represented only an opinion with regard to certain events. Evidence which was contemporaneous with the period concerned may, however, be of special value. Further, a statement by a competent governmental official with regard to boundary lines was likely to have greater weight than sworn statements of a private person.²⁴⁰

The Court will make its own determination of the facts and then apply the relevant rules of international law to those facts it has found to exist and which are necessary in order to respond to the submissions of the parties, including defences and counter-claims. These findings of facts require an assessment of the evidence, which necessitates the Court deciding which of the material before it is relevant and of probative value with regard to the alleged facts. In so doing, the Court will make its own assessment of the weight, reliability and value of the evidence produced by the parties.²⁴¹ The Court has noted that it will treat with caution evidentiary materials specially prepared for the case in question²⁴² and also materials emanating from a single source, but would give particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable to the state represented by the person making them.²⁴³ Weight would also be given to evidence that has not been challenged by impartial persons for the correctness of what it contains and special attention given to evidence obtained by skilled judicial examination and cross-examination of persons directly involved.²⁴⁴ However, the evidence of government and military figures of a state involved in litigation before the Court would be treated with ‘great reserve’.²⁴⁵ The Court has also noted that witness statements produced in the form of affidavits should be treated with caution and, in assessing such affidavits, a number of factors would have to be taken into account, including whether they had been made by state officials or private persons not interested in the outcome of the proceedings and whether a particular affidavit attests to the existence of facts or represents only an opinion with regard to certain events. Evidence which is contemporaneous with the period concerned may, however, be of special value. Further, a statement by a competent governmental official with regard

to boundary lines is likely to have greater weight than sworn statements of a private person.²⁴⁶

The Court may also take judicial notice of facts which are public knowledge, primarily through media dissemination, provided that caution was shown and that the reports do not emanate from a single source.²⁴⁷ In *Congo v. Uganda*, the Court noted the particular importance of consistency and concordance in evaluating press information.²⁴⁸

It is for the applicant to present the terms of the dispute to the Court,²⁴⁹ and the burden of proof lies upon the party seeking to assert a particular fact or facts,²⁵⁰ although the Court has also stated that the principle is not an absolute one and there may be circumstances where the applicant cannot be required to prove a ‘negative fact’.²⁵¹ The Court has also noted that this does not relieve the other party of its duty to cooperate ‘in the provision of such evidence as may be in its possession that could assist the Court in resolving the dispute submitted to it’,²⁵² and has stated that there was no burden of proof to be discharged in the matter of jurisdiction.²⁵³ On the other hand, the burden of proof, and a relatively high one, lies upon the applicant state who wishes to intervene. Such state ‘must demonstrate convincingly what it asserts, and thus . . . bear the burden of proof’, although it need only show that its interest may be affected, not that it will or must be so affected. It must identify the interest of a legal nature in question and show how that interest may be affected.²⁵⁴ The actual standard of proof required will vary with the character of the particular issue of fact.²⁵⁵ In the *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* case, the Court emphasised that it had long recognised that ‘claims against a state

involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive'. The Court would need to 'be fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings, that the crime of genocide or the other acts enumerated in Article III [of the Genocide Convention] have been committed, have been clearly established' and it has noted that the same standard of proof would apply to the proof of attribution for such acts.²⁵⁶

Evidence which has been illegally or improperly acquired may also be taken into account, although no doubt where this happens its probative value would be adjusted accordingly.²⁵⁷ In the second provisional measures order in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)*, for example, the Court was prepared to admit a series of documents even though submitted on the eve of and during the oral hearings despite being 'difficult to reconcile with an orderly progress of the procedure before the Court, and with respect for the principle of equality of the parties'.²⁵⁸ In dealing with questions of evidence, the Court proceeds upon the basis that its decision will be based upon the facts occurring up to the close of the oral proceedings on the merits of the case.²⁵⁹

In so far as the scope of the Court's decision is concerned, it was noted in *Nicaragua v. United States* that the Court 'is bound to confine its decision to those points of law which are essential to the settlement of the dispute before it'.²⁶⁰ In so doing, the Court will seek to ascertain 'the true subject of the dispute' taking into consideration the submissions, the applications, oral arguments and other documents placed before it.²⁶¹

Provisional Measures²⁶²

Under article 41 of the Statute, the Court has the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional (or interim) measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. In deciding upon a request for provisional measures, the Court need not satisfy itself in a definitive manner that it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case, although such measures will not be indicated unless the provisions invoked by the relevant party appear *prima facie* to afford a basis upon which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded,²⁶³ whether the request for the indication of provisional measures is made by the applicant or by the respondent in the proceedings on the merits.²⁶⁴ In establishing the Court's *prima facie* jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case, the question of the nature and extent of the rights for which protection is being sought in the request for the indication of provisional measures has no bearing, this being addressed once the Court's *prima facie* jurisdiction over the merits of the case has been established.²⁶⁵

The Court, when considering a request for the indication of provisional measures, 'must be concerned to preserve . . . the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either to the Applicant or to the Respondent',²⁶⁶ without being obliged at that stage of the proceedings to rule on those rights.²⁶⁷ Thus, the purpose of exercising the power is to protect 'rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings',²⁶⁸ and thus the measures must be such that once the dispute over those rights has been resolved by the Court's judgment on the merits, they would no longer be

required.²⁶⁹ The Court must be satisfied that the rights asserted by a party are at least plausible²⁷⁰ and that there is a sufficient link with the subject of the proceedings before the Court on the merits of the case, that is between the rights whose protection is sought and the provisional measures being requested.²⁷¹ Further, there must be a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights which are the subject of the judicial proceedings and there is urgency in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that such prejudice will be caused to the rights in dispute ‘at any moment’ before the final decision on the merits.²⁷² It was noted, for example, in the *Lockerbie* case²⁷³ that the measures requested by Libya ‘would be likely to impair the rights which appear *prima facie* to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom by virtue of Security Council resolution 748 (1992)’. The Court has also noted that ‘the sound administration of justice requires that a request for the indication of provisional measures founded on Article 73 of the Rules of Court be submitted in good time’.²⁷⁴

Provisional measures are granted to assist the Court to ensure the integrity of the proceedings. Such interim measures were granted, for example, by the Court in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland)* (Provisional Measures) case,²⁷⁵ to protect British fishing rights in Icelandic-claimed waters, and again in the *Nuclear Tests* case.²⁷⁶

Provisional measures or recommendations or statements as to relevant international obligations may also be indicated or made by the Court, independently of requests by the parties, with a view to preventing ‘the aggravation or extension of the dispute whenever it considers that circumstances so require’.²⁷⁷ In *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, for example, the Court

referred explicitly not only to the rights of each party, but also by calling on the parties to observe an agreement reached for cessation of hostilities, to take all necessary steps to preserve relevant evidence in the disputed area and to cooperate with a proposed UN fact-finding mission.²⁷⁸ The Court also took care to link with the rights of the parties that were being protected the danger to persons within the disputed area.²⁷⁹ In the *Preah Vihear* (Interpretation) case, the Court ordered the establishment of a provisional demilitarised zone, the withdrawal of forces from it, Cambodia's free access to the Temple of Preah Vihear and provision of fresh supplies to its non-military personnel in the area, and continued cooperation by the parties with ASEAN, not least by allowing the observers appointed by that organisation to have access to the provisional demilitarised zone.²⁸⁰

The question of the legal effects of orders indicating provisional measures was discussed and decided by the Court for the first time in the *LaGrand* case. The Court addressed the issue in the light of the object and purpose of the Statute,²⁸¹ which was to enable it to fulfil its functions and in particular to reach binding decisions. The Court declared that:

The context in which article 41 has to be seen within the Statute is to prevent the Court from being hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective rights of the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved. It follows from the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as from the terms of article 41 when read in this context, that the power to

indicate provisional measures entails that such measures should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the right of the parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court. The contention that provisional measures indicated under article 41 might not be binding would be contrary to the object and purpose of that article.²⁸²

This clear and unanimous decision that provisional measures orders are binding until judgment on the merits is having a significant impact,²⁸³ although in a disappointing number of cases, the Court has noted breaches of orders of provisional measures in the *dispositifs* (operative paragraphs) of final judgments.²⁸⁴

Joinder of Cases²⁸⁵

By virtue of article 48 of the Statute, the Court has the authority to join cases into a single proceeding where the same general situation is in evidence. This is rare; however, the Court did prescribe joinder in the applications brought by Costa Rica against Nicaragua concerning *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area* and by Nicaragua against Costa Rica in the case concerning *The Construction of a Road along the San Juan River*. The Court noted that under article 47 of the Rules, it could ‘at any time direct that the proceedings in two or more cases be joined’ and that it had so acted ‘in

circumstances where joinder was consonant not only with the principle of sound administration but also with the need for judicial economy'. Any such decision would have to be taken in the light of the specific circumstances of each case. The Court noted that the two cases involved the same parties and related to the same general area. Both cases were based on facts relating to works carried out along or in close proximity to the River and both cases concerned the effect of the works in question on the local environment and on the free navigation on, and access to, the River. The Court emphasised that a decision to join the proceedings would allow the Court to address simultaneously the totality of the various interrelated and contested issues raised by the parties.²⁸⁶

Counter-Claims²⁸⁷

The Court has noted that a party may introduce a new claim provided that the additional claim is implicit in the application or it must arise directly out of the question which is the subject-matter of the application.²⁸⁸

Article 80 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court may entertain a counter-claim only if it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court and 'is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party'.²⁸⁹

A counter-claim constitutes a separate claim, or 'autonomous legal act', while requiring to be linked to the principal claim.²⁹⁰ It goes beyond a mere defence on the merits to the principal claim, but cannot be used as a means of referring to court claims which exceed the limits of its jurisdiction as recognised by the parties.²⁹¹ The Rule does not define what is meant by direct connection and this is a matter for the discretion of the Court, which

has noted that ‘the degree of connection between the claims must be assessed both in fact and in law’.²⁹² The direct connection of facts has been referred to in terms of ‘facts of the same nature . . . [that] form part of the same factual complex’,²⁹³ including the same geographical area or the same time period.²⁹⁴

In *Application of the Genocide Convention*, the direct connection of law appeared in that both parties sought the same legal aim, being the establishment of legal responsibility for violations of the Genocide Convention.²⁹⁵ In *Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States)*, the Court held that it was open to the parties to challenge the admissibility of counter-claims in general at the merits stage of the proceedings, even though the counter-claims had previously been found admissible. That was because the earlier incidental proceedings were concerned only with the question of whether the requirements of article 80 of the Rules had been complied with, i.e. that the counter-claim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the principal claim. A more general challenge, going beyond the terms of article 80, was therefore possible at the merits stage.²⁹⁶ In the joined *Certain Activities Carried Out in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)* and *Construction of a Road (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica)* cases, the Court emphasised that article 80(1) laid down two requirements, namely that the counter-claim comes within the jurisdiction and that it is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party. These related to the admissibility of the counter-claim as such. The Court stated that the term ‘admissibility’ had to be understood to include both the jurisdictional requirement and the direct-connection requirement.²⁹⁷

Third-Party Intervention²⁹⁸

There is no general right of intervention in cases before the Court by third parties as such, nor any procedure for joinder of new parties by the Court itself, nor any power by which the Court can direct that third states be made a party to proceedings.²⁹⁹ However, under article 62 of the ICJ Statute, any state which considers that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in a case may submit a request to be permitted to intervene,³⁰⁰ while under article 63, where the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question,³⁰¹ the Registrar of the Court shall notify all such states forthwith. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings. There is thus an important distinction between these provisions.³⁰² While the Court may draw the attention of third states to proceedings, it cannot order them to intervene.

Essentially, the Court may permit an intervention by a third party even though it be opposed by one or both of the parties to the case. The purpose of such intervention is carefully circumscribed and closely defined in terms of the protection of a state's interest of a legal nature which may be affected by a decision in an existing case, and accordingly intervention cannot be used as a substitute for contentious proceedings, which are based upon consent. Thus the intervener does not as such become a party to the case.³⁰³

The Court appeared to have set a fairly high threshold of permitted intervention. In the *Nuclear Tests* case,³⁰⁴ Fiji sought to intervene in the

dispute between France on the one hand and New Zealand and Australia on the other, but the Court postponed consideration of this and, after its judgment that the issue was moot, it was clearly unnecessary to take any further steps regarding Fiji. Malta sought to intervene in the *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf* case³⁰⁵ in the light of its shelf delimitation dispute with Libya in order to submit its views to the Court. The Court felt that the real purpose of Malta's intervention was unclear and did not relate to any legal interest of its own directly in issue as between Tunisia and Libya in the proceedings or as between itself and either one of those countries.³⁰⁶ While Malta did have an interest similar to other states in the area in the case in question, the Court said³⁰⁷ that in order to intervene under article 62 it had to have an interest of a legal nature which might be affected by the Court's decision in the instant case.

However, the Court granted permission for the very first time in the history of both the ICJ and its predecessor to a third state intervening under article 62 of the Statute to Nicaragua in the case concerning *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute)* (Nicaragua Intervening). The Court held unanimously that Nicaragua had demonstrated that it had an interest of a legal nature which might be affected by part³⁰⁸ of the judgment of the Chamber on the merits of the case.³⁰⁹ The intervening state does not need to demonstrate a basis of jurisdiction, since the competence of the Court is here not founded upon the consent of the parties as such, but is rather derived from the consent given by the parties in becoming parties to the Court's Statute to the Court's exercise of its powers conferred by the Statute.³¹⁰ The purpose of intervention, it was emphasised, was to protect a state's 'interest of a legal nature' that might be affected by a decision, not that

it will or must be affected, in an existing case already established between other states, the parties to the case, and not to enable a third state to ‘tack on a new case’.³¹¹ It was for the Court to decide on the request and to determine its limits and scope.³¹² The function of such intervention is to inform the Court of the interest of the intervening state of a legal nature which may be affected.³¹³

The Court in *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, repeating the formulation adopted in the *El Salvador/Honduras* case,³¹⁴ stated that it followed from the juridical nature and purpose of intervention that the existence of a valid link of jurisdiction between the intended intervener and the parties was not a requirement for the success of the application. Indeed, ‘the procedure of intervention is to ensure that a state with possibly affected interests may be permitted to intervene even though there is no jurisdictional link and it therefore cannot become a party’.³¹⁵ A jurisdictional link between the intervening state and the parties to the case is, accordingly, only necessary where the former wishes actually to become a party to the case.³¹⁶

In *Indonesia/Malaysia* (Philippines Intervening), the Court addressed the meaning of ‘interest of a legal nature’ and concluded that it referred not only to the *dispositif*, or the operative paragraphs, of the judgment, but also to the reasons constituting the necessary steps to it.³¹⁷ In deciding whether to permit an intervention, the Court had to decide, in relation to all the circumstances of the case, whether the legal claims which the proposed intervening state has outlined might indeed be affected by the decision in the case between the parties. The state seeking to intervene had to ‘demonstrate convincingly what it asserts’³¹⁸ and where the state relies on an interest of a legal nature other

than in the subject-matter of the case itself, it ‘necessarily bears the burden of showing with a particular clarity the existence of the interest of a legal nature which it claims to have’.³¹⁹

The Court in the merits stage of the *El Salvador/Honduras* case,³²⁰ noting that Nicaragua as the intervening state could not thereby as such become a party to the proceedings, concluded that that state could not therefore become bound by the judgment.³²¹ The intervener upon obtaining permission from the Court to intervene acquires the right to be heard, but not the obligation of being bound by the decision.³²² Since neither of the parties had given any indication of consent to Nicaragua being recognised to have any status which would enable it to rely on the judgment,³²³ it followed that the Court’s decision could not bind Nicaragua and thus was not *res judicata* for it.³²⁴

Applications to intervene have to be filed ‘as soon as possible, and not later than the closure of the written proceedings’.³²⁵

Remedies³²⁶

There has been relatively little analysis of the full range of the remedial powers of the Court.³²⁷ In the main, an applicant state will seek a declaratory judgment that the respondent has breached international law. Such declarations may extend to provision for future conduct as well as characterisation of past conduct.³²⁸ Requests for declaratory judgments may also be coupled with a request for reparation for losses suffered as a consequence of the illegal activities or damages for injury of various kinds, including non-material damage.³²⁹ Such requests for damages may include not only direct injury to the state in question, but also with regard to its citizens or their property.³³⁰ The Court awarded monetary compensation in the *Corfu Channel* case³³¹ and then again in the *Diallo* case.³³²

The Court may also interpret a relevant international legal provision so that individual rights as well as state rights are recognised in a particular case, thus opening the door to a claim for damages on behalf of the former by the national state where there has been a breach of such rights.³³³ Reparation may conceivably extend to full restitution, or *restitutio in integrum*.³³⁴ The Court in the *Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark)* case allowed for the possibility of an order for the modification or dismantling of disputed works.³³⁵ The question of restitution also arose in the *Congo v. Belgium* case, where the Court concluded that Belgium was under an obligation to cancel the arrest warrant concerned on the basis of the need for restitution.³³⁶

The issue of reparation was also raised in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case,³³⁷ where the Court concluded that both parties had committed internationally wrongful acts and that therefore both parties were entitled both to receive and to pay compensation. In the light of such ‘intersecting wrongs’, the Court declared that the issue of compensation could be satisfactorily resolved in the framework of an overall settlement by the mutual renunciation or cancellation of all financial claims and counter-claims.³³⁸ The parties may also request the Court’s assistance with regard to matters yet to be decided between the parties. Accordingly, in the *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project* case, the Court, having reached its decision on the past conduct of the parties, proceeded in its judgment to exercise its prescriptive competence, that is ‘to determine what the future conduct of the Parties should be’.³³⁹

The Court may also refer to, and thus incorporate in its judgment, a statement of one of the parties, and in effect treat it as a binding unilateral statement. In the *LaGrand* case, the Court noted the ‘substantial activities’ that the United States declared that it was carrying out in order to comply with the Convention in question and concluded that such behaviour ‘expresses a commitment to follow through with the efforts in this regard’ and must be regarded as meeting Germany’s request for a general assurance of non-repetition.³⁴⁰ In *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, the Court referred, both in the text of its judgment and in the *dispositif*, to a statement of the Cameroonian Agent as to the treatment of Nigerians living in his country and stated that it took note with satisfaction of the ‘commitment thus undertaken’.³⁴¹

The Court took a further step when, in the *LaGrand* case, it referred to the United States' 'obligation . . . to review' in cases of conviction and death sentence imposed upon a foreign national whose rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations had not been respected,³⁴² while in operative paragraph (7) of the *dispositif*, the Court, by a majority of fourteen votes to one, concluded that in such situations, 'the United States of America, by means of its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in that Convention'.³⁴³ The Court may order that the responsible state provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, but it will only do this where the circumstances so warrant and in special circumstances.³⁴⁴

The question of compensation came before the Court in *Certain Activities Carried Out in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*,³⁴⁵ where it was noted that the obligation to make full reparation for the damage caused by a wrongful act had been recognised by the Court in a number of cases. Where restitution was materially impossible or unduly burdensome, compensation could be an appropriate form of reparation. This applied to environmental damage as in other cases and the Court noted that, 'damage to the environment, and the consequent impairment or loss of the ability of the environment to provide goods and services, is compensable under international law. Such compensation may include indemnification for the impairment or loss of environmental goods and services in the period prior to recovery and payment for the restoration of the damaged environment.'³⁴⁶

Where the Court reserves the question of reparation to a later stage of proceedings, neither party may call in question such findings of the Court in

the earlier judgment as have become *res judicata* and seek to re-litigate these findings. Where the parties seek to negotiate a resolution by direct negotiations, the Court has emphasised that such negotiations have to be conducted in good faith and in order to find an agreed solution based on the findings of the judgment of the Court in question.³⁴⁷

Enforcement

Once given, the judgment of the Court under article 60 of the Statute is final and without appeal.³⁴⁸ Although it has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of the particular case under article 59, such decisions are often very influential in the evolution of new rules of international law.³⁴⁹ The Court itself is not concerned with compliance and takes the view that ‘once the Court has found that a state has entered into a commitment concerning its future conduct it is not the Court’s function to contemplate that it will not comply with it’.³⁵⁰

Under article 94 of the UN Charter, each member state undertakes to comply with the decision of the Court in any case to which it is a party and if this does not occur, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council which may make recommendations or take binding decisions. Examples of non-compliance would include Albania in the *Corfu Channel* case,³⁵¹ Iceland in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland)* case³⁵² and Iran in the *Iranian Hostages* case.³⁵³ However, since the 1990s, the record of compliance has been generally good. For example, despite initial reservations, both Libya³⁵⁴ and Nigeria³⁵⁵ accepted the judgments of the Court in favour of their opponents in the litigation in question. The political

costs of non-compliance have to be taken into account by potentially recalcitrant states.³⁵⁶

Application for Interpretation of a Judgment³⁵⁷

Article 60 of the Statute provides that: ‘The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.’ Rule 98(1) states that in the event of dispute³⁵⁸ as to the meaning or scope of a judgment any party may make a request for its interpretation. The object of the request must be solely to obtain clarification of the meaning and the scope of what the Court has decided with binding force and not to obtain an answer to questions not so decided.³⁵⁹ Accordingly, a request for interpretation must relate to the operative part of the judgment and not the reasons for the judgment, unless these are inseparable from the operative part.³⁶⁰ The need to avoid impairing the finality, and delaying the implementation, of judgments means that the question of the admissibility of the request needs ‘particular attention’.³⁶¹

Application for Revision of a Judgment³⁶²

Under article 61 of the Statute, an application for revision of a judgment may only be made when based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence. The application must be made within six months of the discovery of the new fact and within ten years of the date of the judgment. In the *Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment in the Tunisia/Libya Case*,³⁶³ the Court decided that the ‘new fact’ in question, namely the text of a resolution of the Libyan Council of Ministers of 28 March 1968 setting out the western boundary of the Libyan oil concessions in the first sector of the delimitation, was a fact that could have been discovered through the application of normal diligence. If Tunisia was ignorant of the facts, it was due to its own negligence.³⁶⁴ In addition, it could not be said that the new facts alleged were of such a nature as to be a decisive factor as required by article 61.³⁶⁵ In *Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 Concerning Application of the Genocide Convention* (Preliminary Objections), the Court noted that the first stage of the procedure was to examine the question of admissibility of the request.³⁶⁶ The Court emphasised that article 61 required that the application for revision be based upon the discovery of some fact which was unknown when the judgment was given. Thus, the fact must have been in existence at the date of the judgment and discovered subsequently. A fact occurring several years after the judgment would not be regarded as ‘new’.³⁶⁷ Drawing legal consequences from post-judgment facts or reinterpreting a legal situation ex

post facto would not fall within the terms of article 61. In *Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 Concerning the El Salvador/Honduras (Nicaragua Intervening) Case*,³⁶⁸ El Salvador sought revision of one sector of the land boundary between it and Honduras that had been determined by the Court in the earlier judgment. The Court detailed the requirements of article 61³⁶⁹ and held that each of the conditions laid down in the provision had to be fulfilled, otherwise the application would be dismissed.³⁷⁰

Examination of a Situation after the Judgment

The Court may have the competence to re-examine a situation dealt with by a previous decision where the terms of that decision so provide. This is likely to be rare for it runs the risk of allowing the parties to re-litigate an issue already decided simply because some of the circumstances have changed. In the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*,³⁷¹ the Court was asked to act in accordance with paragraph 63 of its 1974 decision in the light of further proposed French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. Paragraph 63 had noted that 'if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute'.³⁷² The 1974 judgment had concluded that there was no need for a decision on New Zealand's claims with regard to French nuclear testing as France had undertaken not to carry out any further atmospheric nuclear testing.

The Court implicitly accepted that ‘a special procedure’ in the sense of a re-examination of a situation in the light of changed circumstances could be established as a result of the terms of the original decision which did not amount to either an interpretation of the judgment under article 60 or a revision of the judgment under article 61.³⁷³ Such a procedure would in fact have the aim not of seeking changes in the original judgment, but rather of preserving it intact faced with an apparent challenge to it by one of the parties at a later date. As Judge Weeramantry noted, ‘[t]he Court used its undoubted powers of regulating its own procedure to devise a procedure *sui generis*’.³⁷⁴ However, in the instant case, the Court found that the basis of its 1974 judgment was a French undertaking not to conduct any further atmospheric nuclear tests and that therefore it was only a resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere that would affect the basis of that judgment and that had not occurred.³⁷⁵ Accordingly, New Zealand’s request for an examination of the situation was rejected.

The Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court³⁷⁶

In addition to having the capacity to decide disputes between states, the ICJ may give advisory opinions. Article 65 of the Statute declares that ‘the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorised by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request’, while article 96 of the Charter notes that as well as the General Assembly and Security Council, other organs of the United Nations and specialised agencies where so authorised by the Assembly may request such opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.³⁷⁷

Unlike contentious cases, the purpose of the Court's advisory jurisdiction is not to settle, at least directly or as such, inter-state disputes, but rather to 'offer legal advice to the organs and institutions requesting the opinion'.³⁷⁸ Accordingly, the fact that the question put to the Court does not relate to a specific dispute does not affect the competence of the Court, nor does it matter that the question posed is abstract in nature.³⁷⁹ Similarly, the fact that a legal question also has political aspects will not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction, nor of its function, which is to assess the legality of the possible conduct of states with regard to obligations imposed upon them by international law.³⁸⁰ The Court has also emphasised that questions put to it for an advisory opinion should be asked 'in neutral terms rather than assuming conclusions of law that are in dispute' and should not include reasoning or argument.³⁸¹ In addressing the question put to the Court by a political organ of the United Nations, the Court will not have regard to the origins or the political history of the request nor to the distribution of votes with regard to the relevant resolution. The fact that any answer given by the Court might become a factor in relation to the subject-matter of the request in other fora is also irrelevant in determining the appropriate response of the Court to the request for the advisory opinion.³⁸² Further, the lack of clarity in the drafting of the question would not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Such uncertainty could be clarified by the Court as a matter of interpretation. Indeed, the Court may 'broaden, interpret and even reformulate the questions put', seeing its role essentially as identifying the relevant principles and rules, interpreting them and applying them, 'thus offering a reply to the question posed based on law'.³⁸³

Having decided that it has jurisdiction, the Court will then proceed to determine whether it should as a matter of its discretion exercise such jurisdiction. This discretion exists in order to protect the integrity of the Court's judicial function as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.³⁸⁴ Originally, the Court took the broad view that it would not exercise its advisory jurisdiction in respect of a central issue in a dispute between the parties where one of these parties refused to take part in the proceedings.³⁸⁵ However, the scope of this principle, which was intended to reflect the sovereignty and independence of states, has been reduced in a number of subsequent cases before the Court, so that the presumption is that the Court, subject to jurisdictional issues, would answer a request for an advisory opinion. In the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* case,³⁸⁶ for example, which concerned the interpretation of the 1947 peace agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, it was stressed that whereas the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious proceedings rested upon the consent of the parties to the dispute, the same did not apply with regard to advisory opinions. Such opinions were not binding upon anyone and were given not to the particular states but to the organs which requested them. The Court declared that 'the reply of the Court, itself an "organ of the United Nations", represents its participation in the activities of the organisation, and in principle should not be refused'. Similarly, the Court emphasised in *Reservations to the Genocide Convention* that the object of advisory opinions was 'to guide the United Nations in respect of its own action'. Thus, the Court would lean towards exercising its jurisdiction, despite the objections of a concerned party, where it would be providing guidance for an international body with regard to the application of an international treaty. In fact, the Court has said that only 'compelling reasons' should lead the Court to refuse

to give an opinion on grounds of propriety as distinct from grounds of lack of jurisdiction.³⁸⁷

In the *Western Sahara* case,³⁸⁸ the ICJ gave an Advisory Opinion as regards the nature of the territory and the legal ties therewith of Morocco and Mauritania at the time of colonisation, notwithstanding the objections of Spain, the administering power. The Court distinguished the case from the *Eastern Carelia* dispute on a number of grounds, the most important being that the dispute in the *Western Sahara* case had arisen within the framework of the General Assembly's decolonisation proceedings and the object of the request for the Advisory Opinion (by the Assembly) was to obtain from the Court an opinion which would aid the Assembly in the decolonisation of the territory.³⁸⁹ Accordingly, the matter fell within the *Peace Treaties/Reservations* cases category of opinions to guide the United Nations.³⁹⁰ The Court noted that it was the fact that inadequate material was available for an opinion that impelled the PCIJ to refuse to consider the *Eastern Carelia* issue, notwithstanding that this arose because of a refusal of one of the parties to participate in the proceedings. In the *Western Sahara* case, the Court emphasised that what was decisive was whether sufficient information and evidence to enable it to read a judicial conclusion was available and in that case an abundance of documentary material was available to the Court.³⁹¹ Similarly in the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, the Court pointed to the abundance of material presented to it, including a 'voluminous dossier' from the United Nations.³⁹² The key issue was whether the Court's opinion would assist the requesting organisation in the performance of its functions and this was a matter for the latter.³⁹³ The Court was not asked in such opinions to resolve, for example, a territorial dispute

between states, but simply to advise the organisation concerned in fulfilling its functions, especially if the matter concerned decolonisation.³⁹⁴

It is therefore evident that the general rule expressed in the *Eastern Carelia* case has been considerably weakened.³⁹⁵ However, it would not be correct to say that it has been entirely eroded. There may indeed be circumstances where the lack of consent of an interested party may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the judicial character of the Court.³⁹⁶ Further, the need to have ‘sufficient information and evidence’ to enable the Court to reach a judicial conclusion still remains, but the primary criterion appears to be whether the request for an advisory opinion is made with the aim of obtaining assistance in the proper exercise of the functions of the requesting organ. This necessarily poses the question as to the proper exercise of its functions.³⁹⁷

In examining the question posed by the requesting organ, the Court will operate on the same basis as in contentious cases with regard to the nature of evidence, as well as the burden and standard of proof,³⁹⁸ regard being had to the different purposes of contentious and advisory proceedings. In addition, the Court has a certain latitude in advisory proceedings as distinct from contentious proceedings, since it is not as such determining the rights and duties of the parties to the case, but providing advice to the requesting organ as to the legal issues comprised in the question asked. That would seem to import a responsibility to provide ‘a balanced opinion’, taking account of the relevant context, particularly where a dispute between states is apparent in the situation in the sense of referring to all relevant legal issues.³⁹⁹

With regard to the Court's jurisdiction to give an opinion, article 96(2) of the Charter provides that, in addition to the Security Council and the General Assembly:

Other organs of the United Nations and specialised agencies which may at any time be so authorised by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

The Court in the request for an Advisory Opinion by the World Health Organization on the *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*⁴⁰⁰ found that three conditions were required in order to found the jurisdiction of the Court in such circumstances: first, that the specialised agency in question must be duly authorised by the General Assembly to request opinions from the Court; secondly, that the opinion requested was on a legal question; and, thirdly, that the question must be one arising within the scope of activities of the requesting agency.⁴⁰¹ The Court examined the functions of the WHO in the light of its Constitution⁴⁰² and subsequent practice, and concluded that the organisation was authorised to deal with the effects on health of the use of nuclear weapons and of other hazardous activities and to take preventive measures with the aim of protecting the health of populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in. However, the question put to the Court, it was emphasised, concerned not the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on

health, but the legality of the use of such weapons in view of their health and environmental effects. Accordingly, the Court held that the question posed in the request for the Advisory Opinion did not arise within the scope of activities of the organisation as defined in its Constitution.⁴⁰³

The Advisory Opinion in the *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur* case was the first time the Court had received a request under article VIII, section 30, of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946, which allowed for recourse to the Court for an advisory opinion where a difference has arisen between the United Nations and a member state. The particular interest in this provision is that it stipulates that the opinion given by the Court ‘shall be accepted as decisive by the parties’. The importance of advisory opinions delivered by the Court is therefore not to be underestimated.⁴⁰⁴

The Role of the Court

There are a variety of other issues currently facing the Court. As far as access to it is concerned, it has, for example, been suggested that the power to request advisory opinions should be given to the UN Secretary-General⁴⁰⁵ and to states and national courts,⁴⁰⁶ while the possibility of permitting international organisations to become parties to contentious proceedings has been raised.⁴⁰⁷ Perhaps more centrally, the issue of the relationship between the Court and the UN political organs, particularly the Security Council, has been raised anew as a consequence of the revitalisation of the latter in recent years and its increasing activity.⁴⁰⁸ The Court possesses no express power of judicial review of UN activities, although it is the principal judicial organ of

the organisation and has in that capacity dealt on a number of occasions with the meaning of resolutions and organs.⁴⁰⁹ In the *Lockerbie* case,⁴¹⁰ the Court was faced with a new issue, that of examining the relative status of treaty obligations and binding decisions adopted by the Security Council. In its decision on provisional measures, the Court accepted that by virtue of article 103 of the UN Charter obligations under the Charter (including decisions of the Security Council imposing sanctions) prevailed over obligations contained in other international agreements.⁴¹¹

The decisions and advisory opinions of the ICJ (and PCIJ before it) have played a vital part in the evolution of international law.⁴¹² Further, the increasing number of applications in recent years have emphasised that the Court is now playing a more central role within the international legal system than thought possible two decades ago.⁴¹³ Of course, many of the most serious of international conflicts may never come before the Court, due to a large extent to the unwillingness of states to place their vital interests in the hands of binding third-party decision-making, while the growth of other means of regional and global resolution of disputes cannot be ignored.

Proliferation of Courts and Tribunals

The proliferation of judicial organs on the international and regional level has been one characteristic of recent decades.⁴¹⁴ It has reflected the increasing scope and utilisation of international law on the one hand and an increasing sense of the value of resolving disputes by impartial third-party mechanisms on the other. It is now possible to identify an accepted international practice of turning to such mechanisms as a reasonably effective way of settling

differences in a manner that is reflective of the rule of law and the growth of international cooperation. The importance of this practice to the evolution of international law is self-evident, as the development of legal rules and the creation of legal institutions with accompanying compulsory adjudication go hand in hand.

The European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the African Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights were joined by the two Tribunals examining war crimes in Bosnia and Rwanda and by the International Criminal Court.⁴¹⁵ In addition, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is in operation⁴¹⁶ and a variety of other relevant mechanisms have arisen, ranging from the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement provisions creating an Appellate Body⁴¹⁷ to administrative tribunals and economic courts.⁴¹⁸ Again, the work of arbitral tribunals, whether established to hear one case or a series of similar cases, is of direct relevance.

It is unclear how this may impinge upon the work of the International Court in the long run. Some take the view that proliferation will lead to inconsistency and confusion, others that it underlines the vigour and relevance of international law in an era of globalisation.⁴¹⁹ Evidence to date suggests the latter rather than the former. Inconsistency may sometimes flow from the subject-matter of the dispute or the different functions of the courts in question, but it is not necessarily fatal to the development of international law. The courts and tribunals now regularly refer to one another's decisions,⁴²⁰ and some issues of international law, such as treaty interpretation principles, are regularly discussed in a range of courts and

tribunals.⁴²¹ It is also true that the same situation may arise before two or more dispute settlement mechanisms.⁴²²

Of course, many of the other tribunals concern disputes between individuals and states rather than inter-state disputes and those in specialist areas, such as human rights, investment problems or employment issues. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is beginning to deal with questions that have been before the International Court, such as jurisdiction and nationality and provisional measures issues, as well as maritime boundary disputes, but it is also concerned with specific and limited matters, particularly the prompt release of arrested foreign vessels, and non-states parties may become parties to cases before it.⁴²³ Nevertheless, all of these courts and tribunals and other organs relate in some way to international law and thus may contribute to its development and increasing scope, but one must note the special position of the International Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and as the pre-eminent inter-state judicial dispute settlement forum.

Suggestions for Further Reading

R. Kolb, *The International Court of Justice*, Oxford, 2013

J. G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, Cambridge, 6th ed., 2017, chapters 6 and 7

Rosenne's Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920–2015 (ed. M. N. Shaw), 5th ed., The Hague, 4 vols., 2016

Y. Tanaka, *The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes*, Cambridge, 2018, chapters 6 and 7

The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (ed. A. Zimmermann, C.

¹ See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920–2015* (ed. M. N. Shaw), 5th ed., The Hague, 4 vols., 2016; S. Rosenne, *The World Court*, 6th ed., Dordrecht, 2005; *The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary* (ed. A. Zimmermann, C. Tomuschat and K. Oellers-Frahm), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2019; R. Kolb, *The International Court of Justice*, Oxford, 2013; International Court of Justice, *Handbook*, The Hague, 2019; H. Thirlway, *The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice*, 2 vols., Oxford, 2013; H. Thirlway, *The International Court of Justice*, Oxford, 2016; *Oppenheim's International Law United Nations* (ed. R. Higgins et al.), Oxford, 2017, chapter 29; *The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice* (ed. C. Tams and J. Sloan), Oxford, 2013; P. Cuvreur, *The International Court of Justice and the Effectiveness of International Law*, The Hague, 2016; G. Hernández, *The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function*, Oxford, 2014; J. J. Quintana, *Litigation at the International Court of Justice*, The Hague, 2015; A. M. Weisburd, *Failings of the International Court of Justice*, Oxford, 2016; G. Guillaume, *La Cour Internationale de Justice à l'Aube du XXIe Siècle: Le Regard d'un Juge*, Paris, 2003; *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice* (ed. A. V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice), Cambridge, 1996; G. G. Fitzmaurice, *The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice*, Cambridge, 2 vols., 1986; R. Y. Jennings, 'The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years', **89 AJIL**, 1995, p. 493; R. Y. Jennings, 'The Role of the International Court of Justice', **68 BYIL**, 1997, p. 1; G. Guyomar, *Commentaire du Règlement de la CIJ*, Paris, 1983; T. O. Elias, *The International Court of Justice and Some Contemporary Problems*, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1983; J. G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, Cambridge, 6th ed., 2017, chapters 6 and 7; Y. Tanaka, *The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes*, Cambridge, 2018, chapters 6 and 7; E. Lauterpacht, *Aspects of the Administration of International Justice*, Cambridge, 1991; T. M. Franck, 'Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System', **240 HR**, 1993 III, pp. 13, 302; R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, chapter 11; *Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice* (ed. C. Peckand and R. S. Lee), The Hague, 1997; *The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role after Fifty Years* (ed. A. S. Muller, D. Raič and J. M. Thuránszky), The Hague, 1997; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 985; *The Rules, Practice and Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals* (ed. C. Giogetti), Leiden, 2012; K. H. Kaikobad, *The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review*, The Hague, 2000; and E. McWhinney, *Judicial Settlement of International Disputes*, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1991.

² See above, [Chapter 17](#), p. 915.

³ For an assessment of its work, see e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **I**, ch. 1, para. I.4.

⁴ See e.g. M. Shahabuddeen, *Precedent in the World Court*, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 22 ff.

⁵ See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **I**, ch. 6 and vol. **III**, ch. 17. See also B. Fassbender, 'Article 9', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 355; Kolb, *International Court*, p. 109; H. Thirlway, 'Procedural Law and the International Court of Justice', in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice*, p. 389.

⁶ Article 2, ICJ Statute.

⁷ See e.g. B. S. Murty, 'Settlement of Disputes', in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, p. 700. See also L. Lloyd, *Peace Through Law*, London, 1997.

⁸ Articles 4 and 5 of the ICJ Statute. In practice, governments exercise a major influence upon the nominations process of the national groups: see Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 143 ff.

⁹ See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **I**, ch. 6, para. I.88; and S. Rosenne, 'The Composition of the Court', in *The Future of the International Court of Justice* (ed. L. Gross), Dobbs Ferry, 1976, vol. **I**, pp. 377, 381–6. See also G. Abi-Saab, 'The International Court as a World Court', in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the ICJ*, p. 3.

¹⁰ ICJ Reports, 1966, p. 6; 37 ILR, p. 243.

¹¹ ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 16; 49 ILR, p. 2.

¹² Article 10 of the ICJ Statute. For these purposes a majority in the Security Council is understood to mean eight rather than the usual nine, see the Legal Opinion of the UN Office of Legal Affairs, *United Nations Juridical Yearbook*, 1984, p. 173, 175.

¹³ Article 3 of the ICJ Statute.

¹⁴ See e.g. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 144.

¹⁵ See C. Ku, 'International Court of Justice', in *Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (ed. T. G. Weiss and S. Daws), Oxford, 2018, pp. 190, 193. Judge Greenwood from the UK had a majority of votes in the Security Council, while Judge Bhandari had a majority in the General Assembly, www.un.org/press/en/2017/ga11974.doc.htm. Judge Greenwood eventually withdraw after a number of ballots, www.icj-cij.org/public/files/press-releases/0/000-20171121-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf and Fourth Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017–19, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaaff/860/860.pdf>.

¹⁶ Article 13 of the ICJ Statute.

¹⁷ Article 19 of the ICJ Statute.

¹⁸ Article 18 of the ICJ Statute.

¹⁹ Articles 16 and 17 of the ICJ Statute. Note the problem raised particularly in *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 3, 6, 9, of judges who had previously been involved in the dispute albeit in another capacity. The Court did not accept the need to remove the judges in question. Practice, however, has been variable and, e.g., Judges Fleischhauer (former UN Legal Counsel) and Higgins (former member of the Human Rights Committee) felt unable to take part in *Application of the Genocide Convention*: see CR 96/5, 29 April 1996, p. 6. In *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 142; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 58–9, and the Court's Order of 30 January 2004, objections made to the participation of Judge Elaraby for playing a 'leading role in recent years in the very Emergency Special Session from which the advisory opinion request has now emerged' and other diplomatic and political involvement in the Middle East question prior to election to the Court were dismissed by the Court, citing the *Namibia* opinion. See also Rosenne, 'Composition', pp. 388–90; and Rosenne's *Law and Practice*, vol. I, ch. 6, para. I.94 and vol. III, ch. 17, para. III.260; P. Couvreur, 'Article 16' and 'Article 17', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, pp. 444 ff.; Kolb, *International Court*, p. 132; H. Thirlway, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989', 72 *BYIL*, 2001, p. 38; and M. N. Shaw,

‘The International Court of Justice: A Practical Perspective’, 46 *ICLQ*, 1997, pp. 831, 845–6.

²⁰ See www.icj-cij.org/public/files/press-releases/0/000-20181025-PRE-02-00-EN.pdf.

²¹ Article 21, ICJ Statute. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘Article 21’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 482.

²² Article 22, ICJ Statute. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘Article 22’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 499. Note that article 31(5) of the Statute provides that where there are several parties ‘in the same interest’ they shall be treated *inter alia* for the purposes of appointing ad hoc judges as one party only: see *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. III, ch. 17, para. III.269 and *Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 279, 287.

²³ It is possible for states in this position not to appoint ad hoc judges: see e.g. *Temple of Preah Vihear*, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 6; 33 ILR, p. 48. Note that in *Djibouti v. France*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 177, 181–2, an ad hoc judge was appointed for France as the French judge on the Court recused himself.

²⁴ See e.g. H. Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law in the International Community*, Oxford, 1933, pp. 215 ff. This provision should be distinguished from article 27(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which similarly provides for the appointment of an ad hoc judge to the Court. In this case, the Court deals with the provisions of municipal law of the member states of the Council of Europe and measures their conformity with the Convention. It is thus necessary to retain some expertise as to the domestic system in the case in question. Note that it is possible for an ad hoc judge to be of the same nationality as that of one of the permanent judges: see e.g. *Liechtenstein v. Germany*, ICJ Reports, 2005, p. 6; and *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. III, p. 1125, note 76.

²⁵ See e.g. S. Schwebel, ‘National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of the International Court of Justice’, 48 *ICLQ*, 1998, p. 889; N. Valticos, ‘L’Évolution de la Notion de Judge Ad Hoc’, 50 *Revue Hellénique de Droit International*, 1997, pp. 11–12; H. Thierry, ‘Au Sujet du Juge Ad Hoc’, in *Liber Amicorum Judge Ruda* (ed. C. A. Armas Barea *et al.*), The Hague, 2000, p. 285; P. Kooijmans, ‘Article 31’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 495; *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. III, ch. 17, para. III.267; and L. V. Prott, *The Latent Power of Culture and the International Judge*, Abingdon, 1979.

²⁶ See Franck, 'Fairness', p. 312. See also N. Singh, *The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice*, Dordrecht, 1989, pp. 193–4.

²⁷ ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 408–9; 95 ILR, pp. 43, 126–7, and see also at the Counter-Claims Order phase of the case, ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 243, 278; 115 ILR, p. 206. Judge Lauterpacht's views were cited with approval by Judge ad hoc Franck in his Dissenting Opinion in *Indonesia/Malaysia*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 625, 693.

²⁸ Note that Practice Direction VII of the Court now requires that 'parties, when choosing a judge *ad hoc* pursuant to article 31 of the Statute and article 35 of the Rules of Court, should refrain from nominating persons who are acting as agent, counsel or advocate in another case before the Court or have acted in that capacity in the three years preceding the date of the nomination. Furthermore, parties should likewise refrain from designating as agent, counsel or advocate in a case before the Court a person who sits as judge *ad hoc* in another case before the Court.' Practice Direction VIII provides in addition that 'parties should refrain from designating as agent, counsel or advocate in a case before the Court a person who in the three years preceding the date of the designation was a Member of the Court, judge *ad hoc*, Registrar, Deputy-Registrar or higher official of the Court'.

²⁹ See e.g. *Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment in the Tunisia/Libya Case*, ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 192; 81 ILR, p. 419; and *Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark)*, ICJ Reports, 1991, p. 12; 94 ILR, p. 446.

³⁰ See article 102(3) of the Rules of Court 1978. See *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12; 59 ILR, p. 30. Cf. *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 16; 49 ILR, p. 2. See also L. Gross, 'The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Roles in the International Legal Order', in Gross, *Future of the ICJ*, vol. I, p. 61.

³¹ See ICJ, *Yearbook 1993–1994*, The Hague, 1994, p. 18. It has not yet been called upon, no doubt partly because whether or not an issue is an environmental one may indeed be very much in dispute between the parties: see R. Higgins, 'Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Ship', 50 *ICLQ*, 2001, pp. 121, 122.

³² Labour cases and cases relating to transit and communications are specifically mentioned.

³³ See articles 15–18 and 90–93 of the Rules of Court.

³⁴ ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 3 and *ibid.*, 1984, p. 246; 71 ILR, p. 58. The Chamber consisted of Judge Ago (President) and Judges Gros, Mosler and Schwebel and Judge ad hoc Cohen.

³⁵ See e.g. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, p. 150; and R. M. Brauer, ‘International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and the Gulf of Maine Dispute’, 23 *Va. JIL*, 1982–83, p. 463. See also Singh, *Role and Record*, p. 110.

³⁶ ICJ Reports, 1987, pp. 10, 13; 97 ILR, pp. 139, 142.

³⁷ Although concern was expressed about the unity of the jurisprudence of the Court by frequent use of ad hoc Chambers: see H. Mosler, ‘The *Ad Hoc* Chambers of the International Court of Justice’, in *International Law at a Time of Perplexity* (ed. Y. Dinstein), Dordrecht, 1989, p. 449. See also S. Schwebel, ‘Chambers of the International Court of Justice formed for Particular Cases’, in *ibid.*, p. 739; E. Valencia-Ospina, ‘The Use of Chambers of the International Court of Justice’, in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice*, p. 503; *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. III, ch. 17, para. III.262; P. Palchetti, ‘Article 26’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 547; and Franck, ‘Fairness’, pp. 314 ff. As to the precedential value of decisions of Chambers, see Shahabuddeen, *Precedent*, pp. 171 ff. See also Thirlway, *Law and Procedure*, pp. 902 ff.

³⁸ See 22 ILM, 1983, p. 1252 and Communiqué of the ICJ No. 85/8, 1 May 1985. The Chamber consisted of Judge Bedjaoui (President) and Judges Lachs and Ruda, with Judges ad hoc Luchaire and Abi-Saab: see ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 554; 80 ILR, p. 441.

³⁹ ICJ Reports, 1989, p. 15; 84 ILR, p. 311.

⁴⁰ See ICJ Reports, 1987, p. 10; 97 ILR, pp. 112, 139; and ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 351.

⁴¹ ICJ Reports, 2003, p. 392; 129 ILR, p. 1.

⁴² ICJ Reports, 2005, p. 90.

⁴³ See *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. III, p. 1106.

⁴⁴ See below, pp. 940 and 962.

⁴⁵ See below, p. 941.

⁴⁶ Allowing for hearings to take place and the judgment to be read by video link.

⁴⁷ See e.g. D. Bowett *et al.*, *The International Court of Justice: Process, Practice and Procedures*, London, 1997. See also e.g. Jennings, ‘Role’, pp. 8 ff.; M. Bedjaoui, ‘La “Fabrication” des Arrêts de la Cour Internationale de Justice’, in *Mélanges Virally*, Paris, 1991, p. 87; and S. Oda, ‘The International Court of Justice Viewed from the Bench’, *244 HR*, 1993 VII, p. 13. See also Shaw, ‘International Court’, pp. 862 ff.

⁴⁸ See the 1976 Resolution on Practice, ICJ, *Acts and Documents Concerning the Organisation of the Court*, The Hague, 1989, p. 165. See also Higgins, ‘Respecting Sovereign States’. See also below, p. 961, **note 284**.

⁴⁹ There are currently thirteen, the majority seeking essentially to ensure that the parties keep strictly to the Rules concerning pleadings and to restrict the tendency to produce large numbers of annexes. Practice Direction XII, e.g., provides that written statements and documents submitted by international non-governmental organisations in advisory proceedings shall not be considered as part of the case file, but rather as publications in the public domain and available for consultation, see www.icj-cij.org/en/practice-directions.

⁵⁰ See e.g. Judge Weeramantry’s Dissenting Opinion in the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 288, 320; 106 ILR, pp. 1, 42, where he noted that this power enabled it to devise a procedure *sui generis*.

⁵¹ The memorial is to contain a statement of relevant facts, a statement of law and the submissions. The counter-memorial is to contain an admission or denial of the facts stated in the memorial, any additional facts if necessary, observations upon the statement of law in the memorial and a statement of law in answer thereto and the submissions: see articles 49(1) and (2) of the Rules. The reply and rejoinder, if authorised by the Court, are to be directed at bringing out the issues still dividing the parties: article 49(3).

⁵² See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **II**; and C. Tomuschat, 'Article 36', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 712. See also Xue Hanqin, *Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice*, Leiden, Brill 2017; M. N. Shaw, 'The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial Function', in Muller *et al.*, *International Court*, p. 219; Y. Shany, *Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility before International Courts*, Cambridge, 2015; W. M. Reisman, 'The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: International Arbitration and International Adjudication', **258 HR**, 1996, p. 9; and S. A. Alexander, 'Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with Reservations', **14 Leiden Journal of International Law**, 2001, p. 89. See also the series of articles by Thirlway on 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice' in the *British Year Book of International Law* from 1989 to date reproduced in *Law and Procedure*.

⁵³ See *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 19; 55 ILR, pp. 238, 254.

⁵⁴ *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 237.

⁵⁵ *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 26; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 509.

⁵⁶ *Northern Cameroons*, ICJ Reports, 1963, pp. 15, 33; 35 ILR, pp. 353, 369.

⁵⁷ See *Haya de la Torre*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 71, 79; 18 ILR, p. 349. See also Judge Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion in *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 56; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 539.

⁵⁸ ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 1307.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1353–4.

⁶⁰ *Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 69, 91; 84 ILR, pp. 218, 246. See also *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 151, 155; 34 ILR, pp. 281, 285; and the *Tadić* case before the ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, p. 11. See also R. Higgins, 'Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process', **17 ICLQ**, 1968, pp. 58, 74.

⁶¹ ICJ Reports, 1988, p. 92; 84 ILR, p. 247. See also *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 7, 19–20; 61 ILR, pp. 530, 545–6; *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 234; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 184; *Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. US)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 7, 23; and *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, para. 48. See, for the view that rather than concentrate upon definitions of legal and political questions, one should focus upon the distinctions between political and legal methods of dispute settlement, R. Y. Jennings, ‘Gerald Gray Fitzmaurice’, 55 *BYIL*, 1984, pp. 1, 18; and Higgins, ‘Policy Considerations’, p. 74.

⁶² See the Advisory Opinion on the *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 73; 110 ILR pp. 1, 13. See also e.g. *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 151, 155; 34 ILR, pp. 281, 284–5.

⁶³ *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 190. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, *ibid.*, p. 335.

⁶⁴ See *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1978, pp. 3, 12; 60 ILR, pp. 562, 571.

⁶⁵ See *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 7, 21–2; 61 ILR, pp. 530, 547–8.

⁶⁶ See *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 431–4; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 142–5.

⁶⁷ ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 440; and *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 307.

⁶⁸ ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 435; 76 ILR, p. 146.

⁶⁹ *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 13, 22.

⁷⁰ See e.g. *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 190. See also Judge Weeramantry’s Dissenting Opinion in *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 56; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 539.

⁷¹ This rule (known as the *non ultra petita* rule) has been termed by Judge Buergenthal in his Separate Opinion in *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 271; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 426, ‘a cardinal rule which does not allow the Court to deal with a subject in the *dispositif* [operative paragraphs] of its judgment that the parties to the case have not, in their final submissions, asked it to adjudicate’. See the *Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment in the Asylum Case*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 395, 402; *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 40, 96–7; and *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 18–19; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 73–5. See also *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. II, ch. 9, para. II.160.

⁷² See below, p. 952.

⁷³ ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 3, 25; 70 ILR, pp. 527, 554.

⁷⁴ See also Judge Weeramantry’s Dissenting Opinion in *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 158; 105 ILR, pp. 226, 299. See also generally M. Bedjaoui, ‘Expediency in the Decisions of the International Court of Justice’, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 1.

⁷⁵ See e.g. *Monetary Gold*, ICJ Reports, 1954, p. 32; 21 ILR, p. 399; and *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 105; 105 ILR, pp. 226, 246.

⁷⁶ See further below, p. 952.

⁷⁷ The Court noted in *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 270–1; 57 ILR, pp. 398, 415–16, that ‘the existence of a dispute is the primary condition for the Court to exercise its judicial function’. It is also a question which is ‘essentially preliminary’: ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 260; 57 ILR, p. 405.

⁷⁸ PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924, p. 11. See also *Chorzów Factory* (Interpretation), PCIJ, Series A, No. 13, 1927, pp. 3, 10; *South West Africa Cases* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 319, 328; 37 ILR, pp. 3, 10; *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 253; 57 ILR, p. 398; *Liechtenstein v. Germany*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 6, 18; *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 40; and *Marshall Islands v. UK* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 833, 849.

⁷⁹ *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 110, 115; and *Marshall Islands v. UK* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 833, 851.

⁸⁰ ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 65, 74; 17 ILR, pp. 331, 336. See also *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 70, 84; and *Burkina Faso/Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2013, para. 49.

⁸¹ *South West Africa Cases*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 319, 328; 37 ILR, pp. 3, 10; *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 429–41; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 140; *Marshall Islands v. UK* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 833, 849, 850–1; *Ukraine v. Russia* (Provisional Measures), ICC, Order of 19 April 2017, pp. 104, 115; and *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (Provisional Measures), ICJ, Order of 23 January 2020, para. 20. See also *Larsen v. Hawaii* 119 ILR, pp. 566, 587. Note also that Kelsen wrote that ‘a dispute is a legal dispute if it is to be settled by the application of legal norms, that is to say, by the application of existing law’, *Principles of International Law* (ed. R. W. Tucker), 2nd ed., New York, 1966, p. 526. See also *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. II, ch. 9, para. II.147. Higgins has made the point that generally the Court has taken a robust attitude as to what is a ‘legal’ matter: *Problems and Process*, p. 195. See also V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the *Lockerbie* Case’, 88 *AJIL*, 1994, p. 643.

⁸² Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 833, 850–1. But see criticisms of this formulation apparently importing a requirement of ‘objective awareness’ by Judge Crawford in his dissenting opinion, pp. 1093 ff.

⁸³ ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 12, 30; 82 ILR, pp. 225, 248.

⁸⁴ ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 99–100.

⁸⁵ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 615. See also *Liechtenstein v. Germany*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 6, 19.

⁸⁶ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 614.

⁸⁷ In *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 315, the Court said that such disagreement or opposition need not necessarily be stated *expressis*

verbis, but may be established by inference, whatever the professed view of that party. This was referenced by ITLOS in *M/T San Pedro Pío* (Switzerland v. Nigeria) (Provisional Measures), Order of 6 July 2019, para. 53; *M/V Norstar* (Panama v. Italy) (Merits), Judgment of 10 April 2019, ITLOS Reports 2016, para. 100; and *Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels* (Ukraine v. Russia) (Provisional Measures), ITLOS, Order of 25 May 2019, para. 43. The Court has stated that the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the failure of a state to respond to a claim in circumstances where a response is called for, *Marshall Islands v. India*, ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 255, 271; and *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (Provisional Measures), ICJ, Order of 23 January 2020, para. 28. In *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 70, 84 ff., the Court emphasised that the matter was one of substance and not form and that while the existence of a dispute and the undertaking of negotiations were distinct as a matter of principle, the negotiations could help demonstrate the existence of the dispute and delineate its subject-matter. See also *Belgium v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 422, 442–3. The Court has pointed out that the existence of a dispute under article 60 of the ICJ Statute did not require the same criteria to be fulfilled as those determining the existence of a dispute under article 36(2) of the Statute, while it was not required that a dispute as to the meaning and scope of a judgment should have manifested itself formally, it being sufficient if the two governments in question had in fact shown themselves as holding opposite views as to the meaning and scope of the judgment: *Avena* (Request for Interpretation) (Provisional Measures), Order of 16 July 2008, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 311, 325–6; and *Request for Interpretation of Temple Judgment*, ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 281, 295–6. See further as to negotiations, [Chapter 17](#), p. 882.

⁸⁸ Note that article 40(1) of the Statute requires that the application indicate the subject of the dispute and that article 38(2) of the Rules requires that the ‘precise nature of the claim’ be specified in the application.

⁸⁹ *Nuclear Tests* (Australia v. France), ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 262; and *Bolivia v. Chile* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 592, 602. See e.g. *Fisheries Jurisdiction* (Spain v. Canada), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 432, 449; 123 ILR, pp. 189, 209–10; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 832, 848. See also *Marshall Islands v. UK* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 833, 849–50; and *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (Provisional Measures), ICJ, Order of 23 January 2020, para. 26. The Court will take into account in particular any statements or documents exchanged between the Parties, as well as any exchanges made in multilateral settings. In so doing, it will pay special attention to the author of the statement or document, their

intended or actual addressee and their content; see *Belgium v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 422, 443–5; *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 70, 94, 95, 100; and *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, paras. 24, 43 ff.

⁹⁰ *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 263; 57 ILR, pp. 398, 408. Note that new claims formulated during the course of proceedings will be declared inadmissible where such claims would, if admitted, transform the subject of the dispute originally brought before the Court in the application: see e.g. *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 695; and *Bolivia v. Chile* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 592, 602–3. The Court noted in *Marshall Islands v. UK* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 833, 849–50 that it will take into account ‘in particular any statements or documents exchanged between the parties . . . as well as any exchanges made in multilateral settings . . . In so doing, it pays special attention to “the author of the statement or document, their intended or actual addressee, and their content”’ (references omitted). It was also underlined that the conduct of the parties may also be relevant, especially where there have been no diplomatic exchanges: *ibid.*, p. 850; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 3, 32–3.

⁹¹ *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 271; 57 ILR, p. 416. See also *Northern Cameroons*, ICJ Reports, 1963, pp. 15, 38; 35 ILR, p. 353; and *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 14–15; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 69–71.

⁹² *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 432, 448; 123 ILR, pp. 189, 208–9.

⁹³ *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 303. The question of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is an admissibility issue: see below, p. 937.

⁹⁴ See e.g. *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. II; Kolb, *International Court*, pp. 159 ff.; and R. Szafarz, *The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice*, Dordrecht, 1993.

⁹⁵ See *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. II, ch. 13, para. II.215; and I. Shihata, *The Power of the International Court to Determine Its Own Jurisdiction*, The Hague, 1965. This is a characteristic of the judicial function generally: see e.g. *Effect of Awards of Compensation*

Made by the UN Administrative Tribunal, ICJ Reports, 1954, pp. 47, 51–2; the *Tadić* case before the ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, pp. 7–9; *Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 16, 1928, p. 20; and *Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal*, Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, ICJ Reports, 1991, pp. 53, 68–9. See also *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Partial Arbitral Award of 30 June 2016, paras. 148 ff.

⁹⁶ See *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 432, 450; 123 ILR, pp. 189, 210–11. See also *Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1988, p. 76; 84 ILR, p. 231; and *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1322.

⁹⁷ See e.g. *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 29; *Croatia v. Serbia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 412, 445; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 100, 115. However, the Court has held that it would not penalise a defect in procedure which the applicant could easily remedy, *ibid.* Similarly, the admissibility of an application will be determined as of the date of the filing of the application: *Belgium v. Senegal* (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 139, 148–9; and *Marshall Islands v. UK* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 833, 851, concerning the determination of the date of the existence of the dispute.

⁹⁸ *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 12–13; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 67–8.

⁹⁹ See *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 613; 115 ILR, pp. 10, 26. See also *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924, p. 34; 2 AD, p. 27; and *Northern Cameroons*, ICJ Reports, 1963, pp. 15, 28; 35 ILR, pp. 353, 363. The Court in *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 105; 106 ILR, p. 144, in fixing relevant time limits for the parties, noted that Cameroon had submitted an additional application after its original application, by which it sought to extend the object of the dispute. It was intended as an amendment to the first application. There is no provision in the Statute and Rules of the Court for amendment of applications as such, although in this case Nigeria consented to the request and the Court accepted it.

¹⁰⁰ *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 259; 57 ILR, pp. 398, 404, citing *Northern Cameroons*, ICJ Reports, 1963, pp. 15, 29; 35 ILR, pp. 353, 365. See also below, p. 940.

¹⁰¹ *LaGrand*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 485; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 24.

¹⁰² *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1323.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 1325.

¹⁰⁴ See *Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 91 ff. See further as to *res judicata*, above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 85.

¹⁰⁵ See below, p. 971.

¹⁰⁶ *Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 92–3.

¹⁰⁷ See e.g. *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1322. The Court has emphasised that admissibility is distinct from jurisdiction: *Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 264. See also *Croatia v. Serbia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 412, 456; and *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, para. 55. Note the discussion in Tomuschat, ‘Article 36’, pp. 712, 785 ff.; and in *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. **II**, ch. 9.

¹⁰⁸ See e.g. *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 276; and *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)*, ICJ Reports, 2007, paras. 33 ff. See also *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. **II**, pp. 817 ff.; Tomuschat, ‘Article 36’, pp. 712, 785; and article 79 of the Rules of Court. Note that the Court noted in *Djibouti v. France*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 177, 200, that the determination of the scope of consent by one of the parties to jurisdiction was a jurisdictional matter and not one of admissibility.

¹⁰⁹ See *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 177; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 337; and *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, para. 55. Questions of admissibility are dealt with as a preliminary matter unless so intertwined with the merits that it cannot be determined without determining to some extent at least issues properly pertaining to the merits, *Croatia v. Serbia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 412, 459; and *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, para. 57.

¹¹⁰ *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 6, 23–4; 102 ILR, pp. 1, 64–5.

111 See e.g. *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 46.

112 Note the question of the status of Palestine that will accordingly need to be addressed by the Court in the application by Palestine dated 28 September 2018 instituting proceedings against the US concerning the relocation of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, www.icj-cij.org/en/case/176. See further above, *Chapter 5*, p. 215.

113 See e.g. P. M. Dupuy, ‘Article 34’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 661.

114 General Assembly resolution 91 (I). Switzerland became a member of the UN in September 2002. See also *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. **II**, ch. 10, para. II.165. Japan, Liechtenstein, Nauru and San Marino were also in the same position until 1956, 1990, 1999 and 1992 respectively.

115 Security Council resolution 9 (1946).

116 *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, Pleadings, vol. **I**, pp. 6, 8.

117 *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4; 16 AD, p. 155.

118 *Monetary Gold*, ICJ Reports, 1954, p. 19; 21 ILR, p. 399.

119 Such conditions were laid down in Security Council resolution 9 (1946). See also A. Zimmermann, ‘Article 35’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 684.

120 ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1350. The Court accepted that no such prior treaties referring to the jurisdiction of the Court had been brought to its attention, *ibid.*

121 Article 34(2), ICJ Statute. See also *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. **II**, ch. 10, para. II.171. Individuals, groups and corporations have no right of access to the Court: see here also H. Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights*, London, 1950, p. 48. Note that Judge Higgins has written that: ‘There is some flexibility I think for possible *amicus* briefs by NGOs in Advisory Opinion cases, and I think that a useful possibility for the Court to explore’: ‘Respecting Sovereign States’, p. 123. See now Practice Direction XII with

regard to the provision of written information by international NGOs in advisory proceedings, which provides that where an international NGO submits a written statement and/or document in an advisory opinion case on its own initiative, such statement and/or document is not to be considered as part of the case file. However, such statements and/or documents shall be treated as publications readily available and may accordingly be referred to by states and intergovernmental organisations presenting written and oral statements in the case in the same manner as publications in the public domain.

¹²² *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1322, 1326.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 1326.

¹²⁴ ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 1307. This was one of a series of cases brought by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the precursor to Serbia and Montenegro) against NATO countries in 1999, so that the point in question applied to other respondent states.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1336–7. As to the relevant details of the case, see above, [Chapter 16](#), p. 839.

¹²⁶ See e.g. C. Brown, ‘The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals’, 76 *BYIL*, 2005, p. 195.

¹²⁷ *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1321. The Rules do not provide for such a procedure.

¹²⁸ See below, p. 942.

¹²⁹ See e.g. *Yugoslavia v. Spain*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 761, 773–4; and *Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 916, 925–6.

¹³⁰ ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1370 ff.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1361.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 1361–2. The question, therefore, that Judge Higgins believed that the Court should have addressed was whether it was possible to say that in the case, ‘the circumstances are such that it is reasonable, necessary and appropriate for the Court to strike the case off the List as an exercise of inherent power to protect the integrity of the

judicial process’: *ibid.*, p. 1362. Note that article 76(1) of the Rules of Court as amended in October 2019 provides that: ‘At the request of a party or *proprio motu*, the Court may, at any time before the final judgment in the case, revoke or modify any decision concerning provisional measures if, in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or modification.’ The purpose of the amendment was to add the phrase ‘or *proprio motu*’.

¹³³ Practice Direction V as amended in December 2019.

¹³⁴ See e.g. *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 832, 850. See also the preliminary objections judgment in *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1998, p. 275. Note the distinction between preliminary questions and preliminary objections to jurisdiction introduced in the October 2019 amendments to articles 79 and 79*ter*. The former relates to preliminary questions as to jurisdiction or admissibility raised by the Court and the latter concerns objections raised by a party; see speech by the President of the Court to the UN General Assembly on 30 October 2019, www.icj-cij.org/public/files/press-releases/0/000-20191030-STA-01-00-EN.pdf.

¹³⁵ *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 832, 852. It is possible, however, for the determination by the Court of its jurisdiction to ‘touch upon certain aspects of the merits of the case’: *ibid.* See also *Iran v. US* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2019, paras. 96–7.

¹³⁶ See Tomuschat, ‘Article 36’, pp. 712, 742 ff.; Kolb, *International Court*, pp. 370 ff.; and M. Papadaki, ‘Compromissory Clauses as the Gatekeepers of the Law to be “Used” in the ICJ and the PCIJ’, 5 *Journal of International Dispute Settlement*, 2014, p. 560. See also article 40 of the ICJ Statute and article 39 of the Rules of Court.

¹³⁷ See e.g. L. C. Marion, ‘La Saisine de la CIJ par Voie de Compromis’, 99 *RGDIP*, 1995, p. 258.

¹³⁸ ICJ Reports, 1953, p. 47; 20 ILR, p. 94.

¹³⁹ See e.g. *Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands)*, ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 209; 27 ILR, p. 62; *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 18; 67 ILR, p. 4; and *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 6; 100 ILR, p. 1.

¹⁴⁰ See *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 32; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 366. The Court noted in the *Application for the Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment in the Tunisia/Libya Case*, ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 192, 216; 81 ILR, pp. 419, 449, that it was ‘a fundamental principle’ that ‘the consent of states parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction in contentious cases’, citing here *Interpretation of Peace Treaties*, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 71; 17 ILR, pp. 331, 335. See also *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 421; and *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 18. The Court further noted that ‘its jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties and is confined to the extent accepted by them’ and that ‘the conditions to which such consent is subject must be regarded as constituting the limits thereon . . . The examination of such conditions relates to its jurisdiction and not to the admissibility of the application’: *ibid.*, p. 39. See also *Djibouti v. France*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 177, 200.

¹⁴¹ ICJ Reports, 1948, p. 15; 15 AD, p. 349.

¹⁴² See e.g. *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. II, ch. 11, paras. II.181–9; and S. Yee, ‘Forum Prorogatum in the International Court’, 42 *German YIL*, 1999, p. 147.

¹⁴³ See article 38(5) of the Rules. The Republic of the Congo filed an application against France on 9 December 2002 with regard to which the former gave its consent on 11 April 2003: see ICJ Press Release 2003/14 and the ICJ’s Order of 17 June 2003, while France consented to jurisdiction with regard to an application dated 9 January 2006 brought by Djibouti: see *Djibouti v. France*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 177, 204, 206, 211–12, where the Court noted that ‘[f]or the Court to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of *forum prorogatum*, the element of consent must be either explicit or clearly to be deduced from the relevant conduct of a State’ and that the extent of consent (and thus the jurisdiction of the Court) depended upon the matching of the application made with the expression by the other party of its consent. It was emphasised that: ‘Where jurisdiction is based on *forum prorogatum*, great care must be taken regarding the scope of the consent as circumscribed by the respondent State.’ On 18 April 2007, Rwanda filed an application against France, but France never gave its consent to jurisdiction: see ICJ Press Release 2007/11.

¹⁴⁴ See e.g. *Monetary Gold*, ICJ Reports, 1954, pp. 19, 31; 21 ILR, pp. 399, 406. But cf. *Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft of the US*, ICJ Reports, 1964, pp. 99, 103; *Aerial Incident (US v. USSR)*, ICJ Reports, 1956, pp. 6, 9, 12, 15; and the two *Antarctic* cases, ICJ Reports, 1958, p. 158 and *ibid.*, 1959, p. 276. Note that article 38(2) of the 1978 Rules of

the Court stipulates that the application shall specify as far as possible the legal grounds upon which the jurisdiction of the Court is said to be based. See also *Djibouti v. France*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 177, 234–5.

¹⁴⁵ *Corfu Channel* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1948, pp. 15, 27. See also *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 621.

¹⁴⁶ Although not a member of the UN, Albania had agreed to assume the obligations of a member with regard to the dispute. This application was on the basis of that part of article 36(1) which specifies that the Court’s jurisdiction also comprised ‘all matters specifically provided for in the Charter’ of the UN.

¹⁴⁷ ICJ Reports, 1948, pp. 15, 31–2; 15 AD, pp. 349, 354.

¹⁴⁸ ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 112 and ICJ Reports, 1995, p. 6; 102 ILR, pp. 1, 47. See M. Evans, ‘Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (*Qatar v. Bahrain*)’, Jurisdiction and Admissibility’, 44 *ICLQ*, 1995, p. 691.

¹⁴⁹ The argument revolving around whether any application to the Court had to be by both parties or whether unilateral application was provided for.

¹⁵⁰ ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 121; 102 ILR, p. 18.

¹⁵¹ ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 9–11; 102 ILR, pp. 50–2.

¹⁵² ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 17, 25; 102 ILR, pp. 58, 66. This was disputed by four of the five dissenting judges, who argued that the Zubarah sovereignty issue had not been properly laid before it: ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 49, 55 ff., 72, 74–5; 102 ILR, pp. 90, 96 ff., 113, 115–16.

¹⁵³ See also E. Lauterpacht, “‘Partial’ Judgments and the Inherent Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the ICJ*, p. 465.

¹⁵⁴ See e.g. *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf* (Application for Permission to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 3, 24; 70 ILR, pp. 527, 553; *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 431; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 142; *El*

Salvador/Honduras (Application for Permission to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 1990, pp. 92, 114–16; 97 ILR, pp. 214, 235–7; and *Certain Phosphate Lands (Nauru v. Australia)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 240, 259–62; 97 ILR, pp. 1, 26–9. See also Tomuschat, ‘Article 36’, pp. 712, 729 ff.; A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Competence of the International Court of Justice and the Doctrine of the Indispensable Party: From Monetary Gold to East Timor and Beyond’, 2 *Journal of International Dispute Settlement*, 2011, pp. 373, 374; T. Thienel, ‘Third States and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: The Monetary Gold Principle’, 57 *German Yearbook of International Law*, 2014, p. 321; and O. Pomson, ‘Does the *Monetary Gold* Principle Apply to International Courts and Tribunals Generally?’, 10 *Journal of International Dispute Settlement*, 2019, p. 88.

¹⁵⁵ *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 421.

¹⁵⁶ ICJ Reports, 1954, pp. 19, 32; 21 ILR, pp. 399, 406. In this case, Italy asked that the UK, US and French governments should deliver to it any share of the monetary gold that might be due to Albania under Part III of the Paris Act of 14 January 1946, as satisfaction for alleged damage to Italy by Albania. Albania chose not to intervene in the case.

¹⁵⁷ Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 431; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 142.

¹⁵⁸ ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 240, 261; 97 ILR, p. 28. See also *M/V Norstar (Panama v. Italy)* (Preliminary Objections), ITLOS, 4 November 2016, paras. 144 ff., 171 ff.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* See also *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 237–8; and *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece*, ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 644, 660–1. Note also the dissenting opinion of Judge Crawford in *Marshall Islands v. India*, ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 255, 513, 525–6.

¹⁶⁰ ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 101 ff.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 105. See also *Larsen v. Hawaii* 119 ILR, pp. 566, 588–92; and *South China Seas (Philippines v. China)*, Arbitral Award of 12 July 2016, para. 640.

¹⁶⁴ ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 57–8.

¹⁶⁵ ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 15, 23.

¹⁶⁶ Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020, para. 41. See also *Belgium v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 422, 449, with regard to the Convention against Torture.

¹⁶⁷ See also article 40 of the ICJ Statute and article 38 of the Court’s Rules. See also C. Tomuschat, ‘Article 36’, pp. 712, 748 ff.

¹⁶⁸ See *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. II, ch. 11. There are almost 300 such treaties, bilateral and multilateral, currently listed on the Court’s website: www.icj-cij.org/en/treaties. To these need to be added treaties giving such jurisdiction to the Permanent Court of International Justice: see article 37 of the Court’s Statute. See also J. Charney, ‘Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’, 81 *AJIL*, 1989, p. 85.

¹⁶⁹ See *Georgia v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2011, p. 70; *Ukraine v. Russia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2019, paras. 78 ff.; and *Qatar v. UAE*, Orders of 23 July 2018 (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports, 2018, p. 406 and 2 May 2019, ICJ Reports, 2019, p. 358.

¹⁷⁰ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 615–17 on preliminary objections. See also ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 3, 325; 95 ILR, pp. 18, 43 (the two Orders on Provisional Measures). Note also *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (Provisional Measures), ICJ, Order of 23 January 2020, para. 20, where The Gambia seeks to found jurisdiction on article IX of the Genocide Convention.

¹⁷¹ ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 24; 61 ILR, pp. 530, 550.

¹⁷² ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 426–9; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 137. See H. W. Briggs, ‘Nicaragua v. United States: Jurisdiction and Admissibility’, 79 *AJIL*, 1985, p. 373.

¹⁷³ Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 69, 76; 84 ILR, pp. 218, 231.

¹⁷⁴ ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 78–90. The decision to affirm jurisdiction and admissibility was unanimous. See also *Peru v. Chile*, ICJ Reports, 2014, p. 3.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 85–8.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 88–90.

¹⁷⁷ By article VI of the Pact, article XXXI would not apply to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or by arbitral award or by decision of an international court, or which are governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the Pact. See *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 832, 852 ff., 869, where the Court rejected Colombia’s objection to jurisdiction on the basis of article XXXI. See also *Bolivia v. Chile* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 592, 605 ff.; ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 507, 516.

¹⁷⁸ See e.g. *Ambatielos* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1952, p. 28; 19 ILR, p. 416; and *Barcelona Traction* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1964, p. 6; 46 ILR, p. 18. Cf. *Aerial Incident (Israel v. Bulgaria)*, ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 127; 27 ILR, p. 557. See also *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1978, p. 14; and *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, para. 28.

¹⁷⁹ See above, p. 936.

¹⁸⁰ See e.g. *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. II, ch. 12; and C. Tomuschat, ‘Article 36’, pp. 712, 759 ff. See also J. G. Merrills, ‘The Optional Clause Today’, 50 *BYIL*, 1979, p. 87; J. G. Merrills, ‘The Optional Clause Revisited’, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 197; L. Gross, ‘Compulsory Jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol: History and Practice’, in Damrosch, *ICJ at a Crossroads*, p. 19; E. Gordon, ‘“Legal Disputes” Under Article 36(2) of the Statute’, in *ibid.*, p. 183; M. Vogiatzi, ‘The Historical Evolution of the Optional Clause’, 2 *Non-State Actors and International Law*, 2002, p. 41; and M. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Optional Clause System and the Law of Treaties’, 20 *Australian YIL*, 2000, p. 127.

¹⁸¹ See www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations. Note the new declarations of the UK (February 2017); the Netherlands (February 2017); Pakistan (March 2017); Equatorial Guinea (August 2017); India (September 2019); and Latvia (September 2019); *ibid.* Note also that in deciding whether it has jurisdiction in this case, the Court will need to evaluate whether the ‘force of the arguments militating in favour of jurisdiction is preponderant’: see *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 45, citing *Border and*

Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 69, 76; and *Chorzów Factory*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 9, 1927, p. 32.

¹⁸² ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 275, 291.

¹⁸³ ICJ Reports, 1957, p. 9; 24 ILR, p. 782.

¹⁸⁴ ICJ Reports, 1957, p. 23; 24 ILR, p. 786. But note Judge Lauterpacht's individual opinion, ICJ Reports, 1957, p. 34; 24 ILR, p. 793. See also *Right of Passage* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 125, 145; 24 ILR, pp. 840, 845; *Interhandel* (Switzerland v. US), ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 6, 23; 27 ILR, pp. 475, 487; and *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 45.

¹⁸⁵ Article 36(5), ICJ Statute. See also Tomuschat, 'Article 36', pp. 712, 777 ff.

¹⁸⁶ ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 127; 27 ILR, p. 557.

¹⁸⁷ Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 403–12; 76 ILR, pp. 104, 114.

¹⁸⁸ The Court also noted that since Court publications had placed Nicaragua on the list of states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by virtue of article 36(5) and that no states had objected, one could conclude that the above interpretation had been confirmed: *ibid.* The Court also regarded the conduct of the parties as reflecting acquiescence in Nicaragua's obligations when article 36(5) was argued: ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 411–15; 76 ILR, p. 122.

¹⁸⁹ But see the Separate Opinions, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 517–27 and Jennings, *ibid.*, pp. 533–45, and the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, *ibid.*, Judges Mosler, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 461–3; Oda, *ibid.*, pp. 473–89; Ago, pp. 562–600; 76 ILR, pp. 172, 184, 228, 244, 273.

¹⁹⁰ Article 36(3) of the Statute. See also Tomuschat, 'Article 36', pp. 712, 767 ff.; and Kolb, *International Court*, pp. 459 ff.

¹⁹¹ See *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. II, ch. 12, para. II.202.

¹⁹² See e.g. L. Henkin, 'The Connally Reservation Revisited and, Hopefully, Contained', **65** *AJIL*, 1971, p. 374; Tomuschat, 'Article 36', pp. 712, 773 ff.; and L. Preuss, 'The International Court of Justice, the Senate and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction', **40** *AJIL*, 1946, p. 720. See also Judge Lauterpacht, *Norwegian Loans*, ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 9, 43–66; 24 ILR, pp. 782, 800; *Interhandel (Switzerland v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 6, 77–8, 93; 27 ILR, pp. 475, 524, 534; and A. D'Amato, 'Modifying US Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court', **79** *AJIL*, 1985, p. 385.

¹⁹³ See above, Chapter 11, p. 557. Note also the 'Vandenberg' reservation by the US, whereby the jurisdiction of the Court is excluded in the case of a multilateral treaty unless all the parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case: see Tomuschat, 'Article 36', pp. 712, 774.

¹⁹⁴ See *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **II**, ch. 12, para. II.203; and Merrills, 'Revisited', pp. 213 ff.

¹⁹⁵ *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **II**, ch. 12, para. II. 204. The UK, e.g., excluded disputes arising out of events occurring between 3 September 1939 and 2 September 1945 in its 1963 declaration, Cmnd 2248. This was altered in the 1969 declaration, which is expressed to apply only to disputes arising after 24 October 1945: Cmnd 3872. The December 2014 UK Declaration refers to disputes arising after 1 January 1984, while the declaration of 22 February 2017 amended the date to 1 January 1987, www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations/gb.

¹⁹⁶ See Merrills, 'Revisited', pp. 219 ff. and **previous note**.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 224 ff. See *Certain Phosphate Lands (Nauru v. Australia)*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 240, 245–7; 97 ILR, pp. 1, 12–14. The Court emphasised that declarations made under article 36(2) related only to disputes between states and did not therefore cover disputes arising out of a trusteeship agreement between the Administering Authority and the indigenous population: *ibid.* See also *Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal*, ICJ Reports, 1990, p. 64 and *ibid.*, 1991, p. 54; 92 ILR, pp. 1, 30.

¹⁹⁸ See e.g. reservations relating to territorial matters, Merrills, 'Revisited', pp. 234 ff.

199 See e.g. *Nottebohm*, ICJ Reports, 1953, p. 111; 20 ILR, p. 567. See also Judge Shahabuddeen's Separate Opinion, the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in the Nuclear Tests Case*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 288, 315.

200 See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **II**, ch. 12, para. II.210. A state may waive its jurisdictional reservation, but this must be done unequivocally: *Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment in the Tunisia/Libya Case*, ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 192, 216; 81 ILR, pp. 419, 449; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 33; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 367.

201 Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 415–21; 76 ILR, p. 126.

202 Excluding disputes related to Central America for a two-year period. See e.g. A. Chayes, 'Nicaragua, the United States and the World Court', **85** *Columbia Law Review*, 1985, p. 1445; K. Highet, 'Litigation Implications of the US Withdrawal from the Nicaragua case', **79** *AJIL*, 1985, p. 992; and US Department of State, 'Statement on the US Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice', **22** *ILM*, 1985, p. 246.

203 *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 432, 454; 123 ILR, pp. 189, 214. See also Tomuschat, 'Article 36', pp. 712, 761; and above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 103.

204 *Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 69, 76; *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 432, 450–1; and *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 45 ff.

205 *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1351.

206 *Congo v. Rwanda*, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 6, 32, 52. As to obligations *erga omnes* and *jus cogens*, see above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 104.

207 *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 1307, 1351. Note also that the Court has held that only in exceptional cases would it reject a claim based on a valid title to jurisdiction on the ground of abuse of process; see *Immunities and Criminal Proceedings*

(*Equatorial Guinea v. France*) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 292, 336–7; and *Iran v. US* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2019, paras. 113 ff.

208 See e.g. *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 183; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 342.

209 See article 36(6) of the Statute; and *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. II, ch. 13, para. II.215. See also Tomuschat, 'Article 36', pp. 712, 779 and above, p. 936. Note that in *Somalia v. Kenya* (Preliminary Objections), the Court did not accept Kenya's argument that the Court's jurisdiction was precluded where its (Kenya's) declaration covered disputes 'other than . . . [d]isputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement', where the two states were parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its dispute settlement provisions: ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 3, 46 ff.

210 See also *Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. US)* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 2019, paras. 30, 114.

211 ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 182–3. Note that at the preliminary objections to jurisdiction phase, the Court regarded that provision as 'confined to affording the Parties a possible defence on the merits to be used should the occasion arise': ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 803, 811.

212 See further above, [Chapter 3](#). See also P. Tomka, 'Custom and the International Court of Justice', *12 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals*, 2013, p. 195. Note that the Court may be specifically requested by the parties to consider particular factors. In *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 18, 21; 67 ILR, pp. 3, 14, the *compromis* specifically asked the Court to take into account 'the recent trends admitted at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea'.

213 Article 38(2) of the Statute. See also A. Pellet and D. Müller, 'Article 38', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 819; and see above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 90.

214 See e.g. above, [Chapter 10](#), p. 509.

215 ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 226; 110 ILR, 163.

216 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 263, 266. This is the subject of a strong rebuttal by Judge Higgins in her Dissenting Opinion, *ibid.*, pp. 583, 584 ff.

217 See above, Chapter 3, p. 83.

218 ‘Or other objection’, with regard to which a decision is requested before consideration of the merits: see article 79 of the Rules of Court 1978 and the previous sections of this chapter.

219 See further above, p. 940. See also e.g. *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1998, p. 275; and S. Rosenne, ‘The International Court of Justice: Revision of Articles 79 and 80 of the Rules of Court’, **14** *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 2001, p. 77.

220 *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 30–1; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 364–5.

221 See the *South West Africa Cases* (Second Phase), ICJ Reports, 1966, pp. 3, 37; 37 ILR, pp. 243, 270. It is to be noted that admissibility issues may be discussed at the merits stage: see e.g. *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, p. 90; 105 ILR, p. 226. See also C. M. Chinkin, ‘East Timor Moves into the World Court’, **4** *EJIL*, 1993, p. 206.

222 ICJ Reports, 1963, pp. 15, 33–4; 35 ILR, pp. 353, 369.

223 *Ibid.*, p. 29; and *Burkina Faso/Niger*, ICJ Reports, 2013, paras. 45–6.

224 See e.g. *Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 69, 95; 84 ILR, p. 218; *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 272; 57 ILR, p. 348; *Lockerbie* (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 9, 26; 117 ILR, pp. 1, 24; and *Congo v. Belgium*, ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 14–15; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 69–70.

225 ICJ Reports, 1966, p. 6; 37 ILR, p. 243.

226 See above, p. 931.

²²⁷ See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **III**, ch. 16, para. III.257; M. Benzing, 'Evidentiary Issues', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1371 ff.; K. Highet, 'Evidence and Proof of Facts', in Damrosch, *International Court of Justice at a Crossroads*, pp. 355, 357; C. F. Amerasinghe, 'Presumptions and Inferences in Evidence in International Litigation', **3** *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals*, 2004, p. 394; and L. Malintoppi, 'Fact Finding and Evidence before the International Court of Justice (Notably in Scientific-Related Disputes)', **7** *Journal of International Dispute Resolution*, 2016, p. 421. See also A. Riddell and B. Plant, *Evidence before the International Court of Justice*, London, 2009; Kolb, *International Court*, pp. 928 ff.; D. V. Sandifer, *Evidence before International Tribunals*, Charlottesville, 1975; S. Schwebel, *Justice in International Law*, Cambridge, 1994, p. 125; K. Highet, 'Evidence, the Court and the Nicaragua Case', **81** *AJIL*, 1987, p. 1; M. Kazazi, *Burden of Proof and Related Issues*, The Hague, 1996; and T. M. Franck, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*, Oxford, 1995, pp. 335 ff.

²²⁸ President Schwebel in his address to the UN General Assembly on 27 October 1997 noted that the Court's 'attitude to evidence is demonstrably flexible': see A/52/PV.36, www.icj-cij.org/public/files/press-releases/9/3009.pdf. See e.g. the introduction of illegally obtained evidence in *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 32–6; 16 AD, p. 155.

²²⁹ Article 36 of the Statute.

²³⁰ Article 48 of the Statute.

²³¹ Article 49 of the Statute.

²³² Article 50 of the Statute. By article 43(5), the Court may hear witnesses and experts, as well as agents, counsel and advocates.

²³³ Article 44(2) of the Statute and article 66 of the Rules of Court. See e.g. C. Foster, 'New Clothes for the Emperor? Consultation of Experts by the International Court of Justice', **5** *Journal of International Dispute Settlement*, 2014, p. 139; J. R. Rodríguez, *L'Expert en Droit International*, Paris, 2010; and D. Peat, 'The Use of Court-Appointed Experts by the International Court of Justice', **84** *BYIL*, 2014, p. 271.

²³⁴ See Highet, 'Evidence', p. 10.

²³⁵ But see *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4; and *DRC v. Uganda*, Orders of 8 September 2020 and October 2020.

²³⁶ But see *ibid.*, and *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1989, p. 18; 67 ILR, p. 4; *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 13; 81 ILR, p. 238; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14; 76 ILR, p. 349.

²³⁷ First, in *Diversion of Water from the River Meuse*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 70; and, secondly, in *Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project*, ICJ Communiqué No. 97/3, 17 February 1997 and see ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 14; 116 ILR, p. 1.

²³⁸ See e.g. *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 9; 61 ILR, pp. 530, 535. See also F. A. Mann, ‘Foreign Investment in the International Court of Justice: The *ELSI* Case’, 86 *AJIL*, 1992, pp. 92, 94–5; and *El Salvador/Honduras*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 574; 97 ILR, pp. 112, 490. Note in particular *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14; 76 ILR, p. 349. The difficulties of proving facts in this case were exacerbated by the absence of the respondent state during the proceedings on the merits.

²³⁹ *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 203.

²⁴⁰ *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 731. See also *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 77 ff.

²⁴¹ *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 200. See also *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 72–3; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia*, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 624, 643 ff.

²⁴² However, the Court has noted that affidavits prepared for litigation purposes may be received if they attest to personal knowledge of facts by a particular individual: *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), pp. 659, 731.

²⁴³ *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 201, 206. See also *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 41; 76 ILR, p. 349; and *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 77 ff.

²⁴⁴ *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 201. See also *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 130–1, where it was held that in principle the Court would accept as highly persuasive relevant findings of fact made by the ICTY at trial, unless they had been upset on appeal. In addition, any evaluation by the Tribunal based on the facts was entitled to due weight. However, the procedural stages prior to a decision, which did not involve definitive rulings, should not be given weight: *ibid.*, pp. 132 ff. See also *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 74 ff.

²⁴⁵ *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 203.

²⁴⁶ *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 731. See also *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 701; and *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Arbitral Award of 29 June 2017, paras. 606–8, 621, 623, 695. Note that the Court has emphasised that those providing evidence based on their scientific or technical knowledge or on their personal experiences should testify as experts or witnesses, rather than as counsel, so that they can be cross-examined: *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 72.

²⁴⁷ See *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 24–5, 41, 97–8; 76 ILR, p. 349. Note that the Court is deemed to take judicial notice of international law: see *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 9; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 24. The principle is sometimes referred to as *jura novit curia*.

²⁴⁸ ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 204. As to the value of maps as evidence, see *ibid.*, p. 206 and above, [Chapter 9](#), p. 441.

²⁴⁹ *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 695.

²⁵⁰ See e.g. *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 73 ff.; *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 71; *Romania v. Ukraine*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 61, 86; *Malaysia/Singapore*, ICJ Reports, 2008, pp. 12, 31; *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 392, 437; 76 ILR, p. 1; *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 432, 450; *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 41; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 144; *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 128–9; *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 639, 660;

and *Croatia v. Slovenia*, Award of 29 June 2017, para. 356. Note also the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brčko Area in its Award of 14 February 1997. The Appendix to the Order lays down the Principles Applicable to the Admissibility of Evidence and notes *inter alia* that each party bears the burden of proving its own case and, in particular, facts alleged by it. The party having the burden of proof must not only bring evidence in support of its allegations, but must also convince the Tribunal of their truth. The Tribunal is not bound to adhere to strict judicial rules of evidence, the probative force of evidence being for the Tribunal to determine. Where proof of a fact presents extreme difficulty, the Tribunal may be satisfied with less conclusive, i.e. *prima facie*, evidence: see 36 ILM, 1997, pp. 396, 402–3.

²⁵¹ *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 73; and *Diallo*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 639, 660–1. In *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 15, 26, the Court noted that while as a general rule, it is for the party which alleges a particular fact in support of its claims to prove the existence of that fact, it ‘has recognized that this general rule may be applied flexibly in certain circumstances, where, for example, the respondent may be in a better position to establish certain facts’.

²⁵² *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 73; and *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 14, 71.

²⁵³ See *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 432, 450.

²⁵⁴ *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute)* (Nicaragua Intervening), ICJ Reports, 1990, pp. 92, 117–18; 97 ILR, pp. 112, 238–9; and *Indonesia/Malaysia* (Philippines Intervening), ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 575, 587. As to third-party intervention, see below, p. 963.

²⁵⁵ Judge Higgins in her Separate Opinion in *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 233; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 392, noted that ‘the Court’s prime objective appears to have been to retain a freedom in evaluating the evidence, relying on the facts and circumstances of each case’. See also Judge Shahabuddeen’s Dissenting Opinion in *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 6, 63; 102 ILR, pp. 1, 104.

²⁵⁶ Merits, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 129. See also *Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania)*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 17; and *Croatia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 74. Judge Higgins in her Separate Opinion in *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161,

234, noted that ‘the graver the charge the more confidence there must be in the evidence relied on’.

²⁵⁷ See e.g. *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 32–6; 16 AD, p. 155. See also H. Thirlway, ‘Dilemma or Chimera? Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in International Adjudication’, 78 *AJIL*, 1984, p. 622; and G. Marston, ‘Falsification of Documentary Evidence Before International Tribunals: An Aspect of the *Behring Sea* Arbitration, 1892–3’, 71 *BYIL*, 2000, p. 357. See also the difficulties in *Qatar v. Bahrain*, ICJ, Order of 17 February 1999.

²⁵⁸ ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 336–7. Article 56 of the Rules provides that after the closure of written proceedings, no further documents may be submitted to the Court by either party except with the consent of the other party or, in the absence of consent, where the Court, after hearing the parties, authorises production where it is felt that the documents are necessary.

²⁵⁹ *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 39; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 373. Although note that in *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 13; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 496, the Court referred in detail to Security Council resolution 748 (1992) adopted three days after the close of the oral hearings.

²⁶⁰ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 110; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 444.

²⁶¹ *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 466–7.

²⁶² See e.g. *Rosenne’s Law and Practice*, vol. III, ch. 24; and S. Rosenne, *Provisional Measures in International Law: The International Court of Justice and the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea*, Oxford, 2005; C. Miles, *Provisional Measures before International Courts and Tribunals*, Cambridge, 2017; and C. Miles, ‘Provisional Measures and the “New” Plausibility in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice’, *BYIL*, 2018, available online; K. Oellers-Frahm and A. Zimmermann, ‘Article 41’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1135; Kolb, *International Court*, pp. 611 ff.; S. Oda, ‘Provisional Measures’, in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice*, p. 541; B. Oxman, ‘Jurisdiction and the Power to Indicate Provisional Measures’, in Damrosch, *International Court of Justice at a Crossroads*, p. 323; C. Gray, *Judicial Remedies in International Law*, Oxford, 1987, pp. 69–74; Elias, *International Court*, chapter 3; J. G. Merrills, ‘Interim Measures of Protection and the Substantive

Jurisdiction of the International Court’, **36** *Cambridge Law Journal*, 1977, p. 86; J. G. Merrills, ‘Reflections on the Incidental Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’, in *Remedies in International Law* (ed. M. Evans and S. V. Konstanidis), Oxford, 1998, p. 51; L. Gross, ‘The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran: Phase of Provisional Measures’, **74** *AJIL*, 1980, p. 395; and M. Mendelson, ‘Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of Contested Jurisdiction’, **46** *BYIL*, 1972–3, p. 259. See also articles 73–78 of the Rules of Court 1978.

263 See e.g. *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (Provisional Measures), ICJ, Order of 23 January 2020, para. 16; *Qatar v. UAE* (Provisional Measures), Order of 23 July 2018, pp. 406, 413; Order of 14 June 2019, pp. 361, 367; *Alleged Violations of Treaty of Amity (Iran v. US)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 3 October 2018, pp. 623, 630; *Jadhav (India v. Pakistan)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 18 May 2017, pp. 231, 236; the two *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)* applications for provisional measures, Order of 13 July 2006, ICJ Reports, 2006, pp. 113, 128–9 and Order of 23 January 2007, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 3, 10. Note also the provisional measures orders in *Ukraine v. Russia*, ICC, Order of 19 April 2017, pp. 104, 114; *Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark)*, Order of 29 July 1991, ICJ Reports, 1991, pp. 12, 15; 94 ILR, pp. 446, 453, where jurisdiction was not at issue; and *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, Order of 15 March 1996, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 13, 21, where it was. The Court in *Application of the Genocide Convention*, Order of 8 April 1993, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 3, 12; 95 ILR, pp. 1, 27, declared that jurisdiction included both jurisdiction *ratione personae* and jurisdiction *ratione materiae*. Note that Jiménez de Aréchega, a former President of the Court, has written that ‘interim measures will not be granted unless a majority of judges believes at the time that there will be jurisdiction over the merits’: ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, **159** *HR*, 1978 I, pp. 1, 161.

264 *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 23 January 2007, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 3, 10.

265 *Ibid.*

266 *Cameroon v. Nigeria* (Provisional Measures), Order of 15 March 1996, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 13, 21–2. See also *Qatar v. UAE*, Order of 14 June 2019, pp. 361, 367, noting that: ‘The power of the Court to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute has as its object the preservation of the respective rights of the parties in a case, pending its decision on the merits thereof.’

²⁶⁷ *Avena (Mexico v. US)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 5 February 2003, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 77, 89; 134 ILR, pp. 104, 115.

²⁶⁸ *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1978, pp. 3, 9; 60 ILR, pp. 524, 530; and *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1979, pp. 7, 19; 61 ILR, pp. 513, 525. See also *Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal*, Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, ICJ Reports, 1990, pp. 64, 69; 92 ILR, pp. 9, 14.

²⁶⁹ *Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal*, Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, ICJ Reports, 1990, p. 69; 92 ILR, pp. 9, 14.

²⁷⁰ See e.g. *Qatar v. UAE*, Order of 14 June 2019, pp. 361, 367; Order of 23 July 2018 (Provisional Measures), pp. 406, 421–2; *Request for Interpretation of Temple Judgment (Cambodia v. Thailand)*, Order of 18 July 2011, ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 537, 545 ff.; and *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Provisional Measures), Order of 8 March 2011, ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 6, 18. See also Miles, ‘Provisional Measures’.

²⁷¹ See e.g. *Qatar v. UAE*, Order of 14 June 2019, pp. 361, 368; Order of 23 July 2018 (Provisional Measures), pp. 406, 422; *Ukraine v. Russia*, ICC, Order of 19 April 2017, pp. 104, 126; and *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 23 January 2007, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 3, 10–1.

²⁷² *Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 7 December 2016, ICJ Reports, 2016, pp. 1148, 1169; *Ukraine v. Russia*, ICC, Order of 19 April 2017, pp. 104, 136; *Qatar v. UAE* (Provisional Measures), Order of 23 July 2018, pp. 406, 428. See also e.g. *Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 29 July 1991, ICJ Reports, 1991, pp. 12, 17; *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 23 January 2007, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 3, 11; and *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 13, 22.

²⁷³ ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 15; 95 ILR, pp. 478, 498.

²⁷⁴ *LaGrand (Germany v. US)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 3 March 1999, ICJ Reports, 1999 (I), pp. 9, 14.

²⁷⁵ ICJ Reports, 1972, p. 12; 55 ILR, p. 160. See also *Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.*, ICJ Reports, 1952, p. 89; 19 ILR, p. 501.

²⁷⁶ ICJ Reports, 1973, p. 99; 57 ILR, p. 360. They were also granted in the *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1979, pp. 7, 19; 61 ILR, pp. 513, 525; and in *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 169; 76 ILR, p. 35. See also *Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark)*, ICJ Reports, 1991, p. 12; 94 ILR, p. 446; *Application of the Genocide Convention*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 3, 325; 95 ILR, p. 1; and *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 13. See also *LaGrand* (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports, 1999, p. 9; 118 ILR, p. 37.

²⁷⁷ *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 13, 23. See also *Burkina Faso/Mali*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 9; 80 ILR, pp. 440, 456; and *Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay)* (Provisional Measures), Order of 23 January 2007, paras. 49, 53.

²⁷⁸ See the *dispositif*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 13, 24–5.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23. See also J. d’Aspremont, ‘The Recommendations Made by the International Court of Justice’, 56 *ICLQ*, 2007, p. 185. Note that the Court may make such recommendations even where it refuses to grant an order for provisional measures.

²⁸⁰ Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, pp. 537, 555–6.

²⁸¹ Referring to article 33(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, which the Court noted reflected customary law: ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 506.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 502–3. The Court also referred to a related reason, the principle that parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect regarding the execution of the decision to be given and not to allow any step to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute, citing *Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria*, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 79, 1939, p. 199, *ibid.*, p. 503. The Court also noted that the preparatory work leading to the adoption of article 41 of the ICJ Statute did not preclude the conclusion that orders under that article have binding force, *ibid.*, pp. 503 ff.

²⁸³ See *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 258; and *Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 230, 236.

²⁸⁴ See *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 281; *Bosnia v. Serbia*, ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 235; *Avena* (Request for Interpretation) (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 3, 21; and *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 740. Note that article 11 of the Resolution on the Court's Internal Judicial Practice, adopted in December 2020, established an ad hoc committee to monitor the implementation of provisional measures.

²⁸⁵ See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. III, ch. 20, para. III.302; S. Torres Bernárdez and M. Mbengue, 'Article 48', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, pp. 1351, 1359; and Kolb, *International Court*, pp. 997 ff.

²⁸⁶ See *Certain Activities* (*Costa Rica v. Nicaragua*), Order of 17 April 2013, Joinder of Proceedings, ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 166, 170–1; and *Construction of a Road* (*Nicaragua v. Costa Rica*), Order of 17 April 2013, Joinder of Proceedings, ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 184, 187–8. As a consequence, Judge Simma, who had been chosen by Costa Rica to sit as ad hoc judge in *Construction of a Road* resigned, leaving Judge Dugard, who had been appointed by Costa Rica as judge ad hoc in the *Certain Activities* case to continue in post: see ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 674–5. See also *South West Africa Cases*, Order of 20 May 1961, ICJ Reports, 1961, p. 13; and *North Sea Continental Shelf*, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 3, 19. Cf. *Fisheries Jurisdiction* (*UK v. Iceland*), ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 3, 6, 175, 177.

²⁸⁷ See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. III, ch. 20, para. III.305; and Rosenne, 'Counter-Claims in the International Court of Justice Revisited', in Armas Barea *et al.*, *Liber Amicorum Judge Ruda*, p. 457. See also C. Antonopoulos, *Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice*, Heidelberg, 2011; Kolb, *International Court*, pp. 658 ff.; and S. Murphy, 'Counter-Claims: Article 80 of the Rules', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, pp. 1104 ff.

²⁸⁸ *Territorial and Maritime Dispute* (*Nicaragua v. Honduras*) (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 695, 697; and *Diallo* (*Guinea v. Congo*), ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 639, 656–7.

²⁸⁹ As revised in 2000. One major difference from the text of the previous Rule 80 is to emphasise the role of the Court. See Rosenne, 'Revision', p. 83. The Rule also provides that 'a counter-claim shall be made in the Counter-Memorial and shall appear as part of the submissions contained therein. The right of the other party to present its views in writing on the counter-claim, in an additional pleading, shall be preserved, irrespective of any decision of the Court, in accordance with Article 45, paragraph 2, of these Rules,

concerning the filing of further written pleadings.’ Counter-claims must be made in the Counter-Memorial and appear as part of the submissions contained therein: article 80(2).

²⁹⁰ *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Counter-Claims), ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 243, 256. In *Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia)* (Counter-Claims), Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 289, 295, the Court noted: ‘Counter-claims are autonomous legal acts the object of which is to submit new claims to the Court which are, at the same time, linked to the principal claims.’

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 258. See also *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Counter-Claims), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 190, 204–5. The Court has also noted that counter-claims do not have to rely on identical instruments to meet the ‘connection’ test of article 80: see *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 275; and *Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia)* (Counter-Claims), Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 289, 296.

²⁹³ See *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Counter-Claims), ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 243, 258; and *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, Order of 30 June 1999, ICJ Reports, 1999, p. 983. See also *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Counter-Claims), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 190, 205; *Congo v. Uganda* (Counter-Claims), Order of 29 November 2001, ICJ Reports, 2001, p. 664; *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 259 ff.; *Germany v. Italy* (Counter-Claim), Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 310, 315 ff.; and *Costa Rica v. Nicaragua* (Counter-Claims), ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 200, 211 ff., in which the Court, citing earlier case-law, referred to a range of factors that could establish a direct connection, ranging from geographical and temporal factors to the nature of the facts and legal principles or instruments relied on.

²⁹⁴ *Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia)* (Counter-Claims), Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 289, 297.

²⁹⁵ *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Counter-Claims), ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 243, 258; and see *Application of the Genocide Convention (Croatia v. Serbia)*, ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 120–3. In *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, the ‘same legal aim’ was the establishment of legal responsibility for frontier incidents: ICJ, Order of 30 June 1999. See also *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Counter-Claims), ICJ Reports, 1998, pp. 190, 205; and *Caribbean*

Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Counter-Claims), Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports, 2017, pp. 289, 297.

²⁹⁶ Merits, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 210. See also *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 261.

²⁹⁷ ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 200, 208; ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 665, 674–5. Note that in *Jurisdictional Immunities (Germany v. Italy)* (Counter-Claim), ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 310, 316, the Court concluded that the dispute that Italy wished to bring to it by way of its counter-claim related to facts and situations existing prior to the entry into force of the relevant jurisdictional convention and thus did not come within the jurisdiction of the Court as required by article 80(1).

²⁹⁸ See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. III, chapter 26; S. Rosenne, *Intervention in the International Court of Justice*, Dordrecht, 1993; J. M. Ruda, 'Intervention Before the International Court of Justice', in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the ICJ*, p. 487; C. M. Chinkin, 'Third Party Intervention Before the International Court of Justice', **80 AJIL**, 1986, p. 495; Elias, *International Court*, chapter 4; P. Jessup, 'Intervention in the International Court', **75 AJIL**, 1981, p. 903; and Thirlway, *Law and Procedure*, pp. 1026, 1836. See also articles 81–6 of the Rules of Court 1978.

²⁹⁹ See *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf* (Application for Permission to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 3, 25; 70 ILR, p. 527; and *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 431; 76 ILR, p. 104.

³⁰⁰ See A. Miron and C. Chinkin, 'Article 62', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1686; and Kolb, *International Court*, p. 694. See also article 81 of the Rules of Court. It is for the Court itself to decide upon any request for permission to intervene: see *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf* (Request for Intervention), ICJ Reports, 1981, pp. 3, 12; 62 ILR, p. 608.

³⁰¹ See here *SS Wimbledon*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 1, 1923; 2 AD, p. 4; *Haya de la Torre*, ICJ Reports, 1951, pp. 71, 76–7; 18 ILR, pp. 349, 356–7; and *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 215–16; 76 ILR, pp. 74–5. See also A. Miron and C. Chinkin, 'Article 63', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1741.

³⁰² See *SS Wimbledon*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 1, 1923, pp. 9–13; and *Haya de la Torre*, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 71; 18 ILR, p. 349.

³⁰³ *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute)* (Nicaragua Intervening), ICJ Reports, 1990, pp. 92, 134–5; 97 ILR, p. 112. See also Lauterpacht, *Aspects*, pp. 26 ff.

³⁰⁴ ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 253; 57 ILR, p. 398.

³⁰⁵ ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 18; 67 ILR, p. 4.

³⁰⁶ ICJ Reports, 1981, pp. 3, 12; 62 ILR, pp. 612, 621.

³⁰⁷ ICJ Reports, 1981, p. 19; 62 ILR, p. 628. The Court also refused Italy permission to intervene under article 62 in *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf* (Application for Permission to Intervene): see ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 3; 70 ILR, p. 527. The Court also refused permission to El Salvador to intervene in *Nicaragua v. US* (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) under article 63: see ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 215; 76 ILR, p. 74, in as much as it related to the current phase of the proceedings. The Court here more controversially also refused to hold a hearing on the issue, *ibid.*

³⁰⁸ I.e. concerning the legal regime of the waters within the Gulf of Fonseca only and not the other issues in dispute, such as maritime delimitations and delimitation of the land frontier between El Salvador and Honduras.

³⁰⁹ ICJ Reports, 1990, p. 92; 97 ILR, p. 112.

³¹⁰ ICJ Reports, 1990, p. 133; 97 ILR, p. 254. The Court noted that ‘the procedure of intervention is to ensure that a state with possibly affected interests may be permitted to intervene even though there is no jurisdictional link and it therefore cannot become a party’: ICJ Reports, 1990, p. 135, 97 ILR, p. 256. In the earlier cases it was not felt necessary to decide this issue: see e.g. *Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf* (Request for Intervention), ICJ Reports, 1981, pp. 3, 20; 62 ILR, pp. 612, 629; and *Libya/Malta Continental Shelf* (Application for Permission to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 3, 28; 70 ILR, pp. 527, 557.

311 ICJ Reports, 1990, pp. 117–18, 133–4.

312 *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Costa Rica Application to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 348, 358; and *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Honduras Application to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 420, 433–4. See also *Germany v. Italy* (Greece Application to Intervene), Order of 4 July 2011, ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 494, 501.

313 *Nicaragua v. Colombia* (Costa Rica Application to Intervene), ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 348, 360; and *Germany v. Italy* (Greece Application to Intervene), Order of 4 July 2011, ICJ Reports, 2011, pp. 494, 502.

314 *Ibid.*, p. 135.

315 ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 1034–5.

316 *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute)* (Nicaragua Intervening), ICJ Reports, 1990, pp. 92, 135; 97 ILR, p. 112.

317 ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 575, 596.

318 *El Salvador/Honduras (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute)* (Nicaragua Intervening), ICJ Reports, 1990, pp. 92, 117–18; 97 ILR, p. 112. And, on the basis of documentary evidence, see *Indonesia/Malaysia* (Philippines Intervening), ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 575, 603. As to the burden and scope of proof generally, see above, p. 956.

319 *Indonesia/Malaysia* (Philippines Intervening), ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 575, 598. The Court concluded that the Philippines had shown in the instruments it had invoked ‘no legal interest on its part that might be affected by reasoning or interpretations of the Court in the main proceedings, either because they form no part of the arguments of Indonesia and Malaysia or because their respective reliance on them does not bear on the issue of retention of sovereignty by the Sultanate of Sulu as described by the Philippines in respect of its claim in North Borneo’: *ibid.*, pp. 603–4.

320 ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 351, 609; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 525.

321 This was partly because article 59 of the ICJ Statute refers to the binding effect of a judgment as between the parties only: ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 609; 97 ILR, p. 525.

322 ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 610; 97 ILR, p. 526. It includes the right to receive copies of the pleadings and documents: Rule 85(1).

323 Since the consent of the existing parties is required for an intervener to become itself a party to the case: *ibid.*

324 *Ibid.* Note that by Rule 85(3), a non-party intervening state may only be heard on the subject of the intervention and not on the case as a whole.

325 Rule 81(1). See also *Indonesia/Malaysia (Philippines Intervening)*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 575, 584 ff.

326 See also above, [Chapter 13](#), p. 696.

327 But see e.g. Gray, *Judicial Remedies*; and I. Brownlie, ‘Remedies in the International Court of Justice’, in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the ICJ*, p. 557. Note that the Court has stated that where jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court to consider the remedies a party has requested for the breach of the obligation: see *LaGrand (Germany v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 485; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 24; and *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 33; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 136–7.

328 However, where the Court finds a continuing wrong, it would not usually refer to this in the *dispositif*, unless there were special circumstances, as the obligation to cease was both an obligation under general international law and derived from the specific obligation on parties to disputes before the Court to comply with the judgment under article 59 of the Statute: *Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 267.

329 See e.g. *I’m Alone*, 3 RIAA, p. 1609 (1935); and *Rainbow Warrior* 74 ILR, pp. 241, 274; 82 ILR, pp. 499, 575. See also *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 279.

330 Note that the Bosnian application to the Court in *Application of the Genocide Convention* included a claim ‘to pay Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its own right and as

parens patriae for its citizens, reparations for damages to persons and property as well as to the Bosnian economy and environment caused by the foregoing violations of international law in a sum to be determined by the Court’: ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 3, 7; 95 ILR, p. 1.

331 *Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania)* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 244.

332 *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 324, 331.

333 See *LaGrand*, ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 514 ff.; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 53, paras. 3 and 4 of the *dispositif* contained in para. 128 of the Judgment.

334 See *Chorzów Factory*, PCIJ, Series A, No. 13; and *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 4; 61 ILR, p. 502, for possible authority for such a power. See also Gray, *Judicial Remedies*, pp. 95–6.

335 ICJ Reports, 1991, pp. 12, 19; 94 ILR, p. 446.

336 ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 3, 31–2; 128 ILR, pp. 60, 87–8. But see the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, which expressed the view that: ‘As soon as he ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, the illegal consequences attaching to the warrant also ceased’: *ibid.*, pp. 89–90. See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert: *ibid.*, p. 183.

337 ICJ Reports, 1997, pp. 7, 81 ff.; 116 ILR, p. 1.

338 *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 80–1.

339 *Ibid.*, pp. 75–6. The Court concluded that: ‘It is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty, which must be pursued in a joint and integrated way, as well as the norms of international environmental law and the principles of the law of international watercourses’: *ibid.*, p. 78.

340 ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 512–13, 513–14; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 50–1, 51–2. See also *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 69; 134 ILR, pp. 120, 172.

341 ICJ Reports, 2002, pp. 303, 452, 457, para. V(C) of the *dispositif*.

³⁴² ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 514; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 51–2. See also above, Chapter 12, p. 671.

³⁴³ ICJ Reports, 2001, pp. 466, 514 ff.; 134 ILR, pp. 1, 51 ff. But see R. Y. Jennings, ‘The *LaGrand* Case’, 1 *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals*, 2002, pp. 1, 40. See also *Avena (Mexico v. US)*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 12, 69–70, where the Court emphasised as an ‘important point’ that it had been addressing issues of principle with regard to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and that its comments with regard to Mexican nationals, the subject of the application, could not be taken to mean that the principles did not apply to all foreign nationals in the US in a similar position. The Court also concluded that it was for the US to find an appropriate remedy with regard to the individuals in question having the nature of review and reconsideration according to the criteria indicated in the judgment: *ibid.*, p. 70. See as to the response of the US and relevant US case-law, above, Chapter 4, p. 143, note 209. See also the *Request for the Interpretation of the Avena Judgment* (Provisional Measures), Order of 16 July 2008, ICJ Reports, 2008, p. 311 and ICJ Reports, 2009, p. 3. The Court drew attention to the ‘special emphasis’ to be placed on ‘the need for the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr Jadhav’ and for the need for these to be ‘effective’ in *Jadhav (India v. Pakistan)*, ICJ Reports, 2019, paras. 139, 144, with the choice of means being left to the respondent state, *ibid.*, para. 146.

³⁴⁴ *Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)*, ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 213, 267.

³⁴⁵ ICJ Reports, 2018, pp. 15, 25 ff. See also *Diallo (Guinea v. Congo)* (Compensation), ICJ Reports, 2012, p. 324, referring to various heads of damage, including non-material and material injury.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 31.

³⁴⁷ *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 257.

³⁴⁸ See e.g. A. Zimmermann and T. Thienel, ‘Article 60’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1617.

³⁴⁹ See C. Brown, ‘Article 59’, in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1561; and generally Shahabuddeen, *Precedent*. See also *Jones v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of

14 January 2014, para. 198, noting that the Decision of the ICJ in *Germany v. Italy* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2012, p. 99, was authoritative with regard to customary international law concerning jurisdictional immunities.

350 *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 477.

351 ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 4; 16 AD, p. 155.

352 ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 3; 55 ILR, p. 238.

353 ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 3; 61 ILR, p. 530. During the 1970s and part of the 1980s, there was reluctance by some respondent states to appear before the Court at all: see e.g. *Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland)*, ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 3; 55 ILR, p. 238; *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 253; 57 ILR, p. 350; *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 3; 61 ILR, p. 530; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14. See also article 53 of the Statute; H. Thirlway, *Non-Appearance Before the International Court of Justice*, Cambridge, 1985; G. G. Fitzmaurice, 'The Problem of the "Non-appearing" Defendant Government', 51 *BYIL*, 1980, p. 89; and J. Elkind, *Non-Appearance Before the ICJ, Functional and Comparative Analysis*, Dordrecht, 1984. On 29 March 2018, Guyana filed an Application before the Court against Venezuela, however, the latter announced that it would not appear. The oral hearings went ahead in June 2020 in Venezuela's absence; see A. Wentker, 'Venezuela's Non-Participation Before the ICJ in the Dispute over the Essequibo Region', *EJIL: Talk!*, 29 June 2018; and www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/171/171-20200630-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf.

354 See *Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute*, ICJ Reports, 1994, p. 40. See also above, [Chapter 17](#), p. 880.

355 *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, ICJ Reports, 2002, p. 303.

356 See e.g. C. Paulson, 'Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice since 1987', 98 *AJIL*, 2004, p. 434; and A. P. Llamzon, 'Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice', 18 *EJIL*, 2007, p. 815.

357 See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. III, ch. 28, para. III.395; S. Rosenne, *Interpretation, Revision and Other Recourse from International Judgments and Awards*,

Leiden, 2007; and K. H. Kaikobad, *Interpretation and Revision of International Boundary Decisions*, Cambridge, 2007, part III. See also Zimmermann and Thienel, 'Article 60', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1617; and Kolb, *International Court*, p. 776.

358 A dispute must exist for a request for interpretation to be admissible and it is for the Court to decide whether such dispute exists: *Avena (Mexico v. US)* (Request for Interpretation) (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2009, pp. 3, 10, 12 ff.; and *Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)* (Request for Interpretation), ICJ Reports, 2013, pp. 281, 295 ff. The Court noted that a dispute within the meaning of article 60 had to be understood as a 'difference of opinion or views between the parties as to the meaning or scope of a judgment rendered by the Court' and differed from the definition of a dispute under article 36(2): *ibid.*, p. 295, and see above, p. 933.

359 See *Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case*, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 402; 17 ILR, p. 339; and *Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment in the Tunisia/Libya Case*, ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 191, 214–20; 81 ILR, pp. 420, 447.

360 See *Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 (Cameroon v. Nigeria)*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 31, 35; and *Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)* (Request for Interpretation), ICJ Reports, 2013, p. 296. Note the *Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 23 May 2008 in the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore)* filed on 30 June 2017, but withdrawn from the list by agreement following a change of government in Malaysia, see Order of 29 May 2018, ICJ Reports, 2018, p. 288.

361 *Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 (Cameroon v. Nigeria)*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 31, 36. The Court noted: 'The language and structure of article 60 of the Statute reflect the primacy of the principle of *res judicata*. That principle must be maintained': *ibid.* As to *res judicata*, see above, p. 85.

362 See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. III, ch. 28, para. III.397; Rosenne, *Interpretation*, chapter 6; and Kaikobad, *Interpretation and Revision*, part IV. See also A. Zimmermann and R. Geiss, 'Article 61', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1651; and Kolb, *International Court*, p. 802.

363 ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 191, 198–214; 81 ILR, p. 431.

364 ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 206–7; 81 ILR, p. 439.

365 ICJ Reports, 1985, pp. 213–14; 81 ILR, p. 446.

366 ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 7, 11. See also the *Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 Concerning the El Salvador/Honduras (Nicaragua Intervening) Case*, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 392, 398. The latter case is the first article 61 judgment by a chamber. See e.g. M. N. Shaw, ‘Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992’, 54 *ICLQ*, 2005, p. 999.

367 ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 7, 30.

368 ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 392, 398–9.

369 The application should be based upon the ‘discovery’ of a ‘fact’; the fact the discovery of which is relied on must be ‘of such a nature as to be a decisive factor’; the fact should have been ‘unknown’ to the Court and to the party claiming revision when the judgment was given; ignorance of this fact must not be ‘due to negligence’; and the application for revision must be ‘made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact’ and before ten years have elapsed from the date of the judgment.

370 ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 392, 399, 404. Note the *Request for Revision of the Judgment of 23 May 2008 in the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore)* filed on 2 February 2017, but withdrawn from the list by agreement following a change of government in Malaysia, see ICJ, Order of 29 May 2018, ICJ Reports, 2018, p. 284.

371 ICJ Reports, 1995, p. 288; 106 ILR, p. 1.

372 ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 477.

373 *Ibid.*, pp. 303–4. Judge Weeramantry noted that the request for an examination of the situation was ‘probably without precedent in the annals of the Court’ and one that did not

fit in with any of the standard applications recognised by the Rules of the Court for revision or interpretation of a judgment: *ibid.*, p. 320.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 305–6. France was proposing to undertake a series of underground nuclear tests. This it eventually did.

³⁷⁶ See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. **I**, ch. 5, vol. **II**, ch. 15 and vol. **III**, ch. 30; Kolb, *International Court*, p. 1019; D. Negulesco, 'L'Évolution de la Procédure des Avis Consultatifs de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale', 57 *HR*, 1936, p. 1; K. Keith, *The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice*, Leiden, 1971; M. Pomerance, *The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court in the League and UN Eras*, Baltimore, 1973; D. Pratap, *The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court*, Oxford, 1972; D. Greig, 'The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court and the Settlement of Disputes Between States', 15 *ICLQ*, 1966, p. 325; R. Higgins, 'A Comment on the Current Health of Advisory Opinions', in Lowe and Fitzmaurice, *Fifty Years of the ICJ*, p. 567; G. Abi-Saab, 'On Discretion: Reflections on the Nature of the Consultative Function of the International Court of Justice', in *International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons* (ed. L. Boisson de Chazournes and P. Sands), Cambridge, 1999, p. 36; and Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 1007.

³⁷⁷ See P. d'Argent, 'Article 65', in Zimmermann *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 1783; and P. d'Argent, 'Article 96 UN Charter', *ibid.*, p. 269. See further as to advisory opinions which are to be recognised as binding, below, [Chapter 22](#), p. 1150.

³⁷⁸ *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 236; 110 ILR, p. 163. In *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 162–3; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 80, the Court noted that 'advisory opinions have the purpose of furnishing to the requesting organs the elements of law necessary for them in their action'. It was then for the requesting organ to draw conclusions from the Court's findings.

³⁷⁹ *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 236; 110 ILR, p. 163. See also *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 154; 129 ILR, p. 37.

380 *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 234; and *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 155, 159–60. See also *Kosovo UDI*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 415.

381 *Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 10, 36.

382 *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 236.

383 *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 153–4, 160; and *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 234. See also the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 112.

384 See *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 156–7; *Kosovo UDI*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 415–6; and the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 113.

385 See *Eastern Carelia*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 5, 1923; 2 AD, p. 394. Note that the Court dealt with the consent of an interested party as a matter not of the competence or jurisdiction of the Court, but of the judicial propriety of giving an opinion: see *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 25; and *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 157–8.

386 ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 65, 71. See also *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 156; and the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 113.

387 See e.g. *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 235; *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 156, 164; *Kosovo UDI*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 417 ff.; *Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 10, 25; and the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 113.

388 ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12; 59 ILR, p. 14.

³⁸⁹ ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 24–5; 59 ILR, p. 42. It was also noted that in the *Eastern Carelia* case, Russia had objected to the Court’s jurisdiction and was neither a member of the League (at that time) nor a party to the PCIJ Statute, whereas in the *Western Sahara* case, Spain was a UN member and thus a party to the ICJ Statute. It had therefore given its consent in general to the exercise by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction. Further, Spain’s objection was to the restriction of the reference to the Court to the historical aspects of the Sahara question: *ibid.*

³⁹⁰ The Court emphasised that the central core of the issue was not a dispute between Spain and Morocco, but rather the nature of Moroccan (and Mauritanian) rights at the time of colonisation: ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 27; 59 ILR, p. 44.

³⁹¹ ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 28–9; 59 ILR, p. 45. See also *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 161–2, where the Court noted the detailed information available to it from UN and other sources.

³⁹² ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 114–15.

³⁹³ *Kosovo UDI*, ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 403, 417; and the *Chagos Advisory Opinion*, ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 115.

³⁹⁴ *Chagos Advisory Opinion*, ICJ Reports, 2019, pp. 95, 117–18.

³⁹⁵ See also *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur*, ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 62, 78–9; 121 ILR, p. 405; and *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 156–7, where the Court concluded that it had a duty to satisfy itself each time it was asked to give an advisory opinion as to the propriety of the exercise of its judicial function, by reference to the criterion of ‘compelling reasons’: *ibid.*, p. 157.

³⁹⁶ See *Western Sahara*, ICJ Reports, 1975, pp. 12, 25. See also e.g. the Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins in *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 209–10.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

³⁹⁸ See above, p. 953. Note that in her Separate Opinion in *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 211, 213, 214, Judge Higgins declared *inter alia* that she found the

history of the Arab–Israeli dispute as recounted by the Court ‘neither balanced nor satisfactory’. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, *ibid.*, p. 220.

³⁹⁹ ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 136. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, *ibid.*, p. 223 and the Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, *ibid.*, pp. 267 ff. See generally ‘Agora’, 99 *AJIL*, 2005, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁰ ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 66.

⁴⁰¹ *ibid.*, pp. 71–2. See also the *Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 (Mortished Case)*, ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 325, 333–4; 69 ILR, pp. 330, 344–5. In *Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 10, 20, the Court referred to the ‘gatekeeping role’ of the General Assembly under article 96(2).

⁴⁰² See article 2(a)–(v) of the WHO Constitution adopted on 22 July 1946 and amended in 1960, 1975, 1977, 1984 and 1994.

⁴⁰³ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 75 ff.; 110 ILR, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁴ Among other influential Advisory Opinions delivered by the Court are *Reparation for Injuries Suffered*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174; 16 AD, p. 318; *Admissions (Conditions of Membership of the UN)*, ICJ Reports, 1948, p. 57; 15 AD, p. 333; and *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151; 34 ILR, p. 281. See also *Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt*, ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 73; 62 ILR, p. 451; *Administrative Tribunal of the UN, Application for Review of Judgment No. 158*, ICJ Reports, 1973, p. 166; 54 ILR, p. 381; *Administrative Tribunal of the UN, Application for Review of Judgment No. 273*, ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 325; 69 ILR, p. 330; *Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, Application for Review of Judgment No. 333*, ICJ Reports, 1987, p. 18; 83 ILR, p. 296; and *Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate*, ICJ Reports, 1988, p. 12; 82 ILR, p. 225. Note also the Decision of the Israeli Supreme Court in *Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel* 129 ILR, pp. 241, 285, 298, on the influence of advisory opinions.

⁴⁰⁵ See e.g. Higgins, ‘Current Health’, p. 569; and S. Schwebel, ‘Authorising the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions’, 78 *AJIL*, 1984, p. 4. See also UN Secretary-General, *Agenda for Peace*, New York, 1992, A/47/277, para. 38.

⁴⁰⁶ See e.g. S. Schwebel, 'Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National Courts', *28 Va. JIL*, 1988, p. 495; and S. Rosenne, 'Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National Courts: A Reply', *29 Va. JIL*, 1989, p. 40.

⁴⁰⁷ See e.g. D. Bowett *et al.*, *The International Court of Justice: Process, Practice and Procedures*, London, 1997.

⁴⁰⁸ See e.g. M. Bedjaoui, *The New World Order and the Security Council*, Dordrecht, 1994. See also below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1072.

⁴⁰⁹ See e.g. *Reparation for Injuries Suffered*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174; 16 AD, p. 318, concerning the legal personality of the UN; *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151; 34 ILR, p. 281, by virtue of which the UN was able to take action which did not amount to enforcement action outside the framework of the Security Council, thus enabling the creation of peacekeeping missions; and *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 56; 94 ILR, p. 2, recognising the succession of the UN to the League of Nations with regard to mandated territories and enshrining the principle of self-determination within international law. See also *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 103–4; 105 ILR, p. 226.

⁴¹⁰ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 3; 94 ILR, p. 478.

⁴¹¹ ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 15; 94 ILR, p. 498.

⁴¹² Indeed, the importance of the pleadings in the evolution of international law has been noted: see e.g. P. Sands, 'Pleadings and the Pursuit of International Law', in *Legal Visions of the 21st Century* (ed. A. Anghie and G. Sturges), The Hague, 1998, while dissenting opinions may also be significant: see e.g. the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Franck in *Indonesia/Malaysia*, ICJ Reports, 2002, p. 3; and H. Lauterpacht, *The Development of International Law by the International Court*, London, 1958, pp. 68–9. See also, as to the international bar, M. N. Shaw, 'A Practical Look at the International Court of Justice', in Evans and Konstanidis, *Remedies*, pp. 11, 12 ff.; A. Watts, 'Enhancing the Effectiveness of Procedures of International Dispute Settlement', *5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, 2001, pp. 21, 24 ff.; and the Declaration of Judge Ad Hoc Cot in *Grand Prince (Belize v. France)*, ITLOS, 2001, p. 3; 125 ILR, p. 272.

413 See e.g. K. Highet, 'The Peace Palace Hots Up: The World Court in Business Again?', **85 AJIL**, 1991, p. 646. See also e.g. A. Pellet, 'Strengthening the Role of the International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations', **3 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals**, 2004, p. 159; P. Kooijmans, 'The ICJ in the 21st Century: Judicial Restraint, Judicial Activism, or Proactive Judicial Policy', **56 ICLQ**, 2007, p. 741; and R. Higgins, 'A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench', **55 ICLQ**, 2006, p. 791. Note that as of June 2020, there were twenty cases being heard or pending before the Court, www.icj-cij.org/en/pending-cases.

414 See e.g. *Rosenne's Law and Practice*, vol. I, ch. 1, para. I.4A; S. Rosenne, 'The Perplexities of Modern International Law', **291 HR**, 2002, pp. 13, 125; J. I. Charney, 'The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea', **90 AJIL**, 1996, p. 69; J. I. Charney, 'The Multiplicity of International Tribunals and Universality of International Law', **271 HR**, 1998, p. 101; and S. Oda, 'The International Court of Justice from the Bench', **244 HR**, 1993 VII, pp. 9, 139 ff. See also Kolb, *International Court*, p. 1199; and G. Gaja, 'Relationship of the ICJ with Other International Courts and Tribunals', in Zimmerman *et al.*, *Statute of the International Court*, p. 647.

415 See further above, [Chapters 6](#) and [7](#). See also with regard to the fragmentation of international law generally, above, [Chapter 2](#), p. 54.

416 See above, [Chapter 10](#), p. 548.

417 See above, [Chapter 17](#), p. 902.

418 See e.g. the Court of Justice of the European Communities, the Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Court of Justice of the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Court of Justice of the African Union: see Y. Shany, *The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals*, Oxford, 2003, p. 5. See further as to economic courts and tribunals, above, [Chapter 17](#), p. 901, and as to non-compliance mechanisms in the field of environmental law, above, [Chapter 14](#).

419 See e.g. G. Guillaume, 'The Future of International Judicial Institutions', **44 ICLQ**, 1995, p. 848; S. Rosenne, 'Establishing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea', **89 AJIL**, 1995, p. 806; T. Buergenthal, 'Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals:

Is it Good or Bad?', **14** *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 2001, p. 267; R. Higgins, 'The ICJ, ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law', **52** *ICLQ*, 2003, pp. 1, 12 ff.; Higgins, 'A Babel of Judicial Voices?'; Shany, *Competing Jurisdictions*; F. K. Tiba, 'What Caused the Multiplicity of International Courts and Tribunals?', **10** *Gonzaga Journal of International Law*, 2006, p. 202; B. Kingsbury, 'Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?', **31** *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 1999, p. 679; P. M. Dupuy, 'The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the ICJ', **31** *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 1999, p. 791; and J. Charney, 'Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?', **271** *HR*, 1998, p. 101. See also the speeches referring to proliferation, of ICJ Presidents Schwebel (1999); Guillaume (2001); Higgins (2007); Tomka (2013); and Abraham (2015), available on the Court's website at www.icj-cij.org/en/statements-by-the-president.

420 See e.g. the reference to the International Court's judgment in *Congo v. Uganda* in the International Criminal Court's confirmation of charges in *Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, paras. 212 ff.; and the reference in *Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 659, 683 ff., to a decision of the Central American Court of Justice. See also the discussion by the ICJ of the ICTY: *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 125 ff. The European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights have long referred to each other's judgments: see generally above, [Chapter 6](#).

421 See generally above, [Chapter 15](#).

422 E.g. the *Mox* case: see Shany, *Competing Jurisdictions*, p. 9; and see above, [Chapter 10](#), pp. 545 ff.

423 See generally above, [Chapter 10](#).

19

International Law and the Use of Force by States

The rules governing resort to force form a central element within international law, and together with other principles such as territorial sovereignty and the independence and equality of states provide the framework for international order.¹ While domestic systems have, on the whole, managed to prescribe a virtual monopoly on the use of force for the governmental institutions, reinforcing the hierarchical structure of authority and control, international law is in a different situation. It must seek to minimise and regulate the resort to force by states, without itself being able to enforce its will. Reliance has to be placed on consent, consensus, reciprocity and good faith. The role and manifestation of force in the world community is, of course, dependent upon political and other non-legal factors, as well as upon the current state of the law, but the law must seek to provide mechanisms to restrain and punish the resort to violence.

Law and Force from the ‘Just War’ to the United Nations²

The doctrine of the just war arose as a consequence of the Christianisation of the Roman Empire and the ensuing abandonment by Christians of pacificism. Force could be used provided it complied with the divine will. The concept of the just war embodied elements of Greek and Roman philosophy and was employed as the ultimate sanction for the maintenance of an ordered society. St Augustine (354–430)³ defined the just war in terms of avenging of injuries suffered where the guilty party has refused to make amends. War was to be embarked upon to punish wrongs and restore the peaceful status quo, but no further. Aggression was unjust and the recourse to violence had to be strictly controlled. St Thomas Aquinas⁴ in the thirteenth century took the definition of the just war a stage further by declaring that it was the subjective guilt of the wrongdoer that had to be punished rather than the objectively wrong activity. He wrote that war could be justified provided it was waged by the sovereign authority, it was accompanied by a just cause (i.e. the punishment of wrongdoers) and it was supported by the right intentions on the part of the belligerents.

With the rise of the European nation-states, the doctrine began to change.⁵ It became linked with the sovereignty of states and faced the paradox of wars between Christian states, each side being convinced of the justice of its cause. This situation tended to modify the approach to the just war. The requirement that serious attempts at a peaceful resolution of the dispute were necessary

before turning to force began to appear. This reflected the new state of international affairs, since there now existed a series of independent states, uneasily co-existing in Europe in a primitive balance of power system. The use of force against other states, far from strengthening the order, posed serious challenges to it and threatened to undermine it. Thus, the emphasis in legal doctrine moved from the application of force to suppress wrongdoers to a concern (if hardly apparent at times) to maintain the order by peaceful means. The great Spanish writer of the sixteenth century, Vitoria,⁶ emphasised that ‘not every kind and degree of wrong can suffice for commencing war’, while Suarez⁷ noted that states were obliged to call the attention of the opposing side to the existence of a just cause and request reparation before action was taken. The just war was also implied in immunity of innocent persons from direct attack and the proportionate use of force to overcome the opposition.⁸

Gradually it began to be accepted that a certain degree of right might exist on both sides, although the situation was confused by references to subjective and objective justice. Ultimately, the legality of the recourse to war was seen to depend upon the formal processes of law. This approach presaged the rise of positivism with its concentration upon the sovereign state, which could only be bound by what it had consented to. Grotius,⁹ in his systematising fashion, tried to exclude ideological considerations as the basis of a just war, in the light of the destructive seventeenth-century religious conflicts, and attempted to redefine the just war in terms of self-defence, the protection of property and the punishment for wrongs suffered by the citizens of the particular state.

But with positivism and the definitive establishment of the European balance of power system after the Peace of Westphalia 1648, the concept of the just war disappeared from international law as such.¹⁰ States were sovereign and equal, and therefore no one state could presume to judge whether another's cause was just or not. States were bound to honour agreements and respect the independence and integrity of other countries, and had to try and resolve differences by peaceful methods.

But where war did occur, it entailed a series of legal consequences. The laws of neutrality and war began to operate as between the parties and third states and a variety of legal situations at once arose. The fact that the war may have been regarded as unjust by any ethical standards did not in any way affect the legality of force as an instrument of the sovereign state nor alter in any way the various rules of war and neutrality that sprang into operation once the war commenced. Whether the cause was just or not became irrelevant in any legal way to the international community (though, of course, important in political terms) and the basic issue revolved around whether in fact a state of war existed.¹¹ The doctrine of the just war arose with the increasing power of Christianity and declined with the outbreak of the inter-Christian religious wars and the establishment of an order of secular sovereign states. Although war became a legal state of affairs which permitted force to be used and in which a series of regulatory conditions were recognised, there existed various other methods of employing force that fell short of war with all the legal consequences as regards neutrals and conduct that that entailed. Reprisals and pacific blockades¹² were examples of the use of force as 'hostile measures short of war'.¹³

The creation of the League of Nations, following the First World War, reflected a completely different attitude to the problems of force in the international order.¹⁴ The Covenant of the League declared that members should submit disputes likely to lead to a rupture to arbitration or judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council of the League. In no circumstances were members to resort to war until three months after the arbitral award or judicial decision or report by the Council. This was intended to provide a cooling-off period for passions to subside and reflected the view that such a delay might well have broken the seemingly irreversible chain of tragedy that linked the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo with the outbreak of general war in Europe. League members agreed not to go to war with members complying with such an arbitral award or judicial decision or unanimous report by the Council.¹⁵

The League system did not, it should be noted, prohibit war or the use of force, but it did set up a procedure designed to restrict it to tolerable levels. It was a constant challenge of the inter-war years to close the gaps in the Covenant in an effort to achieve the total prohibition of war in international law and this resulted ultimately in the signing in 1928 of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (the Kellogg–Briand Pact).¹⁶ The parties to this treaty condemned recourse to war and agreed to renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.¹⁷

In view of the fact that this treaty has never been terminated and in the light of its widespread acceptance,¹⁸ it is clear that prohibition of the resort to war is now a valid principle of international law. It is no longer possible to set up the legal relationship of war in international society. Thus, for example, it is

unnecessary to declare war in order to engage legitimately in armed conflict.¹⁹

However, the prohibition on the resort to war does not mean that the use of force in all circumstances is illegal. Reservations to the treaty by some states made it apparent that the right to resort to force in self-defence was still a recognised principle in international law.²⁰ Whether in fact measures short of war such as reprisals were also prohibited or were left untouched by the treaty's ban on war was unclear and subject to conflicting interpretations.²¹

The UN Charter²²

Article 2(4) of the Charter declares that:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

This provision is regarded now as a principle of customary international law and as such is binding upon all states in the world community.²³ The reference to 'force' rather than war is beneficial and thus covers situations in which violence is employed which fall short of the technical requirements of the state of war.

Article 2(4) was elaborated as a principle of international law in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law and analysed systematically. First, wars of aggression constitute a crime against peace for which there is responsibility under international law. Secondly, states must not threaten or use force to violate existing international frontiers (including demarcation or armistice lines) or to solve international disputes. Thirdly, states are under a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force. Fourthly, states must not use force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination and independence. And, fifthly, states must refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state and must not encourage the formation of armed bands for incursion into another state's territory. Many of these items are crucial, but ambiguous. Although the Declaration is not of itself a binding legal document, it is important as an interpretation of the relevant Charter provisions.²⁴ Important exceptions to article 2(4) exist in relation to collective measures taken by the United Nations²⁵ and with regard to the right of self-defence.²⁶ Whether such an exception exists with regard to humanitarian intervention is the subject of some controversy.²⁷

Article 2(6) of the Charter provides that the United Nations 'shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security'. In fact, many of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations are addressed simply to 'all states'. In particular, for example, Security Council resolution 757 (1992) adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, and therefore binding upon all member states, imposed comprehensive sanctions upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia

and Montenegro). However, the invocation in that decision was to ‘all states’ and not to ‘member states’.

‘Force’

One point that was considered in the past²⁸ and is now being reconsidered is whether the term ‘force’ in article 2(4) includes not only armed force,²⁹ but, for example, economic force.³⁰ Does the imposition of boycotts or embargoes against particular states or groups of states come within article 2(4), so rendering them illegal?³¹ Although that provision is not modified in any way, the preamble to the Charter does refer to the need to ensure that ‘armed force’ should not be used except in the common interest, while article 51, dealing with the right to self-defence, specifically refers to armed force, although that is not of itself conclusive as to the permissibility of other forms of coercion.

The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law recalled the ‘duty of states to refrain . . . from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any state’ and the International Covenants on Human Rights adopted in 1966 emphasised the right of all peoples freely to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. This approach was underlined in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, approved by the General Assembly in 1974, which particularly specified that ‘no state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights’. The question of the legality of the open use of economic pressures to induce a change of policy by states was examined with renewed interest in

the light of the Arab oil weapon used in 1973–74 against states deemed favourable to Israel.³² It does seem that there is at least a case to be made out in support of the view that such actions are contrary to the UN Charter, as interpreted in numerous resolutions and declarations. But whether such action constitutes a violation of article 2(4) is dubious.³³

It is to be noted that article 2(4) covers threats of force as well as use of force.³⁴ This issue was addressed by the International Court in its Advisory Opinion to the General Assembly on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. The Court stated that a ‘signalled intention to use force if certain events occur’ could constitute a threat under article 2(4) where the envisaged use of force would itself be unlawful. Examples given included threats to secure territory from another state or causing it to ‘follow or not follow certain political or economic paths’.³⁵ The Court appeared to accept that the mere possession of nuclear weapons did not of itself constitute a threat. However, noting that the policy of nuclear deterrence functioned on the basis of the credibility of the possibility of resorting to those weapons in certain circumstances, it was stated that whether this amounted to a threat would depend upon whether the particular use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state or against the purposes of the United Nations. If the projected use of the weapons was intended as a means of defence and there would be a consequential and necessary breach of the principles of necessity and proportionality, this would suggest that a threat contrary to article 2(4) existed.³⁶ One key point here would be the definition of proportionality, in particular would it relate to the damage that might be caused or rather to the scope of the threat to which the response in self-defence is proposed? If the

latter is the case, and logic suggests this, then the threat to use nuclear weapons in response to the prior use of nuclear or possibly chemical or bacteriological weapons becomes less problematic.³⁷

The provisions governing the resort to force internationally do not affect the right of a state to take measures to maintain order within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, such a state may forcibly quell riots, suppress insurrections and punish rebels without contravening article 2(4).³⁸ In the event of injury to alien persons or property, the state may be required to make reparation to the state of the alien concerned,³⁹ but apart from this the prohibition on force in international law is not in general applicable within domestic jurisdictions.⁴⁰ Accordingly, international law posits a general prohibition on the use of force. In order for force to be legitimate, it must fall within one of the accepted exceptions. These are essentially the right to self-defence⁴¹ and enforcement action mandated by the UN Security Council.⁴² Whether force may also be used in cases of extreme humanitarian need is discussed below.⁴³

‘Against the Territorial Integrity or Political Independence of Any State’

Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’.⁴⁴ There is a debate as to whether these words should be interpreted restrictively,⁴⁵ so as to permit force that would not contravene the clause, or as reinforcing the primary prohibition,⁴⁶ but the weight of opinion probably suggests the latter position.

The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States⁴⁷ emphasised that:

No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.

This was reaffirmed in the 1970 Declaration on Principles in International Law,⁴⁸ with the proviso that not only were such manifestations condemned, but they were held to be in violation of international law. The International Court of Justice in the *Corfu Channel* case⁴⁹ declared specifically, in response to a British claim to be acting in accordance with a right of intervention in minesweeping the channel to secure evidence for judicial proceedings, that:

the alleged right of intervention [was] the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot . . . find a place in international law.

The Court noted that to allow such a right in the present case as a derogation from Albania's territorial sovereignty would be even less admissible,

for, from the nature of things it would be reserved for the most powerful states, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself.

The essence of international relations, concluded the Court, lay in the respect by independent states of one another's territorial sovereignty.⁵⁰ In addition, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission took the position that recourse to force would violate international law even where some of the territory concerned was territory to which the state resorting to force had a valid claim. It noted that 'border disputes between states are so frequent that any exception to the threat or use of force for territory that is allegedly occupied unlawfully would create a large and dangerous hole in a fundamental rule of international law'.⁵¹ Intervention and, depending on the circumstances, aggression may also occur when foreign forces legitimately in the country act beyond the permitted conditions governing their stay or beyond the ending of the particular agreement in question (article 3(e) of the Consensus Definition of Aggression 1974). For example, Russian forces legitimately in the Crimean region of Ukraine under the treaty of 1997 (extended in 2010) moved beyond their permitted bases and areas to take control, directly or indirectly, of the peninsula in late February/early March 2014 following a period of upheaval in Ukraine which culminated in the President fleeing the country and a new government taking control.⁵²

Categories of Compulsion

Various measures of self-help ranging from economic retaliation to the use of violence pursuant to the right of self-defence have historically been used.

Since the establishment of the Charter regime there are basically three categories of compulsion open to states under international law. These are retorsion, reprisal and self-defence.⁵³

Retorsion⁵⁴

Retorsion is the adoption by one state of an unfriendly and harmful act, which is nevertheless lawful, as a method of retaliation against the injurious legal activities of another state. Examples include the severance of diplomatic relations and the expulsion or restrictive control of aliens, as well as various economic and travel restrictions. Retorsion is a legitimate method of showing displeasure in a way that hurts the other state while remaining within the bounds of legality. The Hickenlooper Amendments to the American Foreign Assistance Act are often quoted as an instance of retorsion since they required the US President to suspend foreign aid to any country nationalising American property without proper compensation. This procedure was applied only once, as against Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in 1963, and has now been effectively repealed by the American Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.⁵⁵

Retorsion would also appear to cover the instance of a lawful act committed in retaliation to a prior unlawful activity.⁵⁶

Reprisals⁵⁷

Reprisals are acts which are in themselves illegal and have been adopted by one state in retaliation for the commission of an earlier illegal act by another state. They are thus distinguishable from acts of retorsion, which are in themselves lawful acts. The classic case dealing with the law of reprisals is the *Naulilaa* dispute⁵⁸ between Portugal and Germany in 1928. This concerned a German military raid on the colony of Angola, which destroyed property, in retaliation for the mistaken killing of three Germans lawfully in the Portuguese territory.

The Tribunal, in discussing the Portuguese claim for compensation, emphasised that before reprisals could be undertaken, there had to be sufficient justification in the form of a previous act contrary to international law. If that was established, reprisals had to be preceded by an unsatisfied demand for reparation and accompanied by a sense of proportion between the offence and the reprisal. In fact, the German claim that it had acted lawfully was rejected on all three grounds. Those general rules are still applicable, but have now to be interpreted in the light of the prohibition on the use of force posited by article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Thus, reprisals short of force (now usually termed countermeasures)⁵⁹ may still be undertaken legitimately, while reprisals involving armed force may be lawful where resorted to in conformity with the right of self-defence.⁶⁰ Reprisals as such undertaken during peacetime are thus unlawful, unless they fall within the framework of the principle of self-defence.⁶¹ Sometimes regarded as an aspect of reprisal is the institution of pacific blockade.⁶² This developed during the nineteenth century and was extensively used as a forceful application of pressure against weaker states. In the absence of war or armed hostilities, the vessels of third

states were probably exempt from such blockade, although this was disputed by some writers.

Pacific blockades may be instituted by the UN Security Council,⁶³ but cannot now be resorted to by states since the coming into force of the UN Charter. The legality of the so-called 'quarantine' imposed by the United States upon Cuba in October 1962 to prevent certain weapons reaching the island appears questionable and should not be relied upon as an extension of the doctrine of pacific blockades.⁶⁴

The Right of Self-Defence⁶⁵

The traditional definition of the right of self-defence in customary international law arose out of the *Caroline* case.⁶⁶ This dispute revolved around an incident in 1837 in which British subjects seized and destroyed a vessel in an American port. This had taken place because *The Caroline* had been supplying groups of American nationals, who had been conducting raids into Canadian territory. In the correspondence with the British authorities which followed the incident, the US Secretary of State laid down the essentials of self-defence. There had to exist ‘a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’. Not only were such conditions necessary before self-defence became legitimate, but the action taken in pursuance of it must not be unreasonable or excessive, ‘since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it’. These principles were accepted by the British government at that time and are accepted as part of customary international law.⁶⁷

Article 51 of the Charter provides that:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and

security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

There has been extensive controversy as to the precise extent of the right of self-defence⁶⁸ in the light of article 51, with some writers arguing that article 51 in conjunction with article 2(4) was exhaustive⁶⁹ and others maintaining that the opening phrase in article 51 specifying that ‘nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of . . . self-defence’ meant that there existed in customary international law a right of self-defence over and above the specific provisions of article 51, which referred only to the situation where an armed attack had occurred.⁷⁰

The International Court of Justice in *Nicaragua v. United States*,⁷¹ however, clearly established that the right of self-defence existed as an inherent right under customary international law as well as under the UN Charter. It was stressed that:

Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right of self-defence and it is hard to see how

this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter . . . It cannot, therefore, be held that article 51 is a provision which ‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international law.

Accordingly, customary law continued to exist alongside treaty law (i.e. the UN Charter) in this field.⁷² There was not an exact overlap and the rules did not have the same content. The Court also discussed the notion of an ‘armed attack’ and noted that this included not only action by regular armed forces across an international border, but additionally the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands or groups which carry out acts of armed force of such gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular armed forces or its substantial involvement therein.⁷³ In this situation, the focus would then shift to a consideration of the involvement of the state in question so as to render it liable and to legitimate action in self-defence against it.

In order to be able to resort to force in self-defence, a state has to be able to demonstrate that it has been the victim of an armed attack, a concept that is linked to but not identical with the use of force contrary to article 2(4), and it bears the burden of proof.⁷⁴ The Court has noted that it is possible that the mining of a single military vessel might suffice,⁷⁵ but an attack on a ship owned, but not flagged, by a state will not be equated with an attack on that state.⁷⁶ However, it is necessary to show that the state seeking to resort to force in self-defence has itself been intentionally attacked. In a series of incidents discussed by the Court in the *Oil Platforms* case, it was noted that

none of them appeared to have been aimed specifically and deliberately at the United States.⁷⁷ In seeking to determine how serious an attack must be in order to validate a self-defence response, the Court in *Nicaragua v. United States*⁷⁸ distinguished ‘the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms’ and this was reaffirmed in the *Oil Platforms* case.⁷⁹ It is, nevertheless, extremely difficult to define this more closely.

In many cases, however, it might be difficult to determine the moment when an armed attack had commenced in order to comply with the requirements of article 51 and the resort to force in self-defence. For example, it has been argued that with regard to actions against aircraft, an armed attack begins at the moment that the radar guiding the anti-aircraft missile has ‘locked on’.⁸⁰ Further, one argument that has been made with regard to Israel’s first strike in June 1967 is that the circumstances were such that an armed attack could be deemed to have commenced against it.⁸¹

Another aspect of the problem as to what constitutes an armed attack is the difficulty of categorising particular uses of force for these purposes. For example, would an attack upon an embassy or diplomats abroad constitute an armed attack legitimating action in self-defence? On 7 August 1998, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, causing the loss of over 250 lives and appreciable damage to property. On 20 August, the United States launched a series of cruise missile attacks upon installations in Afghanistan and Sudan associated with the organisation of Bin Laden deemed responsible for the attacks. In so doing, the United States declared itself to be acting in

accordance with article 51 of the Charter and in exercise of its right of self-defence.⁸²

While it is clear that the right of self-defence applies to armed attacks by other states, the question has been raised whether the right of self-defence applies in response to attacks by non-state actors.⁸³ Where it is the state itself which has dispatched armed bands to carry out acts of armed force of such gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular armed forces, then force in self-defence can legitimately be used. The difficulties arise in more ambiguous circumstances. In *Nicaragua v. United States*, the Court did not accept that the right of self-defence extended to situations where a third state had provided assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support, although this form of assistance could constitute a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of the state.⁸⁴ This lays open the problem that in certain circumstances a state under attack from groups supported by another state may not be able under this definition to respond militarily if the support given by that other state does not reach the threshold laid down. Judge Jennings referred to this issue in his Dissenting Opinion, noting that, ‘it seems dangerous to define unnecessarily strictly the conditions for lawful self-defence, so as to leave a large area where both a forcible response to force is forbidden, and yet the United Nations employment of force, which was intended to fill that gap, is absent’.⁸⁵

The line between assistance from a third state to groups (whether characterised as terrorists or rebels or freedom fighters) which would give rise to the legitimate use of force in self-defence against such state and

assistance which fell below this is difficult to specify in practice. The International Court in its Advisory Opinion in the *Construction of a Wall* case⁸⁶ appeared to adopt what at first sight is a very restrictive approach by noting that article 51 recognised ‘the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one state against another state’ and declaring that the provision did not apply with regard to Israel’s actions since these were taken with regard to threats originating from within the occupied territories and not imputable to another state. However, this cannot be read to mean that self-defence does not exist with regard to an attack by a non-state entity emanating from a territory outside the control of the target state. Further, the legal source of Israeli actions in the occupied territories, whether or not they legitimated the construction of the wall or security barrier in whole or in part, would appear to lie rather in the laws of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) and the competence of an occupying state to take action to maintain public order and protect its own forces.⁸⁷

The Court failed to take the opportunity to revisit the ambiguities of the *Nicaragua* decision in *Congo v. Uganda*.⁸⁸ In this case, the Court found that there was no satisfactory proof of involvement in attacks, direct or indirect, on Uganda by the Congo government and that such attacks did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by or on behalf of the Congo. Such attacks were non-attributable, therefore, on the evidence to the Congo. Since the Court concluded that the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defence by Uganda against the Congo were not present, ‘accordingly’ there was no need to address the issue as to whether and under which conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.⁸⁹ Since the Court

addressed itself only to actions that Uganda might or might not take against the Congo as such, it did not deal with the increasingly important question as to whether action might be taken in self-defence against an armed attack by a non-state actor as distinct from another state.⁹⁰ However, state practice is moving in that direction. Article 1(c) of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, adopted in 2005 and in force from December 2009, refers in terms to aggression *inter alia* committed by non-state actors,⁹¹ while influential non-governmental institutions have also so concluded.⁹²

An important element of relevant state practice concerns international terrorism and, in particular, whether terrorist acts could constitute an ‘armed attack’ within the meaning of the Charter or customary law.⁹³ The day after the 11 September 2001 attacks upon the World Trade Center in New York, the Security Council adopted resolution 1368 in which it specifically referred to ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter’. Resolution 1373 (2001) reaffirmed this and, acting under Chapter VII, adopted a series of binding decisions, including a provision that all states shall ‘take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts’. Such binding Security Council resolutions declaring international terrorism to be a threat to international peace and security with regard to which the right of self-defence is operative as such lead to the conclusion that large-scale attacks by non-state actors might amount to ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning of article 51 without the necessity to attribute them to another state and thus justify the use of force in self-defence by those states so attacked.⁹⁴

On 7 October 2001, the United States notified the Security Council that it was exercising its right of self-defence in taking action in Afghanistan against the Al-Qaida organisation deemed responsible for the 11 September attacks and the Taliban regime in that country which was accused of providing bases for the organisation.⁹⁵ The members of the NATO alliance invoked article 5 of the NATO Treaty⁹⁶

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

and the parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 1947 invoked a comparable provision.⁹⁷ Both provisions refer specifically both to an ‘armed attack’ and to article 51 of the Charter. Accordingly, the members of both these alliances accepted that what had happened on 11 September constituted an armed attack within the meaning of article 51. In fact, neither treaty was activated as the United States acted on its own initiative with specific allies (notably the United Kingdom), relying on the right of self-defence with the support or acquiescence of the international community.⁹⁸

This approach has received support with regard to the situation in Iraq and Syria in the light of the forceful operations in these countries of various armed groups including ISIL (otherwise known as ISIS or ‘Islamic State’ or Da’esh) in recent years. Security Council resolution 2249 (2015) reaffirmed that ‘terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security’, that the Al-Nusrah Front and other individuals and groups associated with Al-Qaida constitute a threat to international peace and security, and that, in particular, ISIL ‘constitutes a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security’. The resolution called upon member states that have the capacity to do so ‘to take all necessary measures’ (a formula in the United Nations which encompasses the use of force), in compliance with international law, to act to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by these groups and to eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria.⁹⁹

A further issue is whether a right to anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence exists. This would appear unlikely if one adopted the notion that self-defence is restricted to responses to actual armed attacks. The concept of anticipatory self-defence is of particular relevance in the light of modern weaponry that can launch an attack with tremendous speed, which may allow the target state little time to react to the armed assault before its successful conclusion, particularly if that state is geographically small.¹⁰⁰ States have employed pre-emptive strikes in self-defence. Israel, in 1967, launched a strike upon its Arab neighbours, following the blockading of its southern port of Eilat and the conclusion of a military pact between Jordan and Egypt. This completed a chain of events precipitated by the mobilisation of Egyptian forces on Israel’s border and the eviction of the UN peacekeeping forces from the area by the Egyptian President.¹⁰¹ It could, of course, also be argued that the Egyptian blockade itself constituted the use of force, thus legitimising Israeli actions

without the need for ‘anticipatory’ conceptions of self-defence, especially when taken together with the other events.¹⁰² It is noteworthy that the United Nations in its debates in the summer of 1967 apportioned no blame for the outbreak of fighting and did not condemn the exercise of self-defence by Israel.

The International Court in *Nicaragua v. United States*¹⁰³ expressed no view on the issue of the lawfulness of a response to an imminent threat of an armed attack since, on the facts of the case, that problem was not raised. The trouble, of course, with the concept of anticipatory self-defence is that it involves fine calculations of the various moves by the other party. A pre-emptive strike embarked upon too early might constitute an aggression. There is a difficult line to be drawn. The problem is that the nature of the international system is such as to leave such determinations to be made by the states themselves, and, in the absence of an acceptable, institutional alternative, it is difficult to foresee a modification of this. States generally are not at ease with the concept of anticipatory self-defence, however,¹⁰⁴ and one possibility would be to concentrate upon the notion of ‘armed attack’ so that this may be interpreted in a relatively flexible manner.¹⁰⁵ One suggestion has been to distinguish anticipatory self-defence, where an armed attack is foreseeable, from interceptive self-defence, where an armed attack is imminent and unavoidable so that the evidential problems and temptations of the former concept are avoided without dooming threatened states to making the choice between violating international law and suffering the actual assault.¹⁰⁶ According to this approach, self-defence is legitimate both under customary law and under article 51 of the Charter where an armed attack is imminent. It would then be a question of evidence as to whether that were an

accurate assessment of the situation in the light of the information available at the relevant time. This would be rather easier to demonstrate than the looser concept of anticipatory self-defence and it has the merit of being consistent with the view that the right to self-defence in customary law exists as expounded in the *Caroline* case.¹⁰⁷ In any event, much will depend upon the characterisation of the threat and the nature of the response, for this has to be proportionate.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that the concept of self-defence extends to a response to an attack that is reasonably and evidentially perceived to be imminent, however that is semantically achieved. The *Caroline* criteria remain critical.¹⁰⁹

There have, however, been suggestions that the notion of anticipatory self-defence, controversial though that is, could be expanded to a right of ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ (sometimes termed ‘preventive self-defence’) that goes beyond the *Caroline* limits enabling the use of force in order to defend against, or prevent, possible attacks. The US 2002 National Security Strategy,¹¹⁰ reaffirmed in the 2006 National Security Strategy, emphasised the role of pre-emption in national security strategy.¹¹¹ In so far as this exceeded the *Caroline* criteria, this doctrine of pre-emption must be seen as going beyond what is currently acceptable in international law.¹¹²

The concepts of necessity and proportionality are at the heart of self-defence in international law.¹¹³ The Court in *Nicaragua v. United States* stated that there was a ‘specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law’,¹¹⁴ and in the Advisory Opinion it gave to the General Assembly on the *Legality of the Threat or Use*

of *Nuclear Weapons* it was emphasised that: ‘The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law.’¹¹⁵ Quite what will be necessary¹¹⁶ and proportionate¹¹⁷ will depend on the circumstances of the case.¹¹⁸ The necessity criterion raises important evidential as well as substantive issues. It is essential to demonstrate that, as a reasonable conclusion on the basis of facts reasonably known at the time, the armed attack that has occurred or is reasonably believed to be imminent requires the response that is proposed. In the *Oil Platforms* case,¹¹⁹ the Court held that it was not satisfied that the US attacks on the oil platforms in question were necessary in order to respond to the attack on the *Sea Isle City* and the mining of the USS *Samuel B Roberts*, noting in particular that there was no evidence that the United States had complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms (contrary to its conduct with regard to other events such as minelaying and attacks on neutral shipping). Further, the United States had admitted that one attack on an oil platform had been a ‘target of opportunity’. It has been argued that: ‘Necessity is a threshold, and the criterion of imminence can be seen to be an aspect of it, inasmuch as it requires that there be no time to pursue non-forcible measures with a reasonable chance of averting or stopping the attack.’¹²⁰

Quite what response would be regarded as proportionate is sometimes difficult to quantify. It raises the issue as to what exactly is the response to be proportionate to. Is it the actual attack or the threat or likelihood of further attacks? And what if the attack in question is but part of a continuing series of such attacks to which response has thus far been muted or non-existent? In the *Oil Platforms* case, the Court felt it necessary to consider the scale of the

whole operation that constituted the US response, which included *inter alia* the destruction of two Iranian frigates and a number of other naval vessels and aircraft, to the mining by an unidentified agency of a single warship without loss of life.¹²¹ In *Congo v. Uganda*,¹²² the Court, while finding that the pre-conditions for the exercise of self-defence did not exist in the circumstances, stated that ‘the taking of airports and towns [by Ugandan forces] many hundreds of kilometres from Uganda’s border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end’.

Proportionality as a criterion of self-defence may also require consideration of the type of weaponry to be used, an investigation that necessitates an analysis of the principles of international humanitarian law. The International Court in the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* case took the view that the proportionality principle may ‘not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all circumstances’, but that ‘a use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict’. In particular, the nature of such weapons and the profound risks associated with them would be a relevant consideration for states ‘believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defence in accordance with the requirements of proportionality’.¹²³ One especial difficulty relates to whether in formulating the level of response a series of activities may be taken into account, rather than just the attack immediately preceding the act of self-defence. The more likely answer is that where such activities clearly form part of a sequence or chain of events, then the test of proportionality will be so interpreted as to incorporate this. It also appears inevitable that it will be the state

contemplating such action that will first have to make that determination,¹²⁴ although it will be subject to consideration by the international community as a whole and more specifically by the Security Council under the terms of article 51.¹²⁵

It is also important to emphasise that article 51 requires that states report ‘immediately’ to the Security Council on measures taken in the exercise of their right to self-defence and that action so taken may continue ‘until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’.¹²⁶

The Protection of Nationals Abroad¹²⁷

In the nineteenth century, it was clearly regarded as lawful to use force to protect nationals and property situated abroad and many incidents occurred to demonstrate the acceptance of this position.¹²⁸ Since the adoption of the UN Charter, however, it has become rather more controversial since of necessity the ‘territorial integrity and political independence’ of the target state is infringed,¹²⁹ while one interpretation of article 51 would deny that ‘an armed attack’ could occur against individuals abroad within the meaning of that provision since it is the state itself that must be under attack, not specific persons outside the jurisdiction.¹³⁰

The issue has been raised in recent years in several cases. In 1964, Belgium and the United States sent forces to the Congo to rescue hostages (including nationals of the states in question) from the hands of rebels, with the permission of the Congolese government,¹³¹ while in 1975 the United States

used force to rescue an American cargo boat and its crew captured by Cambodia.¹³² The most famous incident, however, was the rescue by Israel of hostages held by Palestinian and other terrorists at Entebbe, following the hijack of an Air France airliner.¹³³ The Security Council debate in that case was inconclusive. Some states supported Israel's view that it was acting lawfully in protecting its nationals abroad, where the local state concerned was aiding the hijackers;¹³⁴ others adopted the approach that Israel had committed aggression against Uganda or used excessive force.¹³⁵

The United States has in recent years justified armed action in other states on the grounds partly of the protection of American citizens abroad. It was one of the three grounds announced for the invasion of Grenada in 1984¹³⁶ and one of the four grounds put forward for the intervention in Panama in December 1989.¹³⁷ However, in both cases the level of threat against the US citizens was such as to raise serious questions concerning the satisfaction of the requirement of proportionality.¹³⁸ The United States conducted a bombing raid on Libya on 15 April 1986 as a consequence of alleged Libyan involvement in an attack on US servicemen in West Berlin. This was justified by the United States as an act of self-defence.¹³⁹ On 26 June 1993, the United States launched missiles at the headquarters of the Iraqi military intelligence in Baghdad as a consequence of an alleged Iraqi plot to assassinate former US President Bush in Kuwait. It was argued that the resort to force was justified as a means of protecting US nationals in the future.¹⁴⁰ It is difficult to extract from the contradictory views expressed in these incidents the apposite legal principles. While some states affirm the existence of a rule permitting the use of force in self-defence to protect nationals abroad, others deny that such a principle operates in international law. There are states

whose views are not fully formed or coherent on this issue. The UK Foreign Minister concluded on 28 June 1993 that:¹⁴¹

Force may be used in self-defence against threats to one's nationals if: (a) there is good evidence that the target attacked would otherwise continue to be used by the other state in support of terrorist attacks against one's nationals; (b) there is, effectively, no other way to forestall imminent further attacks on one's nationals; (c) the force employed is proportionate to the threat.

On balance, and considering the opposing principles of saving the threatened lives of nationals and the preservation of the territorial integrity of states, it would seem preferable to accept the validity of the rule in carefully restricted situations consistent with the conditions laid down in the *Caroline* case.¹⁴² Whether force may be used to protect property abroad is less controversial. It is universally accepted today that it is not lawful to have resort to force merely to save material possessions abroad.

Conclusions

Despite controversy and disagreement over the scope of the right of self-defence, there is an indisputable core and that is the competence of states to resort to force in order to repel an attack. A clear example of this was provided in the Falklands conflict. Whatever doubts may be entertained about

the precise roots of British title to the islands, it is very clear that after the Argentinian invasion of the territory, the United Kingdom possessed in law the right to act to restore the *status quo ante* and remove the Argentinian troops. Security Council resolution 502 (1982), in calling for an immediate withdrawal of Argentinian forces and determining that a breach of the peace existed, reinforced this. It is accepted that a state is entitled to rely upon the right of self-defence even while its possession of the territory in question is the subject of controversy.¹⁴³

Collective Self-Defence¹⁴⁴

Historically, the right of states to take up arms to defend themselves from external force is well established as a rule of customary international law. Article 51, however, also refers to ‘the inherent right of . . . collective self-defence’ and the question therefore arises as to how far one state may resort to force in the defence of another. The idea of collective self-defence, however, is rather ambiguous. It may be regarded merely as a pooling of a number of individual rights of self-defence within the framework of a particular treaty or institution, as some writers have suggested,¹⁴⁵ or it may form the basis of comprehensive regional security systems. If the former were the case, it might lead to legal difficulties should Iceland resort to force in defence of Turkish interests, since actions against Turkey would in no way justify an armed reaction by Iceland pursuant to its individual right of self-defence.

In fact, state practice has adopted the second approach. Organisations such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact were established after the Second World War, specifically based upon the right of collective self-defence under article 51. By such agreements, an attack upon one party is treated as an attack upon all,¹⁴⁶ thus necessitating the conclusion that collective self-defence is something more than a collection of individual rights of self-defence, but another creature altogether.¹⁴⁷

This approach finds support in *Nicaragua v. United States*.¹⁴⁸ The Court stressed that the right to collective self-defence was established in customary

law, but added that the exercise of that right depended upon both a prior declaration by the state concerned that it was the victim of an armed attack and a request by the victim state for assistance.¹⁴⁹ In addition, the Court emphasised that ‘for one state to use force against another, on the ground that that state has committed a wrongful act of force against a third state, is regarded as lawful, by way of exception, only when the wrongful act provoking the response was an armed attack’.¹⁵⁰ The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 raised the issue of collective self-defence in the context of the response of the states allied in the coalition to end that conquest and occupation. The Kuwaiti government in exile appealed for assistance from other states.¹⁵¹ Although the armed action from 16 January 1991 was taken pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions,¹⁵² it is indeed arguable that the right to collective self-defence is also relevant in this context.¹⁵³

The doctrine of collective self-defence has also been used in the context of the attacks on Iraq by ISIL (ISIS, ‘Islamic State’, Da’esh). For example, the United Kingdom reported to the UN Security Council on 25 November 2014¹⁵⁴ that it was taking action against this group, engaged in an armed attack on Iraq, in the collective self-defence of Iraq in the light of the request of that state for assistance.¹⁵⁵ A development of this doctrine occurred with the actions taken by a number of states against ISIL in Syria (and not just in Iraq). For example, in explaining its vote for Security Council resolution 2249 (2015), which called upon member states to take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law, ‘on the territory under the control of ISIL also known as Da’esh, in Syria and Iraq’ to ‘prevent and suppress terrorist acts’ and to ‘eradicate the safe haven they [ISIL and similar

groups] have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria’, the United States declared that a coalition had been formed to take, in accordance with the UN Charter and its recognition of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, necessary and proportionate military action to deny ISIL safe haven.¹⁵⁶ Belgium informed the Security Council on 7 June 2016 that it was taking ‘necessary and proportionate measures’ against ISIL in Syria in the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, in response to the request from the Iraqi government. It also cited resolution 2249 (2015) and noted that ISIL had occupied parts of Syrian territory over which the government of Syria did not exercise effective control. Accordingly, and exceptionally, it was noted, ‘states that have been subjected to armed attack by ISIL originating in that part of the Syrian territory are therefore justified under article 51 of the Charter to take necessary measures of self-defence’.¹⁵⁷

Intervention¹⁵⁸

The principle of non-intervention is part of customary international law and founded upon the concept of respect for the territorial sovereignty of states.¹⁵⁹ Intervention is prohibited where it bears upon matters in which each state is permitted to decide freely by virtue of the principle of state sovereignty. This includes, as the International Court of Justice noted in *Nicaragua v. United States*,¹⁶⁰ the choice of political, economic, social and cultural systems and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention becomes wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must be free ones.¹⁶¹ There was ‘no general right of intervention in support of an opposition within another state’ in international law. In addition, acts constituting a breach of the customary principle of non-intervention will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations.¹⁶² The principle of respect for the sovereignty of states was another principle closely allied to the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of non-intervention.¹⁶³

Civil Wars¹⁶⁴

International law treats civil wars as essentially internal matters, with the possible exception of self-determination conflicts.¹⁶⁵ Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations, not in domestic situations. There is no rule against rebellion in international law. It is within the domestic jurisdiction of states and is left to be dealt with by internal law. Should the rebellion succeed, the resulting situation would be dealt with primarily in the context of recognition and other relevant principles of international law. As far as third parties are concerned, traditional international law developed the categories of rebellion, insurgency and belligerency.

Once a state has defined its attitude and characterised the situation, different international legal provisions would apply. If the rebels are regarded as criminals, the matter is purely within the hands of the authorities of the country concerned and no other state may legitimately interfere. If the rebels are treated as insurgents, then other states may or may not agree to grant them certain rights. It is at the discretion of the other states concerned, since an intermediate status is involved. The rebels are not mere criminals, but they are not recognised belligerents. Accordingly, the other states are at liberty to define their legal relationship with them. Insurgency is a purely provisional classification and would arise, for example, where a state needed to protect nationals or property in an area under the *de facto* control of the rebels.¹⁶⁶ On the other hand, belligerency is a formal status involving rights and duties. In the eyes of classical international law, other states may accord recognition of

belligerency to rebels when certain conditions have been fulfilled. These were defined as the existence of an armed conflict of a general nature within a state, the occupation by the rebels of a substantial portion of the national territory, the conduct of hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and by organised groups operating under a responsible authority and the existence of circumstances rendering it necessary for the states contemplating recognition to define their attitude to the situation.¹⁶⁷ This would arise, for example, where the parties to the conflict are exercising belligerent rights on the high seas. Other maritime countries would feel compelled to decide upon the respective status of the warring sides, since the recognition of belligerency entails certain international legal consequences. Once the rebels have been accepted by other states as belligerents, they become subjects of international law and responsible in international law for all their acts. In addition, the rules governing the conduct of hostilities become applicable to both sides, so that, for example, the recognising states must then adopt a position of neutrality.

However, these concepts of insurgency and belligerency are lacking in clarity and are extremely subjective. The absence of clear criteria, particularly with regard to the concept of insurgency, has led to a great deal of confusion. The issue is of importance since the majority of conflicts in the years since the conclusion of the Second World War have been in essence civil wars. The reasons for this are many and complex and ideological rivalry and decolonisation within colonially imposed boundaries are among them.¹⁶⁸ Intervention may be justified on a number of grounds, including response to earlier involvement by a third party. For instance, the Soviet Union and Cuba justified their activities in the Angolan Civil War of 1975–76 by reference to

the prior South African intervention,¹⁶⁹ while the United States argued that its aid to South Vietnam grew in proportion to the involvement of North Vietnamese forces in the conflict.¹⁷⁰

The international law rules dealing with civil wars depend upon the categorisation by third states of the relative status of the two sides to the conflict. In traditional terms, an insurgency means that the recognising state may, if it wishes, create legal rights and duties as between itself and the insurgents, while recognition of belligerency involves an acceptance of a position of neutrality (although there are some exceptions to this rule) by the recognising states. But in practice, states very rarely make an express acknowledgement as to the status of the parties to the conflict, precisely in order to retain as wide a room for manoeuvre as possible. This means that the relevant legal rules cannot really operate as intended in classical law and that it becomes extremely difficult to decide whether a particular intervention is justified or not.¹⁷¹

Aid to the Authorities of a State¹⁷²

It would appear that in general outside aid to the government authorities to repress a revolt¹⁷³ is perfectly legitimate,¹⁷⁴ provided, of course, it was requested by the government. Recent practice as to Iraq would appear to support this.¹⁷⁵ The problem of defining the governmental authority entitled to request assistance was raised in the Grenada episode. In that situation, the appeal for the US intervention was allegedly made by the Governor-General of the island,¹⁷⁶ but controversy exists as to whether this in fact did take place

prior to the invasion and whether the Governor-General was the requisite authority to issue such an appeal.¹⁷⁷

The issue resurfaced in a rather different form regarding the Panama invasion of December 1989. One of the legal principles identified by the US Department of State as the basis for the US action was that of assistance to the 'lawful and democratically elected government in Panama'.¹⁷⁸ The problem with this was that this particular government had been prevented by General Noriega from actually taking office and the issue raised was therefore whether an elected head of state who is prevented from ever acting as such may be regarded as a governmental authority capable of requesting assistance, including armed force, from another state. This in fact runs counter to the test of acceptance in international law of governmental authority, which is firmly based upon effective control rather than upon the nature of the regime, whether democratic, socialist or otherwise.¹⁷⁹

The general proposition, however, that aid to recognised governmental authorities is legitimate,¹⁸⁰ would be further reinforced where it could be shown that other states were encouraging or directing the subversive operations of the rebels. In such cases, it appears that the doctrine of collective self-defence would allow other states to intervene openly and lawfully on the side of the government authorities.¹⁸¹ Some writers have suggested that the traditional rule of permitting third-party assistance to governments would not extend to aid where the outcome of the struggle has become uncertain or where the rebellion has become widespread and seriously aimed at overthrowing the government.¹⁸² While this may be politically desirable for the third state, it may put at serious risk entirely

deserving governments.¹⁸³ Practice, however, does suggest that many forms of aid, such as economic, technical and arms provision arrangements, to existing governments faced with civil strife, are acceptable.¹⁸⁴ There is an argument, on the other hand, for suggesting that substantial assistance to a government clearly in the throes of collapse might be questionable as intervention in a domestic situation that is on the point of resolution, but there are considerable definitional problems here. Similarly, doubts will arise where the armed action taken by the government against rebels within its country reaches a stage of egregious violations of human rights.¹⁸⁵

Aid to Rebels¹⁸⁶

The reverse side of the proposition is that aid to rebels is contrary to international law. The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law emphasised that:

No state shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state.¹⁸⁷

The Declaration also provided that:

Every state shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national

unity and territorial integrity of any other state
or country.

In *Nicaragua v. United States*,¹⁸⁸ the Court declared that the principle of non-intervention prohibits a state ‘to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another state’ and went on to say that acts which breach the principle of non-intervention ‘will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations’. Further, the Court emphasised in *Congo v. Uganda*¹⁸⁹ that where such an unlawful military intervention reaches a certain magnitude and duration, it would amount to ‘a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter’.

In reality, state practice is far from clear.¹⁹⁰ Where a prior, illegal intervention on the government side has occurred, it may be argued that aid to the rebels is acceptable. This was argued by a number of states with regard to the Afghanistan situation, where it was argued that the Soviet intervention in that state amounted to an invasion.¹⁹¹

The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1999 and after, with intervention against the government by Uganda and Rwanda (seeking initially to act against rebel movements operating against them from Congolese territory and then assisting rebels against the Congo government) and on behalf of the government by a number of states, including Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, is instructive.¹⁹² In resolution 1234 (1999), the Security Council recalled the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in

accordance with article 51 and reaffirmed the need for all states to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. It called upon states to bring to an end the presence of uninvited forces of foreign states.¹⁹³ The Council in resolution 1291 (1999) called for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Congo in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.¹⁹⁴ Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) went further and, acting under Chapter VII, demanded that ‘Uganda and Rwanda, which have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, withdraw all their forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without delay’. An end to all other foreign military presence and activity was also called for in conformity with the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement.¹⁹⁵ The United Nations also established a mission in the Congo (MONUC) in 1999, whose mandate was subsequently extended.¹⁹⁶ The situation demonstrates the UN approach, reflecting international law, to the effect that while aid by foreign states to the government was acceptable,¹⁹⁷ aid to rebels by foreign states was not. Side by side with this, the United Nations did recognise the problem posed by foreign militias based in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (particularly the Rwanda Interahamwe who had been involved in the 1994 genocide and the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army) and called for them to be disarmed.¹⁹⁸

The question of aid to rebels was raised again in the Syrian Civil War, which commenced in 2011 with a series of demonstrations that were forcibly repressed. This was followed by recourse to force by those opposing the government. Government forces were actively assisted by Iran and the Hezbollah organisation from Lebanon.¹⁹⁹ The Report of the Independent

International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, was published in February 2012.²⁰⁰ This noted the deterioration in the human rights situation in the country and held that the government had committed widespread, systematic and gross human rights violations. A number of countries recognised the Syrian opposition (National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces) as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of the Syrian people.²⁰¹ However, this constituted and entailed political and humanitarian support and engagement, and not legal recognition as a government²⁰² and would not have justified forcible intervention as distinct from humanitarian assistance.

Failure to agree among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council meant that the Council was unable to adopt a binding resolution concerning action in Syria until September 2013, following upon the use of chemical weapons. Resolution 2118 condemned the use by Syria of chemical weapons in violation of international law and called for the destruction of such weapons. Resolution 2139 (2014) condemned violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities and armed groups, called for the immediate lifting of sieges of populated areas and demanded that all parties allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, at no point was there international recognition of a right to intervene beyond humanitarian aid to the opposition forces. Eventually, the forces of the Syrian government with Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah intervention succeeded in defeating the rebels, apart from relatively isolated areas, primarily Idlib, where an unstable cease-fire negotiated by Russia and Turkey currently reigns.²⁰³

The civil war in Libya, following the NATO-led intervention against Colonel Ghadaffi in 2011,²⁰⁴ has continued with interventions by Turkey on the side of the UN-backed Government of National Accord and interventions by a number of states including Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates on the side of the rebels.²⁰⁵

Humanitarian Intervention²⁰⁶

This section concerns the question as to whether there can be said to be a right of humanitarian intervention by individual states. The issue of intervention by the United Nations in situations of humanitarian need and as a consequence of Security Council action is covered in the next chapter.

It has sometimes been argued that intervention in order to protect the lives of persons situated within a particular state and not necessarily nationals of the intervening state is permissible in strictly defined situations. This has some support in pre-Charter law and it may very well have been the case that in the nineteenth century such intervention was accepted under international law.²⁰⁷ However, it is difficult to reconcile today with article 2(4) of the Charter²⁰⁸ unless one either adopts a rather artificial definition of the ‘territorial integrity’ criterion in order to permit temporary violations or posits the establishment of the right in customary law. Practice has also been in general unfavourable to the concept, primarily because it might be used to justify interventions by more forceful states into the territories of weaker states.²⁰⁹ Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that in some situations the international community might refrain from adopting a condemnatory stand where large numbers of lives have been saved in circumstances of gross oppression by a state of its citizens due to an outside intervention. In addition, it is possible that such a right might evolve in cases of extreme humanitarian need. One argument used to justify the use of Western troops to secure a safe haven in northern Iraq after the Gulf War was that it was taken in pursuance of the customary international law principle of humanitarian intervention in an

extreme situation. Security Council resolution 688 (1991) condemned the widespread repression by Iraq of its Kurd and Shia populations and, citing this, the United States, the United Kingdom and France proclaimed ‘no-fly zones’ in the north and south of the country.²¹⁰ There was no express authorisation from the United Nations. It was argued by the United Kingdom that the no-fly zones were ‘justified under international law in response to a situation of overwhelming humanitarian necessity’.²¹¹

The Kosovo crisis of 1999 raised squarely the issue of humanitarian intervention.²¹² The justification for the NATO bombing campaign, acting out of area and without UN authorisation, in support of the repressed ethnic Albanian population of that province of Yugoslavia, was that of humanitarian necessity. The UK Secretary of State for Defence stated that: ‘In international law, in exceptional circumstances and to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, military action can be taken and it is on that legal basis that military action was taken.’²¹³ The Security Council by twelve votes to three rejected a resolution condemning NATO’s use of force.²¹⁴ After the conflict, and after an agreement had been reached between NATO and Yugoslavia,²¹⁵ the Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) which welcomed the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from the territory and decided upon the deployment under UN auspices of international civil and military presences. Member states and international organisations were, in particular, authorised to establish the international security presence and the resolution laid down the main responsibilities of the civil presence. There was no formal endorsement of the NATO action, but no condemnation.²¹⁶ It can be concluded that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in a crisis situation was invoked and not condemned by the United Nations, but it received meagre support.²¹⁷ It is not

possible to characterise the legal situation as going beyond this.²¹⁸ The matter was revisited during the Syrian crisis of 2013 following in particular the use by the Syrian authorities of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom took the position that if action in the Security Council were blocked, the United Kingdom would be permitted under international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.²¹⁹ The matter, however, remains controversial.²²⁰ In April 2017, the Syrian regime engaged in a particularly egregious poison gas attack resulting in the deaths of more than eighty persons.²²¹ The United States ‘in retaliation’ launched a missile attack on a Syrian airforce base.²²²

In April 2018, the Syrian regime engaged in a further chemical weapons attack in Douma. The United States responded with cruise missile attacks against a Syrian airfield. The legal basis for this was not clearly formulated beyond the degrading of Syrian capabilities in chemical weaponry and as a deterrence,²²³ however, the United Kingdom issued a statement expressly referencing humanitarian intervention as the legal rationale for such action.²²⁴

One variant of the principle of humanitarian intervention is the contention that intervention in order to restore democracy is permitted as such under international law.²²⁵ One of the grounds given for the US intervention in Panama in December 1989 was the restoration of democracy,²²⁶ but, apart from the problems of defining democracy, such a proposition is not acceptable in international law in view of the clear provisions of the UN

Charter. Nor is there anything to suggest that even if the principle of self-determination could be interpreted as applying beyond the strict colonial context²²⁷ to cover ‘democracy’, it could constitute a norm superior to that of non-intervention.

More recently, there has been extensive consideration of the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a composite concept comprising the responsibilities to prevent catastrophic situations, to react immediately when they do occur and to rebuild afterwards.²²⁸ Such an approach may be seen as an effort to redefine the principle of humanitarian intervention in a way that seeks to minimise the motives of the intervening powers and there is no doubt that it reflects an important trend in international society and one that is influential, particularly in the context of UN action. Such responsibilities are deemed to fall both upon states and the international community and notably include the commitment to reconstruction after intervention or initial involvement. As they have been broadly and flexibly proposed, emphasising, for example, the obligation of states to protect human rights on their territory and the primary focus upon the United Nations with regard to any military action, the sharp edges of unilateral humanitarian intervention doctrine have been blunted, but it remains to be seen how influential this approach may be.²²⁹

Terrorism and International Law²³⁰

The use of terror as a means to achieve political ends is not a new phenomenon, but it has recently acquired a new intensity. In many cases, terrorists deliberately choose targets in uninvolved third states as a means of pressurising the government of the state against which it is in conflict or its real or potential or assumed allies.²³¹ As far as international law is concerned, there are a number of problems that can be identified. The first major concern is that of definition.²³² For example, how widely should the offence be defined: for instance, should attacks against property as well as attacks upon persons be covered? And to what extent should one take into account the motives and intentions of the perpetrators? Secondly, the relationship between terrorism and the use of force by states in response is posed.²³³ Thirdly, the relationship between terrorism and human rights needs to be taken into account.

Despite political difficulties, increasing progress at an international and regional level has been made to establish rules of international law with regard to terrorism, although whether there exists a definition of terrorism in customary international law is a matter of some controversy.²³⁴ A twin-track approach has been adopted, dealing both with particular manifestations of terrorist activity and with a general condemnation of the phenomenon.²³⁵ In so far as the first is concerned, the United Nations has currently adopted fourteen international conventions (and four amendments) concerning terrorism, dealing with issues such as hijacking, hostages and terrorist bombings.²³⁶ Many of these conventions operate on a common model,

establishing the basis of quasi-universal jurisdiction with an interlocking network of international obligations. The model comprises a definition of the offence in question and the automatic incorporation of such offences within all extradition agreements between states parties coupled with obligations on states parties to make this offence an offence in domestic law, to establish jurisdiction over this offence (usually where committed in the territory of the state or on board a ship or aircraft registered there, or by a national of that state or on a discretionary basis in some conventions where nationals of that state have been victims) and, where the alleged offender is present in the territory, either to prosecute or to extradite to another state that will.²³⁷

In addition, the United Nations has sought to tackle the question of terrorism in a comprehensive fashion. In December 1972, the General Assembly set up an ad hoc committee on terrorism²³⁸ and in 1994, a Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism was adopted.²³⁹ This condemned ‘all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed’, noting that ‘criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group or person or persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them’. States are also obliged to refrain from organising, instigating, facilitating, financing or tolerating terrorist activities and to take practical measures to ensure that their territories are not used for terrorist installations, training camps or for the preparation of terrorist acts against other states. States are further obliged to apprehend and prosecute or extradite perpetrators of terrorist acts and to cooperate with other states in

exchanging information and combating terrorism.²⁴⁰ The Assembly has also adopted a number of resolutions calling for ratification of the various conventions and for improvement in cooperation between states in this area.²⁴¹ In September 2006, the General Assembly adopted ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’,²⁴² comprising a Plan of Action, including: condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as it constitutes ‘one of the most serious threats to international peace and security’; international cooperation; addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; adoption of a variety of measures to prevent and combat terrorism; adoption of measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism; and, finally, measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. A particular concern has been foreign terrorist fighters and Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) called for all states to prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border and documentary controls and for all states, consistent with international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, to prevent and suppress the recruiting, organising, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities.

An Ad Hoc Committee was established in 1996²⁴³ to elaborate international conventions on terrorism. The Conventions for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 and of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 resulted, as did a Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005. The

Committee is currently working on drafting a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.²⁴⁴

The Security Council has also been active in dealing with the terrorism threat.²⁴⁵ In particular, it has characterised international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. This approach has evolved. In resolution 731 (1992), the Security Council, in the context of criticism of Libya for not complying with requests for the extradition of suspected bombers of an airplane, referred to ‘acts of international terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and security’, and in resolution 1070 (1996) adopted with regard to Sudan it reaffirmed that ‘the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which states are involved, is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security’.²⁴⁶

It was, however, the 11 September 2001 attack upon the World Trade Center that moved this process onto a higher level. In resolution 1368 (2001) adopted the following day, the Council, noting that it was ‘[d]etermined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist attack’, unequivocally condemned the attack and declared that it regarded such attacks ‘like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security’.²⁴⁷ Resolution 1373 (2001) reaffirmed this proposition and the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the UN Charter, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.²⁴⁸ Acting under Chapter VII, the Council made a series of binding decisions demanding *inter alia* the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, the criminalisation of wilful provision or collection of funds for such purposes, and the freezing of financial assets and economic resources of

persons and entities involved in terrorism. Further, states were called upon to refrain from any support to those involved in terrorism and take action against such persons, and to cooperate with other states in preventing and suppressing terrorist acts and acting against the perpetrators. The Council also declared that acts, methods and practices of terrorism were contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts were also contrary to UN purposes and principles. Crucially, the Council established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor implementation of the resolution. States were called upon to report to the Committee on measures they had taken to implement the resolution. The Committee was also mandated to maintain a dialogue with states on the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005) on prohibiting incitement to commit terrorist acts and promoting dialogue and understanding among civilisations.

In resolution 1377 (2001), the Council, in addition to reaffirming earlier propositions, declared that acts of international terrorism ‘constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century’ and requested the Counter-Terrorism Committee to assist in the promotion of best-practice in the areas covered by resolution 1373, including the preparation of model laws as appropriate, and to examine the availability of various technical, financial, legislative and other programmes to facilitate the implementation of resolution 1373.²⁴⁹

The Counter-Terrorism Committee was strengthened in 2004 by the establishment of the Executive Directorate, comprising a number of experts and administrative and support staff.²⁵⁰ A further committee was established

by resolution 1540 (2004) to examine the implementation of the resolution, which requires all states to establish domestic controls to prevent access by non-state actors to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, and to take effective measures to prevent proliferation of such items and establish appropriate controls over related materials.²⁵¹ The Counter-Terrorism Committee has now received a large number of reports, and has reviewed and responded to many of them. The Committee has since 2005 been conducting visits to member states. It also provides technical assistance, encourages best practices, issues country reports and holds special meetings.²⁵²

In addition to UN activities, a number of regional instruments condemning terrorism have been adopted. These include the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977;²⁵³ the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005; the European Union Framework Decision on Terrorism 2002; the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism 1987 and Additional Protocol of 2005; the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism 1998; the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism 1999; the Commonwealth of Independent States Treaty on Co-operation in Combating Terrorism 1999; the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999 and Protocol of 2005; the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism 2007; and the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention against Terrorism 2002.²⁵⁴ In addition, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe adopted a Ministerial Declaration and Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism in 2001.²⁵⁵

Coupled with the increase in international action to suppress international terrorism has been a concern that this should be accomplished in conformity with the principles of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.²⁵⁶ This has been expressed by the UN Secretary-General²⁵⁷ and UN human rights organs.²⁵⁸ In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights, for example, appointed a Special Rapporteur on the ‘promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’.²⁵⁹ Particular concerns have focused on ‘shoot to kill’ policies in the context of combating suicide bombings reportedly adopted by some states²⁶⁰ and the practice of secret detention and illegal transfer of detainees across international boundaries (‘extraordinary rendition’).²⁶¹ The situation of detainees in the US military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a matter of particular concern.²⁶² All of these issues have demonstrated the tension between combating international terrorism and respecting human rights and the need to accomplish the former without jettisoning the latter.

Regional organisations have also been concerned by this dilemma. The Council of Europe adopted international guidelines on human rights and anti-terrorism measures in July 2002,²⁶³ seeking to integrate condemnation of terrorism and efficient combating of the phenomenon with the need to respect human rights. In particular, guideline XVI provides that in the fight against terrorism, states may never act in breach of peremptory norms of international law (*jus cogens*) nor in breach of international humanitarian law. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights adopted a Report on Terrorism and Human Rights in October 2002.²⁶⁴

Cyber Warfare and International Law: Part I

The Use of Force²⁶⁵

Cyber activities are playing an increasing role in the law relating to the use of force and in international humanitarian law (discussed in the next chapter).

The first question is whether a cyber operation by one state against another constitutes an armed attack falling within article 2(4) of the UN Charter.²⁶⁶

Apart from being able to prove that one state has actually launched a cyber attack upon another, something which may be extraordinarily difficult in the circumstances,²⁶⁷ there are questions of definition and scale. The key is to define what constitutes a cyber attack in the context of the use or threat of force. The *Tallinn Manual 2.0*, a publication of an international group of experts, but not as such binding nor an example of state practice, suggests: ‘A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.’²⁶⁸

Eight relevant, but non-exhaustive, factors were identified, being severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military character, state involvement and presumptive legality.²⁶⁹ It will, of course, all depend upon the circumstances and the view taken at the relevant time by the international community and will partly turn upon the level of actions taken which do not amount to an actual armed attack by armed forces, but which may be seen as a use of force. The level of harm caused and the sensitivity of the target under cyber attack will be relevant. For example, had the cyber attack upon Israel’s water system (reportedly by attempting to raise chlorine to dangerous levels)²⁷⁰ succeeded, the number of casualties could have

approximated to those caused by a significant armed attack.²⁷¹ The second question relates to the right of self-defence. The *Tallinn Manual* suggests that where the cyber attack ‘rises to the level of an armed attack’ which depends on its scale and effects, the inherent right of self-defence will be exercisable.²⁷² There is a difference between the ‘use of force’ and an ‘armed attack’ under international law, so that a use of force which did not rise to the level of an armed attack would not as such justify a reaction in the form of self-defence.²⁷³ Whether the action taken in self-defence is legitimate will depend upon factors such as necessity, proportionality, imminence (if relevant) and immediacy, as discussed above.²⁷⁴ Similar considerations would apply to collective self-defence.²⁷⁵ Also relevant are the rules as to collective security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the determination required as to whether particular cyber attacks amount to a threat to or breach of international peace and security or an act of aggression.²⁷⁶ It is likely that following the Security Council resolutions after 9/11, a cyber attack by a non-state entity of a particular scale and effect would also trigger the application of the right to self-defence.²⁷⁷ However, it is fair to conclude that the rules governing cyber attacks and the use of force are in process of evolution and no internationally accepted code has been adopted, nor has any particular cyber attack been accepted by states as constituting an armed attack.

Suggestions for Further Reading

I. Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Oxford, 1963

Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, 6th ed., Cambridge, 2017

T. M. Franck, *Recourse to Force*, Cambridge, 2002

C. Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force*, 4th ed., Oxford, 2018

The Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force (ed. M. Weller), Oxford, 2015

¹ See e.g. Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, 6th ed., Cambridge, 2017; C. Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force*, 4th ed., Oxford, 2018; C. Chinkin and M. Kaldor, *International Law and New Wars*, Cambridge, 2017; S. Neff, *War and the Law of Nations: A General History*, Cambridge, 2005; O. Corten, *The Law against War*, Oxford, 2012; O. Corten, *Le Droit Contre La Guerre*, 2nd ed., Paris, 2014; *The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-Based Approach* (ed. T. Ruys and O. Corten), Cambridge, 2018; *Law on the Use of Force and Armed Conflict* (ed. R. Cryer and C. Henderson), Cheltenham, 2017; M. Byers, *War Law*, London, 2005; D. Kennedy, *Of Law and War*, Princeton, 2006; T. M. Franck, *Recourse to Force*, Cambridge, 2002; D. W. Bowett, *Self-Defence in International Law*, Manchester, 1958; I. Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Oxford, 1963; J. Stone, *Aggression and World Order*, Berkeley, 1958; J. Stone, *Legal Controls of International Conflict*, 2nd ed., Berkeley, 1959; M. S. McDougal and F. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order*, New Haven, 1961, and McDougal and Feliciano, *The International Law of War*, New Haven, 1994; H. Waldock, 'The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law', **81 HR**, 1982, p. 415; A. Cassese, *Violence and Law in the Modern Age*, Cambridge, 1988; *Law and Force in the New International Order* (ed. L. Damrosch and D. J. Scheffer), Boulder, 1991; J. Maogoto, *Technology and the Law on the Use of Force*, London, 2014; *The Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force* (ed. M. Weller), Oxford, 2015; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 1032; and M. Pinto, 'L'Emploi de la Force dans la Jurisprudence des Tribunaux Internationaux', **331 HR**, 2009, p. 9.

² See e.g. L. C. Green, *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict*, 3rd ed., Manchester, 2008; G. Best, *War and Law Since 1945*, Oxford, 1994; S. Bailey, *Prohibitions and Restraints in War*, Oxford, 1972; M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 4th ed., New York, 2006; and T. M. Franck, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*, Oxford, 1995, chapter 8. See also Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 5 ff.; Dinstein, *War*, chapter 3; and C. Greenwood, 'The Concept of War in Modern International Law', **36 ICLQ**, 1987, p. 283.

³ See J. Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations*, Washington, DC, 1935, pp. 65 ff.; Bailey, *Prohibitions*, pp. 6–9; and Brownlie, *Use of Force*, p. 5.

⁴ *Summa Theologica*, II, ii, 40. See Bailey, *Prohibitions*, p. 9. See also J. Von Elbe, ‘The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law’, *33 AJIL*, 1939, p. 669; and C. Parry, ‘The Function of Law in the International Community’, in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, pp. 1, 27.

⁵ Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 7 ff.

⁶ *De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectiones*, ss. 14, 20–3, 29 and 60, cited in Bailey, *Prohibitions*, p. 11.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 11–12. Suarez felt that the only just cause was a grave injustice that could not be avenged or repaired in any other way: *ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 12–15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, chapter 2; and Brownlie, *Use of Force*, p. 13. See *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, 1625.

¹⁰ See e.g. Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 14 ff. See also L. Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948’, *42 AJIL*, 1948, p. 20.

¹¹ Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 26–8.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Note instances in the nineteenth century in particular of force being used in this manner against the weaker states of Latin America and Asia, *ibid.*, pp. 28 ff.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, chapter 3. But note Hague Convention II of 1907, which provided that the parties would not have recourse to armed forces for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another as being due to its nationals.

¹⁵ Brownlie, *Use of Force*, chapter 4. See especially articles 10–16 of the Covenant.

¹⁶ See e.g. Dinstein, *War*, chapter 4; A. K. Skubiszewski, ‘The Use of Force by States’, in Sørensen, *Manual of Public International Law*, pp. 739, 742–4; and Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 74–92.

¹⁷ Article I.

¹⁸ It came into force on 24 July 1929 and is still in effect. Many inter-war treaties reaffirmed the obligations imposed by the Pact: see e.g. Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 75–6.

¹⁹ See e.g. *Yossi Beilin v. The Prime Minister of Israel* HCJ 6204/06, 2006. See also C. Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law’, in *Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts* (ed. D. Fleck), Oxford, 1999, p. 43; and I. Detter, *The Law of War*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2004, pp. 9 ff.

²⁰ See e.g. Cmd 3153, p. 10.

²¹ See Brownlie, *Use of Force*, p. 87. Cf. Bowett, *Self-Defence*, p. 136.

²² See *Oppenheim’s International Law United Nations* (ed. R. Higgins), Oxford, 2017; *La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire Article par Article* (ed. J. P. Cot, A. Pellet and M. Forteau), 3rd ed., Paris, 2005; and *The Charter of the United Nations* (ed. B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte and A. Paulus), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2012.

²³ See e.g. Skubiszewski, ‘Use of Force’, p. 745; and L. Henkin, R. C. Pugh, O. Schachter and H. Smit, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 3rd ed., St Paul, 1993, p. 893. See also the *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 1987, p. 27; Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, p. 437 (N. Schrijver); and Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, p. 203, noting that this constitutes a rule of *jus cogens*. See also T. Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?’, **108 AJIL**, 2014, p. 159.

²⁴ See e.g. G. Arangio-Ruiz, *The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of Sources of International Law*, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979; and R. Rosenstock, ‘The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations’, **65 AJIL**, 1971, p. 713. See also General Assembly resolution 42/22, the Declaration on the

Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations 1987.

²⁵ See below, Chapter 21, p. 1101.

²⁶ See below, p. 993.

²⁷ See below, p. 1016.

²⁸ An attempt by Brazil to prohibit ‘economic measures’ in article 2(4) itself was rejected, 6 UNCIO, Documents, p. 335. See also L. M. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. P. Simons, *Charter of the United Nations*, 3rd ed., New York, 1969, p. 49.

²⁹ See e.g. the mining of Nicaraguan harbours by the US: *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 128; 76 ILR, p. 349.

³⁰ See Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, p. 208. A further issue is whether cyber activities may possibly constitute a use of force contrary to article 2(4) that may trigger resort to self-defence: see below, p. 1028.

³¹ See e.g. *Economic Coercion and the New International Economic Order* (ed. R. B. Lillich), Charlottesville, 1976; and *The Arab Oil Weapon* (ed. J. Paust and A. Blaustein), Dobbs Ferry, 1977.

³² Paust and Blaustein, *Arab Oil Weapon*.

³³ See e.g. Dinstein, *War*, p. 90, unless accompanied by the use or at least the threat of force, *ibid.*

³⁴ Brownlie, *Use of Force*, p. 364, notes that a threat of force consists ‘in an express or implied promise by a government of a resort to force conditional on non-acceptance of certain demands of that government’. See also N. Stürchler, *The Threat of Force in International Law*, Cambridge, 2007; M. Roscini, ‘Threats of Armed Force and Contemporary International Law’, 54 *NILR*, 2007, p. 229; R. Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’, 82 *AJIL*, 1988, p. 239; F. Grimal, *Threats of Force: International Law and Strategy*, London, 2012; and N. White and R. Cryer, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of Resolution 687: A Threat Too Far?’, 29 *California Western International Law Journal*, 1999, p. 243.

³⁵ This was cited with approval by the Arbitral Tribunal in *Guyana v. Suriname*, Award of 17 September 2007, paras. 439, 445, where an order by Surinamese naval vessels to an oil rig to leave the area within 12 hours or face the consequences was deemed to constitute such a threat.

³⁶ ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 246–7; 110 ILR, p. 163.

³⁷ Note that article 2(b) of the Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties defines ‘armed conflict’ as ‘a situation in which there is resort to armed force between States or protracted resort to armed force between governmental authorities and organized armed groups’: A/66/10, 2011.

³⁸ See the discussion in the case concerning the detention of three Ukrainian vessels by Russia, *Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v. Russia)*, ITLOS, Order of 25 May 2019, para. 66, noting in the context of article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, that the distinction between military and law enforcement activities must be based primarily on an objective evaluation of the nature of the activities in question, taking into account the relevant circumstances of each case.

³⁹ See above, [Chapter 13](#), p. 697.

⁴⁰ But see below, p. 1009, note 165, regarding self-determination, and p. 1009, regarding civil wars, and see with regard to non-international armed conflicts, below, [Chapter 20](#), p. 1055.

⁴¹ See below, p. 993.

⁴² See below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1101.

⁴³ Below, p. 1016.

⁴⁴ The International Court has described the prohibition against the use of force as a ‘cornerstone of the United Nations Charter’: *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 223. See also Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, p. 215.

⁴⁵ See e.g. Bowett, *Self-Defence*, p. 152.

⁴⁶ See Brownlie, *Use of Force*, p. 268. See also Skubiszewski, 'Use of Force', pp. 745–6.

⁴⁷ General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX).

⁴⁸ General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).

⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 35; 16 AD, pp. 155, 167. See also Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 283–9; and H. Lauterpacht, *The Development of International Law by the International Court*, London, 1958, p. 90.

⁵⁰ See *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 109–10; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 443–4; and see further below, p. 993.

⁵¹ *Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1–8*, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision of 19 December 2005, para. 10: see 45 ILM, 2006, pp. 430, 433. This statement was cited by the Arbitral Tribunal in *Guyana v. Suriname*, Award of 17 September 2007, para. 423. See also C. Gray, 'The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps Its Boundaries: A Partial Award?', 17 *EJIL*, 2006, p. 699.

⁵² See e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275. See also Security Council debate on 3 March 2014, S/PV.7125 and General Assembly resolution 68/262, 27 March 2014. See also T. Grant, *Aggression Against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility and International Law*, New York, 2015.

⁵³ As to the use of force by the UN, see below, Chapter 21, p. 1108.

⁵⁴ See e.g. Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 1056; Skubiszewski, 'Use of Force', p. 753; and G. von Glahn, *Law Among Nations*, 7th ed., Boston, 1996, pp. 533 ff.

⁵⁵ See e.g. R. B. Lillich, 'Requiem for Hickenlooper', 69 *AJIL*, 1975, p. 97; and C. F. Amerasinghe, 'The Ceylon Oil Expropriations', 58 *AJIL*, 1964, p. 445.

⁵⁶ See also, with regard to countermeasures, above, Chapter 13, p. 691.

⁵⁷ See e.g. Dinstein, *War*, pp. 264 ff.; Skubiszewski, 'Use of Force', pp. 753–5; Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 219–23, 281–2; D. W. Bowett, 'Reprisals Including Recourse to Armed

Force’, **66** *AJIL*, 1972, p. 1; and R. W. Tucker, ‘Reprisals and Self-Defence: The Customary Law’, **66** *AJIL*, 1972, p. 581.

⁵⁸ 2 RIAA, p. 1011 (1928); 4 AD, p. 526. See also G. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1943, vol. **VI**, p. 154.

⁵⁹ See above, [Chapter 13](#), p. 691. Note also article 50 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 2001 providing that countermeasures do not affect obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals.

⁶⁰ See Dinstein, *War*, p. 264. But see Bowett, ‘Reprisals’. See also SCOR, 19th Year, 111th meeting, 8 April 1964, in which the Security Council condemned reprisals as contrary to the UN Charter and deplored the UK bombing of Fort Harib, and R. B. Lillich, ‘Forcible Self-Help under International Law’, **62** *US Naval War College International Law Studies*, 1980, p. 129. Note that the US State Department has declared that, ‘it is clear that the United States has taken the categorical position that reprisals involving the use of force are illegal under international law’: ‘Memorandum on US Practice with Respect to Reprisals’, **73** *AJIL*, 1979, p. 489. As for episodes that appear to be on the borderline between self-defence and reprisals, see e.g. R. A. Falk, ‘The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation’, **63** *AJIL*, 1969, p. 415; and Y. Blum, ‘The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard’, **64** *AJIL*, 1970, p. 73.

⁶¹ The International Court declared in *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* that ‘armed reprisals in time of peace . . . are considered to be unlawful . . . any right to [belligerent] reprisals would, like self-defence, be governed *inter alia* by the principle of proportionality’: ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 246; 110 ILR, p. 163. Note that reprisals taking place within an armed conflict (belligerent reprisals) are permitted in response to prior violation of the laws of armed conflict by the opposing side: see Y. Dinstein, *The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2016, pp. 289 ff.; and C. Greenwood, ‘The Twilight of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals’, **20** *Netherlands YIL*, 1989, pp. 35, 38. See also *Customary International Humanitarian Law* (ed. J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck), vol. I, Cambridge, 2005, Rule 145, p. 513; and *Kupreškić*, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY, Judgment of 14 January 2000, paras. 256, 528.

⁶² See e.g. Skubiszewski, ‘Use of Force’, pp. 755–7; and Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 223–4.

⁶³ See below, Chapter 21, p. 1102.

⁶⁴ See e.g. Q. Wright, 'The Cuban Quarantine', *57 AJIL*, 1963, p. 546; and M. S. McDougal, 'The Soviet–Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defence', *ibid.*, p. 597. See also A. Chayes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, Oxford, 1974. But note the rather different declaration by the UK of a Total Exclusion Zone during the Falklands conflict: see 22 HC Deb., cols. 296–7, 28 April 1982; and R. P. Barston and P. W. Birnie, 'The Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas Conflict. A Question of Zones', *7 Marine Policy*, 1983, p. 14. It is clear that maritime blockades in times of armed conflict are not illegal: see e.g. International Institute of Humanitarian Law, *San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea* (ed. L. Doswald-Beck), Cambridge, 1995, pp. 176 ff. See also the Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, September 2011, pp. 80 ff., <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/Palmer-Committee-Final-report.pdf>.

The Panel concluded that Israel's naval blockade of Gaza in the circumstances of the armed conflict between the two parties was lawful: see pp. 40–4.

⁶⁵ See Bowett, *Self-Defence*; and Brownlie, *Use of Force*, chapter 13. See also I. Brownlie, 'The Use of Force in Self-Defence', *37 BYIL*, 1961, p. 183; Dinstein, *War*, chapters 7 and 8; Gray, *Use of Force*, chapter 4; M. E. O'Connell, *The Art of Law in the International Community*, Cambridge, 2019, chapter 4; Franck, *Recourse*, chapters 3–7; Corten, *Law Against War*, chapter 7; S. Alexandrov, *Self-defence against the Use of Force in International Law*, The Hague, 1996; J. Delivanis, *La Légitime Défense en Droit International*, Paris, 1971; Byers, *War Law*, Part Two; M. C. Alder, *The Inherent Right of Self-Defence in International Law*, Heidelberg, 2013; S. Schwebel, 'Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modern International Law', *136 HR*, 1972, p. 411; O. Schachter, 'The Right of States to Use Armed Force', *82 Michigan Law Review*, 1984, p. 1620; O. Schachter, 'Self-Defence and the Rule of Law', *83 AJIL*, 1989, p. 259; O. Schachter, *International Law in Theory and Practice*, Dordrecht, 1991, chapter 8; N. Ochoa-Ruiz and E. Salamanca-Aguado, 'Exploring the Limits of International Law relating to the Use of Force in Self-defence', *16 EJIL*, 2005, p. 499; Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, p. 506 (A. Cassese); Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 1038; and Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, p. 1397.

⁶⁶ 29 BFSP, p. 1137 and 30 BFSP, p. 195. See also R. Y. Jennings, 'The Caroline and McLeod Cases', *32 AJIL*, 1938, p. 82.

⁶⁷ See e.g. the Legal Adviser to the US Department of State, who noted that ‘the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence depends upon a prior delict, an illegal act that presents an immediate, overwhelming danger to an actual and essential right of the state. When these conditions are present, the means used must then be proportionate to the gravity of the threat or danger’: *DUSPIL*, 1975, p. 17.

⁶⁸ Note that article 21 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility 2001, provides that: ‘The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.’

⁶⁹ See e.g. Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 112–13, 264 ff.; and E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of the Century’, **159 HR**, 1978, pp. 1, 87–98. See also Skubiszewski, ‘Use of Force’, pp. 765–8; and H. Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations*, London, 1950, p. 914.

⁷⁰ See e.g. Bowett, *Self Defence*, pp. 185–6; and Stone, *Aggression and World Order*, pp. 43, 95–6. See also H. Waldock, ‘General Course on Public International Law’, **166 HR**, 1980, pp. 6, 231–7; Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 1403 ff.; Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 134 ff.; and D. P. O’Connell, *International Law*, 2nd ed., London, 1970, vol. **I**, p. 317. See also e.g. 6 UNCIO, Documents, where it is noted that ‘the use of arms in legitimate self-defence remains admitted and unimpaired’.

⁷¹ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 94; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 428.

⁷² Note that the Institut de Droit International adopted a resolution on self-defence in 2007, para. 1 of which noted that ‘Article 51 of the United Nations Charter as supplemented by customary international law adequately governs the exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defence’: www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2019/06/Annexe-1bis-Compilation-Resolutions-EN.pdf.

⁷³ The Court noted that this provision, contained in article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974, reflected customary international law: ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 103; 76 ILR, p. 437. See also T. Ruys, ‘*Armed Attacks*’ and *Article 51 of the UN Charter*, Cambridge, 2010.

⁷⁴ *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 189, 190; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 348–50.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* The incidents included a missile attack from a distance that meant it could not have been aimed at a particular vessel (the US *Sea Isle City*) as distinct from ‘some target in Kuwaiti waters’; an attack on a non-US flagged vessel; the alleged firing on US helicopters from Iranian gunboats that the Court found unproven; and mine-laying that could not be shown to have been aimed at the US: *ibid.*, pp. 191–2. However, this requirement for a deliberate and intentional attack on the target state, rather than merely an indiscriminate attack, is controversial and open to question.

⁷⁸ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 101.

⁷⁹ Merits, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 187; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 346.

⁸⁰ See Gray, *Use of Force*, p. 135, note 64.

⁸¹ See below, p. 999. See also the actions taken by Israel following attacks upon it by Iranian forces in May 2018; see e.g. UK Prime Minister’s statement, www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-israel-britain/britain-says-it-supports-israels-right-to-defend-itself-against-iran-idUSKBN1IB2RI.

⁸² See ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States’, 93 *AJIL*, 1999, p. 161. The US stated that the missile strikes ‘were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities’: *ibid.*, p. 162 and S/1998/780.

⁸³ See e.g. Dinstein, *War*, pp. 241 ff.; Corten, *Law Against War*, chapter 3; and Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 139 ff. See also N. Lobell, *Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors*, Oxford, 2010; L. Zegveld, *The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law*, Cambridge, 2002; V. Lanovoy, ‘The Use of Force by Non-State Actors and the Limits of Attribution of Conduct’, 28 *EJIL*, 2017, p. 56; and J. Brunnée and S. J.

Toope, ‘Self-Defence against Non-State Actors: Are Powerful States Willing but Unable to Change International Law?’, 67 *ICLQ*, 2018, p. 263.

⁸⁴ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 103–4; 76 ILR, pp. 437–8.

⁸⁵ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 543–4; 76 ILR, p. 877. Franck suggests that Security Council practice following the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center has followed Judge Jennings’ approach: see *Recourse*, p. 63, and below, p. 997.

⁸⁶ ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 194. Cf. the Separate Opinions of Judge Higgins, *ibid.*, p. 215 and Judge Kooijmans, *ibid.*, p. 230.

⁸⁷ See article 43 of the Hague Regulations 1907. See further below, Chapter 20, p. 1039.

⁸⁸ ICJ Reports, 2005, p. 168.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 222–3.

⁹⁰ See the Separate Opinions of Judge Kooijmans, *ibid.*, p. 314 and Judge Simma, *ibid.*, pp. 336 ff.

⁹¹ See [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37292-treaty-0031 - african union non-aggression and common defence pact e.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37292-treaty-0031_-_african_union_non-aggression_and_common_defence_pact_e.pdf).

⁹² The Institut de Droit International resolution on Self-Defence 2007, e.g., notes in para. 10 that: ‘In the event of an armed attack against a state by non-state actors, Article 51 of the Charter as supplemented by customary international law applies as a matter of principle’, www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2019/06/Annexe-1bis-Compilation-Resolutions-EN.pdf, while the Chatham House Principles on International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 55 *ICLQ*, 2006, pp. 963, 969, provide that the right to self-defence may apply to attacks by non-state actors where the attack is large-scale; if the right to self-defence is exercised in the territory of another state, and that state is unable or unwilling to deal with the non-state actors itself, and further that it is necessary to use force from outside to deal with the threat in circumstances where the consent of the territorial state cannot be obtained; and the force used in self-defence may only be directed against the government of the state where the attacker is found in so far as is necessary to avert or end the attack.

⁹³ See e.g. Dinstein, *War*, pp. 245 ff.; Franck, *Recourse*, chapter 4; and Gray, *Use of Force*, chapter 5. See also M. Byers, 'Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September', **51 ICLQ**, 2002, p. 401; L. Condorelli, 'Les Attentats du 11 Septembre et Leur Suite', **105 RGDIP**, 2001, p. 829; C. Tams, 'The Use of Force against Terrorists', **20 EJIL**, 2009, p. 359; and F. Sperotto, 'The Use of Force Against Terrorists: A Reply to Christian J. Tams', **20 EJIL**, 2010, p. 1043. As to terrorism, see further below, p. 1020.

⁹⁴ See the Separate Opinions of Judge Kooijmans and Judge Simma in *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 314, 337 respectively. Further recognition that particular hostile actions by non-state actors could amount to 'attacks' may be found in Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), in which both the 'attacks' by Hizbollah, an armed militia controlling parts of Lebanon, upon Israel (which precipitated the summer 2006 armed conflict) and Israeli 'offensive military operations' were condemned.

⁹⁵ See S/2001/946. See also 'Contemporary Practice of the United States', **96 AJIL**, 2002, p. 237.

⁹⁶ See www.nato.int/terrorism/factsheet.htm and www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm. Article 5 provides that:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

⁹⁷ Article 3(1) provides that:

The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

⁹⁸ See e.g. Byers, 'Terrorism', pp. 409–10; E. Cannizzaro, 'Entités Non-étatique et Régime Internationale de l'Emploi de la Force – une Étude sur le Cas de la Réaction Israélienne au Liban', **111** *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 2007, p. 333; and K. N. Trapp, 'Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence against Non-State Terrorist Actors', **56** *ICLQ*, 2007, p. 141.

⁹⁹ See also Security Council resolutions 2354 (2017), 2368 (2017), 2396 (2017) and 2462 (2019). The letter dated 7 September 2015 from the UK to the President of the Security Council noted that the UK had 'undertaken military action in Syria against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence'. In particular, it was noted that a precision air strike against an ISIL vehicle against a target 'known to be actively engaged in planning and directing imminent armed attacks against the United Kingdom' constituted 'a necessary and proportionate exercise of the individual right of self-defence' of the UK: S/2015/688. Note the claim by Turkey that its actions against terrorist groups in northern Syria were justified by the right of self-defence, Letter from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council, S/2018/53, 22 January 2018 and Letter dated 9 October 2019, S/2019/804.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Bowett, *Use of Force*, pp. 118–92, who emphasises that ‘no state can be expected to await an initial attack which, in the present state of armaments, may well destroy the state’s capacity for further resistance and so jeopardise its very existence’; and Franck, *Fairness*, p. 267, who notes that in such circumstances ‘the notion of anticipatory self-defence is both rational and attractive’; with Brownlie, *Use of Force*, p. 275; and L. Henkin, *How Nations Behave*, 2nd ed., New York, 1979, pp. 141–5. See also R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford, 1963, pp. 216–21; and Franck, *Recourse*, chapter 7.

¹⁰¹ See generally *The Arab–Israeli Conflict* (ed. J. N. Moore), Princeton, 4 vols., 1974–2014.

¹⁰² Note that Gray writes that Israel did not argue that it acted in anticipatory self-defence, but rather in self-defence following the start of the conflict: *Use of Force*, p. 171. See also Dinstein, *War*, pp. 222 ff.

¹⁰³ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 103; 76 ILR, p. 437. See also *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 222.

¹⁰⁴ See e.g. the Security Council debate on, and condemnation of, Israel’s bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 on the basis of anticipatory self-defence: 20 ILM, 1981, pp. 965–7. See also A. Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 230 ff., who concludes that a consensus is growing to the effect that anticipatory self-defence is allowed, but under strict conditions relating to proof of the imminence of an armed attack that would jeopardise the life of the target state and the absence of peaceful means to prevent the attack, *ibid.*, p. 233. However, in *International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005, p. 362, Cassese states that ‘it is more judicious to consider such action [anticipatory self-defence] as *legally prohibited*, while admittedly knowing that there may be cases where breaches of the prohibition may be justified on moral and political grounds and the community will eventually condone them or mete out lenient condemnation’ (emphasis in the original). See also *Nuclear Weapons under International Law* (ed. G. Nystuen, S. Casey-Maslen and A. G. Bersagel), Cambridge, 2014.

¹⁰⁵ See e.g. the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 347–8; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 681. But see Dinstein, *War*, pp. 229 ff. Note also the suggestion that attacks on computer networks may also fall within the definition of armed

attack if fatalities are caused, e.g. where the computer-controlled systems regulating waterworks and dams are disabled: see Y. Dinstein, 'Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defence', **76** *International Law Studies*, US Naval War College, 2001, p. 99. See also H. Dinniss, *Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War*, Cambridge, 2012; and M. N. Schmitt, 'Classification in Future Conflicts', in Wilmschurst, *Classification*, pp. 455, 457. See below, p. 1027.

106 See Dinstein, *War*, pp. 231–3. Note also that the Institut de Droit International resolution on Self-Defence 2007, para. 3, provides that: 'The right of self-defence arises for the target state in case of an actual or manifestly imminent armed attack', and that it may be exercised 'only when there is no lawful alternative in practice in order to forestall, stop or repel the armed attack', www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2019/06/Annexe-1bis-Compilation-Resolutions-EN.pdf.

107 See above, p. 993.

108 However, note that the Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2004, para. 188, declared that 'a threatened state, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is *imminent*, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate' (emphasis in the original). The response of the UN Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom*, A/59/2005, para. 124, also stated that imminent threats were covered by the right to self-defence.

109 See also the Chatham House Principles on International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 55 *ICLQ*, 2006, pp. 963, 964–5.

110 41 *ILM*, 2002, p. 1478. See also M. E. O'Connell, 'The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defence', ASIL, Task Force on Terrorism, 2002, www.nyccriminallawyer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/oconnell.pdf; M. Bothe, 'Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force', **14** *EJIL*, 2003, p. 227; and W. M. Reisman and A. Armstrong, 'Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense', **100** *AJIL*, 2006, p. 525.

111 See C. Gray, 'The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA', **5** *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2006, p. 555; and Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 248 ff. This approach may have been mitigated (or nuanced) in later years, see e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, p. 252.

¹¹² See e.g. the Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2004, paras. 189 ff. and the UN Secretary-General's Report, *In Larger Freedom*, A/59/2005, para. 125, both essentially saying that where a threat is less than imminent, resort should be had to the Security Council. The resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit International on 27 October 2007 notes in para. 6 that: 'There is no basis in international law for the doctrine of "preventive" self-defence in the absence of an actual or manifestly imminent armed attack', www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2019/06/Annexe-1bis-Compilation-Resolutions-EN.pdf. See also the Chatham House Principles on International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 55 *ICLQ*, 2006, pp. 963, 968. The concept of imminence was discussed by D. Bethlehem, 'Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State's Right of Self-Defence Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Non-state Actors', 106 *AJIL*, 2012, p. 769, noting in particular the importance of *inter alia*: (a) the nature and immediacy of the threat; (b) the probability of an attack; (c) whether the anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; (d) the likely scale of the attack and the injury, loss or damage likely to result therefrom in the absence of mitigating action; and (e) the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defence that may be expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss or damage. This was cited with approval in the speech of the UK Attorney-General on 11 January 2017, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/attorney-generals-speech-at-the-international-institute-for-strategic-studies. See also the speech of the Australian Attorney-General on 11 April 2017, <https://law.uq.edu.au/files/25365/2017%2004%2011%20-%20Attorney-General%20-%20Speech%20-%20The%20Right%20of%20Self-Defence%20Against%20Imminent%20Armed%20Attack%20in%20International%20Law%20-%20for%20publication.pdf> and the speech by the US State Department Legal Adviser, 2016, www.lawfareblog.com/state-department-legal-adviser-brian-egans-speech-asil. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on targeted killings through armed drones, A/HRC/44/38, 29 June 2020, concludes that 'the notion that a narrowly construed preemptive self-defence to prevent an imminent attack is legal under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, has been somewhat accepted but limited to threats that are "instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, no moment of deliberation"'.

¹¹³ See e.g. Brownlie, *Use of Force*, p. 279, note 2; J. Graham, *Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States*, Cambridge, 2004; Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 157 ff.; and Dinstein, *War*, pp. 249 ff. See also Corten, *Law Against War*, p. 470 ff. and the Institut de

Droit International resolution on self-defence 2007, para. 2, www.idi-il.org/app/uploads/2019/06/Annexe-1bis-Compilation-Resolutions-EN.pdf.

114 ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 94, 103; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 428, 437.

115 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 245; 110 ILR, p. 163. The Court affirmed that this ‘dual condition’ also applied to article 51, whatever the means of force used: *ibid.* See also *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 196 ff.

116 See Judge Ago’s Eighth Report on State Responsibility to the International Law Commission, where it was noted that the concept of necessity centred upon the availability of other means to halt the attack so that ‘the state attacked . . . must not, in the particular circumstances, have had any means of halting the attack other than recourse to armed force’: *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1980, vol. **II**, part 1, p. 69.

117 Judge Ago noted that the correct relationship for proportionality was not between the conduct constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct, but rather between the action taken in self-defence and the purpose of halting and repelling the armed attack, so that ‘[t]he action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack suffered’: *ibid.*, p. 69. See also J. G. Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’, **87 AJIL**, 1993, p. 391.

118 Note that the UK declared that Turkish operations in northern Iraq in 1998 ‘must be proportionate to the threat’: UKMIL, 69 *BYIL*, 1998, p. 586.

119 Merits, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 198.

120 The Chatham House Principles on International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 55 *ICLQ*, 2006, pp. 963, 967.

121 Merits, ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 198; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 357–8.

122 ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 223.

123 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 245; 110 ILR, p. 163. See further below, p. 1051.

¹²⁴ See e.g. H. Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law in the International Community*, London, 1933, p. 179.

¹²⁵ See e.g. D. Grieg, 'Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?', *40 ICLQ*, 1991, p. 366.

¹²⁶ Note that the Court pointed out in *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 222, that Uganda did not report to the Security Council events that it had regarded as requiring it to act in self-defence. See Dinstein, *War*, pp. 258 ff., who argues that failure to report measures taken in the exercise of the right of self-defence 'should not be fatal, provided that the substantive conditions for the exercise of this right are met'.

¹²⁷ Brownlie's *Principles of Public International Law* (ed. J. Crawford), 9th ed., Oxford, 2019, p. 729. See also e.g. M. B. Akehurst, 'The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad', *5 International Relations*, 1977, p. 3; M. B. Akehurst, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in *Intervention in World Politics* (ed. H. Bull), Oxford, 1984, p. 95; Dinstein, *War*, pp. 275 ff.; Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 165 ff.; Franck, *Recourse*, chapter 6; Waldock, 'General Course', p. 467; L. C. Green, 'Rescue at Entebbe – Legal Aspects', *6 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, 1976, p. 312; and M. N. Shaw, 'Some Legal Aspects of the Entebbe Incident', *1 Jewish Law Annual*, 1978, p. 232. See also T. Schweisfurth, 'Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Use of Force in Relation to the Protection of Human Rights', *German YIL*, 1980, p. 159; J. R. d'Angelo, 'Resort to Force to Protect Nationals', *21 Va. JIL*, 1981, p. 485; J. Paust, 'The Seizure and Recovery of the *Mayaguez*', *85 Yale Law Journal*, 1976, p. 774; D. W. Bowett, 'The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad', in *The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force* (ed. A. Cassese), Oxford, 1986, p. 39; and N. Ronzitti, *Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity*, Oxford, 1985.

¹²⁸ See e.g. Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 289 ff.

¹²⁹ There is, of course, a different situation where the state concerned has consented to the action or where nationals are evacuated from a state where law and order has broken down: see Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 159–60.

¹³⁰ See e.g. Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 289 ff.

131 See M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1968, vol. V, p. 475. See also R. B. Lillich, 'Forcible Self-Help to Protect Human Rights', *53 Iowa Law Review*, 1967, p. 325.

132 Paust, 'Seizure and Recovery'. See also *DUSPIL*, 1975, pp. 777–83.

133 See e.g. Akehurst, 'Use of Force'; Green, 'Rescue at Entebbe'; and Shaw, 'Legal Aspects'.

134 See e.g. S/PV.1939, pp. 51–5; S/PV.1940, p. 48; and S/PV.1941, p. 31.

135 See e.g. S/PV.1943, pp. 47–50; and S/PV.1941, pp. 4–10, 57–61, 67–72. Note that Egypt attempted without success a similar operation in Cyprus in 1978: see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 29305 (1978). In 1980, the US attempted to rescue its nationals held hostage in Iran, but failed: see S/13908 and *Iranian Hostages*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 3, 43; 61 ILR, pp. 530, 569.

136 See the statement of Deputy Secretary of State Dam, 78 *AJIL*, 1984, p. 200. See also W. C. Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, London, 1984; and below, p. 1011.

137 See the statements by the US President and the Department of State, 84 *AJIL*, 1990, p. 545.

138 In the case of Grenada, it was alleged that some American students were under threat: see Gilmore, *Grenada*, pp. 55–64. In the Panama episode, one American had been killed and several harassed: see V. Nanda, 'The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under International Law', 84 *AJIL*, 1990, pp. 494, 497.

139 See President Reagan's statement, *The Times*, 16 April 1986, p. 6. The UK government supported this: see *The Times*, 17 April 1986, p. 4. However, there are problems with regard to proportionality in view of the injuries and damage apparently caused in the air raid. One US serviceman was killed in the West Berlin action. The role of the UK in consenting to the use of British bases for the purposes of the raid is also raised. See also UKMIL, 57 *BYIL*, 1986, pp. 639–42 and 80 *AJIL*, 1986, pp. 632–6; and C. J. Greenwood, 'International Law and the United States' Air Operation Against Libya', 89 *West Virginia Law Review*, 1987, p. 933.

¹⁴⁰ See Security Council Debates S/PV. 3245, 1993, and UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, pp. 731 ff. See also D. Kritsiotis, ‘The Legality of the 1993 US Missile Strike on Iraq and the Right of Self-Defence in International Law’, 45 *ICLQ*, 1996, p. 162. Russia apparently argued at one point that one of the reasons for its actions in the Crimean region of Ukraine in late February/early March 2014 was to protect Russians and Russian-speakers, see e.g. <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/6763>. However, there has been no evidence of the level of threats or attacks upon Russian nationals that would be necessary for the doctrine even to become relevant.

¹⁴¹ 227 HC Deb., col. 658; 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 732.

¹⁴² See above, p. 993.

¹⁴³ See e.g. Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 382–3. See also above, p. 990.

¹⁴⁴ See e.g. Dinstein, *War*, chapter 9; and Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 176 ff.

¹⁴⁵ See e.g. Bowett, *Self-Defence*, p. 245; cf. Goodrich *et al.*, *Charter*, p. 348. See also Brownlie, *Use of Force*, pp. 328–9.

¹⁴⁶ See e.g. article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 1949.

¹⁴⁷ Note article 52 of the UN Charter, which recognises the existence of regional arrangements and agencies, dealing with such matters relating to international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN: see further below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1126.

¹⁴⁸ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 103–5; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 437.

¹⁴⁹ See also Institut de Droit International resolution on Self-Defence 2007, para. 8, noting that ‘Collective self-defence may be exercised only at the request of the target state’: www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2019/06/Annexe-1bis-Compilation-Resolutions-EN.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 110. See also *ibid.*, p. 127; 76 ILR, pp. 444, 461. This was reaffirmed in *Oil Platforms (Iran v. US)* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2003, pp. 161, 186; 130 ILR, pp. 323, 346.

151 See *Keesing's Record of World Events*, pp. 37631 ff. (1990).

152 See below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1108.

153 Note that Security Council resolution 661 (1990) specifically referred in its preamble to 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait'. See also *Barcelona Traction*, ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 32; 46 ILR, pp. 178, 206.

154 S/2014/851, 26 November 2014 and see also S/2015/688.

155 See S/2014/440, annex and S/2014/691.

156 *DUSPIL*, 2015, pp. 74 and see also the speech of US Secretary of State Kerry to the Security Council on 30 September 2015, *ibid.*, pp. 758–9.

157 S/2015/523. See also the similar letter from Germany on 10 December 2015, S/2015/946 and the letter from the UK of 26 November 2014, S/2014/851, referring to 'striking ISIL sites and military strongholds in Syria, as necessary and proportionate measures' in the context of ending attacks on Iraq. The letter from the State Department's Bureau of Legislative Affairs to the Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *DUSPIL*, 2017, pp. 730–1, stated that the US justified its actions against Al-Qaeda and associated forces, including ISIS, in Syria on the basis of the 'collective self-defence of Iraq (and other states)'. See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 190 ff.

158 See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, chapter 3; Daillier *et al.*, *Droit International Public*, p. 947; T. Komarnicki, 'L'Intervention en Droit International Moderne', **62** *RGDIP*, 1956, p. 521; T. Farer, 'The Regulation of Foreign Armed Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict', **142** *HR*, 1974 II, p. 291; and J. E. S. Fawcett, 'Intervention in International Law', **103** *HR*, 1961 II, p. 347. See also T. Ruys and L. Ferro, 'Weathering the Storm: Legality and Legal Implications of the Saudi-led Military Intervention in Yemen', **65** *ICLQ*, 2016, p. 61.

159 See *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 35; 16 AD, pp. 155, 167; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 106; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 440. See also the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 1965; and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 1970, above, p. 989.

160 ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 108; 76 ILR, p. 442. See also S. McCaffrey, 'The Forty-First Session of the International Law Commission', **83 AJIL**, 1989, p. 937.

161 ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 108.

162 ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 109–10; 76 ILR, p. 443.

163 ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 111; 76 ILR, p. 445.

164 See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, chapter 3; *Law and Civil War in the Modern World* (ed. J. N. Moore), Princeton, 1974; E. Lieblich, *International Law and Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent*, London, 2013; *The International Regulation of Civil Wars* (ed. E. Luard), Oxford, 1972; *The International Law of Civil Wars* (ed. R. A. Falk), Princeton, 1971; T. Fraser, 'The Regulation of Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict', **142 HR**, 1974, p. 291; and W. Friedmann, 'Intervention, Civil War and the Rule of International Law', *PASIL*, 1965, p. 67. See also R. Higgins, 'Intervention and International Law', in Bull, *Intervention in World Politics*, p. 29; C. C. Joyner and B. Grimaldi, 'The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention', **25 Va. JIL**, 1985, p. 621; and Schachter, *International Law*, pp. 158 ff.

165 Note that the Declaration on Principles of International Law 1970 emphasised that all states were under a duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives people of their right to self-determination and that 'in their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action' such peoples could receive support in accordance with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter. Article 7 of the Consensus Definition of Aggression in 1974 referred ambiguously to the right of peoples entitled to but forcibly deprived of the right to self-determination 'to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity' with the 1970 Declaration. Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1949, adopted in 1977, provided that international armed conflict situations 'include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination' as enshrined in the UN Charter and the 1970 Declaration. Whether this means that articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter now apply to self-determination conflicts so that the peoples in question have a valid right to use force in self-defence is controversial and difficult to maintain. However, the use of force to suppress self-determination is now clearly unacceptable, as is help by third parties given to that end, but the provision of armed assistance to peoples seeking self-determination would

appear to remain unlawful: see Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 68 ff.; A. Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples*, Cambridge, 1995, p. 193; and H. Wilson, *International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements*, Oxford, 1988. See as to the principle of self-determination, above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 187.

¹⁶⁶ See e.g. H. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law*, Cambridge, 1947, pp. 275 ff.

¹⁶⁷ See e.g. N. Mugerwa, ‘Subjects of International Law’, in Sørensen, *Manual of Public International Law*, pp. 247, 286–8. See also R. Higgins, ‘International Law and Civil Conflict’, in Luard, *International Regulation of Civil Wars*, pp. 169, 170–1.

¹⁶⁸ See e.g. M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford, 1986.

¹⁶⁹ See e.g. C. Legumand and T. Hodges, *After Angola*, London, 1976.

¹⁷⁰ See e.g. *Law and the Indo-China War* (ed. J. N. Moore), Charlottesville, 1972. See also *The Vietnam War and International Law* (ed. R. A. Falk), Princeton, 4 vols., 1968–76.

¹⁷¹ But see below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1098, with regard to the increasing involvement of the UN in internal conflicts and the tendency to classify such conflicts as possessing an international dimension.

¹⁷² See e.g. G. H. Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, in *Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force*, chapter 37; L. Doswald-Beck, ‘The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government’, 56 *BYIL*, 1985, p. 189; D. Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Conflict’, in *International Law and the Classification of Conflicts* (ed. E. Wilmschurst), Oxford, 2012, pp. 32, 62; and Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 84 ff. See also as to the phenomenon of private contractors performing pseudo-state functions in this context, the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, ICRC, 2008, www.icrc.org/en/publication/0996-montreux-document-private-military-and-security-companies; and L. Cameron and V. Chetail, *Privatising War: Private Military and Security Companies Under Public International Law*, Cambridge, 2013.

¹⁷³ See *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 126, where the Court noted that intervention is ‘already allowable at the request of the government of a state’; however,

apparently not where the recipient state is forcibly suppressing the right to self-determination of a people entitled to such rights: see above, p. 1009, **note 165**.

174 Until a recognition of belligerency, of course, although this has been unknown in modern times: see e.g. Lauterpacht, *Recognition*, pp. 230–3.

175 See above, p. 1007. Following resolutions by the African Union on 12 December 2016 and a similar ECOWAS resolution adopted on 17 December deciding to take ‘all necessary measures’ to enforce the results of the 1 December election in The Gambia which the losing president was unwilling to accept, troops from ECOWAS states surrounded The Gambia. The elected president was sworn in on 19 January 2017 in Senegal. The Security Council in resolution 2337 (2017) welcomed these decisions without express endorsement of the actions taken. Eventually, the losing president left the country.

176 See the statement by Deputy Secretary of State Dam, 78 *AJIL*, 1984, p. 200.

177 See e.g. J. N. Moore, *Law and the Grenada Mission*, Charlottesville, 1984; and Gilmore, *Grenada*. See also Higgins, *Development of International Law*, pp. 162–4 regarding the Congo crisis of 1960, where that state’s President and Prime Minister sought to dismiss each other.

178 84 *AJIL*, 1990, p. 547.

179 See above, [Chapter 8](#), p. 378.

180 Note that article 20 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility 2001 provides that: ‘Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.’ See also Commentary to ILC article 20, A/56/10, pp. 72 ff. Note in particular, the need to show that consent has been validly given in terms, e.g., of the authority requesting intervention and whether or not coercion was involved. See also *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 197; and Dinstein, *War*, pp. 125 ff. See the recent example of Mali, where French forces at the invitation of the government employed airstrikes against rebels and sent troops to that country. This was welcomed by the Security Council, which set up a peacekeeping mission and authorised French troops to use ‘all necessary means’ to support the mission: see resolution 2100 (2013). Russia sought to justify its intervention in the Crimean region of

Ukraine on the grounds that it had been invited by the legitimate President of that country: see statement by the Russian Federation representative at the Security Council on 3 March 2014, S/PV.7125. However, by that time the Ukrainian President had long fled the country to be replaced by a new government endorsed by the parliament: see e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275. See e.g. T. Grant, 'Annexation of Crimea', **109** *AJIL*, 2015, p. 68; and Grant, *Aggression*.

181 But in the light of the principles propounded in *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 104, 120–3; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 438, 454–7.

182 See e.g. Q. Wright, 'US Intervention in the Lebanon', **53** *AJIL*, 1959, pp. 112, 122. See also R. A. Falk, *Legal Order in a Violent World*, Princeton, 1968, pp. 227–8, 273; and Doswald-Beck, 'Legal Validity', p. 251.

183 However, where consent to the presence of foreign troops has been withdrawn by the government of the state concerned, the continuing presence of those troops may constitute (in the absence of any legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence) an unlawful use of force: see e.g. *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 213, 224. See also article 3(e) of the Consensus Definition of Aggression 1974.

184 See, with regard to the UK continuance of arms sales to Nigeria during its civil war, Higgins, 'International Law and Civil Conflict', p. 173. Note also the US policy of distinguishing between traditional suppliers of arms and non-traditional suppliers of arms in such circumstances. It would support aid provided by the former (as the UK in Nigeria), but not the latter: see *DUSPIL*, 1976, p. 7.

185 The Institut de Droit International, e.g., adopted a resolution in 2011, which noted that: 'Military assistance is prohibited when it is exercised in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, of the principles of non-intervention, of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and generally accepted standards of human rights and in particular when its object is to support an established government against its own population.' This resolution, however, only dealt with internal riots below the threshold of non-international armed conflict.

186 See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 108 ff. See also Akande, 'Classification', pp. 32, 56.

¹⁸⁷ See also in similar terms the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 1965, above, p. 989. Article 3(g) of the General Assembly's Consensus Definition of Aggression 1974, characterises as an act of aggression 'the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state'. See also, with regard to US aid to the Nicaraguan 'Contras', Chayes, *Cuban Missile Crisis*; and *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 14; 76 ILR, p. 349.

¹⁸⁸ ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 108, 109–10. These propositions were reaffirmed by the Court in *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 227.

¹⁸⁹ ICJ Reports, 2005, p. 168.

¹⁹⁰ See e.g. Syrian intervention in the Jordanian Civil War of 1970 and in Lebanon in 1976; and see Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 108 ff. Note, however, the conclusion of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_II1.pdf, p. 279, that: 'Military force is never admissible as a means to carry out a claim to self-determination, including internal self-determination. There is no support in state practice for the right to use force to attain self-determination outside the context of decolonization or illegal occupation . . . This also means that a secessionist party cannot validly invite a foreign state to use force against the army of the metropolitan state.'

¹⁹¹ See e.g. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, pp. 30339, 30364, 30385 (1980). See also General Assembly resolutions ES-62, 35/37, 36/34, 37/37 and 38/29 condemning the USSR for its armed intervention in Afghanistan. See also Doswald-Beck, 'Legal Validity', pp. 230 ff.

¹⁹² See Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 86 ff. See also P. N. Okowa, 'Congo's War: The Legal Dimension of a Protracted Conflict', 77 *BYIL*, 2006, p. 203.

¹⁹³ Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 83–4, noting that the Security Council took a clear position that aid to the government was permissible, while intervention or force to overthrow the government was not. The Democratic Republic of the Congo had written to the Security Council accusing Rwanda and Uganda of aggression and justifying its invitation to Angola,

Namibia and Zimbabwe as a response to foreign intervention: see *UN Yearbook*, 1998, pp. 82–8 and S/1998/827.

¹⁹⁴ See S/1999/815.

¹⁹⁵ See also Security Council resolutions 1341 (2001) and 1355 (2001). Security Council resolution 1376 (2001) welcomed the withdrawal of some forces, including the full Namibian contingent, from the Congo. See also resolutions 1417 (2002), 1457 (2003) and 1468 (2003). Essentially condemnation was reserved by name for Rwanda and Uganda.

¹⁹⁶ See further below, *Chapter 21*, p. 1118.

¹⁹⁷ See Okowa, ‘Congo’, p. 224.

¹⁹⁸ See e.g. Security Council resolutions 1756 (2007) and 1794 (2007).

¹⁹⁹ See generally M. Schmitt, ‘Legitimacy versus Legality Redux: Arming the Syrian Rebels’, 7 *Journal of National Security Law and Policy*, 2014, p. 139; www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17258397; and http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/debate_map_syria/debate-map-use-of-force-against-syria.

²⁰⁰ A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012.

²⁰¹ See, e.g., the UK, www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-gaza-the-middle-east-peace-process-and-syria, 20 November 2012, and France, <https://in.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis/france-recognizes-new-syria-opposition-idUKBRE88J0X720121113>. See also Schmitt, ‘Legitimacy’, p. 153; and S. Talmon, ‘Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People’, 12 *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2013, p. 219. However, note that the EU Foreign Ministers declared that the EU considered the Opposition ‘legitimate representatives of the aspirations of the Syrian people’, 19 November 2012: Talmon, ‘Recognition’, p. 221.

²⁰² *DUSPIL*, 2012, p. 281. Not least as the criterion of effective control was missing: see above, *Chapter 8*, p. 383.

²⁰³ See International Crisis Group, *Silencing the Guns in Idlib*, 15 May 2020, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/213-silencing-the-guns-idlib.pdf>. See also Security

Council resolution 2401 (2018) calling for a ceasefire, but excluding ‘military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al Qaida and Al Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaida or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council’.

²⁰⁴ See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 89 ff.; and Dinstein, *War*, pp. 359 ff. See also Security Council resolutions 1973 (2011), 2214 (2015) and 2259 (2015).

²⁰⁵ See e.g. International Crisis Group, *Turkey Wades into Libya’s Troubled Waters*, 30 April 2020, www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/257-turkey-wades-libyas-troubled-waters. See also Security Council resolution 2510 (2020) endorsing the results of the Berlin Conference, S/2020/63.

²⁰⁶ See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 40 ff.; Dinstein, *War*, pp. 75 ff.; Franck, *Recourse*, chapter 9; Byers, *War Law*, Part Three; T. G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2016; R. Goodman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War’, **100** *AJIL*, 2006, p. 107; D. Kennedy, *The Dark Sides of Virtue*, Princeton, 2004; *Humanitarian Intervention* (ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and R. O. Keohane), Cambridge, 2003; S. Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law*, Oxford, 2001; *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations* (ed. R. B. Lillich), Charlottesville, 1973; Lillich, ‘Forcible Self-Help’, 1967, p. 325; R. B. Lillich, ‘Intervention to Protect Human Rights’, **15** *McGill Law Journal*, 1969, p. 205; R. B. Lillich, ‘Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Nations: Towards the Development of Criteria’, **53** *ZaöRV*, 1993, p. 557; T. M. Franck and N. S. Rodley, ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force’, **67** *AJIL*, 1973, p. 275; J. P. Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention’, **4** *California Western International Law Journal*, 1974, p. 203; R. M. Chilstrom, ‘Humanitarian Intervention under Contemporary International Law’, **1** *Yale Studies in World Public Order*, 1974, p. 93; N. D. Arnison, ‘The Law of Humanitarian Intervention’, in *Refugees in the 1990s: New Strategies for a Restless World* (ed. H. Cleveland), 1993, p. 37; D. J. Scheffer, ‘Towards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention’, **23** *University of Toledo Law Review*, 1992, p. 253; D. Kritsiotis, ‘Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention’, **19** *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 1998, p. 1005; N. Tsagourias, *The Theory and Praxis of Humanitarian Intervention*, Manchester, 1999; and F. Tesón, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality*, 2nd ed., New

York, 1997. See also J. Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect*, Oxford, 2010.

207 See e.g. H. Ganji, *The International Protection of Human Rights*, New York, 1962, chapter 1; and references cited in **previous note**.

208 See, in particular, I. Brownlie, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in Moore, *Law and Civil War*, p. 217.

209 See e.g. M. B. Akehurst, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in Bull, *Intervention in World Politics*, p. 95.

210 See the views expressed by a Foreign Office legal adviser to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, UKMIL, 63 *BYIL*, 1992, pp. 827–8. This is to be compared with the views of the Foreign Office several years earlier where it was stated that the best case that could be made was that it was not 'unambiguously illegal': see UKMIL, 57 *BYIL*, 1986, p. 619. See also Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 32 ff.; and below, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1111.

211 UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 590. See also UKMIL, 75 *BYIL*, 2004, p. 857.

212 See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 45 ff.; N. S. Rodley and B. Çali, 'Kosovo Revisited: Humanitarian Intervention on the Fault Lines of International Law', 7 *Human Rights Law Review*, 2007, p. 275; B. Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', 10 *EJIL*, 1999, p. 1; Kofi A. Annan, *The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary-General*, New York, 1999; various authors, 'NATO's Kosovo Intervention', 93 *AJIL*, 1999, pp. 824–62; D. Kritsiotis, 'The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Armed Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', 49 *ICLQ*, 2000, p. 330; P. Hilpod, 'Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?', 12 *EJIL*, 2001, p. 437; and various memoranda, 'Kosovo: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 4th Report, June 2000', 49 *ICLQ*, 2000, pp. 876–943.

213 UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 586. A Foreign Office Minister wrote that 'a limited use of force was justifiable in support of the purposes laid down by the Security Council but without the Council's express authorisation when that was the only means to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe', *ibid.*, p. 587, and see also *ibid.*, p. 598. The UK Prime Minister wrote to Parliament in 2004 stating that force may be used by states '[i]n exceptional circumstances, when it is the only way to avert an overwhelming

humanitarian catastrophe, as in Kosovo in 1999', 419 HC Deb., cols. 561W–562W, 22 March 2004; UKMIL, 75 *BYIL*, 2004, p. 853.

²¹⁴ SCOR, 3989th meeting, 26 March 1999.

²¹⁵ See 38 ILM, 1999, p. 1217.

²¹⁶ Note that Yugoslavia made an application in April 1999 to the International Court against ten of the nineteen NATO states, alleging that these states, by participating in the use of force, had violated international law. The Court rejected the application made for provisional measures in all ten cases: see e.g. *Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium)*, ICJ Reports, 1999, p. 124, and upheld preliminary objections as to jurisdiction and admissibility: see e.g. *Serbia and Montenegro v. UK*, ICJ Reports, 2004, p. 1307.

²¹⁷ See also *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 134–5; 76 ILR, p. 349, where the Court stated that the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure respect for human rights in Nicaragua.

²¹⁸ Note that the UK produced a set of Policy Guidelines on Humanitarian Crises in 2001. This provided *inter alia* that the Security Council should authorise action to halt or avert massive violations of humanitarian law and that, in response to such crises, force may be used in the face of overwhelming and immediate humanitarian catastrophe when the government cannot or will not avert it, when all non-violent methods have been exhausted, the scale of real or potential suffering justifies the risks of military action, if there is a clear objective to avert or end the catastrophe, there is clear evidence that such action would be welcomed by the people at risk and that the consequences for suffering of non-action would be worse than those of intervention. Further, the use of force should be collective, limited in scope and proportionate to achieving the humanitarian objective and consistent with international humanitarian law: UKMIL, 72 *BYIL*, 2001, p. 696.

²¹⁹ See www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version, 29 August 2013. It was stated that humanitarian intervention could constitute the legal basis, provided that three conditions were met: (i) there was convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief; (ii) it must be objectively clear that there was no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to

be saved; and (iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose). It was argued that these conditions had been met, *ibid.* See also H. H. Koh, 'The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention', 53 *Houston Law Review*, 2016, p. 971; and Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 57–8.

²²⁰ See e.g. the comments by Bethlehem, www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/, and Koh, <http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2/> (former legal advisers to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the US State Department respectively). Cf. e.g. the comments in 2013 by D. Akande, www.ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-intervention-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-legality-of-military-action-in-syria/ and M. Milanovic, www.ejiltalk.org/breaking-uk-government-discloses-legal-rationale-for-syria-intervention/.

²²¹ See e.g. 'Contemporary Practice of the United States', 111 *AJIL*, 2017, p. 781; and M. N. Schmitt and C. M. Ford, 'Assessing U.S. Justifications for Using Force in Response to Syria's Chemical Attacks: An International Law Perspective', 9 *Journal of National Security and Policy*, 2017, p. 284.

²²² See www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1144601/trump-orders-missile-attack-in-retaliation-for-syrian-chemical-strikes/. See also M. Milanovic, www.ejiltalk.org/the-clearly-illegal-us-missile-strike-in-syria/; M. Hakimi, www.ejiltalk.org/us-strikes-against-syria-and-the-implications-for-the-jus-ad-bellum/#more-15138; R. Goodman, www.justsecurity.org/39712/top-legal-experts-syria-strikes/#more-39712; cf. H. H. Koh, www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/.

²²³ See e.g. *DUSPIL*, 2018, pp. 782 ff.; www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13296.doc.htm; www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43697084 and www.independent.co.uk/voices/douma-syria-opcw-chemical-weapons-chlorine-gas-video-conspiracy-theory-russia-a8927116.html.

²²⁴ 'The UK is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force is humanitarian intervention, which requires three conditions to be met: (i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief; (ii) it

must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; and (iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering and must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose) . . . The UK considers that military action met the requirements of humanitarian intervention in the circumstances of the present case’, www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position, 14 April 2018. See, however, M. Milanovic, www.ejiltalk.org/the-syria-strikes-still-clearly-illegal/; and cf. M. Hakimi, www.ejiltalk.org/pigs-positivism-and-the-jus-ad-bellum/.

²²⁵ See e.g. J. Crawford, ‘Democracy and International Law’, *44 BYIL*, 1993, p. 113; B. R. Roth, *Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law*, Oxford, 1999; Franck, *Fairness*, chapter 4; T. M. Franck, *The Empowered Self*, Oxford, 1999; Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 64 ff.; and O. Schachter, ‘The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion’, *78 AJIL*, 1984, p. 645.

²²⁶ See e.g. *Keesing’s Record of World Events*, p. 37112 (1989). See also Nanda, ‘Validity’, p. 498.

²²⁷ See above, *Chapter 6*, p. 258.

²²⁸ See e.g. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa, 2001; Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2004, paras. 201–3; UN Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom*, A/59/2005, paras. 16–22; World Summit Outcome, General Assembly resolution 60/1, 2005, paras. 138–9; and the UN Secretary-General’s reports, A/63/677 (2009); A/64/864 (2010); A/66/874-S/2012/578 (2012); A/67/929 (2013); A/68/947 (2014); A/69/981 (2015); A/70/999 (2016); A/71/1016, 2-17 and A/72/884 (2018). See e.g. Security Council resolutions 1674 (2006); 1706 (2006) on Sudan; 1970 and 1973 (2011) on Libya; 1975 (2011) on Côte d’Ivoire; and 2165 (2014) on Syria. See also Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention*; Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 58 ff.; S. Mohamed, ‘Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect’, *48 Stanford Journal of International Law*, 2012, p. 63; A. Bellamy and P. Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection?’, *87 International Affairs*, 2011, p. 825; A. Orford, *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect*, Cambridge, 2011; *Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice* (ed. J. Hoffmann and A. Nollkaemper), Amsterdam, 2012; *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect* (ed. A. Bellamy and T. Dunne), Oxford, 2016; C. Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, *101 AJIL*, 2007, p. 99; and D. Whetham and

B. J. Strawser, *Responsibilities to Protect*, The Hague, 2015. Note also www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/index.shtml and the UK House of Lords Library Note, 'The "Responsibility to Protect" and the Application of this International Norm by the UK and the UN', July 2015, <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/LLN-2015-0020#fullreport>.

229 The doctrine may be summarised in the light of the Secretary-General's 2009 Report as follows: The state carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in fulfilling this responsibility. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the UN Charter: A/63/677 (2009) and UN Background Note, p. 4, www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20R2P%202014.pdf. See further below, Chapter 21, p. 1113.

230 See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, chapter 5; T. Becker, *Terrorism and the State*, Oxford, 2006; B. Saul, *Defining Terrorism in International Law*, Oxford, 2006; K. Trapp, *State Responsibility for International Terrorism*, Oxford, 2011; H. Duffy, *The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2015; *Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism* (ed. B. Saul), 2nd ed., Cheltenham, 2020; N. Lubell, 'The War (?) against Al-Qaeda', in Wilmshurst, *Classification of Conflicts*, p. 421; *Legal Aspects of International Terrorism* (ed. A. E. Evans and J. Murphy), Lexington, 1978; R. Friedlander, *Terrorism*, Dobbs Ferry, 1979; R. B. Lillich and T. Paxman, 'State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Caused by Terrorist Activity', **26** *American Law Review*, 1977, p. 217; *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (ed. M. C. Bassiouni), 1975; E. McWhinney, *Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism*, 2nd ed., Dordrecht, 1987; A. Cassese, *Terrorism, Politics and Law*, Cambridge, 1989; V. Lowe, "'Clear and Present Danger": Responses to Terrorism', **54** *ICLQ*, 2005, p. 185; G. Guillaume, 'Terrorism and International Law', **53** *ICLQ*, 2004, p. 537; J. Pejic, 'Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for International Law', **75** *BYIL*, 2004, p. 71; J. Delbrück, 'The Fight Against Global Terrorism', *German YIL*, 2001, p. 9; and A. Cassese, 'Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law', **95** *AJIL*, 2001, p. 993. See also www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/.

²³¹ The hijack of TWA Flight 847 on 14 June 1985 by Lebanese Shi'ites is one example of this phenomenon: see e.g. *The Economist*, 22 June 1985, p. 34.

²³² See e.g. B. Saul, 'Defining Terrorism, and Articles on the Quest for a Legal Definition', 4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2006, pp. 894 ff.

²³³ See below, p. 1113.

²³⁴ See Saul, *Defining Terrorism*, p. 270, noting that this is 'premature'. However, see also the Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law in *Prosecutor v. Ayyash* before the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 16 February 2011, [www.worldcourts.com/stl/eng/decisions/2011.02.16 Prosecutor v Ayyash.pdf](http://www.worldcourts.com/stl/eng/decisions/2011.02.16_Prosecutor_v_Ayyash.pdf), in which President Cassese held that such a definition did exist: see paras. 83 ff., especially para. 102.

²³⁵ See, with regard to the failed attempt by the League of Nations in the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism to establish a comprehensive code, e.g. Murphy, *United Nations*, p. 179. See also T. M. Franck and B. Lockwood, 'Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism', 68 *AJIL*, 1974, p. 69.

²³⁶ See the Conventions on Offences Committed on Board Aircraft 1963 and Protocol 2014; for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, and 2010 Protocol; for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971; on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973; against the Taking of Hostages 1979; on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980; for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports, Protocol 1988; for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988, and Protocol 2005; for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, Protocol 1988; on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification 1991; for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997; for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999; for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005; and for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation 2010, www.un.org/counterterrorism/international-legal-instruments.

²³⁷ See further above, Chapter 11, p. 579.

²³⁸ See General Assembly resolution 3034 (XXVII).

²³⁹ General Assembly resolution 49/60.

²⁴⁰ A supplementary declaration was adopted in 1996, which emphasised in addition that acts of terrorism and assisting them are contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. The question of asylum-seekers who had committed terrorist acts was also addressed, General Assembly resolution 51/210. See also resolution 55/158, 2001 and the 2005 World Summit Outcome, resolution 60/1.

²⁴¹ See e.g. resolutions 34/145, 35/168 and 36/33.

²⁴² Resolution 60/288. See also Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, resolution 64/297 and Review, resolution 66/282; the Secretary-General's Report on the Strategy, 2012, A/66/762; the Secretary-General's Report on the Strategy, 2016, A/70/826 and the Secretary-General's Report on the Strategy, 2018, A/72/284. See also www.un.org/counterterrorism/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.

²⁴³ General Assembly resolution 51/210.

²⁴⁴ See e.g. A/59/37 (2004); A/60/37 (2005); A/61/37 (2006); A/62/37 (2007); A/63/37 (2008); A/68/37 (2013); A/69/100 (2014); and General Assembly resolutions 57/27 (2003); 62/71 (2008); and 68/119 (2013). See also M. Hmoud, 'Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism', 4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2006, p. 1031. Major areas of contention have focused on the definition of terrorism, the scope of the proposed convention and the relationship between the proposed convention and the conventions dealing with specific terrorist crimes, *ibid*. Note General Assembly resolution 71/151 (2016) and <https://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/>. See also Security Council resolution 2354 (2017) welcoming the 'Comprehensive International Framework to Counter Terrorist Narratives', S/2017/375, including recommended guidelines and good practices to effectively counter the ways that ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities use their narratives to encourage, motivate and recruit others to commit terrorist acts.

²⁴⁵ E.g. in resolution 579 (1985), it condemned unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and abduction, and see also the statement made by the President of the Security Council on

behalf of members condemning the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* and generally ‘terrorism in all its forms, whenever and by whomever committed’, 9 October 1985, S/17554, 24 ILM, 1985, p. 1656. See e.g. H. Martinez, ‘The Legislative Role of the Security Council in its Fight against Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical Limits’, 57 *ICLQ*, 2008, p. 333.

²⁴⁶ See also resolution 1189 (1998), concerning the bombings of the US Embassies in East Africa, and resolution 1269 (1999), which reaffirms many of the points made in the 1994 General Assembly Declaration.

²⁴⁷ Emphasis in the original. See further above, p. 997, with regard to recognition of the right to self-defence in this context.

²⁴⁸ Note also the condemnation of the terrorist bombing in Bali in October 2002 – see resolution 1438 (2002); of the taking of hostages in Moscow in October 2002 referred to as a terrorist act – see resolution 1440 (2002); and of the terrorist attacks in Kenya in November 2002 – see resolution 1450 (2002).

²⁴⁹ See also resolution 1456 (2003), which *inter alia* called upon the Counter-Terrorism Committee to intensify its work through reviewing states’ reports and facilitating international assistance and cooperation. Note the establishment of a Security Council committee (the 1267 committee) to oversee sanctions imposed upon the Taliban and associated individuals and entities: resolution 1267 (1999). In resolution 1566 (2004), the Security Council established a working group to recommend practical measures against individuals and groups engaged in terrorist activities not subject to the 1267 Committee’s review. See also resolution 1822 (2008).

²⁵⁰ See resolution 1535 (2004). The mandate of the Executive Directorate was extended to the end of 2010 – see resolution 1805 (2008); and further extended to the end of 2017 – see resolution 2129 (2013).

²⁵¹ See also resolution 1977 extending the mandate of the committee to 2021, www.un.org/en/sc/1540/.

²⁵² See the website of the Committee, www.un.org/sc/ctc. Note also the case of *Boudellaa and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment of 11 October 2002, paras. 93–8.

²⁵³ Note that a Protocol amending the Convention was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in February 2003. This incorporates new offences into the Convention, being those referred to in the international conventions adopted after 1977. See also the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204> and the case-law of the ECtHR, see www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Terrorism_ENG.pdf.

²⁵⁴ Note also the establishment of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism in 1999, AF/Res. 1650 (XXIX-0/99) and the Additional Protocol on Combating Terrorism to the Agreement among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Participating States 2004.

²⁵⁵ See www.osce.org/secretariat/terrorism.

²⁵⁶ See e.g. H. J. Steiner, P. Alston and R. Goodman, *International Human Rights in Context*, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2008, chapter 5; and D. Pokempner, 'Terrorism and Human Rights: The Legal Framework', in *Terrorism and International Law* (ed. M. Schmitt and G. L. Beruto), San Remo, 2003, p. 39.

²⁵⁷ See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, A/57/1, 2002, p. 1, where the Secretary-General stated: 'I firmly believe that the terrorist menace must be suppressed, but states must ensure that counter-terrorist measures do not violate human rights.'

²⁵⁸ See e.g. the statement of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of 8 March 2002, A/57/18, pp. 106–7, and the statement by the Committee against Torture of 22 November 2001, CAT/C/XXVII/Misc.7. Note also that on 27 March 2003, the legal expert of the Counter-Terrorism Committee briefed the UN Human Rights Committee: see UN Press Release of that date. See also the report on Terrorism and Human Rights by Special Rapporteur K. K. Koufa to the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2004, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40. Note that the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee has emphasised that states in adopting measures to counter terrorism must comply with all their international law obligations, including those relating to human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law, and issued policy

guidance to the Executive Directorate noting that human rights should be incorporated into its communications strategy: see S/AC.40/2006/PG.2.

²⁵⁹ See resolution 2005/80. This mandate was assumed by the Human Rights Council: see General Assembly resolution 60/251 and see Council resolution 6/28. See further on the Human Rights Council, above, Chapter 6, p. 270. The Special Rapporteur produces annual reports, e.g. report on terrorist-profiling practices and human rights, 2007: see also 2020 report on preventing and countering violent extremism, A/HRC/43/46. See generally www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Terrorism/Pages/SRTerrorismIndex.aspx#:~:text=At%20its%20thirty%2Dfifth%20session,fundamental%20freedoms%20while%20countering%20terrorism.

²⁶⁰ See e.g. A/HRC/4/26, pp. 21 ff. and the report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/CN.4/2006/53, paras. 44 ff. In particular, the need for resort to force as a last resort and the requirement of proportionality were emphasised: see also the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers, General Assembly resolution 34/169.

²⁶¹ See e.g. L. N. Sadat, ‘Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under International Law’, 37 *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 2005–06, p. 309; and J. T. Parry, ‘The Shape of Modern Torture: Extraordinary Rendition and Ghost Detainees’, 6 *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, 2005, p. 516.

²⁶² See e.g. Lord Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, 53 *ICLQ*, 2004, p. 1; F. Johns, ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’, 16 *EJIL*, 2005, p. 613; and T. Gill and E. van Sliedregt, ‘Guantanamo Bay: A Reflection on the Legal Status and Rights of “Unlawful Enemy Combatants”’, 1 *Utrecht Law Review*, 2005, p. 28. Note in particular the joint report by the five UN Special Rapporteurs respectively on arbitrary detention, on the independence of judges and lawyers, on torture, on freedom of religion or belief and on the right of everyone to physical and mental health, 16 February 2006, and the reports by the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on secret detentions and illegal transfer of detainees involving Council of Europe members of 22 January 2006, AS/Jur (2006) 03 rev. and of 7 June 2007, AS/Jur (2007) 36. The EU signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 and Additional Protocol on 22 October 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20151022_2_en.htm. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted precautionary measures in favour of detainees in Guantanamo Bay,

requesting the US to take ‘urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal’: see Annual Report of the IACHR, 2002, chapter III(C)(1), para. 80, first precautionary measures reiterated and amplified in 2003, 2004 and 2005: see B. D. Tittmore, ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A Case for International Oversight in the Struggle Against Terrorism’, *6 Human Rights Law Review*, 2006, p. 378. See also with regard to US courts and Guantanamo Bay, above, Chapter 11, p. 566, **note 59**.

263 Supplemented in March 2005 by guidelines concerning the protection of victims of terrorist acts.

264 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr. Note the creation by the OAS Assembly of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism in 2014, which has *inter alia* produced a number of resolutions and declarations: see e.g. www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/default.asp.

265 See generally K. Kittichaisaree, *Public International Law of Cyberspace*, Basel, 2017; F. Delerue, *Cyber Operations and International Law*, Cambridge, 2020; H. Moynihan, *The Application of International Law to State Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention*, Chatham House, 2019; R. Buchan, *Cyber Espionage and International Law*, Oxford, 2018; International Group of Experts, *Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2017; D. Efrony and Y. Shany, ‘A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyber Operations and Subsequent State Practice’, *112 AJIL*, 2018, p. 583; G. Brown and K. Poellet, ‘The Customary International Law of Cyberspace’, *6 Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 2012, p. 126; Y. Dinstei and A. W. Dahl, *Oslo Manual on Select Topics of the Law of Armed Conflict*, Switzerland, 2020; H. H. Diniss, *Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War*, Cambridge, 2012; R. Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’, *17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 2012, p. 211; M. Roscini, ‘Cyber Operations as a Use of Force’, in *Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace* (ed. N. Tsagourias and R. Buchan), Cheltenham, 2015, p. 233; M. C. Waxman, ‘Cyber Attacks as “Force” under UN Charter Article 2(4)’, in *International Law and the Changing Character of War* (ed. R. Pedrozo and D. P. Wollschlaeger), *87 International Law Studies*, US Naval War College, 2011, p. 43. See also the updated ICRC Commentary to the First Geneva Convention article 2, March 2016, paras. 253 ff., <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518>. See

also above, Chapter 13, p. 735, on state responsibility and cyber activities and below, Chapter 20, p. 1063, on cyber warfare and international humanitarian law.

²⁶⁶ Note that any action which constitutes intervention in domestic affairs under article 2(7) of the UN Charter will be unlawful.

²⁶⁷ See e.g. Y. Ronen, ‘Some Evidentiary Dimensions to Attributing Unlawful Cyber Operations to States’, Hebrew University Law Faculty, Research Paper No. 03-20, April 2020; Y. Shany and M. N. Schmitt, ‘An International Attribution Mechanism for Hostile Cyber Operations’, **96** *International Law Studies*, 2020; and https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3628435. See also C. Antonopoulos, ‘State Responsibility in Cyberspace’, in Tsagourias and Buchan Research Handbook, pp. 55, 64, suggesting a reversal of the burden of proof with regard to cyber operations. See also above, Chapter 18, p. 953, with regard to evidence and the ICJ.

²⁶⁸ *Tallinn Manual*, pp. 330 ff. See also *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 103.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 334 ff.

²⁷⁰ See www.timesofisrael.com/iran-cyberattack-on-israels-water-supply-could-have-sickened-hundreds-report/.

²⁷¹ Note that both the UK and the US appear to set a rather high standard as to casualties caused in such circumstances, see **following footnote**.

²⁷² *Tallinn Manual*, pp. 339 ff. See also the statement by the UK Attorney-General on 23 May 2018, noting that ‘cyber operations that result in, or present an imminent threat of, death and destruction on an equivalent scale to an armed attack will give rise to an inherent right to take action in self-defence, as recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter’, giving as examples cyber attacks on nuclear reactors resulting in widespread loss of life or on air traffic control towers resulting in lethal effects, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century. The US Legal Adviser declared on 18 September 2012 that: ‘In analyzing whether a cyber operation would constitute a use of force, most commentators focus on whether the direct physical injury and property damage resulting from the cyber event looks like that which would be considered a use of force if produced by kinetic weapons. *Cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force*. In assessing whether an

event constituted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors: including the context of the event, the actor perpetrating the action (recognizing challenging issues of attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects and intent, among other possible issues. Commonly cited examples of cyber activity that would constitute a use of force include, for example: (1) operations that trigger a nuclear plant meltdown; (2) operations that open a dam above a populated area causing destruction; or (3) operations that disable air traffic control resulting in airplane crashes' (emphasis in the original). Further, the 'right of self-defence may be triggered by computer network activities that amount to an armed attack or imminent threat thereof. As the United States affirmed in its 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, "when warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country"', <https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm>. See also *DUSPIL*, 2014, p. 734. See also *National Security Strategy of the United States*, December 2017, pp. 12 ff.

²⁷³ *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 101 ff. The International Court has not developed this distinction and has not specified the level of gravity that would separate a use of force from an armed attack. Note that the International Group of Experts were divided as to whether the deployment of the Stuxnet computer virus against Iranian centrifuges in the context of its nuclear programme constituted an armed attack or the use of force, *Tallinn Manual*, p. 342.

²⁷⁴ See also *Tallinn Manual*, pp. 348 ff. The same rules will apply with regard to action in collective self-defence, see above, p. 1006.

²⁷⁵ NATO e.g. has accepted that cyber defence is part of its mandate of collective self-defence, to be decided on a case-by-case basis, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.

²⁷⁶ Discussed below in *Chapter 21*, p. 1084.

²⁷⁷ See above, p. 1024; and see *Tallinn Manual*, pp. 345 ff.

International Humanitarian Law

In addition to prescribing laws governing resort to force (*jus ad bellum*), international law also seeks to regulate the conduct of hostilities (*jus in bello*). These principles cover, for example, the treatment of prisoners of war, civilians in occupied territory, sick and wounded personnel, prohibited methods of warfare and human rights in situations of conflict.¹ This subject was originally termed the laws of war and then the laws of armed conflict. More recently, it has been called international humanitarian law. Although international humanitarian law is primarily derived from a number of international conventions, some of these represent in whole or in part rules of customary international law, and it is possible to say that a number of customary international law principles exist over and above conventional rules,² although international humanitarian law is one of the most highly codified parts of international law. Reliance upon relevant customary international law rules is particularly important where one or more of the states involved in a particular conflict is not a party to a pertinent convention. A good example of this relates to the work of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, which noted that since Eritrea did not become a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 until 14 August 2000, the applicable law before that date for relevant claims was customary international humanitarian law.³ On the other hand, treaty provisions that cannot be said to be part of customary international law⁴ will bind only those states that are parties to

them. This is particularly important with regard to some provisions deemed controversial by some states contained in Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions 1949. One additional factor that has emerged recently has been the growing convergence between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, coupled with the relevance in this context of the rules of international criminal law. This is discussed below.⁵

Development

The law in this area developed from the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1864, as a result of the pioneering work of Henry Dunant,⁶ who had been appalled by the brutality of the Battle of Solferino five years earlier, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field was adopted. This brief instrument was revised in 1906. In 1868, the Declaration of St Petersburg prohibited the use of small explosive or incendiary projectiles. The laws of war were codified at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.⁷

A series of conventions were adopted at these conferences concerning land and naval warfare, which still form the basis of the existing rules. It was emphasised that belligerents remained subject to the law of nations and the use of force against undefended villages and towns was forbidden. It defined those entitled to belligerent status and dealt with the measures to be taken as regards occupied territory. There were also provisions concerning the rights and duties of neutral states and persons in case of war,⁸ and an emphatic prohibition on the employment of 'arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering'. However, there were inadequate means to

implement and enforce such rules with the result that much appeared to depend on reciprocal behaviour, public opinion and the exigencies of morale.⁹ A number of conventions in the inter-war period dealt with rules concerning the wounded and sick in armies in the field and prisoners of war.¹⁰ Such agreements were replaced by the Four Geneva 'Red Cross' Conventions of 1949 which dealt respectively with the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea, the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war.¹¹ The Fourth Convention was an innovation and a significant attempt to protect civilians who, as a result of armed hostilities or occupation, were in the power of a state of which they were not nationals.

The foundation of the Geneva Conventions system is the principle that persons not actively engaged in warfare should be treated humanely.¹² A number of practices ranging from the taking of hostages to torture, illegal executions and reprisals against persons protected by the Conventions are prohibited, while a series of provisions relate to more detailed points, such as the standard of care of prisoners of war and the prohibition of deportations and indiscriminate destruction of property in occupied territory. In 1977, two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Conventions were adopted.¹³ These built upon and developed the earlier Conventions. While many provisions may be seen as reflecting customary law, others do not and thus cannot constitute obligations upon states that are not parties to either or both of the Protocols.¹⁴ Additional Protocol III was adopted in 2005 and introduced a third emblem to the two previously recognised ones (the Red Cross and the Red Crescent)

in the form of a red diamond within which either a Red Cross or Red Crescent, or another emblem which has been in effective use by a High Contracting Party and was the subject of a communication to the other High Contracting Parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross through the depositary prior to the adoption of this Protocol, may be inserted. This allows in particular for the use of the Israeli Red Magen David (Shield of David) symbol.¹⁵

The International Court of Justice has noted that the ‘Law of the Hague’, dealing primarily with inter-state rules governing the use of force or the ‘laws and customs of war’ as they were traditionally termed, and the ‘Law of Geneva’, concerning the protection of persons from the effects of armed conflicts, ‘have become so closely interrelated that they are considered to have gradually formed one single complex system, known today as international humanitarian law’.¹⁶ More than this, the increasing influence of international human rights law and, indeed, of relevant domestic provisions has ensured that this branch of the law is increasingly complex and sophisticated.

The Scope of Protection under International Humanitarian Law

The rules of international humanitarian law seek to extend protection to a wide range of persons, but the basic distinction drawn has been between combatants and those who are not involved in actual hostilities. Common article 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides that the Conventions ‘shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may

arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties even if the state of war is not recognised by them . . . [and] to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance’. The rules contained in these Conventions cannot be renounced by those intended to benefit from them, thus precluding the possibility that the power which has control over them may seek to influence the persons concerned to agree to a mitigation of protection.¹⁷

The Wounded and Sick

The First Geneva Convention concerns the Wounded and Sick on Land and emphasises that members of the armed forces and organised militias, including those accompanying them where duly authorised, ‘shall be respected and protected in all circumstances’.¹⁸ They are to be treated humanely by the party to the conflict into whose power they have fallen on a non-discriminatory basis and any attempts upon their lives or violence to their person is strictly prohibited. Torture or biological experimentation is forbidden, nor are such persons to be wilfully left without medical assistance and care.¹⁹ The wounded and sick of a belligerent who fall into enemy hands are also to be treated as prisoners of war.²⁰ Further, the parties to a conflict shall take all possible measures to protect the wounded and sick and ensure their adequate care and to ‘search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled’.²¹ The parties to the conflict are to record as soon as possible the details of any wounded, sick or dead persons of the adversary party and to transmit them to the other side through particular means.²² This Convention also includes provisions as to medical units and establishments, noting in

particular that these should not be attacked,²³ and deals with the recognised emblems (i.e. the Red Cross, the Red Crescent and, after Additional Protocol III, the Red Diamond).²⁴

The Second Geneva Convention concerns the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea and is very similar to the First Convention, for instance in its provisions that members of the armed forces and organised militias, including those accompanying them where duly authorised, and who are sick, wounded or shipwrecked are to be treated humanely and cared for on a non-discriminatory basis, and that attempts upon their lives and violence and torture are prohibited.²⁵ The Convention also provides that hospital ships may in no circumstances be attacked or captured, but must be respected and protected.²⁶ The provisions in these Conventions were reaffirmed in and supplemented by Additional Protocol I 1977, Parts I and II. Article 1(4), for example, supplements common article 2 contained in the Conventions and provides that the Protocol is to apply in armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes as enshrined in the UN Charter and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law.

Prisoners of War²⁷

The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 is concerned with prisoners of war, and consists of a comprehensive code centred upon the requirement of humane treatment in all circumstances.²⁸ The definition of prisoners of war in article 4, however, is of particular importance since it has been regarded as the elaboration of combatant status. It covers members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict (as well as members of militias and other volunteer corps forming part of such armed force) and members of other militias and volunteer corps, including those of organised resistance movements, belonging to a party to the conflict providing the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; (c) carrying arms openly; and (d) conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.²⁹ This article reflected the experience of the Second World War, although the extent to which resistance personnel were covered was constrained by the need to comply with the four conditions. Since 1949, the use of guerrillas spread to the Developing Countries and the decolonisation experience. Accordingly, pressures grew to expand the definition of combatants entitled to prisoner of war status to such persons, who as practice demonstrated rarely complied with the four conditions. States facing guerrilla action, whether the colonial powers or others such as Israel, objected. Articles 43 and 44 of Additional Protocol I 1977, provide that combatants are members of the armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict.³⁰ Such armed forces consist of all organised armed units under an effective command structure which enforces compliance with the rules of international

law applicable in armed conflict. Article 44(3) further notes that combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. When an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, the status of combatant may be retained provided that arms are carried openly during each military engagement and during such time as the combatant is visible to the adversary while engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack. This formulation is clearly controversial and was the subject of many declarations in the vote at the conference producing the draft.³¹

Article 5 also provides that where there is any doubt as to the status of any person committing a belligerent act and falling into the hands of the enemy, ‘such person shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal’.³² This formulation was changed somewhat in article 45 of Additional Protocol I. This provides that a person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse party ‘shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war and therefore shall be protected by the Third Convention’. The term ‘unlawful combatant’, therefore, refers to a person who fails the tests laid down in articles 43 and 44, after due determination of status, and who would not be entitled to the status of prisoner of war under international humanitarian law. Such a person, who would thus be a civilian, would be protected by the basic humanitarian guarantees laid down in articles 45(3) and 75 of Additional Protocol I and by the general principles of international human rights law in terms of his or her treatment upon capture. However, since such a person would not have the status of a prisoner of war, he would not benefit from the

protections afforded by such status and would thus be liable to prosecution under the normal criminal law.³³

The framework of obligations covering prisoners of war is founded upon ‘the requirement of treatment of POWs as human beings’, while: ‘At the core of the Convention regime are legal obligations to keep POWs alive and in good health.’³⁴ Article 13 provides that prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated and must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against ‘insults and public curiosity’.³⁵ This means that displaying prisoners of war on television in a humiliating fashion confessing to ‘crimes’ or criticising their own government must be regarded as a breach of the Convention.³⁶ Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited. Article 14 provides that prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour.³⁷

Prisoners of war are bound only to divulge their name, date of birth, rank and serial number. Article 17 provides that ‘no physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted . . . to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.’ Once captured, prisoners of war are to be evacuated as soon as possible to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger,³⁸ while article 23 stipulates that ‘no prisoner of war may at any time be sent to, or detained in, areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations’.³⁹ Prisoners of war are subject to the laws and orders of the state detaining them.⁴⁰ They may be

punished for disciplinary offences and tried for offences committed before capture, for example for war crimes. They may also be tried for offences committed before capture against the law of the state holding them.⁴¹ Other provisions of this Convention deal with medical treatment, religious activities, discipline, labour and relations with the exterior. Article 118 provides that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities. The Convention on prisoners of war applies only to international armed conflicts,⁴² but article 3 (which is common to the four Conventions) provides that as a minimum ‘persons . . . including members of armed forces, who have laid down their arms and those placed *hors de combat* by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely’.

Protection of Civilians and Occupation

The Fourth Geneva Convention is concerned with the protection of civilians in time of war and builds upon the Hague Regulations (attached to Hague Convention IV on the Law and Customs of War on Land 1907).⁴³ This Geneva Convention, which marked an extension to the pre-1949 rules, is limited under article 4 to those persons ‘who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals’. The Convention comes into operation immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities or the start of an occupation and ends at the general close of military operations.⁴⁴ Under article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I 1977, a civilian is defined as any person not a combatant,⁴⁵ and in cases of doubt a person is to be considered a civilian. The Fourth Convention provides

a highly developed set of rules for the protection of such civilians, including the right to respect for person, honour, convictions and religious practices, and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, hostage-taking and reprisals.⁴⁶ The wounded and sick are the object of particular protection and respect⁴⁷ and there are various judicial guarantees as to due process.⁴⁸

The protection of civilians in occupied territories is covered in section III of Part III of the Fourth Geneva Convention,⁴⁹ but what precisely occupied territory is may be open to dispute.⁵⁰ Article 42 of the Hague Regulations provides that territory is to be considered as occupied ‘when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army’ and that the occupation only extends to the territory ‘where such authority has been established and can be exercised’,⁵¹ while article 2(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that it is to apply to all cases of partial or total occupation ‘of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no resistance’. The International Court in *Congo v. Uganda*⁵² noted that in order to determine whether a state whose forces are present on the territory of another state is an occupying power, one must examine whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the said authority was in fact established and exercised by the intervening state in the areas in question. The Court understood this to mean in practice in that case that Ugandan forces in the Congo were stationed there in particular areas and that they had substituted their own authority for that of the Congolese government.

The military occupation of enemy territory is termed ‘belligerent occupation’ and international law establishes a legal framework concerning the legal

relations of occupier and occupied. There are two key conditions for the establishment of an occupation in this sense: first, that the former government is no longer capable of publicly exercising its authority in the area in question; and, secondly, that the occupying power is in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the former government.⁵³ An occupation will cease as soon as the occupying power is forced out or evacuates the area.⁵⁴ Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides the essential framework of the law of occupation. It notes: ‘The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’⁵⁵ This establishes several key elements. First, only ‘authority’ and not sovereignty passes to the occupier.⁵⁶ The former government retains sovereignty and may be deprived of it only with its consent. Secondly, the basis of authority of the occupier lies in effective control. Thirdly, the occupier has both the obligation and the right to maintain public order in the occupied territory. Fourthly, the existing laws of the territory must be preserved as far as possible.

The situation with regard to the West Bank of Jordan (sometimes known as Judaea and Samaria), for example, demonstrates the problems that may arise. Israel has argued that since the West Bank has never been recognised internationally as Jordanian territory,⁵⁷ it cannot therefore be regarded as its territory to which the Convention would apply. In other words, to recognise that the Convention applies formally would be tantamount to recognition of Jordanian sovereignty over the disputed land.⁵⁸ However, the International Court has stated that the Convention ‘is applicable in any occupied territory

in the event of an armed conflict arising between two or more High Contracting Parties’ so that with regard to the Israel/Palestine territories question, ‘the Convention is applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay to the east of the Green Line [i.e. the 1949 armistice line] and which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precise legal status of those territories’.⁵⁹ The Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission has pointed out that: ‘These protections [provided by international humanitarian law] should not be cast into doubt because the belligerents dispute the status of territory . . . respecting international protections in such situations does not prejudice the status of the territory.’⁶⁰ Further, the Commission emphasised that ‘neither text [the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention] suggests that only territory the title of which is clear and uncontested can be occupied territory’.⁶¹

Article 47 provides that persons protected under the Convention cannot be deprived in any case or in any manner whatsoever of the benefits contained in the Convention by any change introduced as a result of the occupation nor by any agreement between the authorities of the occupied territory and the occupying power nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory. Article 49 prohibits ‘individual or mass forcible transfers’, as well as deportations of protected persons from the occupied territory regardless of motive, while the occupying power ‘shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies’.⁶² Other provisions refer to the prohibition of forced work or conscription of protected persons, and the prohibition of the destruction of real or personal property except where rendered absolutely necessary by military operations,

and of any alteration of the status of public or judicial officials.⁶³ The occupying power also has the responsibility to ensure that the local population has adequate food and medical supplies and, if not, to facilitate relief schemes.⁶⁴ Article 70 provides that protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted for acts committed or opinions expressed before the occupation, apart from breaches of the laws of war.⁶⁵

In addition to the traditional rules of humanitarian law, international human rights law may now be seen as in principle applicable to occupation situations. The International Court interpreted article 43 of the Hague Regulations to include ‘the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any third state’.⁶⁶ Further, the Court has stated that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, unless there has been a relevant derogation permitted by the convention in question. The Court has also emphasised that many human rights treaties apply to the conduct of states parties where the state is exercising jurisdiction on foreign territory⁶⁷ and that in such cases the matter will fall to be determined by the applicable *lex specialis*, that is international humanitarian law.⁶⁸ In *Congo v. Uganda*, the Court reaffirmed that ‘international human rights instruments are applicable “in respect of acts done by a state in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory”, particularly in occupied territories’.⁶⁹ It was concluded that Uganda was internationally responsible for various violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including those committed by virtue of failing to comply with its obligations as an occupying power.⁷⁰

As part of this general approach, the Court has noted that the principle of self-determination applies to the Palestinian people,⁷¹ and that the construction by Israel of a separation barrier (sometimes termed a wall or a fence) between its territory and the occupied West Bank was unlawful to the extent that it was situated within the occupied territories.⁷² Further, although an occupying power can plead military exigencies and the requirements of national security or public order in the framework of the international law of occupation, the route of the wall could not be so justified.⁷³

The Israeli Supreme Court in a judgment rendered shortly before the International Court's Advisory Opinion emphasised that the authority of a military commander to order the construction of each segment of the separation barrier could not be founded upon political as distinct from military considerations and that the barrier could not be motivated by annexation wishes nor in order to draw a political border. Such military authority was inherently temporary since belligerent occupation was inherently temporary.⁷⁴ In a further case, decided one year after the International Court's Advisory Opinion, the Israeli Supreme Court referred to the balance to be drawn between the legitimate security needs of the state, its military forces and of persons present in the occupied area in question on the one hand, and the human rights of the local population derived from international humanitarian law on the other.⁷⁵ The Court also proceeded on the assumption that the international conventions on human rights applied in the area.⁷⁶ In addressing the question as to how to achieve what was termed the 'delicate balance' between military necessity and humanitarian considerations, the Court referred to the application of general principles of law, one of these being the principle of proportionality. This principle was

based on three sub-tests, the first being a call for a fit between goal and means, the second calling for the application of the least harmful means in such a situation, and the third being that the damage caused to an individual by the means employed must be of appropriate proportion to the benefit stemming from it.⁷⁷ Each segment of the route of the barrier had to be assessed in the light of the impact upon the Palestinian residents and whether any impingement was proportional.⁷⁸

The UK *Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict* has underlined that: ‘an occupying power is also responsible for ensuring respect for applicable human rights standards in the occupied territory’ and that: ‘Where the occupying power is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights the standards of that Convention may, depending on the circumstances, be applicable in the occupied territories.’⁷⁹

Moving further beyond the traditional and passive approach with regard to the law of occupation,⁸⁰ the Security Council adopted resolution 1483 (2003) after the coalition military action against Iraq, reaffirming the position of the United Kingdom and the United States as occupying powers in Iraq under international law, but placing upon them (and the Coalition Provisional Authority, which included other states) a range of other powers and responsibilities over and above the international law relating to occupation.⁸¹ These included the obligation ‘to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including . . . the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future’ and the relevance of the establishment of an internationally recognised, representative government of Iraq. In addition, a Special

Representative for Iraq was appointed, whose functions included the promotion of human rights.

International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law

As noted in the previous section, the relationship between these two branches of international law has been undergoing consideration and re-evaluation. Once thought of as separate and distinct, it is now accepted that there is a degree of overlap. In particular situations, treaties on human rights applicable to one state may apply to that state extraterritorially.⁸² One example, noted above, concerns the situation where one state occupies territory beyond its borders. The European Commission on Human Rights in *Cyprus v. Turkey (First and Second Applications)*, for example, declared that in belligerent operations a state was bound to respect not only the humanitarian law laid down in the Geneva Conventions, but also fundamental human rights,⁸³ while the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in the *La Tablada* case against Argentina noted that it was in situations of internal armed conflict that international humanitarian law and international human rights law ‘most converge and reinforce each other’. However, there were difficulties in resorting simply to human rights law when issues of the right to life arise in combat situations, so that ‘the Commission must necessarily look to and apply definitional standards and relevant rules of humanitarian law as sources of authoritative guidance in its resolution’ of such issues.⁸⁴

The question that has been raised is whether international humanitarian law is *lex specialis* to the general law or *lex generalis* of international human rights

law, thus displacing the latter within its own sphere. The International Court in two cases did specifically refer to this.⁸⁵ Another approach is to regard the question as one of interpretation of rules that apply in the particular case without any general displacement.⁸⁶ It is not unusual for human rights bodies to refer to humanitarian law in discussing the right to life in armed conflict. In November 2015, for example, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted General Comment No. 3 concerning article 4 (the right to life) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.⁸⁷ This noted that:

In armed conflict, what constitutes an 'arbitrary' deprivation of life during the conduct of hostilities is to be determined by reference to international humanitarian law. This law does not prohibit the use of force in hostilities against lawful targets (for example combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities) if necessary from a military perspective, provided that, in all circumstances, the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attack are observed. Any violation of international humanitarian law resulting in death, including war crimes, will be an arbitrary deprivation of life.⁸⁸

Of interest is the Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the *Santo Domingo Massacre* case,⁸⁹ where the Court noted that it was able

to use the rules of international humanitarian law ‘as a supplementary norm of interpretation’ of the relevant provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.⁹⁰

The relationship between the principles of international humanitarian law and those of human rights law is further illustrated in the cases of detention of civilians by the forces of one state present in another state.⁹¹ In the important case of *Hassan v. United Kingdom*, the European Court of Human Rights took the view that the provisions on detention of prisoners of war and the internment of protected persons contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 could be read into article 5 (concerning the right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights as part of the process of interpreting the latter in the light of international law generally.⁹² The Court also interpreted the habeas corpus requirement in article 5(4) in a manner that would incorporate the administrative forms of review under the Fourth Geneva Convention.⁹³ This is a development from the approach in cases such as *Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom*⁹⁴ and *Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom*,⁹⁵ where the approach was that once the Court had found jurisdiction and the state had made no derogation under article 15 of the European Convention, then the latter instrument would simply apply. The International Court returned to the issue in *Croatia v. Serbia*,⁹⁶ concluding that, while it could not rule in general and abstract terms on the relationship between the Genocide Convention and international humanitarian law since it was concerned with a dispute over the interpretation and application of the former, the rules of international humanitarian law might be relevant in order to decide whether the acts alleged by the parties constituted genocide within the meaning of article II of the Genocide Convention. It is also to be noted

that most international human rights conventions permit derogations from particular rights in times of war or public emergency.⁹⁷

A further question concerning the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law was raised in *Yesh Din v. IDF Chief of Staff*,⁹⁸ which concerned whether the standards of law enforcement under human rights law or those under the law of armed conflict were applicable in cases of rules of engagement governing the use of force by troops at the Israel–Gaza border faced by rioting, including the loss of life. The Israeli Supreme Court essentially accepted the government argument that the applicable law enforcement model for dealing with rioters could be displaced in the circumstances of the Hamas/Israel armed conflict by the conduct of hostilities rules where particular rioters engaged in hostilities by, for example, holding explosive devices. This would allow for a more vigorous response.

The Conduct of Hostilities⁹⁹

International law, in addition to seeking to protect victims of armed conflicts, also tries to constrain the conduct of military operations in a humanitarian fashion. In analysing the rules contained in the ‘Law of the Hague’, it is important to bear in mind the delicate balance to be maintained between military necessity¹⁰⁰ and humanitarian considerations.¹⁰¹ A principle of long-standing, if not always honoured in practice, is the requirement to protect civilians against the effects of hostilities. As far as the civilian population is concerned during hostilities,¹⁰² the basic rule (sometimes termed the principle of distinction)¹⁰³ formulated in article 48 of Additional Protocol I is that the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between such population and combatants and between civilian and military objectives and must direct their operations only against military objectives.¹⁰⁴ Military objectives are limited in article 52(2) to ‘those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’. There is thus a principle of proportionality to be considered. Judge Higgins, for example, in referring to this principle, noted that ‘even a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from the attack’.¹⁰⁵ Issues have arisen particularly with regard to so-called ‘dual use’ objects such as bridges, roads and power stations,¹⁰⁶ and care must be taken to interpret these so that such objects are not indiscriminately attacked on the one hand, while ensuring that, on the other, such objects or facilities are not used by opposing

military forces in an attempt to secure immunity from attack, with the inevitable result that civilians may be endangered.¹⁰⁷ Much will depend upon whether the military circumstances are such that they fall within the definition provided in article 52(2). This will require a balancing of military need and civilian endangerment.

Article 51 provides that the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, 'shall not be the object of attack.'¹⁰⁸ Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.'¹⁰⁹ Additionally, indiscriminate attacks¹¹⁰ are prohibited.¹¹¹ Article 57 provides that in the conduct of military operations, 'constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects'.¹¹²

Although reprisals involving the use of force are now prohibited in international law (unless they can be brought within the framework of self-defence),¹¹³ belligerent reprisals during an armed conflict may in certain circumstances be legitimate. Their purpose is to ensure the termination of the prior unlawful act which precipitated the reprisal and a return to legality. They must be proportionate to the prior illegal act.¹¹⁴ Modern law, however, has restricted their application. Reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited by article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention, while article 52 of Additional Protocol I provides that civilian objects are not to be the object of attack or of reprisals.¹¹⁵ Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in article 52(2).¹¹⁶ Cultural objects and places of worship are also protected,¹¹⁷ as are objects deemed indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for

the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works, so long as they are not used as sustenance solely for the armed forces or in direct support of military action.¹¹⁸ Attacks are also prohibited against works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear generating stations.¹¹⁹

The right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods of warfare is not unconstrained.¹²⁰ The Preamble of the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868, banning explosives or inflammatory projectiles below 400 grams in weight, emphasises that the ‘only legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy’, while article 48 of Additional Protocol I provides that a distinction must at all times be drawn between civilians and combatants. Article 22 of the Hague Regulations points out that the ‘right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited’,¹²¹ while article 23(e) stipulates that it is especially prohibited to ‘employ arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering’.¹²² Quite how one may define such weapons is rather controversial and can only be determined in the light of actual state practice.¹²³ The balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations is relevant here. The International Court in its Advisory Opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*¹²⁴ summarised the situation in the following authoritative way:

The cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and

civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; states must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.

According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants; it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In application of that second principle, states do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use.

The Court emphasised that the fundamental rules flowing from these principles bound all states, whether or not they had ratified the Hague and Geneva Conventions, since they constituted ‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’.¹²⁵ At the heart of such rules and principles lies the ‘overriding consideration of humanity’.¹²⁶ Whether the actual possession or threat or use of nuclear weapons would be regarded as illegal in international law has been a highly controversial question,¹²⁷ although there is no doubt that such weapons fall within the general application of international humanitarian law.¹²⁸ The International Court has emphasised that, in examining the legality of any particular situation, the principles regulating the resort to force, including the right to self-defence, need to be coupled with the requirement to consider also the norms governing the means

and methods of warfare itself. Accordingly, the types of weapons used and the way in which they are used are also part of the legal equation in analysing the legitimacy of any use of force in international law.¹²⁹ The Court analysed state practice and concluded that nuclear weapons were not prohibited either specifically or by express provision.¹³⁰ Nor were they prohibited by analogy with poisoned gases prohibited under the Second Hague Declaration of 1899, article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925.¹³¹ Nor were they prohibited by the series of treaties¹³² concerning the acquisition, manufacture, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons and the treaties concerning the ban on such weapons in certain areas of the world.¹³³ Nor were nuclear weapons prohibited as a consequence of a series of General Assembly resolutions, which taken together fell short of establishing the necessary *opinio juris* for the creation of a new rule to that effect.¹³⁴ In so far as the principles of international humanitarian law were concerned, the Court, beyond noting their applicability, could reach no conclusion. The Court felt unable to determine whether the principle of neutrality or the principles of international humanitarian law or indeed the norm of self-defence prohibited the threat or use of nuclear weapons.¹³⁵ This rather weak conclusion, however, should be seen in the context of continuing efforts to ban all nuclear weapons testing, the increasing number of treaties prohibiting such weapons in specific geographical areas and the commitment given in 1995 by the five declared nuclear weapons states not to use such weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, it does seem clear that the possession of nuclear weapons and their use *in extremis* and in strict accordance with the criteria

governing the right to self-defence are not prohibited under international law.¹³⁷

A number of specific bans on particular weapons has been imposed.¹³⁸ Examples would include small projectiles under the St Petersburg formula of 1868, dum-dum bullets under the Hague Declaration of 1899 and asphyxiating and deleterious gases under the Hague Declaration of 1899 and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.¹³⁹ Under the 1980 Conventional Weapons Treaty,¹⁴⁰ Protocol I 1980, it is prohibited to use weapons that cannot be detected by X-rays, while Protocol II 1980 (minimally amended in 1996), prohibits the use of mines and booby-traps against civilians, Protocol III 1980, the use of incendiary devices against civilians or against military objectives located within a concentration of civilians where the attack is by air-delivered incendiary weapons, Protocol IV 1995, the use of blinding laser weapons and Protocol V 2003 concerns the explosive remnants of war. In 1997, the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction was adopted.¹⁴¹

Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Conventions provides that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.¹⁴² Article 55 further states that care is to be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against such damage, which may prejudice the health or survival of the population, while noting also that attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of

Environmental Modification Techniques 1977 prohibits such activities having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other state party. An issue of rising concern is the use of drones (remotely piloted aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles).¹⁴³ While not illegal *per se*, their use is regulated by the same rules as pertain to manned aircraft and general humanitarian law.¹⁴⁴ That is, they fall within the legal rules concerning the resort to armed force (see Chapter 19), international humanitarian law and to the extent that it is relevant international human rights law.¹⁴⁵

Armed Conflicts: International and Internal

The rules of international humanitarian law apply to armed conflicts. Accordingly, no formal declaration of war is required in order for the Conventions to apply. The concept of ‘armed conflict’ is not defined in the Conventions or Protocols, although it has been noted that ‘any difference arising between states and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict’ and ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups within a state’.¹⁴⁶

A distinction has historically been drawn between international and non-international armed conflicts,¹⁴⁷ founded upon the difference between inter-state relations, which was the proper focus for international law, and intra-state matters, which traditionally fell within the domestic jurisdiction of states and were thus in principle impervious to international legal regulation.¹⁴⁸

However, this difference has been breaking down in recent decades primarily because of the tremendous increase in the number of non-international armed conflicts and the rise in situations of mixed international and non-international armed conflicts. In the sphere of humanitarian law, this evolution can be seen in the gradual application of such rules to internal armed conflicts.¹⁴⁹ The notion of an armed conflict itself was raised before the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its decision on jurisdictional issues in the *Tadić* case.¹⁵⁰ It was claimed that no armed conflict as such existed in the Former Yugoslavia with regard to the circumstances of the instant case since the concept of armed conflict covered only the precise time and place of actual hostilities and the events alleged before the Tribunal did not take place during hostilities. The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal correctly refused to accept a narrow geographical and temporal definition of armed conflicts, whether international or internal. It was stated that:¹⁵¹

International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place.

This definition arose in the specific context of the Former Yugoslavia, where it was unclear whether an international or a non-international armed conflict or some kind of mixture of the two was involved. This was important to clarify since it would have had an effect upon the relevant applicable law. The Security Council did not as such classify the nature of the conflict, simply condemning widespread violations of international humanitarian law, including mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians and deliberate attacks upon non-combatants, and calling for the cessation.¹⁵² The Appeals Chamber concluded that ‘the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have both internal and international aspects’.¹⁵³ Since such conflicts could be classified differently according to time and place, a particularly complex situation was created. However, many of the difficulties that this would have created were mitigated by an acceptance of the evolving application of humanitarian law to internal armed conflicts.¹⁵⁴ This development has arisen partly because of the increasing frequency of internal conflicts and partly because of the increasing brutality in their conduct. The growing interdependence of states in the modern world makes it increasingly difficult for third states and international organisations to ignore civil conflicts, especially in view of the scope and insistence of modern communications, while the evolution of international human rights law has contributed to the end of the belief and norm that whatever occurs within other states is the concern of no other state or person.¹⁵⁵ Accordingly, the international community is now more willing to demand the application of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts.¹⁵⁶ In the *Tadić* case, the Appeals Chamber (in considering jurisdictional issues) concluded that article 3 of its ICTY Statute 1993, which gave it jurisdiction over ‘violations of the laws or customs of war’,¹⁵⁷ provided it with such jurisdiction

‘regardless of whether they occurred within an internal or an international armed conflict’.¹⁵⁸ In its decision, the Appeals Chamber noted that:

It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.¹⁵⁹

The Appeals Chamber concluded that until 19 May 1992 with the open involvement of the Federal Yugoslav Army, the conflict in Bosnia had been international, but the question arose as to the situation when this army was withdrawn at that date. The Chamber examined the legal criteria for establishing when, in an armed conflict which is *prima facie* internal, armed forces may be regarded as acting on behalf of a foreign power, thus turning the conflict into an international one. The Chamber examined article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention which defines prisoner of war status¹⁶⁰ and noted that states have in practice accepted that belligerents may use paramilitary units and other irregulars in the conduct of hostilities only on the condition that those belligerents are prepared to take responsibility for any

infringements committed by such forces. In order for irregulars to qualify as lawful combatants, control over them by a party to an international armed conflict was required and thus a relationship of dependence and allegiance. Accordingly, the term ‘belonging to a party to the conflict’ used in article 4 implicitly refers to a test of control.¹⁶¹

In order to determine the meaning of ‘control’, the Decision of the International Court in *Nicaragua v. United States* was examined¹⁶² and rejected, the Appeals Chamber preferring a rather weaker test, concluding that in order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a state, it must be proved that the state wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity. However, it was not necessary that, in addition, the state should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to international law.¹⁶³

Accordingly, the line between international and internal armed conflicts may be drawn at the point at which it can be shown that a foreign state is either directly intervening within a civil conflict or exercising ‘overall control’ over a group that is fighting in that conflict.

The Appeals Chamber in the *Kunarac* case discussed the issue of the meaning of armed conflict where the fighting is sporadic and does not extend to all of the territory of the state concerned. The Chamber held that the laws of war would apply in the whole territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party to

the conflict, whether or not actual combat takes place there, and continued to apply until a general conclusion of peace or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. A violation of the laws or customs of war may therefore occur at a time when and in a place where no fighting is actually taking place.¹⁶⁴

While the applicable rules of humanitarian law with regard to international and non-international armed conflict have increasingly approximated, it is important to note that there are still differences (for example, as to provisions concerning detention¹⁶⁵ and prosecutions) so that the precise characterisation of a conflict will still have operative legal consequences. Such a scenario is presented by the Syrian conflict where elements of civil war have combined with active armed intervention by Syria, Iran and Western states, with particular emphasis here being upon the Western involvement in attacks upon ISIS (ISIL or 'Islamic State').¹⁶⁶ Whether such intervention may be regarded as an international armed conflict (since attacks are taking place against these groups in Syria without the consent of that state) or a non-international armed conflict (since the attacks are not against the government of Syria and are possibly tacitly supported by it) is a controversial question.¹⁶⁷

Non-International Armed Conflict¹⁶⁸

Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions were concerned with international armed conflicts, common article 3 did provide in cases of non-international armed conflicts occurring in the territory of one of the parties a series of minimum guarantees for protecting those not taking an active part in hostilities, including the sick and wounded.¹⁶⁹ Precisely where this article applied was difficult to define in all cases. Non-international armed conflicts could, it may be argued, range from full-scale civil wars to relatively minor disturbances. This poses problems for the state in question which may not appreciate the political implications of the application of the Geneva Conventions, and the lack of the reciprocity element due to the absence of another state adds to the problems of enforcement. The International Committee of the Red Cross in its 2016 Commentary to the First Geneva Convention 1949 reaffirms that in order for common article 3 to apply, a situation of violence must have reached a certain level of intensity, characterised by recourse to arms by non-state armed groups that are capable of being parties to an armed conflict, while non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a state. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation. This approach has been supported in doctrine and in practice.¹⁷⁰ However, quite when the ‘minimum level of intensity’ has been reached is unclear, although it does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence

and other acts of a similar nature, not being armed conflicts.¹⁷¹ The term ‘protracted’ has been defined in terms of the intensity of the conflict¹⁷² rather than its duration and various indicative factors have been proposed.¹⁷³

Common article 3 lists the following as the minimum safeguards:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities are to be treated humanely without any adverse distinction based on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth.

To this end, the following are prohibited:

- a)** violence to life and person, in particular murder, cruel treatment and torture;
- b)** hostage-taking;
- c)** outrages upon human dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
- d)** the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions in the absence of due process.

2. The wounded and the sick are to be cared for.

Common article 3¹⁷⁴ was developed by Additional Protocol II 1977,¹⁷⁵ which applies by virtue of article 1 to all non-international armed conflicts which take place in the territory of a state party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces. The latter have to be under responsible command and exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and actually implement Additional Protocol II. As already noted above, the Protocol does not apply

to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, not being armed conflicts. The Protocol lists a series of fundamental guarantees and other provisions calling for the protection of non-combatants.¹⁷⁶ In particular, one may note the prohibitions on: violence to the life, health and physical and mental well-being of persons, including torture; collective punishment; hostage-taking; acts of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity, including rape and enforced prostitution; and pillage.¹⁷⁷ Further provisions cover the protection of children;¹⁷⁸ the protection of civilians, including the prohibition of attacks on works or installations containing dangerous forces that might cause severe losses among civilians;¹⁷⁹ the treatment of civilians, including their displacement;¹⁸⁰ and the treatment of prisoners and detainees,¹⁸¹ and the wounded and sick.¹⁸²

The Appeals Chamber in its decision on jurisdiction in the *Tadić* case noted that international legal rules had developed to regulate internal armed conflict for a number of reasons, including the frequency of civil wars, the increasing cruelty of internal armed conflicts, the large-scale nature of civil strife making third-party involvement more likely and the growth of international human rights law. Thus, the distinction between inter-state and civil wars was losing its value so far as human beings were concerned.¹⁸³ Indeed, one of the major themes of international humanitarian law has been the growing move towards the rules of human rights law and vice versa.¹⁸⁴ There is a common foundation in the principle of respect for human dignity¹⁸⁵ and, in particular, the importance of the right to life.¹⁸⁶

The principles governing internal armed conflicts in humanitarian law are becoming more extensive, while the principles of international human rights law are also rapidly evolving, particularly with regard to the fundamental non-derogable rights which cannot be breached even in times of public emergency.¹⁸⁷

However, in addition to the overlap between internal armed conflict principles and those of human rights law in situations where the level of domestic violence has reached a degree of intensity and continuity, there exists an area of civil conflict which is not covered by humanitarian law since it falls below the necessary threshold of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II.¹⁸⁸ Moves have been underway to bridge the gap between this and the application of international human rights law.¹⁸⁹ A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards was adopted by a group of experts in 1990.¹⁹⁰ This Declaration emphasises the prohibition of violence to the life, health and physical and mental well-being of persons, including murder, torture and rape; collective punishment; hostage-taking; practising, permitting or tolerating the involuntary disappearance of individuals; pillage; deliberate deprivation of access to necessary food, drinking water and medicine; and threats or incitement to commit any of these acts.¹⁹¹ In addition, the Declaration provides *inter alia* that persons deprived of their liberty should be held in recognised places of detention (article 4); that acts or threats of violence to spread terror are prohibited (article 6); that all human beings have the inherent right to life (article 8); that children are to be protected so that, for example, children under 15 years of age should not be permitted to join armed groups or forces (article 10); that the wounded and sick should be

cared for (article 12); and medical, religious and other humanitarian personnel should be protected and assisted (article 14).¹⁹²

Cyber Warfare and International Law: Part II

The Conduct of Hostilities¹⁹³

The conduct of cyber operations in situations of armed conflict is subject to the rules of international humanitarian law just as they are subject to the principles of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and those relating to the resort to force as discussed in earlier chapters.¹⁹⁴ It has been accepted that the principles of international humanitarian law apply in cases of cyber warfare as they do in other areas of armed conflict, such as the principles of distinction and of proportionality.¹⁹⁵ However, difficulties arise in several areas. Problems can, for example, arise concerning the identification of ‘combatants’ in specific cyber operations, although where there is a doubt as to whether a person is or is not a combatant or a civilian, there is a presumption in favour of the latter.¹⁹⁶ This applies in the case of international armed conflicts, whether the same principle applies in non-international armed conflicts is less clear. Again, there can be definitional issues in terms of the characterisation of objects of the action. It is accepted that members of the opposing armed forces or organised armed groups or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities may be targeted,¹⁹⁷ but it is apparent that many operations involve the integration of cyber and non-cyber (‘kinetic’) activities, such as the disruption of air defences prior to a bombing raid, while certain installations may have a dual function or may have a significant strategic value. The former would be covered.¹⁹⁸ Civilian objects cannot be attacked unless they constitute a military objective and there are clearly difficulties in drawing a line here, although location, purpose or use

may be guides.¹⁹⁹ Attacks upon intangible objects such as data do not appear to be covered by the rules unless the functionality of the cyber infrastructure is affected.²⁰⁰ The means or methods of cyber warfare cannot be used to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.²⁰¹ Certain cyber activities in time of conflict would not be unlawful, such as the mass emailing of combatants of the other side;²⁰² however, there is no consensus among states as to the scope of some of the relevant rules and the debates continue.

A further area of considerable difficulty is that of being able to attribute the cyber attack to a particular state, or indeed non-state entity, in view of the way in which the internet works across frontiers, possibly utilising computers based in different countries.

The significant role played by domestic law is also evident in a situation where the hardware and software concerned are often created by private individuals or corporations, although the cyber environment relies on cross-national facilities. The consequences of this have yet to be fully worked out.

Enforcement of Humanitarian Law²⁰³

Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and to Additional Protocol I 1977 undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the instrument in question,²⁰⁴ and to disseminate knowledge of the principles contained therein.²⁰⁵ A variety of enforcement methods also exist, although the use of reprisals has been prohibited.²⁰⁶ One of the means of implementation is the concept of the Protecting Power, appointed to look after the interests of nationals of one party to a conflict under the control of the other, whether as prisoners of war or occupied civilians.²⁰⁷ Sweden and Switzerland performed this role during the Second World War. Such a Power must ensure that compliance with the relevant provisions has been effected and that the system acts as a form of guarantee for the protected person as well as a channel of communication for him with the state of which he is a national. The drawback of this system is its dependence upon the consent of the parties involved. Not only must the Protecting Power be prepared to act in that capacity, but both the state of which the protected person is a national and the state holding such persons must give their consent for the system to operate.²⁰⁸ Since the role is so central to the enforcement and working of humanitarian law, it is a disadvantage for it to be subject to state sovereignty and consent. It only requires the holding state to refuse its cooperation for this structure of implementation to be greatly weakened, leaving only reliance upon voluntary operations. This has occurred on a number of occasions, for example the Chinese refusal to consent to the appointment of a Protecting Power with regard to its conflict with India in 1962, and the Indian refusal, of 1971 and subsequently, with regard to Pakistani prisoners of war in its charge.²⁰⁹

Additional Protocol I also provides for an International Fact-Finding Commission for competence to inquire into grave breaches²¹⁰ of the Geneva Conventions and that Protocol or other serious violations, and to facilitate through its good offices the ‘restoration of an attitude of respect’ for these instruments.²¹¹ The parties to a conflict may themselves, of course, establish an ad hoc inquiry into alleged violations of humanitarian law.²¹²

It is, of course, also the case that breaches of international law in this field may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity or even genocide for which universal jurisdiction is provided.²¹³ Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 1945, for example, includes as war crimes for which there is to be individual responsibility the murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour of the civilian population of an occupied territory; the ill-treatment of prisoners of war; the killing of hostages; and the wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages.²¹⁴ The United Nations has also the competence to establish inquiries to gather evidence that may be used in subsequent proceedings, whether domestic or international. Recent examples include the Darfur²¹⁵ and Libya inquiries,²¹⁶ the continuing inquiries into Syria,²¹⁷ ISIS²¹⁸ and Myanmar.²¹⁹

A great deal of valuable work in the sphere of humanitarian law has been accomplished by the International Red Cross.²²⁰ This indispensable organisation consists of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), over 100 national Red Cross (or Red Crescent) societies with a League coordinating their activities and conferences of all these elements every four years. The ICRC is the most active body and has a wide-ranging series of functions to perform, including working for the application of the

Geneva Conventions and acting in natural and man-made disasters. It has operated in a large number of states, visiting prisoners of war²²¹ and otherwise functioning to ensure the implementation of humanitarian law.²²² It operates in both international and internal armed conflict situations. One of the largest operations it has undertaken since 1948 related to the Nigerian Civil War, and in that conflict nearly twenty of its personnel were killed on duty. The ICRC was also deeply involved in the Yugoslav situation and indeed, in 1992, contrary to its usual confidentiality approach, it felt impelled to speak out publicly against the grave breaches of humanitarian law taking place. The organisation has also been involved in Somalia (where its activities included visiting detainees held by the UN forces), Rwanda, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka²²³ and Iraq. Due to circumstances, the ICRC must act with tact and discretion and in many cases states refuse their cooperation. It performed a valuable function in the exchange of prisoners after the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars, although for several years Israel did not accept the ICRC role regarding the Arab territories it occupied.²²⁴

The main challenge faced currently by the ICRC and international humanitarian law generally is that faced by Syria,²²⁵ where a series of interlocking non-international armed conflicts (the Syrian government versus groups such as Al-Nusrah, ISIL or 'Islamic State' and Free Syrian Army and others and conflicts between some of the latter groups)²²⁶ is complicated by a spillover from the conflict between the Iraqi government and ISIL or 'Islamic State' onto Syrian territory and the armed disputes between Kurdish forces and both Syrian government forces and 'Islamic State'. This is rendered even more convoluted by the relatively low-level assistance to rebel groups which was provided by the United States, Saudi Arabia and others and by the

extensive and comprehensive involvement on the side of the government by Russia, Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah organisation, including combat operations and air support. In addition, Turkey has intervened in the north of the country,²²⁷ while Israel continues to act against threats to it by Hezbollah and Iranian forces from Syrian territory.²²⁸ The United Nations has expressed its condemnation of the violations of humanitarian law and human rights by various parties on a number of occasions. For example, Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) condemned ‘the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as all grave violations and abuses committed against children in contravention of applicable international law, such as recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape, attacks on schools and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill treatment and use as human shields, as described in the United Nations Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in Syria (S/2014/31)’. This resolution also called for the end of attacks on civilians and the indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, the facilitation and expansion of humanitarian relief convoys and the lifting of the sieges of populated areas such as Aleppo.²²⁹ However, the Russian veto has precluded serious condemnation of, or meaningful action to end, the Syrian government’s actions, which have included the use of chemical weapons and bombardment of civilian areas by heavy munitions by land and air with little attempt to distinguish between civilians and armed forces.²³⁰

Further challenges in this context are provided by the Libyan and Yemeni Civil Wars, in each of which there is significant third-party intervention, primarily Russian and Turkish in the former and Iranian and Saudi Arabian in the latter, and in both of which there is a developing humanitarian catastrophe.²³¹

Thus, it can be seen that the system of international humanitarian law faces challenges on several fronts. First, because armed conflicts are becoming far more complex, involving internal and international dimensions, blurring the line between international and non-international conflicts in practice and incorporating an increasing level of participation by civilians and indeed civilian casualties, which together sow confusion as to the applicable rules and currently accepted categorisations. Secondly, because the techniques and instruments of warfare are becoming ever-more sophisticated and far-reaching. The increasing resort to cyber attacks and the development of autonomous weapons systems, from armed drones to unmanned but armed boats, submarines, robots and vehicles, demonstrate the depth and dangers of the rapidly evolving environment and the need to ensure that the rules keep pace with the facts on the ground and that, above all, such rules can be enforced.²³²

Suggestions for Further Reading

Y. Dinstein, *The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2016

M. Sassòli, *International Humanitarian Law*, Cheltenham, 2019

The Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law (ed. B. Saul and D. Akande),

Oxford, 2020

Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (ed. A. Clapham and P. Gaeta), Oxford, 2014

UK Ministry of Defence, *Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict*, Oxford, 2004 and online amendments

US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, Washington, DC, 2016

¹ See e.g. Y. Dinstein, *The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2016; Y. Dinstein and A. W. Dahl, *Oslo Manual on Select Topics of the Law of Armed Conflict*, Switzerland, 2020; N. Tsagourias and A. Morrison, *International Humanitarian Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary*, Cambridge, 2018; M. Sassòli, *International Humanitarian Law*, Cheltenham, 2019; K. Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary Conflict*, Oxford, 2016; G. S. Corn et al., *The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military Perspective*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2015; *US Military Operations: Law, Policy and Practice* (ed. G. S. Corn, R. E. Van Landingham and S. R. Reeves), Oxford, 2016; *Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict* (ed. A. Clapham and P. Gaeta), Oxford, 2014; *The Companion to International Humanitarian Law* (ed. D. Djukic and N. Pons), Leiden, 2018; *The Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law* (ed. B. Saul and D. Akande), Oxford, 2020; *Les Nouvelles Frontières du Droit International Humanitaire* (ed. J.-F. Flauss), Brussels, 2003; T. Meron, *The Humanization of International Law*, The Hague, 2006; UK Ministry of Defence, *Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict*, Oxford, 2004 and amendments to 2014, www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-manual-of-the-law-of-armed-conflict-amendments-to-the-text#history; US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, Washington, DC, 2016; E. Crawford and A. Pert, *International Humanitarian Law*, Cambridge, 2015; L. Green, *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict*, 3rd ed., Manchester, 2008; I. Detter, *The Law of War*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2000; G. Best, *Humanity in Warfare*, London, 1980; G. Best, *War and Law Since 1945*, Oxford, 1994; A. P. V. Rogers, *Law on the Battlefield*, Manchester, 1996; *The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict* (ed. D. Fleck), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2013; *Customary International Humanitarian Law* (ed. J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck), Cambridge, 2005; N. Melzer, *International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction*, Geneva, 2016; *Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles* (ed. C. Swinarski), The Hague, 1984; *The New Humanitarian Law of Armed*

Conflict (ed. A. Cassese), Naples, 1979; G. I. A. D. Draper, ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949’, **114 HR**, p. 59; G. I. A. D. Draper, ‘Implementation and Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions and of the two Additional Protocols’, **164 HR**, 1979, p. 1; F. Kalshoven, *The Law of Warfare*, Leiden, 1973; M. Bothe, K. Partsch and W. Solf, *New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict*, The Hague, 1982; and J. Pictet, *Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims*, Dordrecht, 1982. See also *Documents on the Laws of War* (ed. A. Roberts and R. Guelff), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2000; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 1062; E. David, *Principes de Droit des Conflits Armés*, 6th ed., Brussels, 2019; and C. Rousseau, *Le Droit des Conflits Armés*, Paris, 1983. See also D. Thürer, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context’, **338 HR**, 2008, p. 9.

² See e.g. T. Meron, ‘Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law’, **99 AJIL**, 2005, p. 817; and Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, *Customary International Humanitarian Law*. See also G. H. Aldrich, ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law – an Interpretation on Behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, **76 BYIL**, 2005, p. 503; and J. M. Henckaerts, ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law – a Rejoinder to Judge Aldrich’, *ibid.*, p. 525.

³ See e.g. *Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim 17*, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision of 1 July 2003, paras. 38 ff. It was, however, accepted that the Conventions ‘have largely become expressions of customary international law’, *ibid.*, para. 40. See also Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, *Partial Award, Civilian Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23, 27–32*, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Judgment of 17 December 2004, para. 28.

⁴ As to which, see above, [Chapter 3](#), p. 81.

⁵ See below, p. 1044. See also above, [Chapters 6](#) and [7](#).

⁶ See e.g. C. Moorehead, *Dunant’s Dream*, London, 1998. See also C. Greenwood, ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’, in Fleck, *Handbook*, chapter 1; and A. Alexander, ‘A Short History of International Humanitarian Law’, **26 EJIL**, 2015, p. 109.

⁷ See e.g. Green, *Armed Conflict*, chapter 2; and *The Centennial of the First International Peace Conference* (ed. F. Kalshoven), The Hague, 2000. See also Symposium on the Hague Peace Conferences, **94 AJIL**, 2000, p. 1. The Nuremberg Tribunal regarded Hague Convention IV and Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907 as

declaratory of customary law: see 41 *AJIL*, 1947, pp. 172, 248–9. See also the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the ICTY Statute, Security Council resolutions 808 (1993) and 823 (1993), S/25704 and 32 ILM, 1993, pp. 1159, 1170; and the ICJ's Advisory Opinion in *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 258; 110 ILR, p. 163.

⁸ See S. C. Neff, *The Rights and Duties of Neutrals*, Manchester, 2000.

⁹ Note, however, the Martens Clause in the Preamble to the Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which provided that ‘in cases not included in the Regulations . . . the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilised peoples from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience’.

¹⁰ See e.g. the 1929 Conventions, one revising the 1864 and 1906 instruments on wounded and sick soldiers, the other on the treatment of prisoners of war.

¹¹ Note that 196 states are parties to the Geneva Conventions, as of June 2020: <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp>. See generally *The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary* (ed. A. Clapham, P. Gaeta and M. Sassòli), Oxford, 2015.

¹² See e.g. article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I 1977, which provides: ‘In case not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.’

¹³ See e.g. Swinarski, *Studies and Essays*, part B; and Draper, ‘Implementation and Enforcement’. See also B. Wortley, ‘Observations on the Revision of the 1949 Geneva “Red Cross” Conventions’, 54 *BYIL*, 1983, p. 143; and G. Aldrich, ‘Prospects for US Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions’, 85 *AJIL*, 1991, p. 1.

¹⁴ E.g. article 44 of Additional Protocol I: see below, p. 1035.

¹⁵ The Red Lion and Sun that used to be used by Iran was also included as a Geneva Convention emblem: see e.g. Detter, *Law of War*, p. 293.

¹⁶ See the Advisory Opinion on *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 256; 110 ILR, p. 163. The Court also noted, *ibid.*, that: ‘The provisions of the Additional Protocols of 1977 give expression and attest to the unity and complexity of that law.’

¹⁷ See article 7 of the first three Conventions and article 8 of the fourth. Note that Security Council resolution 1472, adopted under Chapter VII on 28 March 2003, called on ‘all parties concerned’ to the Iraq conflict of March–April 2003 to abide strictly by their obligations under international law and particularly the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations, ‘including those relating to the essential civilian needs of the people of Iraq’. See also C. Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law’, in Fleck, *Handbook*, chapter 2.

¹⁸ See article 13. See also UK, *Manual*, chapter 7. See also J. K. Kleffner, ‘Protection of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked’, in Fleck, *Handbook*, chapter 6. See also the updated ICRC Commentary to the First Geneva Convention published online in March 2016, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCi-commentary>.

¹⁹ Article 12. See also Green, *Armed Conflict*, chapter 11.

²⁰ Article 14. Thus, the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention will apply to them: see below, p. 1035.

²¹ Article 15.

²² Article 16 and see article 122 of the Third Geneva Convention.

²³ Article 19, even if the personnel of the unit or establishment are armed or otherwise protected: article 22. Chapter IV concerns the treatment of medical personnel.

²⁴ Chapter VII.

²⁵ Articles 12 and 13. See also Green, *Armed Conflict*, chapter 11.

²⁶ Chapter III. See, with regard to the use of hospital ships in the Falklands conflict, H. Levie, ‘The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War’, in *The Falklands War* (ed. A. R. Coll

and A. C. Arend), Boston, 1985, pp. 64, 67–8. Chapter IV deals with medical personnel, Chapter V with medical transports and Chapter VI with the emblem: see above, p. 1033.

²⁷ See e.g. Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, pp. 48 ff.; Green, *Armed Conflict*, chapter 10; H. Fischer, ‘Protection of Prisoners of War’, in Fleck, *Handbook*, chapter 7; US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, chapter IX; and UK, *Manual*, chapter 8. Note that the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission in its *Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia’s Claim 4*, Decision of 1 July 2003, para. 32, has held that this Convention substantially reflected customary international law. See also the updated ICRC Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention published online in 2020, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=1B9A4ABF10E7EAD2C1258585004E7F19>.

²⁸ See also the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV on the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907, Section I, Chapter II.

²⁹ These conditions appear in article 1 of the Hague Regulations and have been regarded as part of customary law: see G. I. A. D. Draper, ‘The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerilla Warfare’, 45 *BYIL*, 1971, pp. 173, 186. See also *Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 15 July 1999, 124 ILR, p. 61.

³⁰ Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I includes as international armed conflicts ‘armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’. Note that there is no provision for prisoner of war status in non-international armed conflicts: see below, p. 1058.

³¹ See e.g. H. Verthé, *Guérilla et Droit Humanitaire*, 2nd ed., Geneva, 1983; E. Crawford, *The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict*, Oxford, 2010; K. Ipsen, ‘Combatants and Non-Combatants’, in Fleck, *Handbook*, chapter 3; and P. Nahlik, ‘L’Extension du Statut de Combattant à la Lumière de Protocol I de Genève de 1977’, 164 *HR*, 1979, p. 171. Where a person is a mercenary, there is no right to combatant or POW status under article 47. See also the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 1989: Green, *Armed Conflict*, pp. 138 ff. However, such persons remain entitled to the basic humanitarian guarantees provided by Additional Protocol I: see articles 45(3) and 75. See also General Assembly resolution 62/145 (2008); and UK, *Manual*, p. 147.

³² See also the *British Manual of Military Law, Part III, The Law of Land Warfare*, London, 1958, para. 132, note 3; and the US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, para. 4.27.3 discussing the nature of such a competent tribunal. In the case of the UK, the competent tribunal would be a board of inquiry convened in accordance with the Prisoner of War Determination of Status Regulations 1958: see UK, *Manual*, p. 150.

³³ See e.g. A. Cassese, *International Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2005, pp. 409–10; cf. Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, pp. 45 ff.; M. Finaud, ‘L’Abus de la Notion de “Combattant Illégal”: Une Atteinte au Droit International Humanitaire’, **110 RGDIP**, 2006, p. 861; and T. M. Franck, ‘Criminals, Combatants, or What – an Examination of the Role of Law in Responding to the Threat of Terror’, **98 AJIL**, 2005, p. 686. Accordingly, captured Taliban fighters who formed part of the army of Afghanistan at the relevant time would have the status of POWs, while captured Al-Qaida operatives would be subject to relevant national criminal law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Note that once a civilian takes part in hostilities, he or she loses the protection of the prohibition of attacks upon him or her: see article 51(3), Additional Protocol I; and E. Crawford, *Identifying the Enemy Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict*, Oxford, 2015. See also *Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and Others v. Government of Israel and Others*, Israeli Supreme Court, 13 December 2006, 101 *AJIL*, 2007, p. 459; *A and B v. State of Israel*, Israeli Supreme Court, Judgment of 11 June 2008; and D. Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’, **16 EJIL**, 2005, p. 171.

³⁴ See the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission in its *Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia’s Claim 4*, Decision of 1 July 2003, paras. 53, 64, where the Commission declared that ‘customary international law, as reflected in Geneva Conventions I and III, absolutely prohibits the killing of POWs, requires the wounded and sick to be collected and cared for, the dead to be collected, and demands prompt and humane evacuation of POWs’. See also Best, *War and Law*, p. 135; Y. Dinstein, ‘Prisoners of War’, in *Encyclopaedia of Public International Law* (ed. R. Bernhardt), Amsterdam, 1982, pp. 146, 148; and R. M. Chesney, ‘Prisoners of War’, in *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2009.

³⁵ See also article 11 of Additional Protocol I.

³⁶ See e.g. the treatment of allied POWs by Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, *The Economist*, 26 January 1991, p. 24, and in the 2003 Gulf War: see the report by the International

Committee of the Red Cross on the Treatment by Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War, 2004, <https://cryptome.org/icrc-report.htm>.

³⁷ See also article 75 of Additional Protocol I.

³⁸ Article 19.

³⁹ Thus, the reported Iraqi practice during the 1991 Gulf War of sending allied POWs to strategic sites in order to create a ‘human shield’ to deter allied attacks was clearly a violation of the Convention: see e.g. *The Economist*, 26 January 1991, p. 24. See also UKMIL, 62 *BYIL*, 1991, pp. 678 ff.

⁴⁰ Article 82, Geneva Convention III.

⁴¹ Articles 82 and 85. See Green, *Armed Conflict*, p. 237. See also *US v. Noriega* 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1529 (1990); 99 ILR, pp. 143, 171.

⁴² See below, p. 1054.

⁴³ See e.g. Green, *Armed Conflict*, chapters 12 and 15; UK, *Manual*, chapters 9 and 11; US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, chapter XI; Y. Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2019; E. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2012; A. Gross, *The Writing on the Wall: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation*, Cambridge, 2017; G. Fox, *Humanitarian Occupation*, Cambridge, 2008; M. Longobardo, *The Use of Armed Force in Occupied Territory*, Cambridge, 2018; S. Wills, ‘Occupation Law and Multi-National Operations: Problems and Perspectives’, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, p. 256; P. Spoerri, ‘The Law of Occupation’, in *Oxford Handbook*, p. 182; and H. Hu, ‘The Doctrine of Occupation: An Analysis of Its Invalidity Under the Framework of International Legal Positivism’, 15 *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2016, p. 75. See also 94 *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2012, ICRC, special edition on Occupation. The Hague Regulations have become part of customary international law: see *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 172; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 91.

⁴⁴ Article 6. See V. Koutroulis, *Le Début et la Fin de l’Application du Droit de l’Occupation*, Paris, 2010.

⁴⁵ As defined in article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention 1949 and article 43 of Additional Protocol I 1977, above, p. 1035; however, the obligation contained in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 25 May 2000, to ensure that children under the age of 18 do not take part in hostilities.

⁴⁶ See articles 27–34. The rights of aliens in the territory of a party to a conflict are covered in articles 35–46.

⁴⁷ Article 16.

⁴⁸ See articles 71–6. See also article 75 of Additional Protocol I 1977.

⁴⁹ See also the Hague Regulations, Section III.

⁵⁰ Iraqi-occupied Kuwait in 1990–91 was, of course, a prime example of the situation covered by this Convention: see e.g. Security Council resolution 674 (1990).

⁵¹ See *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 167; and *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 229, reaffirming article 42 as part of customary international law.

⁵² ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 230.

⁵³ See e.g. UK, *Manual*, p. 275. See also Y. Ronen, ‘A Century of the Law of Occupation’, *18 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, 2015, p. 169.

⁵⁴ UK, *Manual*, p. 277. See also *R v. Civil Aviation Authority* [2006] EWHC 2465 (Admin), para. 15; 132 ILR, p. 713, noting: ‘The state of Israel has withdrawn from Gaza [in 2005] so that it is not an occupied Palestinian Territory.’ However, see Dinstein, *Belligerent Occupation*, pp. 296 ff.; and E. Samson, ‘Is Gaza Occupied? Redefining the Legal Status of Gaza’, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 83, Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 2010. Note that Israel handed over certain powers with regard to parts of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority following the Oslo agreements of 1993: see generally J. Crawford, *The Creation of States*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006, pp. 442 ff.; *New Political Entities in Public and Private International Law* (ed. A. Shapira and M. Tabory), The Hague, 1999; E. Benvenisti, ‘The Israeli–Palestinian

Declaration of Principles: A Framework for Future Settlement’, 4 *EJIL*, 1993, p. 542; and P. Malanczuk, ‘Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law’, 7 *EJIL*, 1996, p. 485. Since one assumes that the Palestinian Authority is not an occupying power, the fact that Israel is not in effective day-to-day control over the whole area must impact upon its responsibilities, but it is unlikely that this has affected its legal status as such as belligerent occupant.

⁵⁵ Note that the International Court has emphasised that ‘international humanitarian law contains provisions enabling account to be taken of military exigencies in certain circumstances’ and that ‘the military exigencies contemplated by these texts may be invoked in occupied territories even after the general close of the military operations that lead to their occupation’: *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 192; and see M. Sassòli, ‘Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers’, 16 *EJIL*, 2005, p. 661. See also the Decision of the Supreme Court of Israel, 1308/17 and 2055/17, 9 June 2020, supporting the Attorney-General’s view that Regulation Law 2017, which sought to regularise the position of Israeli settlements in the West Bank by declaring that although the legal title of the land would remain with the original owners its use would be taken over by the state, was unconstitutional. The law was revoked, see www.loc.gov/law/help/israel-settlement/judea-and-samaria.php and www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-high-court-strikes-down-west-bank-land-grab-law-as-unconstitutional-1.8908929.

⁵⁶ See e.g. *Prefecture of Voiotia v. Germany (Distomo Massacre)*, Court of Cassation, Greece, Judgment of 4 May 2000, 129 ILR, pp. 514, 519; and *Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel*, Israel Supreme Court, Judgment of 15 September 2005, 129 ILR, pp. 241, 252. See also Dinstein, *Belligerent Occupation*, pp. 58 ff.; Benvenisti, *International Law of Occupation*, pp. 5–7; and UK, *Manual*, p. 278.

⁵⁷ It was annexed by the Kingdom of Transjordan, as it then was, in 1949 at the conclusion of the Israeli War of Independence, but this annexation was recognised only by the UK and Pakistan. See e.g. A. Gerson, *Israel, the West Bank and International Law*, London, 1978.

⁵⁸ Note that Israel does observe the humanitarian parts of the Convention *de facto*: see e.g. *Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel*, Israeli Supreme Court, Judgment of 15 September 2005, 129 ILR, pp. 241, 253. This was noted by the International Court in *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 174. See also D. Kretzmer, *The Occupation of Justice*, New York, 2002; M. Shamgar, ‘The Observance of International Law in the Administered

Territories’, *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, 1977, p. 262; T. Meron, ‘West Bank and Gaza’, *ibid.*, 1979, p. 108; F. Fleiner-Gerster and H. Meyer, ‘New Developments in Humanitarian Law’, 34 *ICLQ*, 1985, p. 267; and E. Cohen, *Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories*, Manchester, 1985. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘Territorial Administration by Non-Territorial Sovereigns’, in *The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law* (ed. Y. Shany and T. Broudie), Oxford, 2008, pp. 369, 385 ff.

⁵⁹ *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 177.

⁶⁰ *Partial Award, Central Front, Ethiopia’s Claim 2*, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Judgment of 28 April 2004, para. 28.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, para. 29. Note that article 4 of Additional Protocol I provides: ‘The application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, as well as the conclusion of the agreements provided for therein, shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. Neither the occupation of a territory nor the application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall affect the legal status of the territory in question.’

⁶² The International Court has stated that this provision prohibits ‘any measures taken by an occupying power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied territory’ and that ‘the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law’: *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 183–4. See also criticisms of Israel’s policy of building settlements in territories it has occupied since 1967: UKMIL, 54 *BYIL*, 1983, pp. 538–9. Note also Kretzmer, *Occupation of Justice*, chapter 5; and E. Kontorovich, ‘Unsettled: A Global Study of Settlements in Occupied Territories’, Northwestern University School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Series, No. 16–20, 2016.

⁶³ Articles 51, 53 and 54. Article 64 stipulates that penal laws remain in force, unless a threat to the occupier’s security, while existing tribunals continue to function. See also Security Council resolution 1472 (2003) concerning the March–April 2003 military operation by coalition forces in Iraq.

⁶⁴ Articles 55, 56, 59 and 60.

⁶⁵ Section IV consists of regulations for the treatment of internees.

⁶⁶ *Congo v. Uganda*, ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 231, 242 ff.

⁶⁷ *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 178 ff. See also Wills, ‘Occupation Law’, pp. 265 ff.

⁶⁸ *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 240.

⁶⁹ ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 242–3. A series of international human rights instruments was listed as being applicable with regard to the Congo situation, including the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: *ibid.*, pp. 243–4.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 244–5. Reference was also made to the violation of article 47 of the Hague Regulations and article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights with regard to the exploitation of the natural resources of Congo: *ibid.*, pp. 252 ff.

⁷¹ The Court relied primarily upon the terms of the Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement 1995 and the reference therein to the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinian people, which the Court held included the right to self-determination ‘as the General Assembly has moreover recognized on a number of occasions (see e.g. resolution 58/163 of 22 December 2003)’: *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 183.

⁷² This was partly because the Court saw this as creating a *fait accompli* on the ground which might become permanent and would then be tantamount to *de facto* annexation, and partly because it was seen as severely impeding the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination: *ibid.*, p. 184. The Court also noted that it appeared that the construction of the wall was contrary to provisions in the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning requisition of property and liberty of movement: *ibid.*, pp. 185 ff. Israel’s argument was that the construction of the barrier commenced after a series of suicide car bombings within its territory emanating from the occupied territories and that the barrier was a temporary security measure: *ibid.*, p. 182. See generally the articles on the case collected in ‘Agora’, **99** *AJIL*, 2005, p. 1.

⁷³ ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 192, 193.

⁷⁴ *Beit Sourik v. Government of Israel*, Israeli Supreme Court, 30 June 2004, 129 ILR, pp. 189, 205–6.

⁷⁵ *Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel*, Israeli Supreme Court, Judgment of 15 September 2005, 129 ILR, pp. 241, 264–5. See also Y. Shany, 'Capacities and Inadequacies: A Look at the Two Separation Barrier Cases', 38 *Israel Law Review*, 2005, p. 230.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 241, 266, but without formally deciding the matter, *ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 266, 268, reaffirming the decision in *Beit Sourik v. Government of Israel*, Israeli Supreme Court, 30 June 2004, 129 ILR, pp. 189, 215 ff. See also generally as to proportionality, A. Barak, *Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations*, Cambridge, 2012; and E. Cannizzaro, 'Proportionality in the Law of Armed Conflict', in *Oxford Handbook*, p. 332.

⁷⁸ *Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel* 129 ILR, pp. 241, 286. The Court held that the route of the barrier in the area in question in the case had to be reconsidered as it was not shown that the least injurious means test had been satisfied: *ibid.*, pp. 316 ff. The effect of this would be to reduce the size of the fenced-in enclave projecting into the West Bank. Note that the Court explained that the difference between its Judgment and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court stemmed from the difference in facts laid before the two courts, particularly the paucity of facts relating to the security–military necessity to erect the fence arising from the phenomenon of suicide bombing inside Israel put before the International Court: *ibid.*, pp. 287–8.

⁷⁹ At p. 282. The ECtHR held in *Al-Skeini v. UK*, Judgment of 7 July 2011, paras. 133 ff., that the UK was responsible under the European Convention on Human Rights in its operations in Iraq both where the acts of its authorities produced effects in that territory with regard to the applicant and where it exercised effective control over areas of that territory. See also *Al-Jedda v. UK*, Judgment of 7 July 2011, paras. 74 ff., where the European Court rejected the argument that the UN was responsible for activities of UK forces in Iraq since it lacked the required effective control. Note *Coard v. US*, Report No. 109/99, 29 September 1999; 123 ILR, p. 156, for the view expressed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that the US was bound by relevant rules of humanitarian law and human rights law in the Grenada intervention.

⁸⁰ Note the problems posed by long-lasting occupations and the tension between the traditional law of minimal interference with local life and the need to cope with societal changes: see e.g. A. Roberts, 'Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967', **84** *AJIL*, 1990, p. 44; and A. Roberts, 'Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights', **100** *AJIL*, 2006, p. 580. See also D. Murray, *Practitioners' Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict*, Oxford, 2016.

⁸¹ See generally 'Iraq: Law of Occupation', House of Commons Research Paper 03/51, 2 June 2003; E. Benvenisti, 'Water Conflicts During the Occupation of Iraq', **97** *AJIL*, 2003, p. 860; M. Hmoud, 'The Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and Security Council Resolution 1483', **36** *Cornell International Law Journal*, 2004, p. 435; and D. Scheffer, 'Beyond Occupation Law', **97** *AJIL*, 2003, p. 842.

⁸² See e.g. M. Milanovic, *Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties*, Oxford, 2011, chapter V; and D. Jinks, 'International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict', in *Oxford Handbook*, p. 656.

⁸³ Report of the Commission of 10 July 1976, paras. 509–10. See also Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries*, chapter 5.

⁸⁴ Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137 and OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, paras. 153, 160–1. See also *Coard v. US*, Report No. 109/99, 29 September 1999; 123 ILR, pp. 156, 169.

⁸⁵ See *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 240; and *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 178 ff.

⁸⁶ See e.g. J. d'Aspremont and E. Tranchez, 'The Quest for a Non-Conflictual Coexistence of International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law: Which Role for the *Lex Specialis* Principle?', in *Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law* (ed. R. Kolb and G. G. Gaggioli), Cheltenham, 2013, p. 223.

⁸⁷ See above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 323.

⁸⁸ See www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=10.

⁸⁹ *Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia*, IACHR, Judgment of 30 November 2012, para. 24.

⁹⁰ See also General Comment No. 36 to article 6 (the right to life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on 30 October 2018, para. 64, noting that: ‘While rules of international humanitarian law may be relevant for the interpretation and application of article 6, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.’ See also General Comment No. 31, 2004, para. 11 and General Comment No. 29, 2001, para. 9.

⁹¹ See as to the question of persons captured by the US in Afghanistan in 2001–02 and elsewhere, and detained at the US military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, *Rasul v. Bush* 542 US 466 (2004); US Military Commissions Act 2006, 45 ILM, 2006, p. 1246; and *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* 548 US 557; and see *Boumediene v. Bush* 553 US 723 (2008). See also above, [Chapter 11](#), p. 566 and [Chapter 19](#), p. 1026. Note also the Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations 2012, applicable in non-international armed conflicts and peace operations; and J. Pejic, ‘Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force’, in *International Law and the Classification of Conflicts* (ed. E. Wilmschurst), Oxford, 2012, p. 80. See also *Al-Jedda v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 July 2011, paras. 158 ff.; *Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2015] EWCA Civ 843; and *Hussein v. Secretary of State for Defence* [2014] EWCA Civ 1087.

⁹² Judgment of 16 September 2014, paras. 101 ff. See also R. Goodman, ‘Authorisation versus Regulation: Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, ⁹¹ *International Law Studies*, US Naval War College, 2015, p. 155.

⁹³ Judgment of 16 September 2014, para. 106. The reference is to articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

⁹⁴ ECtHR, Judgment of 7 July 2011.

⁹⁵ ECtHR, Judgment of 7 July 2011.

⁹⁶ ICJ Reports, 2015, pp. 3, 67 ff.

⁹⁷ See e.g. article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights ('In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law . . . No derogation from Article 2 [right to life], except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3 [prohibition of torture], 4 (paragraph 1) [prohibition of slavery] and 7 [prohibition of retrospective crimes] shall be made under this provision'); article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin . . . No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision'); and article 27 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights ('In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin . . . The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights'). Note also, in particular, M. Milanovic, 'Extraterritorial Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Armed Conflict', in *The Frontiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and Its Challenges* (ed. N. Bhuta), Oxford, 2016, p. 55.

⁹⁸ The Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment of 24 May 2018, H CJ 3003/18, <https://supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/FullCase.aspx?&CaseYear=2018&CaseNumber=3003>. See e.g. Y. Shereshevsky, 'H CJ 3003/18 Yesh Din

– Volunteers for Human Rights v. Chief of General Staff, Israel Defense Forces’, **113 AJIL**, 2019, p. 361; E. Chachko and Y. Shany, ‘The Supreme Court of Israel Dismisses a Petition against the Gaza Rules of Engagement’, *Lawfare*, 26 May 2018, www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-israel-dismisses-petition-against-gaza-rules-engagement#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20of%20Israel%20Dismisses%20a%20Petition%20Against%20Gaza%20Rules%20of%20Engagement,-By%20Elena%20Chachko&text=On%20Thursday%2C%20the%20Supreme%20Court,IDF%20Chief%20of%20General%20Staff); and H. Jöbsti, ‘Lost Between law Enforcement and Active Hostilities’, *EJIL: Talk!*, 4 June 2018.

⁹⁹ See e.g. Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*; UK, *Manual*, chapter 5; Green, *Armed Conflict*, chapters 7 (land), 8 (maritime), 9 (air); and W. Boothby, *Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016. See also Rogers, *Law on the Battlefield*; and Best, *War and Law*, pp. 253 ff. As to armed conflicts at sea, see also International Institute of Humanitarian Law, *The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea* (ed. L. Doswald-Beck), Cambridge, 1995. As to the legitimacy of maritime blockades, see the First Report of the Turkel Commission, www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_a.pdf, and the Report of the UN Secretary General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, 2011, <https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1922B40C9F4575598525790300457132>.

¹⁰⁰ The UK *Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict* defines military necessity as ‘the principle whereby a belligerent has the right to apply any measures which are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military operation and which are not forbidden by the laws of war’: see amendment 3, September 2010, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27871/20100929JSP383Amendment3NoterUpChs14Sep10.pdf. The US Department of Defense *Law of War Manual* defines military necessity as ‘the principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war’: para. 2.2, p. 52. See also Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, pp. 10–12; and Y. Beer, ‘Humanity Considerations Cannot Reduce War’s Hazards Alone: Revitalizing the Concept of Military Necessity’, **26 EJIL**, 2016, p. 801.

¹⁰¹ The US Department of Defense *Law of War Manual* defines humanity as ‘the principle that forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a

legitimate military purpose’: para. 2.3, p. 58. See also UK, *Manual*, pp. 23–4; and Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, p. 9.

¹⁰² Apart from the provisions protecting the inhabitants of occupied territories under the Fourth Geneva Convention. See also Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, and Security Council Presidential Statement of 27 May 2008, 5/PRST/2008/18. See generally www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/protection-of-civilians/.

¹⁰³ See e.g. Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, pp. 12, 72.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, chapter 4. See also N. Melzer, ‘The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants’, in *Oxford Handbook*, p. 296.

¹⁰⁵ Dissenting Opinion, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 587; 110 ILR, pp. 163, 536.

¹⁰⁶ Note that in *Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 and 26*, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision of 19 December 2005, paras. 113 ff., it was held that article 52(2) constituted a statement of customary international law. Whether an aerial attack on a power station fell within the term ‘military advantage’ could only be understood in the context of military operations between the parties as a whole and not simply in the context of a simple attack: *ibid.* See also UK, *Manual*, pp. 55 ff.

¹⁰⁷ See, as to the Kosovo conflict 1999, e.g. J. A. Burger, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis’, **82** *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2000, p. 129; P. Rowe, ‘Kosovo 1999: The Air Campaign’, *ibid.*, p. 147; and W. J. Fenrick, ‘Targeting and Proportionality During the NATO Bombing Campaign Against Yugoslavia’, **12** *EJIL*, 2001, p. 489. See also the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by a review committee of the ICTY recommending that no investigation be commenced by the Office of the Prosecutor: see www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal; and the attempt to bring aspects of the bombing campaign before the ECtHR: see *Banković v. Belgium*, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 December 2001, 123 ILR, p. 94. Note also the ‘indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, schools and deliberate attacks on protected objects such as hospitals, killing and injuring thousands of

civilians, in acts amounting to war crimes' committed by Syrian government forces in Idlib (a rebel-held province in northern Syria), *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, A/HRC/44/61, 2 July 2020, para. 70.

108 Article 51(3) provides that the general protection afforded to civilians applies 'unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities'. See also *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities* (ed. N. Melzer), Geneva, 2009; but see Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, pp. 174 ff.; and M. N. Schmitt, 'The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis', 1 *Harvard National Security Journal*, 2010, p. 5. Note that the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance was endorsed by the Israeli Supreme Court in *Yesh Din v. IDF Chief of Staff*, Judgment of 24 May 2018, HCJ 3003/18, para. 45, <https://supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/FullCase.aspx?&CaseYear=2018&CaseNumber=3003>.

109 See e.g. *Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 and 26*, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Decision of 19 December 2005, para. 27.

110 These are defined in article 51(4) as: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by Additional Protocol I; and consequently in each such case are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. See Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, pp. 146 ff.

111 See 21(5) *UN Chronicle*, 1984, p. 3 with regard to an appeal by the UN Secretary-General to Iran and Iraq to refrain from attacks on civilian targets. See also Security Council resolution 540 (1983). The above provisions apply to the use by Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War of missiles deliberately fired at civilian targets. The firing of missiles at Israeli and Saudi Arabian cities in early 1991 constituted, of course, an act of aggression against a state not a party to that conflict: see e.g. *The Economist*, 26 January 1991, p. 21. As to the failure of the Security Council to take a clear position on the conduct of hostilities in the Syrian Civil War due to the use of the veto by permanent members, see e.g. <https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-non-effectiveness-of-the-United-nations-security-councils-role-in-the-syrian-conflict/>; www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-un/russia-casts-13th-veto-of-un-security-council-action-during-syrian-war-idUSKBN1W42CJ and

www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_PV.8738.pdf.

112 See in particular the decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court in *Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza*, HCJ 4764/04, [2004] IsrL 200; *Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister*, HCJ 9132/07, 2008; and *Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister*, HCJ 201/09 [2009] IsrLR 1 concerning the application of international humanitarian law during ongoing military operations.

113 See above, [Chapter 19](#), p. 991.

114 See e.g. Green, *Armed Conflict*, pp. 148–9; C. J. Greenwood, ‘Reprisals and Reciprocity in the New Law of Armed Conflict’, in *Armed Conflict in the New Law* (ed. M. A. Meyer), London, 1989, p. 227; and F. Kalshoven, *Belligerent Reprisals*, Leiden, 1971. See also V. Bílková, ‘Belligerent Reprisals in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, *63 ICLQ*, 2014, p. 31.

115 Similarly, wounded, sick, shipwrecked, medical and missing persons; also protected against reprisal are the natural environment and works or installations containing dangerous forces: see articles 20 and 53–6.

116 See above, p. 1048.

117 See article 53. See also the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, together with Protocol I 1954 and Protocol II 1999. The protections as to cultural property are subject to ‘military necessity’: see article 4 of the 1954 Convention and articles 6 and 7 of the 1999 Protocol. Under articles 3 and 22 of the Protocol, protection is extended to non-international armed conflicts: see R. O’Keefe, *The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict*, Cambridge, 2006, and below, p. 1058. See also Security Council resolution 2347 (2017). Note *Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi*, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, ICC, Judgment of 27 September 2016, where the International Criminal Court found the offender ‘guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-perpetrator of the war crime consisting in intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu, Mali, in June and July 2012’: www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1242 (27 September 2016).

118 Article 54.

119 Article 56.

120 See UK, *Manual*, chapter 6; and Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, chapter 3. See also US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, chapter VI.

121 This is repeated in virtually identical terms in article 35 of Protocol I.

122 See article 35(2) of Protocol I and the Preamble to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: see M. N. Shaw, 'The United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 1981', *9 Review of International Studies*, 1983, pp. 109, 113. Note that 'employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering' is stated to be a violation of the laws and customs of war by article 3(a) of the ICTY Statute: see Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/25704 and Security Council resolution 827 (1993), and see also article 20(d)(i) of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth Session, 1996, A/51/10, pp. 111–12.

123 See e.g. US Department of the Army, *Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare*, FM 27–10, 1956, p. 18; and US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, pp. 311 ff.; and regarding the UK, *The Law of War on Land*, Part III of the *Manual of Military Law*, 1958, p. 41; and UK, *Manual*, chapter 6. See also the Israeli Supreme Court's decision in *Physicians for Human Rights v. Almog*, HCJ 8990–02, ILDC 365 (IL 2002), 2003, discussing the use of flechette shells.

124 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 257; 110 ILR, p. 163.

125 *Ibid.*

126 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 257, 262–3. See also *Corfu Channel*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 4, 22; 16 AD, p. 155.

127 See e.g. *Shimoda v. Japan* 32 ILR, p. 626.

128 *Ibid.*, pp. 259–61. See e.g. *International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons* (ed. L. Boisson de Chazournes and P. Sands), Cambridge, 1999; D.

Akande, 'Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law?', **68 BYIL**, 1997, p. 165; *Nuclear Weapons and International Law* (ed. I. Pogany), Aldershot, 1987; Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, pp. 153 ff.; Green, *Armed Conflict*, pp. 83 ff.; and L. C. Green, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict', **17 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy**, 1988, p. 1; N. Singh and E. McWhinney, *Nuclear Weapons and Contemporary International Law*, Dordrecht, 1988; G. Schwarzenberger, *Legality of Nuclear Weapons*, London, 1957; and H. Meyrowitz, 'Les Armes Nucléaires et le Droit de la Guerre', in *Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges* (ed. A. J. M. Delissen and G. J. Tanja), Dordrecht, 1991.

129 The Court emphasised, e.g., that 'a use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict', ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 245; 110 ILR, p. 163. The Court also pointed to the applicability of the principle of neutrality to all international armed conflicts, irrespective of the type of weaponry used: ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 261. See also *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 112; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 446.

130 ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 247.

131 *Ibid.*, p. 248. Nor by treaties concerning other weapons of mass destruction such as the Bacteriological Weapons Treaty 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993, *ibid.*, pp. 248–9. See also *The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary* (ed. W. Krutzsch, E. Myjer and R. Trapp), Oxford, 2014.

132 E.g. the Peace Treaties of 10 February 1947; the Austrian State Treaty 1955; the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 1963; the Outer Space Treaty 1967; the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 14 February 1967 on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968 (extended indefinitely in 1995); the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Ocean Floor and Sub-soil 1971; Treaty of Rarotonga of 6 August 1985 on the Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone of the South Pacific; the Treaty of Final Settlement with Respect to Germany 1990; the Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 1995; and the Treaty on an African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 1996.

133 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 226, 248–53; 110 ILR, p. 163.

134 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 254–5.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 262–3, 266.

¹³⁶ See Security Council resolution 984 (1995). The treaty was extended indefinitely at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference: see generally www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml. There are currently 191 parties to the treaty, under which non-nuclear weapons states agree not to obtain such weapons and to place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards. One of the states parties is Iran which is suspected of moving towards nuclear weapons: see generally www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran and Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); 1929 (2010); 1984 (2011); 2049 (2012); and 2105 (2013). Resolution 2231 (2015) endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action restricting Iran's nuclear programme, S/2015/544; however, the US withdrew from the Plan, see www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/. North Korea is the only party to have withdrawn from the treaty, see e.g. www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/ and www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/, and has been condemned for conducting nuclear tests: see e.g. Security Council resolution 2094 (2013). See also Security Council resolutions 2270 (2016); 2321 (2016); and 2397 (2017).

¹³⁷ See also the UK, *Manual*, pp. 117 ff.; the US *The Law of Land Warfare*, 1956, s. 35; and US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, chapter 6.18, p. 391. Note the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017 which is not yet in force and with regard to which the US, the UK and France issued a joint statement on 7 July 2017 declaring that they had no intention of becoming parties to this instrument; see <https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-press-statement-from-the-permanent-representatives-to-the-united-nations-of-the-united-states-united-kingdom-and-france-following-the-adoption/>.

¹³⁸ See e.g. Green, *Armed Conflict*, pp. 150 ff.; and Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, chapter 3.

¹³⁹ See also e.g. the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Weapons and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their

Destruction. See 21(3) *UN Chronicle*, 1984, p. 3 with regard to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War.

¹⁴⁰ See Shaw, ‘Conventional Weapons’. Note article 1 was amended in 2001.

¹⁴¹ Note the adoption on 30 May 2008 of a Convention banning the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. See also Security Council resolution 2365 (2017) calling for an end to the ‘indiscriminate use of explosive devices in violation of international humanitarian law’.

¹⁴² See e.g. the deliberate spillage of vast quantities of oil into the Persian Gulf by Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War: see *The Economist*, 2 February 1991, p. 20. See also Green, *Armed Conflict*, p. 162; and Rogers, *Law on the Battlefield*, chapter 6. Note that the International Law Commission included the topic on its agenda entitled ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict’ in 2013: see A/68/10, para. 131. See A/CN.4/L.870/Rev.1 and A/CN.4/L.876 (26 July and 3 August 2016 respectively) for the draft principles to date.

¹⁴³ See e.g. M. N. Schmitt, ‘Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International Humanitarian Law’, **30** *Boston University International Law Journal*, 2012, p. 595. See also Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, pp. 116, 149–51; R. Vogel, ‘Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict’, **39** *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, 2011, p. 101; and F. Mégret, ‘The Humanitarian Problem with Drones’, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2228659. Note the increasing concern with the development of autonomous weapons: see e.g. Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, *Autonomous Weapons Systems Under International Law*, Geneva, 2014; *Research Handbook on Remote Warfare* (ed. J. D. Ohlin), Cheltenham, 2017; *New Technologies and the Law in War and Peace* (ed. W. H. Boothby), Cambridge, 2018; K. Anderson, D. Reisner and M. Waxman, ‘Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems’, **90** *International Law Studies*, US Naval War College, 2014, p. 393; and W. H. Boothby, *Conflict Law: The Influence of New Weapons: Technology, Human Rights and Emerging Actors*, The Hague, 2014. See also ICRC Report of Expert Meeting on Autonomous Weapons Systems, March 2016, <https://shop.icrc.org/autonomous-weapon-systems.html>.

¹⁴⁴ See e.g. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, *Study on Targeted Killings*, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010); comments by US

officials, e.g. Brennan (www.lawfareblog.com/text-john-brennans-speech-drone-strikes-today-wilson-center), Holder (www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html) and Koh (www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_Testimony.pdf); and UK Ministry of Defence, *The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems*, Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, 2011. See also J. Pejic, 'Extraterrestrial Targeting by Means of Armed Drones: Some Legal Implications', *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2015, p. 1; House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, *The Government's Policy on the Use of Drones for Targeted Killing*, Second Report of Session 2015–16, 2016; International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute, *The Legality of Armed Drones Under International Law*, 25 May 2017; and C. Heyns, D. Akande, L. Hill-Cawthorne and T. Chengeta, 'The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones', 65 *ICLQ*, 2016, p. 791. Note also the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 29 June 2020, A/HRC/44/38, criticising the use of armed drones to kill an Iranian general.

¹⁴⁵ Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 29 June 2020, A/HRC/44/38, paras. 30 ff.

¹⁴⁶ J. Pictet, *Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, Geneva, 1952, vol. I, p. 29. In *Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, para. 70; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 488, the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that 'an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a state'. See also ICRC Commentary to the First Geneva Convention, 2016, paras. 220 ff., https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518#49_B; and L. Hill-Cawthorne, 'Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and the Bifurcation of Armed Conflict', 64 *ICLQ*, 2015, p. 293.

¹⁴⁷ See e.g. Green, *Armed Conflict*, chapter 3. See also D. Akande, 'Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts', in Wilmschurst, *Classification of Conflicts*, p. 32.

¹⁴⁸ Armed conflicts taking place in occupied territory constitute international armed conflicts: see e.g. Dinstein, *Belligerent Occupation*, pp. 37–8. See also common article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 1949; article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 1949; and *Public Committee*

Against Torture in Israel and Others v. Government of Israel and Others, Israeli Supreme Court, 13 December 2006, 101 *AJIL*, 2007, p. 459. Cf. S. Sivakumaran, *The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict*, Oxford, 2012, pp. 529 ff.

¹⁴⁹ See further below, p. 1058.

¹⁵⁰ Case No. IT-94-1-AR72; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 486 ff.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 488. This decision was cited with approval by the ICC Trial Chamber in *Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 2012, paras. 531 ff.

¹⁵² See e.g. Security Council resolution 771 (1992). See also C. Gray, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-State Conflict? Characterisation and Consequences’, 67 *BYIL*, 1996, p. 155.

¹⁵³ Case No. IT-94-1-AR, 105 ILR, pp. 453, 494. This was approved by the ICC Trial Chamber in *Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 2012, paras. 539–40.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 495 ff.

¹⁵⁵ See e.g. General Assembly resolutions 2444 (XXV) and 2675 (XXV), adopted in 1970 unanimously.

¹⁵⁶ See e.g. Security Council resolutions 788 (1992), 972 (1995) and 1001 (1995) with regard to the Liberian Civil War; Security Council resolutions 794 (1992) and 814 (1993) with regard to Somalia; Security Council resolution 993 (1993) with regard to Georgia and resolution 1193 (1998) with regard to Afghanistan.

¹⁵⁷ An historic term now subsumed within the concept of international humanitarian law. Article 3 states that such violations shall include, but not be limited to, the employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity; attack or bombardment of undefended towns, villages or buildings; seizure of or destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science; and plunder of public or private property.

¹⁵⁸ Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 105 ILR, pp. 453, 504. See also *Furundžija*, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Decision of Trial Chamber II of 10 December 1998, 121 ILR, pp. 213, 253–4.

¹⁵⁹ Judgment of 15 July 1999, para. 84; 124 ILR, p. 96.

¹⁶⁰ See above, p. 1035.

¹⁶¹ Judgment of 15 July 1999, paras. 94, 95; 124 ILR, p. 100.

¹⁶² In that case it was held that in order to establish the responsibility of the US over the ‘Contra’ rebels, it was necessary to show that the state was not only in effective control of a military or paramilitary group, but also that there was effective control of the specific operation in the course of which breaches may have been committed. In order to establish that the US was responsible for ‘acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law’ allegedly perpetrated by the Nicaraguan Contras, it was necessary to prove that the US had specifically ‘directed or enforced’ the perpetration of those acts: see ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 64–5; 76 ILR, p. 349. The International Court in *Application of the Genocide Convention* (Merits), ICJ Reports, 2007, pp. 43, 204 ff., reaffirmed its decision in *Nicaragua v. US* on this point and distinguished the *Tadić* case: see above, [Chapter 13](#), p. 688.

¹⁶³ Judgment of 15 July 1999, paras. 131, 145; 124 ILR, pp. 116, 121.

¹⁶⁴ Decision of 12 June 2002, Case Nos. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, para. 57.

¹⁶⁵ In the case of international armed conflicts, then the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention would apply, whereas in the case of internal armed conflicts, then domestic law will apply: see above, p. 1038. In the case of prosecution, in the case of international armed conflicts the principle of combatant immunity will apply, whereas domestic law rules will apply in internal armed conflicts: see below, **note 176**.

¹⁶⁶ See below, p. 1067.

¹⁶⁷ See Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries*, pp. 339 ff.; and the comments by D. Akande at www.ejiltalk.org/are-extraterritorial-armed-conflicts-with-non-state-groups-international-or-non-international and at www.ejiltalk.org/when-does-the-use-of-force-

[against-a-non-state-armed-group-trigger-an-international-armed-conflict-and-why-does-this-matter/#more-14663](#), and sources cited therein. Note that the updated ICRC

Commentary to the First Geneva Convention article 2, March 2016, paras. 257 ff., provides that where a third state's armed forces aid rebel forces in another state, that will constitute an international armed conflict: <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCi-commentary>. In the *Tadić* Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para. 84, it was noted that: 'It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more states. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a state, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another state intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other state.'

¹⁶⁸ See e.g. Y. Dinstein, *Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law*, Cambridge, 2014; Sivakumaran, *Law of Non-International Armed Conflict*; UK, *Manual*, chapter 15; US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, chapter XXVII; L. Moir, *The Law of Internal Armed Conflict*, Cambridge, 2002; A. Cullen, *The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law*, Cambridge, 2010; Green, *Armed Conflict*, chapter 19; T. Meron, *Human Rights in Internal Strife*, Cambridge, 1987; Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries*, chapter 9; and M. N. Schmitt, 'Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflicts', *90 International Law Studies*, US Naval War College, 2014, p. 1. See also International Institute of Humanitarian Law, *The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict*, San Remo, 2006; *Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Twenty-first Century* (ed. K. Watkin and A. Norris), Naval War College International Law Studies vol. **88**, 2012; and ICRC, *Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts*, Geneva, 2008. Note in particular: UK, *Manual*, chapter 15; and US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, chapter XVII.

¹⁶⁹ Note that the Court in *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 114; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 448, declared that common article 3 also applied to international armed conflicts as a 'minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts'.

¹⁷⁰ Paras. 422–4, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC#124_B.

See also *Tadić* Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1995, para. 70, and Trial Judgment, 1997, para. 562.

¹⁷¹ See article 1(2), Protocol II and see article 8(2)(d) of the ICC's Rome Statute 1998. Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute lists a series of acts which if committed in internal armed conflicts are considered war crimes. See also Dinstein, *Non-International Armed Conflicts*, p. 21.

¹⁷² *Tadić* Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para. 562.

¹⁷³ See e.g. *Haradinaj*, Case No. IT-04-84-T, 3 April 2008, para. 49. These indicative factors include: the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. The involvement of the UN Security Council may also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict.

¹⁷⁴ The International Court in *Nicaragua v. US* stated that the rules contained in common article 3 reflected 'elementary considerations of humanity': ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 114; 76 ILR, p. 349. See also *Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-1-AR; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 506.

¹⁷⁵ Note, of course, that by article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I 1977, international armed conflicts are now deemed to include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes: see D. Forsyth, 'Legal Management of International War', 72 *AJIL*, 1978, p. 272. Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol I requires the authority representing such peoples to make a special declaration undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. The UK made a declaration on ratification of Additional Protocol I to the effect that it would not be bound by any such special declaration unless the UK has expressly recognised that it has been made by a body 'which is genuinely an authority representing a people engaged in an armed conflict': see UK, *Manual*, p. 384. Note also the UK view that 'a high level of intensity of military operations' is required regarding Additional Protocol I so that the Northern Ireland situation, e.g., would not have been covered: see 941 HC Deb., col. 237.

¹⁷⁶ Note that in non-international armed conflicts the domestic law of the state in which the conflict is taking place continues to apply and that a captured rebel is not entitled to POW

status nor is he or she entitled to combatant immunity (i.e. immunity for lawful acts of war from domestic criminal law), unlike combatants in international armed conflicts: see e.g. Crawford, *Treatment of Combatants*, pp. 52 ff. See also *Khurts Bat v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2011] EWHC 2029 (Admin). However, persons captured from either the government or rebel or opposition side are entitled to humane treatment: see e.g. UK, *Manual*, pp. 387 ff.

177 See article 4. See also Bílková, ‘Belligerent Reprisals’.

178 Article 6.

179 Article 15.

180 Article 17.

181 Article 5.

182 Article 10. Note that the ICTR has jurisdiction to try violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II. These are defined in article 4 of its Statute as including: ‘(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) Collective punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples; and (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.’

183 Case No. IT-94-1-AR; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 505 ff. But see Moir, *Internal Armed Conflict*, pp. 188 ff.; and T. Meron, ‘The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law’, 90 *AJIL*, 1996, pp. 238, 242–3.

184 See e.g. Moir, *Internal Armed Conflict*, chapter 5; and R. Provost, *International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law*, Cambridge, 2002. See also above, p. 1044.

185 See *Furundžija* 121 ILR, pp. 213, 271.

186 See e.g. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, especially paras. 2, 21, 64, noting that the right to life ‘continues to apply also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable, including to the conduct of hostilities’.

187 See e.g. article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950; article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; and article 27 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 1969. See also above, p. 248.

188 See A. Hay, ‘The ICRC and International Humanitarian Issues’, *International Review of the Red Cross*, Jan–Feb 1984, p. 3. See also T. Meron, ‘Towards a Humanitarian Declaration on Internal Strife’, **78 AJIL**, 1984, p. 859; Meron, *Human Rights in Internal Strife*; T. Meron, ‘On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument’, **77 AJIL**, 1983, p. 589; and T. Meron and A. Rosas, ‘A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards’, **85 AJIL**, 1991, p. 375.

189 As to international human rights law, see generally above, [Chapter 6](#). Problems centre upon the situation where humanitarian law does not apply since the threshold criteria for applicability have not been reached; where the state in question is not a party to the relevant instrument; where derogation from the specified standards is involved as a consequence of the declaration of a state of emergency; and where the party concerned is not a government: see A. Eide, A. Rosas and T. Meron, ‘Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards’, **89 AJIL**, 1995, pp. 215, 217.

190 This was reprinted in the Report of the UN Sub-Commission: see E/CN.4/1995/116 (1995) and UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/29 and E/CN.4/1995/81 and 116. See also T. Meron and A. Rosas, ‘Current Development: A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards’, **85 AJIL**, 1991, pp. 375–7.

191 Article 3.

192 See also the Declaration for the Protection of War Victims 1993, A/48/742, Annex. In addition, the ICRC published the following statement with regard to non-international armed conflicts, positing the relevant general rules: (1) The obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians is a general rule applicable in non-international armed conflicts. It prohibits indiscriminate attacks. (2) The prohibition of attacks against the

civilian population as such or against individual civilians is a general rule applicable in non-international armed conflicts. Acts of violence intended primarily to spread terror among the civilian population are also prohibited. (3) The prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is a general rule applicable in non-international armed conflicts. It prohibits, in particular, the use of means of warfare which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable. (4) The prohibition to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy is a general rule applicable in non-international armed conflicts; in a non-international armed conflict, acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or obliged to accord protection under the rules of international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. (5) The obligation to respect and protect medical and religious personnel and medical units and transports in the conduct of military operations is a general rule applicable in non-international armed conflicts. (6) The general rule prohibiting attacks against the civilian population implies, as a corollary, the prohibition of attacks on dwellings and other installations which are used only by the civilian population. (7) The general rule prohibiting attacks against the civilian population implies, as a corollary, the prohibition to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. (8) The general rule to distinguish between combatants and civilians and the prohibition of attack against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians implies, in order to be effective, that all feasible precautions have to be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to the civilian population: see *International Review of the Red Cross*, Sept.–Oct. 1978, p. 247. See also Green, *Armed Conflict*, pp. 395–6.

¹⁹³ See generally *Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2017; D. Efrony and Y. Shany, ‘A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyber Operations and Subsequent State Practice’, *112 AJIL*, 2018, p. 583; Y. Dinstein and A. W. Dahl, *Oslo Manual on Select Topics of the Law of Armed Conflict*, Switzerland, 2020; and H. H. Diniss, *Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War*, Cambridge, 2012.

¹⁹⁴ See above, Chapter 13, p. 735, on state responsibility and cyber activities and Chapter 19, p. 1027, on cyber warfare and the use of force and the footnotes therein contained. See also Dinstein and Dahl, *Oslo Manual*, pp. 20 ff.

¹⁹⁵ See e.g. the speech of 18 September 2012 by the US State Department Legal Advisor, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm>, and the speech of 23 May

2018 by the UK Attorney-General, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century.

196 See article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See also *Tallinn Manual*, pp. 424 ff.; and Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, vol. I: Rules, pp. 23–4.

197 See *Tallin Manual*, pp. 425 ff.

198 *Ibid.*, pp. 445 ff.

199 *Ibid.*, pp. 434 ff.; and Dinstein and Dahl, *Oslo Manual*, p. 23.

200 *Ibid.*, p. 437.

201 See article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations and article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I. See also *Tallin Manual*, pp. 453 ff.

202 See *Tallin Manual*, pp. 421–2.

203 See e.g. UK, *Manual*, chapter 16; and Best, *War and Law*, pp. 370 ff. See also C. Barrat, *Status of NGOs in International Humanitarian Law*, The Hague, 2014.

204 Common article 1. States parties to treaties are, of course, subject to an international legal obligation to carry out their terms. There is also an obligation to investigate. Rule 158 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Law provides: ‘States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects’: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule158. This is reflected in various treaties: see e.g. article VI of the Genocide Convention; article 28 of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954; and article VII(1) of the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993. In addition, the second part of the Turkel Commission’s report underlines that: ‘In relation to the nature of the violations, it can be deduced from the Commentary on the Geneva Conventions that the obligation to investigate and commit for trial the perpetrators of breaches is not limited merely to those grave breaches defined as such in the Conventions, but includes all breaches of

international humanitarian law that amount to “war crimes”:

www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/alternatefiles/he/turkel_eng_b1-474_0.pdf, para. 25.

See also Y. Shany and A. Cohen, ‘Beyond the Grave Breaches Regime: The Duty to Investigate Alleged Violations of International Law Governing Armed Conflicts’, *14 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, 2011, p. 37; and M. N. Schmitt, ‘Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed Conflict’, *2 Harvard National Security Journal*, 2011, pp. 31, 38.

²⁰⁵ See e.g. articles 127 and 144 of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions respectively, article 83 of Additional Protocol I and article 19 of Additional Protocol II.

²⁰⁶ See e.g. articles 20 and 51(6) of Additional Protocol I.

²⁰⁷ See e.g. Draper, ‘Implementation and Enforcement’, pp. 13 ff. See also UK, *Manual*, pp. 416 ff.; and US Department of Defense, *Law of War Manual*, chapter XVIII.18.

²⁰⁸ See articles 8, 8, 8 and 9 of the four Geneva Conventions 1949, respectively.

²⁰⁹ Note that the system did operate in the Falklands conflict, with Switzerland acting as the Protecting Power of the UK and Brazil as the Protecting Power of Argentina: see e.g. Levie, ‘Falklands Crisis’, pp. 68–9.

²¹⁰ See articles 50, 51, 130 and 147 of the four 1949 Conventions respectively and article 85 of Additional Protocol I 1977. A Commission of Experts was established in 1992 to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia: see Security Council resolution 780 (1992). See also the Report of the Commission of 27 May 1994, S/1994/674.

²¹¹ Article 90 of Additional Protocol I 1977.

²¹² Articles 52, 53, 132 and 149 of the four 1949 Conventions respectively. Indeed, one of the parties to a conflict or relevant incident may establish a commission of inquiry: see e.g. the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (the Turkel Commission) set up by Israel with international participation. This Commission produced two reports: one on Israeli actions to prevent the ‘Mavi Marmara’ flotilla from entering Gaza from the sea, and the second to examine the Israeli mechanisms for investigating allegations of violations of humanitarian law,

www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_a.pdf and www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_b1-474.pdf. Note also the Report of the UN Secretary General's Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, 2011, <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/Palmer-Committee-Final-report.pdf>. See, generally, e.g. A. Sanger, 'The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla', *13 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, 2010, p. 397.

²¹³ See e.g. Draper, 'Implementation and Enforcement', pp. 35 ff. Note also that grave breaches are to be the subject of sanction.

²¹⁴ See further, with regard to the statutes of the various war crimes tribunals, above, Chapters 7 and 11. Note also the UN Compensation Commission dealing with compensation for victims of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, above, Chapter 17, p. 912.

²¹⁵ Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1564 (2004), 2005, www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/com_inq_darfur.pdf.

²¹⁶ The Independent International Commission on Libya was established by the UN Human Rights Committee in 2011, resolution S-15/1, and see A/HRC/19/68, 2012; A/HRC/19/68.

²¹⁷ See General Assembly resolution 71/248 (2016) establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. Its mandate is to 'collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law', <https://iiim.un.org/mandate/>. See also the Independent International Commission on the Syrian Arab Republic, established by the UN Human Rights Council, 2011, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/AboutCoI.aspx.

²¹⁸ See Security Council resolution 2379 (2017) establishing an Investigative Team to collect and preserve evidence for use in domestic courts of international crimes carried out by the so-called ‘Islamic State’, see www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13882.doc.htm.

²¹⁹ In March 2017, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in Myanmar concerning the Rohingya minority. It was replaced by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, see www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarffm/pages/index.aspx and www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IIMM/Pages/Index.aspx. See Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, doc. A/HRC/42/50, 8 August 2019, which was used in evidence in *The Gambia v. Myanmar*, ICJ, Order of 23 January 2020, paras. 22, 27, 54, 55, 71, 72. See also General Assembly resolution 73/264 (2018).

²²⁰ See e.g. G. Willemin and R. Heacock, *The International Committee of the Red Cross*, The Hague, 1984; and D. Forsythe, ‘The Red Cross as Transnational Movement’, 30 *International Organisation*, 1967, p. 607. See also Best, *War and Law*, pp. 347 ff.; and J. Kellenberger, ‘The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, in *Oxford Handbook*, p. 20.

²²¹ See e.g. articles 126 and 142 of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions respectively.

²²² The International Court in *Construction of a Wall*, ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 175–6; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 94, referred to the ‘special position’ of the ICRC with regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention, while the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission in its *Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Ethiopia’s Claim 4*, Decision of 1 July 2003, paras. 58, 61–2, noted that the ICRC had been assigned significant responsibilities in a number of articles of the Third Geneva Convention (with which it was concerned) both as ‘a humanitarian organization providing relief and as an organization providing necessary and vital external scrutiny of the treatment of POWs’ and further emphasised that the provisions requiring scrutiny of the treatment of, and access to, POWs had become part of customary international law.

²²³ See e.g. *Challenges of the Nineties: ICRC Special Report on Activities 1990–1995*, Geneva, 1995. Between 1990 and 1994, over half a million prisoners in over sixty

countries were visited by ICRC delegates: *ibid.*

²²⁴ See generally *Annual Report of the ICRC*, 2019, www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/icrc-annual-report-middle-east_2019.pdf. See also ‘Action by the ICRC in the Event of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, *International Review of the Red Cross*, March–April 1981, p. 1. Of particular interest is the memorandum of understanding between the Israeli Magen David Adom and the Palestinian Red Crescent on cooperation, achieved at the ICRC Diplomatic Conference, 2005: <https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2019/11/MoU-MDA-PRCS-2005.pdf>.

²²⁵ Syria is a party to the four Geneva Conventions 1949, but not to Additional Protocol II, and a party to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, but not to the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines or the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

²²⁶ See e.g. www.icrc.org/en/document/operational-update-syria-maintaining-vital-support-most-vulnerable-times-covid-19-while and generally see www.icrc.org/en/resource-centre/result?t=syria.

See also the various reports of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab republic established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/AboutCoI.aspx; Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/report-syria/; Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/syria; and the International Crisis Group, www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria.

²²⁷ See e.g. www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-assault.html.

²²⁸ See e.g. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43020830 and www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51397357.

²²⁹ See also Security Council resolutions 2209 and 2235 (2015) condemning the use of chemical weapons in Syria and reaffirming the decision that Syria ‘shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or, transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other states or non-state actors’. Resolution 2235 also called for a Joint Investigative Mechanism to determine responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. See also resolution 2401 (2018).

²³⁰ See e.g. the vetoes by Russia and China with regard to a draft resolution that would have referred the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in May 2014: www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47860#.V_Zam5MrJjQ. See also the Russian veto on 8 October 2016 of a resolution that called for an end to the aerial bombardment of the Syrian city of Aleppo: www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55246#.V_n-A5MrKi4. See generally www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/other-documents/?ctype=Syria&cbtype=syria.

²³¹ See as to Libya, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/shifts-libya-civil-war/> and www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next. See as to Yemen, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29319423 and <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf>.

²³² Note also the Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts adopted on first reading by the International Law Commission in 2019, see *Report of the International Law Commission*, 2019, A/74/10, pp. 222 ff., noting in particular that, in Principle 14: ‘The law of armed conflict, including the principles and rules on distinction, proportionality, military necessity and precautions in attack, shall be applied to the natural environment, with a view to its protection.’

The United Nations

The UN System

The United Nations¹ was established following the conclusion of the Second World War and in the light of Allied planning and intentions expressed during that conflict.² The purposes of the United Nations are set out in article 1 of the Charter as follows:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

While the purposes are clearly wide-ranging, they do provide a useful guide to the comprehensiveness of its concerns. The question of priorities as between the various issues noted is constantly subject to controversy and change, but this only reflects the continuing pressures and altering political balances within the organisation. In particular, the emphasis upon decolonisation, self-determination and apartheid mirrored the growth in UN membership and the dismantling of the colonial empires, while increasing concern with economic and developmental issues is now very apparent and clearly reflects the adverse economic conditions in various parts of the world.

The UN Charter is not only the multilateral treaty which created the organisation and outlined the rights and obligations of those states signing it, it is also the constitution of the United Nations, laying down its functions and prescribing its limitations.³ Foremost among these is the recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the member states. Under article 2(7) of the Charter, the United Nations may not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (unless enforcement measures under Chapter VII are to be applied). This provision has inspired many debates in the United Nations, and it came to be accepted that colonial issues were not to be regarded as falling within the article 2(7) restriction. Other changes have also occurred, demonstrating that the concept of domestic jurisdiction is not immutable but a principle of international law delineating international and domestic spheres of operations. As a principle of international law it is

susceptible to change through international law and is not dependent upon the unilateral determination of individual states.⁴

In addition to the domestic jurisdiction provision, article 2 also lays down a variety of other principles in accordance with which both the United Nations and the member states are obliged to act. These include the assertion that the United Nations is based upon the sovereign equality of states and the principles of fulfilment in good faith of the obligations contained in the Charter, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the prohibition on the use of force. It is also provided that member states must assist the organisation in its activities taken in accordance with the Charter and must refrain from assisting states against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

The United Nations has six principal organs, these being the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, Secretariat and International Court of Justice.⁵

The Security Council⁶

The Council was intended to operate as an efficient executive organ of limited membership, functioning continuously. It was given primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁷ The Security Council consists of fifteen members, five of them being permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China and France). These permanent members, chosen on the basis of power politics in 1945, have the veto. Under article 27 of the Charter, on all but procedural matters, decisions of the Council must be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. The other ten members are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.⁸

A negative vote by any of the permanent members is therefore sufficient to veto any resolution of the Council, save with regard to procedural questions, where nine affirmative votes are all that is required. The veto was written into the Charter in view of the exigencies of power. The Soviet Union, in particular, would not have been willing to accept the United Nations as it was envisaged without the establishment of the veto to protect it from the Western bias of the Council and General Assembly at that time.⁹ In practice, the veto was exercised by the Soviet Union on a considerable number of occasions, by the United States less frequently and by the other members fairly rarely. In more recent years, the exercise of the veto by the United States has increased. The question of how one distinguishes between procedural and non-procedural matters has been a highly controversial one. In the statement of the Sponsoring Powers at San Francisco, it was declared that the issue of

whether or not a matter was procedural was itself subject to the veto.¹⁰ This ‘double-veto’ constitutes a formidable barrier. Subsequent practice has interpreted the phrase ‘concurring votes of the permanent members’ in article 27 in such a way as to permit abstentions. Accordingly, permanent members may abstain with regard to a resolution of the Security Council without being deemed to have exercised their veto against it.¹¹

It does not, of course, follow that the five supreme powers of 1945 will continue to be the only permanent members of the Council nor the only ones with a veto.¹² However, the complicated mechanisms for amendment of the Charter,¹³ coupled with the existence of the veto, make any change difficult. The question of expansion of Council membership has been before the United Nations for an appreciable period and various proposals have been made.¹⁴ One proposal would provide for six new permanent seats with no veto and three new non-permanent seats. Another would provide for no new permanent seats but a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat. States usually seen as candidates for permanent positions on the Council include Germany, India, Japan and Brazil, but others are also keen to be considered and no consensus is yet in sight.

The Council has the power to establish subsidiary bodies under article 29 of the Charter and has currently three permanent committees, being a Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure, a Committee on Admission of New Members and a Committee on Council meeting away from Headquarters. There are also a number of ad hoc committees and working groups, such as the Governing Council of the UN Compensation Commission

established by Security Council resolution 692 (1991), the Counter-Terrorism Committee¹⁵ and the Committee established by resolution 1540 (2004), which obliges states *inter alia* to refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. There are also a number of sanctions committees covering particular states under sanction, as well as the committee established under resolution 1267 (1999) concerning persons and bodies associated with Al-Qaida.¹⁶ Further subsidiary bodies include the Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Compensation Commission and the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

The Security Council acts on behalf of the members of the organisation as a whole in performing its functions, and its decisions (but not its recommendations)¹⁷ are binding upon all member states.¹⁸ Its powers are concentrated in two particular categories: the peaceful settlement of disputes and the adoption of enforcement measures. By these means, the Council conducts its primary task, the maintenance of international peace and security. However, the Council also has a variety of other functions. In the case of trusteeship territories, for example, designated strategic areas fall within the authority of the Security Council rather than the General Assembly,¹⁹ while the admission, suspension and expulsion of member states is carried out by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council.²⁰ Amendments to the UN Charter require the ratification of all the permanent members of the Council (as well as adoption by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of UN members).²¹ The judges

of the International Court of Justice are elected by the Assembly and Council.²²

Until the end of the Cold War, the Council generally did not fulfil the expectations held of it, although resolution 242 (1967) laid down the basis for negotiations for a Middle East peace settlement and is regarded as the most authoritative expression of the principles to be taken into account.²³ With the development of the *glasnost* and *perestroika* policies in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, increasing cooperation with the United States ensued and reached its highest point as the Kuwait crisis evolved.²⁴ After the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, further activities ensued, including the adoption of resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001 condemning international terrorism, reaffirming the right of self-defence and establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee. However, the failure of the Council to agree upon measures consequent to resolution 1441 (2002) concerning Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction contrary to resolution 687 (1991) and others precipitated a major division within the Council. The United States and the United Kingdom commenced military operations against Iraq in late March 2003 without express Security Council authorisation and against the opposition of other permanent members.²⁵ However, despite this crisis, the Council began to assume a more proactive role in certain areas. The effect of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) with the establishment of monitoring committees with significant authority, together with the increasing use of sanctions against specific states, has led some to talk of legislative activity.²⁶ Nevertheless, recent years have seen a return to the rivalry of the leading powers.²⁷

The General Assembly²⁸

The General Assembly is the parliamentary body of the UN organisation and consists of representatives of all the member states, of which there are currently 193. UN membership, as provided by article 4 of the Charter, is open to:

all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations,

and is effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.²⁹ Other changes in membership may take place. For example, in 1991, Byelorussia informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Belarus, while the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ceased to exist on 31 December 1992 to be replaced by two new states (the Czech Republic and Slovakia), accepted as UN members on 19 January 1993. The former German Democratic Republic ceased to exist and its territory was absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany as from 3 October 1990, while ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ was admitted to the United Nations on 8 April 1993 under that unusual appellation. It changed its name on 14 February 2019 to the Republic of North Macedonia following the Prespa agreement with Greece.³⁰ Russia was regarded as the continuator of the Soviet Union, so no action was required. In November 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted as a new

member and in February 2003 it changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, Montenegro seceded and became a member of the United Nations in its own right.³¹ UN membership may be suspended under article 5 of the Charter by the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, where the member state concerned is the object of preventive or enforcement action by the Security Council. Article 6 allows for expulsion of a member by the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, where the member state has persistently violated the Principles contained in the Charter.³²

Voting in the Assembly is governed by article 18, which stipulates that each member has one vote only, despite widespread disparities in populations and resources between states, and that decisions on ‘important questions’, including the admission of new members and recommendations relating to international peace and security, are to be made by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting.³³

Except for certain internal matters, such as the budget,³⁴ the Assembly cannot bind its members. It is not a legislature in that sense, and its resolutions are purely recommendatory. Such resolutions, of course, may be binding if they reflect rules of customary international law and they are significant as instances of state practice that may lead to the formation of a new customary rule, but Assembly resolutions in themselves cannot establish binding legal obligations for member states.³⁵ The Assembly is essentially a debating chamber, a forum for the exchange of ideas and the discussion of a wide-ranging category of problems. It meets in annual sessions, but special sessions may be called by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security

Council or a majority of UN members.³⁶ Emergency special sessions may also be called by virtue of the Uniting for Peace machinery.³⁷ Ten such sessions have been convened, covering situations ranging from various aspects of the Middle East situation in 1956, 1958, 1967, 1980 and 1982 and a rolling session commencing in 1997, to Afghanistan in 1980 and Namibia in 1981.

The Assembly has established a variety of organs covering a wide range of topics and activities.³⁸ It has six main committees that cover, respectively: disarmament and international security; economic and financial; social, humanitarian and cultural; special political and decolonisation; administrative and budgetary; and legal matters.³⁹

Other Principal Organs⁴⁰

Much of the work of the United Nations in the economic and social spheres of activity is performed by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It can discuss a wide range of matters, but its powers are restricted and its recommendations are not binding upon UN member states. It consists of fifty-four members elected by the Assembly for three-year terms with staggered elections, and each member has one vote.⁴¹ The Council may, by article 62, initiate or make studies upon a range of issues and make recommendations to the General Assembly, the UN members and to the relevant specialised agencies. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the Assembly and call international conferences. The Council has created a variety of subsidiary organs, ranging from nine functional commissions,⁴² to five regional commissions⁴³ and a number of standing committees and expert bodies.⁴⁴ The Council also runs a variety of programmes including the Environment Programme and the Drug Control Programme, and has established a number of other bodies such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Conference on Trade and Development. Its most prominent function has been in establishing a wide range of economic, social and human rights bodies.⁴⁵

The Trusteeship Council⁴⁶ was established in order to supervise the trust territories created after the end of the Second World War.⁴⁷ Such territories were to consist of mandated territories, areas detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War and other territories voluntarily placed under the trusteeship system by the administering authority (of which there have

been none).⁴⁸ The only former mandated territory which was not placed under the new system or granted independence was South West Africa.⁴⁹ With the independence of Palau, the last remaining trust territory, on 1 October 1994, the Council suspended operation on 1 November that year.⁵⁰

The UN Secretariat⁵¹ consists of the Secretary-General and his staff, and constitutes virtually an international civil service. The staff are appointed by article 101 upon the basis of efficiency, competence and integrity, ‘due regard’ being paid ‘to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible’. All member states have undertaken, under article 100, to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and his staff, who are neither to seek nor receive instructions from any other authority but the UN organisation itself.

Under article 97, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the unanimous recommendation of the Security Council and constitutes the chief administrative officer of the United Nations. He or she must accordingly be a personage acceptable to all the permanent members and this, in the light of effectiveness, is vital. Much depends upon the actual personality and outlook of the particular office holder, and the role played by the Secretary-General in international affairs has tended to vary according to the character of the person concerned. Apart from various administrative functions,⁵² the essence of the Secretary-General’s authority is contained in article 99 of the Charter, which empowers him to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which he feels may strengthen the maintenance of international peace and security, although this power has not often been

used.⁵³ In practice, the role of Secretary-General has extended beyond the various provisions of the Charter. In particular, the Secretary-General has an important role in exercising good offices in order to resolve or contain international crises.⁵⁴ Additionally, the Secretary-General is in an important position to mark or possibly to influence developments. The publication of *An Agenda for Peace*⁵⁵ by Dr Boutros-Ghali and of *In Larger Freedom*⁵⁶ by Kofi Annan, for instance, constituted particularly significant events.

In many disputes, the functions assigned to the Secretary-General by the other UN organs have enabled him to increase the influence of the organisation.⁵⁷ One remarkable example of this occurred in the Congo crisis of 1960 and the subsequent Council resolution authorising the Secretary-General in very wide-ranging terms to take action.⁵⁸ Another instance of the capacity of the Secretary-General to take action was the decision of 1967 to withdraw the UN peacekeeping force in the Middle East, thus removing an important psychological barrier to war, and provoking a certain amount of criticism.

The sixth principal organ of the United Nations is the International Court of Justice, established in 1946 as the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice.⁵⁹

The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes⁶⁰

The League of Nations⁶¹

The provisions set out in the UN Charter are to a large degree based upon the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations as amended in the light of experience. Article 12 of the Covenant declared that any dispute likely to lead to a conflict between members was to be dealt with in one of three ways: by arbitration, by judicial settlement or by inquiry by the Council of the League. Article 15 noted that the Council was to try to effect a settlement of the dispute in question, but if that failed, it was to publish a report containing the facts of the case and ‘the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto’. This report was not, however, binding upon the parties, but if it was a unanimous one the League members were not to go to war ‘with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report’. If the report was merely a majority one, League members reserved to themselves ‘the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice’. In other words, in the latter case the Covenant did not absolutely prohibit the resort to war by members. Where a member resorted to war in disregard of the Covenant, then the various sanctions prescribed in article 16 might apply, although whether the circumstances in which sanctions might be enforced had actually arisen was a point to be decided by the individual members and not by the League itself. Sanctions were in fact used against Italy in 1935–36, but in a half-hearted manner due to political considerations by the leading states at the time.⁶²

The UN System

The UN system is founded in constitutional terms upon a relatively clear theoretical distinction between the functions of the principal organs of the organisation. However, due to political conditions in the international order, the system failed to operate as outlined in the Charter and adjustments had to be made as opportunities presented themselves. The Security Council was intended to function as the UN executive, with the General Assembly as the parliamentary forum. Both organs could contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes through relatively traditional mechanisms of discussion, good offices and mediation. Only the Security Council could adopt binding decisions and those through the means of Chapter VII, while acting to restore international peace and security. But the pattern of development has proved rather less conducive to clear categorisation. An influential attempt to detail the methods and mechanisms available to the United Nations in seeking to resolve disputes was made by the UN Secretary-General in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union and the unmistakable ending of the Cold War.

In *An Agenda for Peace*,⁶³ the Secretary-General, while emphasising that respect for the fundamental sovereignty and integrity of states constituted the foundation-stone of the organisation,⁶⁴ noted the rapid changes affecting both states individually and the international community as a whole and emphasised the role of the United Nations in securing peace. The Report sought to categorise the types of actions that the organisation was undertaking or could undertake. *Preventive Diplomacy* was action to prevent disputes from arising between states, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. This included efforts such as fact-finding, good offices and goodwill

missions.⁶⁵ *Peacemaking* involves action to bring the hostile parties to agreement, utilising the peaceful means elaborated in Chapter VI of the Charter.⁶⁶ *Peacekeeping* is the deployment of a UN presence in the field.⁶⁷ *Peacebuilding* is action to identify and support structures that will assist peace.⁶⁸ *Peace Enforcement* is peacekeeping not involving the consent of the parties, which would rest upon the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.⁶⁹

The attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 ‘dramatised the global threat of terrorism’, while focusing attention upon ‘re-constructing weak or collapsed states’.⁷⁰ The Secretary-General also emphasised the need to replace the culture of reaction by one of prevention and by developing *inter alia* a thirty- to ninety-day deployment capability.⁷¹

The Security Council

The primary objective of the United Nations as stipulated in article 1 of the Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security and disputes likely to endanger this are required under article 33 to be solved ‘by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means’. Indeed, the Charter declares as one of its purposes in article 1, ‘to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace’. By article 24,⁷² the UN members conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and by article 25⁷³ agreed to

accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. The International Court in *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*⁷⁴ drew attention to the fact that the provision in article 25 was not limited to enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter, but applied to “decisions of the Security Council” adopted in accordance with the Charter’. Accordingly, a declaration of the Council taken under article 24 in the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security could constitute a decision under article 25 so that member states ‘would be expected to act in consequence of the declaration made on their behalf’.⁷⁵ Whether a particular resolution adopted under article 24 actually constituted a decision binding all member states (and outside the collective security framework of Chapter VII)⁷⁶ was a matter for analysis in each particular case, ‘having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council’.⁷⁷ Under the Charter, the role of the Security Council when dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes specifically under Chapter VI differs from when the Council is contemplating action relating to threats to or breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression under Chapter VII. In the former instance there is no power as such to make binding decisions with regard to member states.

In pursuance of its primary responsibility, the Security Council may, by article 34, ‘investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’. In addition to this power of investigation,

the Security Council can, where it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by the means elaborated in article 33.⁷⁸ The Council may intervene if it wishes at any stage of a dispute or situation, the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security, and under article 36(1) recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. But in making such recommendations, which are not binding, it must take into consideration the general principle that legal disputes should be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice.⁷⁹ Where the parties to a dispute cannot resolve it by the various methods mentioned in article 33, they should refer it to the Security Council by article 37. The Council, where it is convinced that the continuance of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security, may recommend not only procedures and adjustment methods, but also such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Once the Council, however, has determined the existence of a threat to, or a breach of, the peace or act of aggression, it may make decisions which are binding upon UN member states under Chapter VII, but until that point it can under Chapter VI issue recommendations only.⁸⁰ Under article 35(1) any UN member state may bring a dispute or a situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute before the Council, while a non-member state may bring to the attention of the Council any dispute under article 35(2) provided it is a party to the dispute in question and ‘accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter’. It is also possible for third parties to bring disputes to the attention of the Council.⁸¹

In practice, the Security Council has applied all the diplomatic techniques available in various international disputes. This is in addition to open debates and the behind-the-scenes discussions and lobbying that take place. On numerous occasions it has called upon the parties to a dispute to negotiate a settlement and has requested that it be kept informed. The Council offered its good offices in the late 1940s with regard to the Dutch–Indonesian dispute⁸² and has had recourse to mediation attempts in many other conflicts, for example with regard to the Kashmir⁸³ and Cyprus⁸⁴ questions.⁸⁵ However, the cases where the Council has recommended procedures or methods of adjustment under article 36 have been comparatively rare. Only in the *Corfu Channel* and *Aegean Sea* disputes did the Council recommend the parties to turn to the International Court. Probably the most famous Security Council resolution recommending a set of principles to be taken into account in resolving a particular dispute is resolution 242 (1967) dealing with the Middle East. This resolution pointed to two basic principles to be applied in establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East: first, Israeli withdrawal ‘from territories occupied in the recent conflict’ (i.e. the Six Day War) and, secondly, the termination of all claims of belligerency and acknowledgement of the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognised frontiers.⁸⁶

The General Assembly⁸⁷

Although the primary responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security lies with the Security Council, the General Assembly may discuss any question or matter within the scope of the Charter, including the maintenance of international peace and security, and may make

recommendations to the UN members or the Security Council,⁸⁸ provided the Council is not itself dealing with the same matter.⁸⁹ Under similar conditions, the Assembly may under article 14 ‘recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations’. In the *Construction of a Wall* case,⁹⁰ the International Court emphasised that under article 24 the Security Council had a primary and not necessarily an exclusive competence with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, while the constraint placed by article 12 on the powers of the Assembly to make recommendations for the peaceful adjustment of situations had been interpreted by evolving practice to permit both the Assembly and the Council to deal in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of international peace and security, with the former often taking a broader view.⁹¹

In practice, the resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly (which are not binding) have covered a very wide field, from colonial disputes to alleged violations of human rights and the need for justice in international economic affairs. The role of the General Assembly increased after 1945 due to two factors: first, the existence of the veto in the Security Council rendered that organ powerless in many important disputes since the permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), France and China) rarely agreed with regard to any particular conflict; and, secondly, the vast increase in UN membership had the effect of radicalising the Assembly and its deliberations. More recently, the increased role of the Security Council has overshadowed that of the Assembly.

The Secretary-General⁹²

Just as the impotence of the Security Council stimulated a growing awareness of the potentialities of the General Assembly, it similarly underlined the role to be played by the UN Secretary-General. By article 99 of the Charter, he is entitled to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which he thinks may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security and this power is in addition to his function as the chief administrative officer of the UN organisation under article 79.⁹³ In effect, the Secretary-General has considerable discretion and much has depended upon the views and outlook of the person filling the post at any given time, as well as the general political situation.

The good offices role of the Secretary-General has rapidly expanded.⁹⁴ In exercising such a role, Secretaries-General have sought to act independently of the Security Council and General Assembly, in the former case, in so far as they have not been constrained by binding resolutions (as, for example, in the Kuwait situation of 1990–91). The assumption of good offices and mediation activity may arise either because of independent action by the Secretary-General as part of the exercise of his inherent powers⁹⁵ or as a consequence of a request made by the Security Council⁹⁶ or General Assembly.⁹⁷ In some cases, the Secretary-General has acted upon the invitation of the parties themselves,⁹⁸ and on other occasions, the Secretary-General has acted in concert with the relevant regional organisation.⁹⁹ In many cases, the Secretary-General will appoint a Special Representative to assist in seeking a solution to the particular problem.¹⁰⁰

The development of good offices and mediation activities first arose as a consequence of the severe restrictions imposed upon UN operations by the Cold War. The cessation of the Cold War led to greatly increased UN activity and as a consequence the work of the Secretary-General expanded as he sought to bring to fruition the wide range of initiatives undertaken by the organisation. The experiences of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the mid-1990s and Iraq from 1991 to the 2003 war have been disappointing for the organisation.

Peacekeeping and Observer Missions¹⁰¹

There is no explicit legal basis for peacekeeping activities in the UN Charter. They arose in the absence of the contribution of armed forces and facilities to the United Nations as requested in article 43. Accordingly, a series of arrangements and operations have evolved which taken together have established a clear pattern of acceptable reaction by the United Nations in particular crisis situations. The broad bases for such activities lie in the general provisions in the Charter governing the powers of the Security Council and General Assembly. The Security Council, for example, may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions (article 29) and those functions are laid down in articles 34 (powers of investigation); 36, 37 and 38 (powers to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of dispute settlement); and 39 (powers of recommendation or decision in order to maintain or restore international peace and security). The Security Council may, in particular under article 42, take such action by land, sea or air forces as may be necessary to maintain or

restore international peace and security. This is the basis for action explicitly taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.¹⁰²

However, the majority of peacekeeping activities have not been so authorised and it is unlikely that article 42 can be seen as the legal basis for all such activities. The Security Council can entrust functions to the Secretary-General under article 98 and this mechanism has proved significant in practice. The General Assembly has wide powers under articles 10 and 11 to discuss and make recommendations on matters within the scope of the UN Charter, including recommendations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁰³ Under article 14, the Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation regardless of origin which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. It can, however, take no binding decision in such matters.¹⁰⁴ The Assembly may also establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions (article 22) and entrust functions to the Secretary-General (article 98). It is because such operations fall somewhat between Chapter VI (peaceful settlement) and Chapter VII (enforcement) of the Charter, that the term ‘Chapter Six and a Half’ has been used.¹⁰⁵

Essentially, peacekeeping involves the deployment of armed forces under UN control to contain and resolve military conflicts. Although originally intended to deal with inter-state conflicts, more recently peacekeeping forces have been used with regard to civil wars and other intra-state conflicts. Again, primarily military deployments have expanded to include civilian personnel as an increasing number of civil functions have been entrusted to such forces.

There have been fifty-eight past peacekeeping missions as of June 2020 and there are currently thirteen in operation.¹⁰⁶ Peacekeeping and observer missions operate upon a continuum of UN activities and it is helpful to consider these operations together. Indeed, that continuum has in recent years been extended to incorporate elements of enforcement action.¹⁰⁷

The origin of peacekeeping by the United Nations may be traced to truce supervision activities. The first such activity occurred in Greece, where the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) was created in 1947.¹⁰⁸ The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to supervise the truce in the 1948 Middle East War.¹⁰⁹ Peacekeeping¹¹⁰ as such arose as a direct consequence of the problems facing the Security Council during the Cold War. The first peacekeeping activity took place in 1956 as a result of the Suez crisis. The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was established by the General Assembly¹¹¹ to position itself between the hostile forces and to supervise the withdrawal of British and French forces from the Suez Canal and Israeli forces from the Sinai peninsula. It was then deployed along the armistice line until May 1967. The second crucial peacekeeping operation took place in the Congo crisis of 1960, which erupted soon after Belgium granted independence to the colony and resulted in mutinies, insurrections and much confused fighting. The Security Council adopted a resolution permitting the Secretary-General to provide military assistance to the Congo government.¹¹² This was interpreted by Dr Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General, as a mandate to set up a peacekeeping force on an analogy with UNEF. The exercise of the veto in the Council left the Secretary-General with little guidance as to how to proceed in the situation. Accordingly, he performed many of the tasks that had in 1956 been

undertaken by the General Assembly with regard to the Middle East.¹¹³ The development of the Congo crisis from mutiny to civil war meant that the UN force (ONUC) was faced with many difficult decisions and these had in the main to be taken by the Secretary-General. The role that could be played by the Secretary-General was emphasised in the succeeding crises in Cyprus (1964)¹¹⁴ and the Middle East (1973)¹¹⁵ and in the consequent establishment of UN peacekeeping forces for these areas under the general guidance of the Secretary-General.

The creation of traditional peacekeeping forces, whether in the Middle East in 1967 and again in 1973, in the Congo in 1960 or in Cyprus in 1964, was important in that such forces tended to stabilise particular situations for a certain time. Such UN forces are not intended to take enforcement action, but to act as an influence for calm by physically separating warring factions. They are dependent upon the consent of the state upon whose territory they are stationed and can in no way prevent a determined aggression. The various UN peacekeeping operations have met with some limited success in temporarily preventing major disturbances, but they failed to prevent the 1967 Arab–Israeli War¹¹⁶ and the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus.¹¹⁷ One has to be careful not to overestimate their significance in difficult political situations. In addition to the consent of the host state, such forces also require the continuing support of the Security Council and if that is lost or not provided such forces cannot operate.¹¹⁸ Just as crucial as these factors is the provision of sufficient resources by the UN and its member states in order to fulfil the agreed mandate. Events in Bosnia, for example, demonstrated how the absence of adequate resources impacted severely upon operations.

Nevertheless, peacekeeping and observer operations do have a role to play, particularly as a way of ensuring that conflict situations in the process of being resolved do not flare up as a result of misunderstandings or miscalculations. Some recent UN operations in this area demonstrate this.¹¹⁹ The UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan was established in the context of the Geneva Accords of 14 April 1988 dealing with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan,¹²⁰ while the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group was created the same year following the acceptance by the belligerent states of Security Council resolution 598 (1987) calling for a ceasefire.¹²¹ In 1989, in the context of the resolution of the Namibian problem, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) commenced operation in order to verify the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.¹²² Efforts to hold a referendum in Western Sahara are being assisted by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),¹²³ while the UN Iraq–Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) was set up to monitor the demilitarised zone between these two states following the Gulf War.¹²⁴

Further examples of crucial and complex peacekeeping and/or observer activities include observing Eritrea’s plebiscite on secession from Ethiopia¹²⁵ and South Africa’s elections in 1994,¹²⁶ supervising the demilitarisation of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia) and *inter alia* overseeing the return of refugees, training a police force, organising elections and facilitating the removal of mines from the area,¹²⁷ monitoring the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka Peninsula in Croatia,¹²⁸ assisting the Haitian government in the professionalisation of the police and maintaining a secure environment.¹²⁹ The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea was a more traditional operation, aimed at overseeing a ceasefire between the two states

and assisting them in delimiting and demarcating the boundary,¹³⁰ as was that in August 2006 in Lebanon, facilitating the withdrawal of Israeli forces and permitting the return of the Lebanese army to southern Lebanon following a period of Hizbollah control in that area.¹³¹ However, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia tried unsuccessfully from 1993 to resolve the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia. Its mandate came to an end in June 2009 following Security Council disagreements after the Russian invasion of Georgia.¹³²

The legal framework for the actual conduct of peacekeeping and observer activities reflects their status as UN organs, so that they are, for example, subject to the law governing the UN organisations as a whole, such as that concerning the privileges and immunities of UN personnel¹³³ and responsibility.¹³⁴ The United Nations would be liable for breaches of law committed by members of peacekeeping and observer forces and groups and would, on the other hand, be able to claim compensation for damage and injuries caused to its personnel. Where forces are stationed on the territory of a state, the usual practice is for formal agreements to be entered into between that state and the United Nations concerning, for example, facilities, logistics, privileges and immunities of persons and property, and dispute settlement procedures. In 1990, the Secretary-General produced a Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations,¹³⁵ which covers such matters. It notes, for instance, that the peacekeeping operation and its members are to respect all local laws and regulations, while the government in question undertakes to respect the exclusively international nature of the operation. Jurisdictional and military discipline issues are also dealt with. The United Nations has also adopted the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 1994 in order to deal with the situation

where the UN operation is not an enforcement operation authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter, in combat with local forces and operating under the laws of armed conflict.¹³⁶

The question as to whether UN forces are subject to the laws of armed conflict or international humanitarian law¹³⁷ has proved controversial. Since the United Nations is bound by general international law, it is also bound by the customary rules concerning armed conflict,¹³⁸ although not by the rules contained only in treaties to which the United Nations is not a party. The problem has arisen in the light of whether such UN activities may be properly classified as ‘armed conflicts’.¹³⁹ The question of the application of international humanitarian law to operations has been a matter of some concern and a model agreement was put forward in 1991. While it has long been accepted that the rules of humanitarian law applied to UN enforcement actions,¹⁴⁰ article 2(2) of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 1994 provides that the Convention will not apply to a UN enforcement operation ‘to which the law of international armed conflict applies’. Difficulties have arisen where the United Nations has become involved in operations of a mixed peacekeeping/enforcement character. However, the Model Agreement prepared by the Secretary-General in May 1991 specified that ‘United Nations peacekeeping operations shall observe and respect the principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military operations’¹⁴¹ and Status of Forces agreements signed by the United Nations with host countries usually contain a provision that humanitarian law applies.¹⁴²

On 6 August 1999, the UN Secretary-General addressed the difficulty and issued a statement declaring that:

The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law . . . are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permissible in self-defence.¹⁴³

Conclusion

The functioning of the UN system for the preservation and restoration of world peace has not been a tremendous success in the broadest strategic sense. It constitutes merely one additional factor in international disputes management and one often particularly subject to political pressures. The United Nations has played a minimal part in some of the major conflicts and disputes since its inception, whether it be the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962 or the Vietnam War, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan or the Nigerian, Angolan, Syrian, Libyan or Yemeni Civil Wars.

Nevertheless, the position of the United Nations improved with the ending of the Cold War and the substantial changes in the approach of the Soviet Union, soon to be Russia, in particular.¹⁴⁴ More emphasis was laid upon the

importance of the United Nations in the context of an increased cooperation with the United States. This began to have a significant impact upon the work and achievements of the United Nations. The new cooperative approach led to the agreements leading to the independence of Namibia, while substantial progress was made by the five permanent members of the Security Council in working out a solution to the Cambodian problem. The long-running dispute with Iraq and how to deal with its failure to comply fully with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) appeared to mark a further moment of achievement with the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002). However, the unanimity of the Council fractured and, amid deep division, the United States and the United Kingdom commenced military action against Iraq in March 2003.¹⁴⁵

The range and extent of activities engaged in by the United Nations is startling by past experience. UN missions may not only be used now to stabilise a tense situation in the traditional exposition of the peacekeeping approach, they may also be utilised in order to carry out key administrative functions; verify peace agreements both international and internal; monitor the implementation of human rights accords; supervise and monitor elections; train and oversee police forces; oversee withdrawal and demilitarisation arrangements; and assist in demining operations.

The Secretary-General has emphasised that there are three particularly important principles of peacekeeping.¹⁴⁶ These are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force. While these three may characterise traditional peacekeeping and observer missions, even as these developed during the 1990s, they do not apply necessarily to a new form of

peacekeeping that is mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter.¹⁴⁷ To seek to revitalise the structure, the Secretary-General mandated a Panel on UN Peace Operations to conduct a thorough review. In the Panel Report, a series of recommendations were made.¹⁴⁸ These included encouraging a more frequent use by the Secretary-General of fact-finding missions to areas of tension in support of short-term crisis-preventive action and a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule-of-law elements in peace operations that emphasises an increased focus on, and team approach to, upholding the rule of law and human rights.¹⁴⁹ In 2006, the Secretary-General outlined a 'Peace Operations 2010' reform strategy¹⁵⁰ and a major reform of the support aspects of peacekeeping operations was initiated. In 2010, a global field support strategy was initiated and a five-year implementation horizon proposed.¹⁵¹ In 2015, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations appointed by the Secretary-General issued its report on *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People*.¹⁵² This noted a range of criticisms, such as the lack of resources for such operations and the slowness often demonstrated in engaging with emerging crises, and called for four essential shifts to be embraced in the future design and delivery of peace operations. First, that political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of operations; secondly, that the current 'sharp distinctions between peacekeeping operations and special political missions' should give way to a continuum of responses and smoother transitions between different phases of missions. It is proposed that the United Nations use the term 'peace operations' to denote the full spectrum of responses required, allowing missions to evolve rather than 'trying to do everything at once, and failing'. Thirdly, a stronger global-regional peace and security partnership was needed to respond to the crises of

tomorrow. More integration was required. Fourthly, the UN Secretariat needed to become more focused upon the distinct and important needs of field missions and upon the needs of the people the United Nations has been mandated to assist.¹⁵³

The Collective Security System¹⁵⁴

The system established by the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security was intended to be comprehensive in its provisions and universal in its application. It has often been termed a collective security system, since a wronged state was to be protected by all, and a wrongdoer punished by all. The history of collective security since 1945 demonstrates how flexibility and textual interpretation have prevented the system from failing completely.

The Security Council

The original scheme by which this was achieved laid great stress upon the role of the Security Council, although this has been modified to some extent in practice. By article 24 of the UN Charter, the Council was granted primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and its decisions are under article 25 binding upon all member states. It was thus intended to fulfil a dynamic, executive function.

While actions adopted by the Security Council in pursuance of Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes, are purely recommendatory, matters concerning threats to, or breaches of, the peace or

acts of aggression, under Chapter VII, give rise to decision-making powers on the part of the Council. The system is completed by article 103, which declares that obligations under the Charter prevail over obligations contained in other international agreements.¹⁵⁵

Determination of the Situation

Before the Council can adopt measures relating to the enforcement of world peace, article 39 of the Charter requires that it must first ‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’. This is the key to the collective security system. Once such a determination has been made, which may be done implicitly by the use of the language contained in article 39 of the Charter,¹⁵⁶ the way is clear for the adoption of recommendations or decisions to deal with the situation. The adoption of Chapter VII enforcement action constitutes an exception to the principle stated in article 2(7) of the Charter, according to which the United Nations is not authorised ‘to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.

The question is thus raised at this juncture as to the definition of a threat to, or breach of, the peace or act of aggression. The answer that has emerged in practice is that it depends upon the circumstances of the case and it also depends upon the relationship of the five permanent members of the Council (the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, China and France) to the issue under consideration, for a negative vote by any of the permanent members is sufficient to block all but procedural resolutions of the Council.¹⁵⁷

Threat to the peace is the broadest category provided for in article 39 and the one least susceptible to precise definition. In a sense it constitutes a safety net for Security Council action where the conditions needed for a breach of the peace or act of aggression do not appear to be present. It is also the category which has marked a rapid evolution as the perception as to what amounts to a threat to international peace and security has broadened. In particular, the concept has been used to cover internal situations that would once have been shielded from UN action by article 2(7) of the Charter. Indeed, it has proved in recent years to be a significant driver for expansion of the functions of the Council.

A threat to the peace was first determined in the 1948 Middle East War, when in resolution 54 (1948), the Security Council found that the situation created by the conflict in the former mandated territory of Palestine where neighbouring Arab countries had entered the territory in order to conduct hostilities against the new state of Israel constituted ‘a threat to the peace within the meaning of article 39’ and demanded a cease-fire. In resolution 221 (1966), the Council determined that the situation of the minority white regime in Rhodesia constituted a threat to the peace.¹⁵⁸

With the cessation of the Cold War, the Security Council has been able to extend its activities under Chapter VII to a remarkable extent. In resolution 713 (1991), the Council determined that the situation in former Yugoslavia¹⁵⁹ constituted a threat to the peace; and in resolution 733 (1992), it was held that the situation in Somalia amounted to a threat to peace. In resolution 794 (1992), the Council underlined that ‘the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being

created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security'.¹⁶⁰ In resolution 788 (1992), the Council decided that the deteriorating civil war situation in Liberia constituted a threat to international peace, while in resolution 955 (1994), it was determined that the genocide in Rwanda constituted a threat to international peace and security. The latter three cases were clearly internal civil war situations and it could be said that the situation in Yugoslavia at the time of the adoption of the 1991 resolution was also a civil war situation, although this is more complex. Further resolutions with regard to former Yugoslavia determined that threats to the peace were involved.¹⁶¹ In another move of considerable importance, the Council has also determined that 'widespread violations of international humanitarian law' constitute a threat to peace.¹⁶²

A further expansion in the meaning in practice of a threat to international peace and security took place with regard to Libya. In resolution 748 (1992), the Council determined that 'the failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests in resolution 731 (1992),¹⁶³ constitute a threat to international peace and security'. Again, in resolution 1070 (1996), the Council determined that the failure of Sudan to comply with earlier resolutions demanding that it act to extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution suspects on its territory wanted in connection with an assassination attempt against the President of Egypt,¹⁶⁴ constituted a threat to international peace and security. In both cases, references to 'international terrorism' were made in the context of a determination of a threat to the peace. This constitutes an important step in combating such a phenomenon for it paves the way for the adoption of

binding sanctions in such circumstances. This has been reinforced by resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) adopted in the wake of the 11 September bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and of the Pentagon.¹⁶⁵

The Haiti situation similarly marked a development in the understanding by the Council as to what may amount to a threat to international peace and security. UN observers monitored an election in that country in 1990, but on 30 September 1991 the elected President Aristide was ousted. In a process which demonstrates the growing interaction between UN organs in crisis situations, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative for Haiti on 11 December 1991, the General Assembly authorised a joint UN–Organization of American States civilian mission on human rights (MICIVIH) on 20 April 1993,¹⁶⁶ and, on 16 June 1993, the Security Council imposed an arms and oil embargo on Haiti with sanctions to enter into force on 23 June unless the Secretary-General and the OAS reported that such measures were no longer warranted.¹⁶⁷ The Security Council referred to the fact that ‘the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bernard Aristide’ had not been reinstated and noted ‘the incidence of humanitarian crises, including mass displacements of population, becoming or aggravating threats to international peace and security’.¹⁶⁸ The Council determined therefore that ‘in these unique and exceptional circumstances’, the continuation of the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. Thus, although the Security Council did not go so far as to declare that the removal of a legitimate government constituted of itself a threat to peace, it was clearly the precipitating factor that taken together with other matters could enable a determination to be made under article 39, thus permitting the

adoption of binding sanctions. The sanctions were suspended following the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993.¹⁶⁹

However, in resolution 873 (1993), the Council determined that the failure by the military authorities in Haiti to fulfil obligations under that agreement constituted a threat to international peace and security, and sanctions were reimposed.¹⁷⁰ Further, in resolution 1540 (2004), the Council affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constituted a threat to international peace and security and proceeded to establish a sanctions regime monitored by a committee of the Council.¹⁷¹ The Council has also determined that international health crises may constitute a threat to international peace and security, commencing with resolution 1983 (2012) with regard to HIV/AIDS and on to resolutions 2177 (2014) and 2439 (2018) with regard to Ebola and to resolution 2532 (2020) determining that ‘the unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’.

After several decades of discussion and deliberation, a definition of aggression was finally agreed upon by the UN General Assembly in 1974.¹⁷² Article 1 provides that aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. A number of examples of aggressive acts are given in article 3 and these include the use of weapons by a state against the territory of another state, the blockade of the ports or coasts of a state by the armed forces of another state,¹⁷³ and attack by the armed forces of a state on the land, sea or air forces of another state and the sending by, or on behalf of, a state of armed bands to carry out acts of

armed force against another state.¹⁷⁴ This elucidation of some of the features of the concept of aggression might prove of some use to the Security Council, but the Council does retain the right to examine all the relevant circumstances, including the gravity of any particular incident, before deciding on the determination to make pursuant to article 39.¹⁷⁵

Findings as to actual breaches of the peace have occurred four times. In 1950, as a result of the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, the Security Council adopted resolutions determining that a breach of the peace had occurred and calling upon member states to assist South Korea,¹⁷⁶ while in resolution 502 (1982), the Council determined that a breach of the peace in the Falkland Islands region had taken place following the Argentine invasion. The third situation which prompted a finding by the Security Council of a breach of the peace was in resolution 598 (1987) dealing with the Iran–Iraq War, while the fourth occasion was in resolution 660 (1990), in which the Council determined that there existed ‘a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait’.

Chapter VII Measures¹⁷⁷

*Measures Not Involving the Use of Force*¹⁷⁸

Once the Security Council has resolved that a particular dispute or situation involves a threat to the peace or act of aggression, the way is open to take further measures. Such further measures may, however, be preceded by provisional action taken to prevent the aggravation of the situation. This action, provided for by article 40 of the Charter,¹⁷⁹ is without prejudice to the

rights or claims of the parties, and is intended as a provisional measure to stabilise a crisis situation. Usual examples of action taken by the Security Council under this provision include calls for ceasefires (as in the Middle East in 1967 and 1973)¹⁸⁰ and calls for the withdrawal of troops from foreign territory.¹⁸¹ However, the adoption of provisional measures by the Council often has an effect ranging far beyond the confines of a purely temporary action. They may induce a calmer atmosphere leading to negotiations to resolve the difficulties and they may set in train moves to settle the dispute upon the basis laid down in the Security Council resolution which called for the provisional measures.

The action adopted by the Council, once it has decided that there exists with regard to a situation a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, may fall into either of two categories. It may amount to the application of measures not involving the use of armed force under article 41, such as the disruption of economic relations or the severance of diplomatic relations, or may call for the use of such force as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security under article 42.

The Council had not until relatively recently utilised the powers it possesses under article 41 to any great extent. The first major instance of action not including the use of force occurred with regard to the Rhodesian situation following upon the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the white minority government of that territory in 1965.¹⁸² In two resolutions in 1965, the Council called upon member states not to recognise or assist the illegal regime and in particular to break all economic and arms relations with it.¹⁸³

However, the most comprehensive range of economic sanctions thus far imposed by the Security Council was adopted in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990.¹⁸⁴ Security Council resolution 661 (1990), noting that Iraq had failed to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait¹⁸⁵ and acting specifically under Chapter VII of the Charter, imposed a wide range of economic sanctions upon Iraq, including the prohibition by states of all imports from and exports to Iraq and occupied Kuwait,¹⁸⁶ and the transfer of funds to Iraq and Kuwait for such purposes.¹⁸⁷ The Security Council also established a Committee consisting of all members of the Council to oversee the implementation of these measures.¹⁸⁸

The economic sanctions were reinforced under Security Council resolution 665 (1990), which authorised those UN member states deploying maritime forces in the area in cooperation with the legitimate government of Kuwait ‘to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council’ in order to enforce the naval blockade on Iraq. The states concerned were requested to coordinate their actions ‘using as appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staffs Committee’¹⁸⁹ and after consultation with the UN Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990).

Having once established a comprehensive set of economic and financial sanctions together with mechanisms of supervision, it has become easier to put in place similar responses to other situations. On 31 March 1992, the Security Council imposed a relatively restricted range of sanctions upon Libya due to the latter’s refusal to renounce terrorism and respond fully and

effectively to the call in Security Council resolution 731 (1992) to extradite suspected bombers to the United Kingdom or the United States.¹⁹⁰ On 30 May 1992, the Security Council in resolution 757 (1992) imposed a wide range of economic sanctions upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), having imposed an arms embargo upon all states within the territory of the former Yugoslavia in resolution 713 (1991).¹⁹¹

As negotiations progressed, the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were progressively eased.¹⁹² After the Dayton peace agreement was initialled, the arms embargo was lifted¹⁹³ and sanctions were suspended indefinitely by resolution 1022 (1995) on 22 November 1995, except with regard to Bosnian Serb forces. Sanctions were fully lifted by resolution 1074 (1996) following the holding of elections in Bosnia as required under the peace agreement and the Sanctions Committee was dissolved. Arms sanctions were reimposed in 1998 due to the Kosovo situation, but lifted in 2001.¹⁹⁴

Arms sanctions have also been imposed, for example, upon Somalia,¹⁹⁵ Rwanda,¹⁹⁶ Liberia,¹⁹⁷ and Ethiopia and Eritrea.¹⁹⁸ An arms embargo on Sierra Leone¹⁹⁹ was extended to cover the import of rough-cut diamonds other than those controlled by the government under the certificate of origin scheme.²⁰⁰ An air embargo and a freezing of assets was imposed on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1999.²⁰¹ An arms embargo was imposed on all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and Ituri, and on groups not party to the Global and All-inclusive Agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in resolution 1493 (2003),²⁰² while in resolution 1718 (2006), an arms embargo

was placed on North Korea, which was called upon to suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme, and abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Further resolutions followed.²⁰³ An arms embargo on Sudan was imposed in 2004 with regard to all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed Arab militia, operating in North, South and West Darfur,²⁰⁴ while sanctions have also been imposed upon Iran in view of suspicions that it is moving towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons in violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.²⁰⁵

While measures taken under article 41 have traditionally been economic sanctions, other possibilities exist. The Council may, for example, call for action to be taken to reduce the number and level of diplomatic staff of the target state within other states.²⁰⁶ More dramatically, the Council has on two occasions established international tribunals to prosecute war criminals by the adoption of binding resolutions under Chapter VII.²⁰⁷ Further, the Council may adopt a series of determinations concerning legal responsibilities of states that will have considerable consequences.

Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and agreed to by Iraq as part of the ceasefire arrangement,²⁰⁸ constitutes the supreme illustration of such a situation. This laid down a series of conditions for the ending of the conflict in the Gulf. The resolution demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary as laid down in the Agreed Minutes signed by Iraq and Kuwait on 4

October 1963. The Council then proceeded to guarantee the inviolability of this international boundary, a development of great significance in UN history. The resolution also provided for the immediate deployment of a UN observer unit to monitor a demilitarised zone to be established extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait from the international boundary.²⁰⁹ Iraq was called upon to accept the destruction or removal of all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. A special commission was provided for to ensure that this happened.²¹⁰ Iraq was to agree unconditionally not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. The Security Council resolution reaffirmed that Iraq was liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.²¹¹

The scope and extent of this binding resolution amounts to a considerable development of the Security Council's efforts to resolve disputes. The demands that Iraq give up certain types of weapons and the requirement that repudiation of foreign debt is invalidated would appear to mark a new departure for the Council. In this category would also fall the guarantee given to the inviolability of an international border which is still the subject of dispute between the two parties concerned. In addition to the provisions noted above, the Council established a fund to pay compensation for claims²¹² and created a UN Compensation Commission.²¹³

Sanctions continued after the ceasefire as the Security Council determined that Iraq had failed to comply fully with resolution 687 (1991). Concern

centred upon the failure to destroy weapons of mass destruction as required in the resolution. Iraq was also required to place all of its nuclear-weapon-usable materials under the exclusive control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable materials.²¹⁴ The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created to implement the non-nuclear provisions of the resolution and to assist the IAEA in the nuclear areas.

Iraq ceased its partial cooperation with UNSCOM in October 1998. The Security Council adopted resolution 1205 (1998) condemning this as a ‘flagrant violation’ of resolution 687 (1991). The UNSCOM inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998 and the conclusion of its final report was that Iraq had not provided it with the necessary declarations and notifications as required under the Security Council resolution.²¹⁵ In resolution 1284 (1999), noting that Iraq had not fully carried out Council resolutions so that sanctions could not be lifted, the Security Council established the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM.²¹⁶ In resolution 1441 (2002), adopted unanimously, the Security Council pointed to Iraq’s failures to comply with resolution 687 (1991) and decided that Iraq remained in ‘material breach’ of its obligations under Council resolutions. The sanctions regime that continued in force was mitigated by the adoption of the ‘oil-for-food’ programme instituted under resolution 986 (1995) and administered by the United Nations.²¹⁷

Targeted Sanctions and Human Rights

The issue generally of the efficacy of sanctions remains open, but the economic damage that sanctions can do to the general population of a state, particularly where the government concerned does not operate in good faith, may be immense, and this has opened a debate as to whether sanctions may be better focused and targeted or made ‘smarter’.²¹⁸ One manifestation of this has been the increasing resort to sanctions against particular individuals or entities (as determined by the Security Council sanctions committee established to deal with the matter). This has raised the issue as to the ability of the named persons or entities to challenge their inclusion on the relevant list. Different de-listing (removal) procedures have been established by the various sanctions committees monitoring imposed sanctions, but these have not permitted direct approaches by individuals or entities concerned and this has prompted human rights concerns.²¹⁹ Accordingly, the Security Council adopted resolution 1730 (2006), which called for the Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat (Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch) a focal point to receive de-listing requests from the pertinent individuals or entities. Such requests are to be sent to the designating governments concerned (and governments of citizenship and residence), who may approach the sanctions committee directly or through the focal point, proposing that the individuals or entities be removed from the sanctions list. It would then be for the sanctions committee to take the decision.²²⁰ In resolution 1904 (2009), the Office of the Ombudsperson was created for individuals, groups or entities seeking to be removed from the Al-Qaida sanctions list.

However, a number of cases have come before domestic courts,²²¹ the European Court of Justice²²² and the European Court of Human Rights²²³

arguing that the sanctions system as it affects particular legal or natural persons has to be rendered compliant with human rights. The countervailing claim was that by virtue of article 25 member states are obliged to carry out Security Council decisions and by article 103, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the UN members under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, obligations under the Charter were to prevail. It is now clear that, in Europe at least, Charter obligations would not be immune from review on the grounds of incompatibility with fundamental human rights.

Measures Involving the Use of Force

Where the Council feels that the measures short of armed force as prescribed under article 41 have been or would be inadequate, it may take 'such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'. Article 42 also provides that such action may extend to demonstrations, blockades and other armed operations by UN members. In order to be able to function effectively in this sphere, article 43 provides for member states to conclude agreements with the Security Council to make available armed forces, assistance and facilities, while article 45 provides that member states should hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action in accordance with article 43 agreements. In this manner, it was intended to create a UN corps to act as the arm of the Council to suppress threats to, or breaches of, the peace or acts of aggression.

Article 47 provides for the creation of a Military Staffs Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members or their representatives, to advise and assist the Security Council on military requirements and to be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed force placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Indeed, article 46 provides that plans for the application of armed force ‘shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staffs Committee’. However, during the Kuwait crisis of 1990–91, the Military Staffs Committee played an important coordinating role, while under Security Council resolution 665 (1990), it was given a more general coordination function.

Because of great power disputes and other factors, none of the projected agreements has been signed and article 43 remains ineffective. This has weakened article 42 to the extent that the envisaged procedure for its implementation has had to be abandoned. This has meant that the United Nations, through a process of interpretation by subsequent conduct, has been obliged to reconfigure the collective security regime.

The first example of enforcement action in practice was the United Nations’ reaction to the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950,²²⁴ and this only occurred because of a fortuitous combination of circumstances. In June 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel dividing North from South Korea and thus precipitated armed conflict. Almost immediately, the Security Council debated the issue and, after declaring that a breach of the peace had taken place, called upon member states to assist the United Nations in achieving a North Korean withdrawal. Two days later, another resolution was adopted which recommended that UN members should furnish all necessary

assistance to the South Korean authorities, while the third in the trio of Security Council resolutions on this issue authorised the United States to designate the commander of the unified forces established for the purpose of aiding the South Koreans and permitted the use of the UN flag by such forces.²²⁵

The only reason that these resolutions were in fact passed by the Council was the absence of the Soviet Union in protest at the seating of the Nationalist Chinese delegation.²²⁶ This prevented the exercise of the veto by the Soviet Union and permitted the creation of an authoritative UN umbrella for the US-commanded forces combating the North Korean armies. The Soviet Union returned to the Council at the start of August 1950 and effectively blocked further action by the Council on this issue, but they could not reverse what had been achieved, despite claims that the resolutions were not constitutionally valid in view of the Soviet boycott.²²⁷ However, although termed UN forces, the contingents from the sixteen states which sent troops were under effective US control, pursuant to a series of agreements concluded by that country with each of the contributing states, and were not in any real sense directed by the United Nations other than operating under a general Security Council authorisation. This improvised operation clearly revealed the deficiencies in the UN system of maintaining the peace since the Charter collective security system as originally envisaged could not operate, but it also demonstrated that the system could be reinterpreted so as to function.²²⁸

The second example occurred following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990.²²⁹ Resolution 660 (1990), adopted unanimously the same day

by the Security Council, condemned the invasion and called for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Resolution 662 (1990) declared that the purported Iraqi annexation of Kuwait had no legal validity and was null and void. States and international organisations were called upon to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation. The Council, specifically acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded in resolution 664 (1990) that Iraq permit the immediate departure of the nationals of third countries²³⁰ and in resolution 667 (1990) condemned Iraqi aggressive acts against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreign nationals present in those premises, and demanded the protection of diplomatic premises and personnel.²³¹ Eventually, the Security Council, feeling that the response of Iraq to all the foregoing resolutions and measures adopted had been unsatisfactory, adopted resolution 678 (1990) on 29 November 1990. This allowed Iraq a further period of grace within which to comply with earlier resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait. This ‘final opportunity’ was to end on 15 January 1991. After this date, member states cooperating with the Kuwaiti government were authorised to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area. All states were requested to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of this resolution. The armed action commenced on 16 January 1991 by a coalition of states²³² under the leadership of the United States can thus be seen as a legitimate use of force authorised by the UN Security Council under its enforcement powers elaborated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and binding upon all UN member states by virtue of article 25.²³³ This is to be seen in the context of the purposes laid down by the Council in binding resolutions, that

is the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of international peace and security in the area, and within the framework of the exercise of enforcement action in the light of the absence of article 43 arrangements.

Implied Authorisation

However, the question has arisen whether the process of reinterpreting the Charter by subsequent conduct has moved beyond the authorisation by the Council to member states to take action in the absence of specifically designated UN forces operating under the aegis of the Military Staffs Committee. In particular, is it possible to argue that in certain situations such authorisation may be implied rather than expressly granted?²³⁴ Following the Gulf War, revolts against the central government in Iraq led to widespread repression by Iraqi forces against the Shias in the south and the Kurds in the north of the country. Security Council resolution 688 (1991), which was not adopted under Chapter VII and did not authorise the use of force, condemned such repression ‘the consequences of which threaten international peace and security’ and insisted that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to those in need in the country. In the light of the repression, the United States, the United Kingdom and France sent troops into northern Iraq to create a safe haven for humanitarian operations. They were speedily withdrawn and replaced by a small number of UN Guards operating with the consent of Iraq.²³⁵ In addition, Western states declared a ‘no-fly’ zone over southern Iraq in August 1992, having established one over northern Iraq in April 1991. The justification of these zones was argued to be that of supporting resolution 688.²³⁶ Further, it was maintained that the right

of self-defence existed with regard to flights over the zones, thus permitting proportionate responses to Iraqi actions.²³⁷ Whether resolution 688 can indeed be so interpreted is unclear. What is clear is that such actions were not explicitly mandated by the United Nations. It is also to be noted that the United Kingdom in particular has also founded such actions upon the need to prevent a humanitarian crisis as supported by resolution 688. In March 2001, for example, it was noted that the no-fly zones were established ‘in support of resolution 688’ and ‘are justified under international law in response to a situation of overwhelming humanitarian necessity’.²³⁸

More dramatically, the use of force based impliedly on Security Council resolutions occurred in March 2003, when the United Kingdom and the United States commenced military action against Iraq.²³⁹ The legal basis for this action was deemed to rest upon the ‘combined effect of resolutions 678, 687 and 1441’.²⁴⁰ Resolution 1441 (2002)²⁴¹ *inter alia* recognised that Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to international peace and security and recalled that resolution 678 authorised member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security. Citing Chapter VII, the resolution decided that Iraq was and remained in material breach of resolutions including 687, decided to afford that state a ‘final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council’ and established an enhanced inspection regime. Subsequent events, however, revealed Iraqi deficiencies in complying with the resolution.²⁴² The Security Council was divided on the need for a follow-up resolution to 1441 in order for force to be used. On 20 March, military operations commenced. Resolution 1441 was intended as a final opportunity and it was provided that

serious consequences would ensue upon Iraq's failure to comply. However, whether this amounts to a justification in international law for the United States and the United Kingdom to use force in the face of the opposition of other Security Council members remains controversial.²⁴³

Perhaps a less contentious use of force, at least at first, on the basis of asserted Security Council authorisation occurred following the violent repression by the Libyan government of demonstrations in early 2011. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Libya (resolution 1970, paragraph 9) and subsequently adopted resolution 1973 (2011) authorising member states to 'take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack . . . while excluding a foreign occupation force'. In addition, a no-fly zone was established and various economic sanctions imposed. A multi-state coalition (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and others) commenced air and naval operations invoking resolution 1973.²⁴⁴ NATO took over operations shortly thereafter and action ceased with the overthrow of the Gaddafi government in late October.²⁴⁵ There were questions as to whether the scope of operations matched the text of the authorisation and the subsequent events in Libya raised doubts as to the long-term success of the action actually taken.²⁴⁶

Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations

Linking together human rights and the use of force, the United Nations has taken the concept of humanitarian intervention²⁴⁷ and sought to determine

whether international intervention may be required in egregious violations of human rights within a state. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome,²⁴⁸ it was noted that while each state had the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the international community through the United Nations also had the responsibility to take action, including under Chapter VII should peaceful means prove inadequate, on a case-by-case basis. The Security Council reaffirmed these provisions in resolution 1674 (2006). The matter was taken further by the Secretary-General's Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009.²⁴⁹ However, it would be premature to acknowledge that the United Nations had the obligation or responsibility to take forceful action in such situations, although the Security Council clearly has the right to adopt enforcement measures in situations of egregious abuses of human rights where there has been a determination that these constitute a threat to international peace and security. This approach has not resolved the question as to whether individual states may resort to force in extreme humanitarian situations in the absence of Security Council authorisations.

The Use of Force in Non-Enforcement Situations

In some recent peacekeeping situations, missions established without reference to Chapter VII of the Charter have later been expanded with mandates wholly or partly referring specifically to Chapter VII and in some cases this has led to the application of force by the United Nations. The results are variable. In both Bosnia and Somalia, the temptation to resort to more robust tactics (often for the best of humanitarian reasons) involving the use of force, but without adequate political or military resources or support,

led to severe difficulties. The following is a brief survey of some of the more prominent examples of the use of force in non-enforcement situations.

Former Yugoslavia

The outbreak of hostilities in Yugoslavia led the Security Council in resolution 713 (1991), adopted on 25 September 1991, to impose an arms embargo on that country. As the situation deteriorated, the decision was taken to establish a peacekeeping force (the UN Protection Force or UNPROFOR) in order to ensure the demilitarisation of three protected areas in Croatia (inhabited by Serbs).²⁵⁰ This resolution did not refer to Chapter VII and did specifically note the request of the Yugoslavian government for a peacekeeping operation.²⁵¹ The full deployment of the force was authorised by resolution 749 (1992). During the following months, the mandate of UNPROFOR was gradually extended. By resolution 762 (1992), for example, it was authorised to monitor the situation in areas of Croatia under Yugoslav army control,²⁵² while by resolution 779 (1992) it assumed responsibility for monitoring the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula near Dubrovnik.²⁵³ At the same time, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated. Both Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were criticised for their actions in Bosnia in resolution 757 (1992)²⁵⁴ and sanctions were imposed upon the latter. In resolution 758 (1992), the Council approved an enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength and authorised the deployment of military observers and related personnel and equipment to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia.²⁵⁵

In a further measure responding to the dire situation, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted resolution 770 (1992) calling on all states to ‘take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary’ to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to and within Bosnia. The phrase ‘all necessary measures’, it will be recalled, permits in UN terminology the resort to force.²⁵⁶ The mandate of UNPROFOR was augmented by resolution 776 (1992) to incorporate support for the humanitarian relief activities of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and, in particular, to provide protection where requested. It was noted in the Secretary-General’s Report, approved by this resolution, that the normal peacekeeping rules of engagement would be followed, so that force could be used in self-defence, particularly where attempts were made to prevent the carrying out of the mandate.²⁵⁷ However, resolution 776 (1992) made no mention of either Chapter VII or ‘all necessary measures’.²⁵⁸

In order to protect certain Bosnian Moslem areas under siege from Bosnian Serb forces, the Security Council established a number of ‘safe areas’.²⁵⁹ Although Chapter VII was referred to in these resolutions, it was cited only in the context of resolution 815 (1993), which dealt with the security of UNPROFOR personnel. The enforcement of the ‘safe areas’ was therefore to be attained by UNPROFOR personnel authorised to use force only to protect themselves.²⁶⁰ Although the Secretary-General stated that approximately 34,000 extra troops would be necessary, only an additional 7,000 were authorised.²⁶¹ At the request of the Secretary-General, NATO established a 3-kilometre ‘total exclusion zone’ and a 20-kilometre ‘military exclusion zone’ around Gorazde and a 20-kilometre ‘heavy weapons exclusion zone’

around Sarajevo. These zones were to be enforced by air strikes if necessary, although no Security Council resolutions referred to such zones or created any special regime with regard to them.²⁶² Relations between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs led to a series of incidents in the spring of 1995. The latter breached the Sarajevo no-heavy-weapons arrangement. This precipitated NATO airstrikes, which provoked the taking hostage of several hundred UNPROFOR soldiers. The 'safe area' of Srebrenica was then captured by Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995, involving major human rights abuses against the population. After incidents involving other 'safe areas' and Sarajevo, NATO with UN approval launched a series of airstrikes.²⁶³ At the same time, Bosnian and Croat forces captured areas held by the Bosnian Serbs. A ceasefire agreement came into force on 12 October 1995.²⁶⁴

UN peacekeeping missions in former Yugoslavia were reorganised in March 1995, following the capture by Croatian forces of three of the four protected areas inhabited by Serbs in Croatia. The UN missions therefore comprised UNPROFOR in Bosnia,²⁶⁵ the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO)²⁶⁶ and the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.²⁶⁷ As a consequence of the Dayton peace agreement initialled in November 1995, UNPROFOR was replaced by a multinational implementation force (IFOR)²⁶⁸ composed primarily of troops from NATO countries. In addition, it was proposed to set up a UN International Police Task Force to carry out a variety of police-related training and assistance missions.²⁶⁹

The evolution of the UN role in the complex Yugoslav tragedy may be characterised as a series of impromptu actions taken in response to traumatic

events. UNPROFOR was never authorised to use force beyond that required in self-defence while performing their rapidly expanding duties. The United Nations sought to fulfil its fundamental mandated responsibilities with regard to Sarajevo and the transportation of humanitarian aid in cooperation with the warring parties based on the peacekeeping principles of impartiality and consent. But the situation was far from a normal peacekeeping situation of separating hostile forces that consent to such separation. The use of air power was subsequently authorised both in order to defend UNPROFOR personnel and to deter attacks upon the ‘safe areas’, which had been proclaimed as such with little in the way of initial enforcement means. Eventually, air strikes by NATO were resorted to in the face of fears of further Bosnian Serb capture of ‘safe areas’. Whether a peacekeeping mission in the traditional sense can ever really be mounted in the conditions then faced in Bosnia must be seriously in doubt, although the humanitarian efforts undertaken were important. Only a meaningful enforcement mandate could have given the United Nations a chance to put an end to the fighting. But that required a major political commitment and substantial resources. States are rarely willing to provide these unless their own vital national interests are at stake.²⁷⁰

Somalia²⁷¹

The Somali situation marked a further effort by the United Nations to resolve a humanitarian crisis arising out of civil war conditions and one that saw a peacekeeping mission drifting into an enforcement one. Following a prolonged period of civil war, the Security Council urged all parties to agree to a ceasefire and imposed an arms embargo. The Secretary-General was requested to organise humanitarian assistance.²⁷² A UN technical mission

was then established to look at mechanisms to provide such aid and to examine peacekeeping options.²⁷³ The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was set up shortly thereafter,²⁷⁴ but this modest operation (of fifty ceasefire observers and a security force) was deemed insufficient to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of additional UN security units in order to protect the distribution centres and humanitarian convoys was authorised.²⁷⁵ However, the situation continued to deteriorate and few humanitarian supplies arrived where needed due to constant attacks.²⁷⁶ Accordingly, after the Secretary-General had concluded that Chapter VII action was required,²⁷⁷ the Security Council determined that the ‘magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security’. The use of ‘all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations’ was authorised and the Unified Task Force was created (UNITAF).²⁷⁸ This comprised troops from over twenty states, including some 30,000 from the United States.²⁷⁹

This operation was expanded the following spring and UNOSOM II was established with an enlarged mandate with enforcement powers under Chapter VII.²⁸⁰ UNOSOM II was given the humanitarian mandate of UNITAF, together with ‘responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia’ and the provision of security to assist the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement of displaced persons. The force was also to complete the disarmament of factions, enforce the Addis Ababa agreement of January 1993²⁸¹ and help rebuild the country. The authorisation to take all necessary measures was

reiterated in resolution 837 (1993), following an attack upon UNOSOM II forces. This authorisation was stated to include taking action against those responsible for the attacks and to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout the country. A series of military incidents then took place involving UN forces.²⁸² Security Council resolution 897 (1994), while condemning continued violence in the country especially against UN personnel, authorised a reduction in UNOSOM II's force levels to 22,000.²⁸³ And in resolution 954 (1994), the Council decided to terminate the mission at the end of March 1995 and authorised UNOSOM II to take actions necessary to protect the mission and the withdrawal of personnel and assets and to that end called upon member states to provide assistance to aid the withdrawal process. The Secretary-General concluded his report of 14 October 1994 noting that the vacuum of civil authority and of governmental authority severely hampered the work of the United Nations, while 'the presence of UNOSOM II troops has had limited impact on the peace process and limited impact on security in the face of continuing interclan fighting and banditry'.²⁸⁴

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Security Council has also concerned itself with the civil war and foreign interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the former Zaire). Following fighting involving both internal and external forces, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 1999.²⁸⁵ This was welcomed by the Security Council and the deployment of a small UN military liaison force was authorised.²⁸⁶ This force was designated the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).²⁸⁷ The Mission was

expanded and extended with a mandate, *inter alia*, to include monitoring the ceasefire and to supervise and verify the disengagement arrangements.²⁸⁸ Paragraph 8 of the resolution, specifically citing Chapter VII, states that the Council has decided that MONUC ‘may take the necessary action . . . to protect United Nations and co-located JMC [Joint Military Commission] personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. During the summer of 2000, fighting broke out between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in the Congo and the Security Council in resolution 1304 (2000), acting under Chapter VII, demanded that Uganda and Rwanda withdraw all their forces from the Congo and that all other foreign military presence and activity, direct and indirect, be brought to an end. MONUC was asked to monitor the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement of forces and withdrawal of foreign forces.²⁸⁹ This demand was repeated in resolutions 1341 (2001) and 1355 (2001), again acting under Chapter VII.²⁹⁰ In resolution 1797 (2008), MONUC was authorised to assist the authorities in organising, preparing and conducting local elections, while in resolution 1804 (2008), the Security Council demanded that armed groups and militias in the eastern part of the country immediately lay down their arms and turn themselves in to Congolese and MONUC authorities for disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration. In virtually all of these resolutions, the situation was characterised as a ‘threat to international peace and security in the region’.²⁹¹ By virtue of Security Council resolution 1925 (2010), MONUC was transformed into the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) with an expanded mandate to ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, and UN personnel, and to support the

government in its stabilisation and peace consolidation efforts ‘using all necessary means’, the UN terminology which includes the use of force.²⁹² Following a further deterioration in the situation in 2013, the Security Council authorised in resolution 2098 (2013) the creation of an ‘Intervention Brigade’ with the additional responsibility *inter alia* of neutralising armed groups.²⁹³

Sudan

Following a long-running civil war in the south of the country, an agreement was signed on 20 July 2002 (the Machakos Protocol) between the parties and this led to subsequent agreements in 2004. In June that year, the United Nations established a special political mission (UNAMIS) to assist the parties. Faced with a deteriorating situation in Darfur in western Sudan, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolution 1556 (2004), calling for political talks between the parties, endorsing the dispatch of international monitors, including a protection force envisioned by the African Union, and assigning certain responsibilities to UNAMIS.²⁹⁴ On 9 January 2005, a full peace agreement (the Comprehensive Peace Agreement) was signed, ending the civil war in the south of Sudan. In resolution 1590 (2005), the Council, acting under Chapter VII, established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to take over from UNAMIS, and authorised it to ‘take the necessary action’ to protect UN and humanitarian personnel. A peaceful solution to the Darfur crisis was also called for in this resolution.²⁹⁵ African Union efforts to seek a solution to the crisis in Darfur culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006.

Following a recommendation from the UN Secretary-General,²⁹⁶ the Security Council adopted resolution 1706 (2006) under Chapter VII, determining that the situation in Darfur constituted a threat to international peace and security and deciding that the UNMIS forces be increased and deployed in Darfur in order to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, without prejudice to their existing mandate in the south of Sudan. UNMIS was authorised to use all necessary measures to protect UN personnel, to support implementation of the peace agreement, to protect civilians under threat of physical violence and to collect arms.²⁹⁷

Following discussions with the African Union in view of the deteriorating situation in Darfur,²⁹⁸ and in the light of the presence of forces from the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS),²⁹⁹ the Security Council, noting that the situation continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security, adopted resolution 1769 (2007) establishing the UN–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) incorporating AMIS personnel to consist of a force of up to 19,555 military personnel. Unity of command and control was provided for, with command and control structures and backstopping provided by the United Nations. The Council, acting under Chapter VII, decided that UNAMID was authorised to take the necessary action to protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers, to support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, to prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Sudanese government.³⁰⁰

The Range of UN Actions from Humanitarian Assistance to Enforcement – Conclusions

The United Nations has been unable to operate Chapter VII as originally envisaged. It has, however, been able to develop a variety of mechanisms to fill the gap left by the non-implementation of article 43. First and foremost, the Council may delegate its enforcement powers to member states. This occurred in Korea, the Gulf War and to some extent Rwanda. However, the events concerning Iraq have shown uncertainty as to the extent to which, if at all, such authorisation may be implied from resolutions adopted. The United Nations has also been able to create peacekeeping forces, whose mandate has traditionally been to separate hostile forces with their consent, such as in the Middle East and in Cyprus. The evolution of peacekeeping activities to include confused civil war situations where fighting has not ended and no lasting ceasefire has been put into operation, although prefigured in the Congo crisis of the 1960s, has really taken place in the last few years. It has brought attendant dangers for, as has been seen, the slippage from peacekeeping to self-defence activities more widely defined and thence to *de facto* enforcement action is sometimes hard to avoid and complicated to justify in legal terms. Consent is the basis of traditional peacekeeping and irrelevant in enforcement activities. In the mandate drift that has been evident in some situations, elements of both consent and imposition have been present in a way that has confused the role of the United Nations. Nevertheless, behind the difficulties of the United Nations have lain a dearth of both political will demonstrated by, and material resources provided by, member states for the completion of complex enforcement actions.

Developments that have been seen in recent years have demonstrated an acceptance of a far broader conception of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, so that not only external aggression but certain purely internal convulsions may qualify, thus constraining further the scope of article 2(7) and the exclusive jurisdiction of states. Secondly, the range of actions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII has increased to cover a wide variety of missions and the creation of international criminal tribunals to prosecute alleged war criminals for crimes occurring within particular states arising out of civil wars. Not only that, but, with regard to Iraq, the Security Council took a range of binding measures of unprecedented scope, from the guaranteeing of a contested boundary to implementing strict controls on certain kinds of armaments and establishing a compensation commission to be funded by a levy on oil exports. Finally, increasing flexibility has been manifested in the creation and use of such forces. The establishment of the hybrid UN–African Union force for Darfur is an interesting development and one that may prefigure a number of similar operations as regions may increasingly wish to marry regional personnel with expertise, equipment and logistical support from outside the region.

The Security Council, International Law and the International Court of Justice

The issue of the relationship between binding decisions of the Council and international law generally has arisen with particular force in recent years in view of the rapidly increased range and nature of activity by the Security Council. The issue has involved particular consideration of the role of the International Court.³⁰¹ The Security Council is, of course, constrained by the

provisions of the Charter itself. It must follow the procedures laid down and act within the confines of its constitutional authority as detailed particularly in Chapters V to VII. Its composition and voting procedures are laid down, as are the conditions under which it may adopt binding enforcement measures. As the International Court has emphasized: ‘The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment.’³⁰² In particular, the Council must under article 24(2) act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, article 1(1) of which declares that one of the aims of the organisation is to bring about a resolution of international disputes by peaceful means ‘and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’.³⁰³

The Council has recently not only made determinations as to the existence of a threat to or breach of international peace and security under article 39 in traditional inter-state conflict situations, but also under Chapter VII binding determinations as to the location of boundaries, supervision of destruction of weaponry, liability under international law for loss or damage, methods of compensation, asserted repudiation of foreign debt,³⁰⁴ the establishment of tribunals to try individual war criminals³⁰⁵ and assertions as to the use of force against those responsible for, and those inciting, attacks against UN personnel, including their arrest, prosecution and punishment.³⁰⁶ In addition, the Council has asserted that particular acts were null and void, demanding non-recognition.³⁰⁷

In view of this increased activity and the impact this has upon member states, the issue has arisen as to whether there is a body capable of ensuring that the

Council does act in conformity with the Charter and international law. Since the International Court is the ‘principal judicial organ’ of the United Nations,³⁰⁸ it would seem to be the natural candidate, and indeed the problem has been posed in two recent cases. In *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)*,³⁰⁹ it was claimed by Bosnia that the Security Council-imposed arms embargo upon the former Yugoslavia had to be construed in a manner that did not deprive Bosnia of its inherent right of self-defence under article 51 of the Charter and under customary international law.³¹⁰ In the *Lockerbie* case,³¹¹ Libya claimed that the United Kingdom and the United States were seeking to compel it to surrender alleged bombers contrary to the Montreal Convention 1971 (which required that a state either prosecute or extradite alleged offenders) and that the Council’s actions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992)³¹² were contrary to international law.

While the question of the compatibility of Security Council resolutions with international law was not discussed by the Court in *Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)* (Merits), the issue assumed central position in the *Lockerbie* case. The Court here affirmed that all member states were obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with article 25 of the Charter and that *prima facie* this obligation extended to resolution 748 (1992), which imposed sanctions upon Libya for failing to extradite the suspects. Thus, in accordance with article 103 of the Charter, under which obligations under the Charter prevail over obligations contained in other international agreements, the resolution prevailed over the Montreal Convention.³¹³

The issue was raised in the request for provisional measures phase of the *Congo v. Uganda* case. Uganda argued that the request by the Congo for interim measures would ‘directly conflict with the Lusaka Agreement, and with the Security Council resolutions – including resolution 1304 . . . calling for implementation of the Agreement’.³¹⁴ The Court noted that resolution 1304 was adopted under Chapter VII, but concluded after quoting the text of the resolution that the Security Council had taken no decision which would *prima facie* preclude the rights claimed by the Congo from being regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures.³¹⁵ While there is no doubt that under the Charter system the Council’s discretion to determine the existence of threats to or breaches of international peace and security is virtually absolute, limited only by inherent notions of good faith and non-abuse of rights,³¹⁶ and its discretion to impose measures consequent upon that determination in order to maintain or restore international peace and security is undoubtedly extensive,³¹⁷ the determination of the legality or illegality of particular situations is essentially the Council’s view as to the matching of particular facts with existing rules of international law. That view, when adopted under Chapter VII, will bind member states, but where it is clearly wrong in law and remains unrectified by the Council subsequently, a challenge to the system is indubitably posed. While the Court can, and has, examined and analysed UN resolutions in the course of deciding a case or rendering an Advisory Opinion, for it to assert a right of judicial review in the fullest sense enabling it to declare invalid a binding Security Council resolution would equally challenge the system as it operates.

The Role of the General Assembly³¹⁸

The focus of attention during the 1950s shifted from the Security Council to the General Assembly as the use of the veto by the permanent members led to a perception of the reduced effectiveness of the Council. Since it was never really envisaged that the General Assembly would play a large part in the preservation of international peace and security, its powers as defined in the Charter were vague and imprecise. Articles 10 to 14 provide that the Assembly may discuss any question within the scope of the Charter and may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Assembly may make recommendations with regard to questions relating to international peace to members of the United Nations or the Security Council or both, provided (except in the case of general principles of cooperation, including disarmament) the Council is not dealing with the particular matter. In addition, any question respecting international peace and security on which action is necessary has to be referred to the Security Council.

The Uniting for Peace resolution was adopted by the Assembly in 1950 and was founded on the view that as the Security Council had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace under article 24, it could therefore be argued that the Assembly possessed a secondary responsibility in such matters, which could be activated in the event of obstruction in the Security Council. The resolution³¹⁹ declared that where the Council failed to exercise its responsibility upon the occurrence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression because of the exercise of the veto by any of its

permanent members, the General Assembly was to consider the matter at once with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures. Such measures could include the use of force when necessary in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, and, if not already in session, the Assembly would be able to meet within 24 hours in emergency special session.³²⁰

However, problems soon arose in the context of the creation by the Assembly in 1956 of the UN Emergency Force which was to supervise the ceasefire in the Middle East, and by the UN Secretary-General in 1960 of the UN Force in the Congo. It was argued that since article 11 provides that any question dealing with international peace and security on which action was necessary had to be referred to the Security Council, the constitutionality of such forces was questionable. A number of states refused to pay their share of the expenses incurred, and the matter was referred to the International Court. In *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*,³²¹ the Court took the term ‘action’³²² to refer to ‘enforcement action’, thus permitting action which did not amount to enforcement action to be called for by the General Assembly and the Secretary-General.³²³ This opinion, although leading to some interpretive problems, did permit the creation of UN peacekeeping forces in situations where because of superpower rivalry it was not possible for the Security Council to reach a decision, provided such forces were not concerned with enforcement action. The adoption of this kind of action remains firmly within the prerogative of the Security Council. In practice, the hopes raised by the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution have not really been fulfilled. The procedure prescribed within the resolution has been used, for example, with regard to the Suez and Hungarian crises of 1956, the

Lebanese and Jordanian troubles of 1958, the Congo upheavals of 1960, the Middle East in 1967, the conflict leading to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, Afghanistan in 1980, Namibia in 1981, the Palestine question in 1980 and 1982, and 'Illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory' from 1997 onwards.³²⁴ But it cannot be said that the Uniting for Peace system has in effect exercised any great influence regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. It has provided a method whereby disputes may be aired before the Assembly in a way that might not have otherwise been possible, but as a reserve mechanism for the preservation or restoration of international peace, it has not proved very successful.

The UN and Regional Arrangements and Agencies³²⁵

The Security Council has increasingly made use of regional organisations in the context of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter concerns regional arrangements. Article 52 provides that nothing contained in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to international peace and security as are appropriate for such arrangements or agencies, providing that these are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations itself.³²⁶ Article 53 notes that the Security Council where appropriate shall utilise such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. Without the authorisation of the Security Council, regional enforcement action is not possible.³²⁷ Article 54 provides that the Security Council is to be kept fully informed at all times of activities undertaken or in contemplation by regional organisations. The definition of ‘regional arrangements or agencies’ is left open, so that a useful measure of flexibility is provided, enabling the term to cover a wide range of regional organisations going beyond those strictly established for defence cooperation.³²⁸

Several issues arise. First, there is the issue of when regional action may be deemed to be appropriate, and here recent events have demonstrated a broader measure of flexibility akin to the widening definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Secondly, there is the extent to which regional action is consistent with UN purposes and principles, and here the provisions of article 103, assigning priority to Charter obligations over obligations contained in other international agreements,

should be noted.³²⁹ Thirdly, there is the question as to whether a broad or a narrow definition of enforcement action is to be accepted.³³⁰ Fourthly, the important issue is raised as to whether prior approval by the Security Council is required in order for a regional organisation to engage in an activity consistent with Chapter VIII. Practice here recently appears to suggest rather controversially that not only is prior approval not required, but that Security Council authorisation need not occur until substantially after the action has commenced.³³¹ However, it is clear that the United Nations is keen to coordinate activity with regional organisations.³³²

Article 52(2) and (3) establishes that peaceful settlement of disputes through regional mechanisms before resort is had to the Security Council is the preferred route and this, on the whole, has been UN practice. However, the United Nations has not accepted the idea of the exclusive jurisdiction of regional mechanisms and practice with regard to priority remains uncertain.³³³ Enforcement action is a different matter and here priority lies with the Council under the Charter. However, the reference to the inherent right of collective self-defence in article 51 does detract somewhat from the effect of Chapter VIII, and it also seems clear that regional peacekeeping operations, in the traditional sense of being based on consent of the parties and eschewing the use of force save in self-defence, do not need the authorisation of the Security Council. Practice in the post-Cold War era has amply demonstrated the increasing awareness by the Security Council of the potentialities of regional organisations. References in resolutions of the Council have varied in this regard. Some have specifically mentioned, commended or supported the work of named regional organisations without mentioning Chapter VIII,³³⁴ others have referred explicitly to Chapter

VIII,³³⁵ while others have stated that the Council is acting under Chapter VIII.³³⁶

A particularly interesting example of the interaction of regional organisations and the United Nations occurred with regard to Haiti. The OAS adopted sanctions against Haiti upon the overthrow of the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991.³³⁷ Although the General Assembly welcomed the actions,³³⁸ the Security Council did not react. Eventually, in June 1993, the Council, acting under Chapter VII, imposed an arms and oil embargo on Haiti. Resolution 841 (1993) specifically referred to a series of OAS resolutions,³³⁹ commended the work of the OAS Secretary-General and stressed the need ‘for effective co-operation between regional organisations and the United Nations’.³⁴⁰ In resolution 875 (1993), the Council, acting under Chapters VII and VIII, called upon member states ‘acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements’ in cooperation with the legitimate government of Haiti to act to ensure the implementation of the arms and oil embargo.³⁴¹

Liberia constitutes another instructive example.³⁴² A complicated civil war broke out during 1989–90 and, in the absence of any moves by the United Nations or the OAS, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to act. This organisation, which consists of sixteen members including Liberia, is aimed at improving living standards in the region.³⁴³ A Protocol on Non-Aggression was signed in 1978 and came into force three years later.³⁴⁴ This prohibits aggression among member states and does not specifically mention peacekeeping nor provide for the right of unilateral intervention. In May 1990, ECOWAS established a Standing

Mediation Committee and this called for an immediate ceasefire in Liberia and for its implementation to be monitored by an ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG). This group, led by Nigeria, landed in Liberia in August 1990 and became involved in actual fighting. It is somewhat unclear whether ECOWAS provides a sufficient legal basis of itself to justify the actions taken, and UN involvement did not occur until January 1991, when the President of the Security Council issued a statement commending the efforts of ECOWAS to promote peace in Liberia and calling upon the parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with ECOWAS.³⁴⁵ In April 1992, ECOMOG proceeded to secure a buffer zone on the Liberia–Sierra Leone border envisaged by an October 1991 accord (the Yamoussoukro IV Accord) between the Liberian parties, to secure all entry and exit points in the country and to enforce the disarmament of combatants.³⁴⁶

The situation, however, continued to deteriorate and the Security Council adopted resolution 788 (1992) in November of that year. This determined that the deterioration of the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security ‘particularly in West Africa as a whole’ and recalled Chapter VIII of the Charter. The resolution commended ECOWAS for its ‘efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia’ and, acting under Chapter VII, imposed an arms embargo upon that country. This support was reaffirmed in resolution 813 (1993), which also noted the endorsement of ECOWAS’ efforts by the OAU.³⁴⁷ With the assistance of the special representative of the UN Secretary-General, a new peace agreement was signed at Cotonou on 25 July 1993, which called upon ECOWAS and the United Nations to assist in its implementation.³⁴⁸ The UN Observer Mission in Liberia was established to assist in this process.³⁴⁹ Security Council resolution 866 (1993) in

particular noted that ‘this would be the first peacekeeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in co-operation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organisation, in this case ECOWAS’. Subsequent resolutions continued to commend ECOWAS for its actions and the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was extended. Eventually, elections were held.³⁵⁰ When ECOWAS sought to intervene in Liberia in 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1497 (2003) under Chapter VII, authorising the establishment of a multinational force based upon ECOWAS to implement a June 2003 ceasefire. The role of ECOWAS within the context of Chapter VIII was specifically commended. Authority was transferred from the ECOWAS force to a new UN Mission in Liberia in October 2003 by resolution 1509.

The Liberian situation is therefore marked by the following features: first, intervention in a civil war in an attempt to secure a ceasefire by a regional organisation whose authority in this area was far from clear constitutionally; secondly, delayed support by the Security Council in the context of Chapter VIII until 1992; thirdly, the first establishment of a dual UN–regional organisation peacekeeping operation; fourthly, the acceptance by the United Nations of the responsibility of the regional organisation for military issues with the UN mission possessing a rather indeterminate monitoring and peace-encouraging role. It should also be noted that, apart from the imposition of the arms embargo in resolution 788 (1992), Security Council resolutions refrained from referring to Chapter VII. The United Nations, therefore, adopted very much a secondary role. While it is clear that the Security Council ultimately supported the action taken by ECOWAS, it is questionable whether the spirit and terms of Chapter VIII were fully

complied with.³⁵¹ Ultimately, the Security Council fully adopted the actions of ECOWAS, authorised further such actions and then subsumed the ECOWAS operation into a UN peacekeeping mission.

The failed UN experience of the early 1990s in Somalia was succeeded by a long period of neglect in practice, during which the United Nations maintained the arms embargo on that country and expressed support for regional action to seek to resolve the complicated civil war. In a number of Security Council resolutions, for example, the Council, acting under Chapter VII, called for continuation of the arms embargo and also commended the efforts of the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD), the relevant sub-regional organisation, in support of the Transitional Federal Institutions, the claimant Somali government.³⁵² In resolution 1725 (2006), the Council, acting under Chapter VII, and following decisions taken by IGAD and the AU, authorised IGAD and the member states of the AU to establish ‘a protection and training mission’ in Somalia with the mandate, *inter alia*, to monitor progress in talks between the Transitional Federal Institutions and the rival Union of Islamic Courts and to maintain security in Baidoa (the headquarters of the Transitional Federal Institutions). In January 2007, the AU decided to deploy for six months a mission to Somalia (AMISOM) aimed at stabilising the situation and which would evolve into a UN operation for long-term stabilisation and post-conflict restoration of Somalia.³⁵³ The mandate for AMISOM has been renewed since 2007.³⁵⁴

As already noted, the United Nations in the situation in Bosnia turned to NATO³⁵⁵ in particular in order to enforce the arms embargo against all the

states of the former Yugoslavia and to implement sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). NATO airplanes in particular enforced the 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight) as from April 1993 and on 28 February 1994, four warplanes were shot down by NATO aircraft for violating the zone. NATO airplanes also provided close air support for UNPROFOR activities as from June 1993, and as from April 1994, air support to protect UN personnel in the 'safe areas' was instituted. NATO airstrikes took place at UN request during 1994–95 in a variety of situations.³⁵⁶ Following the Dayton Peace Agreement initialled in November 1995, a 60,000-troop NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) commenced operations in Bosnia. This was authorised by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, in resolution 1031 (1995), under which authority was transferred from UNPROFOR to IFOR. Within a short time, this organisation gave way to SFOR (stabilisation force), which was NATO-led, but included non-NATO countries.³⁵⁷ SFOR was replaced by an EU force, EUFOR, in December 2004.³⁵⁸ In Kosovo, an international security presence paralleled the international civil presence³⁵⁹ and this force, KFOR, like SFOR in Bosnia, is NATO-led.³⁶⁰ Kosovo declared independence in February 2008.³⁶¹ In December 2001, the Security Council authorised the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) pursuant to the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001 (S/2001/1154). ISAF completed its mission at the end of 2014 when Afghan forces assumed full security responsibility to be succeeded by a non-combat training mission.³⁶² In March 2003, the NATO peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which had commenced in August 2001, was handed over to the European Union, this being the first such mission for the European Union.³⁶³

The most dramatic and far-reaching cooperation with a regional organisation in the context of peacekeeping and enforcement is the UN–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur. The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was created in July 2004, as part of a ceasefire-monitoring arrangement together with the European Union. In August that year, AU troops were sent to protect the monitors and the force grew from there. Due to the deteriorating situation, including difficulties with the Sudanese government and resource problems, the AU force eventually merged with the UN force to form the hybrid mission (UNAMID) in 2007.³⁶⁴ This unprecedented arrangement is currently the largest peacekeeping operation in the world³⁶⁵ and UNAMID’s mandate has been renewed from year to year, emphasising priority for the protection of civilians across Darfur and ensuring safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access, and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and humanitarian activities.³⁶⁶

Suggestions for Further Reading

S. Chesterman, I. Johnstone and D. M. Malone, *Law and Practice of the United Nations*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016

R. Higgins, P. Webb, D. Akande, S. Sivakumaran and J. Sloan, *Oppenheim’s International Law: United Nations*, 2 vols., Oxford, 2017

La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire Article par Article (ed. J. P. Cot, A. Pellet and M. Forteau), 3rd ed., Paris, 2005

J. G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, 6th ed., Cambridge, 2017, chapter 10

The Charter of the United Nations (ed. B. Simma, D. E. Khan, G. Nolte and A. Paulus), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2012

The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (ed. T. Weiss and S. Daws), 2nd ed., Oxford, 2018

¹ See e.g. R. Higgins, P. Webb, D. Akande, S. Sivakumaran and J. Sloan, *Oppenheim's International Law United Nations*, 2 vols, Oxford, 2017; *The Charter of the United Nations* (ed. B. Simma, D. E. Khan, G. Nolte and A. Paulus), 3rd ed., Oxford, 2012; *La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire Article par Article* (ed. J. P. Cot, A. Pellet and M. Forteau), 3rd ed., Paris, 2005; S. Chesterman, I. Johnstone and D. M. Malone, *Law and Practice of the United Nations*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016; *La Charte des Nations Unies, Constitution Mondiale?* (ed. R. Chemain and A. Pellet), Paris 2006; B. Fassbender, *The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community*, Leiden, 2009; *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (ed. T. Weiss and S. Daws), 2nd ed., Oxford, 2018; B. Conforti, *The Law and Practice of the United Nations*, 2nd ed., The Hague, 2000; *United Nations Legal Order* (ed. O. Schachter and C. C. Joyner), Cambridge, 2 vols., 1995; *Bowett's Law of International Institutions* (ed. P. Sands and P. Klein), 5th ed., London, 2001, chapter 2; *The United Nations and a Just World Order* (ed. R. A. Falk, S. S. Kim and S. H. Mendlovitz), Boulder, 1991; B. Broms, *United Nations*, Helsinki, 1990; E. Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, London, 1982, vol. I; R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford, 1963; R. Higgins, 'The United Nations at 70 Years: The Impact Upon International Law', **65 ICLQ**, 2016, p. 1; *United Nations, Divided World* (ed. A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury), 2nd ed., Oxford, 1993; L. M. Goodrich, *The United Nations in a Changing World*, New York, 1974; *The United Nations Global Compact* (ed. A. Rasche and G. Kell), Cambridge, 2010; the *Bertrand Report*, 1985, A/40/988; and L. M. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. P. Simons, *Charter of the United Nations*, 3rd ed., New York, 1969. See also International Law Association Study Group on United Nations Reform, *United Nations Reform Through Practice*, 2011, www.ila-hq.org/en/study-groups/index.cfm/cid/0 and www.un.org/.

² See UNCIO, San Francisco, **15** vols., 1945. Note that questions as to legal personality, responsibility, accountability and immunity will be covered in Chapter 22.

³ See Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 71 ff.

⁴ See above, Chapter 11, p. 557. Note also the Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, 19 September 2012, A/67/L.1, reaffirming the commitment to the purposes and principles of

the UN Charter, international law and justice, and to an international order based on the rule of law, applicable to all states and to international organisations. See also General Assembly resolution 70/118, 14 December 2015.

⁵ See e.g. *The United Nations at the Millennium* (ed. P. Taylor and A. J. R. Groom), London, 2000. As to the administration of territory by the UN, see above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 208.

⁶ See e.g. Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 3; S. von Einsiedel and D. M. Malone, ‘Security Council’, in *Oxford Handbook*, chapter 7; L. Sievers and S. Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, 4th ed., Oxford, 2014; C. Denis, *Le Pouvoir Normatif du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies: Portée et Limites*, Brussels, 2004; M. Hilaire, *United Nations Law and the Security Council*, Aldershot, 2005; *The UN Security Council from the Cold War to the 21st Century* (ed. D. M. Malone), Boulder, 2004; Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 867 ff.; S. Bailey, *Voting in the Security Council*, Oxford, 1969; Bowett’s *International Institutions*, p. 39; *The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights* (ed. J. Genser and B. S. Ugarte), Cambridge, 2014; D. Hovell, *The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process in Security Council Sanctions Decision-Making*, Oxford, 2016; and R. Higgins, ‘The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council’, **64 AJIL**, 1970, p. 1. See also M. C. Wood, ‘Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments’, **45 ICLQ**, 1996, p. 150; J. Galbraith, ‘Ending Security Council Resolutions’, **109 AJIL**, 2015, p. 806; and J. K. Cogan, ‘Stabilization and the Expanding Scope of the Security Council’s Work’, **109 AJIL**, 2015, p. 324.

⁷ Articles 23, 24, 25 and 28 of the UN Charter.

⁸ Note the unique situation in 2013, when Saudi Arabia, having been elected, declined to take its seat and Jordan was then elected in its stead:
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/06/jordan-un-security-council-saudi-arabia#:~:text=The%20UN%20general%20assembly%20has,the%20193%2Dmember%20general%20assembly.&text=Jordan%20was%20selected%20by%20Arab%20countries%20and%20endorsed%20by%20Asian%20nations.

⁹ See e.g. H. G. Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution*, Oxford, 1975, pp. 10–13. See as to vetoes cast in recent years, *Oxford Handbook*, p. 157.

¹⁰ *Repertory of Practice of UN Organs*, New York, 1955, vol. II, p. 104. See also Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 903 ff.

¹¹ See e.g. A. Stavropoulos, 'The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of the Security Council under Article 27(3) of the Charter', 61 *AJIL*, 1967, p. 737. See also *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 22; 49 *ILR*, pp. 2, 12, recognising this practice as lawful.

¹² Of the ten non-permanent seats, five are allocated to Afro-Asian states, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America, and two to Western European and other powers: see General Assembly resolution 1991 (XVIII).

¹³ See articles 108 and 109 of the Charter, which require *inter alia* the consent of all the permanent members to any amendment to or alteration of the Charter. It may indeed be suggested that the speed with which Russia was accepted as the continuance of the former USSR with regard to the permanent seat on the Security Council partly arose out of a desire by the Council to avoid opening up the question of membership for general debate: see F. L. Kirgis, *International Organizations in their Legal Setting*, 2nd ed., St Paul, 1993, pp. 188 ff. See also above, [Chapter 16](#), p. 837.

¹⁴ See e.g. the Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004, A/59/565, especially paras. 244 ff. detailing the two proposals made (models A and B respectively) and Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom*, A/59/2005, paras. 167 ff. The General Assembly has also been considering the question of the 'equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council' and an open-ended working group was established in 1993 to consider the matter further: see General Assembly resolution 48/26 and A/55/46. In 2007, the President of the General Assembly appointed five facilitators, who reported that expansion of the Council needed to be based both on the contribution of member states to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the UN and on equitable geographical distribution, while addressing the underrepresentation of developing countries as well as small states: A/61/47, pp. 11 ff. See also Higgins, *United Nations*, pp. 68–9; Chesterman *et al.*, *United Nations*, chapter 17; A. Blanc Altemir and B. Real, 'La Réforme du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies: Quelle Structure et Quels Membres?', 110 *RGDIP*, 2006, p. 801; and Y. Blum, 'Proposals

for UN Security Council Reform’, **99 AJIL**, 2005, p. 632. See also S. Hassler, *Reforming the UN Security Council Membership*, London, 2013.

¹⁵ Established under resolution 1373 (2001). See above, Chapter 19, p. 1025.

¹⁶ As amended by a number of subsequent resolutions, including resolution 1735 (2006): see further www.un.org/securitycouncil/. See also above, Chapter 19, p. 1028.

¹⁷ Cf. e.g. article 36 of the Charter (peaceful settlement) with articles 41, 42 and 44 (enforcement actions).

¹⁸ Article 25 of the Charter.

¹⁹ See articles 82 and 83 of the Charter.

²⁰ See articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Charter. The restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member is by the Council: article 5.

²¹ Article 108. A similar requirement operates with regard to alteration of the Charter by a General Conference of Members: see article 109.

²² Article 4 of the ICJ Statute.

²³ Reaffirmed in resolution 338 (1973). See generally I. Pogany, *The Security Council and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, Aldershot, 1984, chapter 5; and A. Shapira, ‘The Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967: Its Legal Nature and Implications’, **4 Israel Law Review**, 1969, p. 229.

²⁴ See below, p. 1102. See also *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents* (ed. E. Lauterpacht, C. Greenwood, M. Weller and D. Bethlehem), Cambridge, 1991.

²⁵ See further below, p. 1111.

²⁶ See e.g. J. E. Alvarez, ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’, **97 AJIL**, 2003, p. 873; and S. Talmon, ‘The Security Council of World Legislature’, **99 AJIL**, 2005, p. 175. See further as to these resolutions, above, Chapter 19, p. 1024.

²⁷ See *Oxford Handbook*, pp. 156 ff.

²⁸ See e.g. Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 2; M. J. Peterson, 'General Assembly', in *Oxford Handbook*, chapter 6; Bowett's *International Institutions*, pp. 27 ff.; Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 631 ff.; Nicholas, *United Nations*, chapter 5; B. Finley, *The Structure of the United Nations General Assembly*, Dobbs Ferry, 3 vols., 1977; and S. Bailey, *The General Assembly of the United Nations*, London, 1964.

²⁹ An Advisory Opinion by the International Court held that only the conditions enumerated in article 4 were to be taken into account in considering a request for membership: *Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations*, ICJ Reports, 1948, p. 57; 15 AD, p. 333. See also *Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations*, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 4; 17 ILR, p. 326, where the Court held that the General Assembly alone could not effect membership in the absence of a recommendation by the Security Council. See also T. Grant, *Admission to the United Nations*, Leiden, 2009; Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 341 ff.; and Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 511 ff. The most recent new member of the UN is South Sudan: see General Assembly resolution 65/308 (2011) and Security Council resolution 1999 (2011).

³⁰ See www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html#gotoM and www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-47002865.

³¹ See as to succession issues, Chesterman *et al.*, *United Nations*, pp. 213 ff.; and see further as to Yugoslavia and the UN, above, *Chapter 16*, p. 838.

³² See article 2. See also as to the question of the refusal of credentials to General Assembly delegations, e.g. Chesterman *et al.*, *United Nations*, pp. 225 ff.; Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 455 ff.; D. Ciobanu, 'Credentials of Delegations and Representation of Member States at the United Nations', 25 *ICLQ*, 1976, p. 351; and M. Halberstam, 'Excluding Israel from the General Assembly by a Rejection of its Credentials', 78 *AJIL*, 1984, p. 179. The General Assembly may accord observer status to non-member states, entities and organisations: see www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-permanent-observers/index.html. Current non-member states granted observer status are the Holy See and, more controversially, Palestine: see General Assembly resolution 67/19 (2012).

³³ See e.g. G. Clarke and L. B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, Cambridge, 1958, pp. 19–30; *The Strategy of World Order* (ed. R. A. Falk and S. H. Mendlovitz), New York, 1966, vol. III, pp. 272 ff.; and L. B. Sohn, *Cases on United Nations Law*, 2nd ed., Brooklyn, 1967, pp. 248 ff. Note also the emergence of bloc voting, whereby, e.g., the Afro-Asian states agree to adopt a common stance on particular issues, which has been a constant feature of the Assembly's work.

³⁴ Article 17 of the Charter.

³⁵ See further above, Chapter 3, p. 97.

³⁶ Article 20 of the Charter. Such special sessions have been held, e.g., to discuss the issues of Palestine in 1947–48, Namibia (South West Africa) in 1967, 1978 and 1986, and to debate the world economic order in 1974, 1975 and 1990. See also www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/special.shtml.

³⁷ See below, p. 1125.

³⁸ Note the creation by the General Assembly in 2009 of the UN Dispute Tribunal. This body decides cases filed by or on behalf of current and former staff members of a variety of organisations within the UN family, including economic commissions, war crimes tribunals, development programmes and the UN Secretariat, appealing administrative decisions alleged to be in non-compliance with their terms of appointment or contract of employment. Both staff members and the Administration have a right to appeal the judgments of the Dispute Tribunal to the UN Appeals Tribunal: see www.un.org/en/internaljustice/undt/ and General Assembly resolution 70/112 (2015).

³⁹ See e.g. Broms, *United Nations*, pp. 198 ff.; and www.un.org/en/ga/maincommittees/index.shtml. Note that in 1993, the Special Political Committee was merged with the Fourth Committee on Decolonisation: see General Assembly resolution 47/233. See also the procedural General Committee dealing with agenda issues and a Credentials Committee; two Standing Committees dealing with inter-sessional administrative and budgetary questions and contributions; and a number of subsidiary, ad hoc and other bodies dealing with relevant topics, including the International Law Commission, the UN Commission on International Trade Law, the UN Institute for Training and Research, the Council for Namibia and the UN Relief and Works Agency.

See e.g. *United Nations Handbook 2019–20*, Wellington, 2019, pp. 28 ff. There is also an Investments Committee and a Board of Auditors. The Human Rights Council, established in 2006, is elected by and reports to the Assembly, see [Chapter 6](#).

⁴⁰ See e.g. *United Nations Handbook 2019–20*, pp. 138 ff.; and Broms, *United Nations*, chapter 11. See also www.un.org/en/ecosoc/; Bowett's *International Institutions*, p. 55; W. R. Sharp, *The UN Economic Council*, New York, 1969; and above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 252.

⁴¹ Article 61 of the Charter. Note that under article 69, any UN member may be invited to participate in its deliberations without a vote. See also Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 1581 ff.; and Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 5.

⁴² These include the Statistical Commission, the Commission on Human Rights, which came to an end in 2006, the Commission on the Status of Women and the Commission on Sustainable Development.

⁴³ On Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western Asia.

⁴⁴ These include: the Commission on Transnational Corporations; the Commission on Human Settlements; the Committee on Natural Resources; the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the Committee on New and Renewable Sources of Energy and on Energy for Development.

⁴⁵ ECOSOC is considering a range of reforms, including holding annual ministerial substantive reviews (AMR) to assess the progress made in the implementation of the outcomes of major UN conferences and summits and internationally agreed development goals: see General Assembly resolutions 61/16 (2006) and 68/1 (2013), the latter providing for the adoption of annual themes and an integration segment to monitor and promote the balanced integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development in the ECOSOC system, www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/strengtheningofecosoc.shtml, and ECOSOC resolution E/2007/274 (2007).

⁴⁶ See e.g. Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 4; Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 1887 ff.; Broms, *United Nations*, chapter 12; Bowett's *International Institutions*, p. 63; and C. E. Toussaint, *The Trusteeship System of the United Nations*, New York, 1956.

⁴⁷ By article 83 of the Charter, the UN functions relating to strategic areas were to be exercised by the Security Council (where each permanent member has a veto) rather than, as normal for trust territories, under article 85 by the General Assembly with the assistance of the Trusteeship Council. The last trust territory was the strategic trust territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the US.

⁴⁸ Article 77 of the Charter.

⁴⁹ See above, Chapter 5, p. 204.

⁵⁰ See e.g. *Basic Facts About the United Nations*, E. 95.I.3.1; and Press Release ORG/1211/Rev. 1. Note that the UN Secretary-General has called for its formal termination, but this would require an amendment of the Charter: see A/49/1. See also C. L. Willson, 'Changing the Charter: The United Nations Prepares for the Twenty-First Century', **90** *AJIL*, 1996, pp. 115, 121–2.

⁵¹ See e.g. Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 15; Chesterman *et al.*, *United Nations*, chapter 5; Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 2023 ff.; S. Bailey, 'The United Nations Secretariat', in *The Evolution of International Organisations* (ed. E. Luard), London, 1966, p. 9; S. Bailey, *The Secretariat of the UN*, London, 1962; T. Meron, *The UN Secretariat*, Lexington, 1977; S. Schwebel, *The Secretary-General of the United Nations*, Cambridge, MA, 1952; S. Schwebel, 'The International Character of the Secretariat of the United Nations' and 'Secretary-General and Secretariat', in *Justice in International Law*, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 248, 297 respectively; J. Crawford, 'The Term of Office of the UN Secretary-General', University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 2, 2013; A. W. Rovine, *The First Fifty Years: The Secretary General in World Politics, 1920–1970*, Leiden, 1970; and, generally, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations* (ed. A. W. Cordier and W. Foote, and A. W. Cordier and M. Harrelson), New York, 8 vols., 1969–77. See also Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 2014 ff.; and below, p. 1085.

⁵² These include servicing a variety of organs, committees and conferences; coordinating the activities of the secretariat, the specialised agencies and other inter-governmental organisations; the preparation of studies and reports and responsibility for the preparation of the UN's annual budget. Note that the Secretary-General also acts as depositary for a wide range of multinational treaties, and, under article 98, submits an annual report on the work of the organisation. See also www.un.org/sg/en.

⁵³ Article 99 was invoked, e.g., in 1950 in the Korean War crisis, in 1960 in the Congo crisis and in 1979 with regard to the Iranian hostage issue: see *Yearbook of the UN*, 1979, pp. 307–12. See also S/13646; and S. Schwebel, ‘The Origins and Development of Article 99 of the Charter’, in *Justice in International Law*, p. 233.

⁵⁴ See further below, p. 1085.

⁵⁵ The Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, New York, 1992.

⁵⁶ A/59/2005.

⁵⁷ Article 98. See also J. Pérez de Cuéllar, ‘The Role of the UN Secretary-General’, in Roberts and Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World*, p. 125.

⁵⁸ See below, p. 1088.

⁵⁹ See above, [Chapter 18](#).

⁶⁰ See e.g. Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 28; M. Raman, *Dispute Settlement Through the United Nations*, Oxford, 1977; J. G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, 6th ed., Cambridge, 2017, chapter 10; United Nations, *Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States*, New York, 1992; N. Bar-Yaacov, *The Handling of International Disputes by Means of Inquiry*, London, 1974, chapter 8; B. S. Murty, ‘Settlement of Disputes’, in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, p. 673; Luard, *History*; Falk and Mendlovitz, *Strategy of World Order*, vol. **III**; *The United Nations* (ed. R. A. Falk and S. Mendlovitz), New York, 1966; Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 1069 ff.; Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 1047 ff.; N. D. White, *Keeping the Peace*, 2nd ed., Manchester, 1998. See also above, [Chapter 17](#).

⁶¹ See generally, e.g., G. Scott, *The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations*, London, 1973; and Falk and Mendlovitz, *Strategy of World Order*, chapter 1.

⁶² See e.g. Scott, *Rise and Fall*, chapter 15.

⁶³ This was welcomed by the General Assembly in resolution 47/120. See also the Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Recommendations in the 1992 Report, A/47/965.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 13 ff.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 20 ff.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 28 ff.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 32 ff. See the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2006, General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), intended to bring together all relevant actors, to marshal and sustain resources and advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. See the Report of the Commission on its first session, A/62/137–S/2007/458, 25 July 2007; and Chesterman *et al.*, *United Nations*, chapter 9.

⁶⁹ See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, New York, 1993, p. 96.

⁷⁰ See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, A/57/1, 2002, p. 1. See also the Secretary-General's *Agenda for Further Change*, A/57/387, 9 September 2002.

⁷¹ See the *Road Map Towards Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration*, A/56/326, 6 September 2001. See also www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.

⁷² See e.g. Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 761 ff.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 771 ff.

⁷⁴ ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 52–3; 49 ILR, pp. 1, 42–3.

⁷⁵ This approach is controversial and has not, e.g., been accepted by Western states: see e.g. Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 794 ff., who concludes that the Council can take binding decisions in the context of dispute settlement. See also R. Higgins, ‘The Advisory Opinion on Namibia. Which UN Resolutions are Binding under Article 25 of the Charter?’, 21 *ICLQ*, 1972, p. 270.

⁷⁶ See below, p. 1101.

⁷⁷ ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 53; 49 ILR, p. 43. The question as to whether relevant Security Council resolutions on East Timor could be regarded as binding was raised in *East Timor*, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 90, 103; 105 ILR, p. 226, but the Court concluded that the resolutions cited did not go so far as to impose obligations. But cf. the Dissenting Opinion by Judge Weeramantry, ICJ Reports, 1995, pp. 205–8. See now Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) determining that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security and calling for the expeditious destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons programme.

⁷⁸ Note that under article 38, the Security Council may make recommendations to the parties with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes generally if all the parties to the dispute so request.

⁷⁹ E.g. when the Security Council recommended that the UK and Albania should take their case regarding the *Corfu Channel* incident to the International Court: see Security Council resolution 22 (1947) and SCOR, 2nd yr, 127th meeting, 9 April 1947, p. 727. See also Luard, *History*, pp. 209–12. However, this example proved to be exceptional. See also Security Council resolution 395 (1976) calling for negotiations between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Sea continental shelf dispute and inviting the parties to refer the question to the International Court. Note also the competence of the Security Council to refer matters to the International Criminal Court, article 13(b), Rome Statute 1998, and see above, [Chapter 7](#), p. 342.

⁸⁰ However, note that under article 37(2) if the Council deems that a continuance of a dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security, it ‘shall decide whether to take action under article 36 [i.e. recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment] or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate’.

⁸¹ See the succeeding sections as to the General Assembly and the Secretary-General.

⁸² See e.g. Luard, *History*, chapter 9; and S/1156. See also S/514 and S/1234; and Murty, 'Settlement', p. 721.

⁸³ Murty, 'Settlement', p. 721. See also Luard, *History*, chapter 14.

⁸⁴ See e.g. Murty, 'Settlement', p. 721. See also T. Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958–1967*, Oxford, 1974.

⁸⁵ Note also the appointment of Count Bernadotte and Dr Jarring as UN mediators in the Middle East in 1948 and 1967, respectively. See Luard, *History*, chapters 10 and 11; and *The Arab–Israeli Conflict* (ed. J. N. Moore), Princeton, 4 vols., 1974–91.

⁸⁶ Various other points were referred to in resolution 242, including the need to guarantee freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, achieve a just settlement of the refugee problem and reinforce the territorial inviolability of every state in the area through measures such as the use of demilitarised zones. Resolution 242 (1967) was reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

⁸⁷ See e.g. White, *Keeping the Peace*, part II; and M. J. Peterson, *The General Assembly in World Politics*, Boston, 1986.

⁸⁸ Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter.

⁸⁹ Article 12.

⁹⁰ ICJ Reports, 2004, pp. 136, 148–9; 129 ILR, pp. 37, 66. The General Assembly may request an advisory opinion of the International Court: see *Construction of a Wall*, *ibid.*, the *Kosovo UDI* Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2010, p. 403; and the *Chagos* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2019, p. 95.

⁹¹ As to the right of the Assembly to deal with a threat to or breach of the peace or act of aggression if the Security Council fails to act because of the exercise of the veto by a permanent member, see resolution 377(V), the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, below, p. 1125.

⁹² See e.g. Rovine, *First Fifty Years*; and Cordier *et al.*, *Public Papers*. See also Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, pp. 241 ff.; and Crawford, 'Term of Office of the UN Secretary-General'.

⁹³ Under article 98, the Secretary-General also performs such other functions as are entrusted to him by the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council.

⁹⁴ See e.g. T. M. Franck, *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*, Oxford, 1995, chapter 6; Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Role of the UN Secretary-General', p. 125; and T. M. Franck and G. Nolte, 'The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General', in Roberts and Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World*, p. 143.

⁹⁵ See e.g. with regard to Abkhazia, Franck, *Fairness*, p. 207, and Central America, *ibid.*

⁹⁶ See e.g. Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) regarding the Middle East; 367 (1975) regarding Cyprus; 384 (1975) regarding East Timor; 435 (1978) regarding Namibia; and 713 (1991) regarding Yugoslavia.

⁹⁷ See e.g. with regard to Afghanistan, General Assembly resolution ES-6/2, 1980; and *The Geneva Accords* published by the UN, 1988, DPI/935–40420. As to Cambodia, see Franck, *Fairness*, p. 184.

⁹⁸ See e.g. the General Peace Agreement of Rome between the Mozambique government and RENAMO rebels in 1992, which called upon the UN to monitor its implementation. The President of Mozambique called upon the Secretary-General to chair the key implementation commissions and assist in other ways, including the dispatch of monitors: see Report of the Secretary-General, S/24635, 1992; and Franck, *Fairness*, p. 188. Note that in his Report on the Work of the Organisation, A/57/1, 2002, the Secretary-General noted that he had used his good offices to facilitate national reconciliation and democratisation in Myanmar (p. 5), while stating that if requested he 'would positively consider the use of my good offices' in seeking a peaceful solution in Nepal (p. 4).

⁹⁹ See e.g. with regard to the Secretary-General of the OAS concerning the Central American peace process from the mid-1980s, Report of the UN Secretary-General, A/42/127–S/18688, 1987.

¹⁰⁰ See www.un.org/sg/en/global-leadership/home.

¹⁰¹ See e.g. Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 27; *Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (ed. J. Koops and N. MacQueen), Oxford, 2015; R. Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo*, Cambridge, 2007; B. Oswald, H. Durham and A. Bates, *Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2019; T. Gill, *Leuven Manual on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations*, Cambridge, 2017; T. Benner, S. Mergenthaler and P. Rotman, *The New World of UN Peace Operations*, Oxford, 2011; H. Nasu, *International Law on Peacekeeping*, Leiden, 2009; UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York, 2008; UN, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed., New York, 1990; D. W. Bowett, *UN Forces*, London, 1964; *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (ed. W. J. Durch), London, 1994; White, *Keeping the Peace*; R. Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Oxford, 4 vols., 1969–81; S. Morphet, ‘UN Peacekeeping and Election Monitoring’, in Roberts and Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World*, p. 183; A. James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, London, 1990; and Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 1171 ff. See also <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/departments-of-peace-operations>.

¹⁰² The power of the Security Council to resort to force under article 42 is dealt with below, p. 1108.

¹⁰³ However, under article 11(2), where action is necessary on any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, the matter must be referred to the Security Council.

¹⁰⁴ See further below, p. 1124.

¹⁰⁵ See e.g. T. Franck, *Recourse to Force*, Cambridge, 2002, p. 39. It seems to have been first used by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld: see <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>.

¹⁰⁶ See <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations> and <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>.

¹⁰⁷ See below, p. 1113.

108 See General Assembly resolution 109. The operation lasted until 1954. See also K. Birgisson, 'United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans', in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 5.

109 See Security Council resolution 50 (1948); and M. Ghali, 'The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation', in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 6. It has expanded to supervise the armistice agreements of 1949 and ceasefire arrangements of June 1967. See also the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established by Security Council resolution 47 (1948) to supervise the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir: see K. Birgisson, 'United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan', in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 16.

110 This has been defined by the Secretary-General as 'the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well': *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 11. See also E. Suy, 'Peacekeeping Operations', in *A Handbook on International Organizations* (ed. R. J. Dupuy), Dordrecht, 1988, p. 379.

111 See General Assembly resolutions 997, 998 and 1000 (ES-1). The Security Council was unable to act as two permanent members (the UK and France) were directly involved in the crisis and had vetoed draft resolutions. See e.g. M. Ghali, 'United Nations Emergency Force I', in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 7.

112 S/4387, 14 July 1960. By resolution S/4405, 22 July 1960, the Council requested all states to refrain from action which might impede the restoration of law and order or undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. By resolution S/4426, 9 August 1960, the Council confirmed the authority given to the Secretary-General by earlier resolutions and called on member states to carry out the decisions of the Security Council. See e.g. G. Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960–1964*, Oxford, 1978; C. Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence*, Oxford, 1965; L. Miller, 'Legal Aspects of UN Action in the Congo', 55 *AJIL*, 1961, p. 1; and W. J. Durch, 'The UN Operation in the Congo', in *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 19.

113 See Abi-Saab, *Congo*, pp. 15 ff.

114 See Security Council resolution 186 (1964). See also Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958–1967*; J. A. Stegenger, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, Columbus, 1968; and K. Birgisson, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus’, in *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 13. The force is known as the UN Force in Cyprus (UNICYP).

115 The Security Council established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) to monitor the Israeli–Egyptian disengagement process in 1973 – see resolution 340 (1973); and a Disengagement Observer Force with regard to the Israel–Syria disengagement process: see resolution 350 (1974). See generally Pogany, *Arab–Israeli Conflict*; and M. Ghali, ‘United Nations Emergency Force II’, in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 8. Note also the creation of the UN Interim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL) established by the Council in resolution 425 (1978) after Israel’s incursion into the Lebanon in 1978: see e.g. M. Ghali, ‘United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’, in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 10.

116 In fact, the hasty withdrawal of the UNEF in May 1967 by the Secretary-General following an Egyptian request did much to precipitate the conflict. See generally Special Report of the Secretary-General on Removal of UNEF from Egyptian territory, A/6669, 1967; and T. M. Franck, *Nation Against Nation*, Oxford, 1985.

117 See e.g. Security Council resolution 359 (1974) criticising the Turkish invasion.

118 The Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979 envisaged the deployment of a UN force such as UNEF to supervise the limited forces zones established by the parties, but, due to Soviet action, the mandate of UNEF II expired in July 1979: see e.g. M. Akehurst, ‘The Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel’, 7 *International Relations*, 1981, pp. 1035, 1046; and M. N. Shaw, ‘The Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty, 1979’, 2 *Jewish Law Annual*, 1980, pp. 180, 185. As a result, a special Multinational Force and Observers unit was established by the parties and the US, independently of the UN: see 20 ILM, 1981, pp. 1190 ff. See also M. Tabor, *The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai*, Boulder, 1986; and James, *Peacekeeping*, pp. 122 ff.

119 See generally White, *Keeping the Peace*.

120 See S/19836 and Security Council resolution 622 (1988). This activity continued until 1990: see Morphet, ‘UN Peacekeeping’, p. 213. See also K. Birgisson, ‘United Nations

Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 18.

¹²¹ This was to monitor the ceasefire and lasted until February 1991: see e.g. Morphet, ‘UN Peacekeeping’, p. 213; and B. Smith, ‘United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group’, in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 14.

¹²² Security Council resolution 626 (1988). This was completed in 1991. The Security Council then established UNAVEM II to monitor the implementation of the peace accords between the Angolan government and the UNITA rebels: see Security Council resolution 696 (1991); V. P. Fortna, ‘United Nations Angola Verification Mission I’, in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 21; and V. P. Fortna, ‘United Nations Angola Verification Mission II’, in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 22. This ended in February 1995. Note that the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), originally established in 1978 in Security Council resolution 435 (1978), commenced operations with the Namibian independence process on 1 April 1989, Security Council resolution 632 (1989). UNTAG monitored the withdrawal of South African troops, confined SWAPO forces to their bases in Angola and Zaire and assisted in the election process. The operation ended in March 1990. See V. P. Fortna, ‘United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia’, in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 20. See also the UN Observer for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) sent to monitor elections in that country following the 1987 Esquipulas Agreement. This was the first electoral observer mission to monitor elections in an independent state: see Security Council 637 (1989). See also Morphet, ‘UN Peacekeeping’, pp. 216 ff.; and Franck, *Fairness*, pp. 105 ff.

¹²³ See e.g. Security Council resolutions 690 (1991) and 2285 (2016); and W. J. Durch, ‘United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara’, in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, chapter 23.

¹²⁴ See Security Council resolution 689 (1991). See also the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) established pursuant to peace efforts in the civil war in that country and which was followed by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which exercised governmental functions in that state: see resolutions 717 (1991) and 745 (1992). See further above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 208.

¹²⁵ See General Assembly resolution 47/114 (1992) and A/47/544.

126 See Security Council resolution 894 (1994). Over 1,800 electoral observers were sent: see Franck, *Fairness*, p. 107.

127 The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES): see Security Council resolution 1037 (1996). This mission had both a military and a civilian component.

128 The UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), Security Council resolution 1038 (1996).

129 The UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH): see Security Council resolution 1063 (1996). In June 1996, this mission succeeded the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) created by resolution 867 (1993) to assist the military and police forces in that state. However, it was prevented from deploying. In resolution 940 (1994), the Security Council authorised the creation of a Multi-National Force (MNF) and extended the mandate and scope of UNMIH. After the restoration of the ousted President and the subsequent holding of elections, UNMIH took over responsibility from the MNF (March 1995).

130 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 1312 (2000), 1320 (2000), 1640 (2005) and 1798 (2008). This mandate was terminated in 2008: see resolution 1827 (2008).

131 See resolution 1701 (2006).

132 See Security Council resolution 1866 (2009) and S/2009/254, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomig/index.html>. See also resolutions 849 (1993), 881 (1993), 1077 (1996), 1364 (2001), 1393 (2002), 1427 (2002), 1462 (2003) and 1494 (2003). Note also the UN's role in the move to Timor–Leste independence. The establishment of the UN Mission in East Timor in 1999 provided a mandate to oversee a transition period pending implementation of the decision of the people of that territory under Indonesian occupation as to their future. After the elections and the vote for independence, pro-Indonesian militias commenced a campaign of violence and, after an agreement with Indonesia, the UN adopted resolution 1264 (1999) establishing a multinational force under Australian command to restore peace and security. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor was established by resolution 1272 (1999) with powers to administer the territory until independence. At the time of the independence of the territory of Timor–Leste in May 2002, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor was

established to replace UNTAET: see resolution 1410 (2002). See also, with regard to the UN administration of East Timor, above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 211.

133 See in particular the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946. See also D. Fleck, 'The Legal Status of Personnel Involved in United Nations Peace Operations', **95** *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2013, p. 613; and see below, [Chapter 22](#), p. 1163.

134 See also Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 1187 ff.

135 A/45/594. See also Oswald *et al.*, *Documents*, chapter 2.

136 The Convention provides *inter alia* that the UN and its personnel shall respect local laws and regulations and refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and international nature of their duties (article 6); that the intentional commission of activities such as the murder or kidnapping of UN or associated personnel, attacks on official premises or private accommodation or means of transportation, are to be made criminal offences under national law (article 9); and that states parties must take such measures as are necessary to establish jurisdiction in such cases when the crime is committed within their territory (or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that state) or when the alleged offender is a national (article 10). See also the Optional Protocol to this Convention, adopted in 2005, which extends the protection of the Convention to UN personnel delivering humanitarian, political or development assistance in peacebuilding, or delivering emergency humanitarian assistance going beyond peace operations.

137 See above, [Chapter 20](#).

138 See e.g. S. Will, 'Occupation Law and Multi-National Operations: Problems and Perspectives', **77** *BYIL*, 2006, pp. 256, 277.

139 See L. Green, *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict*, 3rd ed., Manchester, 2008, chapter 20.

140 See e.g. D. W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces*, London, 1964, p. 56.

141 These conventions would include the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols as well as the Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of

Armed Conflict 1954: see Green, *Armed Conflict*, p. 344; C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations', *1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, 1998, p. 3; and D. Shrager, 'UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage', *94 AJIL*, 2000, p. 406.

¹⁴² See e.g. the agreement with Rwanda in 1993 on the status of the UN Mission in that country: Shrager, 'UN Peacekeeping Operation', p. 325, footnote 16; and S/26927 (1993), para. 7. See also the resolutions adopted by the Institut de Droit International stating that the laws of armed conflict apply to the UN: 54 (II) *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International*, 1971, p. 465; and 56 *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International*, 1975, p. 540. Note also the growing role of the UN Police, Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/615, 2011, and the review of the processes concerning the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed against deployed UN peacekeepers, A/65/700, 2011.

¹⁴³ ST/SGB/1999/13 (Bulletin on the Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law). According to the official *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 2008, pp. 15–16, this statement sets out the 'fundamental principles and rules of international law that may be applicable to United Nations peacekeepers'. See also UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Guidelines on the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, January 2017, <https://publicintelligence.net/un-peacekeeping-forces-guidelines/>. See Higgins, *United Nations*, pp. 423–5; P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in United Nations Peace Support Operations', *5 Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 2000, pp. 45, 52 ff.; A. J. T. Dörenberg, 'Legal Aspects of Peacekeeping Operations', *28 Military Law and Law of War Review*, 1989, p. 113; F. Hampson, 'States' Military Operations Authorised by the United Nations and International Humanitarian Law', in *The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law* (ed. L. Condorelli, A. M. LaRosa and S. Scherrer), Paris, 1996, p. 371; Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, 6th ed., Cambridge, 2017, pp. 184–5, 355–8; and Will, 'Occupation Law', pp. 274 ff.

¹⁴⁴ See e.g. A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, 'The UN's Role in International Society since 1945', in Roberts and Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World*, p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ See further below, p. 1111.

¹⁴⁶ *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, A/50/60, 1995, para. 33. See also *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, chapter 3.

¹⁴⁷ See below, p. 1113.

¹⁴⁸ See A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 August 2000 and 39 ILM, 2000, p. 1432. The Report is also termed the Brahimi Report after the chair of the UN Panel on UN Peace Operations: see C. Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force*, 4th ed., Oxford, 2018, pp. 300 ff.

¹⁴⁹ Brahimi Report, paras. 29 ff. The Panel reaffirmed that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence constitute the ‘bedrock principles of peacekeeping’, but noted that consent could sometimes be manipulated and that impartiality must take into account adherence to UN principles. Equal treatment where one party is violating such principles could not be acceptable: *ibid.*, paras. 48 ff. The Panel also called for improved standby arrangements to enable forces to ‘meet the need for the robust peacekeeping forces that the Panel has advocated’ and ‘robust rules of engagement against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence’: *ibid.*, paras. 86 ff., 55.

¹⁵⁰ A/60/696, paras. 6 ff. See A/62/11, paras. 51 ff.; and Press Release GA/SPD/382, 31 October 2007.

¹⁵¹ A/64/633.

¹⁵² A/70/95–S/2015/446. See also C. Gray, ‘The 2015 Report on *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: A New Framework for UN Peacekeeping?*’, 15 *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2016, p. 193. See also Security Council resolution 2378 (2017) affirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including the primacy of politics, the need to increase transparency and effectiveness and the need for reform.

¹⁵³ A/70/95–S/2015/446, pp. 26–30. Note also the (non-binding) Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians adopted in 2015 at a conference bringing together troop-contributing countries and finance-contributing countries, http://civilianprotection.rw/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/REPORT_PoC_conference_Long-version.pdf. The Principles have received support from a number of states, including the UK, www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-support-for-the-kigali-principles-on-the-protection-of-civilians.

[civilians](http://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/documents/publications/2018/7/31/letter-to-the-sg-concerning-kigali-principles), and see the joint letter of support from thirty-two states, including France, the UK, the US and Australia, on 31 July 2018, www.permanentrepresentations.nl/documents/publications/2018/7/31/letter-to-the-sg-concerning-kigali-principles.

¹⁵⁴ See e.g. A. Orakhelashvili, *Collective Security*, Oxford, 2011; Chesterman *et al.*, *United Nations*, chapter 10; Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 1131 ff.; Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 26; G. Wilson, *The United Nations and Collective Security*, Abingdon, 2014; Denis, *Pouvoir Normatif*; A. Novosseloff, *Le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et la Maîtrise de la Force Armée*, Brussels, 2003; E. de Wet, *The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council*, Oxford, 2004; Franck, *Fairness*, chapter 9; Gray, *Use of Force*, chapter 7; D. Sarooshi, *The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security*, Oxford, 1999; R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, chapter 15; P. M. Dupuy, 'Sécurité Collective et Organisation de la Paix', **97 RGDIP**, 1993, p. 617; G. Gaja, 'Réflexions sur le Rôle du Conseil de Sécurité dans le Nouvel Ordre Mondial', *ibid.*, p. 297; T. M. Franck and F. Patel, 'UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Older Order Changeth"', **85 AJIL**, 1991, p. 63; C. Gray, 'A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security System?', **56 ICLQ**, 2007, p. 157; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 1093; Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 1237 ff.; and D. Whittle, 'The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action', **26 EJIL**, 2015, p. 671.

¹⁵⁵ See *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 3; 94 ILR, p. 478. But see the discussion of article 103 by Judge Lauterpacht in the second provisional measures order in *Application of the Genocide Convention*, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 440; 95 ILR, pp. 43, 158; and by Judge Bedjaoui in *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 47; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 530. See also Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 2133 ff.; A. Toubanc, 'L'Article 103 et la Valeur Juridique de la Charte des Nations Unies', **108 RGDIP**, 2004, p. 439; and R. Kolb, *L'Article 103 de la Charte des Nations Unies*, The Hague, 2014.

¹⁵⁶ Gray, *Use of Force*, chapter 6.

¹⁵⁷ Article 27 of the UN Charter.

¹⁵⁸ See also Security Council resolution 217 (1965).

159 This situation was characterised by fighting ‘causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, and by the consequences for the countries in the region, in particular in the border areas of neighbouring countries’: *ibid.*

160 See also Security Council resolution 751 (1992).

161 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 743 (1992), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 827 (1993).

162 See Security Council resolutions 808 (1993), with regard to former Yugoslavia, and 955 (1994), with regard to Rwanda.

163 Which called for the extradition of alleged bombers of an airplane over Lockerbie in 1988 to the US or the UK.

164 Security Council resolutions 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996).

165 See above, [Chapter 19](#), p. 1024. See also e.g. resolutions 1373 (2001), 1904 (2009), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012) and 2133 (2014).

166 See General Assembly resolution 47/20 B.

167 Security Council resolution 841 (1993).

168 Note that in Security Council resolution 688 (1991), it had been determined that the consequences of the Iraqi repression of its civilian population in different parts of the country, including areas populated by Kurds, involving considerable refugee flows over the borders of Turkey and Iran threatened international peace and security.

169 Security Council resolution 861 (1993).

170 Security Council resolution 873 (1993). Further sanctions were imposed in resolution 917 (1994). Sanctions were finally lifted by resolution 944 (1994), upon the restoration of President Aristide following a US-led operation in Haiti. As the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY concluded in the *Tadić* case, 105 ILR, pp. 419, 466: ‘It can thus be said that there is a common understanding, manifested by the “subsequent practice” of the membership of

the United Nations at large, that the “threat to the peace” of article 39 may include, as one of its species, internal armed conflicts.’

¹⁷¹ See also resolution 2094 (2013). The situation in South Sudan has also been termed a threat to international peace and security, see e.g. resolution 2521 (2020). Note also resolution 2118 (2013) determining that ‘the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security’ and resolution 2117 (2013) declaring that ‘the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of life, contribute to instability and insecurity and continue to undermine the effectiveness of the Security Council in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. See, generally, the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council concerning Chapter VII, www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/.

¹⁷² General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX).

¹⁷³ As, e.g., the blockade of the Israeli port of Eilat in May 1967, above, Chapter 19, p. 999.

¹⁷⁴ See *Nicaragua v. US*, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 103–4; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 437. Note that the definition of aggression was essentially replicated in article 8bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 by virtue of resolution RC/Res.6, adopted at the Kampala Conference of States Parties in 2010. The Court’s jurisdiction as to aggression was activated on 17 July 2018: see ICC Assembly of States Parties, resolution 5 (14 December 2017) and www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/search-results.aspx?k=aggression.

¹⁷⁵ The first finding as to aggression by the Security Council was in 1976 with regard to South African action against Angola: Security Council resolution 387 (1976). See also Security Council resolutions 411 (1977) condemning Rhodesian action against Mozambique, 573 (1985) condemning Israel’s action against PLO headquarters in Tunisia and 667 (1990) condemning aggressive acts by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait.

¹⁷⁶ Security Council resolution S/1501.

¹⁷⁷ See e.g. P. Conlon, 'Legal Problems at the Centre of United Nations Sanctions', 65 *Nordic Journal of International Law*, 1996, p. 73; A. Tzanakopoulos, *Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions*, Oxford, 2011.

¹⁷⁸ See e.g. G. Hakimdavar, *A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions*, Abingdon, 2014; A. Charron, *UN Sanctions and Conflict*, Abingdon, 2011; M. Doxey, *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*, London, 1980; J. Combacau, *Le Pouvoir de Sanction de l'ONU*, Paris, 1974; N. Schrijver, 'The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An International Perspective', in *International Economic Law and Armed Conflict* (ed. H. Post), Dordrecht, 1994; and *Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peace-Building in a Post-Cold War World* (ed. D. Cortright and G. Lopez), Boulder, 1995.

¹⁷⁹ See Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, p. 1297; and Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, p. 1171. See also *Security Council Repertoire*, www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml#rel2.

¹⁸⁰ See Security Council resolutions 234 (1967) and 338 (1973). See also resolution 2046 (2012) with regard to the situation between Sudan and South Sudan.

¹⁸¹ See e.g. Security Council resolution 509 (1982), with regard to Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Note that article 40 may not be explicitly cited in such calls: see *Security Council Repertoire*, www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20VII/2010-2011_Part%20VII.pdf#page=31.

¹⁸² See e.g. Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 1305 ff. (on article 41) and 1308 (on Southern Rhodesia); Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, p. 1195; R. Zacklin, *The United Nations and Rhodesia*, New York, 1974; J. E. S. Fawcett, 'Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia', 41 *BYIL*, 1965–66, p. 103; M. S. McDougal and W. M. Reisman, 'Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern', 62 *AJIL*, 1968, p. 1; and J. Nkala, *The United Nations, International Law and the Rhodesia Independence Crisis*, Oxford, 1985. See also V. Gowlland-Debbas, *Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law*, Dordrecht, 1990, V. Gowlland-Debbas, 'Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility', 43 *ICLQ*, 1994, p. 55; and V. Gowlland-Debbas, 'The Security Council and Issues of Responsibility under International Law', 353 *HR*, 2012, p. 185.

¹⁸³ Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965). The next year, the Council went further and imposed selective mandatory economic sanctions upon Rhodesia, Security

Council resolution 232 (1966). These sanctions were extended in 1968 and rendered comprehensive, see Security Council resolutions 253 (1968) and 409 (1977). However, several states did act in defiance of these resolutions, see N. Polakas, 'Economic Sanctions: An Effective Alternative to Military Coercion?', 6 *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 1980, p. 289; and *DUSPIL*, 1977, Washington, DC, pp. 830–4. Sanctions were terminated in 1979 as a result of the agreement leading to the independence of Zimbabwe, see Security Council resolution 460 (1979) and 19 ILM, 1980, pp. 287 ff. See also generally *Economic Sanctions and International Law* (ed. M. Happold and P. Eden), Oxford, 2016.

¹⁸⁴ See Lauterpacht *et al.*, *Kuwait Crisis*.

¹⁸⁵ As required in Security Council resolution 660 (1990).

¹⁸⁶ Apart from supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, 'in humanitarian circumstances', foodstuffs: para. 3(c).

¹⁸⁷ It was also decided that states should not make available to the Iraqi government or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait any funds or any other financial or economic resources and should prevent their nationals and persons within their territories from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except for payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs: para. 4. These sanctions were tightened in Security Council resolution 670 (1990).

¹⁸⁸ See e.g. M. Koskeniemi, 'Le Comité des Sanctions Créé par la Résolution 661 (1990) du Conseil de Sécurité', *AFDI*, 1991, p. 121; and P. Conlon, 'Lessons from Iraq: The Functions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a Source of Sanctions Implementation Authority and Practice', 35 *Va. JIL*, 1995, p. 632. Under Security Council resolution 666 (1990), the Committee was instructed to keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review and to bear in mind that foodstuffs (as permitted under the terms of the previous resolutions) should be provided through the UN in cooperation with the ICRC or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision. The Committee was additionally given the task of examining requests for assistance under article 50 of the Charter and making recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action; see Security Council resolution 669 (1990).

¹⁸⁹ See below, p. 1108.

190 Security Council resolution 748 (1992). These sanctions imposed a mandatory arms and air embargo upon Libya. It also called upon states to reduce significantly the number and the level of staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and diplomatic posts. A Committee was set up to monitor compliance with the sanctions. Resolution 1192 (1998) provided *inter alia* for the suspension of the sanctions upon the certification by the Secretary-General of the arrival of the accused bombers in the Netherlands for trial. This duly occurred, see S/1999/726, and sanctions were suspended, see S/PRST/1992/22.

191 A Sanctions Committee was established under Security Council resolution 724 (1991). See also para. 5 of resolution 757 and resolution 787 (1992). These sanctions were essentially extended by Security Council resolution 820 (1993) to areas of Croatia and Bosnia controlled by the Bosnian Serb forces. See also resolution 942 (1994).

192 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 943 (1994), 988 (1995), 992 (1995), 1003 (1995) and 1015 (1995).

193 Security Council resolution 1021 (1995).

194 See resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1367 (2001).

195 See Security Council resolutions 733 (1992), 751 (1992), 1356 (2001), 1407 (2002), 1425 (2002), 1744 (2007) and 1772 (2007).

196 See resolutions 918 (1994), 1005 (1995), 1011 (1995), 1013 (1995), 1053 (1996) and 1161 (1998).

197 See resolutions 788 (1992) and 985 (1995). Sanctions were terminated by resolution 1343 (2001), but reintroduced in resolution 1521 (2003). See also resolutions 1532 (2004) and 1683 (2006). The regime was most recently extended by resolution 1713 (2006).

198 See resolution 1298 (2000). Sanctions were terminated in pursuance of Presidential Statement S/PRST/2001/14 of 15 May 2001. Note that this was the first time that sanctions had been imposed on both sides in a conflict: see C. Gray, 'From Unity to Polarisation: International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq', **13** *EJIL*, 2002, pp. 1, 3.

199 See resolutions 1132 (1997) and 1171 (1998).

200 See resolutions 1306 (2000), 1385 (2001) and 1446 (2002). The diamonds sanctions ended in June 2003: see SC/7778. Note also the sanctions imposed on the Ivory Coast, comprising an arms embargo, travel ban on particular individuals, assets freeze on individuals and designated entities, and diamond sanctions: see e.g. resolutions 1572 (2004), 1584 (2005), 1643 (2005) and 172 (2007). Sanctions were also imposed on individuals to be determined with regard to Lebanon following the assassination of former prime minister Hariri and others: see resolution 1636 (2005).

201 See resolution 1267 (1999). The sanctions regime was intensified in e.g. resolutions 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005) and 1735 (2006). States are currently required to impose sanctions measures upon Al-Qaida and ISIL (Da'esh or 'Islamic State') and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them: see Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) and www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267.

202 See also resolutions 1533 (2004), 1596 (2005), 1649 (2005) and 1698 (2006), expanding the scope of the arms embargo, imposing additional targeted sanctions measures (travel ban and assets freeze), and broadening the criteria under which individuals could be designated as subject to those measures. In resolution 1807 (2008), the arms embargo was limited to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the territory of the Congo, while the travel ban and assets freeze were extended to individuals operating in that country and committing serious violations of international law involving the targeting of women. See also resolution 1804 (2008), affirming the application of sanctions to various Rwandan armed groups operating in the Congo.

203 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

204 See resolution 1556 (2004). The scope of the arms embargo was expanded and additional measures imposed, including a travel ban and an assets freeze on designated individuals, in resolution 1591 (2005).

205 Sanctions included a proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programmes-related embargo; an export ban on arms and related *matériel* from Iran; and individual targeted sanctions (a travel ban, a travel notification requirement and an assets freeze on designated persons and entities): see resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008),

1929 (2010), 1984 (2011) and 2049 (2012). On 14 July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) was signed between Iran and China, France, Russia, the UK, the EU and the US concerning controls over Iran's nuclear programme. This was endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015), which provides for the termination of the provisions of previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue. The US withdrew from the JCPA in May 2018, see 112 *AJIL*, 2018, p. 514. There are currently fourteen sanctions regimes dealing with political settlement of conflicts, nuclear non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Each regime is administered by a sanctions committee chaired by a non-permanent member of the Security Council. There are ten monitoring groups, teams and panels that support the work of the sanctions committees: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information. The Security Council has established a Consolidated List of all persons and entities subject to sanctions; see www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list.

206 See e.g. Security Council resolution 748 (1992), with regard to Libya.

207 See Security Council resolutions 808 (1992) and 827 (1992) with regard to former Yugoslavia, and 955 (1994) with regard to Rwanda. See also the *Milutinović* case before the ICTY, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 May 2003.

208 See S/22456, 6 April 1991.

209 See further above, p. 1090.

210 See also Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and the Reports of the Special Commission: e.g. S/23165; S/23268; S/24108 and Corr.1; S/24984; S/25977; S/26910; S/1994/750; S/1994/1138; S/1994/1422; and S/1994/1422/Add.1.

211 In a further interesting but controversial provision, the resolution 'decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990, repudiating its foreign debt, are null and void, and demands that Iraq scrupulously adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt'.

212 See para. 18 of resolution 687 (1991).

213 *Ibid.*, para. 16 and see Security Council resolution 692 (1991). See further above, [Chapter 17](#), p. 912.

214 Para. 12.

215 See S/1999/1037. See also S/1999/94 detailing the problems faced by UNSCOM and Iraq's partial destruction of proscribed weapons coupled with 'a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions', *ibid.*, para. 5.

216 See e.g. C. de Jonge Oudraat, 'UNSCOM: Between Iraq and a Hard Place', 13 *EJIL*, 2002, p. 139.

217 See S/1996/356 and S/2002/1239. Note that Security Council resolution 1472 (2003), adopted eight days after the military operation against Iraq began, provided for the temporary extension of the oil-for-food arrangements under the changed conditions. The arrangements were also modified in resolutions 1284 (1999) and 1409 (2002). Resolution 1483 (2003) supported the formation of an 'interim administration' for Iraq, following the occupation of that state by the UK and the US, by the people of Iraq with the help of 'the Authority' (the UK and the US) and all economic sanctions (apart from arms) were lifted: see further below, p. 1110. Note also the adoption of targeted sanctions against those involved in wildlife trafficking: see resolutions 2134 (2014) concerning the Central African Republic and 2136 (2014) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

218 See e.g. General Assembly resolution 51/242 and UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, p. 549. See also Gray, *Use of Force*, p. 279; and Forum, 13 *EJIL*, 2002, p. 43.

219 See e.g. E. Rosand, 'The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions', 98 *AJIL*, 2004, p. 745; and B. Fassbender, 'Targeted Sanctions and Due Process', 2006, a study commissioned by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf. See also *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Actions* (ed. T. J. Biersteker, S. E. Eckert and M. Tourinho), Cambridge, 2016; and K. Wellens, *Remedies Against International Organizations*, Cambridge, 2002, p. 89.

220 Where no comments are received within three months, the sanctions committee will be so informed and any member may request de-listing. The Secretary-General informed the Security Council on 30 March 2007 that the focal point had been established, S/2007/178. See also resolution 2255 (2015) and www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting.

²²¹ See *HM Treasury v. Ahmed* [2010] UKSC 2, paras. 6, 77 ff. (per Lord Hope); *Bank Mellat v. HM Treasury (No. 2)* [2013] UKSC 39; and *R v. Forsyth and Mabey* [2011] UKSC 9. See also *Libyan Investment Authority v. Maud* [2016] EWCA Civ 788, paras. 17, 20, noting that the relevant EU sanctions measures must be construed as far as possible compatibly with the UN Security Council resolutions on Libya that they were intended to implement, and pointing to the easing of UN sanctions on the Libyan Investment Authority ‘to enable the Libyan people to have the benefit’ of its assets.

²²² Note that in *Kadi I* [2008] ECR I-6351, the ECJ held that obligations imposed by an international agreement could not prejudice the constitutional principles of the Treaty on European Union 2002, including fundamental rights. Accordingly, the lawfulness of all EU acts could be reviewed by the courts in the light of fundamental rights even where such acts were to implement Security Council resolutions. Kadi was removed from the sanctions list. See also *Bank Melli Iran v. Council*, Case No. C-548–09 P, ECJ, Judgment of 16 November 2011 and *Kadi II*, Joined Case Nos. C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Judgment of 18 July 2013, holding that judicial review of EU implementing measures did not threaten the primacy of the Security Council. See also *Ayadi*, Case No. T-527/09 RENV, Judgment of 14 April 2015; and *Al-Faqih*, Case No. T-134/11, Judgment of 28 October 2015.

²²³ See e.g. *Al Dulimi v. Switzerland*, Judgment of 21 June 2016, paras. 140 ff., where the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR underlined that ‘there must be a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights’ and that in the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a UN Security Council resolution, ‘the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations’. The Court went on to hold that where a Security Council sanctions resolution did not contain any clear wording excluding the possibility of judicial supervision of the measures taken for its implementation, it must always be understood as authorising the courts of the respondent state to exercise sufficient scrutiny so that any arbitrariness can be avoided: *ibid.*, para. 146. Accordingly, in the circumstances, it found a violation of article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights as Switzerland had failed to provide a meaningful judicial review of the applicants’ listing by the Security Council Sanctions Committee. See also *Al-Jedda v. UK*, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 July 2011, para. 102; and *Nada v. Switzerland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 September 2012, paras. 168

ff. Note *Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium*, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1472/2006, Decision of 22 October 2008.

²²⁴ See e.g. Dinstein, *War*, p. 343; Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 266–7; and Franck, *Fairness*, p. 223. See also generally, L. A. Sicilianos, ‘Entre Multilatéralisme et Unilatéralisme: L’Autorisation par le Conseil de Sécurité de Recourir à la Force’, **339 HR**, 2008, p. 12.

²²⁵ Security Council resolutions 82 (1950), 83 (1950) and 84 (1950).

²²⁶ See e.g. Sohn, *Cases on UN Law*, pp. 479 ff.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 481 ff. See also *ibid.*, pp. 509 ff. with regard to the situation following the Chinese involvement in the conflict.

²²⁸ Franck has written, referring to the UN’s ‘adaptive capacity’, that the ‘gradual emancipation of article 42 as a free-standing authority for deploying collective force, *ad hoc*, had prevented the collapse of the Charter system in the absence of the standby militia envisioned by article 43’: *Recourse*, p. 23.

²²⁹ See Lauterpacht *et al.*, *Kuwait Crisis*. See also O. Schachter, ‘United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict’, **85 AJIL**, 1991, p. 452; Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 361 ff.; and Dinstein, *War*, pp. 345 ff.

²³⁰ See also Security Council resolution 674 (1990).

²³¹ See generally *Keesing’s Record of World Events*, pp. 37631 ff., 37694 ff. (1990).

²³² The following states supplied armed forces and/or warships or aircraft for the enforcement of the UN resolutions: the US, the UK, France, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Australia, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Pakistan, Norway, Denmark, the USSR, Bangladesh, Senegal, Niger, Czechoslovakia and the Gulf Co-operation Council (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE): see *Sunday Times* ‘War in the Gulf’ Briefing, 27 January 1991, p. 9.

²³³ As well as a legitimate use of force in collective self-defence: see above, [Chapter 19](#), p. 1006.

²³⁴ See e.g. Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 361 ff.

²³⁵ See e.g. White, *Keeping the Peace*, p. 192; and Kirgis, *International Organizations*, pp. 854 ff.

²³⁶ See e.g. the statement of the Minister of State at the Foreign Office on 27 January 1993, UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, p. 739; and see also *ibid.*, p. 728; and UKMIL, 65 *BYIL*, 1994, p. 683. See also the statement of US President Bush cited in Kirgis, *International Organizations*, p. 856. Note that on 3 September 1996, in response to the entry of Iraqi troops and tanks into the northern ‘no-fly’ Kurdish zone in order to aid one of the Kurdish groups against another, US aircraft launched a series of air strikes against Iraq and extended the southern ‘no-fly’ zone from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel. In so doing, the US government cited Security Council resolution 688 (1991): see *The Economist*, 7 September 1996, pp. 55–6. See also Gray, ‘Unity to Polarisation’, p. 9.

²³⁷ UKMIL, 64 *BYIL*, 1993, pp. 728, 740, with regard to Western air raids against Iraqi targets on 13 January 1993. See also UKMIL, 69 *BYIL*, 1998, p. 592; and UKMIL, 70 *BYIL*, 1999, pp. 565, 568, 590.

²³⁸ See UKMIL, 72 *BYIL*, 2001, p. 694. See also above, [Chapter 19](#), p. 1017.

²³⁹ Note that in December 1998, UK and US airplanes attacked targets in Iraq in response to the withdrawal by that state of cooperation with UN weapons inspectors and based this action on resolutions 1154 (1998) and 1205 (1998) adopted under Chapter VII. The resolutions did not authorise force, but the former noted that any violation by Iraq of its obligations to accord ‘immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access’ to UNSCOM and the IAEA would have ‘severest consequences’ and the latter declared that Iraq’s decision to end cooperation with UNSCOM was ‘a flagrant violation’ of resolution 687 (1991): see UKMIL, 69 *BYIL*, 1998, pp. 589 ff.; and Gray, ‘Unity to Polarisation’, pp. 11 ff.

²⁴⁰ See the Attorney General, 646 *House of Lords Hansard*, Written Answer, 17 March 2003 and the letters dated 21 March 2003 sent to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representatives of the UK, the US and Australia, S/2003/350–2. See also 52 *ICLQ*, 2003, pp. 812 ff.; and M. Weller, *Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law*, Oxford, 2010.

²⁴¹ See, as to resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991), above, pp. 1110 and 1094.

²⁴² See e.g. UNMOVIC Report of 28 February 2003, S/2003/232, pp. 3, 12–13; and UNMOVIC Working Document on Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programme (‘Cluster Document’), 6 March 2003.

²⁴³ See e.g. ‘Agora’, *97 AJIL*, 2003, p. 553; Weller, *Iraq*, chapter 5; Gray, *Use of Force*, p. 364; Dinstein, *War*, pp. 347 ff.; E. Papastavridis, ‘Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII in the Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis’, *56 ICLQ*, 2007, p. 83; J.-M. Sorel, ‘L’ONU et l’Irak: Le Vil Plomb N’Est Pas Transformé en Or Pur’, *108 RGDIP*, 2004, p. 845; S. Wheatley, ‘The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq’, *17 EJIL*, 2006, p. 531; and C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq’, *4 San Diego Journal of International Law*, 2003, p. 7. See also Sarooshi, *Collective Security*, chapter 4 and pp. 174 ff. with regard to delegation of Chapter VII powers to member states and the limitations thereupon; Dinstein, *War*, pp. 347 ff.; and Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 361 ff. Note in particular the Report of the Chilcot Inquiry, published on 6 July 2016, especially vol. 5, section 5 on legal advice, www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/247894/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry_section-50.pdf, and the Symposium on the Iraq Inquiry, *87 BYIL*, 2016, pp. 98 ff., especially C. Henderson, ‘Reading Between the Lines: The Iraq Inquiry, Doctrinal Debates, and the Legality of Military Action against Iraq in 2003’, *ibid.*, p. 105.

²⁴⁴ See e.g. advice of the UK Attorney General, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05886/> and www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12810050. See also the statement by the Legal Adviser to the US State Department, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm>; and Gray, *Use of Force*, pp. 377 ff.

²⁴⁵ See www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm. See also 50 ILM, 2011, p. 709.

²⁴⁶ See e.g. www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/ and www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya.

²⁴⁷ See above, *Chapter 19*, p. 1016.

²⁴⁸ General Assembly resolution 60/1 (2005), paras. 138–9. See also the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel Report, A/59/565 (2004), paras. 199–203; and the Report of the Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom*, A/59/2005, para. 135. See also references cited in [Chapter 19](#), p. 1020, **note 228**

²⁴⁹ A/63/677. See also General Assembly resolution 63/308 (2009) and the Secretary-General’s Report on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect, A/64/864 (2010). Other reports include A/69/981 (2015); A/70/999 (2016); A/71/1016 (2017) and A/72/884 (2018). See also www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml.

²⁵⁰ Security Council resolution 743 (1992). See also the Report of the Secretary-General, S/23592 and Security Council resolutions 721 (1991) and 724 (1991).

²⁵¹ The resolution, however, did mention article 25.

²⁵² See also Security Council resolution 769 (1992).

²⁵³ Note also Security Council resolution 802 (1993) criticising Croatia for its attacks within or adjacent to the UN protected areas and upon UNPROFOR personnel.

²⁵⁴ The Security Council in this resolution was explicitly acting under Chapter VII. See also resolution 752 (1992) also criticising outside interference in Bosnia, which did not refer to Chapter VII.

²⁵⁵ Additional elements were deployed to ensure the security of the airport by resolution 761 (1992). Note that neither of these resolutions referred to Chapter VII. See also S/1994/300, with regard to UNPROFOR’s mandate relating to Sarajevo airport. The airlift of humanitarian supplies into this airport was the longest lasting such airlift in history and well over 150,000 tons were delivered: see S/1995/444, para. 23.

²⁵⁶ The Secretary-General was, however, careful to state that this resolution created no additional mandate for UNPROFOR: see S/1995/444, para. 25.

²⁵⁷ See S/24540. Note that a number of resolutions extended the application of Chapter VII to UNPROFOR’s freedom of movement, e.g. resolutions 807 (1993) and 847 (1993), and

force was used on a number of occasions in self-defence: see e.g. S/1995/444, para. 55.

258 A further stage in the evolution of UNPROFOR's role occurred with the adoption of the 'no-fly' ban imposed on military flights over Bosnia by Security Council resolution 781 (1992). UNPROFOR was given the task of monitoring compliance with this ban. See also Security Council resolution 786 (1992). The ban on air activity was expanded in resolution 816 (1993) to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. At the request of the Secretary-General, the no-fly zone was enforced by aircraft from NATO: see S/1995/444, para. 30. A 'dual key' system was put into operation under which decisions on targeting and execution were to be taken jointly by UN and NATO commanders and the principle of proportionality of response to violations was affirmed: see e.g. Joint Press Statement of 29 October 1994, PKO/32.

259 See resolutions 819 (1993) and 824 (1993). These were Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac.

260 See also Security Council resolution 836 (1993).

261 Security Council resolution 844 (1993). See also S/25939. Note that the Secretary-General called for the demilitarisation of the 'safe areas': S/1994/1389. At the request of the Secretary, UNPROFOR was also given the task of monitoring the ceasefire agreement between the Bosnian and Croatian armies: see Security Council resolution 908 (1994), and given additional responsibilities with regard to Sarajevo: see Security Council resolution 900 (1994).

262 S/1995/444, paras. 48–9.

263 See also Security Council resolution 998 (1995) regarding the proposal to establish a rapid reaction force.

264 See S/1995/987.

265 See also Security Council resolution 1026 (1995).

266 See also Security Council resolutions 990 (1995) and 994 (1995).

²⁶⁷ Security Council resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983 (1995). The Security Council had authorised deployment of a preventive force in Macedonia in resolution 795 (1992). See also S/24923, annex.

²⁶⁸ See Security Council resolution 1031 (1995).

²⁶⁹ See e.g. S/1995/1031 and Security Council resolution 1026 (1995). The International Police Task Force was established under resolution 1035 (1995).

²⁷⁰ See also the situation with regard to Rwanda, Franck, *Fairness*, pp. 300 ff. Essentially, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with a mandate to ensure the security of the capital, Kigali, monitor the ceasefire agreement and monitor the security situation generally was established, see Security Council resolution 872 (1993). As the situation deteriorated, an arms embargo was instituted, and in resolution 929 (1994) the Council, acting under Chapter VII, authorised a two-month operation (Operation Turquoise) until UNAMIR was strengthened. The French-led force was replaced by the strengthened UNAMIR, whose mandate ended on 6 March 1996; see resolution 1029 (1995).

²⁷¹ See e.g. Franck, *Fairness*, pp. 301 ff.; I. Lewis and J. Mayall, 'Somalia', in *The New Interventionism 1991–1994* (ed. J. Mayall), Cambridge, 1996, p. 94; and J. M. Sorel, 'La Somalie et les Nations Unies', *AFDI*, 1992, p. 61. See also <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosomi.htm> and <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom2.htm>.

²⁷² Security Council resolution 733 (1992). See also S/23829, 1992.

²⁷³ Security Council resolution 746 (1992).

²⁷⁴ Security Council resolution 751 (1992). This was not originally a Chapter VII operation.

²⁷⁵ Security Council resolution 775 (1992). See also S/244480, 1992. Under resolution 767 (1992), Somalia was divided into four operational zones for the delivery of food aid and ceasefire purposes.

²⁷⁶ See S/24859, 1992.

277 S/24868, 1992.

278 Security Council resolution 794 (1992).

279 The operation was termed ‘Operation Restore Hope’ and it arrived in Somalia in December 1992: see S/24976, 1992 and S/25168, 1993.

280 Security Council resolution 814 (1993). See also S/25354, 1993.

281 See S/25168, annex III.

282 See e.g. S/26022, 1993; and Security Council resolutions 865 (1993), 878 (1993), 885 (1993) and 886 (1993).

283 See also Security Council resolutions 923 (1994) and 946 (1994).

284 S/1994/1166, Part 2, para. 22. See also with regard to Sierra Leone, where the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo, following a military coup, see resolutions 1132 (1997) and 1156 (1998). A UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone with the function of monitoring the disarmament process and restructuring the security forces was established under resolution 1181 (1998). In October 1998, the Security Council set up the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with an initial 6,000 military personnel to replace the previous mission with an enhanced mandate, including monitoring the ceasefire and facilitating humanitarian assistance. Specifically acting under Chapter VII, para. 14 of resolution 1270 (1999), the Council decided that ‘in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and . . . to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. The force was increased and the mandate revised in resolution 1289 (2000). UNAMSIL was further authorised to ‘take the necessary action’ to fulfil the additional tasks. See resolutions 1299 (2000), 1346 (2001), 1400 (2002) and 1436 (2002). The mission ended in 2005: see resolutions 1562 (2004) and 1610 (2005). See also, as to the role of ECOWAS, below, p. 1128.

285 See S/1999/815 and resolution 1234 (1999). See also P. Okawa, ‘Congo’s War: The Legal Dimensions of a Protracted Conflict’, 77 *BYIL*, 2006, p. 203.

286 Resolution 1258 (1999).

287 Resolution 1279 (1999).

288 Resolution 1291 (2000).

289 The mandate of MONUC was further extended in a series of resolutions: 1316 (2000); 1332 (2000); 1493 (2003); 1565 (2004); 1592 (2005); 1635 (2005); 1711 (2006); and 1794 (2007).

290 See also resolutions 1376 (2001), 1399 (2002), 1417 (2002), 1457 (2003) and 1468 (2003).

291 See as to the imposition of sanctions, above, p. 1104.

292 See also resolution 2053 (2012).

293 MONUSCO's mandate has been renewed every year since: see resolutions 2147 (2014), 2211 (2015), 2277 (2016), 2348 (2017), 2409 (2018) and 2502 (2019). See also <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco>.

294 See also resolution 1564 (2004) authorising a human rights presence and resolution 1574 (2004).

295 Note that on 1 February 2005, a UN Commission of Inquiry into Darfur called for in resolution 1564 (2004) reported that while genocide had not been committed by the Sudan government, its forces and allied Janjaweed militias had carried out 'indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement': S/2005/60.

296 S/2006/591.

297 The mandate of UNMIS was extended in resolutions 1709 (2006), 1714 (2006) and 1755 (2007). On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became independent and the Security Council established a mission in that country (UNMIS): see resolution 1996 (2011). See also the UN Interim Security Force created for the border Abyei region: resolution 1990 (2011).

298 See S/2007/307/Rev.1. As to the imposition of sanctions, see above, p. 1104, and as to the reference of the Darfur situation to the International Criminal Court, see above, Chapter Z, p. 342.

299 See resolution 2113 (2013); and see also below, p. 1132.

300 See <https://unamid.unmissions.org/>. See resolution 1996 (2011) establishing the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This was followed by resolution 2155 (2014) which reinforced the mission and reprioritised its mandate. See also resolutions 2187 (2014); 2206 and 2252 (2015); and resolutions 2271, 2280, 2287, 2302 and 2304 (2016). The Mission has been continued, as have calls for an end to the civil war, see e.g. resolution 2514 (2020). Sanctions and an arms embargo have been imposed; see resolutions 2428 (2018) and 2521 (2020). Note also resolution 2100 (2013) establishing the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to support political processes and implement a variety of security related stabilisation tasks; see <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>. As to the establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); see <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca>.

301 See e.g. the Final Report on ‘Judicial Control of Security Council Decisions’, **76** *Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International*, Paris, 2016, p. 413; G. R. Watson, ‘Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court’, **34** *Harvard International Law Journal*, 1993, p. 1; Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council Enforcement’, p. 55; V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the *Lockerbie* Case’, **88** *AJIL*, 1994, p. 643; R. St J. Macdonald, ‘Changing Relations Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council of the United Nations’, *Canadian YIL*, 1993, p. 3; R. F. Kennedy, ‘*Libya v. United States*: The International Court of Justice and the Power of Judicial Review’, **33** *Va. JIL*, 1993, p. 899; T. M. Franck, ‘The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?’, **86** *AJIL*, 1992, p. 519; Franck, *Fairness*, pp. 242 ff.; W. M. Reisman, ‘The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations’, **87** *AJIL*, 1993, p. 83; E. McWhinney, ‘The International Court as Emerging Constitutional Court and the Co-ordinate UN Institutions (Especially the Security Council): Implications of the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie’, *Canadian YIL*, 1992, p. 261; J. M. Sorel, ‘Les Ordonnances de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 14 Avril 1992 dans l’Affaire Relative a des Questions d’Interpretation et d’Application de la Convention de Montreal de 1971 Resultant de l’Incident Aérien de Lockerbie’, *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 1993, p.

689; M. N. Shaw, 'The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial Function', in *The International Court of Justice* (ed. A. S. Muller, D. Raič and J. M. Thuránszky), The Hague, 1997, p. 219; J. Alvarez, 'Judging the Security Council', **90** *AJIL*, 1996, p. 1; and D. Akande, 'The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?', **46** *ICLQ*, 1997, p. 309.

302 *Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations*, ICJ Reports, 1948, p. 64; 15 AD, p. 333. See also Judge Bedjaoui, *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 45; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 528.

303 See Judge Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion in *Lockerbie*, ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 65 and that of Judge Bedjaoui, *ibid.*, p. 46; 94 ILR, pp. 548, 529. See also Judge Fitzmaurice in *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 17, 294; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 284–5. Note also General Assembly resolution 67/1, 30 November 2012, noting that the rule of law applies to all states equally and to international organisations, including the UN and its principal organs. See also General Assembly resolution 70/118, 14 December 2015.

304 See Security Council resolution 687 (1991) with regard to Iraq after the Gulf War.

305 Security Council resolutions 808 (1993) and 827 (1993) regarding former Yugoslavia and resolution 955 (1994) regarding Rwanda. See also the *Tadić* case decided by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, pp. 13 ff.; 105 ILR, pp. 419, 428 ff.

306 Security Council resolution 837 (1993) concerning Somalia.

307 Security Council resolutions 662 (1990) regarding the purported annexation by Iraq of Kuwait and 541 (1983) terming the purported Turkish Cypriot state 'legally invalid'.

308 Article 92 of the Charter.

309 ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 6; 95 ILR, pp. 1, 21.

310 See also the Second Provisional Measures Order, ICJ Reports, 1993, pp. 325, 327–8; 95 ILR, pp. 43, 45–6. The Court confined itself to the Genocide Convention.

311 ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 14; 94 ILR, pp. 478, 497.

312 Calling upon Libya to surrender the suspects and imposing sanctions for failing so to do.

313 Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 3, 15; 94 ILR, p. 498. See also Judge Shahabuddeen, Separate Opinion, *ibid.*, pp. 28, 32. Judge Lachs, in his Separate Opinion, noted that the Court was bound ‘to respect’ the binding decisions of the Security Council as part of international law: *ibid.*, p. 26. See Franck, *Fairness*, p. 243, who emphasised that the verb used, to ‘respect’, does not mean to ‘defer to’. Note that Judge Lachs also pointed to the Court as the ‘guardian of legality for the international community as a whole, both within and without the United Nations’: *ibid.*

314 Order of 1 July 2000, ICJ Reports, 2000, pp. 111, 122.

315 *Ibid.*, pp. 126–7.

316 See e.g. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council Enforcement’, pp. 93–4. See also the *Tadić* case decided by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, pp. 13 ff.; 105 ILR, pp. 419, 428 ff.

317 Note that under article 1(1) actions to bring about the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace must be in conformity with ‘the principles of justice and international law’, while there is no such qualification with regard to effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace and the suppression of breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.

318 See e.g. Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 445 ff.; and White, *Keeping the Peace*, part II.

319 General Assembly resolution 377(V). See e.g. J. Andrassy, ‘Uniting for Peace’, 50 *AJIL*, 1956, p. 563. See also M. J. Petersen, ‘The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950’, 8 *International Organisation*, 1959, p. 219; and F. Woolsey, ‘The Uniting for Peace Resolution of the United Nations’, 45 *AJIL*, 1951, p. 129. See also above, p. 1077.

320 The General Assembly under article 20 of the UN Charter meets only in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require.

321 ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151; 34 ILR, p. 281.

322 Article 11(2) of the Charter provides that the General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, but any such question ‘on which action is necessary’ must be referred to the Security Council.

323 Accordingly, the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East established in 1956 was not contrary to article 11(2) since it had not been intended to take enforcement action: ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 151, 165, 171–2. This precipitated a crisis over the arrears of the states refusing to pay their contributions.

324 See www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml.

325 See e.g. Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 1429 ff.; and Cot *et al.*, *Charte*, pp. 1367 ff. See also Gray, *Use of Force*, chapter 8; A. Abass, *Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security: Beyond Chapter VIII of the UN Charter*, Oxford, 2004; Sarooshi, *Collective Security*, chapter 6; and O. Schachter, ‘Authorised Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations’, in *The New International Order and the Use of Force* (ed. L. Damrosch and D. J. Scheffer), Boulder, 1991, p. 65. See also M. N. Shaw, ‘International Law: A System of Relationships’, 3 *Collected Courses of the Xiamen Academy of International Law*, 2011, pp. 237, 329 ff.

326 Note also the relevance of the right of collective self-defence under both customary international law and article 51 of the Charter: see above, [Chapter 19](#), p. 1006.

327 See e.g. M. Akehurst, ‘Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies’, 42 *BYIL*, 1967, p. 175; *Les Forces Régionales du Maintien de la Paix* (ed. A. Pellet), Paris, 1982; C. Borgen, ‘The Theory and Practice of Regional Organization Intervention in Civil Wars’, 26 *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 1994, p. 797; and I. Pogany, ‘The Arab League and Regional Peacekeeping’, 34 *NILR*, 1987, p. 54.

328 A number of organisations specifically self-identify as regional agencies as understood by Chapter VIII, such as the Organization of American States (see article 1 of the OAS Charter 1948), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (see para. 25 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration 1992 and the Charter for European Security 2000, 39 ILM, 2000, p. 255 and General Assembly resolution 47/10) and the Commonwealth of

Independent States (see 35 ILM, 1996, p. 783). See as to the OSCE role in Bosnia under the Dayton peace arrangements, above, Chapter 17, p. 899.

329 See here e.g. International Law Commission, Report on Fragmentation of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, 2006, pp. 166 ff.; and Kolb, *l'Article 103*. See also above, p. 54.

330 That is, whether all actions noted in articles 41 and 42 are covered or just those using military force.

331 Note that the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, stated that: 'Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations, recognizing that in some urgent situations that authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced': *ibid.*, para. 272(a).

332 See e.g. the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace*, A/47/277, 17 June 1992, p. 37; and Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom*, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para. 213, proposing that the UN should sign memoranda of understanding with regional organisations having a conflict prevention or peacekeeping capacity, linking such organisations with the UN Standby Arrangements System. See also the World Summit Outcome 2005, General Assembly resolution 60/1, and Security Council resolution 1631 (2005) and the subsequent report of the Secretary-General, A/61/204–S/2006/590, 28 July 2006, paras. 94 ff. See also S/25184 (1993) and Secretary-General, *The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, A/65/877–S/2011/393, June 2011.

333 See e.g. Simma *et al.*, *Charter*, pp. 1470 ff., especially p. 1474. Although article 52(4) provides that 'this article in no way impairs the application of articles 34 and 35'.

334 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 743 (1992) commending the work of the European Community and the CSCE in former Yugoslavia and 855 (1993) endorsing the activities of the CSCE in former Yugoslavia; and resolution 865 (1993) noting the efforts of the Arab League, the OAU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference with regard to Somalia.

335 E.g. Security Council resolutions 727 (1992) with regard to former Yugoslavia; 795 (1992) in regard to Macedonia; 757 (1992) with regard to former Yugoslavia; 816 (1993)

extending the ‘no-fly’ zone over Bosnia; 820 (1993) with regard to former Yugoslavia; and resolution 751 (1992) with regard to Somalia, ‘cognisant of the importance of co-operation between the United Nations and regional organisations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations’.

336 See e.g. Security Council resolution 787 (1992) with regard to the maritime blockade of former Yugoslavia; and resolution 794 (1992) with regard to Somalia.

337 OAS resolutions MRE/RES.1/91, MRE/RES.2/91 and MRE/RES.3/92. See article 19 of the OAS Charter. See also S/23109, 1991.

338 See General Assembly resolution 46/7, 1991.

339 Including, in addition to those already mentioned, resolutions MRE/RES.4/92, MRE/RES.5/93 and CP/RES.594 (923/92), and declarations CP/Dec. 8 (927/93), CP/Dec. 9 (931/93) and CP/Dec. 10 (934/93).

340 See also Security Council resolutions 917 (1994) and 933 (1994).

341 See also Security Council resolution 2350 (2017). Note also the problematic US argument concerning its invasion of Grenada, claiming that the 1981 Treaty Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States operated as the necessary ‘existing’ or ‘special’ treaty which would excuse intervention and a violation of territorial integrity under article 22 of the OAS Charter. However, the OECS Defence Committee could only act unanimously and in cases of external aggression and the landing of troops in order to overthrow the Marxist government on the island would not appear to satisfy the requirements: see e.g. J. N. Moore, *Law and the Grenada Mission*, Charlottesville, 1984, pp. 45–50; and W. C. Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, London, 1984. See also American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, Report on Grenada, 1984.

342 See e.g. G. Nolte, ‘Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict’, 53 *ZaöRV*, 1993, p. 603.

343 See article 2 of the ECOWAS Treaty 1975. See also F. Olonisakin, *Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations*, The Hague, 2000.

344 See also the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence 1981.

345 S/22110/Add.3, 1991.

346 S/23863, 1992. This was also supported by a statement from the President of the Security Council, S/23886, 1992. See also S/24815, 1993.

347 See also S/25402, 1993.

348 The peace agreement provided that ECOMOG would have the primary responsibility of supervising the military provisions of the agreement, with the UN monitoring and verifying the process: S/26200, 1993, and Security Council resolution 866 (1993) preamble.

349 See Security Council resolutions 856 (1993) and 866 (1993). See also S/26200 and S/26422 and Add. 1, 1993.

350 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 911 (1994); 950 (1994), which also commended African states sending troops to ECOMOG; 1014 (1995), which also encouraged African states to send troops to join ECOMOG; and resolutions 1020 (1995), 1071 (1996), 1100 (1997) and 1116 (1997) concerning elections. Note also the Security Council Presidential Statement of July 1997 after the elections *inter alia* commending ECOMOG: S/PRST/1997/41. See further as to ECOWAS, above, [Chapter 17](#), p. 895.

351 Note also ECOWAS involvement in Guinea Bissau under an agreement between the government and the opposing junta: see 38 ILM, 1999, p. 28. Security Council resolution 1233 (1999) welcomed the ECOMOG role. ECOMOG also played a part in the Sierra Leone crisis: see e.g. Security Council resolution 1162 (1998) commending ECOWAS and ECOMOG for playing an important role in restoring international peace and security, and resolutions 1270 (1999) and 1289 (2000). ECOWAS also played a role in the Gambian crisis, where, following the refusal of the sitting President to respect the results of the presidential election in 2016, ECOWAS and the AU opposed the unconstitutional approach of the sitting President. ECOWAS resolved at its 15th Summit to uphold the result of the election and guarantee the safety of the President-Elect and declared that it would ‘take all necessary measures’. The Security Council issued a presidential statement welcoming this, S/PRST/2016/19. ECOWAS forces entered The Gambia shortly thereafter. Security

Council resolution 2337 (2017) endorsed the decisions of ECOWAS and the AU recognising the President-Elect as the new President and welcomed the decisions taken by ECOWAS. See e.g. M. S. Helal, 'The ECOWAS Intervention in The Gambia', in *The Use of Force in International Law* (ed. T. Ruys and O. Corten), Oxford, 2018, p. 912.

352 See resolutions 1630 (2005), 1676 (2006) and 1724 (2006).

353 This was authorised in Security Council resolution 1744 (2007).

354 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1918 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013), 2182 (2014), 2232 (2015), 2297 (2016), 2415 (2018), 2472 (2019) and 2520 (2020). See also <http://amisom-au.org/>.

355 With the assistance of the WEU in the maritime activities in the Adriatic under Operation Sharp Guard: see www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm.

356 See e.g. S/1995/444, 1995.

357 See Security Council resolution 1088 (1996).

358 As authorised by Security Council resolution 1575 (2004).

359 See Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). See also above, Chapter 5, p. 210.

360 See e.g. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm?selectedLocale=en.

361 See further above, Chapter 8, p. 384.

362 See resolution 1386 (2001). Its mandate has been regularly extended under different leaders: see e.g. resolutions 1413 (2002); 1444 (2003); 1510 (2003), which extended its role throughout the country, 1563 (2004); 1623 (2005); 1707 (2006); 1776 (2007); 1817 (2008); 1833 (2008); 1917 (2010); 1943 (2010); 2011 (2011); and 2069 (2012). A process of transition was commenced to be completed by the end of 2014: see S/2011/762 and resolutions 2120 (2013) and 2189 (2014). ISAF was supported and led by NATO since 11 August 2003: see www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69366.htm?selectedLocale=en.

363 See www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52121.htm?selectedLocale=en.

364 See <https://unamid.unmissions.org/>.

365 See <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unamid>.

366 See e.g. Security Council resolutions 1828 (2008), 1881 (2009), 1935 (2010), 2063 (2012), 2113 (2013), 2173 (2014), 2228 (2015), 2296 (2016), 2363 (2017), 2495 (2019) and 2525 (2020).

International Organisations

Introduction

The evolution of the modern nation-state and the consequent development of an international order founded upon a growing number of independent and sovereign territorial units inevitably gave rise to questions of international cooperation.¹ The first major instance of organised international cooperation occurred with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the thirty-year religious conflict of Central Europe and formally established the modern secular nation-state arrangement of European politics.² Over a century later, the Napoleonic wars terminated with the Congress of Vienna in 1815, marking the first systematic attempt to regulate international affairs by means of regular international conferences.³ The Congress system lasted, in various guises, for practically a century and institutionalised not only the balance of power approach to politics, but also a semi-formal international order.⁴

Until the outbreak of the First World War, world affairs were to a large extent influenced by the periodic conferences that were held in Europe. The Paris conference of 1856 and the Berlin gathering of 1871 dealt with the problems of the Balkans, while the 1884–85 Berlin conferences imposed some order upon the scramble for Africa that had begun to develop. These, and other such conferences, constituted an important prelude to the establishment of

international institutions, but became themselves ever-more inadequate to fulfil the job they had been intended to do. A conference could only be called into being upon the initiative of one or more of the states involved, usually following some international crisis, and this ad hoc procedure imposed severe delays upon the resolution of the issue. It meant that only states specifically invited could attend and these states made decisions upon the basis of unanimous agreement, a factor which severely restricted the utility of the system.⁵ The nineteenth century also witnessed a considerable growth in international non-governmental associations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (founded in 1863) and the International Law Association and Institut de Droit International (both founded in 1873). These private international unions⁶ demonstrated a wide-ranging community of interest on specific topics, and an awareness that cooperation had to be international to be effective. Such unions created the machinery for regular meetings and many established permanent secretariats. The work done by these organisations was, and remains, of considerable value in influencing governmental activities and stimulating world action.⁷

In addition, there developed during the course of the nineteenth century a series of public international unions. These were functional associations linking together governmental departments or administrations for specific purposes, and were set up by multilateral treaties. The first instances of such inter-governmental associations were provided by the international commissions established for the more efficient functioning of such vital arteries of communication as the Rhine and Danube Rivers, and later for other rivers of Central and Western Europe.⁸ The powers given to the particular commissions varied from case to case, but most of them performed

important administrative and legislative functions. In 1865, the International Telegraphic Union was set up with a permanent bureau or secretariat and nine years later the Universal Postal Union was created. This combined a permanent bureau with periodic conferences, with decisions being taken by majority vote. This marked a step forward, since one of the weaknesses of the political order of ad hoc conferences had been the necessity for unanimity.

The latter half of the nineteenth century was especially marked by the proliferation of such public international unions, covering transportation, communications, health and economic cooperation. These unions restricted themselves to dealing with specific areas and were not comprehensive, but they introduced new ideas which paved the way for the universal organisations of the twentieth century. Such concepts as permanent secretariats, periodic conferences, majority voting, weighted voting and proportionate financial contributions were important in easing administrative cooperation, and they laid the basis for contemporary international institutions.

International organisations (or institutions) have now become indispensable. In a globalised world they facilitate cooperation across state frontiers, allowing for the identification, discussion and resolution of difficulties in a wide range of subjects, from peacekeeping and peace-enforcement to environmental, economic and human rights concerns. This dimension of the international legal system permits the relatively rapid creation of new rules, new patterns of conduct and new compliance mechanisms. Indeed, if there is one paramount characteristic of modern international law, it is the development and reach of international institutions, whether universal or

global, regional or subregional. The predominant theory for international organisations has been that of functionalism since their existence and operation has been conditioned by the requirement to fulfil a defined function or role, constitutionally circumscribed, and descriptive of the relations between the particular organisation and its members. However, this theory has limitations in terms of explaining the impact upon third parties of international organisations.⁹

The range of international organisations may be broadly defined into those of a universal character and those of a regional character. In so far as the former are concerned, the prime examples have been the creation of the League of Nations in 1919¹⁰ and the United Nations in 1945.¹¹ Associated with the United Nations are the specialised agencies. These are organisations established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities in economic, social, cultural and other fields that have been brought into relationship with the United Nations.¹² They are capable of making binding decisions. Examples include the International Labour Organization (established in 1919 to protect and extend the rights of workers), UNESCO (the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization established to further the increase and diffusion of knowledge by various activities, including technical assistance and cooperative ventures with national governments) and the World Health Organization (established in 1946 with the aim of unifying the standards of health care).¹³ On the economic side, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD – the World Bank) emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 to encourage financial investment, and it works in close liaison with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which aims to assist monetary

cooperation and increase world trade. A state can only become a member of the World Bank if it is an IMF member. The plenary organ of these agencies is the Board of Governors and the executive organs are the Executive Directors. These agencies, based in Washington, DC, are assisted by the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which are affiliated to the World Bank and encourage financial investment and the obtaining of loans on easy terms. These financial organisations differ from the rest of the specialised agencies in that authority lies with the Board of Governors, and voting is determined on a weighted basis according to the level of subscriptions made. Very important decisions require the consent of 70 to 85 per cent of the votes. The IBRD, IDA and IFC together with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency constitute the ‘World Bank Group’.¹⁴

A number of international economic arrangements and institutions (not being specialised agencies) of increasing importance have been established. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)¹⁵ arose out of an international conference held at Havana in 1947–48, involving a series of tariff concessions and trade rules, and this originally temporary instrument continued. The arrangement operated on the basis of a bilateral approach to trade negotiations coupled with unconditional acceptance of the most-favoured-nation principle (by which the most favourable benefits obtained by one state are passed on to other states), although there were special conditions for developing states in this respect. The World Trade Organization was established on 1 January 1995 as a permanent institution with its own secretariat.¹⁶ The organisation’s main aims are to administer and implement the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements together making up the

WTO, to act as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations, to try and settle trade disputes and to oversee national trade policies.

The proliferation of regional institutions, linking together geographically and ideologically related states, since the close of the Second World War, has been noticeable. A number of factors can help explain this. The onset of the Cold War and the failure of the Security Council's enforcement procedures stimulated the growth of regional defence alliances (such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and bloc politics. The decolonisation process resulted in the independence of scores of states, most of which were eager to play a non-aligned role between East and West, and the rise of globalisation has meant that all states form part of one economic trading system and can no longer individually function effectively, thus precipitating the evolution of regional economic arrangements.

It is in Europe that regionalism became most developed institutionally. The establishment of the European Economic Community (thereafter European Union), in particular, was intended to lay the basis for a resurgent Europe with meaningful economic and political integration.¹⁷ It has developed to become a major regional organisation with significant supranational components. Consisting originally of three interlocking communities (the European Coal and Steel Community 1951, the European Atomic Energy Community 1957 and the European Economic Community 1957), the European Union aims at establishing a single unified market with common external tariffs and the elimination of internal tariffs and quotas, and it promotes the free movement of capital and labour. The agreements currently in force are the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of

the European Union, the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.¹⁸ The membership of the Union now stands at twenty-seven since the withdrawal of the United Kingdom at the end of January 2020.¹⁹ The institutions of the Union comprise primarily the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Court of Justice.

The Council of Europe was created in 1949 with wide-ranging cooperative aims.²⁰ There are currently forty-seven member states. The Council comprises the Committee of Ministers, consisting of governmental representatives, and the Parliamentary Assembly, composed of members representing the Parliaments of the member states. The most important part of the work of the Council of Europe is the preparation and conclusion of conventions and protocols.²¹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)²² was created in 1949 to counter possible threats from the Soviet Union. It associated the United States and Canada with fourteen European powers for the protection, in essence, of Western Europe (although Greece and Turkey are also involved). By the Treaty,²³ the parties agreed to consult where the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them has been threatened,²⁴ and accepted that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America should be considered an attack against all.²⁵ The alliance (now comprising twenty-eight states) consists of a Council, which is the supreme organ and on which all members are represented, and a NATO parliamentary conference (the North Atlantic Assembly), which acts as an official consultative body.²⁶ The Commonwealth of Independent States was established by an Agreement

signed by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in Minsk on 8 December 1991, to which eight other former republics of the Soviet Union adhered at Alma Ata on 21 December that year. Georgia joined in 1993, so that the organisation now comprises all the former Soviet republics apart from the three Baltic states. The organisation is based on respect for the territorial integrity of member states; and member states agreed to maintain and retain under joint command, a common military and strategic space, including joint control over nuclear weapons. It was also agreed to establish common coordinating institutions.²⁷ The CIS adopted a Charter in Minsk in January 1993.²⁸ Under this Charter, the Commonwealth is expressed to be based on the sovereign equality of its members, who are independent subjects of international law. It is expressly stated that the CIS is not a state nor does it possess supranational powers.²⁹ The supreme organ is the Council of Heads of State, while the Council of Heads of Government has a coordinating role.³⁰ Decisions of both Councils are to be achieved by common consent.³¹

The Organization of American States emerged after the Second World War and built upon the work already done by the Pan-American Union and the various inter-American Conferences since 1890.³² It consists of two basic treaties: the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), which is a collective self-defence system, and the 1948 Pact of Bogotá, which is the original Charter of the OAS and which was amended in 1967 by the Buenos Aires Protocol, in 1985 by the Cartagena de Indias Protocol and by the 1992 Washington Protocol and the 1993 Managua Protocol. There are currently thirty-five member states. The OAS is a collective security system, an attack on one being deemed an attack on all. The organisation consists of: a General Assembly, the supreme organ, which

is a plenary organ with wide terms of reference; meetings of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which exercise broad powers; a Permanent Council, which performs both secretarial supervision and political functions, subject to the authority of the aforementioned institutions; and a number of subsidiary organs.³³

The Arab League was created in 1944 and has broad aims.³⁴ The Council of the League is the supreme organ and performs a useful conciliatory role; and various subsidiary organs dealing with economic, cultural and social issues have been set up. Its headquarters are in Tunisia, having been moved there from Egypt after the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. There is also a permanent secretariat and a Secretary-General. The Council of the League has been involved in the peacekeeping operations in Kuwait in 1961, where an Inter-Arab Force was established to deter Iraqi threats, and in Lebanon in 1976 as an umbrella for the operations of the Syrian troops.³⁵

The Organisation of African Unity was established in 1963 in Ethiopia and was replaced by the African Union in 2001.³⁶ The Constitutive Act of the Union lists a series of objectives in article 3 and these include: the achieving of greater unity between African countries; defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states; the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent and of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments; and the promotion of sustainable development. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act sets out the Principles of the Union and these include: respect of borders existing on achievement of independence; establishment of a common defence policy for

the African continent; peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states; and the prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among member states of the Union. Interestingly, in addition to the emphasis on territorial integrity, the Principles also provide for the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; and the right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.³⁷ Also included are respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, and condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments. The organs of the Union include: an Assembly, the supreme organ of the Union, composed of heads of state or government or their representatives, which sets the common policy of the Union; an Executive Council, composed of foreign or other ministers, which coordinates and takes decisions on policies in areas of common interest to the member states, such as foreign trade, water resources and energy; the Pan-African Parliament; and the Court of Justice, the jurisdiction of which comprises the application and interpretation of the Act and which is currently being merged with the African Court of Human Rights.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967.³⁸ It possesses economic, political and cultural aims and groups together Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In 1976, three agreements were signed: a Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to peace and dealt with the peaceful settlement of disputes; the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which called for increased political and economic

coordination and cooperation; and the Agreement of Establishment of the Permanent Secretariat to coordinate the national secretariats established under the 1967 ASEAN Declaration. In 1987, the Protocol amending the Treaty of Amity was signed, under which countries outside the ASEAN region could accede to the treaty. A number of economic agreements have also been signed, ranging from the Manila Declaration of 1987 to the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Co-operation 1992 and the decision to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area within fifteen years utilising a Common Effective Preferential Tariff scheme. In 2003, ASEAN Concord II was signed, establishing the ASEAN Security Community, Economic Community and Socio-Cultural Community,³⁹ and on 20 November 2007 the ASEAN Charter was adopted. In 2012, the Declaration on Human Rights was adopted,⁴⁰ and, in 2015, the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children was signed.

Some Legal Aspects of International Organisations⁴¹

There is no doubt that the contribution to international law generally made by the increasing number and variety of international organisations is marked. In many fields, the practice of international organisations has had an important effect and one that is often not sufficiently appreciated. In addition, state practice within such organisations is an increasingly significant element within the general process of customary law formation. This is particularly true with regard to the United Nations, with its universality of membership and extensive field of activity and interest, although not all such practice will be capable of transmission into customary law, and particular care will have to be exercised with regard to the *opinio juris*, or binding criterion.⁴²

As well as the impact of the practice of international organisations upon international law, it is worth noting the importance of international legal norms within the operations of such organisations. The norms in question guide the work and development of international institutions and may act to correct illegal acts.⁴³ International organisations have in the past been defined in international treaties simply as ‘inter-governmental organisations’ in order to demonstrate that the key characteristic of such groupings is that their membership comprises states.⁴⁴ However, the International Law Commission in article 2 of its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations adopted in 2011 refers to ‘an organisation established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its

own legal personality', while noting that international organisations 'may include as members, in addition to states, other entities'.⁴⁵ Amerasinghe refers to organisations 'normally created by a treaty or convention to which states are parties and the members of the organisation so created are generally states' and points to basic characteristics such as establishment by international agreement among states, possession of a constitution, possession of organs separate from its members, establishment under international law, and either exclusive or predominant membership of states or governments.⁴⁶

One may therefore distinguish public international organisations that are the subject of this chapter, from private or non-governmental organisations and from international public companies.⁴⁷ The former may have a wide-ranging, open or universal membership (such as the United Nations and the specialised agencies) or may have a limited or closed membership (such as the African Union or the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). Organisations may have a wider or narrower range of functions, depending upon their constitution, with the United Nations as a good example of the former and the World Health Organization as a good example of the latter. Whether a grouping will be regarded as an international organisation will depend essentially upon whether it in fact possesses some or all of the criteria noted above.

Personality⁴⁸

The role of international organisations in the world order centres on their possession of international legal personality as distinct from, and in addition to, personality under domestic law. Once this is established, they become subjects of international law and thus capable of enforcing rights and duties upon the international plane as distinct from operating merely within the confines of separate municipal jurisdictions. Not all arrangements by which two or more states cooperate will necessarily establish separate legal personality. The International Court of Justice in *Certain Phosphate Lands (Nauru v. Australia)*⁴⁹ noted that the arrangements under which Australia, New Zealand and the United Nations became the joint 'Administering Authority' for Nauru in the Trusteeship Agreement approved by the United Nations in 1947 did not establish a separate international legal personality distinct from that of the states.

The question of personality will in the first instance depend upon the terms of the instrument establishing the organisation. If states wish the organisation to be endowed specifically with international personality, this will appear in the constituent treaty and will be determinative of the issue.⁵⁰ But this actually occurs in only a minority of cases. However, personality on the international plane may be inferred from the powers or purposes of the organisation and its practice.⁵¹ This is the more usual situation and one authoritatively discussed and settled (at least as far as the United Nations was concerned directly) by the International Court in the *Reparation for Injuries* case.⁵² The Court held that the United Nations had international legal personality because this was

indispensable in order to achieve the purposes and principles specified in the Charter. In other words, it was a necessary inference from the functions and rights the organisation was exercising and enjoying. The Court emphasised that it had to be:

acknowledged that its [i.e. UN's] members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged.⁵³

The possession of international personality meant that the organisation was a subject of international law and capable of having international rights and duties and of enforcing them by bringing international claims. In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the UN Charter and subsequent relevant treaties and practice to determine the constitutional nature of the United Nations and the extent of its powers and duties. It noted the obligations of members towards the organisation, its ability to make international agreements and the provisions of the Charter contained in Articles 104 and 105, whereby the United Nations was to enjoy such legal capacity, privileges and immunities in the territory of each member state as were necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

The Court emphasised that:

fifty states, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had the power in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality recognised by them alone.⁵⁴

Accordingly, the Court derived the objective international legal personality of the United Nations from the intention of the members, either directly or implicitly. Such personality was objective in the sense that it could be maintained as against non-members as well, of course, as against members. Objective personality is not dependent upon prior recognition by the non-member concerned and would seem to flow rather from the nature and functions of the organisation itself. It may be that the number of states members of the organisation in question is relevant to the issue of objective personality, but it is not determinative.⁵⁵

The attribution of international legal personality to an international organisation is therefore important in establishing that organisation as an entity operating directly upon the international stage rather than obliging the organisation to function internationally through its member states, who may number in the tens of dozens or more. The latter situation inevitably leads to considerable complication in the reaching of agreements, as well as causing problems with regard to enforcing the responsibility or claims of such organisations internationally. The question of the effect of international personality upon the liability of member states for problems affecting the organisation will be referred to later in this chapter.⁵⁶ However, one needs to

be careful not to confuse international with domestic legal personality. Many constituent instruments of international organisations expressly or impliedly provide that the organisation in question shall have personality in domestic law so as to enable it, for example, to contract or acquire or dispose of property or to institute legal proceedings in the local courts or to have the legal capacity necessary for the exercise of its functions.⁵⁷ Article 104 of the UN Charter itself provides that the United Nations ‘shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes’. Where such provisions exist, it follows that member states of the organisation have accepted an obligation to recognise such legal personality within their legal systems. How that may be achieved will vary from state to state and will depend upon the domestic legal system.⁵⁸

The issue also arises at this point as to whether states that are not parties to the treaty in question and thus not member states of the particular international organisation are obliged to recognise the personality of such organisation. This can be achieved either directly, by entering into an agreement with the organisation – a headquarters agreement permitting the establishment of the organisation within the jurisdiction is the obvious example⁵⁹ – or indirectly by virtue of the rules of private international law (or conflict of laws).

Of course, most international organisations need to operate within particular states and thus require that their personality be recognised not only within international law, but also within particular domestic law in order to be able to make and defend claims and generally to perform legal acts in domestic

law. This may be achieved in different ways. In many legal systems, a domestic court will determine the legal status and capacity of a legal person by reference to the applicable or proper law, which will in the case of international organisations be international law. Thus, if the organisation had personality under international law, this would suffice to establish personality under domestic law.⁶⁰ Indeed, in states where treaties form part of domestic law upon ratification by parliament, then domestic legal personality would be a consequence of becoming a party to an international agreement establishing an international organisation explicitly endowed with legal personality, such as the United Nations, for example.⁶¹

However, in the United Kingdom, the approach has been rather different since it adopts a dualist approach to international treaties, so that in order for such agreements to operate within the domestic system, express legislative incorporation is required.⁶² The International Organisations Act 1968⁶³ grants the legal capacity of a body corporate to any organisation declared by Order in Council to be an organisation of which the UK and one or more foreign states are members. The view taken by the House of Lords in the *Tin* case⁶⁴ was that the legal effect of the Order in Council of 1972 concerning the International Tin Council (ITC) was to create the ITC as a legal person separate and distinct from its members, since ‘as an international legal persona [it] had no status under the laws of the United Kingdom’.⁶⁵ In other words, without such legislative action, an international organisation would have no legal existence in the United Kingdom. There is an exception to this strict approach and that is where the organisation has been granted legal personality in another country. The case of *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No. 3)*⁶⁶ concerned the attempt by the AMF to bring an action before the

English courts to recover funds allegedly embezzled. The relevant constituent treaty of 1976 between a number of Arab states gave the AMF ‘independent juridical personality’ and a decree was adopted in Abu Dhabi giving the organisation independent legal status and the capacity to sue and be sued in UAE law. There was, however, no Order in Council under the International Organisations Act 1968 giving the AMF legal personality within the United Kingdom. The Court of Appeal took the view that the Decision of the House of Lords in the *Tin* case⁶⁷ meant that the ordinary conflict of laws rules allowing recognition of an entity created under foreign law could not be applied to an organisation established under international law, since this would apparently circumvent the principle that an international organisation with legal personality created outside the jurisdiction would not have capacity to sue in England without a relevant authorising Order in Council.⁶⁸

The House of Lords, however, by a majority of four to one, expressed the opinion that the majority of the Court of Appeal had felt inhibited by observations made in the *Tin* cases and that the latter cases had not affected the principles that the recognition of a foreign state was a matter for the Crown and that if a foreign state is recognised by the Crown, the UK courts would recognise the corporate bodies created by that state. The House of Lords noted that the UK courts could indeed recognise an international organisation as a separate entity by comity provided that the entity was created by one or more of the member states.⁶⁹

In other words, in the United Kingdom, an international organisation can be recognised as having personality by one of several methods: first, where Parliament has by legislation incorporated an international treaty establishing

such an organisation;⁷⁰ secondly, where the executive expressly recognises an international organisation;⁷¹ thirdly, where an Order in Council under the International Organisations Act so provides; and, fourthly, where the courts by virtue of comity recognise an international organisation that has personality in one or more of the member states.⁷² It is an approach that is not without some difficulty, not least because of the implication that an international organisation not the subject of a UK Order in Council and not incorporated in the domestic law of member states may not be recognised as having personality in the United Kingdom, even though there exists an international treaty establishing such an international organisation with international personality. On the other hand, to argue that an international organisation has legal personality solely due to the fact that it has legal personality within the domestic law of another country which is thus to be applied in the United Kingdom due to conflict of law rules poses its own problems. However, the Court in *Westland Helicopters Ltd v. Arab Organization for Industrialisation*⁷³ held that the law governing the status and capacities of such an organisation was international law.

To state that an international organisation has international personality does not dispose of the question of what such personality entails. While the attribution of international personality to an organisation endows it with a separate identity, distinct from its constituent elements, the consequences of such personality will vary according to the circumstances. Whereas all international legal persons will have some rights and duties (and by definition rights and duties distinct from those of the members of the organisation), they will not all have the same capacities.⁷⁴ The question of how such rights and duties may be enforced or maintained will also depend upon the

circumstances. States are recognised as possessing the widest range of rights and duties; those of international organisations are clearly circumscribed in terms of express powers laid down in the constituent instruments or implied powers necessarily derived therefrom or otherwise evolved through practice.⁷⁵ The International Court emphasised that the attribution of international personality to the United Nations, for example, was not the same thing as declaring the United Nations to be a state, nor that its legal personality and rights and duties were the same as those of a state. By the same token, it did not mean that the United Nations was a ‘super-state’.⁷⁶ The Court declared that UN personality involved the competence to possess and maintain rights and the capacity to enforce them on the international stage.⁷⁷ Accordingly, whereas states would possess the totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law, ‘the rights and duties of an entity such as the [UN] Organisation must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice’.⁷⁸ Precisely which powers and capacities are involved will in reality therefore depend upon a careful analysis of the organisation itself, including the relationship of such powers and capacities to the stated purposes and duties of that organisation.

The Constituent Instruments⁷⁹

International organisations are expressly created by states by formal decision as laid down in their constituent instruments. The very nature, status and authority of such organisations will therefore depend primarily upon the terms of the constituent instruments or constitutions under which they are established. Such instruments have a dual provenance. They constitute multilateral treaties, since they are binding agreements entered into by states parties, and as such fall within the framework of the international law of treaties.⁸⁰ But such agreements are multilateral treaties possessing a special character since they are also methods of creation of new subjects of international law. This dual nature has an impact most clearly in the realm of interpretation of the basic documents of the organisation.⁸¹ This was clearly brought out in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (requested by the World Health Organization) in *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*. The Court declared that:

The constituent instruments of international organisations are also treaties of a particular type; their object is to create new subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy, to which the parties entrust the task of realising common goals. Such treaties can raise specific problems of interpretation owing, *inter alia*, to their character which is conventional and at the same time institutional; the very nature of the

organisation created, the objectives which have been assigned to it by its founder, the imperatives associated with the effective performance of its functions, as well as its own practice, are all elements which may deserve special attention when the time comes to interpret these constituent treaties.⁸²

Accordingly, one needs to consider the special nature of the constituent instruments as forming not only multilateral agreements, but also constitutional documents subject to constant practice, and thus interpretation, both of the institution itself and of member states and others in relation to it. In the first instance, it will usually be for the organs of the institution to interpret the relevant constituent instruments and to determine, for example, their own jurisdiction.⁸³ In some cases, the constituent instruments themselves will determine the organ with the power of interpretation and may provide the methods and mechanisms for resolving interpretation disputes.⁸⁴ Occasionally, a court or tribunal will be established with such a competence. For example, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea can interpret the Law of the Sea Convention⁸⁵ and the European Court of Justice can interpret the EU treaties and instruments.⁸⁶ In so far as the United Nations is concerned, the Security Council and General Assembly may request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, as may other organs of the organisation and specialised agencies where authorised by the General Assembly with regard to a question within the scope of their activities.⁸⁷ The constituent instruments of some organisations provide for binding final determination by the International Court using advisory proceedings, that is,

organisations in such situations agree to accept the advisory opinion as binding.⁸⁸ In addition, article XIX, section 32, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies 1947 provides that differences between a specialised agency and a member arising out of the interpretation or the application of the Convention are to be submitted to the International Court under the advisory procedure contained in article 96 of the Charter and article 65 of the ICJ Statute and the opinion thus obtained is to be treated as decisive by the parties.⁸⁹ In addition, the constituent instrument may provide for a right of appeal from the decision of the relevant body to the International Court regarding a dispute between two or more contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention which cannot be settled by negotiation.⁹⁰ This raises the question as to the limited jurisdiction of the body in question, which is necessarily tied to the questions relating to the interpretation and application of the founding treaty of that body or organisation. The issue was considered in *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar)*.⁹¹ This was an appeal by the applicants against a jurisdictional decision of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organisation on the grounds, primarily, that their defences to the action brought by Qatar concerned issues outside the jurisdiction of the Council, being countermeasures and the alleged illegal act by Qatar precipitating the measures in question. The Court held that the fact that the defence had been cast in a particular way could not affect the competence of the tribunal or organ concerned⁹² and affirmed that the integrity of the Council's dispute settlement function would not be affected if the Council examined issues outside of civil aviation matters for the exclusive purpose of deciding a dispute that fell within its jurisdiction.⁹³

In contentious cases, the International Court may need to interpret the constituent instruments of an international organisation, including the UN Charter itself, where this is relevant to the determination of the issue at hand.⁹⁴ In rare situations, an international tribunal may be required to interpret the constitution of an international organisation where it is examining its own jurisdiction.⁹⁵

The fact that the constituent instruments of international organisations are invariably multilateral agreements means that the process of their interpretation will be governed by articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.⁹⁶ However, such agreements are of a special nature since they also form the constitutions of international organisations⁹⁷ and this argues for a more flexible or purpose-orientated method of interpretation. Rather less attention than would be the case in the interpretation of normal treaties is paid to the intentions of the original framers and the *travaux préparatoires* (negotiating materials) and rather more to the principle of effectiveness in the light of the object and purposes of the agreement in question.⁹⁸ Because constitutions are ‘living instruments’ in constant use in order to carry out the purposes of the organisation in changing and developing circumstances, subsequent practice is of particular importance in the context of interpretation.⁹⁹ The International Court has relied upon the subsequent practice of international organisations in a number of cases, although usually to support an interpretation already reached by the Court.¹⁰⁰

The Powers of International Organisations¹⁰¹

International organisations are unlike states that possess a general competence as subjects of international law.¹⁰² They are governed by the principle of speciality, so that, as the International Court has noted, ‘they are invested by the states which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those states entrust to them’.¹⁰³ Such powers may be expressly laid down in the constituent instruments or may arise subsidiarily as implied powers,¹⁰⁴ being those deemed necessary for fulfilment of the functions of the particular organisation. The test of validity for such powers has been variously expressed. The International Court noted in the *Reparation for Injuries* case that:¹⁰⁵

Under international law the organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.¹⁰⁶

In *Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the UN Administrative Tribunal*,¹⁰⁷ the Court held that the General Assembly could validly establish an administrative tribunal in the absence of an express power since the capacity to do this arose ‘by necessary intendment’ out of the Charter, while in *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*,¹⁰⁸ the Court declared that ‘when

the organisation takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not *ultra vires* the organisation'. The tests posited therefore have ranged from powers arising by 'necessary implication as being essential to the performance' of constitutionally laid-down duties, to those arising 'by necessary intendment' out of the constituent instrument, to those deemed 'appropriate for the fulfilment' of constitutionally authorised purposes of the organisation. There are clearly variations of emphasis in such formulations.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, although the functional test is determinative, it operates within the framework of those powers expressly conferred by the constitution of the organisation. Thus, any attempt to infer a power that was inconsistent with an express power would fail, although there is clearly an area of ambiguity here.¹¹⁰ In *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*,¹¹¹ the Court noted that the World Health Organization had under article 2 of its Constitution adopted in 1946 the competence 'to deal with the effects on health of the use of nuclear weapons, or any other hazardous activity, and to take preventive measures aimed at protecting the health of populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in'.¹¹² However, the Court concluded that the question asked of it related not to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of such weapons in view of their health and environmental effects. Whatever those effects might be, the competence of the WHO to deal with them was not dependent upon the legality of the acts that caused them. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, in the light of the WHO Constitution as properly interpreted, the organisation had not been granted the competence to address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons and that therefore the competence

to request an advisory opinion did not exist since the question posed was not one that could be considered as arising ‘within the scope of . . . activities’ of the WHO as required by article 96(2) of the UN Charter.¹¹³

So far as the International Court itself is concerned, it has held that it possesses ‘an inherent jurisdiction enabling it to take such action as may be required, on the one hand to ensure that the exercise of its jurisdiction over the merits, if and when established, shall not be frustrated, and on the other, to provide for the orderly settlement of all matters in dispute, to ensure the observance of the “inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function” of the Court, and to “maintain its judicial character”’.¹¹⁴

Of great importance is the question of the capacity of international organisations to conclude international treaties.¹¹⁵ This will primarily depend upon the constituent instrument, since the existence of legal personality is on its own probably insufficient to ground the competence to enter into international agreements.¹¹⁶ Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 1986 provides that: ‘The capacity of an international organisation to conclude treaties is governed by the rules of that organisation.’ This is a wider formulation than reliance solely upon the constituent instrument and permits recourse to issues of implied powers, interpretation and subsequent practice. It was noted in the commentary of the International Law Commission that the phrase ‘the rules of the organisation’ meant, in addition to the constituent instruments,¹¹⁷ relevant decisions and resolutions and the established practice of the organisation.¹¹⁸ Accordingly, demonstration of treaty-making capacity will revolve around the competences of the organisation as demonstrated in each

particular case by reference to the constituent instruments, evidenced implied powers and subsequent practice.

The Applicable Law¹¹⁹

International institutions are established by states by means of international treaties. Such instruments fall to be interpreted and applied within the framework of international law. Accordingly, as a general rule, the applicable or 'proper' or 'personal' law of international organisations is international law.¹²⁰ In addition, the organisation in question may well have entered into treaty relationships with particular states, for example, in the case of a headquarters agreement, and these relationships will also be governed by international law. Those matters that will necessarily (in the absence of express provision to the contrary) be governed by international law will include questions as to the existence, constitution, status, membership and representation of the organisation.¹²¹

However, the applicable law in particular circumstances may be domestic law. Thus, where the organisation is purchasing or leasing land or entering into contracts for equipment or services, such activities will normally be subject to the appropriate national law. Tortious liability as between the organisation and a private individual will generally be subject to domestic law, but tortious activity may be governed by international law depending upon the circumstances, for example, where there has been damage to the property of an international organisation by the police or armed forces of a state. The internal law of the organisation will cover matters such as employment relations, the establishment and functioning of subsidiary organs

and the management of administrative services.¹²² The internal law of an organisation, which includes the constituent instruments and subsidiary regulations and norms and any relevant contractual arrangements, may in reality be seen as a specialised and particularised part of international law, since it is founded upon agreements that draw their validity and applicability from the principles of international law.

The Responsibility of International Organisations¹²³

The establishment of an international organisation with international personality results in the formation of a new legal person, separate and distinct from that of the states creating it. This separate and distinct personality necessarily imports consequences as to international responsibility, both to and by the organisation. The International Court noted in the *Reparation for Injuries* case, for example, that¹²⁴ ‘when an infringement occurs, the organisation should be able to call upon the responsible state to remedy its default, and, in particular, to obtain from the state reparation for the damage that the default may have caused’ and emphasised that there existed an ‘undeniable right of the organization to demand that its members shall fulfil the obligations entered into by them in the interest of the good working of the organization’.¹²⁵ Responsibility is a necessary consequence of international personality and the resulting possession of international rights and duties. Such rights and duties may flow from treaties, such as headquarters agreements,¹²⁶ or from the principles of customary international law.¹²⁷ The precise nature of responsibility will depend upon the circumstances of the case and, no doubt, analogies drawn from the law of state responsibility with regard to the conditions under which responsibility will be imposed, although some caution should be exercised here since there is a fundamental conceptual difference between states and international organisations.¹²⁸ In brief, one can note the following. The basis of international responsibility is the breach of an international obligation¹²⁹ and such obligations will depend upon the situation. The Court noted in the *Reparation for Injuries* case¹³⁰ that the obligations entered into by member

states to enable UN agents to perform their duties were obligations owed to the organisation. Thus, the organisation has, in the case of a breach of such obligations, ‘the capacity to claim adequate reparation, and that in assessing this reparation it is authorised to include the damage suffered by the victim or by persons entitled through him’. Whereas the right of a state to assert a claim on behalf of a victim is predicated upon the link of nationality, in the case of an international organisation, the necessary link relates to the requirements of the organisation and therefore the fact that the victim was acting on behalf of the organisation in exercising one of the functions of that organisation. As the Court noted, ‘the organization . . . possesses a right of functional protection in respect of its agents’.¹³¹

Just as a state can be held responsible for injury to an organisation, so can the organisation be held responsible for injury to a state, where the injury arises out of a breach by the organisation of an international obligation deriving from a treaty provision or principle of customary international law.¹³²

Analogies may be drawn from the general rules relating to state responsibility with regard to the conditions under which responsibility is imposed. For example, the conduct of an organ or an agent of an international organisation in the performance of the functions of that organ or agent (including officials and other persons or entities through whom the organisation acts) is considered as an act of the organisation, irrespective of the position actually held by the organ or agent and even if the conduct exceeds the authority of that organ or agent.¹³³ An international organisation which aids or assists a state or another international organisation in the commission of an internationally wrongful act will itself bear international responsibility where the organisation knew the circumstances of the wrongful act and the act

would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organisation.¹³⁴ As in the case of states, international organisations may benefit from the precluding of responsibility in particular circumstances, such as consent by a state or an international organisation to the commission of the act or where the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence in conformity with international law.¹³⁵ An international organisation responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to cease that act and to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition (if circumstances so require) and to make full reparation for the injury caused.¹³⁶

The issue of responsibility has particularly arisen in the context of UN peacekeeping operations and liability for the activities of the members of such forces. In such circumstances, the United Nations has accepted responsibility and offered compensation for wrongful acts.¹³⁷ The crucial issue will be whether the wrongful acts in question are imputable to the United Nations and this has not been accepted where the offenders were under the jurisdiction of the national state, rather than under that of the United Nations. Much will depend upon the circumstances of the operation in question and the nature of the link between the offenders and the United Nations and between the United Nations and the national state of the offenders. It appears, for example, to have been accepted that in the Korean (1950) and Kuwait (1990) operations, the relationship between the national forces and the United Nations was such as to preclude the latter's responsibility. The focus would now appear to be on the nature of effective control as exercised or not by the United Nations with regard to the offender.¹³⁸

While responsibility will exist for internationally unlawful acts attributable to the institution in question, tortious liability may also arise for injurious consequences caused by lawful activities – for example, environmental damage as a result of legitimate space activities.¹³⁹ In the context of often unclear divisions of responsibility between the United Nations itself and states contributing troops for peacekeeping purposes, particularly serious issues have also arisen with regard to allegations of sexual misconduct by UN peacekeepers. Because military members of national contingents are not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the host state, the model Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the state where the peacekeeping force was to be stationed envisaged that the Secretary-General would obtain formal assurances from the troop-contributing country concerned that it would exercise jurisdiction with regard to crimes that might be committed by its forces in the mission area. However, this has not been the practice. It has recently been recommended that peacekeeping operations should be accompanied by a memorandum of understanding which would include a provision to this effect.¹⁴⁰

Liability of Member States¹⁴¹

The relationship between the member states of an organisation and the organisation itself is often complex. The situation is further complicated upon a consideration of the position of third states (or organisations) prejudiced by the activities of the organisation. The starting point for any analysis is the issue of legal personality. An international organisation created by states that does not itself possess legal personality cannot be the bearer of rights or obligations separate and distinct from those of the member states. It therefore follows that such organisations cannot be interposed as between the injured third parties and the member states of that organisation. In such cases, any liability for the debts or delicts attributable to the organisation causing harm to third parties would fall upon the member states.¹⁴² Where, however, the organisation does possess legal personality, the situation is different. Separate personality implies liability for activities entered into. The question of the liability of member states to third parties may arise subsidiarily and poses some difficulty. Such a question falls to be decided by the rules of international law not least since it is consequential upon a determination of personality which is in the case of international organisations governed by international law.¹⁴³ The problem is also to be addressed in the context of the general principle of international law that treaties do not create obligations for third states without their consent (*pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt*).¹⁴⁴ By virtue of this rule, member states would not be responsible for breaches of agreements between organisations and other parties.

The problems faced by the International Tin Council during 1985–86 are instructive in this context.¹⁴⁵ The ITC, created in 1956, conducted its activities in accordance with successive international tin agreements, which aimed to regulate the tin market by virtue of export controls and the establishment of buffer stocks of tin financed by member states. The Sixth International Tin Agreement of 1982 brought together twenty-three producer and consumer states and the EEC. In October 1985, the ITC announced that it had run out of funds and credit and the London Metal Exchange suspended trading in tin. Since the ITC member states refused to guarantee the debts of the organisation and since proposals to create a successor organisation to the ITC collapsed, serious questions were posed as to legal liabilities. The ITC was a corporate entity enjoying a measure of legal immunity in the United Kingdom as a result of the International Tin Council (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1972. It had immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts except in cases of enforcement of an arbitral award. The ITC Headquarters Agreement provided that contracts entered into with a person or company resident in the United Kingdom were to contain an arbitration clause. It was also the case that where a specific agreement provided for a waiver of immunity by the organisation, the courts would have jurisdiction.¹⁴⁶ Accordingly, the immunity from suit of the ITC was by no means unlimited.

A variety of actions were commenced by the creditors, of which the most important was the direct action. Here, a number of banks and brokers proceeded directly against the Department of Trade and Industry of the British government and other members of the ITC on the argument that they were liable on contracts concluded by the ITC.¹⁴⁷ The issues were argued at length in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords.¹⁴⁸ The main

submission¹⁴⁹ for present purposes was that the ITC members and the organisation were liable concurrently for the debts under both English and international law. It was argued that under international law members of an international organisation bear joint and several liability for its debts unless the constituent treaty expressly excludes such liability. Although there had been hints of such an approach earlier¹⁵⁰ and treaty practice had been far from consistent, Lord Templeman noted that ‘no plausible evidence was produced of the existence of such a rule of international law’¹⁵¹ and this, it is believed, correctly represents the current state of international law.¹⁵² The liability of a member state could arise, of course, either through an express provision¹⁵³ in the constituent instruments of the organisation providing for the liability of member states or where the organisation was in fact under the direct control of the state concerned or acted as its agent in law and in fact, or by virtue of unilateral undertakings or guarantee by the state in the particular circumstances.¹⁵⁴

There may, however, be instances where the liability of member states is engaged. For example, in *Matthews v. United Kingdom*, the European Court of Human Rights stated that the European Convention on Human Rights did not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations ‘provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured”. Member states’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer.’¹⁵⁵ Similarly, where the member state acts together with an international organisation in the commission of an unlawful act, then it too will be liable.¹⁵⁶

The Accountability of International Organisations

The concept of accountability is broader than the principles of responsibility and liability for internationally wrongful acts and rests upon the notion that the lawful application of power imports accountability for its exercise. Such accountability will necessarily range across legal, political, administrative and financial forms and essentially create a regulatory and behavioural framework. In such a context, particular attention should be devoted to the principle of good governance, which concerns the benchmarks of good administration and transparent conduct and monitoring; the principle of good faith; the principle of constitutionality and institutional balance, including acting within the scope of functions; the principle of supervision and control with regard to subsidiary organs; the principle of stating reasons for decisions; the principle of procedural regularity to prevent, *inter alia*, abuse of discretionary powers and errors of fact or law; the principle of objectivity and impartiality; and the principle of due diligence.¹⁵⁷ Most, if not all, international organisations will establish their own disciplinary and control procedures with regard to internal issues. The United Nations, for example, has produced Staff Rules and Staff Regulations,¹⁵⁸ and a revised mechanism for dealing with internal disputes and disciplinary matters commencing on 1 July 2009. This has created a two-tier judicial system with judges serving on the UN Dispute Tribunal and the UN Appeal Tribunal, both of which produce binding decisions.¹⁵⁹

Privileges and Immunities¹⁶⁰

In order to carry out their functions more effectively, states and their representatives benefit from a variety of privileges and immunities. International organisations will also be entitled to the grant of privileges and

immunities for their assets, properties and representatives. The two situations are not, of course, analogous in practice, since, for example, the basis of state immunities may be seen in terms of the sovereign equality of states and reciprocity, while this is not realistic with regard to organisations, both because they are not in a position of ‘sovereign equality’¹⁶¹ and because they are unable to grant (or withdraw) immunities as a reciprocal gesture. It is also the case that the immunities of states have been restricted in the light of the distinction between transactions *jure imperii* and *jure gestionis*,¹⁶² while any such distinction in the case of international organisations would be inappropriate.¹⁶³ The true basis for the immunities accorded to international organisations is that they are necessitated by the effective exercise of their functions. This, of course, will raise the question as to how one is to measure the level of immunities in the light of such functional necessity.

As far as the United Nations itself is concerned, article 105 of the Charter notes that:

- (1) The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
- (2) Representatives of the members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.¹⁶⁴

These general provisions have been supplemented by the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946, and by the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies

1947.¹⁶⁵ These general conventions, building upon provisions in the relevant constituent instruments, have themselves been supplemented by bilateral agreements, particularly the growing number of headquarters and host agreements. The United Nations, for example, has concluded headquarters agreements with the United States for the UN Headquarters in New York and with Switzerland for the UN Office in Geneva in 1947.¹⁶⁶ Such agreements, for example, provide for the application of local laws within the headquarters area subject to the application of relevant staff administrative regulations; the immunity of the premises and property of the organisation from search, requisition and confiscation and other forms of interference by the host state; exemption from local taxes except for utility charges and freedom of communication.¹⁶⁷

The International Court noted in *Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate*,¹⁶⁸ which concerned US anti-terrorism legislation necessitating the closure of the PLO Observer Mission to the United Nations in New York, that the United States was obliged to respect the obligation contained in section 21 of the UN Headquarters Agreement to enter into arbitration where a dispute had arisen concerning the interpretation and application of the Agreement. This was despite the US view that it was not certain a dispute had arisen, since the existence of an international dispute was a matter for objective determination.¹⁶⁹ The Court emphasised in particular that the provisions of a treaty prevail over the domestic law of a state party to that treaty.¹⁷⁰

It is clearly the functional approach rather than any representational argument that forms the theoretical basis for the recognition of privileges and

immunities with regard to international organisations. This point has been made in cases before domestic courts, but it is important to note that this concept includes the need for the preservation of the independence of the institution as against the state in whose territory it is operating. In *Mendaro v. World Bank*,¹⁷¹ for example, the US Court of Appeals held that the reason for the granting of immunities to international organisations was to enable them to pursue their functions more effectively and in particular to permit organisations to operate free from unilateral control by a member state over their activities within its territory. In *Iran–US Claims Tribunal v. AS*,¹⁷² the Dutch Supreme Court pointed to the ‘interest of the international organisation in having a guarantee that it will be able to perform its tasks independently and free from interferences under all circumstances’ and noted that ‘an international organisation is in principle not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the host state in respect of all disputes which are immediately connected with the performance of the tasks entrusted to the organisation in question’. The Italian Court of Cassation in *FAO v. INPDAI*¹⁷³ held that activities closely affecting the institutional purposes of the international organisation qualified for immunity, while the Employment Appeal Tribunal in *Mukuro v. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development*¹⁷⁴ stated that immunity from suit and legal process was justified on the ground that it was necessary for the fulfilment of the purposes of the bank in question, for the preservation of its independence and neutrality from control by or interference from the host state and for the effective and uninterrupted exercise of its multinational functions through its representatives. The Swiss Labour Court in *ZM v. Permanent Delegation of the League of Arab States to the UN* held that ‘customary international law recognised that international organisations, whether universal or regional, enjoy absolute jurisdictional

immunity . . . This privilege of international organisations arises from the purposes and functions assigned to them. They can only carry out their tasks if they are beyond the censure of the courts of member states or their headquarters.’¹⁷⁵

The issue of the immunity of international organisations came before the European Court of Human Rights in *Waite and Kennedy v. Germany*, where the applicants complained that by granting immunity to an international organisation in an employment dispute, Germany had violated the Convention right of free access to a court under article 6(1). The European Court, however, declared that the attribution of privileges and immunities to international organisations was ‘an essential means of ensuring the proper functioning of such organisations free from unilateral interference by individual governments’ and that the requirements of article 6 would be satisfied where there existed reasonable alternative means to protect effectively the rights in question under the Convention and a satisfactory system of dispute settlement in the relevant international instruments.¹⁷⁶ It may be that such alternative dispute settlement requirements are not essential where the relevant international agreement providing for the immunities in question pre-dated the European Convention on Human Rights, but this should be regarded as controversial.¹⁷⁷ Of some concern, however, is the situation revealed in *Behrami v. France*,¹⁷⁸ where the European Court of Human Rights held that since the various national forces constituting KFOR (the NATO-led armed force in Kosovo) operated under a general Security Council mandate (Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)), the respondent states could not be held responsible for alleged violations of the European Human Rights Convention, and that since KFOR had immunity by virtue of

UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) Regulation 2000/47,¹⁷⁹ there was thus no entity that could be held responsible for human rights violations in Kosovo. Immunity is critical to the working of international organisations, but in some circumstances it seems right and desirable that an effective alternative dispute settlement procedure be created.¹⁸⁰

The US Supreme Court in *Jam v. International Finance Corporation*,¹⁸¹ faced with the definition of immunities for international organisations as being the ‘same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments’ under the US International Organisations Immunities Act of 1945,¹⁸² held that the International Finance Corporation, part of the World Bank group tasked with working with the private sector in developing countries, was entitled only to the more limited form of immunities granted to foreign governments that currently existed and not to absolute immunity as had been the case when the Act had been adopted.¹⁸³

Connected with the question of immunity is the issue of UN responsibility which may thus be avoided or deflected. This has on occasion caused reputational damage to the organisation.¹⁸⁴ The example of the outbreak of cholera in Haiti is fortunately rare, but tragic. The disease spread from Nepalese troops, part of the UN peacekeeping forces on the island (the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH), occasioning the death of some 8,000 people and the illness of around 600,000 people in 2010.¹⁸⁵ Claims were filed on behalf of those affected, but were declared by the United Nations to be ‘not receivable’ as these involved political and policy matters, thus barring the claims from being heard by the United Nations’ dispute

resolution mechanisms.¹⁸⁶ The United Nations refused a request for compensation, relying upon its immunity.¹⁸⁷ Article VIII, section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946, does provide that the United Nations ‘shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of . . . Disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary-General’. However, failure to do this does not invalidate immunity.¹⁸⁸ This UN immunity does not preclude, of course, the exercise of jurisdiction by relevant states and the General Assembly has adopted resolutions¹⁸⁹ urging all states ‘to take all appropriate measures to ensure that crimes by United Nations officials and experts on mission do not go unpunished and that the perpetrators of such crimes are brought to justice, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities of such persons and the United Nations under international law, and in accordance with international human rights standards, including due process’, and urging states ‘to consider establishing, to the extent that they have not yet done so, jurisdiction over crimes, particularly those of a serious nature, as known in their existing national criminal laws, committed by their nationals while serving as United Nations officials or experts on mission, at least where the conduct as defined in the law of the state establishing jurisdiction also constitutes a crime under the laws of the host state’.

Immunities may be granted to the representatives of states to the organisation, to the officials of the organisation and to the organisation itself. As far as the position of representatives of states to international organisations is concerned, article IV, section 11, of the UN Convention 1946 provides for the following privileges and immunities:

- (a)** immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage, and in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, immunity from legal process of every kind;
- (b)** inviolability for all papers and documents;
- (c)** the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed bags;
- (d)** exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from immigration restrictions, alien registration or national service obligations in the state they are visiting or through which they are passing in the exercise of their functions;
- (e)** the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to representatives of foreign governments on temporary official missions;
- (f)** the same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal baggage as are accorded to diplomatic envoys; and also
- (g)** such other privileges, immunities and facilities not inconsistent with the foregoing as diplomatic envoys enjoy, except that they shall have no right to claim exemption from customs duties on goods imported (otherwise than as part of their personal baggage) or from excise duties or sales taxes.¹⁹⁰

in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the United Nations. Consequently a Member not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the

immunity of its representative in any case where in the opinion of the Member the immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded. Article IV, section 16 provides that the term 'representatives' is deemed to include 'all delegates, deputy delegates, advisers, technical experts and secretaries of delegations'. The question of the representation of states to international organisations is also dealt with in the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character, which is closely modelled on the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, although it has been criticised by a number of host states for permitting more extensive privileges and immunities than is required in the light of functional necessity.

See *DUSPIL*, 1975, pp. 38 ff. See also above, Chapter 12, p. 663.

One particular issue that has arisen and appears to have received no definitive determination relates to the competence of the host state under customary international law to seek unilaterally to withdraw the immunities of a state representative to an international organisation where relevant international agreements are unclear.¹⁹¹ The matter was the subject of an application to the

International Court of Justice by the Commonwealth of Dominica against Switzerland in 2006, complaining that the latter state had terminated the appointment of a Head of Mission accredited by the applicant to the United Nations and specialised agencies (but not to Switzerland).¹⁹² However, the application was subsequently withdrawn.¹⁹³

The question of the privileges and immunities of representatives, however, is invariably addressed in headquarters agreements between international organisations and host states. Article V, section 15 of the UN Headquarters Agreement 1947, for example, states that representatives¹⁹⁴ are entitled in US territory ‘to the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as it accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it’.¹⁹⁵ Secondly, privileges and immunities are granted to the officials of the organisation. Article V, section 18 of the UN Convention 1946 provides that UN officials are immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity; exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the United Nations; immune from national service obligations; and immune, together with their spouses and relatives dependent on them, from immigration restrictions and alien registration. They also have the right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first taking up their post in the country in question. In addition, the Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General are accorded in respect of themselves, their spouses and minor children, the privileges and immunities exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law.¹⁹⁶ Further, section 20 provides that privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the

individuals themselves. The Secretary-General has the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations. In the case of the Secretary-General, the Security Council shall have the right to waive immunity.

Experts performing missions for the United Nations are also granted a range of privileges and immunities, such as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions during the period of their missions, including the time spent on journeys in connection with their missions. In particular, they are accorded immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage; immunity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission; inviolability for all papers and documents; for the purpose of their communications with the United Nations, the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed bags; and the same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal baggage as are accorded to diplomatic envoys.¹⁹⁷

The question of the immunities of persons on mission for the United Nations has come before the International Court in a couple of cases. The International Court delivered an Advisory Opinion concerning the applicability of provisions in the UN Convention 1946 to Special Rapporteurs appointed by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities.¹⁹⁸ As noted above, article VI, section 22, of the Convention provides that experts performing missions for the United Nations are to be accorded such privileges and immunities as

are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions during the periods of their missions. The International Court noted that such privileges and immunities could indeed be invoked against the state of nationality or of residence¹⁹⁹ and that Special Rapporteurs for the Sub-Commission were to be regarded as experts on missions within the meaning of section 22.²⁰⁰ The privileges and immunities that would apply would be those that were necessary for the exercise of their functions, and in particular for the establishment of any contacts which may be useful for the preparation, drafting and presentation of their reports to the Sub-Commission.²⁰¹

The issue was revisited in the *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur* Advisory Opinion of the International Court which concerned the question of the immunity from legal process in Malaysia of Mr Cumaraswamy, a Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission of Human Rights on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers.²⁰² The Court confirmed that article VI, section 22 applied to Mr Cumaraswamy who, as Special Rapporteur, had been entrusted with a mission by the United Nations and was therefore an expert within the terms of the section. The Court held that he was entitled to immunity with regard to the words spoken by him during the course of an interview that was published in a journal and that, in deciding whether an expert on mission was entitled to immunity in particular circumstances, the UN Secretary-General had a ‘pivotal role’.²⁰³ The Court concluded by stating that the government of Malaysia had an obligation under article 105 of the Charter and under the UN Convention 1946 to inform its courts of the position taken by the Secretary-General. Failure to do so rendered the state liable under international law.²⁰⁴

Thirdly, privileges and immunities are granted to the organisation itself. The range of privileges and immunities usually extended includes immunity from jurisdiction; inviolability of premises and archives; currency and fiscal privileges; and freedom of communications.²⁰⁵ In the case of immunity from jurisdiction, article II, section 2 of the UN Convention 1946 provides that:

The United Nations, its property and assets
wherever located and by whomsoever held,
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal
process except insofar as in any particular case
it has expressly waived its immunity. It is,
however, understood that no waiver of
immunity shall extend to any measure of
execution.²⁰⁶

One question that has arisen is whether such immunity is absolute or, as is the case now with state immunity, a distinction between sovereign or public acts (*jure imperii*) on the one hand and private acts (*jure gestionis*) on the other can be drawn. However, the analogy with state immunity is inappropriate. International organisations do not exercise sovereign power nor is the theoretical basis of reciprocity arguable. International organisations are not states, but entities created in order to perform particular functions. In any event, relevant treaties do not make a distinction between sovereign or public acts and private acts in the case of international organisations and such a distinction cannot be inferred.²⁰⁷ Case-law indeed is generally consistent in accepting the absolute nature of UN immunity.²⁰⁸

It should also be noted that international organisations benefit from immunity from execution or enforcement, which means that their property or other assets cannot be seized, while a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction, which must be express, does not encompass a waiver of immunity from execution which would have to be given separately and expressly.²⁰⁹

Immunity will also cover inviolability of premises and archives.²¹⁰ This is particularly important for the effective operation of international organisations. Article II, section 3 of the UN Convention 1946, for example, provides that:

The premises of the United Nations shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the United Nations, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action,

while section 4 provides that: ‘The archives of the United Nations, and in general all documents belonging to it or held by it, shall be inviolable wherever located.’²¹¹ Similar provisions exist in all relevant agreements concerning international organisations. The inviolability of premises means that the authorities of a state cannot enter without the permission of the administrative head of the organisation even where a crime has been committed there or in order to arrest a person. Further, the host state is under

a duty of due diligence with regard to the protection of the premises in question. However, the premises remain under the general jurisdiction of the host state, subject to the immunity described. Accordingly, a crime committed on the premises may be prosecuted in the local courts.²¹²

Immunity also includes certain currency and fiscal privileges, such as exemption from direct taxation with regard to the assets, income and property of the organisation and from customs dues. Organisations may also be permitted to hold and transfer funds and other financial assets freely.²¹³ Freedom of official communications equal to that provided to foreign governments is also usually stipulated with regard to international organisations, including freedom from censorship, while the right to send and receive correspondence by courier and bag, on the same basis as diplomatic couriers and diplomatic bags, is also provided for.²¹⁴

International agreements concerning privileges and immunities have been implemented into domestic law by specific legislation in a number of states where there is no automatic incorporation of ratified treaties, examples being the UK International Organisations Act 1968²¹⁵ and the US International Organisations Immunities Act 1945.²¹⁶ The usual pattern under such legislation is for the general empowering provisions contained in those Acts to be applied to named international organisations by specific secondary acts. In the case of the International Organisations Act 1968, for example, a wide variety of organisations have had privileges and immunities conferred upon them by Order in Council.²¹⁷ In the case of the US Act, the same process is normally conducted by means of Executive Orders.²¹⁸

Withdrawal²¹⁹

Withdrawal by members from an international organisation is subject to provisions in the relevant constitution, which usually require prior notice.²²⁰ During this period of notice, the state concerned is free to revoke its notification.²²¹ In the case of the European Union, for example, article 50 of the Treaty on European Union provides for a two-year notice period in order to leave the organisation. On 29 March 2017, the United Kingdom made the required notification.²²² The United Kingdom withdrew from the Union as from 11.00 pm (UK time) on 31 January 2020.²²³ Withdrawal is invariably for political reasons, but such reasons may be coupled with concern over the operations of the organisation either generally, with regard, for example, to budgetary matters or specifically with regard to the organisation's approach to a particular member state or issue.²²⁴ Indonesia announced in January 1965 that it had decided to withdraw from the United Nations, but declared in September 1966 that it was resuming full cooperation with and participation in the work of the United Nations. The President of the General Assembly took this to mean that Indonesia had not actually withdrawn from the United Nations, but had temporarily ceased to cooperate with it. There was no objection to this statement.²²⁵

Dissolution²²⁶

The constitutions of some international organisations contain express provisions with regard to dissolution. Article VI(5) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), for example, provides for dissolution by a vote of the majority of Governors exercising a majority of total voting, and detailed provisions are made for consequential matters. Payment of creditors and claims, for instance, will have precedence over asset distribution, while the distribution of assets will take place on a proportional basis to shareholding. Different organisations with such express provisions take different positions with regard to the type of majority required for dissolution. In the case of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for example, a majority of two-thirds of the members and three-quarters of the total voting power is required. A simple majority vote is sufficient in the case of the International Monetary Fund, and a majority of member states coupled with a majority of votes is necessary in the case of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Where an organisation has been established for a limited period, the constitution will invariably provide for dissolution upon the expiry of that period.²²⁷ Where there are no specific provisions concerning dissolution, it is likely that an organisation may be dissolved by the decision of its highest representative body.²²⁸ The League of Nations, for example, was dissolved by a decision taken by the Assembly without the need for individual assent by each member²²⁹ and a similar process was adopted with regard to other organisations.²³⁰ It is unclear whether unanimity is needed or whether the degree of majority required under the constitution of the

particular organisation for the determination of important questions²³¹ would suffice.²³² The actual process of liquidating the assets and dealing with the liabilities of dissolved organisations is invariably laid down by the organisation itself, either in the constitutional documents or by special measures adopted on dissolution.

Succession²³³

Succession between international organisations takes place when the functions and (usually) the rights and obligations are transferred from one organisation to another. This may occur by way of straightforward replacement,²³⁴ or by absorption,²³⁵ or by merger, or by effective secession of part of an organisation, or by simple transfer of certain functions from one organisation to another.²³⁶ This is achieved by agreement and is dependent upon the constitutional competence of the successor organisation to perform the functions thus transferred of the former organisation. In certain circumstances, succession may proceed by way of implication in the absence of express provision.²³⁷ The precise consequences of such succession will depend upon the agreement concerned between the parties in question.²³⁸ In general, assets of the predecessor organisation will go to the successor organisation, as well as archives.²³⁹ Whether the same rule applies to debts is unclear.²⁴⁰

Suggestions for Further Reading

J. E. Alvarez, *The Impact of International Organisations on International Law*, The Hague, 2016

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Bowett's Law of International Institutions (ed. P. Sands and P. Klein), 6th ed., London, 2009

R. Higgins, P. Webb, D. Akande, S. Sivakumaran and J. Sloan, *Oppenheim's International Law United Nations*, Oxford, 2017

J. Klabbers, *An Introduction to International Organisations Law*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2015

The Oxford Handbook of International Organisations (ed. J. K. Cogan, I. Hurd and I. Johnstone), Oxford, 2016

D. Sarooshi, *International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers*, Oxford, 2005

H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, 6th revised ed., Leiden, 2018

¹ See C. F. Amerasinghe, *Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2005; J. E. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-Makers*, Oxford, 2005; J. E. Alvarez, *The Impact of International Organisations on International Law*, The Hague, 2016; J. E. Alvarez, 'International Organisations and the Rule of Law', in *A New International Legal Order* (ed. Chia-Jui Cheng), The Hague, 2016, p. 147; *The Oxford Handbook of International Organisations* (ed. J. K. Cogan, I. Hurd and I. Johnstone), Oxford, 2016; *International Organizations Under Pressure* (ed. K. Dingwerth et al.), Oxford, 2019; D. Sarooshi, *International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers*, Oxford, 2005; H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, 6th revised ed., Leiden, 2018; J. Klabbers, *An Introduction to International Organisations Law*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, 2015; *Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations* (ed. J. Klabbers and Å. Wallendahl), Cheltenham, 2011; *Bowett's Law of International Institutions* (ed. P. Sands and P. Klein), 6th ed., London, 2009; E. David, *Droit des Organisations Internationales*, Brussels, 2016; A. Duxberry, *The Participation of States in International Organizations*, Cambridge, 2011; *Routledge Handbook of International Organization* (ed. B. Reinalda), London, 2013; E. Benvenisti, *The Law of Global Governance*, The Hague, 2014; *Evolutions in the Law of*

International Organisations (ed. R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo), The Hague, 2015; N. White, *The Law of International Organizations*, 2nd ed., Manchester, 2005; G. Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, London, 1976, vol. **III**; E. Lauterpacht, 'The Development of the Law of International Organizations by the Decisions of International Tribunals', **152 HR**, p. 377; F. Kirgis, *International Organizations in their Legal Settings*, 2nd ed., St Paul, 1993; A. El Erian, 'The Legal Organization of International Society', in *Manual of Public International Law* (ed. M. Sørensen), London, 1968, p. 55; M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, DC, 1968, vol. XIII; *A Handbook of International Organizations* (ed. R. J. Dupuy), Dordrecht, 1988; I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, *Corporations in and Under International Law*, Cambridge, 1987; *Judicial Decisions on the Law of International Organisations* (ed. C. Ryngaert, I. F. Dekker, R. A. Wessel and J. Wouters), Oxford, 2016; L. Dubin and M.-C. Runavot, *Le Phénomène Institutionnel International dans Tous ses États*, Paris, 2014; F. Morgenstern, *Legal Problems of International Organizations*, Cambridge, 1986; G. F. Sinclair, *To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States*, Oxford, 2017; and P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, *Droit International Public*, 8th ed., Paris, 2009, p. 638. See also G. Schiavone, *International Organizations: A Dictionary and Directory*, London, 1992; and Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations*, 39th ed., Brussels, 5 vols., 2002–03.

² See e.g. L. Gross, 'The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948', **42 AJIL**, 1948, p. 20.

³ See e.g. El Erian, 'Legal Organization', p. 58. See also A. Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace*, London, 2007.

⁴ See e.g. P. Reuter, *Institutions Internationales*, London, 1958, pp. 55–6. See also *Bowett's International Institutions*, chapter 1.

⁵ *Bowett's International Institutions*, p. 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–65.

⁷ See as to the role of the ICRC in international humanitarian law, above, [Chapter 20](#), p. 1066.

⁸ See *Bowett's International Institutions*, pp. 5–8; and Klabbers, *Introduction*, chapter 1.

⁹ See e.g. J. Klabbers, ‘The EJIL Foreword: The Transformation of International Organisations Law’, **26** *EJIL*, 2015, p. 9; J. Klabbers, ‘The Emergence of Functionalism in International Institutional Law: Colonial Inspirations’, **25** *EJIL*, 2014, p. 645; and J. Klabbers, ‘Contending Approaches to International Organizations: Between Functionalism and Constitutionalism’, in Klabbers and Wallendahl, *Research Handbook*, p. 3; M. Herren, ‘International Organisations, 1865–1945’, in *Oxford Handbook*, chapter 4; B. S. Chimni, ‘International Organisations, 1945–Present’, in *ibid.*, chapter 5; and J. Alvarez, ‘International Organizations: Then and Now’, **100** *AJIL*, 2006, p. 324.

¹⁰ See e.g. *Bowett’s International Institutions*, chapter 2; G. Scott, *Rise and Fall of the League of Nations*, London, 1973; El Erian, ‘Legal Organization’, pp. 60 ff.; and F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, Oxford, 2 vols., 1952.

¹¹ See above, Chapter 21.

¹² Article 57 of the Charter. See also articles 62–6 and e.g. J. Harrod, ‘Problems of the United Nations Specialised Agencies at the Quarter Century’, **28** *YBWA*, 1974, p. 187; and E. Klein, ‘United Nations, Specialised Agencies’, in *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (ed. R. Bernhardt), Amsterdam, 2002, vol. **V**, pp. 349–69. See also El Erian, ‘Legal Organization’, pp. 55, 96–106.

¹³ See also the Food and Agriculture Organization, created in 1943 to collect and distribute information related to agricultural and nutritional matters: see e.g. R. W. Phillips, *FAO, Its Origins, Formation and Evolution 1945–1981*, Rome, 1981. See also www.fao.org/. The following specialised agencies should also be noted in passing: the International Civil Aviation Organization; the Universal Postal Union; the International Telecommunication Union; the World Meteorological Organization; the International Maritime Organization; the World Intellectual Property Organization; the International Fund for Agricultural Development; the UN Industrial Development Organization; and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. The International Atomic Energy Agency exists as an autonomous organisation within the UN. See e.g. E. Klein, ‘United Nations, Specialised Agencies’, *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, 2006; C. W. Alexandrowicz, *The Law-Making Functions of the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations*, Sydney, 1973, chapter 9; and R. Higgins, P. Webb, D. Akande, S. Sivakumaran and J. Sloan, *Oppenheim’s International Law United Nations*, Oxford, 2017, chapter 7. See also www.unsystem.org/members/specialized-agencies.

¹⁴ See e.g. *Bowett's International Institutions*, pp. 93 ff. See also W. M. Scammell, 'The International Monetary Fund', in *The Evolution of International Organizations* (ed. E. Luard), London, 1966, chapter 9; A. Shonfield, 'The World Bank', in *ibid.*, chapter 10; and R. Townley, 'The Economic Organs of the United Nations', in *ibid.*, chapter 11. See also www.worldbank.org/.

¹⁵ See e.g. A. F. Lowenfeld, *International Economic Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2008; M. Herdegen, *Principles of International Economic Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016; J. H. Jackson, *Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law*, Cambridge, 2006; J. H. Jackson, *The World Trading System*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA, 1997; T. Flory, 'Les Accords du Tokyo Round du GATT et la Réforme des Procédures de Règlement des Différends dans la Système Commercial Interétatique', *86 RGDI*, 1982, p. 235; A. H. Qureshi and A. Ziegler, *International Economic Law*, 4th ed., London, 2019; and I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, *International Economic Law*, 3rd ed., The Hague, 1999.

¹⁶ The organisation consists of a Ministerial Conference, with representatives of all members meeting at least once every two years; a General Council composed of representatives of all members meeting as appropriate and exercising the functions of the Conference between sessions. The General Council also meets to discharge the responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body: see article IV(3) and (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1994. In addition, Councils for Trade in Goods, Trade in Services and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights operating under the general guidance of the General Council; a Secretariat; and a Director-General were created: see article IV.

¹⁷ D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, *European Union Law*, 4th ed., Cambridge, 2019; P. Craig and G. De Búrca, *EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials*, 7th ed., Oxford, 2020; T. C. Hartley, *The Foundations of European Union Law*, 8th ed., Oxford, 2014; L. Woods, P. Watson and M. Costa, *Steiner and Woods' EU Law*, 13th ed., Oxford, 2017; and Wyatt and Dashwood's *European Union Law* (ed. A. Dashwood et al.), 6th ed., Oxford, 2011.

¹⁸ See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/treaties.html>.

¹⁹ See above, *Chapter 5*, p. 222.

²⁰ See e.g. *The Council of Europe: Its Laws and Policies* (ed. S. Schmahl and M. Breuer), Oxford, 2016; C. Archer, *Organising Europe*, London, 1994, chapter 4; A. H. Robertson,

The Council of Europe, 2nd ed., London, 1961; and T. Ouchterlony, *The Council of Europe in the New Europe*, Edinburgh, 1991. See also www.coe.int/en/web/portal/home.

²¹ See articles 15 and 16 of the CoE Statute. There are a very large number of these, including pre-eminently the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the European Social Charter (1961) and agreements dealing with cultural and educational questions and conventions covering patents, extradition, migration, state immunity, terrorism and others: see further [Chapter 6](#). See also as to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *The CSCE* (ed. A. Bloed), Dordrecht, 1993; J. Maresca, *To Helsinki: The CSCE 1973–75*, Durham, 1987; *Essays on Human Rights in the Helsinki Process* (ed. A. Bloed and P. Van Dijk), Dordrecht, 1985; A. Bloed and P. Van Dijk, *The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process*, Dordrecht, 1991; and D. McGoldrick, ‘The Development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: From Process to Institution’, in *Legal Visions of the New Europe* (ed. B. S. Jackson and D. McGoldrick), London, 1993, p. 135. See also www.osce.org/.

²² See e.g. Archer, *Organising Europe*, chapter 9; Bowett’s *International Institutions*, pp. 194 ff.; K. Myers, *NATO, The Next Thirty Years*, Boulder, 1980; and L. S. Kaplan and R. W. Clawson, *NATO After Thirty Years*, Wilmington, 1981. See also www.nato.int.

²³ 43 *AJIL*, 1949, Supp., p. 159.

²⁴ Article 4. Support to Turkey was requested and provided in early 2003 under article 4: see www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p030216e.htm.

²⁵ Article 5. This was invoked for the first time on 12 September 2001, when the Allies declared that the terrorist attack on the US was deemed to constitute an attack on all members of the alliance: see www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.

²⁶ Note also the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council bringing together NATO, former Warsaw Pact and other OSCE states into a cooperative framework. There are currently fifty such partners. See as to NATO’s involvement in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, above, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1131.

²⁷ See articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Minsk Agreement, 31 *ILM*, 1992, pp. 143 ff.

²⁸ See 4 *Finnish YIL*, 1993, p. 263.

²⁹ See article 1.

³⁰ See articles 21 and 22.

³¹ Article 23. There are a number of other councils linking various ministers (see articles 27, 28, 30 and 31), together with an Economic Court and a Commission on Human Rights (see articles 32 and 33). See also www.cis.minsk.by/.

³² See e.g. *Bowett's International Institutions*, chapter 7; A. V. W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, *The Organization of American States*, Dallas, 1963; M. Ball, *The OAS in Transition*, Durham, 1969; and M. Wood, 'The Organization of American States', 33 *YBWA*, 1979, p. 148. See also www.oas.org/.

³³ The organisation has adopted a Human Rights Convention: see above, Chapter 6, p. 316. There exist also a number of other American organisations of limited competence: see e.g. *Bowett's International Institutions*, chapter 7. These include, e.g., the Inter-American Bank (1959); the Andean Pact (1969); the Caribbean Community and Common Market or CARICOM (1973); the Latin American Integration Association (1980); the Southern Cone Common Market or MERCOSUR (1991); and the Association of Caribbean States (1994).

³⁴ See e.g. *Bowett's International Institutions*, p. 241; and R. W. MacDonald, *The League of Arab States*, Princeton, 1965. See also B. Boutros-Ghali, 'La Ligue des États Arabes', 137 *HR*, 1972, p. 1; and H. A. Hassouna, *The League of Arab States*, Dobbs Ferry, 1975. Note also the existence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, founded in 1960, which obtained the power to fix crude oil prices in 1973: see e.g. I. Seymour, *OPEC, Instrument of Change*, London, 1980; and I. Skeet, *OPEC: Twenty-five Years of Prices and Politics*, Cambridge, 1988. See also www.arableagueonline.org/ and www.lasportal.org/.

³⁵ See e.g. *Bowett's International Institutions*, p. 242; and G. Feuer, 'Le Force Arabe de Sécurité au Liban', 22 *AFDI*, 1976, p. 51. See also above, Chapter 17, p. 898.

³⁶ *Bowett's International Institutions*, p. 243; Z. Cervenka, *The Organization of African Unity and Its Charter*, London, 1969; Z. Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity*, London, 1977; B. Andemicael, *The OAU and the UN*, London, 1976; M. Wolfers, *Politics in the Organization of African Unity*, London, 1976; C. A. A. Packer and D. Rukare, 'The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act', 96 *AJIL*, 2002, p. 365; and K. D. Magliveras

and G. J. Naldi, 'The African Union: A New Dawn for Africa?', 51 *ICLQ*, 2002, p. 415. See also above, Chapter 17, p. 893; and <https://au.int/>.

³⁷ See e.g. B. Kioko, 'The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention', 85 *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2003, p. 807.

³⁸ See e.g. *Bowett's International Institutions*, p. 232. See also S. B. Das, *The ASEAN Economic Community and Beyond: Myths and Realities*, Singapore, 2016; C. B. Roberts, *ASEAN Regionalism*, Abingdon, 2013; T. W. Allen, *The ASEAN Report*, 2 vols., Washington, DC, 1979; and *Understanding ASEAN* (ed. A. Broinowski), London, 1982. See also www.asean.org. The supreme policy-making body of ASEAN is the Summit, comprising the Heads of State or Government, with a Coordinating Council composed of Foreign Ministers (see articles 7 and 8 of the Charter), and a variety of community councils and sectorial ministerial bodies have been established (see articles 9 and 10). There is also a Secretary-General and Secretariat and a Committee of Permanent Representatives (see articles 11 and 12). Decision-making is in principle to be by consultation and consensus (see article 20).

³⁹ See 43 ILM, 2004, p. 18.

⁴⁰ See <https://asean.org/asean-human-rights-declaration>. See also the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, <http://aichr.org/>, and the Working Group on a Human Rights Mechanism, <https://aseanhrmech.org/>.

⁴¹ See e.g. Amerasinghe, *Principles*; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*; *Bowett's International Institutions*, part 3; Klabbers, *Introduction*; A. Reinisch, *International Organizations Before National Courts*, Cambridge, 2000; and Reuter, *Institutions*, pp. 227–64. See also E. Lauterpacht, 'Development' and 'The Legal Effects of Illegal Acts of International Organizations', in *Cambridge Essays in International Law*, Cambridge, 1965, p. 98; K. Skubiszewski, 'Enactment of Law by International Organizations', 4 *BYIL*, 1965–6, p. 198; Whiteman, *Digest*, vol. XIII; R. Higgins, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford, 1963; and generally other sources cited in **note 1** above.

⁴² See above, Chapter 3, p. 96.

⁴³ See e.g. *IMCO*, ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 150; 30 ILR, p. 426; *Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations*, ICJ Reports, 1948, p. 57; 15 AD, p. 333; and *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151; 34 ILR, p. 281. See also Lauterpacht, 'Development', pp. 388–95.

⁴⁴ See e.g. the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations 1975; the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978; and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 1986.

⁴⁵ Report of the International Law Commission, 2011, A/66/10, chapter V.

⁴⁶ *Principles*, pp. 9, 10.

⁴⁷ See above, [Chapter 5](#), pp. 226 and 236.

⁴⁸ See e.g. R. Portmann, *Legal Personality in International Law*, Cambridge, 2010, chapter 5; T. Gazzini, 'Personality of International Organizations', in Klabbers and Wallendahl, *Research Handbook*, chapter 2; D. Sarooshi, 'Legal Capacity and Powers', in *Oxford Handbook*, chapter 46; Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 11; H. Thirlway, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960–1989 (Part Eight)', **67 BYIL**, 1996, p. 1; Klabbers, *Introduction*, chapter 3; *Bowett's International Institutions*, chapter 15; Amerasinghe, *Principles*, chapter 3; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, chapter 11; D. Sarooshi and A. Tzaakopoulos, 'International Organizations before United Kingdom Courts', University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, No. 70/2012, 2012; C. W. Jenks, 'The Legal Personality of International Organizations', **22 BYIL**, 1945, p. 267; M. Rama-Montaldo, 'International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations', **44 BYIL**, 1970, p. 111; M. Sørensen, 'Principes de Droit International Public', **101 HR**, 1960, pp. 1, 127 ff.; H. Barberis, 'Nouvelles Questions Concernant la Personnalité Juridique Internationale', **179 HR**, 1983, p. 145; F. Seyersted, 'Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations', **34 Nordisk Tidskrift for International Ret**, 1964, p. 1; and C. Ijalaye, *The Extension of Corporate Personality in International Law*, Dobbs Ferry, 1978. See also above, [Chapter 5](#), p. 179.

⁴⁹ ICJ Reports, 1992, pp. 240, 258; 97 ILR, pp. 1, 25.

⁵⁰ See e.g. article 47 of the Treaty on European Union 2012 provides that the EU ‘shall have legal personality’, while article 335 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union notes that ‘in each of the member states, the Union shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under their laws’. See also *Flaminio Costa v. ENEL* [1964] ECR 585; 93 ILR, p. 23.

⁵¹ Note also the approach championed by Seyersted that international organisations become *ipso facto* international legal persons where there exists at least one organ with a will distinct from that of the member states: see Seyersted, ‘Objective International Personality’; and Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, chapter 11.

⁵² ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174; 16 AD, p. 318.

⁵³ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 179; 16 AD, p. 322.

⁵⁴ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 185; 16 AD, p. 330.

⁵⁵ See the *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, St Paul, 1987, vol. I, p. 141, noting that: ‘An international organisation with a substantial membership is a person in international law even in relation to states not members of the organisation. However, a state does not have to recognise the legal personality of an organisation of which it is not a member, which has few members, or which is regional in scope in a region to which the state does not belong.’ Cf. Amerasinghe, *Principles*, p. 90. It should be noted that the question of objective personality is not essentially linked to recognition by non-member states as such. What will, however, be important will be patterns of dealing with such organisations by non-member states. Note also the examination by the International Court in the *IFAD* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 2012, pp. 10, 32 ff., of the legal personality of the Global Mechanism and its conclusion that in the light of the lack of express conferral of personality or endowment with the capacity to enter into legal arrangements and the absence of power to enter into contracts, agreements or arrangements, internationally or nationally, the Mechanism did not have separate legal personality. See also Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, *Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute*, Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Judgment of 6 September 2018, paras. 48–9, concluding that the ICC has objective international legal personality, being brought into being by over 120 states, and ‘is a legal-

judicial-institutional entity’, although this did not mean that the Court had automatic or unconditional *erga omnes* jurisdiction.

⁵⁶ See below, p. 1159.

⁵⁷ See e.g. articles IX(2) and VII(2) respectively of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See also article 16 of the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization, article 6(h) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization and article XII of the UNESCO Constitution.

⁵⁸ See also e.g. article 335 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; and Klabbers, *Introduction*, pp. 44 ff.

⁵⁹ See e.g. *Re Poncet* 15 AD, p. 346 (concerning Switzerland and the UN).

⁶⁰ See e.g. *International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc.* 524 NYS 2d 971 (1988); 80 ILR, p. 30. See also *UNRAA v. Daan* 16 AD, p. 337; and *Branno v. Ministry of War* 22 ILR, p. 756.

⁶¹ See e.g. *UN v. B* 19 ILR, p. 490; and *International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc.* 524 NYS 2d 971 (1988). See also Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 69 ff. As to the relationship between international law and domestic law generally, see above, [Chapter 4](#).

⁶² See e.g. J. W. Bridge, ‘The United Nations and English Law’, **18** *ICLQ*, 1969, p. 689; G. Marston, ‘The Origin of the Personality of International Organizations in United Kingdom Law’, **40** *ICLQ*, 1991, p. 403; and F. A. Mann, ‘International Organizations as National Corporations’, **107** *LQR*, 1991, p. 357. See also R. Higgins, Report on the ‘Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-Fulfilment by International Organizations of their Obligations Toward Third States’, *Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International*, 1995 I, p. 249; and Sarooshi and Tzaakopoulos, ‘International Organizations’.

⁶³ As amended: see International Organisations Act 2005.

⁶⁴ *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry* [1989] 3 WLR 969, 982, 1004 ff.; 81 ILR, pp. 670, 678, 703 ff.

⁶⁵ [1989] 3 WLR 1008; 81 ILR, p. 708 (per Lord Oliver). But see Lord Templeman in *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No. 3)* [1991] 2 WLR 729, 738; 85 ILR, pp. 1, 11, who noted that no argument based on incorporation by one or more foreign states had been relevant or canvassed in the *Tin* case.

⁶⁶ [1991] 2 WLR 729; 85 ILR, p. 1.

⁶⁷ [1989] 3 WLR 969; 81 ILR, p. 670.

⁶⁸ [1990] All ER 769, 775 (Donaldson MR); 83 ILR, pp. 259–61, 778 (Nourse LJ); 83 ILR, p. 264.

⁶⁹ [1991] 2 WLR 738–9; 85 ILR, pp. 12–13.

⁷⁰ See [1991] 2 WLR 738; 85 ILR, p. 12, giving the example of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act 1945.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ [1995] 2 WLR 126; 108 ILR, p. 564.

⁷⁴ The International Court in *Reparation for Injuries Suffered*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 174, 178; 16 AD, p. 330, stated: ‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.’

⁷⁵ The Court in *Reparation for Injuries Suffered* took particular care to emphasise that possession of international personality was far from an ascription of statehood or recognition of equal rights and duties: ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 174, 185; 16 AD, p. 330.

⁷⁶ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 179; 16 AD, p. 322. See also the *WHO* case, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 73, 89; 62 ILR, pp. 450, 473; and the *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 78, where the

Court noted that ‘international organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike states, possess a general competence’.

⁷⁷ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 179.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁷⁹ See e.g. Amerasinghe, *Principles*, chapter 2; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, chapter 8; N. Blokker, ‘Constituent Instruments’, in *Oxford Handbook*, chapter 44; and E. P. Hexner, ‘Interpretation by International Organizations of their Basic Instruments’, 53 *AJIL*, 1959, p. 341.

⁸⁰ As to which see above, Chapter 15.

⁸¹ See C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘Interpretation of Texts in Open International Organizations’, 65 *BYIL*, 1994, p. 175; M. N. Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 64–73; S. Rosenne, ‘Is the Constitution of an International Organization an International Treaty?’, 12 *Comunicazioni e Studi*, 1966, p. 21; and G. Distefano, ‘La Pratique Subséquente des Etats Parties à un Traité’, *AFDI*, 1994, p. 41. See also H. Lauterpacht, *The Development of International Law by the International Court*, London, 1958, pp. 267–81; and Lauterpacht, ‘Development’, pp. 414 ff.

⁸² ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 74–5; 110 *ILR*, pp. 1, 14–15.

⁸³ See *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 151, 168. See also Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 25 ff.; and Bowett’s *International Institutions*, p. 451.

⁸⁴ The constitutions of the various international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, invariably provide for binding determination by the supreme plenary organ: see e.g. Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 28 ff.

⁸⁵ See e.g. the two Advisory Opinions provided to date: *Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area*, ITLOS Reports, 2011, p. 10; and *Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission*, ITLOS Reports, 2015. See further Chapter 10, p. 548.

⁸⁶ See generally http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/; and A. Arnulf, *The European Union and Its Court of Justice*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2006.

⁸⁷ See article 96(1) and (2) of the Charter. See further above, [Chapter 18](#), p. 973. Note that there is no provision in the Charter authorising the International Court to review decisions of the UN judicially, but see further above, [Chapter 21](#), p. 1123.

⁸⁸ See e.g. article 37 of the ILO Constitution. Article XIV of the UNESCO Constitution 1945 provides: ‘Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation of this Constitution shall be referred for determination to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitral tribunal, as the General Conference may determine.’ See also Amerasinghe, *Principles*, p. 29.

⁸⁹ See also article VIII, section 30, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946, with regard to disputes between the UN and member states as to the interpretation or application of the Convention. Note in addition article VIII, section 21(b) of the UN–US Headquarters Agreement 1947.

⁹⁰ See e.g. article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944 and the appeals from the decisions of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in *India v. Pakistan*, ICJ Reports, 1972, p. 46; and *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, paras. 23 ff. Such disputes may relate to both jurisdiction and the merits, *India v. Pakistan*, ICJ Reports, 1972, pp. 46, 52 ff.; and *ICAO (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020, para. 30. In the latter case, the Court held that the fact that a disagreement arose in a broader context did not deprive the ICAO Council of its jurisdiction under article 84, nor did the claim that the actions adopted amounted to lawful countermeasures as this was a matter going to the merits, see paras. 48–9.

⁹¹ ICJ Reports, 2020. See also the similar *IATA (Bahrain, Egypt and UAE v. Qatar)*, ICJ Reports, 2020.

⁹² *Ibid.*, paras. 49–50, citing *ICAO (India v. Pakistan)*, ICJ Reports, 1972, pp. 46, 61.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 61. See also the separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Berman.

⁹⁴ Note that by article 34 of the ICJ Statute, only states may be parties to a contentious case before the Court.

⁹⁵ See e.g. the *Tadić* case, 105 ILR, p. 419.

⁹⁶ Note that by virtue of article 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, this Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organisation and to any treaty adopted within an international organisation, without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organisation. See also the Advisory Opinion on the *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 74, noting: ‘From a formal standpoint, the constituent instruments of international organisations are multilateral treaties, to which the well-established rules of treaty interpretation apply.’ See as to the principles of treaty interpretation, above, [Chapter 15](#), p. 813. See also Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, chapter 9.

⁹⁷ See the Advisory Opinion on *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 74, referring to the institutional character of such organisations and emphasising that ‘the very nature of the organisation created, the objectives which have been assigned to it by its founders, the imperatives associated with the effective performance of its functions, as well as its own practice, are all elements which may deserve special attention when the time comes to interpret these constituent treaties’.

⁹⁸ See Amerasinghe, *Principles*, p. 59; and Klabbers, *Introduction*, pp. 82 ff. See also *Reparation for Injuries Suffered*, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 174, 180.

⁹⁹ See article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. See also Lauterpacht, ‘Development’, pp. 420 ff. See also the *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 75; and the *Namibia* Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 22.

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. *Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 4, 9; 17 ILR, pp. 326, 329; *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 17, 22; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 12; and *IMCO*, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 150, 167–8; 30 ILR, pp. 426, 439–41.

¹⁰¹ See e.g. Sarooshi, *International Organizations*; Klabbers, *Introduction*, pp. 50 ff.; V. Engström, 'Reasoning on Powers of International Organizations', in Klabbers and Wallendahl, *Research Handbook*, chapter 3; Lauterpacht, 'Development', pp. 423–74; Amerasinghe, *Principles*, p. 135; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, chapter 3; Rama-Montaldo, 'Legal Personality'; A. I. L. Campbell, 'The Limits of Powers of International Organizations', 32 *ICLQ*, 1983, p. 523; K. Skubiszewski, 'Implied Powers of International Organizations', in *International Law at a Time of Perplexity* (ed. Y. Dinstein), Dordrecht, 1989, p. 855; and Kirgis, *International Organizations*, chapter 3.

¹⁰² See the Advisory Opinion of the International Court on the *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict* brought by the World Health Organization, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 78–9.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* The Court here cited the Permanent Court's Advisory Opinion in the *Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube*, PCIJ, Series B, No. 14, 1927, p. 64, which noted: 'As the European Commission is not a state, but an international institution with a special purpose, it only has the functions bestowed upon it by the Definitive Statute with a view to the fulfilment of that purpose, but it has power to exercise those functions to their full extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose restrictions upon it.'

¹⁰⁴ See Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 194 ff. Note in particular the limits on the scope of implied powers, *ibid.*, pp. 197–9.

¹⁰⁵ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 174, 182; 16 AD, pp. 318, 326.

¹⁰⁶ This passage was cited in *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict*, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 78–9. Cf. also the approach adopted by the International Court in *Reparation for Injuries Suffered* with that adopted by Judge Hackworth in his Dissenting Opinion in that case, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 196–8; 16 AD, pp. 318, 328. See also G. G. Fitzmaurice, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: International Organizations and Tribunals', 29 *BYIL*, 1952, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ ICJ Reports, 1954, pp. 47, 56–7; 21 ILR, pp. 310, 317–18.

¹⁰⁸ ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 151, 168; 34 ILR, pp. 281, 297.

109 See also *Fédéchar*, Case No. 8/55, European Court Reports, 1954–56, p. 299.

110 See also e.g. *International Status of South West Africa*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 128, 136–8; 17 ILR, pp. 47, 53; *Certain Expenses of the UN*, ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 151, 167–8; 34 ILR, pp. 281, 296; and *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 47–9; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 37.

111 ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66, 78–9.

112 *Ibid.*, p. 76.

113 Article 96(2) of the UN Charter provides that UN organs (apart from the Security Council and General Assembly) and specialised agencies which may at any time be so authorised by the General Assembly may request advisory opinions of the International Court on ‘legal questions arising within the scope of their activities’.

114 *Nuclear Tests*, ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 253, 259; 57 ILR, p. 398. See the Appeals Chamber in *Tadić* (Jurisdiction), 105 ILR, pp. 453, 463 ff. See also E. Lauterpacht, ‘“Partial” Judgments and the Inherent Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’, in *Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice* (ed. V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice), Cambridge, 1996, pp. 465, 476 ff.

115 See e.g. Klabbers, *Introduction*, chapter 12; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1171 ff.; J. W. Schneider, *Treaty-Making Power of International Organizations*, Geneva, 1959; and C. Parry, ‘The Treaty-Making Power of the UN’, **26 BYIL**, 1949, p. 147. See also above, [Chapter 15](#), p. 831, with regard to the Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations 1986. See also *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1982, vol. **II**, part 2, pp. 9 ff.

116 See e.g. Hungdah Chiu, *The Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties and the Special Legal Aspects of the Treaties So Concluded*, The Hague, 1966; *Agreements of International Organizations and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (ed. K. Zemanek), Vienna, 1971; G. Nascimento e Silva, ‘The 1986 Vienna Convention and the Treaty-Making Power of International Organizations’, **29 German YIL**, 1986, p. 68; and ‘The 1969 and 1986 Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Comparison’,

in Dinstein, *International Law at a Time of Perplexity*, p. 461. See also *NF v. European Council*, Case No. T-192/16, ECJ, Judgment of 28 February 2017, discussing whether an international agreement was made with the EU or rather as one concluded with member states and thus not subject to review.

117 See e.g. article 43 and articles 75, 77, 79, 83 and 85 of the UN Charter concerning military assistance arrangements with the Security Council and Trusteeship Agreements respectively.

118 *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1982, vol. **II**, part 2, p. 41.

119 See e.g. Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 20–2, 227 ff.; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1036 ff., 1070 ff.; F. A. Mann, ‘International Corporations and National Law’, **42 BYIL**, 1967, p. 145; F. Seyersted, ‘Applicable Law in Relations Between Intergovernmental Organizations and Private Parties’, **122 HR**, 1976 III, p. 427; and C. W. Jenks, *The Proper Law of International Organizations*, London, 1961. See also *Challenging Acts of International Organizations before National Courts* (ed. A. Reinisch), Oxford, 2010.

120 Jenks, *Proper Law*, p. 3, wrote that ‘if a body has the character of an international body corporate the law governing its corporate life must necessarily be international in character’. See also the *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, vol. **I**, pp. 133 ff.

121 See also Colman J in *Westland Helicopters Ltd v. Arab Organization for Industrialization* [1995] 2 WLR 126, 144 ff.; and Millett J in *Re International Tin Council* [1987] Ch 419, 452, upheld by the Court of Appeal, [1989] Ch 309, 330.

122 See e.g. Amerasinghe, *Principles*, chapter 9. See also P. Cahier, ‘Le Droit Interne des Organisations Internationales’, **67 RGDIP**, 1963, p. 563; and G. Balldore-Pallieri, ‘Le Droit Interne des Organisations Internationales’, **127 HR**, 1969 II, p. 1.

123 See e.g. *Responsibility and International Organizations* (ed. M. Ragazzi), Leiden, 2013; Klabbers, *Introduction*, chapter 14; Amerasinghe, *Principles*, chapter 12; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1049 ff.; P. Klein, ‘Responsibility’, in *Oxford Handbook*, chapter 48; Bowett’s *International Institutions*, pp. 516 ff.; M. Hirsch, *The Responsibility of International Organizations Towards Third Parties: Some Basic Principles*, Dordrecht, 1995; P. Klein, *La Responsabilité des Organisations*

Internationales, Brussels, 1998; K. E. Boon, ‘The United Nations as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility’, **16** *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 2016, p. 341; K. Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and the Responsibility of International Organisations’, **25** *EJIL*, 2014, p. 991; C. Eagleton, ‘International Organisation and the Law of Responsibility’, **76** *HR*, 1950 I, p. 319; F. V. Garcia Amador, ‘State Responsibility: Some New Problems’, **94** *HR*, 1958, p. 410; N. Voulgaris, *Allocating International Responsibility Between Member States and International Organisations*, Oxford, 2019; M. P. Moelle, *The International Responsibility of International Organisations: Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations*, Cambridge, 2017; J. Klabbers, ‘Reflections on Role Responsibility: The Responsibility of International Organizations for Failing to Act’, **28** *EJIL*, 2017, p. 1133; and M. Perez Gonzalez, ‘Les Organisations Internationales et le Droit de la Responsabilité’, **92** *RGDIP*, 1988, p. 63. The International Law Commission adopted Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations in 2011, see e.g. Report of the ILC, 2011, A/66/10, chapter 5. Note that not all of the provisions can be seen as customary law; some of them constitute suggestions (i.e. progressive development) and criticisms have been made, e.g., as to the close analogy proposed between state and international organisation responsibility: see e.g. Chatham House discussion, 2011, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/il100211summary.pdf; and J. Alvarez, ‘Misadventures in Subjecthood’, 2010, www.ejiltalk.org/misadventures-in-statehood/. The Draft Articles have been commended to states and international organisations by the General Assembly without prejudice to the question of their possible adoption: see resolution 69/126, 2014. See also General Assembly resolution 72/122 (2017). See above, Chapter 13, with regard to the responsibility of states.

¹²⁴ ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 174, 183; 16 AD, pp. 318, 327.

¹²⁵ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 184; 16 AD, p. 328.

¹²⁶ See e.g. *Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt*, ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 73; 62 ILR, p. 450; and *Case Concerning the Obligation to Arbitrate*, ICJ Reports, 1988, p. 12; 82 ILR, p. 225.

¹²⁷ See *Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt*, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 73, 90; 62 ILR, pp. 450, 474, referring to ‘general rules of international law’.

¹²⁸ See above, Chapter 13 and above, note 123. See also Report of the ILC, 2011, A/66/10, pp. 69 ff.

¹²⁹ See e.g. *Reparation for Injuries Suffered*, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 180; 16 AD, p. 323. Article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations provides that: ‘Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization entails the international responsibility of the international organization’; and that: ‘There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the international organization under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that international organization.’

¹³⁰ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 184; 16 AD, p. 328.

¹³¹ ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 184; 16 AD, p. 329. Note that the Court held that there was no rule of law which assigned priority either to the national state of the victim or the international organisation with regard to the bringing of an international claim: ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 185; 16 AD, p. 330.

¹³² See e.g. *Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt*, ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 73; 62 ILR, p. 450. Note that under articles VI and XIII of the Outer Space Treaty 1967, international organisations may be subject to the obligations of the treaty without being parties to it.

¹³³ See articles 4 and 6–8 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations.

¹³⁴ Article 14 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations. See here *Behrami v. France*, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 May 2007, 133 ILR, p. 1, where the Court dismissed as inadmissible an application against a number of NATO states operating with the framework of KFOR (the international security force in Kosovo authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) on the grounds that the actions complained against were ‘directly attributable to the UN’, whether to KFOR or to UNMIK (the international civil administration in Kosovo): see Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1056–8; and see above, Chapter 6, p. 296.

135 Articles 20 and 21. Other examples of circumstances precluding wrongfulness include countermeasures, *force majeure*, distress and necessity: see articles 23–5. However, nothing may preclude the wrongful act of an international organisation which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*): article 26 and see above, Chapter 3, p. 104.

136 Articles 30 and 31. Full reparation is to take the form of restitution (re-establishment of the situation existing before the wrongful act was committed), compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination: see articles 34–40.

137 See e.g. Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 13; S. Chesterton, I. Johnstone and D. M. Malone, *Law and Practice of the United Nations*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2016, chapters 15 and 16; B. Amrallah, ‘The International Responsibility of the United Nations for Activities Carried Out by UN Peace-Keeping Forces’, **23** *Revue Égyptienne de Droit International*, 1976, p. 57; D. W. Bowett, *UN Forces*, London, 1964, pp. 149 ff.; and F. Seyersted, ‘United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems’, **37** *BYIL*, 1961, p. 351. See also Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1052 ff.; Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 401 ff.; and *M v. Organisation des Nations Unies et l’État Belge* 45 ILR, p. 446.

138 See Amerasinghe, *Principles*, p. 403; and T. Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers’, **51** *Harvard International Law Journal*, 2010, p. 113; and references in the **previous note**. See also with regard to UN immunity, below, p. 1163.

139 As to remedies generally, see K. Wellens, *Remedies Against International Organizations*, Cambridge, 2002.

140 See the UN Report on *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel*, A/59/710, 24 March 2005, para. 78; A/45/594, annex, para. 48; and the Secretary-General’s report on *Special Measures for Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*, A/70/729, 2016. Note Security Council resolution 2272 (2016) endorsing the decision of the Secretary-General to repatriate a particular military unit or formed police unit of a contingent when there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by that unit. See also S/2015/446, A/70/357–S/2015/682, 2015 and S/2015/716. Note the various codes of conduct, directives and guidelines governing UN peacekeepers,

B. Oswald, H. Durham and A. Bates, *Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations*, Oxford, 2010, Part 3. See also above, Chapter 21, p. 1093.

¹⁴¹ See e.g. Amerasinghe, *Principles*, chapter 13; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1053 ff., 1038 ff.; Higgins, 'Legal Consequences'; H. Schermers, 'Liability of International Organizations', **1** *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 1988, p. 14; C. F. Amerasinghe, 'Liability to Third Parties of Member States of International Organizations: Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent', **85** *AJIL*, 1991, p. 259.

¹⁴² See e.g. Higgins, 'Legal Consequences', p. 378; and Amerasinghe, *Principles*, p. 412.

¹⁴³ It is possible for states to create an international organisation under domestic law, e.g., the Bank for International Settlements, but this is very rare: see e.g. M. Giovanoli, 'The Role of the Bank for International Settlements in International Monetary Co-operation and Its Tasks Relating to the European Currency Unit', **23** *International Lawyer*, 1989, p. 841.

¹⁴⁴ See articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969; and articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations 1986. See also C. Chinkin, *Third Parties in International Law*, Oxford, 1993. See also above, Chapter 15, p. 809.

¹⁴⁵ See e.g. The Second Report from the Trade and Industry Committee, 1985–6, HC 305-I, 1986 and *The Times*, 13 March 1986, p. 21 and *ibid.*, 14 March 1986, p. 17. See also G. Wassermann, 'Tin and Other Commodities in Crisis', **20** *Journal of World Trade Law*, 1986, p. 232; Lauterpacht, 'Development', p. 412; I. Cheyne, 'The International Tin Council', **36** *ICLQ*, 1987, p. 931, *ibid.*, 38 *ICLQ*, 1989, p. 417 and *ibid.*, 39 *ICLQ*, 1990, p. 945; and R. Sadurska and C. M. Chinkin, 'The Collapse of the International Tin Council: A Case of State Responsibility?', **30** *Va. JIL*, 1990, p. 845.

¹⁴⁶ See e.g. *Standard Chartered Bank v. ITC* [1986] 3 All ER 257; 77 ILR, p. 8.

¹⁴⁷ See also the attempt to have the ITC wound up under Part XXI of the Companies Act 1985, *Re International Tin Council* [1988] 3 All ER 257, 361; 80 ILR, p. 181, and the attempt to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution over the ITC's assets following an arbitral award against the ITC (converted into a judgment), which it was argued would

enable contributions or an indemnity to be claimed from the members, *Maclaine Watson v. International Tin Council* [1988] 3 WLR 1169; 80 ILR, p. 191.

148 *Maclaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry* [1988] 3 WLR 1033 (Court of Appeal); 80 ILR, p. 49; and [1989] 3 All ER 523 (House of Lords) sub. nom. *J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry* 81 ILR, p. 671.

149 One submission was that the relevant International Tin Council (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1972 did not incorporate the ITC under English law, but conferred upon it the capacities of a body corporate and thus the ITC did not have legal personality. This was rejected by the House of Lords: [1989] 3 All ER 523, 527–8 and 548–9; 81 ILR, pp. 677, 703. Another submission was that the ITC was only authorised to enter into contracts as an agent for the members under the terms of the Sixth International Tin Agreement 1982. This was also dismissed, on the basis that the terms of the Order clearly authorised the ITC to enter into contracts as a principal: [1989] 3 All ER 530 and 556–7; 81 ILR, pp. 681, 715.

150 See e.g. *Westland Helicopters v. Arab Organization for Industrialization* 23 ILM, 1984, 1071; 80 ILR, p. 600. See H. T. Adam, *Les Organismes Internationaux Spécialisés*, Paris, 1965, vol. I, pp. 129–30; and Seidl-Hohenveldern, *Corporations*, pp. 119–20.

151 [1989] 3 All ER 523, 529; 81 ILR, p. 680. This was the view adopted by a majority of the Court of Appeal: see Ralph Gibson LJ [1988] 3 WLR 1033, 1149 and Kerr LJ, *ibid.*, 1088–9 (but cf. Nourse LJ, *ibid.*, 1129–31); 80 ILR, pp. 49, 170; 101–2; 147–9. It is fair to emphasise that the approach of the Court, in effect, was primarily focused upon domestic law and founded upon the perception that without the relevant Order in Council the ITC had no legal existence in UK law. An international organisation had legal personality in the sphere of international law and it did not thereby automatically acquire legal personality within domestic legal systems. For that, at least in the case of the UK, specific legislation was required.

152 See e.g. the 1991 Partial Award on Liability of the ICC Tribunal in *Westland Helicopters Ltd v. Arab Organization for Industrialization*: see Higgins, ‘Legal Consequences’, p. 393. See also I. F. I. Shihata, ‘Role of Law in Economic Development: The Legal Problems of International Public Ventures’, 25 *Revue Egyptienne de Droit International*, 1969, pp. 119, 125; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1054–5; and Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 431 ff.

153 Or indeed a provision demonstrating such an intention.

154 See articles 7 and 8 of the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International, *Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International*, 1995 I, pp. 465, 467.

155 Judgment of 18 February 1999, para. 32; 123 ILR, p. 13. However, see also *Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland*, ECtHR, Judgment of 30 June 2005; and *Behrami v. France*, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 May 2007; 133 ILR, p. 1; and see above, **note 134**.

156 See above, p. 1159.

157 See e.g. A. Momirov, *Accountability of International Organizations in Post-Conflict Governance Missions*, The Hague, 2005; K. Wellens, 'The Primary Model Rules of Accountability of International Organizations: The Principles and Rules Governing Their Conduct or the Yardsticks for Their Accountability', in *Proliferation of International Organizations* (ed. N. M. Blokker and H. G. Schermers), Leiden, 2001, p. 433; D. Curton and A. Nollkaemper, 'Conceptualising Accountability in International and European Law', **36** *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law*, 2005, p. 6; E. de Wet, 'Holding International Institutions Accountable', **9** *German Law Journal*, 2008, p. 1987; and M. Koenig-Archbugi, 'Accountability', in *Oxford Handbook*, chapter 54. See also the Recommended Rules and Practices drafted by the Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations and adopted in 2004 at the Berlin Conference of the International Law Association, reprinted in **1** *International Organizations Law Review*, 2004, p. 225.

158 See ST/SGB/2014/1.

159 See www.un.org/en/internaljustice/undt/ and www.un.org/en/internaljustice/unat/. See also Amerasinghe, *Principles*, chapter 9.

160 See e.g. *The Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and Specialised Agencies: A Commentary* (ed. A. Reinisch and P. Backmayer), Oxford, 2016; *Immunity of International Organisations* (ed. N. Blokker and N. Schrijver), The Hague, 2015; Klabbers, *Introduction*, chapter 8; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 267 ff., 1076 ff.; Higgins, *United Nations*, chapter 16; E. C. Okeke, *Jurisdictional Immunities of States and International Organizations*, Oxford, 2018; Reinisch,

International Organizations, pp. 127 ff.; A. Reinisch, 'Privileges and Immunities', in *Oxford Handbook*, chapter 49; Amerasinghe, *Principles*, chapter 10; *The Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations in Domestic Court* (ed. A. Reinisch), Oxford, 2013; C. Ryngaert, 'The Immunity of International Organizations Before Domestic Courts', 7 *International Organizations Law Review*, 2010, p. 121; A. Reinisch, 'The Immunity of International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of their Administrative Tribunals', 7 *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2008, p. 285; E. Gaillard and I. Pingel-Lenuzza, 'International Organizations and Immunity from Jurisdiction: To Restrict or To Bypass', 51 *ICLQ*, 2002, p. 1; M. Singer, 'Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns', 36 *Va. JIL*, 1995, p. 53; C. W. Jenks, *International Immunities*, London, 1961; J. F. Lalive, 'L'Immunité de Jurisdiction et d'Execution des Organisations Internationales', 84 *HR*, 1953 III, p. 205; C. Dominicé, 'Le Nature et l'Étendue de l'Immunité des Organisations', in *Festschrift Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern* (ed. K. H. Böckstiegel), Cologne, 1988, p. 11; Nguyen Quoc Dinh, 'Les Privilèges et Immunités des Organisations Internationales d'après les Jurisprudences Nationales Depuis 1945', *AFDI*, 1957, p. 55; D. B. Michaels, *International Privileges and Immunities*, The Hague, 1971; Kirgis, *International Organizations*, pp. 26 ff.; *Yearbook of the ILC*, 1967, vol. II, pp. 154 ff.; *DUSPIL*, 1978, pp. 90 ff. and *ibid.*, 1979, pp. 189 ff.; and Morgenstern, *Legal Problems*, pp. 5–10.

¹⁶¹ The reference, e.g., in *Branno v. Ministry of War* 22 ILR, p. 756, to the 'sovereignty of NATO' is misleading.

¹⁶² See above, [Chapter 12](#), p. 611.

¹⁶³ See R. Higgins, *Problems and Process*, Oxford, 1994, p. 93.

¹⁶⁴ Note that the provisions dealing with privileges and immunities of international financial institutions tend to be considerably more detailed: see e.g. article VII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, article IX of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, and articles 46–55 of the Constitution of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Note the privileges and immunities of the ICJ judges when engaged on the Court's business, article 19 of the ICJ Statute, and of agents, counsel and advocates, article 42(3) of the Statute. Judges of the ECtHR benefit from similar privileges and immunities, which extend to spouses of judges under the Sixth Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe 1949 and article 51 of the European

Convention on Human Rights, <https://euobserver.com/justice/114006>. Immunity may be waived by the Plenary Court, see e.g. with regard to the Romanian judge in 2011, <https://euobserver.com/justice/114451>. However, see the Court's refusal to waive the immunity of the spouse of the Ukrainian judge, ECtHR, Press Release, ECHR 208 (2020), 8 July 2020.

165 This also contains separate draft annexes relating to each specialised agency. See also the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American States 1949; the General Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe 1949; and the Protocol Concerning the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities 1965.

166 See also the agreements with Austria, 1979, regarding the UN Vienna Centre; with Japan, 1976, regarding the UN University; and with Kenya, 1975, regarding the UN Environment Programme. Note also the various Status of Forces Agreements concluded by the UN with, e.g., Egypt in 1957, the Congo in 1961 and Cyprus in 1964, dealing with matters such as the legal status, facilities, privileges and immunities of the UN peacekeeping forces.

167 Similar agreements may cover regional offices of international organisations: see e.g. the Agreement between the World Health Organization and Egypt 1951 concerning a regional office of the organisation in that state.

168 ICJ Reports, 1988, p. 12; 82 ILR, p. 225.

169 ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 27–30; 82 ILR, p. 245.

170 ICJ Reports, 1988, pp. 33–4; 82 ILR, p. 251.

171 717 F.2d 610, 615–17 (1983); 99 ILR, pp. 92, 97–9.

172 94 ILR, pp. 321, 329. See also *Eckhardt v. Eurocontrol* (No. 2) 94 ILR, pp. 331, 337–8, where the District Court of Maastricht held that since an international organisation had been created by treaty by states, such organisation was entitled to immunity from jurisdiction on the grounds of customary international law to the extent necessary for the operation of its public service.

¹⁷³ 87 ILR, pp. 1, 6–7. See also *Mininni v. Bari Institute* 87 ILR, p. 28; and *Sindacato UIL v. Bari Institute* 87 ILR, p. 37.

¹⁷⁴ [1994] ICR 897, 903. See also the *European Molecular Biology Laboratory Arbitration* 105 ILR, p. 1.

¹⁷⁵ 116 ILR, pp. 643, 647.

¹⁷⁶ Judgment of 18 February 1999, paras. 63, 67 ff.; 116 ILR, pp. 121, 134; and see *Beer and Regan v. Germany*, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 February 1999, paras. 53 ff. See also *Consortium X v. Swiss Federal Government*, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 1st Civil Law Chamber, 2 July 2004; and *Entico Corp. v. UNESCO* [2008] EWHC 531 (Comm).

¹⁷⁷ See e.g. *Entico Corp. v. UNESCO* [2008] EWHC 531 (Comm).

¹⁷⁸ Judgment of 2 May 2007, see above, [Chapter 6](#), p. 296.

¹⁷⁹ ‘On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and their Personnel in Kosovo’, <https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/regulations/02english/E2000regs/RE200047.htm>.

¹⁸⁰ See Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1036–7; and E. De Brabandere, ‘Immunity of International Organizations in Post-Conflict International Administrations’, 7 *International Organizations Law Review*, 2010, pp. 79, 119.

¹⁸¹ 586 US __ (2019).

¹⁸² 22 USC § 288a(b).

¹⁸³ However, as required by the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, there is no immunity for claims that are *inter alia* ‘based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state’, [28 USC § 1605\(a\)\(2\)](#), and on that basis the District Court for the District of Columbia, to whom the case had been remitted by the Supreme Court, upheld the absolute immunity of the Corporation, *Jam v. International Finance*

Corp., Civil Action No. 15-612 (JDB), District Court for the District of Columbia, Judgment of 14 February 2020.

¹⁸⁴ See also *Beric v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Decision of 16 October 2007; and *Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands*, ECtHR, Decision of 11 June, 2013, paras. 141 ff., affirming the immunity of UN operations under Security Council authority. The Netherlands Supreme Court in *Netherlands v. Nuhanović*, Judgment of 6 September 2013, held that both the UN and the Netherlands had effective control (citing articles 6, 7 and 48 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 2011) over the same alleged wrongdoing by Dutchbat (the Dutch Battalion at Srebrenica), which could thus be attributed to the Netherlands irrespective of any responsibility attributable to the UN. However, in *Netherlands v. Mothers of Srebrenica Foundation*, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:1284, Netherlands Supreme Court, Judgment of 19 July 2019, it was held that Dutchbat, and thus the Netherlands, was only 10 per cent responsible for what had happened in Srebrenica since most of its acts were performed under UN command and control without the responsibility of the state, as the state lacked effective control. Liability was limited to the period when the state did have effective control of Dutchbat's conduct. But see also *Jaloud v. Netherlands*, ECtHR, Judgment of 20 November 2014, paras. 142 ff., where the Court found that the fact that Dutch troops operated in the area in question of Iraq under UK command and within the context of the US and the UK being occupying forces, was not sufficient to preclude the operation of article 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. See further [Chapter 6](#), p. 296 and [Chapter 13](#), p. 685, **note 60**.

¹⁸⁵ See Security Council resolution 1542 (2004); and A. Cravioto *et al.*, *Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti*, 2011, <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/final-report-independent-panel-experts-cholera-outbreak-haiti>. See also R. Freedman, 'UN Immunity or Impunity? A Human Rights Based Challenge', 25 *EJIL*, 2014, p. 239; Daugirdas, 'Reputation'; Boon, 'United Nations as Good Samaritan'; and Transnational Development Clinic, Yale Law School *et al.*, *Peace Without Accountability: The United Nations' Responsibility for the Haitian Cholera Epidemic*, 2013, https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Clinics/Haiti_TDC_Final_Report.pdf.

¹⁸⁶ See SG/SM/14828, 21 February 2013.

¹⁸⁷ See www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/UNSG-Letter-to-Rep.-Maxine-Waters.pdf, cited in Freedman, 'UN Immunity', p. 241.

188 See the Decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in *Brzak v. UN* 597 F.3d at 112 (2010), requiring that plaintiffs' suit against the UN be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In that case it was held that the UN enjoys absolute immunity from suit unless it has expressly waived its immunity. See also *Georges v. UN*, US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judgment of 18 August 2016, 834 F.3d 88 (2016), underlining that the obligation under section 29 to provide for a dispute resolution mechanism was not a condition precedent to UN immunity under article II, section 2 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946; and *LaVenture v. UN* 279 F.Supp. 3d 394 (EDNY 2017), reaffirming the absolute immunity of the UN and holding that references to liability in UN reports detailing procedures for redress for third-party claims did not amount to a waiver of immunity.

189 See resolutions 69/114, 2014, and 70/114, 2015. See also the Secretary-General's report, *Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations*, A/60/980, 2006. Note the establishment of an ad hoc Committee on the Criminal of UN Officials and Experts on Mission in 2007, General Assembly resolution 61/29. This has not met since 2008, but has continued as a working group of the General Assembly's sixth committee; see https://legal.un.org/committees/criminal_accountability/.

190 Article IV, section 14 provides that such privileges and immunities are accorded:

in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the United Nations. Consequently a Member not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representative in any case where in the opinion of the Member the immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded. Article IV, section 16 provides that the term 'representatives' is deemed to include 'all

delegates, deputy delegates, advisers, technical experts and secretaries of delegations'. The question of the representation of states to international organisations is also dealt with in the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character, which is closely modelled on the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, although it has been criticised by a number of host states for permitting more extensive privileges and immunities than is required in the light of functional necessity.

See *DUSPIL*, 1975, pp. 38 ff. See also above, [Chapter 12](#), p. 663.

191 Note that some conventions permit this: see e.g. article VII, section 25 of the Convention on the Immunities of Specialised Agencies. See also Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 338 ff.

192 This application dated 26 April 2006 was precipitated by the case of *A v. B*, No. 4C.140/2003, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 1st Civil Law Chamber, Judgment of 8 April 2004.

193 See ICJ, Order of 9 June 2006. The case was entitled *Case Concerning the Status Vis-à-vis the Host State of a Diplomatic Envoy to the United Nations*.

194 These are defined in article V, section 15(1)–(4).

195 See also *Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, pp. 518 ff.

196 Section 19.

197 Article VI, section 22. Section 23 provides that privileges and immunities are granted in the interests of the UN and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves and the Secretary-General has the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any expert in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and it can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the UN.

198 *Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations*, ICJ Reports, 1989, p. 177; 85 ILR, p. 300. This opinion was requested by the Economic and Social Council, its first request for an Advisory Opinion under article 96(2) of the UN Charter.

199 In the absence of a reservation by the state concerned: ICJ Reports, 1989, pp. 195–6; 85 ILR, pp. 322–3.

200 This applied even though the rapporteur concerned was not, or was no longer, a member of the Sub-Commission, since such a person is entrusted by the Sub-Commission with a research mission: ICJ Reports, 1989, pp. 196–7; 85 ILR, pp. 323–4.

201 *Ibid.*

202 ICJ Reports, 1999, p. 62; 121 ILR, p. 405.

203 ICJ Reports, 1999, pp. 84, 87.

204 *Ibid.*, pp. 87–8. The Court also affirmed that questions of immunity were preliminary issues to be decided expeditiously *in limine litis*: *ibid.*, p. 88. This is the same position as immunity claims before domestic courts: see above, [Chapter 12](#), pp. 604 and 650.

205 In all cases, the relevant agreements need to be examined as particular privileges and immunities may vary.

206 See also article III, section 4 of the Convention on Specialised Agencies 1947. See Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 320 ff.

207 See e.g. Amerasinghe, *Principles*, p. 322. Note, however, that many international financial institutions, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,

known as the World Bank (but not the International Monetary Fund), expressly qualify immunity and permit actions to be brought against them, particularly with regard to applications founded on loan agreements in the case of the World Bank: see article VII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; *Lutcher SA v. Inter-American Development Bank* 382 F.2d 454 (1967); and *Mendaro v. World Bank* 717 F.2d 610 (1983); 92 ILR, p. 92. Note also article 6 of the Headquarters Agreement between the UK and the International Maritime Satellite Organization 1980. See also Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 320 ff.

208 See e.g. *Manderlier v. Organisation des Nations Unies et l'Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires Etrangères)*, Brussels Civil Court, Judgment of 11 May 1966, 45 ILR, p. 446; *Boimah v. UN General Assembly* 664 F Supp 69 (EDNY 1987); *Abdi Hosh Askir v. Boutros Boutros-Ghali* 933 F.Supp 368 (SDNY 1996); and *Georges v. UN*, 13-CV-7146 (JPO), US District Court (SDNY), Judgment of 9 January 2015, affirmed in *Georges v. UN*, US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judgment of 18 August 2016, 834 F.3d 88 (2016). See also Reinisch, *International Organisations*, pp. 157 ff., 189 ff., 332 ff.

209 See e.g. article II, section 2 of the UN Convention 1946. See also Singer, 'Jurisdictional Immunity', pp. 72 ff.

210 See Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 330 ff.

211 See also article II, section 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies 1947. Note that in *Shearson Lehman v. Maclaine Watson (No. 2)* [1988] 1 WLR 16, 23 ff. (per Lord Bridge); 77 ILR, p. 145, the House of Lords held that the inviolability of official documents could be lost as a result of communication to third parties in the light of the particular wording of the relevant Order in Council and where such communication was legitimately made by the organisation to its members. This is to be contrasted with the situation where the privacy of diplomatic communications has been violated. In such cases, privacy is to be maintained and the documents, e.g., should not be used in judicial proceedings.

212 See Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 330 ff.

213 *Ibid.*, p. 335. See also article II, sections 5 and 7 of the UN Convention and article III, sections 7 and 9 of the Specialised Agencies Convention.

214 See article III, sections 9 and 10 of the UN Convention and article IV, sections 11 and 12 of the Specialised Agencies Convention. See also Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 335 ff.

215 Replacing the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act 1950. The International Organisations Act 1981 *inter alia* extended the 1968 Act to commonwealth organisations and to international commodity organisations and permitted the extension of privileges and immunities to states' representatives attending conferences in the UK. See also the International Organisations Act 2005.

216 See also *Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations*, ST/LEG/SER.B/10 and 11.

217 See e.g. the African Development Bank, SI 1983 No. 142; Council of Europe, SI 1960 No. 442; European Patent Organisation, SI 1978 No. 179 and SI 1980 No. 1096; International Maritime and Satellite Organization, SI 1980 No. 187; NATO, SI 1974 No. 1257 and SI 1975 No. 1209; and the UN, SI 1974 No. 1261 and SI 1975 No. 1209. An examination of Orders in Council would demonstrate the following privileges and immunities: immunity from suit and legal process; inviolability of official archives and premises; to and from the UN Secretary-General, the heads of principal organs of the UN and the President of the International Court: see also the International Organisations Act 1968, Schedule I. See also sections 2–7 of the US International Organisations Immunities Act 1945.

218 See e.g. the Executive Order 12359 of 22 April 1980 designating the Multi-National Force and Observers as a public international organisation under s. 1 of the 1945 Act entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions and immunities conferred by that Act. See also Executive Order 12403 of 8 February 1983 with regard to the African Development Bank; Executive Order 12467 of 2 March 1984 with regard to the International Boundary and Water Commission, US and Mexico; Executive Order 12628 of 8 March 1988 with regard to the UN Industrial Development Organization; and Executive Order 12647 of 2 August 1988 with regard to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. See further *Cumulative DUSPIL*, 1981–88, Washington, DC, 1993, vol. I, pp. 330 ff.

219 See e.g. Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 106 ff.

²²⁰ Where the relevant treaty contains no provision for withdrawal, article 56(2) of both the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations 1986 provides for a period of one year's notice.

²²¹ See e.g. *Wightman v. Secretary of State*, Case No. C-621/18, Judgment of 10 December 2018.

²²² See www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50 and www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29-euco-50-statement-uk-notification/.

²²³ See the Withdrawal Agreement, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 384 I/1, 12.11.2019.

²²⁴ See e.g. the withdrawal of the US and the UK from UNESCO in 1984 and 1985 respectively. The UK rejoined in 1997 and the US in 2003; see Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, p. 106. The US withdrew again from UNESCO as from 2018 at the expiration of the notice period, citing the need for the reform of the organisation and anti-Israel bias by it; see **112** *AJIL*, 2018, p. 107. The US withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council in 2018 after criticism of its border policy, *ibid.*, p. 745. As to expulsion from an international organisation, see Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 120 ff.

²²⁵ See UN Office of Legal Affairs, 'Resumed participation of Indonesia in the activities of the United Nations', *UN Juridical Yearbook*, 1966, pp. 222–3; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, p. 114–15; E. Schwelb, 'Withdrawal from the United Nations, the Indonesian Intermezzo', **61** *AJIL*, 1967, p. 661; and Y. Blum, 'Indonesia's Return to the UN', **16** *ICLQ*, 1967, p. 522.

²²⁶ See e.g. Amerasinghe, *Principles*, chapter 15; Klabbers, *Introduction*, chapter 9; and Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1094 ff. See also R. A. Wessel, 'Dissolution and Succession: The Transmigration of the Soul of International Organizations', in Klabbers and Wallendahl, *Research Handbook*, chapter 13; and C. W. Jenks, 'Some Constitutional Problems of International Organizations', **22** *BYIL*, 1945, p. 11.

227 This applies particularly to commodity organisations: see e.g. the International Tin Agreement 1981; the Natural Rubber Agreement 1987; and the International Sugar Agreement 1992.

228 See Amerasinghe, *Principles*, p. 468; and Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, p. 1099.

229 In fact, the decision was taken unanimously by the thirty-five members present, ten members being absent: see e.g. H. McKinnon Wood, 'Dissolution of the League of Nations', *23 BYIL*, 1946, p. 317.

230 See e.g. the dissolutions of the International Meteorological Organization; the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; the International Refugee Organization; the International Commission for Air Navigation; the South East Asian Treaty Organization; and the Latin American Free Trade Association: see Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1100 ff.

231 E.g. the two-thirds majority required under article 18 of the UN Charter for the General Assembly's determination of important questions.

232 Organisations may be dissolved where the same parties to the treaty establishing the organisations enter a new agreement or possibly by disuse or more controversially as a result of changed circumstances (*rebus sic stantibus*): see Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1099 ff.

233 See Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 473 ff.; Klabbers, *Introduction*, pp. 196 ff.; Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1094 ff.; Wessel, 'Dissolution and Succession', in Klabbers and Wallendahl, *Research Handbook*; Hungdah Chiu, 'Succession in International Organizations', *14 ICLQ*, 1965, p. 83; and P. R. Myers, *Succession Between International Organizations*, London, 1993.

234 Such as the replacement of the League of Nations by the UN.

235 E.g. the absorption of the International Bureau of Education by UNESCO.

236 See Amerasinghe, *Principles*, pp. 474 ff.

²³⁷ The International Court in *Status of South West Africa*, ICJ Reports, 1950, pp. 128, 134–7; 17 ILR, pp. 47, 51–5, held that the supervisory responsibilities of South Africa under the mandate to administer the territory of South West Africa/Namibia continued beyond the dissolution of the League of Nations and were in essence succeeded to by the UN. This was in the context of the fact that the mandate itself constituted an international status for the territory which therefore continued irrespective of the existence of the League and partly because the resolution of the Assembly of the League dissolving the League of Nations had declared that the supervisory functions of the League were ending, not the mandates themselves. It was emphasised that the obligation to submit to supervision did not disappear merely because the supervisory organ had ceased to exist as the UN performed similar, though not identical, supervisory functions. The Court concluded that the UN General Assembly was legally qualified to exercise these supervisory functions, in the light *inter alia* of articles 10 and 80 of the UN Charter. This was reaffirmed by the Court in *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia*, ICJ Reports, 1971, pp. 16, 37; 49 ILR, pp. 2, 26–34.

²³⁸ See Schermers and Blokker, *International Institutional Law*, pp. 1096 ff. with regard to the relationship between the WTO and the GATT arrangements.

²³⁹ See e.g. *PAU v. American Security and Trust Co.*, US District Court for the District of Columbia, 18 ILR, p. 441.

²⁴⁰ See e.g. Klabbers, *Introduction*, pp. 302–3.

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